

KHUVEN'S ELECTORAL GEOMETRY IN TOMAŠIĆ'S ELECTORAL LAW OF 1910¹

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Abstract

In this paper, the author analyses the political circumstances that influenced the enactment of the Law on the Electoral Order of the Parliament of the Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia of 28 May 1910, and compares the public debate on this law with the statistical data relating to it. While reducing the property threshold, this law preserved the existing division of electoral districts, which had applied under the so-called Khuen's Electoral Law, thus also preserving the key influence of Serbs on the Croatian political scene. However, these were no longer Serbs loyal to the regime, but those who listened to the call of Belgrade.

Keywords: *electoral law; electoral geometry; Nikola Tomašić; Croat-Serb Coalition; Frankists.*

Introduction

Electoral geometry, i.e. the way in which the electoral units are organised, is one of the ways in which a legislator can influence election results. This type of electoral manipulation is particularly pronounced in majority voting systems, where, in contrast to proportional representation systems, there exists a large number of small electoral units, in which one representative is elected to a representative body in

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each electoral unit by a majority of the vote. This electoral system was mostly in effect in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia from the beginning of the formation of representative government in the country, i.e. from the mid-19th century to the collapse of the Monarchy.²

The penultimate and longest-lasting division of electoral units in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia was based on the so-called Khuen's Electoral Law of 1888.³ According to an almost universal opinion, with such a division of constituencies (electoral districts), *Ban* (Viceroy) Khuen-Héderváry enabled a disproportionately large representation of Serbs, who were the mainstay of his regime, in the Croatian Parliament.⁴ In addition, this law maintained a high property threshold for the exercise of the right to vote, so that this right was exercised by a very small number of exclusively male adults, and it also retained two categories of persons who exercised the right to vote: 'electors' and 'voters'. Electors, with a higher property threshold, exercised the right to vote directly, while voters had a lower property threshold and exercised that right indirectly: 50 voters chose one elector from among themselves, who voted on their behalf.⁵

In May 1910, during the reign of *Ban* Nikola Tomašić, the so-called Khuen's Electoral Law was reformed by lowering the property threshold, which was a condition for exercising the right to vote, while the direct right to

² On electoral legislation in Croatia from 1848 to 1875, see: Dalibor Čepulo, „Izborna reforma u Hrvatskoj 1875. – liberalizam, antidemokratizam i hrvatska autonomija“, *Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu*, no. 52, Zagreb, 2002, pp. 669–691; on the electoral law of 1881, see: Jasna Turkalj, *Pravaški pokret 1878.-1887.*, Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2009, pp. 106–112; on the electoral law of 1888, see: Nives Rumenjak, *Srpski zastupnici u banskoj Hrvatskoj: Okvir za kolektivnu biografiju 1881.-1892.*, Srpsko kulturno društvo Prosvjeta, Zagreb, 2003, pp. 161–172.

³ The final electoral geometry was based on the electoral law that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in December 1917, but which did not enter into force until September 1918. This law introduced universal suffrage, and the country was divided into 120 electoral districts (122 electoral districts with Rijeka). On the parliamentary debate in December 1917, see: Bogdan Krizman, *Hrvatska u prvom svjetskom ratu: Hrvatsko-srpski politički odnosi*, Globus, Zagreb, 1989, pp. 149–152. On the content of the mentioned electoral law, see: *Prilog 187. k Stenografskim zapisnicima sabora kraljevina Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije g. 1913.-1918.*

⁴ See for example: Rudolf Horvat, *Poviest slob. i kr. grada Koprivnice*, Hrvatski tiskarski zavod, Zagreb, 1943, pp. 220–225; R. Horvat, “Hrvatska politika od godine 1860.-1895.”, *Obzor: Spomen knjiga 1860.-1935.*, Zagreb, 1936, p. 14; Stjepan Matković, “Izbori za Hrvatski sabor 1897. godine: Afirmacija Khuenove autokracije”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 29 (1997) 3, p. 475; Jure Krišto, *Prešućena povijest: Katolička crkva u hrvatskoj politici 1850.-1918.*, Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb, 1994, p. 85.

⁵ N. Rumenjak, op. cit., pp. 161–165.

vote was expanded by abolishing the category of indirect voters.⁶ With this electoral reform, the number of electors in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia jumped from 49,796 men of legal age, as there would have been according to the old electoral law in 1910, to 190,043.⁷ This meant that, according to the new electoral law, out of a total of 2,610,506 inhabitants of Croatia in 1910,⁸ 7.3% had the right to vote, that is, of the 577,431 men of legal age who were residents of Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia in 1910,⁹ 33% had the right to vote. Electoral rights spread to a much greater extent among the peasant class than among the occupations that made up the bourgeois class,¹⁰ which decreased the political influence of dependent electors, who had until then formed a dominant share in the electoral body.¹¹

On the other hand, Tomašić's electoral reform did not affect Khuen's electoral geometry, so according to some opinions, precisely because of this fact, as well as because of the unchanged general political atmosphere, it did not contribute strongly to democratisation in Croatia.¹² Nevertheless, with this expansion of electoral rights, the regime undoubtedly lost the possibility of manipulating the elections to a great extent. By retaining Khuen's electoral geometry, the great political influence of the Serbs, disproportionate to their distribution on the territory of Croatia, was also retained, with the difference that it was no longer a matter of a regime loyal to the Serbs, but of independent individuals, who primarily listened to the call of Belgrade and dragged a large number of Croats into their Odyssey, first the politicians, and finally the entire Croat people.

⁶ R. Horvat, *Izborna reforma u Hrvatskoj*, Zagreb, 1917.

⁷ Croatian State Archives (Hrvatski državni arhiv – HDA), Presidency of the Land Government (Predsjedništvo Zemaljske vlade – PrZv), box 914, *Sumarni statistički iskaz izbornika (Temeljem listina sastavljenih prema ustanovama izborne reforme od 28. svibnja 1910.)*.

⁸ HDA, PrZv, box 914, *Žiteljstvo (muško /građansko i vojno/ i žensko) izbornih kotara po sadašnjem izbornom redu*.

⁹ HDA, PrZv, box 914, vol. 6-1a, no. 227–4313, *Broj muškaraca (građanskih i vojnih) u dobi preko 24 godine po izbornim kotarima prema popisu žiteljstva od god. 1910*.

¹⁰ "Stenografski zapisnik XXX. sjednice sabora kraljevina Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije, držane dne 12. svibnja 1910.", *Narodne novine*, no. 108, 13 May 1910, p. 1.

