

PROMOTION OF TUTELARY DEMOCRACY AS A SOCIAL ENGINEERING PROJECT BY A POLITICAL INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT: A STUDY ON *YÖN* JOURNAL

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Summary

*Although the widely-accepted definition of democracy ensures governing people for the people by the people, it has been reinterpreted by the Turkish left, and it has been noted that real democracy can only be sustained via a socialist revolution. *Yön Journal* has gained a critical place in reinterpreting the classical definition of democracy and pioneered the construction of a socialist ideology blended with the principles of Kemalism and nationalism. Realizing the key role of *Yön Journal* in Turkey's road to democracy, this study aimed to explore how the essence of democracy was considered within the journal and what identifying characteristics the concept of democracy had within the framework of *Yön Journal*. In line with this purpose, grounded theory was adopted as the research methodology, and all authored and anonymous articles in 222 issues of the journal were examined through the constant comparative method and hermeneutic approach. The results revealed that *Yöncüler* attributed a tutelary feature to the quintessence of democracy. Correspondingly, it was concluded that the socialist ideology adopted in *Yön Journal* pursued a tutelary democracy, and *Yöncüler* did not build tutelary ideology only on the inadequacy of the people, but also on the need for a leading cadre.*

Keywords: *democracy; tutelary democracy; social engineering; *Yön Journal*; Turkish political life.*

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1 INTRODUCTION

In the conjuncture of Turkish political sphere in the 1960s, various fractions in the Turkish left tended to question and re-interpret the classical definition of democracy as “government of the people, for the people, by the people.” In the particular historical course of the left in question, the concept of democracy is mostly considered as “bourgeois democracy.” The idea that real democracy can only be achieved with socialist revolution has taken a place as a dominant parameter within the ideological tendency. Ultimately, this mindset has always been a possible obstacle to the development of Turkish democracy.

In Turkey in the 1960s, as a representative of the socialist school, *Yön* Journal also represented an idea movement, which acted on the above-mentioned understanding. Rather than being a marginal and “narrow Marxist publication,” the journal was “a broad-based discussion platform where different fundamentalist and leftist views were expressed.”¹ *Yön*, which started its publication life with an elitist staff and discourse, pioneered the construction of a new ideological movement. This trend supported a socialist ideology blended with the principles of Kemalism and nationalism. Two factors played a significant role in the development of the intellectual foundation of this movement. The first factor was the aforementioned ideological mindset, and the second one was the anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, and ethatist rhetoric, which transformed it into a coalition movement. In this respect, *Yön* gained an important place in Turkish political life as it was the locomotive and representative of the leftist bourgeois movement.

Throughout its publication life, *Yön* Journal sought to influence the politics of the country, to canalize the political preferences of Turkish left, and to determine the remedies for the development of Turkey. The journal also aimed to direct the Turkish left and radicalism and to give it a new ideological content.² However, the frustrations about Turkish democracy of that period led the journal to come to the fore as a revolutionary political idea movement. Actually, as the representative of an influential political idea movement, *Yöncüler* had the distinction of being the first socialist movement so as to struggle to come to power via anti-democratic methods. With this aim in mind, the leading staff of the journal took an active role in Turkish political life and became an important representative of “top down” and “revolution from above” discourses and practices. In this respect, *Yön* Journal was the equivalent of “a typical intellectual or petty bourgeois radicalism” in the political sphere.³

Considering the political atmosphere of the period, *Yön* Journal was a very stable and long-running intellectual movement and influenced various pressure groups of the period, especially the army, university youth, and progressive intellectuals throughout its publication life. This characteristic of *Yön* led to the motivation to act to be realized with an anti-democratic element. In this vein, the main purpose of the

1 Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, trans. Yasemin Saner (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018), 292.

2 Hasan Cemal, *Kimse Kızmasın, Kendimi Yazdım* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 1999), 109.

3 Ergun Aydınoglu, *Türkiye Solu (1960-1980)* (İstanbul: Verus Kitap, 2011), 89.

study is to analyse the meaning ascribed to democracy by a group of intellectuals who gathered around *Yön*, a journal of ideas and actions, and their perception of Turkish democracy of the period in line with this meaning. This study draws on the basic assumption that *Yön Journal has a tutelary democracy understanding* and aims to reveal the building blocks, basic motivations, and reasons of such an understanding, if such an understanding exists. As it is known, Turkish democracy has a comprehensive history of *tutelage* practices. However, there is dearth of research addressing such issues as *intellectual roots* or *intellectual infrastructure* leading to the emergence of tutelary practices. The present study aims to fill in this research gap, albeit partially. To this end, Glaser and Strauss's (1967) grounded theory was adopted as the research methodology. In this connection, the constant comparison method and hermeneutic approach were utilised to analyse qualitative data obtained from all authored or anonymous articles published in 222 issues of *Yön Journal* throughout its publication life between the years of 1961 and 1967. To provide theoretical insights into the concept of tutelary democracy, a section throwing light on both the essence of tutelary democracy and empirical studies focusing on the relationships between the print media and political issues was included in the present study. After this theory-oriented section, a methodological section was added to put forward a coherent and comprehensive explanation respectively on the data source, research design and data analysis method, and reliability. Lastly, the findings of the current study were presented under four main sub-sections, namely democracy, desire for social engineering, social structure reforms, and determining factors. Besides, a conclusion section clarified educating points of the concepts discussed throughout the study.

2 THEORETICAL LENS ON THE ESSENCE OF TUTELARY DEMOCRACY

In modern democratic systems, two principles constitute the essence of democracy: decision-making bodies are elected by people and the will of the people is the main basis for legitimacy. However, in a political structure where decision-making bodies cannot be determined freely or where powers that do not hold any accountability to the public in the decision-making process are involved in political life, it is not possible to mention a real democratic administration even if all other conditions exist. Such political structures, which have a democratic appearance but are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic, are mentioned in the literature of political theory and political science as “semi-democracy,” “democracy in appearance,” “so-called democracy,” and “tutelary democracy”⁴ because they are not regarded as “developed and settled” democracy.⁵

Tutelary democracy is a concept used to refer to the regimes in which the elected government is faced with anti-democratic control as a result of the pressure

4 Serap Yazıcı, *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Türkiye* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012), 139.

5 Kenneth Newton, and Jan W. Van Deth, *Karşılaştırmalı Siyasetin Temelleri*, trans. Esin Saraçoğlu (Ankara: Phoneix Yayınları, 2014), 60.

of non-democratic actors, whereas elections can be held freely and fairly.⁶ Since anti-democratic forces are strong in these regimes, the political power cannot perform its role properly and remains ineffective. These anti-democratic forces can be the army, the church or any religious group, a traditional aristocratic community, as well as landowners or business circles,⁷ media bosses, academics, or columnists. Although political election is determined as an established principle, elections do not aim to determine the *authority to make the final decision*, because in many of these semi-democracies, various power groups such as the armed forces, which are the protectors or guardians of the nation, have a “silent veto” right with regard to the decisions to be put into practice by civil authorities.⁸

As a result of factors such as the privatization of industries, the appearance of judges in the political scene, and the autonomy of some public institutions from the elected power, democratic control weakened and alternative power groups came to existence. This led to the limitation of the sphere of the elected political powers’ influence.⁹ Therefore, it is seen that electoral democracy still exists in tutelary democracy due to elections held regularly; however, when a legitimate government is elected, unelected actors restrict the process of democratic policy-making.¹⁰ In other words, in tutelary democracy, there is an understanding of government that moves away from the democratic ideal, does not comply with basic democratic principles and values, postpones the demands of the people, narrows down the political field, limits political decision-makers room for manoeuvre, place some political and social spheres under tutelage,¹¹ and justifies the demands of elitist circles. Although it allows for the existence of some democratic values and institutions (e.g., free and fair elections), tutelary democracy is an *incomplete, limited and imperfect* democracy model. This model is desired by people who are in favour of “elitist” and “authoritarian” democracy,¹² and civil society needs to be weak so that this model can be put into practice. Chile after Pinochet, Portugal after the 1974 revolution, Guatemala at the end of the 1980s, and Turkey until the 2000s are among the examples of the tutelary democracy practice.¹³

The first theoretical study on tutelary democracy model was carried out

6 Adam Przeworski, “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” in *Constitutionalism and Democracy (Studies in Rationality and Social Change)*, eds. John Elster, and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 60-61; Julio Samuel Valenzuela, *Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions* (Notre Dame: The Helen Kellogg Institute For International Studies, 1990), 1-37.

7 Newton and Deth, *Karşılaştırmalı Siyasetin Temelleri*, 61.

8 Fatih Demirci, “1982 Anayasası’nda Demokratik Devlet İlkesi: Kavramsal ve Yapısal Bir Analiz Denemesi,” *Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 12, no.1-2 (2008): 654.

9 Rod Hague, and Martin Harrop, *Siyaset Bilimi: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Giriş*, trans. İbrahim Yıldız, Soner Torlak, and İdil Çetin (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2014), 57.

10 Direnç Kanol, “Tutelary Democracy in Unrecognized States,” *Lefke Avrupa Üniversitesi (LAÜ) Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 6, no. 1 (2015): 65.

11 Bekir Berat Özipek et al., *Vesayetsiz ve Tam Demokratik Bir Türkiye İçin İnsan Onuruna Dayanan Yeni Anayasa* (Ankara: Başak Matbaası, 2011), 30.

12 Mehmet Güneş, *Vesayetçi Demokrasi* (Ankara: Savaş Yayınevi, 2013), 255-256.

13 Kanol, “Tutelary Democracy,” 65.

by Edward Shils in his book entitled *Political Development in the New States*.¹⁴ Since Shils regards tutelary democracy as a type of political democracy, he prefers to evaluate it through the concept of political democracy. In this context, political democracy is considered as “the regime of civilian rule through representative institutions and public liberties.”¹⁵ Tutelary democracy, on the other hand, is a different version of political democracy that is suggested to the elites of the new states by the concept itself. “It does so because it is more authoritative than political democracy, and also because the institutions of public opinion and the civil order do not seem qualified to carry the burden which political democracy would impose on them.”¹⁶ The intellectual basis of the elitist assumption is that people do not currently have the capacity to effectively operate democratic institutions in the face of the duties of the new states.¹⁷ In other words, based on the pretext that people are incapable of fulfilling the requirements of the democratic society, political elites opt for taking the duty of democratization on themselves. Linz¹⁸ sees tutelary democracy as a political regime in which the elites tend to undertake the mission of democratizing the state but are uncertain about how to do this.

