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## A New Military Dimension of a Cooperative and Preventive Approach to Security in Southeast Europe

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### *Summary*

The author presents a case for expanding the military dimension of a cooperative and preventive approach to security challenges in Southeast Europe – a troubled region attracting significant international attention at the turn of the millennium. The military, a fundamental building block and one of the most recognizable characteristics of a modern state, is adapting to the changes in the international security environment and reexamining its functional responsibilities. Cooperative security and preventive defense concepts promote military cooperation and look to prevent dangerous situations from arising and ultimately prevent wars of aggression and violent conflict. Leading countries, international institutions and various initiatives look to foster stability and security in Southeast Europe. The Military dimension of these efforts has significant potentials for promoting and contributing to peace and preventing conflicts. International military cooperation can be systematically categorized and analyzed by examining the form, nature and aspects of the cooperative activities. Forms of military cooperation include military-to-military contacts, exchange of information, education and training opportunities, joint exercises and training, seminars, peace support operations and multinational forces. Euro-Atlantic integration is perhaps the ultimate means of cooperation and conflict prevention. Croatia has a robust bilateral military cooperation program and is expected to raise its multilateral efforts to a new level.

### *Introduction: Southeast Europe*

Southeast Europe has been and will probably continue to be a major agenda item on the Euro-Atlantic community's list of priorities for much of the first decade of the Twenty-first Century. The North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the European Union (EU) have both indicated their support for efforts aimed at stabilizing the region and bringing it into the European community of nations sharing democratic ideals and values.<sup>1</sup> The region has also become an increasingly important foreign policy issue in the

\* Opinions implied or expressed in this paper are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of the Government or the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia.

<sup>1</sup> See the *Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 15 December 1999*, and the statement released by European leaders at the Euro-

United States, primarily because of the Clinton administration's commitment to US "engagement" of the area. While Russia is currently acting as a partner in the political arena and its troops are involved in both the Bosnia and Kosovo peace support operations, Russian influence in the region has been decreasing since the end of the cold war. Nevertheless, Russia despite its internal problems seems to be determined to remain involved in the region.

There is a growing awareness in policy-making circles of the importance of Southeast Europe. Many national and international initiatives – such as the newly established Stability Pact for Southeast Europe – are testimony to the international community's commitment in bringing peace and stability to the region. The military dimension of these efforts, where the common denominator is based on "cooperative" and "preventive" concepts, has many recognizable characteristics. Yet before this is examined, a brief review of the region is in order.

Southeast Europe, in a geographical sense, is a rather new, politically-motivated label describing a peninsula-like region that in the Nineteenth Century and for many years since had come to be known as the Balkans. The term "Balkan" is derived from the Turkish word for "mountain". The geographic features of the region include mostly mountainous terrain, some agricultural plains and rich forested areas. Bound by the Adriatic Sea in the west and the Black Sea in the east, the region's southern borders are circumscribed by the Mediterranean Sea. Its northern limits include the rivers Sava and Danube.

While the term "Balkan", originating from the geographic Balkan Peninsula with its negative connotations, is politically unacceptable, the term "Southeast Europe" indicating the same region is geographically incorrect.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the term "Southeast Europe" was introduced with the best intentions in order to avoid the "Balkan" alternative with its negative legacy. It was in fact a political compromise at the international level, since the term "Southeast Europe" is often preferred over the term "Balkan".<sup>3</sup> Experts on the region argue that usage of the "Balkan" label provokes images of nations exercising narrow nationalistic interests usually at the expense of one's neighbors and employing history "to justify the need to rectify past political or social injustice".<sup>4</sup> They insist that the label "Southeast Europe" is fundamentally different from the "Balkan"

pean Union's summit in Helsinki, on 11 and 12 December 1999, respectively. Both statements indicate the significance of Southeast Europe and pledge to work towards the stabilization and integration of the region.

<sup>2</sup> Klemencic, M., "South-East Europe – The Definition of the Term and the Development of the Political Map", in Ravlic, A. (Editor), *Southeastern Europe 1918-1995 – An International Symposium, Dubrovnik, May 23-25, 1996*, Croatian Heritage Foundation and Croatian Information Center, Zagreb, 1996, p. 221.

<sup>3</sup> See Vukadinovic, R. "U.S. Policy in Southeast Europe", *Croatian Political Science Review*, Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb University, Vol. 35, No. 5, 1998, pp. 89-90, for an explanation of the "Southeast Europe" label and an account of the countries that belong to the region. Also see Vukadinovic, R., *Security in Southeast Europe*, Croatian International Studies Association and Interland, Varazdin, 1999, pp. 1-16.

<sup>4</sup> Simon, J., "Sources of Balkan Insecurity: The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy", *Strategic Forum*, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, Number 150, 1998.

label, indicating its European dimension and its recognizable characteristics of stressing cooperative activities and institutions.

The history of this peninsula has been dominated and greatly affected by the interference of outside powers and internal political conflict. Furthermore, the region's geographic proximity to great centers of civilization and the configuration of the land, allowing for easy access to outside invaders and at the same time encouraging division and diversity in the area, represent the dominant characteristics of the region's history.<sup>5</sup> The region's southern part was the center of ancient Greek civilization, while much of the area was also part of the Roman and Byzantine empires. In more recent history, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires also controlled parts of the region.

The bipolar, cold war security environment – where two opposing political sides consistently challenged each other – influenced developments in all of the major regions of the world. Southeast Europe was no exception. In Southeast Europe, however, in addition to the troubles of Tito's socialist, non-aligned Yugoslavia, which had successfully broken ties with the Soviet bloc, both the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance faced their share of internal dissension among the ranks. While NATO's solidarity inevitably suffered due to the Greek-Turkish squabble, Albania's break with Moscow in 1961 and Romania's pursuance of an independent foreign policy in 1963, left the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact with only one continuously loyal ally in Southeast Europe, Bulgaria.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war, the region provided the US, Russia and Western Europe with some of the most challenging threats to international security and stability at the turn of the millennium. The former Yugoslavia fell apart, unleashing a wave of violence unseen in Europe since the Second World War. In fact, while there are NATO and Russian troops present in two separate major international peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo (Yugoslavia), respectfully, the long term political resolution of both crisis is uncertain. Furthermore, all the former communist countries faced political, economic and social difficulties in their democratic transitions, and tensions still remained between Greece and Turkey. The region continues to have more than its share of problems.

Today, national governments, multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and others are fully engaged in the region. From an analytical point of view, there are several reasons why the international community should be amply involved in this region for several years to come. First, the region is clearly an integral part of Europe and is strategically situated adjacent to other major geographical areas of concern (i.e., Caspian Sea region). Second, the potential for a wider conflict erupting and posing greater dangers to regional security at large is both very real and serious. Third, the West has already made significant commitments in the region in terms of political engagement, financial assistance and deployment of large military forces (i.e., Bosnia and Kosovo).

<sup>5</sup> Jelavich, C. and Jelavich, B., *The Balkans*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965.

### *International Security and the Military*

The modern state, which has been the principle actor in the international environment and probably the most important institution of its time, emerged in Western Europe in the Seventeenth Century. The state may be considered as an abstract entity or system, widely varying in definition. Yet for the sake of convenience, it is simply defined as an institution or organization devoted for the most part to assuring the physical security of its structural components.<sup>6</sup> The international environment, from a systems based perspective, is composed of many structural elements, such as societies, states, institutions, organizations and other basic constituents. These structures in turn consist of many sub-systems also composed of fundamental structures. The military establishment, responsible for performing a very specific function for the state, is just such a structure.

The military is one of the most fundamental building blocks of a state and is often directly associated with its sovereignty and with safeguarding its national security. The military, however, has been around much longer than the modern state and may even outlive the territorial-minded state, as we know it.<sup>7</sup> For the time being, the military establishment serves the interests of the state, and its legitimacy comes solely from the fact that it belongs to the state.<sup>8</sup> And while its role in the past was more elementary and direct, today's military establishments have taken on a wider spectrum of roles and tasks.

