

ETHICAL INTELLECTUALISM AND AMORAL LEGALISM

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Summary

The fundamental question in the discussion developed around the ethical intellectualism and amoral legalism is “Does an individual have the right to a worldview?” Primarily, it refers to the contemporary phenomenon known as “cancel-culture” (CC) that manifests a common ideological background with “wokeism”, which is recognized as a development of the ideology of “political correctness” (PC). Such analysis of the PC ideology focuses on discourses that manifest certain legal tendencies, indicating that in this ideology, there is a deeper intention with concrete objectives in social transformation through means recognized as censorship. This aspect suggests that when it comes to the confronted worldviews, PC ideology shows ambitions that extend beyond mere conversational criticism. On that point, a liberal critique confronts PC ideology, advocating freedom of individual worldview and expression – as long as this expression does not oppress fundamental civil liberties. The approach to the subject is philosophical, relying on discourses on morality and legality with historical importance and their contemporary critical reviews. The argument reintroduces

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the concept of ethical intellectualism as a countermeasure to excessive legalism. In that respect, ethical intellectualism represents a humanistic approach to rights and morals that aims to direct and (consequently) limit action, expression and thought through education of intellectual virtue; rather than relying on the repressive regulatory frame. The argument concludes that it is essential for humanity that people can discuss morals, while it is dangerous to legalize ethics.

Keywords: *cancel-culture, censorship, humanity, legalism, morality, society.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Freedom of expression, which encompasses oral and written communication as well as means of art through all known media, is a commonly recognized human right. Considering the nature of the human being this right is basic, necessary and irrevocable. The prerequisite for the freedom of speech is the right to freedom of thought; regardless of these thoughts being abstract ideas or forms of consciousness about world phenomena, things, occurrences, beings and even self as well as other people.¹ The principle of equality in right granted dismisses any cunning attempt of objection to such right with the hypothetical example of mutually excluding acts of freedom. Based on the understanding that if some right is given to each and everyone on equal terms, such exercise of freedom that prevents others to exercise their (same) right is considered excessive and inconsistent with the concept of right as such and is therefore dismissed as redundant. Regarding the right to freedom of expression, as formulated in *UDHR*, and considering the possible harm that unrestricted expression might bring to the rights and reputation of others, national security, public order health or morals, freedom of expression carries duties and responsibilities and therefore is not an absolute legal freedom.² Due to the arbitrariness in the interpretation of dangerous and possibly harmful expression, certain debates on the freedom of expression occasionally emerge even in modern Western (liberal) democracies in which political rights and civil liberties are considered highly developed and progressive.

¹ The importance of thought, as well as the order and sequence in which it necessarily precedes the expression, is recognized in *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, in which article 18 affirms “the right to freedom of thought” and to its associated aspects of consciousness, after which article 19 recognizes and prescribes “the right to freedom of opinion and expression” (United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), United Nations General Assembly, New York, 1948, art. 18-19).

² “The Exercise of the rights provided for [...] carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputation of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. [...] 1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” (United Nations General Assembly, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 1966”, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 999, 1976, p. 178, art. 19-20).

Another aspect of thought, opinion, expression and communication to be considered in this matter is language. Language is an essential determinant of the human being and a fundamental instrument for comprehension of the world in its meaningful (logical) relations,³ while speech, oral or written, is the primary medium for communication; or as Martin Heidegger put it:

“Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility.”⁴

Therefore, discourse has a crucial role in organizing society, which includes the establishment of power and as such is a constant object of desire; “since, as history constantly teaches us, discourse is not simply that which translates struggles of systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized”.⁵ The idea of piety, religious or secular, rests and aims at fidelity so that the establishment can count on stability as long as the society is united under the pious symbol, which the authority represents as social dogma – “a fixed idea” – as Max Stirner explains, referring to a reaffirmation of the hierarchy through fixation of interpretation, which is from this viewpoint of a discursive character.⁶ The ways and methods

³ Cf. Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., LTD, London; Harcourt, Brace & Company, New York, 1933, 5.6-5.61.