One of the factors that play a role in the construction of tutelary thought is the desire for social engineering. The political atmosphere in the early 20th century can help us in comprehending the relations of tutelary power groups with social changes in the context of social engineering. Especially in the period from the late Ottoman period to the foundation of the modern Republic, intensive attempts were made to create “a new nation,” “a new society,” and “a new person”.¹⁹ The prototypical example of such initiatives is the French Revolution, and the Soviet model is the most obvious embodiment of it. Its importance in Turkish political life is that it functioned as an intellectual foundation for legitimizing tutelage. The central motive of this understanding, which is designed as an *engineering* model, is to realize a “delayed modernity”, because “non-civilized” people always pose a danger and are regarded as “a raw material to be processed in a turning machine [to be shaped ideologically].”²⁰ This understanding allows the elites of *late* societies to harvest hegemonic power. In this context, straightforward understanding of “progress” is adopted: just as it is necessary to dominate nature for development of civilization, it is necessary to rule people for political progress, because social engineering posits that people are “wild” and “undeveloped”.²¹ Thus, for logical functioning of social engineering, the existence of certain minimum conditions is essential for bringing society to an advanced, contemporary and modern level; if they do not exist, they must be created

14 Newell M. Stultz, “Parliament in a Tutelary Democracy: A Recent Case in Kenya,” *The Journal of Politics* 31, no. 1 (1969): 116.

15 Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), 51.

16 Shils, *Political Development*, 61.

17 Shils, *Political Development*, 62.

18 Juan J. Linz, *Totaliter ve Otoriter Rejimler*, trans. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2017), 18.

19 Ferhat Kentel, “Askeri vesayetin çaresizliği,” *Stratejikboyut* 2, no.7 (2010): 18.

20 Kentel, “Askeri,” 19.

21 Kentel, “Askeri,” 18.

somehow. As a natural consequence of this understanding, “contemporary Western consciousness”²² is imposed on society through top-down education. In this way, people will reach the qualifications that will provide the minimum conditions for a democratic order and will be able to make healthy choices on issues that concern the democratic society.²³

In sum, tutelary democracy is a model of democracy in which power groups, trying to establish tutelary on politics and society on the pretext that people are inadequate, have the freedom of action. In this type of regime, in which democratic institutions exist as a formality, the public is not considered competent to make healthy decisions regarding public affairs because it is believed that the public is not mature enough to declare intention on political and social issues. For this reason, the existence of various organs/guardians who will declare intention on behalf of and for the people is legitimized.

2.1 Literature Review: Empirical Studies Focusing on the Relationship between the Press and the Construction of Political Thought

Considering that “media is an integral part of any society,” the impact of the press on the people’s mindset and “the role of media in constructing the social” should not be underestimated.²⁴ Hence, it is of critical importance to shed light on the responsibility, role, and place of the press within individuals’ lives. So far, various studies have been conducted to examine the association between the media and several prominent movements of thought²⁵ and explore the reflections of salient public-related cases upon the press.²⁶

To exemplify, Kuypers²⁷ puts a strong and special emphasis on the living and evolving relationship between the media and politics in his book, entitled “Press

22 Kentel, “Askeri,” 18.

23 Vahap Coşkun, “Bir vesayet aracı olarak Kürt meselesi,” *Stratejikboyut* 2, no. 7 (2010): 48.

24 Tripta Sharma, “The Role of Press in the Politics of Knowledge in Development: Challenges of Creating ‘Alternatives’ in Media,” *Studies in Indian Politics* 10, no.1 (2022): 118.

25 Jim A. Kuypers, *Press Bias and Politics: How the Media Frame Controversial Issues* (London: Praeger Publication, 2002); Herbert F. Pimlott, “Marxism’s ‘Communicative Crises’? Mapping Debates over Leninist Print-Media Practices in the 20th Century,” *Communication Studies Faculty Publications* 2, no. 2 (2006): 57-77; Ty West, “Conservative Strategies to Promote New Media: Conservative Thought and the Press in Mexico 1848-1856,” *Tiempo Histórico: Revista de la Escuela de Historia* 11, no. 20 (2020): 57-77; Shraddha Tiwari, and Jaggi Ruchi, “Media Framing of the Covid-19 Pandemic in Indian Print Media: A Content Analysis of Editorials in The Times of India, The Indian Express and Hindustan Times,” *International Journal of Early Childhood* 14, no. 4 (2022): 2603-2611.

26 Peter Deli, “The Quality Press and the Soviet Union: A Case Study of the Reactions of the Manchester Guardian, the New Statesman and the Times to Stalin’s Great Purges, 1936-38,” *Media History* 5, no. 2 (1999): 159-189; Bessie Mitsikopoulou, and Lykou Christina, “The Discursive Construction of the Recent European Economic Crisis in Two Political Magazines,” *On the Horizon* 23, no. 3 (2015): 190-201; Gulsan Ara Parvin et al., “Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: The Role of Printing in Asian Countries,” *Frontiers in Communication* 5, no. 557593 (2020): 1-20.

27 Kuypers, *Press Bias and Politics*, 1-2.

Bias and Politics: How the Media Frame Controversial Issues.” In this vein, he pays particular attention to “the opinions of experts, politicians, prominent social figures, religious leaders, and academic and technical leaders” to understand and further clarify the influence of the printed press on “the messages of political and social leaders when they discuss controversial issues.”²⁸ Similarly, as a recent study in the related literature, Sharma’s²⁹ study focuses primarily on “how the role of press in establishing the hegemony of the modern-industrial west works through the politics of news.”

On the other hand, Deli³⁰ questions “the reactions of the quality press to developments in the other contemporaneous European dictatorship, the Soviet Union” in his research study. He selected *New Statesman*, *The Times*, and *Manchester Guardian* as data sources to throw light on three different political views and voices, namely the left-wing intellectuals, conservative establishment, and the liberal opinion.³¹ His study can be regarded as a leading study exemplifying to what extent the press can have an impact on people’s understanding of political and social events.

In a similar connection, the study of Mitsikopoulou and Lykou³² aims at analysing “discursive constructions of the economic crisis in two political magazines of different ideological positioning by placing emphasis on the economic crisis in Greece, the ‘weak link’ of the Eurozone.” The findings revealed rather non-overlapping and discrete assumptions over the economic crisis, when the texts of two selected British political magazines, i.e., *The New Statesman* and *The Spectator*, were investigated.

In light of the abovementioned studies, it can be noted that conducting studies whose major focus is on the particular relationships between the press and the social, historical, and political events has cardinal importance in charting and interpreting the role and responsibility of the media in constructing individuals’ political attitudes and ideologies. The current study, concordantly, puts a specific importance to the effect of a print magazine on the formation and understanding of the construction of tutelary democracy. In line with this purpose, *Yön Journal* was determined as the data source and all the articles that were included in the journal were examined via the constant comparison method and hermeneutic approach by adopting Glaser and Strauss’s grounded theory as the research methodology. Considering the theoretical and methodological framework adopted in this study, it can be suggested that the present study will make a current contribution to the relevant literature because it basically aims at providing more accurate understanding of Turkish thought and political structure.

28 Kuypers, *Press Bias and Politics*, 1-2.

29 Sharma, “The Role of Press,” 118.

30 Deli, “The Quality Press and the Soviet Union,” 159.

31 Deli, “The Quality Press and the Soviet Union,” 159.

32 Mitsikopoulou and Lykou, “The Discursive,” 190.

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Data Source: *Yön Journal (1961-1967)*

Yön Journal is a national journal of art and ideology published weekly. *Yön*, which started its publication life by publishing its first issue on 20 December 1961 and published its last issue on 30 June 1967, contributed to the intellectual sphere with a total of 222 issues. Described as the most robust step in “the path of Atatürk,” *Yön* signals “a turning point in Turkey’s intellectual life” in view of its effects.³³ Under the leadership of Doğan Avcıoğlu, the “concessionaire and responsible manager” of the journal, the journal’s authors include İlhan Selçuk, Mümtaz Soysal, İlhami Soysal, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Sadun Aren, Çetin Altan, Abdi İpekçi, Nihat Erim, Selahattin Hilav, Turan Güneş, Rıfat Ilgaz, Orhan Kemal, Kemal Tahir, Atilla İlhan, Türkkaya Ataöv, and Bahri Savcı, who were among the leading intellectuals of the period representing various professions (e.g., journalists, authors, and academics). However, the founding staff of the journal consists of the trio of Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu, Mümtaz Soysal, and Doğan Avcıoğlu.

As a journal of ideology and doctrine,³⁴ “*YÖN* is a revolutionary journal that seeks to eliminate the contradictions in our economic structure and make development with democracy a national excitement, and an ideological movement that believes in the creativity of revolutions and represents Turkish alertness for the development of the world.”³⁵ Therefore, rather than being a mere journal, it is realized as “a movement”.³⁶ Besides, “*YÖN* is an organ that stands against the status quo with all its facades throughout its publication life and defends radical changes in every field.”³⁷ At this point, “(...) there are two things to do for the socialists: on the one hand, defending the economic and social freedom of the Turkish people step by step in certain fronts, on the other hand, preparing tomorrow’s Turkey by thinking, working and approaching the people (...).”³⁸ According to *Yöncüler*,³⁹ “socialists are the spirit and brain of this struggle.”⁴⁰ For an underdeveloped country like Turkey, socialism is seen as “the only way out, the only bright way” that will solve the socio-economic problems of the country and save democracy.⁴¹ For this purpose, a conceptualization of “Turkish socialism” peculiar to Turkey has been developed. It is argued that

33 Fay Kirby Berkes, “Yön’ün yükselttiği ses,” *Yön*, November 6, 1964, 16.

34 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, “Don Kişot’un yeldeğirmenleri ile savaşı,” *Yön*, February 14, 1962, 7.