In today's interdependent international setting, international security is more than a summation of the security of individual states. International security represents a set of widely accepted measures and arrangements designed to ensure the security of states at the international level. Its analysis takes into account the numerous factors that stem from the structures, order and the relationships in the international environment. It is also an interdisciplinary field of study that carefully examines similarities, differences and changes.

International security is particularly concerned with the relationships between states, institutions and other structures. It is also concerned with internal structural relationships and with relationships between elements from different structures. A complete examination of these relationships is multidimensional, complex and lengthy. However, a study of the relationships between similar sub-structures such as military establishments is worthwhile for the purposes of this investigation.

Almost every state has a military establishment or a functionally similar structure. International institutions and organizations – such as the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Alliance and

<sup>6</sup> Note that states have many other functions. The state is very much like the corporation, of which it is a subspecies, but it is also much more. See Creveld, M. Van, *The Rise and Decline of the State*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

<sup>7</sup> Creveld, M. Van, p. vii. Van Creveld joins the great debate as to the modern state's future, describing its history, functions, internal and external relationships and its potential decline.

<sup>8</sup> Dyer, G., *War*, Crown Publishers, Inc., New York, 1985, p. 156.

the Western European Union (WEU) – do not have autonomous armies and depend on military forces of their member states. Armies employed by states or through international organizations are instruments of power and their naked use has represented, by far, the most convincing form of force. The military instrument has been used in various ways throughout history. For the most part, warfare was the business of the military profession.

The military establishment has traditionally been an armed, separate and highly specialized institution in society and has clearly emerged into a single, universal profession whose characteristics, in any given society or setting, regardless of the prevailing political ideology or its geographic location, are shaped by the demands of battle. Professional soldiers from different countries probably have more in common with each other than with any other professional in their respective societies. The military is easily the most recognizable profession in any country and in any part of the world.

The military is not necessarily the most significant factor that created the international environment where wars happen, but it certainly should be held accountable in its professional performance of service. The job of the military profession is also to identify the dangers and threats to the state's security. This role enabled military establishments to develop perceptions of insecurity in their own countries and corresponding feelings of insecurity in other countries.<sup>9</sup> This was achieved through mobilization, weapons acquisitions and other initiatives that seemed to contribute to increasing the strength and capabilities of military forces. In addition, non-transparency and closed military policies also contributed to increasing mistrust and suspicion among countries.

The changes after the cold war have created a new, dynamic international environment with many opportunities and extensive challenges. Military power, war and the use of armed force are becoming less effective as a means of executing national policy and assuring the security of the state, as described by the Clausewitz assertion linking war and policy.<sup>10</sup> This, however, does not imply that the role of the military in international security is shrinking. Military establishments are gradually adapting to the new environment and are being politically credited with building relationships, as is the case between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact nations. As its horizon broadened with the inheritance of new roles and missions, the military establishment has become an increasingly important factor in international relations.

These changes now provide an opportunity for more open and cooperative relationships. Some even argue that military rivalry, which has been a constant feature of international politics and a profound source of instability, is now a thing of the past, or at

<sup>9</sup> Dyer, G., p. 151.

<sup>10</sup> Grizold, A., *International Security: Theoretical and Institutional Framework*, Political Science Faculty, University of Zagreb, 1998. For an earlier account, also see Dyer, G., *War*, Crown Publishers, Inc., New York, 1985, p. 161: "Military power is becoming less effective in achieving decisive, politically satisfactory results at every level of conflict. But as early as 1980, the UN's Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues concluded that military strength alone could not ensure security in a changing international environment.

least, subordinated to economic competition<sup>11</sup>. While this may be overly optimistic, it cannot be disregarded that these changes have invoked the need for a redefinition of the military and its role in a new international environment.

Another significant development is that the growing role of the military in peace support operations around the world has contributed to the emergence of a “cult” of professional peacekeeping soldiers. Many countries that supply troops to international peace operations are developing a new kind of organizational culture in their military establishments. In most cases, peacekeeping is a very specialized function, demanding unorthodox military education and training. The military may soon face internal and conceptual conflicts between the “warrior soldier” and the “peacekeeper soldier”.

The renowned futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler describe the need for action by politicians and military leaders “to create conditions that deter or limit the extent of war”<sup>12</sup>. They call these actions “anti-wars” and indicate the urgency to develop strategic applications that involve political, economic, military and information power aimed at preventing wars and reducing the violence often associated with global, regional or national changes. In essence, these applications or mechanisms represent cooperative and preventive measures.

The abrupt emergence of crisis and armed conflicts, which undermine international security around the world, led to an increase in the international community's multinational efforts to settle disputes. While most of these challenges called for joint action and an integrated approach, it was evident that a strong, convincing military tool was absolutely necessary. Given limited resources and constrained military capabilities, and not to mention a national shortage of individual political resolve, a multinational approach was absolutely essential. Thus, cooperation between militaries is a natural and fundamental first step in meeting these new challenges. Bilateral and multilateral relationships, the establishment of new, regional security arrangements, such as NATO's Partnership for Peace program (PFP), and other means contribute to the development of cooperative initiatives among military establishments. In addition to maintaining their primary task of national self-defense, militaries around the world are adapting their roles, functions and purpose to meet the demands of the new international security environment.

<sup>11</sup> Mearsheimer, J.J., “Disorder Restored”, *Strategy and Force Planning*, Naval War College, Newport, 1995, p. 54.

<sup>12</sup> Toffler, Alvin and Heidi, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, Little, Brown and Company, New York, 1993.

### *Cooperative Security and Preventive Defense*

More than anything else, the international security environment at the end of the Twentieth Century could be characterized as a transition from “cold war confrontation to cooperation”<sup>13</sup>. The emergence of political pluralism, democracy and market economy under a cooperative spirit replaced the ideological constraints imposed by the Warsaw Treaty Organization – dissolved in July 1991. The US and Russia led the way as former cold war enemies now began to explore the possibilities in this new spirit of cooperation – one of the most recognizable characteristics of international security at the turn of the century.

A “cooperative” and “preventive” orientation suddenly became a central topic of discussion among policy-makers and experts. And as conflicts continued to erupt, the concepts of “cooperative security”, “preventive diplomacy”, “crisis prevention”, “preventive deployment”, “defensive security”, “defense by other means” and “peacekeeping” gained new meaning and attention. All too often, these terms were loosely used and frequently waved like a banner in the foreign and security policy arenas by politicians and bureaucrats alike. Furthermore, the intellectual thinking habitually was far removed from the reality on the ground and from the limits and constraints of military capabilities. Little was done to develop systematic and effective strategies of a long-term nature. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the continuous ambiguity displayed by Western policies and actions following the Serb-backed armed aggression on Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia from 1991 to 1995, and the Serbian oppression of its Albanian minority in Kosovo.

In 1992, the United Nations circulated the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* and urged more deliberate and earlier international involvement at different stages of conflicts and called for early warning systems, fact finding missions, peacekeeping, preventive deployment of forces and other measures.<sup>14</sup> A potentially effective mechanism to come out of the UN report is the establishment of the UN Stand-by Arrangement, which enables the UN to register forces committed by individual countries and multinational groups to be used in international peacekeeping operations. By the end of 1999, 32 countries have formally pledged forces by signing an agreement with the UN. The UN now possesses critical information on military forces and capabilities that includes some 147,500 available troops for UN peace support operations. It enables the UN to plan better for future missions and meet the growing costs of new operations, and mainly, it leads to a quicker response time by the UN to emerging crisis.

A cooperative security concept is based on the establishment of an arrangement between a given set of states whereby the central purpose of the group is to prevent war<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations, “Study on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies”, Report of the Secretary General, Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1993, pp. 3-4.

<sup>14</sup> Boutros-Ghali, B., *Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, United Nations, New York, 1992.