¹¹ N. Rumenjak, *Srpski zastupnici u banskoj Hrvatskoj*, pp. 159–160; "Hrvatska izborna reforma", *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4314, 9 April 1910, p. 2.

¹² Ines Sabotić – Stjepan Matković, "Saborski izbori i zagrebačka izborna tijela na prijelazu iz 19. u 20. Stoljeće", *Društvena istraživanja*, 14 (2005) 1–2, p. 172.

1. The political background of Tomašić's Electoral reform of may 1910

In February 1910, the Unionist Nikola Tomašić was appointed Croatian *ban* on the proposal of the Hungarian minister-president, Khuen Héderváry. Since the Unionist People's Party was dissolved in 1906, and in the following period the attempt of *Ban* Pavao Rauch (1908–1910) to form a new Unionist party, which was supposed to serve as a support for the Unionist regimes in Croatia, failed, Tomašić's appointment was preceded by his agreement with the Croat-Serb Coalition, by which that party agreed to support Tomašić's regime under certain conditions. During Tomašić's negotiations with the Coalition regarding the terms of supporting his regime, the Hungarian minister-president also received an offer from Starčević's Croatian Party of the Right (Frankists), that the party would 'suspend state-law demands, if the autonomous affairs of Croatia are allowed to be run in accordance with the country's principles'. By appointing Tomašić as *ban*, Khuen rejected the Frankist offer.¹³

On numerous occasions in 1910, the Frankists publicly wrote and spoke about the nature of these politics because of which Starčević's Croatian Party of the Right was ready to suspend 'state-law demands'. According to Karlo Bošnjak, after Friedjung's lawsuit, held in December 1909,¹⁴ the Coalition, despite its apparent victory, was compromised by a suspicion that it maintained high-treasonous ties with Belgrade, which is why the decisive factors in Vienna were not inclined to allow it to take over the executive power in Croatia even though it had won an absolute majority of mandates in the Croatian Parliament in the previous elections, held in 1908. The Frankists tried to take advantage of this, and they got in touch with the decisive factors in Vienna and offered that their party would support any regime in Croatia that would pass such an electoral law that, in addition to universal suffrage, would also include a new division of electoral districts in the interest of the Croat part of the nation and its political representatives, i.e. ultimately Starčević's Croatian Party of the Right. In order to prevent such a development, the

¹³ Josip Horvat, *Politička povijest Hrvatske*, Part 1, 2nd edition, August Cesarec, Zagreb, 1990, p. 302.

¹⁴ On the Friedjung case, see: Jaroslav Šidak et al., *Povijest hrvatskog naroda g. 1860-1914.*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1968, pp. 248–251; Hodimir Sirotković, "Pravni i politički aspekti procesa 'Reichspost'-Friedjung", *Starine Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti*, Book 52, Zagreb, 1962, pp. 43–183.

Coalition concluded an agreement with *Ban* Tomašić primarily in order to push through an electoral reform that would be reduced to the expansion of electoral rights while retaining the previous division of electoral districts. This division, which enabled the Serb part of the population to have a disproportionately large political influence in Croatia, secured the Coalition a parliamentary majority, and therefore opened up the possibility for it to participate in the Croatian government sooner or later. In the words of Karlo Bošnjak, the electoral reform was ‘the golden apple that we and the Coalition fought for’.¹⁵

According to Frankist Iso Kršnjavi, Starčević’s Croatian Party of the Right was ready to support the transitional government, which would pass an electoral law with a new division of electoral districts, and to suspend the state-law part of the programme, while in the new convocation of the parliament, which would be elected on the basis of the new electoral law, Starčević’s Croatian Party of the Right would, as the parliamentary majority, initiate the resolution of state-law issues.¹⁶ According to Iso Kršnjavi, the suspension of a part of the party’s program was justified, because ‘he who implements the electoral reform has a very powerful tool in his hand, with which he can bring happiness or misfortune to the homeland’.¹⁷ In the intimate diary entries of Iso Kršnjavi, it is stated that, throughout the reign of *Ban* Pavao Rauch, Starčević’s Croatian Party of the Right sought a new division of electoral districts that would have enabled their party to win a parliamentary majority.¹⁸ These records also contain a confirmation of the activities that Starčević’s Croatian Party of the Right led in Vienna and Budapest in late 1909 and early 1910, which had the purpose of establishing such a regime in Croatia that Starčević’s Croatian Party of the Right would have supported. During that time, the party would have suspended the state-law part of the programme, and the regime would have had the task of implementing electoral reform by dividing electoral districts in the interest of the Croat part of the nation, which would later have enabled Starčević’s Croatian Party of the Right to win a parliamentary majority.¹⁹

¹⁵ “Govor dra. Karla Bošnjaka, izrečen u hrvatskom saboru dne 15. travnja 1910.”, *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4323, 20 April 1910, pp. 1–3.

¹⁶ “Razgovor o političkom položaju u Hrvatskoj”, *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4285, 4 March 1910, pp. 2–3.

¹⁷ “Uztuk”, *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4286, 5 March 1910, pp. 1–2.

¹⁸ Iso Kršnjavi, *Zapisci: Iza kulisa hrvatske politike*, Book 2, Mladost, Zagreb, 1986, pp. 514, 530–540, 586–587.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 603–618, 624.

The Frankists correctly claimed that the Coalition had always wanted to maintain the status quo in the matter of electoral geometry, and that, in the matter of electoral rights, it was actually opposed to universal suffrage and had always aimed only for the expansion of electoral rights. The Croatian political factors that formed the Croat-Serb Coalition in December 1905 had limited themselves to the request for the extension of electoral rights back in the Rijeka Resolution, a programme document from October 1905.²⁰ And the further electoral policy of the Coalition, even during the time when it was the ruling group of parties, from 1906 to 1907, had moved exclusively within the framework of the extension of electoral rights.²¹ Thus, in the first half of 1907, the Croatian government, which was appointed on the basis of the agreement between *Ban* Teodor Pejačević and the Coalition and consisted of its members,²² adopted a draft of a legal basis according to which the tax threshold for exercising the right to vote would be lowered to such an extent that the previous 'voters' would become 'electors', while indirect electoral rights would be completely abolished.²³ With the fall of Pejačević's government, in which the Coalition participated, in mid-1907, the implementation of this kind of electoral reform was suspended, only for the matter to arise again once Tomašić's government took power.