35 Türkkaya Ataöv, “Devrimler bitmez,” *Yön*, May 14, 1962, 6.

36 İlhan Selçuk, “Gerçeklerin yönü,” *Yön*, September 25, 1964, 5.

37 Yön, “YÖN’den YÖN’cülere,” *Yön*, September 25, 1964, 2.

38 Mümtaz Soysal, “Küçüklükler komedisi,” *Yön*, February 25, 1965, 3.

39 In a panel titled as “Have we managed to build a Turkey that Atatürk missed? (Atatürk’ün özlediği Türkiye’yi kurabildik mi?)” Doğan Avcıoğlu used the expression of *Yöncüler* which means the writers of *Yön* for the first time. *Yön*, November 11, 1962, 12. Therefore, this identification causes the way of thinking of the authors who adopt the same program around *Yön Journal* to be evaluated as a political movement or a school of thought. For this purpose, the concept of *Yöncüler* will be used to describe this movement throughout the study.

40 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Muhalefet, asıl şimdi başlıyor...,” *Yön*, February 19, 1965, 3.

41 Mümtaz Soysal, “İkinci yılın eşğinde,” *Yön*, December 19, 1962, 3.

etatism is ascribed a new meaning with Turkish socialism and it should be rebuilt in a dimension that will include every field: "Building socialism requires a much wider socialization and deep ideological and cultural transformations."⁴² According to Aydemir,⁴³ "(...) this is a new, nationalist, Kemalist, independent order. Etatism should be a social order that includes all areas of national life, not only economic state management, but also private enterprise. This is Turkish socialism."

Toktamış Ateş,⁴⁴ who discusses the role that socialism can play in realizing the revolution desired by intellectuals in underdeveloped countries, emphasizes the tutelary component of socialism. According to him, the desire to create a new society and people in underdeveloped countries should outweigh the development of the country. In this respect, endeavours to transform local commitments, which are mostly seen as feudal or tribal relations, into a national commitment and loyalty should predominate. According to Ateş,⁴⁵ this situation "[is] a task for ideology." *Yön* authors' idea to create a new "Turkish socialism" or "new etatism" specific to Turkey can be considered in this context. One of the basic political theses of this thought, which wants to implement socialism with the support of the state, is "to gain efficiency over the state mechanism."⁴⁶ After safeguarding state sovereignty, initially social structure is transformed and then the individual is transformed into a *good* socialist person. Thus, the state is influential not only in the economic area but also in other areas. Moreover, one of the important function of the state is to work "for the well-being of the ignorant and immature masses, it is imperative to mould these masses through education policies of the state."⁴⁷ The basic assumption of these people, who are mostly described as "statist socialists," is that there can be no common life and social solidarity without dominant-authoritarian guidance and education. "Therefore, since a free society or socialism and communism cannot arise from individuals or by meeting their needs and interests together, *this will be realized step by step by the state on their behalf*, for them and without their wishes."⁴⁸ According to Bal,⁴⁹ "the duty of a 'good' state is to oblige 'bad' people, whose social consciousness has not yet formed and who are immature, to comply with public opinion represented by the state." This conceptualization of state, which is a representative of the paternalist state tradition, adopts a "paternalistic" behavioural pattern in its essence, and it "not only prescribes citizens *what* they should not do, but also tells them *what* to do and *how* to

42 Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Halkçı, devletçi, devrimci ve milliyetçi kalkınma yolu," *Yön*, May 14, 1965, 9.

43 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, "Artık devletçilik yetmez," *Yön*, September 12, 1962, 14.

44 Toktamış Ateş, *Demokrasi: Kavram, tarihi süreç ve ilkeler* (İstanbul: Eser Matbaası, 1976), 172-173.

45 Ateş, *Demokrasi*, 173.

46 Rolf Cantzen, *Daha az devlet daha çok toplum: Özgürlük, ekoloji, anarşizm*, trans. Veysel Ataman (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1994), 23.

47 Cantzen, *Daha az devlet*, 24.

48 Cantzen, *Daha az devlet*, 25.

49 Hüseyin Bal, "Pozitif özgürlük'ün zorunlu paternalizmi," *Turkish Studies-International Periodical for the Turkish Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic* 9, no. 1 (2014): 71.

do.”⁵⁰ Therefore, *Yön* views socialism as a basic instrument for ensuring adoption of a rational view in civic life and creating the Western human model in underdeveloped countries such as Turkey.

3.2 Research Design and Data Analysis Method

The current study adopted Glaser and Strauss’s⁵¹ grounded theory as the research methodology. In Charmaz’s⁵² words, grounded theory is “a rigorous method of conducting research in which researchers construct conceptual frameworks or theories through building inductive theoretical analyses from data and subsequently checking their theoretical interpretations.” In this vein, it can be noted that grounded theory necessitates a “unified theoretical explanation,”⁵³ and the focus of the grounded theory is on “the discovery of theory from data systematically obtained from social research”. Correspondingly, the present research study aimed to carry out inductive theoretical analyses from qualitative data, obtained through a periodical publication, namely *Yön* Journal, and the constant comparative method⁵⁴ was utilised to perform analyses. By giving a detailed definition of the method, Charmaz⁵⁵ describes the constant comparison method as follows:

A method of analysis that generates successively more abstract concepts and theories through inductive processes of comparing data with data, data with code, code with code, code with category, category with category, and category with concept. In the last stages of analysis, researchers compare their major categories with those in relevant scholarly literatures. Comparisons then constitute each stage of analytic development. Grounded theorists use this method to reveal the properties and range of the emergent categories and to raise the level of abstraction of their developing categories.

In this connection, it can be stated that the analysis process of grounded theory research is ongoing, and “data collection and analysis are interrelated processes.”⁵⁶ Taking the same stance toward data collection and analysis, the present study also employed the constant comparison method as the data analysis method. Besides, based on the theoretical analyses, which were grounded in the data, theoretical interpretations were put on the obtained data through the hermeneutic (interpretive) approach,⁵⁷ which allows avoiding data losses and superficial evaluation of data in the analysis process.

50 Bal, “Pozitif,” 72.

51 Barney B. Glaser, and Anselm L. Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Quality Research* (New Brunswick and London: Aldine Transaction, 1967).

52 Kathy Charmaz, *Construction Grounded Theory* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2014), 652.

53 John W. Creswell, and Cheryl N. Poth, *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2018), 133.

54 Glaser, and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*, 2.

55 Charmaz, *Construction Grounded Theory*, 651.

56 Juliet Corbin, and Anselm Strauss, “Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons, and Evaluative Criteria,” *Qualitative Sociology* 1, no. 31 (1990): 6.

57 Orhan Gökçe, *Klasik ve Nitel İçerik Analizi: Felsefe, Yöntem, Uygulama* (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2019), 52.

3.2.1 Reliability

In order to ensure the reliability in the research, the *peer review/examination* approach⁵⁸ was used as the primary technique. Within the *peer review/examination* approach, “discussions with colleagues regarding the process of study, the congruency of emerging findings with the raw data, and tentative interpretations are conducted.”⁵⁹ On the other hand, in addition to *peer review/examination*, *consensus coding* method⁶⁰ was used to ensure reliability in the study. This method is preferred with large-scale, multidimensional and comprehensive data sources and requires the experts (coders), who will perform the analysis, to constantly interact and discuss the themes and codes found and to reach a final consensus in this way. The current study aims to minimize interrater differences that can threaten reliability by using *consensus coding* method in addition to *expert review* and thereby to conduct a sound qualitative content analysis.⁶¹

4 FINDINGS

In this section of the study, the findings of qualitative content analysis of authored and anonymous articles published in *Yön* Journal are presented. To this end, a total of four themes, namely democracy, desire for social engineering, social structure reforms, and determining factors, were included in the findings of the research.

4.1 Democracy

This section discusses the definition of democracy, Turkish democracy and “non-parliamentary” codes under the main theme of democracy. Each of these codes deals with the comprehensive evaluations of *Yön* authors with regard to the concept of democracy in general and Turkish democracy in particular. Each of these evaluations is noteworthy for determining state of affair in the Turkish democracy of the period in line with the meaning *Yöncüler* attributes to the concept of democracy and revealing the proposed solutions for the current situation.

Definition of Democracy: Conceptually, the term democracy was first mentioned in the *Yön* Declaration released at the beginning of *Yön*'s publication life. In the Declaration, democracy is referred to as a ruling system that can solve social problems and described as a type of regime, “above all, a regime based on human dignity and considers human as having a superior value.”⁶² In this context, it is also argued that “a regime that cannot find a cure for famine, unemployment

58 Sharan B. Merriam, and Elizabeth J. Tisdell, *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass A Wiley Brand, 2016).

59 Merriam and Tisdell, *Qualitative Research*, 259.

60 Jennie C. De Gagne et al., “Uncovering Cyberincivility Among Nurses and Nursing Students on Twitter: A Data Mining Study,” *International Journal of Nursing Studies* 89 (2019): 27.