<sup>15</sup> Carter, A. B., Perry, W. J. and Steinbruner, J. D., *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*, Brookings Institute, Washington, DC, 1992.

Primarily, this is done by continuous, carefully designed preventive measures. The objective is to prevent the assembly of any significant means that would enable the employment of aggressive measures. At the heart of the concept is the shift of national strategies from preparing to counter threats to preventing such threats from arising. This cooperative approach by states and international institutions may represent the most fundamental building block for the development of new relationships and security structures.<sup>16</sup>

Many ingredients of cooperative security are already present in the world and evident in the web of multinational institutions, associations, agreements, treaties and other arrangements (both multilateral and bilateral) promoting cooperation. Cooperative security efforts seek to “thicken and unify this web.” The principles of openness and transparency are absolutely essential in that regard and need to be promoted within the framework of international institutions and organizations.<sup>17</sup> A good indicator of the validity and sustainability of this concept is the effect it has on the relationships between military establishments from different countries. Already, militaries around the world are engaged in a diverse spectrum of cooperative activities at the global, regional and sub-regional level.

However, there are also several issues that challenge this well-intentioned concept. Cooperative security depends on political legitimacy, international law and a relatively reliable form of international order. This must be earnestly and broadly accepted. Thus, military forces should only be used in defense of national territory or within the context of a legitimate, multinational effort aimed at achieving peace (usually under the auspices of the UN or a regional organization such as the OSCE). The NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia, from March to June 1999, while broadly accepted and supported, raised some serious questions as to the campaign's legitimacy and consistency with international law.

The concept of preventive defense, which in an evolutionary manner derives from cooperative security, “seeks to forestall dangerous developments before they require drastic remedies”.<sup>18</sup> Preventive defense draws on all the instruments of foreign policy – political, economic and military – in a common cause aimed at curbing events that can potentially become greater dangers. Preventive defense efforts may consist of strategies, policies or programs of a long-term nature or may consist of spontaneous actions or hasty responses to a developing situation.

The West's current economic engagement and security cooperation with Russia is certainly a long-term example of preventive defense. Russia still possesses an awesome

<sup>16</sup> Grizold, A. “The Concept of National Security in the Contemporary World,” *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. XI, No. 3, September 1994.

<sup>17</sup> The concepts of transparency and openness may well be the most important principles of a cooperative security system, acting as a critical conduit for promoting trust and confidence. For a good account of these factors, see Radicevic, T. “Defense Transparency and Openness as Factors of Peace, Stability and Security,” *Defendology*, Defimi d.o.o., Rakitje, Croatia, No. 2-3, Vol. II, September 1999, pp. 6-14.

<sup>18</sup> Carter, A. B. and Perry, W. J., *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 1999.



arsenal of weapons and firepower. Experts believe that the West's efforts are perceptive to the potential dangers of a reversal of Russian reforms and that the investment is well worth it.

An example of how the concept is applied in a short-term situation is the early deployment of some 300 US troops to Macedonia in the summer of 1993 as part of a 750 strong peacekeeping contingent (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force – UN-PRDEP, March 1995 to February 1999). This timely and critical move is a prime example of a successful preventive measure and proved very effective in curbing the crisis in the former Yugoslavia from spreading to Macedonia, a potential regional “powder keg”.

Carter and Perry feel that military cooperation, more precisely “military-to-military links are one of the keys to preventing new divisions and new wars in Europe.”<sup>19</sup> They believe that militaries, especially former enemies, could forge new links and that they could plan, train and exercise together to solve common problems. If so, it would more likely lead to trust and contribute less to the intrigue which has been the bane of South-east Europe.<sup>20</sup> Translated into a regional strategy, the objective of countries would be to promote common activities where “national interests converge, building a foundation of cooperation that would survive the inevitable differences.”<sup>21</sup>

An alternative to a unilateralist approach to security and defense, even for the major powers of the world, is military cooperation.<sup>22</sup> The maintenance of the North Atlantic Alliance, even though the mission for which it was created has vanished, is affirmation of the fact that it is more than just an organization based on collective defense. NATO's establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), now the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and PFP indicate its alignment towards genuine cooperation. NATO has conscientiously become a “zone of stability” where a linkage between democracy, economic prosperity and peace has evolved. NATO's involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo indicates its commitment to preventive measures and its intention of enlarging this “zone” beyond the borders of its member states.

There is a unique opportunity in Southeast Europe today for establishing the foundations of a cooperative and preventive approach to security and defense. While some of the ingredients are present, others will need to be developed. Since, cooperative and multilateral approaches involve more than the development of rigid security organizations. The role of an evolving NATO, as will be described later, is central to this premise. Other European institutions will need to play a complimentary role and assist in the political and economic efforts needed to stabilize the region. A review of particular as-

<sup>19</sup> Carter, A. B. and Perry, W. J., p. 23.

<sup>20</sup> Carter and Perry felt that, from an American perspective, it was very important to establish military cooperation with the Russian military simply because it was an institution that would endure, whatever might happen with the current political leadership or their successors.

<sup>21</sup> Carter, A. B. and Perry, W. J., p. 24.

<sup>22</sup> Hughes, B. B., *International Futures: Choices in the Creation of a New World Order*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1996, p. 159.

pects of international military cooperation would be instrumental in distinguishing between the various initiatives, efforts and activities in the region.

### *Classification of Cooperative Military Activities*

International military cooperation is not a new phenomenon. Militaries formed alliances and worked together throughout history<sup>23</sup>. The 1990s, however, marked a significant increase of military cooperative activities in Europe. These ranged from peacetime engagement activities to peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, given the military's national rank, magnitude and confines, the analysis of international military cooperation begins with a comprehensive understanding of international relations and politics.<sup>24</sup>

A state engages in international military cooperation because it intends to strengthen its national security and well being. An institution or association of states, such as the North Atlantic Alliance for example, will partake in international military cooperation because it is believed to be in the individual and collective interest of the member states. Today, security is considered to be indivisible and interdependence is affecting the national security of states. The importance of transnational interests is on the rise and is taking precedence over national interests. Consequently, strong political bonds between nations are reflected in deeper and more meaningful cooperative efforts between their military establishments.

The United States, United Kingdom, Germany and other West European countries have established some form of military cooperation with many of the former communist countries of Southeast Europe. The US in particular has been extensively involved in peacetime engagement programs with most of the new democracies in the region, providing them with substantial military assistance.<sup>25</sup> US State Secretary Madeleine Albright explains that US "bilateral and multilateral assistance programs benefit American security by promoting stability around the globe, and they contribute to our (US) prosperity by expanding overseas markets for American goods and services."<sup>26</sup>

In 1998, the *Strategic Defense Review* issued by the British Ministry of Defense described the concept of "defense diplomacy", consisting of arms control, military assistance and other defense efforts designed to utilize existing military skills and personnel

<sup>23</sup> This could be traced back 2500 years ago to the writings of Sun Tzu. In terms of strategic consideration, Sun Tzu placed great importance on diplomacy, making alliances and securing agreements.

<sup>24</sup> For a good overview of comparative approaches and some of the key issues debated by international experts today, see Viotti, P.R. and Kauppi, M.V., "Excerpts from International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism," Macmillan College Publishing Company, 1993.

<sup>25</sup> The US European Command invests significant efforts and resources on cooperative activities in Europe (i.e., see "Strategy of Readiness and Engagement", US EUCOM, April 1998). Most of this assistance is in terms of education, training and military advice through an assortment of outreach programs such as the International Military Education and Training program (IMET) and the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP).