It is necessary to examine the claim of the Frankists that the Coalition agreed to the agreement with *Ban* Tomašić primarily in order to implement electoral reform, which would be limited to the expansion of voting rights while retaining the previous division of electoral districts, because this secured it a parliamentary majority, and thus the prospects of eventually participating

²⁰ In fact, the Rijeka Resolution is deliberately vague regarding the issue of the right to vote. It requests the adoption of an electoral law that would enable the election of such a national representation 'that will be a faithful expression of the unhindered and free will of the people'. Tihomir Cipek – Stjepan Matković, *Programatski dokumenti hrvatskih političkih stranaka i skupina 1842.-1914.*, Disput, Zagreb, 2006, p. 495. However, contemporaries in Croatia, including those from the ranks of the Social Democratic Party, who supported the Rijeka Resolution, recognised such a formulation as a demand for expansion of voting rights rather than for universal suffrage. "Visoka politika", *Slobodna rieč*, vol. 4, no. 19, 11 October 1905, p. 2.

²¹ Mirjana Gross, *Vladavina Hrvatsko-srpske koalicije 1906-1907*, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd, 1960, pp. 136–139.

²² On the agreement between *Ban* Teodor Pejačević and the Croat-Serb Coalition of 29 May 1906, based on which the Croatian government comprising Vladimir Nikolić-Podriński, Aleksandar Badaj, and Milan Rojc was appointed, see: M. Gross, op. cit., pp. 85, 88.

²³ *Prilog 20. k stenografskim zapisnicima sabora kraljevina Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije g. 1908.-1913.*, pp. 33–34.

in the Croatian government. Mirjana Gross put forward a different opinion, that the Coalition did not enter into an alliance with *Ban* Tomašić in order to secure a path to power, but to protect itself from possible persecution, which it had experienced in the previous period, and to create, as a representative of the ‘higher strata of the Croat and Serb bourgeoisie’, favourable conditions for the activity of domestic capital. Accordingly, as the Coalition’s conditions for supporting the Tomašić regime, Mirjana Gross cites: first, the request for the renewal of the Zagreb high treason trial from 1909, in which the members of the Serb part of the Coalition were suspected and mostly convicted for participating in the Greater Serbian project; next, a request for the dismissal of those officials of the former government of *Ban* Pavao Rauch who were the most active in anti-Serbian politics in that regime, and finally a request for the extension of the right to vote, ‘which would reduce the possibility of pressure from the regime in the elections, and therefore increase the chances of representatives of the local the bourgeoisie to win them’.²⁴ Therefore, according to Mirjana Gross, the request for the extension of electoral rights was secondary, and it was intended to advance the class interests of the entire bourgeoisie in Croatia, rather than only the narrow party interests of the Croat-Serb Coalition.

However, the Coalition’s request for the extension of electoral rights was by no means secondary. Namely, Tomašić’s agreement with the Coalition, on the basis of which Tomašić was appointed *ban*, had ‘fixed in writing’ and ‘verbally agreed’ points. In the ‘written’ points of that agreement, it was agreed that *Ban* Rauch and his ‘department heads’ would step down, that the Coalition would support *Ban* Tomašić’s government and leave vacant parliamentary mandates to members of the former People’s Party in the by-elections, and that Tomašić’s government would in turn pass ‘constitutional fundamental laws’ and ‘extend the right to vote, until a new electoral system with universal suffrage is created’. In the ‘verbally agreed’ points, Tomašić undertook to: take the position of the Coalition in state-law disputes with Hungary; restore the situation in ‘Serb issues’ before the reign of *Ban* Pavao Rauch; correct the injustices of Rauch’s regime; and, after three to four months of rule, step

²⁴ J. Šidak et al., op. cit., pp. 266–267.

down from the position of *ban* and propose his successor 'in agreement with the Coalition'.²⁵

Therefore, nowhere in the agreement was the request for the renewal of the high treason lawsuit explicitly stated, but it was vaguely stated in the 'verbally agreed' points that the injustices of Rauch's regime would be remedied. The agreement did not include a request for the dismissal of those among Rauch's officials who were the most active in anti-Serbian politics, either, but it was stated in the 'written' points that, along with *Ban* Rauch, his 'department heads' would also resign, which was already common practice during regime changes in Croatia. If we start from the reasonable assumption that the 'fixed in writing' points were more important for the functioning of this agreement than its 'verbally agreed' points, it follows that the adoption of 'constitutional fundamental laws' and the implementation of electoral reform by expanding electoral rights were the primary conditions under which the Coalition agreed to support Tomašić's regime at the beginning of 1910. The request for the adoption of 'constitutional fundamental laws' was already contained in the Rijeka Resolution under the term 'free-minded constitutional provisions', where this general request meant 'complete freedom of the press', 'freedom of meeting, association, and expression of opinion', 'realisation of judicial independence', the organisation of an 'administrative-state court', the organisation of a 'special court for the criminal liability of all public officials', and finally the adoption of the electoral law, which, as stated, amounted to the extension of electoral rights.²⁶ In this agreement, the request for the extension of the right to vote was specifically highlighted and set apart from the general request for the adoption of 'constitutional fundamental laws'. This last request was obviously of first-class importance.

This conclusion is also confirmed by the further development of political relations between *Ban* Tomašić and the Coalition, which resulted in the termination of their agreement at the end of July 1910. According to Mirjana Gross, the termination of the agreement between the Coalition and *Ban* Tomašić was caused by Tomašić's non-compliance with the 'basic condition for cooperation': 'the removal of Rauch's officials from the administration, as they

²⁵ "Autentični tekst pakta Koalicije s banom Tomašićem" *Hrvatstvo*, no. 170, 28 July 1910, p. 1. See also: Andrej Mitrović (ed.), *Istorija srpskog naroda*, Book 6, vol. 1, Beograd, 1983, pp. 477–478.