61 De Gagne et al., “Uncovering,” 27.

62 Yön, “Bildiri,” *Yön*, December 20, 1961, 12.

and homelessness, cannot be called a democracy and will collapse soon, no matter how much sensitively we try to preserve it.”⁶³ In an anonymous article, based on the idea that “(...) classical democracy can turn into an oligarchy unless democracy is established in the social and economic sense,” democracy is defined as a regime enabling people “to participate in administration in real terms, to elect representatives that will be among themselves and protect their own interests, and to audit them.”⁶⁴ Thus, the development of democracy and its adoption as a desired type of regime are conditioned on the realization of the essential economic reforms. In other words, “democracy is an order of equality and freedom in economic aspect as well.”⁶⁵ On the other hand, in another article in which “democracy [is], above all, the will of the people,” it is stated that democracy is a type of regime which allows “people to have more material and moral freedom” and “people’s participation in the administration of the state much more broadly.”⁶⁶ Therefore, democracy is defined as “the expression of the sovereignty of the people, participation of people in the rule as a whole and the use of this rule for the realization of their goals,”⁶⁷ “the natural result of competition between the parties,”⁶⁸ and also as a regime that “stipulates government changeover by means of general elections.”⁶⁹ However, democracy is not always referred to as a positive concept. For example, Çetin Altan, in his article, draws attention to the transformation that democracy causes in social life in terms of economic relations with reference to the liberal component on which democracy is based:⁷⁰

Workers should work for employers, the children of the workers should work for the children of the employers, grandchildren of the workers should work for the grandchildren of the employers. This is what democracy means. Just as in the time of the feudal lord, the peasants worked for the lord, the children of the peasants worked for the son of the lord, and the children of the children of the peasants worked for the son of the lord, thanks to democracy, the employers took the place of the lord.

As a result, although there are different approaches, democracy is valuable for *Yöncüler* as it is based on *people’s power* and it is *a means for the people to participate in the government and a libertarian order*. However, *Yöncüler* also attributes an economic meaning to democracy and expect it to solve social and economic problems.

Turkish Democracy: In several articles, *Yöncüler* used several terms to refer to Turkish democracy including “Ashraf democracy,”⁷¹ “formal democracy,”⁷²

63 Yön, “Bildiri,” 12.

64 Yön, “Türkiye için çıkış yolu,” *Yön*, February 21, 1962, 2.

65 Fakir Baykurt, “Bu düzenin asıl adı,” *Yön*, June 3, 1966, 14.

66 Yön, “Yön’ün tutumu,” *Yön*, March 21, 1962, 4.

67 Yön, “Demokrasinin en büyük düşmanı, yalancı demokrasidir,” *Yön*, October 17, 1962, 10.

68 Kudret Bosuter, “Rejimin dengesizlikleri,” *Yön*, February 21, 1962, 14.

69 Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, “Türkiye’de rejim krizi ve nedenleri,” *Yön*, July 8, 1966, 16.

70 Çetin Altan, “Gerçeği görmek, görebilmek...,” *Yön*, January 3, 1962, 5.

71 Yön, “Yön’ün tutumu,” 4; Taner Timur, “Rejimin gizli hastalıkları: Çarpışan iki tez,” *Yön*, January 24, 1962, 16.

72 Soysal, “İkinci,” 3; İlhan Selçuk, “Türkiye’de demokrasi geriliyor mu?,” *Yön*, June 13, 1962,

“abstract democracy,”⁷³ “limited democracy,”⁷⁴ “Philippine democracy,”⁷⁵ “minority democracy,”⁷⁶ and “bourgeois democracy.”⁷⁷ As can be understood from these identifications, the authors of *Yön* do not make positive evaluations about Turkish democracy. Çetin Altan,⁷⁸ in his article on Turkish democracy in comparison with Western democracies, discusses whether the East is behind and the West is ahead depending on whether there is a legitimate struggle against abuse. According to him, the democratic order of the West has always worked towards the well-being of the society, while the Eastern democracy, Turkish democracy in particular, has only “remained stabilized to guard the interests of a certain group.”⁷⁹ Hence, trial of democracy, which started before essential foundations were thoroughly laid down, was “disgraced because it was carried out ineptly.”⁸⁰ On the other hand, democracy is considered as a balance regime, but it cannot yield the desired results in Turkey, which is expressed as follows:⁸¹

Democracy, which we describe as an open regime and for which we have been fighting tirelessly since 1945, is, in our opinion, rather a regime of balance. It is extremely difficult to believe that this balance can exist in a country where the individual will has not yet been conscious and organized.

The main reason for this is that the unorganized peasant class constitutes a large part of the Turkish society and this class ultimately has the power to determine the election result alone, because the national will that emerged as a result of the elections in October 15, 1961, lacks a democratic spirit and is “contrary to the nature of the system put forward by an advanced constitution and electoral law.”⁸² Thus, “Anatolia entered into politics with democracy, but, on the contrary, Turkish politics became ‘Anatolian’.”⁸³

In order for Turkish democracy to develop and build on solid foundations, socio-economic problems are to be addressed with courage and solutions to these problems must be found.⁸⁴ In this vein, the need for reforms that will change the social structure is emphasized for Turkish democracy,⁸⁵ because democracy “could not achieve a great success in solving fundamental problems in Turkey.”⁸⁶ With this

6; İlhan Selçuk, “Fikir namusu,” *Yön*, June 20, 1962, 3.
73 İlhan Selçuk, “Halk Partisi’nin sonu,” *Yön*, June 25, 1965, 3.
74 Yön, “Açık oturum,” *Yön*, June 10, 1966, 7.
75 Yön, “Parlamentar faşizme doğru,” *Yön*, February 24, 1967, 4-5; Yön, “C.H.P. de küçük kurultay,” *Yön*, February 3, 1967, 4.
76 Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, “Batı tipi demokrasi ve az gelişmiş ülkeler,” *Yön*, May 27, 1966, 16.
77 Can Yücel, “Tek devrim kuramına karşı...,” *Yön*, January 6, 1967, 12.
78 Altan, “Gerçeği,” 5.
79 Altan, “Gerçeği,” 5.
80 Mümtaz Soysal, “Atatürk’ten sonra İnönü,” *Yön*, November 14, 1962, 3.
81 Bosuter, “Rejimin,” 14.
82 Bosuter, “Rejimin,” 14.
83 Friedrich Wilhelm Fernau, “İkinci cumhuriyette sosyal akımlar,” trans. Nihat Türel, *Yön*, February 13, 1963, 12.
84 Doğan Avcioğlu, “Yeni Türkiye,” *Yön*, January 17, 1962, 3.
85 Mümtaz Soysal, “Teşhiste yanılma,” *Yön*, February 21, 1962, 14.
86 Timur, “Rejimin,” 16.

aim in mind, Doğan Avcıoğlu⁸⁷ made some points about what needs to be done to prevent Turkish democracy to be an ostensible democracy and to ensure that it is a really functioning democracy:

The free manifestation of the will of the people and the adaptation of the democratic regime to the realities of the country will only be possible with radical reforms. The people must be organized and the reign of the agha (big land owner) and the monarchy must end. It is essential to carry out a land reform in a modern sense, to save agricultural markets from the hands of middlemen, to increase the number of employment and sales cooperatives, to strengthen trade unionism in every field, to ensure that the children of the people have access to quality education opportunities, to revisit the Village Institutes (meaning Köy Enstitüleri in Turkish) movement, which aims to make the peasant mass a man of the twentieth century, and to save democracy from being a cartoonish.

One of the leading factors that prevent the maturation and institutionalization of Turkish democracy is the agha system, which is described as a medieval remnant. Various references are made to the aghas or the agha system in the journal: “Medieval ruins based on the political and economic exploitation of the farmer”, “the aghas playing the role of middleman between the government and the masses of citizens are a major obstacle that makes it difficult for the establishment of democracy and the realization of public administration.”⁸⁸ İlhan Selçuk,⁸⁹ one of the authors of the *Yön*, makes the following evaluation to describe the situation of the parliament in his article in which he states that there is “a cross tie between the parliament and the people” and that “it is not possible to talk about a healthy democracy in Turkey” without breaking this tie: “The politicians who fill the parliament today represent a happy minority, not the majority of the peasant-worker-tradesman people.” One of the *Yön* writers, Yaşar Kemal,⁹⁰ touched on a similar issue and argued, “Our policy is in the hands of the town politicians.” He also emphasizes that the political parties have to rely on the electorate that are controlled by the landlords (aghas), by stating that “Especially after our democracy trial, it has completely fallen into their hands.”⁹¹ For this reason, the regime lacks “voter’s sanctions.”⁹² In this context, it is emphasized that Turkish democracy can be rooted and a breakthrough in every field can be achieved by “weakening political power of the conservative mediator group that intervenes between the people and the state” and that it can be realized by “the publicization of economic power.”⁹³ “Democracy cannot be safeguarded with private ownership, but rather in the expansion of public ownership and the implementation of a statist, populist economic policy.”⁹⁴ To achieve a proper democratic order in Turkey,

87 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Efendilerimiz,” *Yön*, January 3, 1962, 3.

88 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Ortak çalışma,” *Yön*, March 21, 1962, 8.

89 İlhan Selçuk, “Görünen köye doğru,” *Yön*, September 3, 1965, 3.

90 Yaşar Kemal, “Kasaba politikacıları,” *Yön*, May 14, 1962, 9.

91 Kemal, “Kasaba,” 9.

92 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Rejimin geleceği,” *Yön*, June 10, 1966, 3.

93 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Olup bitene şaşmamak lazım,” *Yön*, August 15, 1962, 6.

94 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Özel sektöre düşen görev,” *Yön*, May 28, 1965, 3.

it is argued that “(...) formal democracy must be complemented by improvements in the economic field.”⁹⁵ To this end, in order to establish a truly democratic order in an underdeveloped country like Turkey, necessary structural reforms should be implemented immediately.⁹⁶

Yön authors expressed various arguments to save Turkish democracy from the impasse it was in and to reform it. Sabahattin Eyüboğlu⁹⁷ states that “We are to educate people in villages as a part of nation-wide equality movement, because unlike the West, where democracy is a bottom-up social movement, we have to bring democracy from the top to the bottom” in order to reach Western civilization as soon as possible and to ensure the restoration of democracy. İlhan Selçuk,⁹⁸ on the other hand, discusses a similar issue and states that Turkey’s history is full of examples of top down or revolution from above. Therefore, it may be misleading to give *Yöncüler* the idea that this door is absolutely closed. In his article titled, “Top Down!”,⁹⁹ Selçuk makes the following evaluation on the issue:

The idea of socialism was introduced in every country by intellectuals and elites. So it came from above. There is no idea of socialism born among people and out of people. If we put aside unnecessary folk romanticism, we see that socialism is instilled into the people top down by the elites.