<sup>26</sup> Albright, M., "Statement by the Secretary of State", *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations*, Fiscal Year 1999, p. vi.

in time of peace. This dimension of British defense policy reflects the belief that by implementing exchange programs and cooperating with other non-alliance militaries in peacetime, it lessens the potential possibility of using the military instrument in war. This is emphasized in the British authorization of sending a team of civilian and military MOD experts to conduct studies and give recommendations on the situation of civil-military relations in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

The degree and extent of military cooperation between nations is a byproduct of national strategies and policies, but it's also a result of many other international factors. From the traditional realist's political perspective of a modern state, foreign policy is the supreme authority guiding and constraining military cooperation with other countries. However, with economic interdependence and integration processes on the rise, the emergence of new initiatives and trends, and the growing importance of various multi-lateral, trans-border associations, the equation begins to take on a new dimension and multitude of new variables.<sup>27</sup> Globalization, new technological breakthroughs and the information age all provide momentum and new avenues for establishing relationships among militaries.

There are many forms of international military cooperation in the world today and it's quite possible to systematically categorize the various activities and interactions taking place. In practical terms, the classification of cooperation between military establishments of countries in Southeast Europe, or to a great extent in any particular region, may be arranged according to the nature and extent of the cooperative dynamics involved. The most basic distinction of international military cooperation can be made along the lines of bilateral and multilateral arrangements. While bilateral cooperation involves two countries, multilateral cooperation involves three or more countries. Although it would depend on the dimension, range and nature of relations, it's safe to assume that multilateral activities tend to be more complex simply because there are more parties and multiplying factors involved.

Another basic division of military cooperation is between non-binding activities and those activities based on an agreement consisting of formal or legal provisions. Non-binding international military cooperation represents those activities that are not constrained by or based on a legal or institutional framework. Cooperation of this kind may be represented by military-to-military contacts, meetings and discussions where none of the parties involved are bound by a formal agreement, obligation or any other kind of constraint. The second type of cooperation is based on a mutually ratified or formal agreement usually characterized by distinct constraints and a systematic, institutionalized process. The agreement could be politically binding or may consist of strict counter measures in case of default.

It is within this second category that international military cooperation obtains structure, form and meaning. Examples of this form of cooperation are military activities de-

<sup>27</sup> For example, the decision by institutions such as NATO and the WEU to undertake crisis management missions and peacekeeping operations (in addition to the involvement of the UN and the OSCE) has directly led to an assortment of practical military cooperation initiatives (i.e., the establishment of multinational forces in peacetime).

scendant of formal agreements, alliances, associations or partnerships or which derive from institutional obligations.<sup>28</sup> This category can be further classified into three subdivisions of international military cooperation:

- institutional, alliance-based cooperation with direct defense guarantees such as the collective defense concepts of NATO and the WEU (i.e., the former Warsaw Pact would fall within this category);
- organizational, non-alliance based cooperation with direct responsibilities and consequences for the parties involved (i.e., UN, OSCE, EU, EAPC, Partnership for Peace);
- non-organizational arrangements in the form of treaties, protocols, memorandums and various agreements between two or more parties (i.e., Dayton/Paris Peace Accords, CFE, Open Skies).

Constrained international military cooperation is usually bound by formal arrangements such as treaties, status of forces agreements (SOFA), agreements on standard operating procedures, memorandums of understanding and technical agreements. The presence of military forces on foreign soil requires several important issues to be agreed upon and leads to the development of legal parameters by-way of a SOFA agreement. The obligations and military cooperation, which result from the *Vienna Document*, are managed within the OSCE framework.

New multilateral organizations have evolved to implement international agreements. While most bilateral agreements on military cooperation fall within the third subdivision above, multilateral cooperation can fall within any of the categories. Cooperation within a global, regional or sub-regional organization provides its members with ample mechanisms for the management of commitments and other arrangements stemming from individual treaties. Such is the case with the structures and assets available within the OSCE. The OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation oversees and administers the activities stemming from various arms control treaties and other confidence and security building measures. The PFP framework enables its members to establish a foundation for building regional multinational forces, which can be used in international peace-keeping operations.

Military cooperation is perhaps best analyzed when categorized into distinct, recognizable activities. This explicit breakdown results in the following classification:

- meetings of defense and military officials (senior, mid or lower level contacts);
- exchange of military attaches;
- confidence and security building measures (CSBM);
- arms control and disarmament;
- exchange of military information (may include information on forces, equipment, financing, plans, strategies and experiences);

<sup>28</sup> OSCE member states are bound to comply with obligations stemming from FSC decisions, the *Vienna Document* and other CSBMs. Last year, the FSC introduced a warning mechanism for countries that do not comply. Although, this mechanism does not carry any official penalties, it may result in negative political consequences for the party that does not adhere to its commitments.

- cooperation in military functional areas (i.e., logistics, intelligence, command and control, communications, operations, force planning);
- exchange of education and training opportunities (i.e., graduate studies and higher education, military academies, military courses, special training, language training);
- joint military exercises;
- peacekeeping, humanitarian missions and other peace support operations (i.e., civil emergencies, search and rescue);
- multinational forces;
- sharing high technology and knowledge;
- arms industry cooperation;
- conferences, seminars and workshops.

This is by no means an exhausted list of cooperative military initiatives. The PFP Partnership Work Program for 2000-2001 (PWP) consists of 21 areas of cooperation, each described in detail and consisting of hundreds of individual activities. Member countries contribute by proposing and hosting individual PWP activities and choosing on the principle of “self-differentiation” activities in which they want to participate in. The PFP provides a multinational security framework for explicit, operational military cooperation between individual partner countries and NATO.

Some forms of military cooperation are directly interconnected. For example, participation in various international peace support operations has contributed to a multitude of military linkages and cooperative activities. It includes seminars, joint education and training, joint exercises and other contacts. Militaries also share intelligence, plan together and cooperate on logistics. This occurs at the bilateral and multilateral level. In fact, there is a growing community of militaries that participate in peacekeeping missions and a peacekeeping “culture” is emerging in some professional military establishments. International peace support operations depend on the will and participation of individual governments and on the legitimacy factor of an institutional and multinational approach.

Another prospective trend in the field of military cooperation is the establishment of multinational forces in peacetime. Mostly, these forces are designed for use in crisis management and in a wide range of international peace support operations. Participation in establishing and maintaining multinational forces enables armed forces to plan, train and exercise together. It gets at the very core of traditional military functions during peacetime and is particularly a meaningful form of cooperation. It establishes strong links and builds trust and friendships.

Cooperation between militaries is relative to the political context, and to the form and extent of the cooperative activities. Clearly, military cooperation between two allied nations (i.e., two NATO member-nations) surpasses that of states that casually host modest military encounters or simply exchange military attaches. The “multinationalization of the defense policies of its member-states” is an unprecedented, significant development credited to the North Atlantic Alliance.<sup>29</sup> It is an achievement often underes-

<sup>29</sup> Kruzal, J., “Partnership for Peace and the Transformation of North Atlantic Security”, in Papacosma, S. V. and Heiss, M. A., *NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does It Have a Future?* Macmillan, Scranton, 1995, pp. 342-343.

timated in comparison to NATO's successful survival over the Warsaw Pact. The classification of international military cooperation is important in analyzing and gaining an understanding of the new role the military can play in regional stability and international security.

### *Challenges and Opportunities in Southeast Europe*

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, nuclear and biological), the spread of dangerous technologies and the mass transfer of conventional and small arms represent common international security concerns. Crisis management, search and rescue, civil emergencies and environmental disasters, peacekeeping and other peace support operations are international challenges that require cooperation among national military resources. Furthermore, as the NATO involvement in the Kosovo crisis has shown, the respect for human and minority rights does not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned. The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe has also accepted this notion as a principle of common concern.

Clearly, these challenges need to be met in common and within a cooperative framework. They can be approached within existing institutions or through bilateral and multinational initiatives. Militaries that establish cooperation can only help improve the prospects of a favorable outcome from any given situation. But before the military establishments of various countries can tackle these difficult tasks together, they need to understand each other and be able to work together. This requires cooperating and establishing a relationship well before a danger emerges or a crisis erupts. Countries and their armed forces need to be prepared to act and act together.