²⁶ T. Cipek – S. Matković, op. cit., p. 495.

certainly would have made it impossible for the Coalition to pursue its interests and, as the bearers of the high treason process, would have continued to endanger the personal safety of members of the Serb Independent Party'.²⁷ As stated, Tomašić's agreement with the Coalition provided for the departure of Rauch's 'department heads', but not the lower-ranking civil servants in Rauch's government who had allegedly been compromised by active participation in anti-Serbian politics. The cause for the termination of the agreement between Tomašić and the Coalition was the head of the judicial department in Rauch's government, Svetislav (Slavko) Aranicki, who remained the head of the judicial department in Tomašić's government despite the 'written' points of the agreement. The conflict between the Coalition and Tomašić started exclusively because of Aranicki.²⁸ During this conflict, the Coalition tried to make its stay in the alliance with the Croatian *ban* conditional on the removal of a large number of allegedly compromised civil servants,²⁹ but after Tomašić resolutely rejected such a request as unconstitutional,³⁰ the Coalition officially declared that 'neither has it so far, nor will it in the future make any demands on the disposition and use of certain public officials subordinate to the royal land government', but that it also 'cannot give up on the full execution of the pact, agreed upon on 25 January 1910', i.e. on the removal of Slavko Aranicki.³¹

The question arises as to why the Coalition suddenly raised the issue of Aranicki's participation in Tomašić's government after months of supporting said government, of which Slavko Aranicki was a member. Mirjana Gross states that only with the victory of Khuen-Tisza's National Party of Work in the elections in Hungary, which took place at the beginning of June 1910, were favourable conditions created for the Coalition to demand 'concrete execution of the pact'.³² It is true that the Coalition's request for the removal of an undesirable civil servant can be temporally linked to the elections in Hungary,

²⁷ J. Šidak et al., op. cit., p. 268.

²⁸ "Hrvatski delegati i vladini listovi", *Pokret*, no. 162, 19 July 1910, p. 3.

²⁹ "Glasovi novinstva", *Narodne novine*, no. 161, 17 July 1910, p. 3. Along with Aranicki, the Coalition objected to Junković, the grand prefect of Požega County, the sub-prefects Križ, Malvić, and Horvat, the state attorney Accurti, the judicial councillor Pobor, the district mayor of Karlovac and several school supervisors.

³⁰ "Budimpeštanske konferencije", *Narodne novine*, no. 161, 17 July 1910, pp. 1–2.

³¹ "Banova demisija", *Narodne novine*, no. 162, 18 July 1910, p. 1. See also: "Banova demisija: Ne osobno već političko pitanje", *Pokret*, no. 161, 18 July 1910, p. 1.

³² J. Šidak et al., op. cit., p. 268.

which the People's Labour Party won. The elections in Hungary began on 1 June and ended on 10 June 1910, but already on 6 June 1910 it was certain that the People's Labour Party would win,³³ so Khuen arrived in Vienna the next day to report to the king 'on the course and the result of the election'.³⁴ According to the Coalition's claim, the Coalition's first official conclusion, that 'the full fulfilment of the pact is demanded', that is, the demand for the removal of department head Aranicki, was submitted to *Ban* Tomašić 'before he went to Karlovy Vary'.³⁵ That year, *Ban* Tomašić 'travelled to a spa abroad' on 8 June 1910.³⁶ Since the *ban* failed to respond to this request of the Coalition at the time, it seems that it was set just before his visit to the spa. It was not until the end of the *ban*'s vacation in July 1910 that the issue of Aranicki arose again,³⁷ and it soon culminated in the termination of the agreement between *Ban* Tomašić and the Coalition. However, what is missing in this construction is an explanation why did the Coalition have to wait for Khuen's election victory in Hungary in order to demand the execution of the pact.

However, the Coalition's request for Aranicki's dismissal can be linked to another event: the passing of the Law on the Electoral Order for the Parliament of the Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia on 28 May 1910, which entered into force upon publication in the Collection of Laws and Orders for the Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia on 6 June 1910. This connection would point to the fact that, by adopting the mentioned electoral law, the Coalition achieved the primary goal for which it had concluded a pact with Tomašić, and that it had waited for that law to become valid, after which it entered into a conflict with Tomašić without fear and risked the termination of the pact, knowing that it had secured a majority in the Croatian Parliament through the electoral reform, and thereby prepared its rise to power.

Just before the termination of the pact, analysing the consequences that could arise from its termination, the Coalition considered that only two options were possible: either the *ban* would dissolve the Parliament and call new elections, in which he would try to create a loyal parliamentary majority, or the *ban* would have to come to terms with the Coalition, which constituted the current parliamentary majority, and conclude a new agreement with it. In

³³ "Politički pregled", *Narodne novine*, no. 126, 6 June 1910, p. 3.

³⁴ "Politički pregled", *Narodne novine*, no. 128, 8 June 1910, p. 3.

³⁵ "Hrvatski delegati i vladini listovi", *Pokret*, no. 162, 19 July 1910, p. 3.

³⁶ "Domaće vesti", *Narodne novine*, no. 129, 9 June 1910, p. 3.

³⁷ "Glasovi novinstva", *Narodne novine*, no. 161, 17 July 1910, p. 3.

the first case, the Coalition was sure that it would win a majority in the new elections, and it wrote that it was now clear to everyone ‘how the coalition had pursued a smart policy when it negotiated the electoral reform with the pact’.³⁸ Precisely because it had secured a majority in the Croatian Parliament through the electoral reform, the Coalition believed that it was more likely that new elections would not take place, and that the *ban* would be forced to conclude a new agreement with it. During the new negotiations, the Coalition decided to seek participation in the Croatian government: ‘Until now, there used to be a special relationship between that [parliamentary] majority and the government. The government did not come from the ranks of the majority, and the majority was not the government party, but supported the government in precisely fixed issues. Now, in this relationship, there will definitely be an attempt to dig deeper, to accurately establish the entire system of further governance and assembly. Or there will be a complete break between both factors.’³⁹

Ban Tomašić was neither an opponent of the parliamentarisation of the Croatian government nor an unconditional opponent of the possibility that the Coalition, as the parliamentary majority, would form that government.⁴⁰ Indeed, his mission was to turn the Coalition into a party that would be eligible to exercise executive power in Croatia at the time. From the written part of Tomašić’s agreement with the Coalition, it is evident that the Coalition pledged to support the candidates of the former People’s Party at the by-elections, which were to take place in early 1910 due to the deaths of parliamentary representatives and because some individuals had been elected as

³⁸ “Izbori po starom ili novom izbornom redu”, *Pokret*, no. 162, 19 July 1910, p. 3.

³⁹ “Neprihvaćena demisija”, *Pokret*, no. 167, 25 July 1910, p. 1.