Socialism in Turkey is also going through the same process.

(...)

Turkey has a history of development. The Tanzimat [political reforms in the Ottoman in 1839] in Turkey was a top down movement. In Turkey, the Republic was also a top down reform. In Turkey, Atatürk’s revolutions were also top-down. The multi-party political regime was a top down reform in Turkey, May 27 was a top-down movement.

It is seen that people were made to accept all the events that prepared the current environment for Turkish socialists.

(...)

We must clearly state that the Democrat Party did not come to power from the top, but we are against the Menderes [the leader of Democrat Party] government. Adalet [Justice] Party is not a top down power, but we are against the Adalet Party government.

We are opposed to movements, albeit they are bottom up, that take compradors and brokers into power; but we stand by movements that oppose imperialism, even if they are top down.

Turkish socialists should be careful when evaluating historical events. We are to deservedly evaluate progressive movements, even if they are top down, and conservative movements, even if they are bottom up.

As a result, *Yön* authors published comprehensive evaluations of Turkish democracy. A significant part of them are related to tutelage. For example, according

95 Soysal, “İkinci,” 3.

96 Mümtaz Soysal, “Boşluk,” *Yön*, July 18, 1962, 3.

97 Sabahattin Eyüboğlu, “Neden Köy Enstitüsü?,” *Yön*, December 20, 1961, 16.

98 İlhan Selçuk, “Tepeden inme,” *Yön*, September 2, 1966, 5.

99 Selçuk, “Tepeden,” 5.

to *Yöncüler*, in an underdeveloped country like Turkey, where the public is not sufficiently conscious and deprived of socio-economic rights, a limited group of people dominate the political and social sphere. Hence, economy-based social relations and economic backwardness are seen as an important obstacle to the development of democracy. This obstacle also paves the way for the formation of political and economic abuse. On the other hand, the way Turkey's democracy is implemented makes the country vulnerable to domination of capitalism in the country and to the formation of an order of exploitation. In this context, *Yöncüler* considers it essential to carry out some structural reforms in Turkish democracy, which lacks voter's sanctions and constantly brings reactionary/conservative elements to power.

"Non-Parliamentary/ism": *Yöncüler* expressed various opinions about saving the Turkish democracy from the impasse it is in by using parliamentary method. However, due to the political picture that emerged especially after the 1965 elections and the absence of the political staff deemed authorized to realize the reforms desired by the *Yöncüler*, various arguments are put forward regarding the "non-parliamentary" discourse for the establishment of the desired system, and various legitimation methods are applied to show that this will not contradict democracy. In this context, they devise a discourse of "democratic revolution" and the pro-reform forces will "make their best efforts to maintain the order stipulated by the Constitution and seek a democratic solution to the parliament-revolutionary contradiction."¹⁰⁰ However, at this point, "the only chance remains for progressive forces to make positive effects in dragging the society in one direction by getting organized outside the parliament."¹⁰¹ In his final article in *Yön*, which he wrote as a farewell article concerning a political context where conservative parties repeatedly won elections, Doğan Avcıoğlu,¹⁰² who considers conservative parties as internal elements of imperialism, argues that "This is a great misfortune and a great handicap, which must be changed, one way or another, for the populist and nationalist forces." Stating that one of the main pillars of the 1961 regime is the Parliament, Mümtaz Soysal¹⁰³ argued that nation was in a political impasse by claiming that "Parliament as it is today does not have the assertiveness and the power of action to radically change the destiny of the nation." However, in the continuation of the article, Soysal¹⁰⁴ states that there is no reason to be hopeless against this situation and that "there are long term, legal and beyond-the-legal solutions to this deadlock":

There are also 'non-parliamentary' power groups that a leader or a team who wants to act and engage in radical reforms in Turkey can withstand. A leader, who will gain strength from public opinion and power groups outside the Parliament, will be able to dominate the conservatism nests in front of him because he will feel the nation behind him; even if it does not secure an absolute majority in the elections, s/he will hold the reins of the coalitions s/he

100 Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Cumhuriyetin 42. Yılında," *Yön*, October 29, 1965, 3.

101 İlhan Selçuk, "Geride kalan kazanıyor!...", *Yön*, February 13, 1963, 11.

102 Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Son söz," *Yön*, June 30, 1967, 3.

103 Mümtaz Soysal, "Bu rejim nasıl yaşar," *Yön*, March 7, 1962, 12.

104 Soysal, "Bu rejim," 12.

will bring to the power.

Let's be honest and as 'scientific' as possible in our discussions: 'out of parliament' does not mean 'out of democracy'.

They seek to legitimize non-parliamentary power discourse with reference to the collective memory, which is described as “Vigorous Forces” (Zinde Kuvvetler) and in which the Kemalist revolution is nested, because the Vigorous Forces “seriously doubt that the political regime and the administrative group created by this regime will rapidly move the country forward.”¹⁰⁵

4.2 Desire for Social Engineering

In this section of the study, under the main theme of *Yön* authors' desire for social engineering, the following codes will be discussed: the inadequacy of the people, the problem of trust in power, and a new individual. Each of these codes contains basic arguments about the lack of well-functioning democracy in Turkey and the steps to be taken to restore it. Ultimately, these arguments are considered as a manifestation of the desire that the society should be modernized or reformed, and it was determined that various justifications have been put forward in favour of them.

People's Inadequacy: The following evaluation is made to describe the social structure in underdeveloped countries such as Turkey:¹⁰⁶

In general, the social structures in underdeveloped countries present a duality. On the one hand, there is a section of society based on an agricultural economy and where human relations are regulated by principles such as kinship and neighbourhood. This strata of society account for the majority of the population in almost all underdeveloped countries. On the contrary side, there is an industrialized and urbanized stratum (...) in Cooley's terminology, who examines these two types of social strata as Primary and Secondary groups.

In underdeveloped countries, primary and secondary societies are located side by side and intertwined. In these societies, public opinion is formed as a result of different formations. Primary, that is, groups outside of city life, are communities where individuals make face-to-face contacts. Everyone here thinks the same way. Individuals are indifferent to national issues. The horizons of vision are surrounded by the boundaries of the village. Their participation in national politics is actualised through aghas (landowners) (...); members of the primary group are not even aware of their right to vote. They consider it as not a right, but a duty to be fulfilled against the agha. Thus, aghas' votes are artificially inflated.

The primary group has a customary pattern. They do not want any interference. They have no desire other than to continue their traditional lifestyle. They do not know any other way of life anyway. However, the enlightened citizen of the open society is impatient. He knows things and he wants to intervene. But he has no power to do so.

105 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “İnanç buhranı,” *Yön*, February 28, 1962, 3.

106 Taner Timur, “Az gelişmiş memleketlerde genel oy prensibi,” *Yön*, January 17, 1962, 17.

In a less developed country, e.g., Turkey, which has a closed social structure, it is considered that the people in the primary group desire to maintain their existence and tradition. At this point, the political preferences of the people are not seen as conscious choices because “the people are not awake.”¹⁰⁷ It is considered that the peasant population, which constitutes a large part of the demographic structure deprived of quality, is not organized, and “has the power to determine the election result alone,”¹⁰⁸ is handicap for the healthy functioning of democracy, which emerges as a balance mechanism in society. The main factor leading to the emergence of this situation is the inadequacy of the education level of the people. In his article titled as “Who makes the main decisions in Turkey?,”¹⁰⁹ İdris Küçükömer makes the following evaluation:

More than half of them are illiterate. For some of them, it is not possible to talk about possibilities and making a choice by evaluating them. Members of this mass cannot participate in social action as decision units; they are limited in their relations with other groups and public authorities. On their behalf, many times, those who have gained the social function by means of social action (such as aghas in the village, noblemen in the town) appear. As Bobhous said, the mass remains outside the system as an object, such as a sling or tractor.

It is unlikely that the intellectuals deliver their message to the people and tell them the truth “in a country where 60 percent of them are uneducated,”¹¹⁰ in “a nation lacking culture”¹¹¹ and in a society, 20 million of whose population is illiterate,¹¹² because “neither the words nor the publications reach the masses, 20 million of whom are still illiterate and living in narrow circles where the ideological domination of feudal remnants predominate.”¹¹³ Since the public is not educated, they remain indifferent to political problems and remain “innocent spectators of the play staged.”¹¹⁴

The Problem of Trust in Power: The fact that the cadres who did not have the necessary courage to implement the reforms in the *Yön* Journal were in political power led *Yöncüler* to lose their trust in those in power. There was a deep disbelief against the political powers of the period in terms of agriculture and land reform, which was seen as the recipe for liberation of Turkish democracy, and the realization of structural reforms that would lead to socio-cultural, political and economic transformations, especially in the Village Institutes. This situation was discussed by several *Yön* authors. In his article titled “Crisis of Trust”, which he wrote after the failed February 22 coup attempt under the leadership of Talat Aydemir, Doğan

107 Çetin Altan, “Eski sakız,” *Yön*, December 27, 1961, 4.

108 Bosuter, “Rejimin,” 14.

109 İdris Küçükömer, “Türkiye’de temel kararları kim alır?,” *Yön*, June 27, 1962, 14.

110 Fethi Naci, “Seçimlerden sonra,” *Yön*, October 15, 1965, 6; Fethi Naci, “Halka anlatmak,” *Yön*, 26 November 1965, 5.

111 Tahir Öztürk, “Cesur olmyanlar,” *Yön*, January 30, 1963, 11.

112 İlhan Selçuk, “Millet yapar!,” *Yön*, May 14, 1965, 3.