An assessment of the military capabilities and defense expenditures (See Figure) of countries in the region indicates some common characteristics, not consistent with much of the democratic world. This unbalanced situation could lead to establishing more tension rather than cooperation. With a few exceptions, defense expenditures as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were well above the NATO averages of 2.8% and 2.6% in 1997 and 1998, respectively.<sup>30</sup> Likewise, most of the countries in the region have comparatively large sized forces in relations to their population. In most cases, about 1% or more of the population are active members of the armed forces. This indicates over-excessive military spending which directly affects national growth by misallocating scarce national resources that could have been used for economic and social development. The need to spend so much on defense and to have large armed forces could be individually and collectively reconsider within a cooperative security framework.

<sup>30</sup> Even NATO members – Greece and Turkey – register much higher defense expenditures, in terms of a percentage of its GDP, than most NATO countries.

Figure 1. Comparative Military Information of Countries in Southeast Europe

Country	Total Population	Size of Armed Force	Forces as % of Total Population	1999 Defense Budget (Mil. US\$)	1997-1998 Defense Budget as % of GDP	Membership in International Institutions and Organizations
Albania	3,741,000	54,000	1.4%	43	6.7-6.6%	UN, OSCE, EAPC/PFP
Bosnia	4,000,000	86,000	2.3%	318	8.0-8.1 %	UN, OSCE
Bulgaria	8,349,000	101,500	1.2%	270	3.3-3.7 %	UN, OSCE, EAPC/PFP, WEU <sup>B</sup>
Croatia	4,794,000	61,000	1.3%	815	8.3-6.2 %	UN, OSCE
Greece	10,645,000	165,670	1.6%	3,800	4.6-4.8%	UN, OSCE, NATO, EAPC, EU/WEU
Hungary	10,028,000	43,440	0.4%	688	1.4 %	UN, OSCE, NATO, EAPC, WEU <sup>A</sup>
Macedonia	2,303,000	16,000	0.7%	68	10.2-9.9 %	UN, OSCE, EAPC, PFP
Romania	22,732,000	207,000	0.9%	607	2.3 %	UN, OSCE, EAPC, PFP, WEU <sup>B</sup>
Slovenia	2,017,000	9,550	0.5%	347	1.8-1.7 %	UN, OSCE, EAPC, PFP, WEU <sup>B</sup>
Turkey	65,161,000	639,000	1.0%	8,900	4.4 %	UN, OSCE, NATO, EAPC, WEU <sup>A</sup>
FR Yugoslavia	10,600,000	108,700	1.0%	1,300	9.2-9.1 %	

Source: *The Military Balance 1999/2000*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, London, 1999. All figures are for 1999, except data on defense budgets as a percentage of the GDP which are given in 1997 and 1998 figures. Information on Albanian armed forces represent figures reported prior to the 1997 unrest. Total number of Bosnia and Herzegovina armed forces includes 40,000 Bosnian Muslim force, 16,000 Bosnian Croat force and 30,000 Bosnian Serb force. The Bosnian defense budget for 1999 does not include Bosnian Serb figures. WEU<sup>A</sup> indicates an Associate Member in the Western European Union and WEU<sup>B</sup> indicates an Associate Partner. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's membership in the OSCE has been suspended and its status in the UN has not been clearly confirmed.

The military establishments of many countries in Southeast Europe have common problems and challenges in their efforts to develop modern armed forces. Democratic control of the armed forces, transparency in planning and budgeting, professional development, political accountability and the military's role in society are all part of the political process in a democracy. The countries in the region facing these challenges are at different stages of development. Common reform challenges and issues of concern with direct force consequences include:

- large forces that need to be reduced and the accompanying political and social problems associated with downsizing;
- developing professional forces (including the officer and noncommissioned officer corps) and the conscription service issue;
- reorganization and force modernization;
- need to decrease defense spending, rationalization of financial allocations, prioritization and defense planning;
- scarce funds for modernization of weapons systems;
- achieving interoperability with Western armed forces.

These and many other military challenges also represent common concerns that could be jointly met by countries willing to cooperate. Political differences on regional orientation among countries also affect cooperative relationships between military establishments in Southeast Europe. For example, Slovenia and Croatia have repeatedly indicated their strong Western European heritage and even Romania sees itself geographically as a Central European country. Another issue of concern is the potential effect of turning the countries in the region into competitors and developing an environment of rivalries for membership in Euro-Atlantic associations. NATO's "19 to 1" bilateral efforts with each PFP partner while providing practical assistance and support also encourages the partners to cooperate with neighbors and within a framework of regional arrangements.

Hungary's position has now dramatically changed with its entrance into the North Atlantic Alliance. It still has to accomplish much and achieve the standards of other NATO members, yet its path represents a model for other countries in the region to follow should they aspire for NATO membership.<sup>31</sup> Romania is keen on building a "network of sub-regional military cooperation initiatives in Central and Southeastern Europe" and, along with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Slovenia, wants to join NATO. This national objective to join the Alliance may well be the dominant driving force in the military cooperation efforts of the countries in Southeast Europe.

The only countries that do not have a formal institutional link to NATO (i.e., EAPC, PFP) are Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This may well change soon for Croatia, and even Bosnia, but Yugoslavia's future is heavily dependent on its internal political developments. Yugoslavia's armed forces remain closed to the outside. Its international military cooperation efforts are extremely limited, amounting to compliance with Article IV Annex 1-B of the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (Dayton Agreement).<sup>32</sup> Yugoslavia's exclusion from the OSCE, while intended as a political reprimand, allows its military forces to elude international scrutiny and avoid compliance with the *Vienna Document* and the OSCE's many other security and confidence building measures.

A web of cooperative military links – within Southeast Europe and with countries and institutions outside the region – has been slowly developing over the past decade. This web consists of bilateral initiatives, multilateral and institutional-based efforts, cooperation, unconstrained contacts and other individual initiatives. While the conflicts and unresolved issues from the break-up of the former Yugoslavia have caused grave human and material devastation and hampered relationships between nations, it has, strangely enough, provided many opportunities for some countries in the region.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Joo, R. *Hungary: A Member of NATO*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, Budapest, 1999.

<sup>32</sup> Yugoslav military representatives also participate in the discussions and negotiations on Article V Annex 1-B of the Dayton Agreement.

<sup>33</sup> The President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, commented on Kosovo and EU enlargement: "I think the Kosovo war speeded up the process (EU expansion). Because it is clear now that without this enlarged, new, friendly Europe, we should have a lot of these problems" (Lobjakas, A., "EU: Doubts Over



The involvement of NATO, UN, OSCE and other institutions in Southeast Europe has enabled the countries in the region to get constructively involved, contribute to the establishment of peace and build relationships with these institutions and its individual member countries. The UN has been involved in several peace operations in the region, including UNPROFOR (former Yugoslavia), UNCRO (Croatia), UNTAES (Croatia), UNPSG (Croatia), UNPREDEP (Macedonia), and is still involved in UNMIBH (Bosnia), UNMOP (Croatia) and UNMIK (Kosovo). While NATO and the WEU were involved in support of UN missions and played a small role in the initial phase, NATO took on a lead-agency position when it supplied large numbers of troops to the IFOR/SFOR and KFOR missions. In NATO-led peacekeeping missions, the Alliance partner countries, some from the region, played an important role by contributing troops and other resources.<sup>34</sup> However, even non-partner countries contributed. Croatia's cooperation was essential for NATO to transport its forces to Bosnia and politically noteworthy in its support for NATO's air campaign over Yugoslavia, particularly because it was not a partner country. Likewise, Albania and Macedonia were instrumental in supporting NATO's mission in Kosovo.

The establishment of multinational forces in peacetime leads to an assortment of cooperative military activities that includes joint training and exercises, planning and many other forms of military contacts and interactions. While the experience gained in the participation of multinational forces taking part in actual missions, such as IFOR/SFOR and KFOR, is invaluable, the establishment of peacetime multilateral forces has also proven to contribute to regional cooperation. The formation of peacetime multinational forces in Europe began well before the concept caught on in Southeast Europe. Now, countries in the region have begun to explore the potential benefits of establishing multinational forces.