⁴⁰ Here, term “parliamentarization of the Croatian government” meant that the department heads of the Croatian government (for internal affairs, for the judicial affairs, and for worship and education) were part of the parliamentary majority. Otherwise, the main features of the parliamentary political system is that the government (council of ministers) comes from the parliament and is politically responsible to it. Ivo Krbeć, *Dioba vlasti*, Hrvatski izdavački bibliografski zavod, Zagreb, 1943, pp. 19–35. In the Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, there were no conditions for the proper implementation of the parliamentary system. First of all, the Croatian government was not organized as a council of ministers, in which individual ministers would be the heads of their departments. Here, the Ban was the head of all departments, and he exercised his authority through department heads as his employees. Although both the ban and the heads of departments were responsible to the Croatian Parliament since 1874, the ban itself should not have been appointed from among the Croatian parliamentary majority, but should have been appointed on the proposal of the president of the Hungarian Minister. Bogoslav Šulek, *Hrvatski ustav ili konstitucija godine 1882.*, Zagreb, 1883, pp. 117–131, 186–187.

representatives in multiple districts.⁴¹ From the verbally agreed points of that agreement, it is evident that Tomašić, when concluding the agreement, hinted to the Coalition that he could step down after three to four months of rule, and that a person proposed by the Coalition could succeed him at the position of *ban*. Therefore, according to the agreement, the Coalition was supposed to support the entry of a smaller number of members of the former People's Party into the Croatian Parliament, which was a step towards bringing that party back to life, and in return, the Coalition was given the hope that it would be allowed to participate in the composition of the Croatian government even before the next elections.

Tomašić interpreted these provisions of the agreement more broadly. On 7 February 1910, in his inaugural interview for the newspaper *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, he announced the adoption of a legal basis on the 'expansion of the electoral order' as the primary goal of his rule after the establishment of the constitutional order, that is, the convening of the parliament. His second goal was, as he stated, 'the final resolution of the dispute arising from the Railway Pragmatic'. After achieving these goals, he announced that he would 'give way to an autochthonous grandseigneur, as required by historical traditions and the development of political and economic interests'. In addition, before he left his position as *ban*, he announced the fusion of 'elements of the former People's Party and the Serb-Croat Coalition' and 'the establishment of parliamentarism, which had not existed since *Ban* Pejačević'. Regarding the parliamentary majority, from which, according to the principles of parliamentarism, the executive power should be composed, Tomašić said that 'there is an effort of the group, which is gathering under the leadership of Dr Frank, to reach the majority. But these elements would weaken the idea of agreement and legal relations with Hungary, so I intend to prevent that. Such a majority can only be made up of the coalition and the former people's party, if a *modus vivendi* is found between them, and that has already happened.'⁴²

⁴¹ „Još jedna punktacija kupoprodajnih uvjeta Koalicije grofu Khuenu“, *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4260, 2 February 1910, pp. 1–2. The Croat-Serb Coalition held six of those ten electoral districts: Bošnjaci, Varaždin, Novska, Morović, Zemun, and Ogulin. In the by-elections, the Coalition did not run in these electoral districts, but instead supported the candidacy of Magyaron: Julije Rorauer, Josip Šilović, Milan Amruš, Svetislav Šumanović, Levin Chavrak, and the wholesaler Šipuš. In addition, in the electoral district of Gospić, previously held by Starčević's Croatian Party of the Right, the Coalition nominated Vinko Krišković, a former Magyaron. “Magjaroni uzkrsnjuju!”, *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4313, 8 April 1910, p. 1.

⁴² “Domaća politika”, *Hrvatstvo*, no. 30, 8 February 1910, pp. 1–2.

From this source it is evident that Tomašić intended to hand over the executive power in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia exclusively to a party that would be created by the fusion of the Coalition and (elements of) the People's Party, which presupposed the merger of the Coalition into a single party, and then the merger of such a party with 'elements' of or a revived People's Party into a new compromise party. In addition, Tomašić set a condition for the Coalition to purge itself, that is, to remove radical elements from its ranks. According to Tomašić, these were mainly elements of the Serb Independent Party and the Croatian People's Progressive Party.⁴³ Since the Coalition did not agree to come to power under such conditions, and Tomašić did not want to unconditionally hand over participation in the government to the Coalition, he dissolved the Parliament in August 1910, after which he started forming his own party, with which he unsuccessfully tried to win the parliamentary majority twice before the end of his reign in January 1912. With no possibility of a strong regime party forming, a commissariat was introduced in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia at the beginning of 1912, during which the king's commissioners, Slavko Cuvaj and Ivan Skerlec, ruled the country without the participation of the Croatian Parliament.

2. Debate on the electoral reform of 1910 in light of statistical data

The debate about Tomašić's electoral reform in the Croatian party press was opened before Tomašić was appointed *ban* on 5 February 1910, and before *Ban* Tomašić, in an opening interview given to the newspaper *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* on 7 February 1910, announced the adoption of the legal basis on the 'expansion of the electoral order' as the primary goal of his rule. The apparently well-informed Frankists wrote a few days before Tomašić's appointment that the Croat-Serb Coalition had capitulated to the Hungarians, fearing that, without its support for the regime in Croatia, an electoral law could be passed that would, in addition to expanding voting rights, change the electoral geometry that gave the Serbs in Croatia a disproportionately large political influence.⁴⁴ Several months of debate in the press followed, which

⁴³ A. Mitrović (ed.), op. cit., p. 480.

⁴⁴ "Zašto se pokoriše?", *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4260, 2 February 1910, p. 1.

was continued in the parliamentary debate on the Basis of the Law on the Electoral Order for the Parliament of the Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia at the beginning of May 1910.

In the aforementioned debate, the Frankists, supported by a group of Catholic-oriented politicians gathered around the newspaper *Hrvatstvo*, opposed the announced reform, demanding an extension of electoral rights and a change in the electoral geometry. On the opposing side were all the other political groups and parties in Croatia, which, even if they did not unreservedly support the announced electoral reform, considered that, by increasing the number of electors, this reform still represented democratic progress. At the same time, it should be noted that the majority of Croatian political factors considered Khuen's electoral geometry to be bad. So, during the debate on the new electoral law, Tomašić's government, starting from the existence of 'many inconveniences in the current electoral geometry',⁴⁵ announced the implementation of a new division of electoral districts already in the autumn session of the Croatian Parliament, after all the relevant data needed for such a distribution was collected using the new electoral documents drawn up on the basis of the expanded right to vote.⁴⁶ It turned out that these were empty promises. Despite the fact that he allowed that 'today's distribution of electoral districts favours the Serbs more than the Croats', and that the Serbs have a disproportionately large political influence in Croatia, Tomašić himself was reluctant to change the electoral geometry, believing that Serbdom in Croatia does not represent 'a separate political idea', and that such a favouring of Serbdom does not endanger the 'political idea of Croatdom, nor the political idea of our Croatian homeland'.⁴⁷

In a similar tone, the existing electoral geometry in the new electoral law was defended by the president of the Banal Table, Vladimir Mažuranić, who participated in the drafting of that law. In the mentioned defence, he started from the fear of the Croats that, as the people of the 'first order in Croatia', they would be threatened by the new electoral law because it would disproportionately increase the number of Serbs in the Croatian Parliament, 'due to the fact that (there can be no doubt about this) according to the

⁴⁵ "Stenografski zapisnik XXXI. sjednice sabora kraljevina Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije, držane dne 13. svibnja 1910.", *Narodne novine*, no. 110, 17 May 1910, p. 2.