113 Fethi Naci, “Söz eskiyor,” *Yön*, November 19, 1965, 6.

114 Mehmed Kemal, “Dilsizler korosu,” *Yön*, May 20, 1966, 6.

Avcıoğlu¹¹⁵ described the crisis of “trust” of progressive elements, referred to as Vigorous Forces, in the political power and in the regime as follows: “Today, the vigorous forces of the society are extremely doubtful that the political regime and the ruling class created by this regime will take the country forward rapidly.” At this point, the inadequacy of the ruling class is attributed to the occupation of the parliament by the political cadres who were raised in the single-party period, as they occupied in the Democratic Party period.¹¹⁶ Since the current political staff was not sufficient to solve the problems and the first coalition period was in a “regime depression,” “CHP-AP coalition, which was established with great difficulties and care and has been carried out with a number of challenges so far, resigned because the coalition government had not been able to perform any significant reforms and would not have the opportunity to do so from now on.”¹¹⁷ İlhan Selçuk,¹¹⁸ on the other hand, wrote a similar evaluation regarding the second coalition period and made the following points regarding this period, which he considered to be too weak to carry out any reforms advocated by *Yöncüler*:

So, according to the foundational principle of this parliament, this government cannot do anything rather than its character to follow a statist policy... It cannot actualise the principle of social justice... It cannot make any reforms... It is against the truth to ask the government to do things it is incapable of. Parliament and its government will engage in practices inherent in their organization. This cannot be changed without turning to coercion.

In his evaluation of the political power of the second coalition period, Mümtaz Soysal¹¹⁹ argues that “the political staff struggling in the absence of path, method, and belief has become so desperate that the administration of the state is about to fall into the hands of the muhtac-ı himmet’ [helpless] old people in Istanbul.” “It is now crystal clear that this government is not capable of solving our difficult economic and social problems. Stating that it is not possible to change the fate of our Turkey with this mentality, this staff, this coalition, and these opposition groups,” Doğan Avcıoğlu¹²⁰ expresses the loss of trust and belief in the political staff led by the prime minister of that period, İsmet İnönü, who could not stand up for the basic arguments of the *Yöncüler*. The crisis of trust gradually increased after 1965 because Turkey became a “country under foreign mortgage” and “some economic organizations with roots outside seized the economic and political life of Turkey.”¹²¹ In the acceleration of this process, the role of the AP (the Adalet [Justice] Party), which gained political power alone after the 1965 elections, was great. İlhan Selçuk¹²² writes in his article that a possible revolutionary process has accelerated due to the inadequacy of Demirel’s power:

115 Avcıoğlu, “İnanç,” 3.

116 Taner Timur, “Ümit kaynağımız,” *Yön*, March 21, 1962, 14.

117 Sadun Aren, “Asıl çözüm yolu,” *Yön*, June 6, 1962, 3.

118 İlhan Selçuk, “İkisi de yalan,” *Yön*, September 5, 1962, 7.

119 Mümtaz Soysal, “Plan ve insan,” *Yön*, August 1, 1962, 3.

120 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Ne kadar yol aldık,” *Yön*, January 2, 1963, 3.

121 İlhan Selçuk, “Kökü dışarıda,” *Yön*, January 8, 1965, 5.

122 İlhan Selçuk, “İnsanlar ve olaylar,” *Yön*, February 11, 1966, 3.

(...) The Justice Party undoubtedly had no chance of success. But it is undoubtedly possible only with a genius like Süleyman Demirel to turn a failure that may occur in the long term into a defeat in the shortest period of time.

Thanks to this genius, a regime case was created in Turkey within three months. And the revolutionary discourse in the big newspapers and stemming from the organs of the Justice Party, was the result of this careless ride. The car is already unsuitable for a ride, but it is not wise to put the most incompetent man behind the wheel to get an accident closer.

A New Individual: The necessity of creating a new individual type for the Turkish social structure to reach the level of contemporary civilization and for Turkish democracy to function properly has a pivotal value in the thought world of *Yön*. Since attaining the level of contemporary civilization as indicated by Atatürk will require “rapid economic development, major improvements in social structure, institutions, conducts, health, education, etc. and will have large influence on them, the goals of reaching the level of contemporary civilization and development” are considered equivalent.¹²³ In this connection, development is defined as “creating a new individual type” or “reducing the agricultural population to 15 percent of the total population.”¹²⁴ The necessity to reach the socio-economic development levels the Western societies have achieved and to close the gap quickly and reach an advanced social order in a short time forces underdeveloped countries such as Turkey to adopt socialism. Such an understanding of socialism has to “eradicate medieval remnants with radical reforms, create a new type of individual and ensure rapid development. In this case, socialism in underdeveloped countries should be considered as a kind of white revolution that requires very radical changes.”¹²⁵ Thus, “socialism, which aims to give a new order to society,”¹²⁶ “is an effort to create a ‘new man’ in a country such as Turkey; a man who can easily accept rational solutions by pushing aside traditional and customary ways.”¹²⁷ In this vein, what needs to be done is to educate and warn the people, “to try to give them a socialist direction by making use of the desires and tendencies of the people, to adopt some socialist goals.”¹²⁸

4.3 Social Structure Reforms

It is a prevalent idea in the thought world of the *Yön* that reforms that can directly or indirectly affect Turkish democracy, especially the structure of Turkish society, should be implemented. In this context, agriculture and land reform and Village Institutes are considered as the primary and basic tools that can be used to eliminate the problem of inadequacy of the people and to create a new individual type. In this section, only these two issues will be discussed in line with the purpose and scope of the study.

123 Doğan Avcioğlu, “Nefis Müdafaası,” *Yön*, March 7, 1962, 3.

124 Avcioğlu, “Nefis,” 3.

125 Doğan Avcioğlu, “Sosyalizm anlayışımız,” *Yön*, August 22, 1962, 3.

126 Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu, “Sosyalizm ve Komünizm,” *Yön*, January 28, 1966, 16.

127 Mümtaz Soysal, “Köyde sosyalizm,” *Yön*, September 5, 1962, 20.

128 Yön, “S.K.D.’de Prof. Aren’in söyleşi,” *Yön*, March 5, 1965, 5.

Agriculture and Land Reform: In order for the country to be built on solid foundations in terms of democracy and development and for modernization, it is necessary to carry out various reforms in the economic and cultural fields. Otherwise, it is believed that “neither a deep-rooted establishment of democracy in the country nor a real development can be achieved.”¹²⁹ Among these reforms, “the most vital for Turkey will undoubtedly be a land reform,”¹³⁰ because “the starting point of all our cases is land reform.”¹³¹ Being “first and foremost political,”¹³² “land reform means the elimination of feudal residues and remnant(s).”¹³³ The following lines are stated about the role that land reform can play in the construction of a new social structure:¹³⁴

Changing the social structure through land reform without deviating from the general ballot is the ideal way. (...) It is more a matter of breaking the authority of the landlord than of increasing the number of small landholders. In order to achieve this goal, consolidating peasant groups through cooperatives and linking them to the central government may be considered.

Village Institutes: The issue of Village Institutes is addressed as a second reform tool. The Village Institute movement is a movement to “find an ideology” in terms of realizing development based on democratic principles in an underdeveloped country like Turkey.¹³⁵ Based on the idea that each ideology has its own principles, “education in the trial undertaken under the roof of Village Institutes becomes a whole and completes itself with parts such as work, cooperation, modern production techniques, and new social rules.”¹³⁶ Therefore, this movement is considered as a manifestation of a mass mobilization. As explained above, it is argued that bottom-up democratization process in the West should be top-down in Turkey so that it can reach contemporary civilization of the West as soon as possible, and the Village Institutes will play an important role in this matter.¹³⁷ With this aim in mind, it is considered essential for an underdeveloped country like Turkey to “educate the masses,”¹³⁸ to change the individual and to achieve a social transformation:¹³⁹

When it was realized that it was necessary to change the society in order to change the individual, education was assigned a great duty. Education should create modern material forms that are not present in the environment, collide with the non-modern material conditions of the environment, and instil

129 Suat Aksoy, “Toprak,” *Yön*, February 7, 1962, 7.

130 Aksoy, “Toprak,” 7.

131 Yön, “Toprak reformu ve sınıf problemi,” *Yön*, May 23, 1963, 6.

132 Mehmed Kemal, “Hangisi daha tehlikesli,” *Yön*, October 23, 1964, 7; Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Toprak reformunun temel şartı,” *Yön*, 27 June 1962, 7; Timur, “Az gelişmiş,” 17; Fethi Naci, “Kalkınma davamız politiktir ve çözüm yolu politiktir!..,” *Yön*, January 22, 1965, 6.

133 Kemal, “Hangisi,” 7.

134 Timur, “Az gelişmiş,” 17.

135 Turhan Tokgöz, “Eğitim gücü ve Köy Enstitüleri,” *Yön*, October 24, 1962, 12.

136 Tokgöz, “Eğitim,” 12.

137 Eyüboğlu, “Neden,” 16.

138 Hayrettin Uysal, “Köy Enstitüleri üzerine,” *Yön*, April 17, 1963, 12.

139 Yön, “Köy Enstitüsünün temeli olan düşünceler,” *Yön*, April 11, 1962, 12.

intellectual foundations of modern civilization in the student.

The Institute movement is a movement that desires to create changes in the socio-economic structure through education.¹⁴⁰ Şükrü Koç¹⁴¹ makes the following evaluation about the Village Institutes, which have the power to fulfil an important function in the process of building a new society:

Education systems are the microcosm of societies. The first and fundamental steps for the development of human communities are carried out in educational institutions. For this reason, education systems, on the one hand, take necessary measures to establish the centres for nationalization, on the other hand, to make them comprehend new life choices that lead societies towards new goals, push them to the points that are desired to be characterized by the words development, progress and development.

Therefore, when “the Village Institutes are considered as a single gateway that opens the mindset of the age to nature, art, economic, and social aspects through education, and via relating education to practice at work,” it turns out that “the village institutes are not institutions that only train teachers.”¹⁴²

4.4 Determining Factors

In this section of the study, the structure of Vigorous Forces is discussed as the determining factors. They can play a leading role in Turkish democracy and are seen as a remedy for the impasse. The codes titled as the military, the university youth, and progressive intellectuals are discussed under the theme of determining factors representing the most progressive and intellectual layer of the society. However, it is necessary to make a short evaluation of the formation in question.