In September 1998, during the third Southeast European Defense Ministerial meeting in Skopje, defense ministers of Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey signed an agreement to establish a Multinational Peace Force in Southeast Europe (MPFSEE). The force headquarters is based in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, and is intended for use under the auspices of the UN, OSCE or NATO for future European peacekeeping missions. The force, one of the strongest examples of regional multilateral military cooperation, will number between 3-4 thousand troops and initially be under the command of a Turkish brigadier general. The first military staff exercise of MPFSEE is scheduled for December 1999 and the first field exercise is planned for early 2000. The United States and Slovenia have observer status in the MPFSEE.

CENCOOP, another multinational force that transcends the boundaries of Central and Southeast Europe, was established on the basis of a regional cooperation agreement initiated in March 1998 by Austria and consisting of Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland. The role of the force, designed to enhance the ability of small

Expansion Remain", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Helsinki, December 15, 1999). If anything positive can be said of a crisis, it is that it usually results in media reports and newspaper headlines and attracts the attention of the public, which then puts pressure on the policy makers to act.

<sup>34</sup> For the most part, the partner countries were individually responsible for the costs of their contingents.

countries to contribute, is to provide military contingents for peace support operations on the basis of effort sharing and mutual support. For the time being, CENCOOP is more of a political gesture than an effective force.

There are many other similar initiatives in the region and the greater area. On the basis of a March 1998 bilateral agreement, Hungary and Romania will establish a peacekeeping battalion. Similarly, a brigade level multinational force will be established by Hungary, Italy and Slovenia on the basis of a multilateral agreement signed by their respective defense ministers in April 1998. Both units were expected to be operational by the end of 1999.

Regional threats and challenges seem to capture much of the focus from the international institutions and countries involved in Southeast Europe. Yet, if just enough effort and resources are invested in examining and exploiting the cooperative opportunities, there may be hope for achieving the kind of lasting stability enjoyed by Western Europe. Perhaps the best possible opportunities lie in Euro-Atlantic integration.

### *Cooperative Initiatives: Stability Pact and Euro-Atlantic Integration*

The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe is a recently devised multilateral effort aimed at bringing peace and prosperity to the region. While it is not the only initiative around, it may be the most comprehensive in terms of its approach, which also includes a military dimension. Other multilateral cooperative initiatives include the US backed Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the Associations of Balkan Chambers of Commerce (ABC) and the Royaumont Initiative. There is also a Southeast European Defense ministerial and several efforts to establish multinational peacetime forces.

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe represents an integrated, multifaceted approach aimed at bringing long-lasting peace, prosperity and stability to the region. It was initiated by the European Union (under German leadership), adopted in Cologne in June 1999 and endorsed in Sarajevo on July 30, 1999 by the heads of state and governments of an assortment of countries identified as “participating and facilitating” states. The Pact, a non-binding endeavor, includes regional and non-regional countries and involves a “jungle” of institutions and organizations. While most politicians are optimistic, experts on international affairs are skeptical. Its intention was to secure the necessary political will and the much-needed resources to stabilize the region. In any event, the Stability Pact is at its early stages and needs to be given a chance.

The Pact is set to focus on three interdependent areas, accordingly divided into three “Working Tables”. These include dimensions of democracy and human rights; economic reconstruction, development and cooperation; and security. The security minded Working Table is projected to also deal with many military issues. Thus, defense and military cooperation will be of primary concern. Arms control (i.e., Articles IV and V

of the Dayton/Paris Peace Accords, CFE Treaty), confidence and security building measures (CSBM) and conflict prevention/management will be specifically targeted.<sup>35</sup>

The highlights of the initiative are its cooperative dimension, the promotion of “good neighborly” relations, emphasis on bilateral and regional cooperation and incentives of Euro-Atlantic integration. The later is particularly appealing to many of the participating states. While the detailed mechanics of the Pact are still unclear, many South-east European countries are drawn by the potentially promising notion that the Pact will “advance their integration, on an individual basis, into Euro-Atlantic structures.” But European leaders have warned that cooperation and relations with neighbors are important criterion for assessing each state's prospects of integration.<sup>36</sup>

As the Pact is designed to lean on the unique knowledge, expertise and capabilities of international organizations, so it appears that the OSCE and NATO will represent the institutional umbrella for most of the security-related aspects of Pact activities, which would have a military dimension. The OSCE's confidence and security building measures and its many mechanisms can provide an ample medium for comprehensive cooperation. However, without the kind of security programs and military support that the North Atlantic Alliance can provide, it would be difficult to assure any of the Pact's objectives. NATO's unique institutional capabilities and strong military presence in Bosnia and Kosovo represents the only practical security regime that can enable the entire region to proceed with political and economic reconstruction.

Furthermore, NATO's Partnership for Peace program already provides a working forum for genuine, practical cooperation—in terms of security, defense and military affairs. The PFP has helped built very special relationships and contributed to strengthening regional stability and security. NATO's partner countries actually contribute to security. The best example being the role partner countries play in the SFOR and KFOR missions. NATO is going even further in its development of an “operational capabilities concept” (OCC), designed to identify individual or multinational partner country forces that can be used in peace support operations. The cooperation also includes planning, training and exercises, education and many other areas of common interest.<sup>37</sup>

NATO's objective is to integrate all the countries of Southeast Europe into the Euro-Atlantic community.<sup>38</sup> At his inaugural address to the press on 14 October 1999, NATO

<sup>35</sup> During the Working Table's first meeting in Oslo, on October 13 and 14, 1999, a sub-table was held to deal with defense and military affairs. The participants discussed arms control, illegal arms flow, CSBMs, non-proliferation, de-mining, conflict prevention and crisis management, improving military contacts and defense transparency.

<sup>36</sup> Bodo Hombach, special coordinator of the Pact, was quoted as saying: “the EU and NATO would not look favorably on those running head down towards Brussels without even looking behind them to see where their neighbors are” (*Atlantic News*, No. 3130, August 5, 1999).

<sup>37</sup> For a complete list of the 21 areas of cooperation, including the scope and objective of each, see the “Partnership Work Program for 2000-2001”.

<sup>38</sup> *Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 15 December 1999*, Article 15.

Secretary General Lord Robertson indicated his intention to put Southeast Europe at the top of his agenda and said “NATO will have to play its full role in the stabilization of the Balkans.” Lord Robertson reinforced how NATO will contribute actively to the Stability Pact. On another occasion, he indicated that all of Southeast Europe should be given a chance to join European structures. He added that integration breeds trust, stability and prosperity and that integration is conflict prevention in its ultimate form.<sup>39</sup> This indicates direct support from NATO's top official and a continued commitment to the region by NATO.

Of the nine partner countries that presented a Membership Action Plan (MAP) last year at NATO headquarters and officially expressed their intention of joining the North Atlantic Alliance, five are from Southeast Europe – Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Rumania and Slovenia.<sup>40</sup> Croatia has repeatedly indicated its intention to apply for NATO membership once it joins the PFP program. Bosnia must first make some significant headway in the political segment of the peace process before making any moves towards Brussels. And while Montenegro is showing signs of wanting to join a democratic Europe, that leaves Yugoslavia's other republic Serbia on its own for the time being.

It appears that the strong sentiments from within Southeast Europe for entrance into the Euro-Atlantic community may affect the next round of NATO enlargement. Since Europe's northern region is sensitive to Russian concerns and three Central countries have already joined the alliance, there are strong arguments that the next round of NATO enlargement would most likely be concentrated in the South.<sup>41</sup> While which country gets invited to join the alliance and which doesn't, and if the alliance decides at all on expansion, is being discussed, NATO is also concerned with its evolving strategic purpose and its future security posture. If it continues to enlarge: will it continue to stress its integrated politico-military alliance aspect or will it put more effort in a cooperative security approach or another form of a regional arrangement? Furthermore, the alliance will almost surely be hesitant to further enlargement if the three new members fail to meet the critical criteria of being “producers” of security rather than just “consumers”.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>39</sup> “Peacekeeping and Conflict Prevention: What Risks and Threats in Geopolitics in the Future?”, Intervention by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, at the Conference “The Trans-Atlantic Century”, Aspen Institute and Philip Morris Institute, Rome, January 13, 2000.