⁴⁶ "U Zagrebu, 10. ožujka", *Narodne novine*, no. 56, 10 March 1910, p. 1.

⁴⁷ "Stenografski zapisnik XXXII. sjednice sabora kraljevina Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije, držane dne 14. svibnja 1910.", *Narodne novine*, no. 111, 18 May 1910, p. 8.

current rounding of districts, it was precisely those regions that are inhabited by purely Catholic Croat people that have fared very poorly'. Despite the fact that he believed that the existing electoral districts were 'undoubtedly' tailored to the detriment of the Croats and to the benefit of the Serb population, Mažuranić claimed that the stated fears of the Croats were unfounded, because the Serbs wanted nothing else, 'but not to be denied equality in any respect'. This 'equality' was manifested in the fact that Serbs, who make up a quarter of the total population of Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, had the right to a quarter of the representatives in the Croatian Parliament, regardless of how they were distributed on the territory of Croatia.

In his analysis of the existing electoral geometry, Mažuranić divided electoral districts in Croatia into three groups based on the population census of 1900. In the first group, he classified 21 electoral districts, in which, according to him, an absolute majority of 'Serbs' lived and in which it was certain that a 'Serb candidate' would be elected. He also included the electoral districts of Šid, Morović, and Srijemski Karlovci, in which, according to the 1900 census, Serbs constituted a relative majority, among the electoral districts where the election of a Serb candidate was certain. On the other hand, his list of securely Serb districts did not include the electoral district of Gospić, where an absolute majority of Serbs lived, but which, as the centre of the county and district, had a large clerical apparatus consisting predominantly of Croats with the right to vote. In the second group, he classified 56 electoral districts with a secure 'Catholic' majority, that is, districts in which a 'candidate with a Serb name' cannot be elected 'against the will of the Catholics'. In these districts, Mažuranić equated Catholics and Croats, and in addition to the districts with an absolute majority of Croats, he also included among the 'Catholic' electoral districts Osijek I and Osijek II, in which, according to the census from 1900, Germans had a relative majority, the district of Daruvar, in which the Serbs had a relative majority, and the districts of Vuka, Našice, and Virovitica, in which the Croats had a relative majority.

In the third group, Mažuranić included the remaining 11 'uncertain' districts, in which an approximately equal number of 'Catholics' and 'Serbs' lived. In contrast to districts with a secure 'Catholic' majority, where he equated Catholics and Croats, Mažuranić distinguished these two categories in certain 'uncertain' districts but not in others. Thus, in Nuštar, Vukovar, and Slatina, electoral districts with a relative Serb majority, and in Hercegovac, a district

with a relative Croat majority, the predominance of the 'Catholic' majority stood out; in the electoral district of Zemun, where there was a relative German majority, he distinguished between Germans and Croats and called for a joint Croat-Serb stand against the German candidate in the elections; and he 'said goodbye' to the electoral district of Ruma, noting the absolute majority of the German and Hungarian population in it. According to Mažuranić, Serbs in the 'uncertain' districts were supposed receive after the implementation of the electoral reform those few mandates so that they can be represented proportionally to their share in the total population of Croatia. Mažuranić claimed that it was planned that the Serbs would gain '23 to 24 districts' after the electoral reform was implemented.⁴⁸

In contrast, the Frankists claimed that, after the extension of voting rights, the Croats would be able to count on barely more than half of the electoral districts. They started from the fact that the Croats have an absolute majority in 53 or 54 electoral districts, and that 35 or 34 electoral districts would fall into non-Croat hands, that is, into the hands of Serbs, Hungarians, and Germans. In addition, they believed that, due to great political disunity and relatively small electoral districts with a Serb majority, which enabled the existence of a large Serb minority in districts with a Croat majority, the Croats would lose around ten more electoral districts in which they had a 'narrow' absolute majority. A narrow Croat absolute majority for the Frankists was every majority roughly below 70–75% in a particular electoral district, which, due to the political disunity of the Croat people, enabled the large Serb minority in some of those districts to have a great influence on the election of representatives.

In this context, the Frankists proved with numerous examples that the electoral districts with an absolute majority of the Serb population were much smaller than the electoral districts with an absolute majority of the Croat population, and that out of a total of 616,000 all Serbs in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, only 317,000 lived in 21 electoral districts with an absolute majority of the Serb population, while the remaining 254,000 Serbs influenced the political situation in around 20 other electoral districts. The Frankists agreed with the claims that the Serbs, since they make up a quarter of the population in Croatia, should get a quarter, that is, 22 electoral districts,

⁴⁸ "O noveli k izbornom zakonu", *Narodne novine*, no. 62, 17 March 1910, pp. 1–2; *Prilog 20. k stenografskim zapisnicima sabora kraljevina Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije g. 1908.-1913.*, pp. 65–71, 73–79.

in which they would constitute an absolute majority, on the condition that they do not represent any political factor in the other electoral districts.⁴⁹ For the time being, the Frankists did not ask for a completely new electoral geometry, but rather the multiplication of electoral districts by dividing the existing large electoral districts with a secure Croat majority.⁵⁰

This discussion shows the intention of the regime to reconcile the Croats with the existing electoral geometry. It was argued that the Serbs, according to their share of the population of Croatia, have the right to at least a quarter, that is, to 22 parliamentary mandates, and that, according to the existing electoral geometry, they will win one or two additional mandates in dubious districts, therefore not to the detriment of the Croats. In return, the Croats were shown that they would also benefit, because they would win all the remaining dubious districts, except for the district of Ruma, in which the Germans and Hungarians together made up the absolute majority, whereby the Croats, at the expense of other, non-Serb peoples, would also get more mandates than they deserve according to their share in population of Croatia. Based on this rhetoric, it is clear that Tomašić's regime accepted the national equality of Serbs in Croatia, where Serbs and Croats would enjoy political primacy. This regime ultimately aspired to Croat-Serb national unity, which would be realised within the Croatian political nation, for which the prerequisite was 'unshakable subject loyalty and faithfulness to the crown and firm faith in the ancient bond that binds us in a state union with the sister Kingdom of Hungary'.⁵¹ However, at this time, this aspiration, which was based on the belief that Serbdom in Croatia does not represent a 'distinct political idea', and that it does not endanger the 'political idea of Croatia or the political idea of our Croatian homeland', was illusory because a large number of the Croatian Serbs, having adopted the Serbian national idea, owed their loyalty only to the Serbian state.