Vigorous Forces refers to the social class, who are sensitive to the real issues of the society and who “determines the destiny of Turkey,”¹⁴³ “are the real opposing force in Turkey, who wants structural change (serious social and economic reforms),”¹⁴⁴ and who are “the traditional representative of a victorious national liberation movement.”¹⁴⁵ “Intermediate strata [Vigorous Forces], which are insignificant in the West and therefore neglected by the Marxist theory, can, under certain conditions and independent of the national bourgeoisie, play a leading role in progress in the Third World.”¹⁴⁶ It is noted that traditional theoretical approach to classification of society as ‘proletariat, national bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie’ is inadequate in the analysis of social and political reality in underdeveloped countries; therefore, “characteristics of intermediate strata such as soldiers and civil servants and the progressive role they can play under certain conditions” are emphasized.¹⁴⁷ At this

140 Turhan Tokgöz, “Yarının Köy enstitüleri,” *Yön*, August 22, 1962, 9.

141 Şükrü Koç, “Türk eğitiminde dış etkiler,” *Yön*, May 14, 1965, 16.

142 Uysal, “Köy Enstitüleri,” 12.

143 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Bir sosyalist stratejinin esasları,” *Yön*, October 14, 1966, 9.

144 İdris Küçükömer, “Bizim liberaller,” *Yön*, October 24, 1962, 20.

145 Fethi Naci, “İktidarsız iktidarın çırpınışları,” *Yön*, March 25, 1966, 6.

146 Yön, “İlerici askeri rejimler ve Marksist teori,” *Yön*, July 15, 1966, 8.

147 Yön, “İlerici,” 8.

point, with reference to the heritage of May 27, 1961 coup in collective memory, the following argument were made about the need for the political leader to rely on the Vigorous Forces as nonparliamentary elements:¹⁴⁸

The coup of May, 27 has shown that in our country, there is a mass of people that can lead progressive movements. This mass is made up of realistic intellectuals, youth, and army members. These forces, which constitute the Vigorous forces of the country, fomented the May 27 coup. Today, since the neutrality of the army is essential within a democratic framework, the forces that the leader will rely on consist of intellectuals and youth. This is by no means a force to be underestimated.

The Army: The most important element in the Vigorous Forces is the army. The army, which is identified with Kemal Atatürk's personality, is seen as the representative of a revolutionary view and the heir of Kemalism. In addition, the army played a pioneering role in creating a *new order* since the Ottoman Empire. Particularly during the reign of Mahmut II, the army was called *Nizam-ı Cedit* [the New Order], and it was the pioneer of a new order in the country ever since. It has been the defender and protector of every new and futurist movement."¹⁴⁹ Hence, the army "has always led the public in Turkey's Westernization revolutions and freedom movements since the Tanzimat."¹⁵⁰ In this vein, it is argued that the military-politics relationship is not distant from each other, and that the military should follow politics closely and intervene when necessary:¹⁵¹

Lounge chatterers self-righteously express an opinion, 'Sir, what on earth do the soldiers know about politics?'. However, for the past forty years, only soldiers knew about politics; Atatürk was a soldier, İnönü was a soldier, Gürsel Pasha was a soldier. We were left in the hands of pure civilians. So? That is nothing to emulate, but it's the truth.

The following statement: "It is their duty as well as their [soldiers'] right to try to make politicians believe in their own views by influencing those who rule the country. This cannot be called 'intervention'."¹⁵² can be regarded as an attempt to legitimize the army's influence on political power. Their belief in the responsibility of the army to intervene in political life when necessary is stated in the following lines:¹⁵³

It cannot be claimed that the army that plotted the great success of May 27 lost anything of its spirit or power. Especially when Celal Bayar was released from Kayseri prison, the nature of the relation between the youth and the army revealed an old painting whose colours had never changed. The constant interest of the officers in the historic sessions of the parliament and their dignified attitude towards the politics tradesman indisputably explain that the

148 Taner Timur, "Liderimiz var mı?," *Yön*, February 14, 1962, 13.

149 İlhami Soysal, "Çıkmazlar içinde bir ışık: Ordu," *Yön*, October 10, 1962, 7.

150 İlhan Selçuk, "Türkiye'de ordu," *Yön*, January 15, 1962, 10.

151 Nimet Arzık, "Asker politikadan anlar mı?," *Yön*, February 14, 1962, 15.

152 S. E. Finer, "At sırtındaki adam: Ordunun politikadaki rolü," trans. Mete Tunçay, *Yön*, December 12, 1962, 10.

153 İlhan Selçuk, "Hayallere Kapılmayalım," *Yön*, April 24, 1963, 3.

army is the strongest support of Kemalism and the May 27 coup.

Historical mission the army played is, herein, emphasized by renouncing it as the absolute guarantor of the country and stating that “the duty falling upon all progressives and all vigorous forces of Turkey is to clamp together around the Army, which is the most powerful, organized and reliable organization of our country.”¹⁵⁴ However, it should be noted that although the army is an important element of the Vigorous Forces, it is not the main determinant actor alone. University youth and progressive intellectuals, who have as much influence as the army, are among the components of the Vigorous Forces.

University Youth: In modern democracies, structures that operate in a multifaceted way in social and political life, e.g., parties, pressure groups, and trade unions, are indispensable elements of democratic society. The Youth, which *Yön* authors considered as a pressure group, is also considered as an element that affects/can affect democratic life. “Especially in underdeveloped societies, the realities necessitate the participation of youth in democratic life as a pressure group.”¹⁵⁵ In this respect, university youth is seen as “the insurance of Turkey’s life and movement power,”¹⁵⁶ “the ultimate guarantee of national liberation,”¹⁵⁷ “the most reliable advocate of Atatürk’s principles,”¹⁵⁸ “the progressive and pioneering great power of our society,”¹⁵⁹ “the pioneer and owner of the May 27 revolution and the meticulous guardian of the 1961 constitution,”¹⁶⁰ “an angry, restless, unsatisfied ‘struggle group’ ready to overflow easily,”¹⁶¹ “one of the sufficient guarantees for us to look to the future with hope.”¹⁶² Accordingly, youth is defined as follows:¹⁶³

Youth means pure excitement that has not yet been caught by any interest organization. What kind of force is youth? You can neither cut off his advertisement... nor disrupt his work... neither penalize his shop... nor expose him... neither put him under the ministry’s order when deemed necessary... nor fire him... neither expropriate his house... nor delay the import license... neither destroy bank loans... nor send gendarmerie to his fields...

“Civil servants and military officers do not engage in politics due to their status; while the people live in a state devoid of all kinds of social opportunities, this intellectual strata of society [the youth] stands against those who want to take advantage of underdeveloped conditions.”¹⁶⁴ It is very clear here that university youth is attributed an operative and appetizing mission as an important element of the Vigorous Forces.

154 Soysal, “Çıkmazlar içinde,” 7.

155 Uğur Mumcu, “Biz anayasayı savunuyoruz... Ya siz?,” *Yön*, June 18, 1965, 12.

156 İlhan Selçuk, “Gençlik, gençlik...,” *Yön*, May 15, 1963, 3.

157 Yön, “Anadolu ikinci bir kurtuluşa hazırlanıyor,” *Yön*, November 13, 1964, 6.

158 Fethi Naci, “Beş yıl sonra,” *Yön*, May 28, 1965, 6.

159 Fethi Naci, “Bağımsızlığa ve reformlara karşı,” *Yön*, February 19, 1965, 5.

160 Yön, “Adalet Bakanı ve gençlik,” *Yön*, February 25, 1966, 7.

161 Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, “Türkiye’de rejim krizi ve nedenleri,” *Yön*, July 8, 1966, 16.

162 İlhan Selçuk, “Atı alan...,” *Yön*, February 25, 1966, 5.

163 Selçuk, “Gençlik,” 3.

164 Mumcu, “Biz,” 12.

Yöncüler assigns various responsibilities to university youth with historical references. “It is the duty of our generation to be worthy of the trust of the first and greatest pioneer of the national liberation wars against imperialism and to accomplish their mission. This task was assigned to the intellectual youth of the new Turkish generations in the discourses of Atatürk himself.”¹⁶⁵ To this end, youth’s sense of responsibility is kept alive by making various references to the collective memory in both Mustafa Kemal’s Address to the Youth and in his Bursa Speech. İlhan Selçuk states the following on this issue:¹⁶⁶

What is the historical task the university youth is burdened today?

It would be useful to ignore baseless words and talk based on documents to unveil this task. The historical document that has laid down the principles that will have a first degree impact on the life of Turkish youth is ‘Atatürk’s Address to the Youth’. Then comes the Bursa Speech.

‘Atatürk’s Address to Youth’ states a very clear task.

The ‘first duty’ of Turkish youth is to defend and protect Turkish independence.

Therefore, “the great Atatürk passed away by having entrusted the reforms that he left uncompleted and failed to achieve because of various social, economic, and political challenges, to the Turkish youth.”¹⁶⁷ “The reforms advocated in this context are to be dealt holistically and solved with the power and belief achieved via a national awakening for their realization. Youth to action...”¹⁶⁸ In this context, it can be argued *Yöncüler* attributed the university youth a similar importance as the army. Both *forces* were regarded as complementary for each other and as the determinants of political life.

Progressive Intellectuals: Another element in the formation of the Vigorous Forces can be described as the progressive intellectuals. This progressive intellectual stratum, which “has been the pioneer of all progressive movements and anti-imperialist and anti-feudal movements since 1839,” “has great political experience.”¹⁶⁹ However, it is seen that not all intellectuals are evaluated in this category. “An intellectual is not just a literate or even educated person. Even if a man is educated, he may not be considered an intellectual or a truly enlightened person.”¹⁷⁰ “In these days when Turkish society is faced with social, economic and political issues that are difficult to resolve in every aspect, the ‘intellectual’ has great responsibilities.”¹⁷¹ What is expected from the sense of responsibility of the intellectual, considered as the real Kemalist of 1962 Turkey, is “to get rid of dogmatism and intellectual sterility and to create a development philosophy suitable for our social and economic realities.”¹⁷² By this way, the level of contemporary civilization can be reached and intellectuals can play a leading role in a case that

165 İlhan Selçuk, “Maymunluğa son verilmeli!,” *Yön*, October 14, 1966, 3.