<sup>40</sup> The other MAP countries are Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

<sup>41</sup> Larrabee, F.S., “NATO Enlargement After the First Round”, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance: A New NATO for a New Europe*, Istituto Affari Internazionali and Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, Rome, January 25, 1999. Larrabee, an expert analyst from RAND, presents the “strategic rational” that will be used in the future enlargement of NATO.

<sup>42</sup> Simon, J., “Partnership for Peace: After the Washington Summit and Kosovo”, *Strategic Forum*, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, Number 167, August 1999.

The future of the Western European Union (WEU)<sup>43</sup> is now in the hands of the EU, and the Europeans are once again talking about a European security and defense identity (ESDI), with apparent US and NATO blessing – mostly in the form of “lip service”. The European Union may get a respectable defense dimension sooner than most experts predict.<sup>44</sup> The Italian led, all-European Alba Operation during the Albanian crisis was, relatively speaking, a successful military campaign. The ad hoc mission was a typical operation for the Europeans to handle alone. Although political consensus was not reached and a common policy was never developed, the “coalition of the willing” concept did work. Current activities, designed to strengthen the European defense initiative, include:

- the establishment of the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Mr. CFSP is the former NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana);
- recent bilateral and trilateral French-British-German talks on a common European defense policy (starting with the French-UK talks on a common European defense policy and the Saint Malo Declaration in December 1998);
- the re-establishment of a rapid reaction force based on the existing Eurocorps (conclusions from the June EU summit in Cologne) and growing importance of the many other European multinational forces;
- recent European defense industry consolidations (on October 14, 1999, the French company Aerospatiale Matra and the German company DASA of Daimler Chrysler merged to become EADS – European Aeronautics Defense and Space, becoming the third largest worldwide in the aerospace and defense sector, after US companies Boeing and Lockheed Martin);
- all-European cooperation on strategic military capabilities (i.e., projection of air power, air and sea transport, command and control, intelligence gathering).

However, this does not imply that the Europeans are ready to constitute a “stand-alone” force against a large-scale external threat. They will for a long time still depend on the US and NATO for such scenarios. The Europeans expect, nevertheless, to embark on peace support operations where its US partner may or may not choose to participate. Recently, the United Kingdom and the five member countries of the Eurocorps have proposed that Eurocorps supply the KFOR Headquarters in Pristina.<sup>45</sup> Non-EU members and non-NATO members may be expected by the EU to be capable of taking part in future European peacekeeping operations.

<sup>43</sup> The WEU is to be fully integrated into the European Union. The details of this integration are not yet known, although, there are many unresolved issues.

<sup>44</sup> Lozancic, D., “Development of a Common Defense Policy as a Component of European Integration Processes”, *Croatian Political Science Review*, Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb University, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1998, pp. 60-89. The author presents EU defense expectations based on the Masstricht Agreement and the major issues involved in developing a common European defense policy.

<sup>45</sup> *Atlantic News*, Brussels, No. 3159, November 26, 1999. On January 28, 2000, NATO decided to hand over command of KFOR to the Staff Headquarters of Eurocorps for a six-month period starting from April 2000. European defense is said to have gained a new dimension and much needed visibility by the decision, which also highlights concrete cooperation between the Europeans and the North Atlantic Alliance (*Atlantic News*, Brussels, No. 3174, February 2, 2000).

Several Southeast European countries are associate members or partners of the WEU and should closely follow developments between the EU and WEU. This had allowed them to have an additional cooperative link with Western countries and institutions. As the WEU is integrated into the EU, the future status of those members is yet unclear. Also, EU aspirant countries may have to satisfy military implications in their candidacy efforts. Invitations to accession talks have been extended to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus. The December 1999 EU summit in Helsinki also extended invitations to “begin” accession talks with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Malta. The EU has been slowly lagging in the entire enlargement process, especially when compared to NATO's process.

The EU and NATO relationship will most likely evolve to develop practical and effective cooperative links. The relationship between these institutions will remain close and complimentary. Their respective enlargement processes will be interdependent. Both institutions support cooperative initiatives in Southeast Europe and are expected to produce a bull-work of corresponding assistance for countries in the region that long for Euro-Atlantic integration. These are also the two institutions that top the membership “wish list” of most countries in Southeast Europe.

### *Croatia's International Military Cooperation*

The Republic of Croatia has, since its independence in 1991, continuously expressed and exemplified a strong will to enter Euro-Atlantic military associations and establish direct links with the US and Western Europe. Its early democratic transition was distinct from any of the new democracies in Eastern Europe. While new NATO-members Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were implementing reforms in the early 1990s, Croatia was forced to fight for its independence and territorial integrity. Croatia has developed a robust bilateral military cooperation program, nevertheless, and has intensified its multilateral campaign. Initially, bilateral military efforts were designed to compensate for a lack of hardy multilateral activity.<sup>46</sup> This is expected to change in the near future as the country looks to join the PFP program by the spring of 2000 and become a front-running candidate for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.

As of January 2000, Croatia has signed 15 bilateral military cooperation agreements, of which seven are with NATO countries. Agreements have been signed with: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States. Bilateral military cooperation is also expected to expand to Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Macedonia and Slovenia. Some of the more meaningful areas of cooperation include education, military training, civil-military relations, resource management and defense policy and planning.

<sup>46</sup> Lozancic, D. and Grubisic, V., “Croatia and the Partnership for Peace Program: Political and Military Perspectives,” *International Conference – The Future of Partnership for Peace*, Bled, Slovenia, June 4-5, 1999.

Education opportunities represent the most significant portion of this military cooperation. Recently, seminars and courses on international peacekeeping operations have been areas of particular focus. Croatia also has several young cadets at US military academies and Croatian officers have also completed higher education programs of study in the US (i.e., Command and Staff College, War College, National Defense University).<sup>47</sup> While the US provides the greatest share of military education and the corresponding financial assistance, opportunities are also available from other countries, including Germany, Great Britain, France, Sweden and Italy, with whom Croatia does not have formal bilateral agreements.

As a member and active participant of the OSCE since 1992, Croatia has fulfilled its obligations under the *Vienna Document* and satisfied other confidence and security building measures stemming from Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) decisions.<sup>48</sup> The OSCE, while encompassing over 50 nations and consisting of a solid framework of cooperative mechanisms, does not provide an opportunity for militaries to plan, train and exercise together. From a Croatian perspective, this is the core advantage of participating in NATO's PFP program.

Ten Croatian officers joined the United Nations observer mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) in September 1999, marking the first time that Croatian military personnel take part in an international peace support mission.<sup>49</sup> The political significance of this event, in terms of "breaking the ice", is by far more monumental than Croatia's actual contribution to the UN mission in Sierra Leone. This is even more remarkable considering that Croatia was just recently host to several UN missions and is still host to the UN observer mission on its southern tip of Prevlaka (UNMOP). Croatia's international peacekeeping role will most likely increase in the future and will probably be augmented to include operations under a NATO or OSCE umbrella, in addition to UN missions.

Much of Croatia's military efforts recently have focused on gaining entrance into the PFP program and eventually achieving NATO membership. Although it is not a PFP member, Croatia has played an instrumental role in indirectly assisting the IFOR/SFOR NATO-led mission in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e., logistics, transportation, intelligence). This fact has been acknowledged by many senior NATO officials but has not helped Croatia make any headway in its bid to join the PFP program. Croatia's lack of participation in certain multinational efforts has prevented its armed forces from

<sup>47</sup> Lozancic, D. and Cosic, K., "Civil-Military Relations in a Democratic Society: Challenges for the Republic of Croatia," *European Security into the 21st Century: Challenges of South East Europe*, Proceedings from an International Conference Held in Dubrovnik, Croatia, May 5-8, 1999, Croatian Center of Strategic Studies, Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar and Europe House, p. 230.