⁴⁹ "Podpuno uništenje hrvatsva", *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4269, 14 February 1910, pp. 1–2; "Posrbice luduju za izbornom reformom", *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4249, 15 March 1910, pp. 4–5; "G. Vladimir Mažuranić za izbornu reformu", *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4297, 18 March 1910, pp. 2–3; "Izborna geometrija i srbstvo", *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4305, 29 March 1910, pp. 1–2; "Hrvatska izborna reforma", *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4314, 9 April 1910, p. 2; "Govor dra. Vladimira Franka izrečen u sjednici hrvatskog sabora od 12. svibnja 1910.", *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4351, 25 May 1910, pp. 1–8.

⁵⁰ "Govor dra. Vladimira Franka izrečen u sjednici hrvatskog sabora od 12. svibnja 1910.", *Hrvatsko pravo*, no. 4351, 25 May 1910, p. 4.

⁵¹ T. Cipek – S. Matković, op. cit., pp. 630–633.

The statistics speak in favour of the stated rhetoric of Tomašić's regime. According to the 1910 census, Croats made up 62.3%, Serbs 24.7%, and Germans 5.1% of the total population of Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. The rest were Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenians, and Ukrainians. According to their share in the population of Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, out of a total of 88 electoral districts (without Rijeka), Croats were supposed to have a majority in 55 electoral districts, Serbs in 22 electoral districts, and Germans in 4 electoral districts. The remaining 7 electoral districts were to be fictitiously won by Hungarians, Czechs (...) and others. However, according to the distribution of electoral districts, in 1910 Croats had an absolute majority in 55 electoral districts and a relative majority in another 3 electoral districts. Serbs had an absolute majority in 18 electoral districts and a relative majority in another 9 electoral districts. In three electoral districts, Petrinja, Ilok, and Dalj, the Serb relative majority was very close to 50%. Germans had a relative majority in 3 electoral districts.⁵² So, in relation to their share in the total population of Croatia, the Croats and Serbs gained influence with this division of electoral districts, while the Germans and especially the other mentioned minority peoples lost theirs.

On the other hand, the Frankists, who, due to their anti-Yugoslav policy, considered the Serbs to be the greatest threat to the interests and survival of the Croat people, believed that, as far as relations between Croats and Serbs are concerned, this electoral geometry favoured the Serbs and those Croatian political parties that enjoyed the support of the Serbs. The statistics undoubtedly confirm their opinion. According to the population census of 1910, there were an average of 29,665 inhabitants per electoral district in Croatia. Of the 58 electoral districts with an absolute or relative Croat majority, 26 (45%) of them were populated below that average, while 32 (55%) were populated above it. On the other hand, of the 27 electoral districts with a Serb absolute or relative majority, 17 (63%) of them were populated below that average, while 10 (37%) of them were populated above it. The average number of inhabitants in majority-Serb electoral districts was 27,912, while the average number of inhabitants in majority-Croat electoral districts was 31,025.

⁵² HDA, PrZv, box 914, *Žiteljstvo (muško /građansko i vojno/ i žensko) izbornih kotara po sadašnjem izbornom redu.*

447,701 Serbs lived in majority-Serb electoral districts, which means that an average of 16,582 Serbs lived in each of them. At the same time, 1,438,764 Croats lived in majority-Croat electoral districts, which means that an average of 24,806 Croats lived each such district. Of the 644,937 Serbs who lived in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia in 1910, 69% lived in majority-Serb electoral districts. Of the 1,627,059 Croats who lived in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia in 1910, 88% lived in majority-Croat electoral districts. While 31% of the Serb population, or 197,236 of them, were outside the majority-Serb electoral districts, 12% of the Croat population, or 188,295 of them, were outside the majority-Croat districts.⁵³ Thus, the majority-Serb electoral districts were much smaller than the majority-Croat electoral districts, and not only did they encompass less of the total population than the majority-Croat electoral districts, but they also encompassed less of the Serb population than the majority-Croat electoral districts encompassed the Croat population. The Serb population outside the majority Serb districts could influence the situation in the majority-Croat, politically non-unified districts to a greater extent than the Croat population in the majority-Serb, politically unified districts.

This conclusion emerges even more clearly if we take into account the population that had the right to vote in Croatia in 1910. As stated, due to the extension of the right to vote, 190,043 men of legal age had the right to vote that year. Of that number, there were 134,017 (70.5%) Croats, 40,773 (21.45%) Serbs, 8,388 (4.4%) Germans, and others. Thus, the share of Croat electors in the total number of electors was higher than the share of Croats in the total population of Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, while the share of Serb and German electors in the total number of electors was lower than the share of Serbs and Germans in the total population of Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. In the case of the Serbs, this was the result of their economically weaker position, while in the case of the Germans it was probably the result of the fact that some of the newly immigrated

⁵³ HDA, PrZv, box 914, *Žiteljstvo (muško /građansko i vojno/ i žensko) izbornih kotara po sadašnjem izbornom redu.*

Germans⁵⁴ did not yet have domicile status in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia at that time and were therefore unable to exercise the right to vote.⁵⁵

According to this share of individual nationalities in the population with the right to vote, Croats should have had a majority in 62 and Serbs in 19 electoral districts. However, Croat electors constituted the majority, absolute and relative, in 59 electoral districts, i.e. in 67% of all electoral districts, which was less than their share in the population with the right to vote, while Serb electors constituted the majority, absolute and relative, in 27 electoral districts, that is, in 30.6% of all electoral districts, which was more than their share in the population with the right to vote. Therefore, if the voting population is taken into account, according to Khuen's electoral geometry, the Croats lost their majority in 3, while the Serbs gained the majority in 8 electoral districts in 1910.