166 İlhan Selçuk, “Birinci vazifen,” *Yön*, February 17, 1967, 5.

167 Muzaffer Karan, “Kemalizm Türk sosyalizmi,” *Yön*, September 12, 1962, 6.

168 Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Gençliğe çağrı,” *Yön*, December 25, 1964, 3.

169 Yön, “TİP büyük kongresi,” *Yön*, November 25, 1966, 5.

170 Niyazi Berkes, “Türk aydınlarının özellikleri üzerine düşünceler,” *Yön*, July 9, 1965, 8.

171 Gülten Kazgan, “Aydının sorumluluğu,” *Yön*, February 7, 1962, 8.

172 Taner Timur, “Felsefesiz Türkiye,” *Yön*, February 28, 1962, 12.

exceeds the level of the period. “The task of an intellectual should be to observe social conditions, to lead the positive changes in the social and economic structure, and to accelerate and organize a dynamic idea movement.”¹⁷³ It was stated that “only educating the large mass” is not sufficient for the solution of the political and social problems Turkey was experiencing, but solution also depended on “also the training of a large number of people who would lead this mass.”¹⁷⁴ “With the leadership of revolutionary and idealist intellectuals for progressive people, the Republic of Turkey can attain its NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC-SECULAR-SOCIAL essence. This is the only way out for our society,”¹⁷⁵ because:¹⁷⁶

The public's will and benefits are inconsistent. To put it more clearly, the vote of the people is used to the detriment of the people. Thusly, what they call the national will is the will of the minority, not the majority. What is in the majority is the people, who are neither reactionary nor progressive. In order to liberate people from this contradictory behaviour and direct them in a way that is to their benefit, it is necessary to disjoin them from the reactionary force and to join them with the progressive force. Intellectuals should be organized with this aim.

On the other hand, progressive intellectuals who “lead the May 27 revolution”¹⁷⁷ played an active role in social life. This situation, which was seen as an inevitable result of backwardness,¹⁷⁸ led intellectuals to play an active role in the May 27:¹⁷⁹

Our nationalist officers, who carried out the May 27 movement, are frequently directed the following questions at various meetings: ‘Why didn't you try to change the Oil Act? Why didn't you try to abolish the bilateral agreements?’ Honest and sincere members of the former National Unity Committee have always answered this question as follows. ‘If we had known, we would have changed it. We didn't know about it.’ You, intellectuals, just kept saying the constitution, the father law [ironic reference to constitution, which literally translates as mother law], the dual assembly, the proportional representation. What you said has been accomplished.

As a result, it is seen that an important role was assigned to the army and the university youth in the formation of Vigorous Forces within the framework of the mission of transforming the society. It is very obvious that in their references to intellectual, they meant an *organic intellectual*, because according to *Yöncüler*, someone who deserved to be identified as an intellectual was to be progressive and had thoughts in line with the sensitivities of the progressive classes or segments of the society.

173 Yön, “Numan Esin 27 Mayıs’ın bilançosunu yapıyor,” *Yön*, May 23, 1962, 7.

174 Kazgan, “Aydının sorumluluğu,” 8.

175 M. Vasıf Ersoy, “Bir intihar daha,” *Yön*, September 12, 1962, 13.

176 Ali Faik Cihan, “Gericilerin gücü,” *Yön*, July 25, 1962, 13.

177 Yön, “İlerici,” 8.

178 Berkes, “Türk,” 8-9.

179 Yön, “Moskova’nın gözüyle Türkiye’de bugünkü sosyalizm hareketi,” *Yön*, January 11, 1967, 12.

5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

As the representative of a tradition that has achieved victory, Kemalism plays a vital role in *Yön*'s ideology. Besides, Kemalism's place in the collective memory and the desire to own its cultural heritage played an important role in *Yön*'s ideology. Especially in the 1960s, in a period when the aspirations of the intellectuals in underdeveloped countries like Turkey to change and reform the society resurfaced, *Yöncüler* regarded Kemalism as a basic tool for legitimatization. This way of thinking made up the essence of the proactivity of *Yön*, which emerged after May 27 with the aim of establishing a new order. It is also seen that Kemalism can be used as an intellectual tool in legitimizing socialism, which was a contradictory and new ideology in that period. At this stage, the understanding of socialism adopted by *Yöncüler* was blended with Kemalism. However, it should be noted that Kemalism is in the second place when compared to socialism.

Socialist ideology blended with Kemalism combines an instrumental function with the goal of partial social transformation. A nationalist meaning is attributed to the socialist ideology as they think that it will contribute to the realization of the desired revolution. Socialism discussed and developed doctrinally in the Journal of *Yön* is mostly a product of the efforts of the intellectuals of less developed countries, who were under the influence of the Marxist tradition, to combine the Marxist theory and the ideology of nationalism. For this reason, Turkish-specific version of socialism was in the centre of discussion within the *Yön* Journal. The alternative or country-specific interpretation of socialism is quite common in the third world countries of the period. Ideology of tutelage that *Yöncüler* adopted can be seen as a progressive step in the transition from tradition to modernity.

In *Yön* Journal, the meaning attributed to the concept of democracy is mostly explained with the problem of modernization. Modernization is problematic because it is based on the idea that the *untrained* people are not aware of what may be in their own interests. For this reason, in the tutelary world of thought, "uneducated" people should be "enlightened," "educated," and "modernized" in line with "true" progressive intellectuals.¹⁸⁰ They have the assumption that only in this way people can realize their true benefits. According to Ateş,¹⁸¹ the understanding of socialism, adopted by the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries, has a functionalist quality in this sense. With a strong emphasis on etatism, it is likely that state's area gradually expands beyond economic field to wider areas, that is, to new areas of social reform through education policies "for the people" and "despite the people."¹⁸² The conceptualizations of "new etatism" or "Turkish socialism" peculiar to Turkey, which *Yön* Journal particularly attempts to develop theoretically, can be considered as an example of this. Hence, considering the relationship between socialism and tutelage and in the light of the findings discussed in detail above, it can be argued that socialist ideology adopted in the *Yön* Journal seeks to promote a tutelary democracy.

180 Mustafa Erdoğan, *Liberal Toplum Liberal Siyaset* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1998), 283.

181 Ateş, *Demokrasi*, 172-173.

182 Cantzen, *Daha az devlet*, 24.

Another point to be emphasized in this context is that *Yöncüler* does not build tutelary ideology only on the inadequacy of the people, but also on the need for a leading cadre.

As a result of the evaluations made within the framework of the concept of democracy and Turkish democracy in *Yön* Journal, it is seen that the ideology/worldview has an important effect in the process of making sense of concepts. Based on this inference, it can be concluded that the ideology discussed above can lead to the emergence of alternative interpretations of democracy. Ultimately, this model of democracy, which the Journal of *Yön* discussed and attempted to build, cause *Yöncüler* to have their place in Turkish political life as representatives of a *radical* ideology engaged with socialist ideology and tutelary tradition. As a matter of fact, *Yön*, which was founded and continued its publication life as Kemalist leftist publication, targeted at a readership including young army officers, university youth, and progressive intellectuals, who were described as progressive and revolutionary. It is argued that the socio-economic and political transformations desired in Turkish political life throughout the six-year publication life of the journal could only be realized with the support of the army and university youth and under the leadership of progressive intellectuals. While the decision-making bodies in a democratic society determine their policies, *Yön* advocates a political ideology that provides a legitimate basis for the existence of various institutions and individuals, such as the army, university youth, and progressive intellectuals, who are not accountable to the public, which “will not be considered democratic even if all other elements exist” in Yazıcı’s¹⁸³ words. As an inevitable result of the ideology adopted in line with these aims, *Yöncüler* is described as the representative of an elitist, and authoritarian idea movement that attempts to promote *small bourgeois radicalism, top-down radicalism, or top-down revolution*.

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183 Yazıcı, *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Türkiye*, 139.

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Sažetak

**PROMICANJE SKRBNIČKE DEMOKRACIJE
KAO PROJEKTA SOCIJALNOG INŽENJERINGA
POLITIČKO INTELEKTUALNOGA POKRETA:
STUDIJA O ČASOPISU YÖN**

Iako općeprihvaćena definicija demokracije osigurava upravljanje ljudima za ljude od ljudi, turska ljevica ponovo ju je protumačila te uočila da se stvarna demokracija može održati samo putem socijalističke revolucije. Časopis *Yön* stekao je kritično mjesto u reinterpretaciji klasične definicije demokracije te je postavio put izgradnji socijalističke ideologije spojene s načelima kemalizma i nacionalizma. Uzimajući u obzir ključnu ulogu časopisa *Yön* na putu Turske prema demokraciji, cilj je ove studije istražiti kako se u časopisu razmatra bit demokracije i koja prepoznatljiva obilježja ima koncept demokracije. U skladu s navedenim, kao metodologija istraživanja odabrana je utemeljena teorija te su autorski i anonimni radovi u 222 broja časopisa istraženi koristeći stalnu komparativnu metodu i hermeneutički pristup. Rezultati su pokazali da je *Yöncüler* kvintesenciji demokracije pripisao skrbničku značajku. U skladu s tim, zaključeno je da je usvojena socijalistička ideologija u časopisu *Yön* težila skrbničkoj demokraciji te da *Yöncüler* nije izgradio skrbničku ideologiju samo na nedostatnosti ljudi, već i na potrebi za vodećim kadrom.

Ključne riječi: *demokracija; skrbnička demokracija; socijalni inženjering; časopis Yön; turski politički život.*

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