<sup>48</sup> These include an exchange of military information, evaluations and inspections, information on weapons exports and imports, "Code of Conduct" questionnaire, defense planning and budget document and other military information.

<sup>49</sup> The UN mission in Sierra Leone has been expanded to include some 6000 troops in addition to the over 210 observers. There have been calls to raise the troop level to over 11,000 total. Croatia was also asked to supply some 200 troops to act as a "quick reaction force". Although this offer was rejected, Croatia's peacekeeping activities will most likely increase in the future.

training and exercising along side NATO forces as other PFP countries have done. This form of exposure to the norms, standard operating procedures and processes of Western forces is the next phase of Croatia's international military cooperation.

Croatia's geographic location represents a practical opportunity to establish mutually beneficial regional military cooperation in disaster relief, search and rescue and other missions in an emergency situation where military capabilities can be used to support civil authorities. For example, the armed forces of Italy, Slovenia and Croatia could readily cooperate on search and rescue operations in the Adriatic Sea. Effective and timely response of joint military forces could influence the critical outcome of an operation. This would also serve to stimulate cooperative ventures between other countries in the region.

On January 3, 2000, Croatia held parliamentary elections, and shortly thereafter, a new government leadership was formed. Initial signals from Brussels indicate that the time may be right for admitting Croatia in the PFP and to consider its candidacy for EU membership. Thus provided that Croatia enters PFP in 2000, gaining NATO membership may quickly top its security and defense policy agenda. The new government is expected to move fast in its integration bids and may establish defense policies in that direction. This would then surely lead to more cooperative initiatives and particularly regional activities. The Republic of Croatia may continue increasing its military cooperation efforts – and corresponding to its political and economic potentials – contribute more to regional and international security. In that regard, its defense policy priorities in the field of international military cooperation could be to:

- pursue defense reforms and reorganization consistent with Western standards (i.e., interoperability with NATO);
- comply with its arms control obligations (i.e., *Vienna Document*, Dayton/Paris Agreement) and seek new opportunities of joining arrangement in the greater region (i.e. CFE, Open Skies);
- support OSCE efforts and regional confidence and security building measures;
- expand its role in international peace support operations (under the UN, OSCE, NATO and the EU/WEU);
- seek new channels of cooperation with the UN (i.e., Stand by Arrangement, Department for Peacekeeping Operations);
- continue developing bilateral military relations, particularly with NATO-member, countries, neighboring states and regional countries (this also may include expanding its military attaché program to new countries);
- join multinational forces and other initiatives, designed for peace support operations (i.e., CENCOOP, MPFSEE);<sup>50</sup>
- explore new cooperative opportunities within the Stability Pact framework (i.e., regional peacekeeping training center, de-mining efforts).

<sup>50</sup> The multinational force CENCOOP is particularly appealing to Croatia, because of its orientation to Central Europe. Countries wishing to participate in CENCOOP, by providing troops, need to be members of the PFP program and require official consent from the other member-states.



Gaining entrance into the PFP program in 2000 would represent a significant achievement, with political, economic and security benefits. The security benefits, while not extending “Article V” defense guarantees, would present a new spectrum of cooperative opportunities. Most likely, it is expected to lead to a greater role for Croatia's armed forces in international peace missions and multinational forces.

Expanding Croatia's role in international peace support operations will certainly enhance the country's prestige and its political influence. Croatia's armed forces are probably best known for routing Serb rebel forces in its 1995 military campaign to retake its occupied territories. Now, the armed forces are expected to contribute to regional and international peace through participation in multinational operations. This will require a corresponding degree of interoperability with NATO, the predominant norm in European military cooperation. And unless new, unforeseen dramatic changes in international security take place, a cooperative concept and preventive role should represent the basis of the future deployment of Croatia's armed forces.

Entrance into the PFP program and potential candidacy for NATO membership will provide more new opportunities and raise Croatia's bilateral and multilateral military cooperation to a new level. This will almost immediately provide new challenges in terms of financial defense allocations and overall resource management. It will be expensive and some “cut-backs” will have to be made by the new budget-conscious government. However, in the long run, Croatia will greatly benefit from the institutional linkages and relationships associated with membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.

### *Conclusions*

Southeast Europe is a region that has attracted a considerable amount of international interest over the past ten years. The region has for many years resisted open, transparent cooperation and instead proved to be a haven of intrigue and conspiracies. Confidence and security building measures lacked individual or collective political will and, until recently, never had enough regional or international support. A cooperative and preventive approach, backed by NATO, the EU and the OSCE, seeks to change that. Their proposition to countries in the region is based on multinational cooperation and preventing conflicts.

The military has come a long way from its traditional role as the nation's war-making machine. When not fighting wars, militaries are usually preparing for war. Today, much more is expected of the military. Thus, one of its primary tasks apart from its core defense function is its newly acquired diplomatic role. Military cooperation offers an opportunity to plan together rather than against one another and to perceive one another as a partner and not a potential enemy. Now, militaries are helping their countries prevent wars by taking part in extensive, meaningful cooperative programs with neighboring and regional military establishments. Peacetime engagement and cooperation in peacekeeping operations and in establishing multinational forces give the military a new role and deeper dimension to contribute to international security.

There are several reasons why military establishments in Southeast Europe should cooperate. First, military cooperation, as an integral part of a cooperative security con-

cept, promotes understanding, trust and confidence. It contributes to building friendships among countries. It also breeds peace and stability of the greater area. Clearly, the alternative to cooperation in the region leads to suspicion, mistrust and uncertainty. Second, it's an effective and efficient way of tackling common problems and security concerns. It contributes to rationalization of national resources and to political, economic and social development. It allows for burden-sharing and enables countries to establish self-confidence in their armed forces. The military cooperation between the Nordic countries in terms of preparation (education, training and exercises) and execution of international peacekeeping missions is a good example of how regional efforts lead to reasonable solutions. Third, military cooperation is a fundamental element of the Euro-Atlantic integration process. The integration of the countries of the region into Euro-Atlantic structures is perhaps the best "preventive medicine" for the region and for Europe.

A preventive approach is by no means a perfect or flawless defense concept.<sup>51</sup> The feverish and quite widespread efforts of military cooperation and attempts to control weaponry in the 1920s did not prevent the global warfare that was to follow in 1940. Cooperative and preventive approaches, for all their promise, are not guaranteed to succeed. If the cooperative security arrangement should break down militaries need to maintain an effective self-defense capability. Hence, NATO's "Article V" defense guarantee needs to remain a strong characteristic of the alliance. Nations that aspire for membership should not forget that their contribution to the military defense of the alliance is a symbolic yardstick and of paramount importance in their membership drive.

A web of cooperative efforts in Europe appears to be thickening with an increasing number of multinational forces, multinational participation in peace support operations, bilateral and multilateral military activities and other military initiatives within the framework of a cooperative spirit. Southeast Europe is on its way to becoming an integral segment of this indivisible webbing. The military linkages and ties, which have represented the critical adhesive maintaining the strong bonds between Western European nations, should be extended to countries in East, Central and Southeast Europe. There is no better path towards assuring peace and stability in Southeast Europe than to extend Euro-Atlantic responsibilities and benefits to the countries in the region.

<sup>51</sup> Berry, N., "The Flaws in Perry and Carter's 'Preventive Defense' Strategy", *Weekly Defense Monitor*, Volume 3, Issue 47, December 9, 1999. Berry asks the question: "What if preventive defense fails?" He goes on to indicate that "defensive systems linked to offensive systems are more threatening to other states than even strong offensive systems alone".

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