In 1910, Croat electors constituted an absolute majority in 58 electoral districts, and a relative majority in one electoral district. When compared to the situation according to the shares in the total population by electoral district, Croat electors made up the absolute majority of electors in the electoral district Osijek I, where Croats constituted only a relative majority of the total number of inhabitants, and in the electoral district Osijek II, where the Germans constituted a relative majority of the population. In addition, Croat electors made up the absolute majority of electors in the electoral district Gospić, where Serbs constituted an absolute majority of the total number of inhabitants, in the electoral district Petrinja, where Serbs constituted a relative majority of the total number of inhabitants, and in the electoral district Hercegovac, where Croats constituted only a relative majority of the total number

⁵⁴ A wave of immigration of economically powerful German and Hungarian peasantry to Slavonia began in the mid-19th century, and was completed at the beginning of the 20th century. Until its completion, this immigration was greater than the natural increase of the Croat and Serb population in Slavonia. Mladen Lorković, *Narod i zemlja Hrvata*, Matica hrvatska, Zagreb, 1939, pp. 96–106.

⁵⁵ According to the law of 1880, domicile affiliation to one of the municipalities in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, which was one of the conditions for having the right to vote in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, was automatically acquired by birth, marriage, or permanent employment in the public service. On the other hand, domicile status was not acquired automatically by settling in one of the Croatian municipalities, but after four years of continuous residence in that municipality and paying municipal levies, with the municipal leadership having the final decision on approving the person's new domicile ties. Dalibor Čepulo, "Pravo hrvatske zavičajnosti i pitanje hrvatskog i ugarskog državljanstva 1868-1918 – pravni i politički vidovi i poredbena motrišta", *Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu*, vol. 49, no. 6, 1999, pp. 806–808.

of inhabitants. On the other hand, Croat electors were in the minority in the electoral districts Brlog and Slunj, where Croats constituted an absolute majority of the total number of inhabitants.⁵⁶

Serb electors had an absolute majority in 22 electoral districts, while they constituted a relative majority in 5 electoral districts. With the aforementioned loss of the electoral districts of Gospić, where Serbs made up the absolute majority of the total number of inhabitants, and Petrinja, where they made up the relative majority of the total number of inhabitants, and with the aforementioned gain of the electoral districts of Brlog and Slunj, where Croats made up the absolute majority of the total number of inhabitants, the Serb electors constituted an absolute majority of electors in three electoral districts where Serbs constituted only a relative majority of the total number of inhabitants: Ilok, Dalj, and Srijemski Karlovci.

According to the situation in 1910, one electoral district had an average of 2,160 electors. A below-average number of electors was present in 41 electoral districts. Of that number, there were 23 electoral districts with a majority of Croat electors, 17 electoral districts with a majority of Serb electors, and one electoral district with a majority of German electors. There were 47 above-average electoral districts, of which 36 districts with a majority of Croat electors, 10 districts with a majority of Serb electors and one district with a majority of German electors. Therefore, 39% of electoral districts with a majority of Croat electors had a below-average number of electors, and 61% of electoral districts with a majority of Croat electors had an above-average number of electors. In contrast, 63% of electoral districts with a majority of Serb electors had a below-average number of electors, while 27% of electoral districts with a majority of Serb electors had an above-average number of electors.

The total number of electors in electoral districts with a majority of Croat electors was 141,014, and each electoral district with a majority of Croat electors had an average of 2,390 electors. The total number of electors in electoral districts with a majority of Serb electors was 45,671, and each electoral district with a majority of Serb electors had an average of 1,691 electors. 122,735 Croat electors, or 91.6% of all Croat electors, lived in electoral districts with a majority of Croat electors, while 27,698 Serb electors, or 68%

⁵⁶ HDA, PrZv, box 914, *Sumarni statistički iskaz izbornika (Temeljem listina sastavljenih prema ustanovama izborne reforme od 28. svibnja 1910.)*.

of all Serb electors, lived in electoral districts with a majority of Serb electors. 11,282 or about 8% of Croat electors lived outside majority-Croat electoral districts, while 13,075 or 32% of Serb electors lived outside majority-Serb electoral districts.⁵⁷

Conclusion

The electoral geometry in Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, which, by favouring the Serb part of the population, had helped *Ban* Khuen-Héderváry secure a parliamentary majority, lost the function of an exclusive support for the regime after Khuen's departure from Croatia, and also became a support for the Croat-Serb Coalition in its aspiration to power. In this aspiration, the Coalition had two opponents. The first of them was the compromise regime, which, in addition to the electoral geometry, could influence the results of the elections with a high electoral census, by which the right to vote was narrowed down to a small number of people, largely those dependent on the regime. Another opponent of the Coalition were the Frankists (Pure Party of the Right/Starčević's Croatian Party of the Right), whose electorate consisted exclusively of Croats and who sought to change the electoral geometry in favour of the Croat part of the population and reduce the property threshold, i.e. introduce universal suffrage. By concluding an agreement with Nikola Tomašić, the Coalition managed to pass an electoral law that lowered the property threshold while retaining the previous division of electoral districts, which enabled it to establish its position against both opponents and secure its dominance in the Croatian Parliament for a longer time.

⁵⁷ HDA, PrZv, box 914, *Sumarni statistički iskaz izbornika (Temeljem listina sastavljenih prema ustanovama izborne reforme od 28. svibnja 1910.)*.

KHUENOVA IZBORNA GEOMETRIJA U TOMAŠIĆEVU IZBORNOME ZAKONU IZ 1910. GODINE

Sažetak

U ovome se radu analiziraju političke prilike koje su utjecale na donošenje Zakona o izbornom redu Kraljevine Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije, koji je donesen 28. svibnja 1910. Također, uspoređuje se javna rasprava o tome zakonu s relevantnim statističkim podacima. Taj je zakon smanjio imovinski prag i očuvao postojeću podjelu na izborne jedinice koja je bila primijenjena u takozvanome Khuenovu izbornom zakonu. Tako je očuvan i ključni utjecaj Srba na hrvatskoj političkoj sceni. Međutim to više nisu bili Srbi lojalni režimu, već zovu iz Beograda.

Ključne riječi: izborni zakon; izborna geometrija; Nikola Tomašić; Hrvatsko-srpska koalicija; frankovci.