⁴ Heidegger, M., *Being and Time*, transl. Macquarrie, J., Robinson, E., Harper & Row, Publishers, New York and Evanston, 1962, H. 161, p. 203-204.

⁵ Foucault, M., *The Order of Discourse*, transl. McLeod, I., in Young, R. (ed.), *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, Routledge, Boston, 1981, pp. 52-53.

⁶ “What is it, then, that is called a ‘fixed idea’? An idea that has subjected the man to itself.” (Stirner, M., *The Ego and His Own*, transl. Byington, S. T., Benj R. Tucker, New York, 1907, p. 43). Stirner relates the concept of “the Spook” (*ibid.*, p. 41) to the “fixed idea”, understanding it as an imposed moral corrective that haunts, or “possesses” people of a given time under a specific rule – which is always recognized as the rule of the idea: “Is it meant only that people have been thinking in every time, and so have had thoughts or truths, and that in the subsequent time these were other than they were in the earlier? No, the word is to be that every time had its ‘truth or faith’; and in fact none has yet appeared in which ‘higher truth’ has not been recognized, a truth that people believed they must subject themselves to as ‘highness and majesty’. Every truth of a time is a fixed idea, and, if people later found another truth, this always happened only because they sought for another; [...] – they wanted to be ‘inspired by an idea.’ They wanted to be dominated – possessed, by a *thought!*” (*ibid.*, p. 269-270). This understanding is based on the subjective will as the instance of legitimization. However, since will reflects the understanding as a faculty of intellect (as demonstrated by Benedictus de Spinoza [E2p49c/G II 131]), the most sophisticated form of domination is in the appropriation

for elimination of dissidents who, from the perspective of a system, are threatening the public stability, are well documented and problematized since ancient times and are essentially perpetuating the famous case of Socrates, who was prosecuted for “impiety” and “corruption of Athenian youth”.⁷

Discourse refers to the perception or worldview, which can then correspond to a greater or lesser extent with the “truth”, “reality”, or “factuality”, whether these are understood from the scientific-objectivist point of view, or from mere subjective desire to represent a certain cluster of meaning as the arbitrary norm, rather than factual methodologically provable truth. If the government does not have pretensions or just enough rough power to slide into a totalitarian form, which as a regime is characterized by harnessing the political power into re-education of citizenry to create uniform followers, whom not only actions they control but also shape their thoughts,⁸ it always approaches the question of discourse with great care. Therefore, the legal frame regarding free speech in the respect in which it has to sanction it using censorship is rather debatable. This debate rests on ontological, epistemological, ethical, social and political perspectives, while other fields and sciences may as well be included. Besides that, not all censorship has to come from the legislature before it should enter the ethical and legal debate.

The matter considered in this work can be summarized in a question “does an individual have the right to a worldview?” that emerges in front of the contemporary phenomenon known as “cancel culture” (CC) that manifests a common ideological background with “wokeism”, which is recognized

of truth by seizing the discourse. By critically examining the concept of the “fixed idea” or “the Spook”, Stirner re-instantiates the subjective consciousness as an authorizer of piety: “Before the sacred, people lose all sense of power and all confidence; they occupy a *powerless and humble* attitude toward it. And yet no thing is sacred of itself, but by my *declaring it sacred*, by my declaration, my judgment, my bending the knee; in short, by my – conscience.” (Stirner, *op. cit.*, p. 63).

⁷ Cf. Plato, *Apology of Socrates*, in Dyer, L. (ed.), *Apology of Socrates and Crito*, Ginn and company proprietors, Boston, 1908, pp. 37-114.

⁸ Cf. Letica, M. M., “100 godina od dolaska fašizma na vlast”, Portal hrvatskoga kulturnog vijeća (5 January 2023), URL: <https://www.hkv.hr/izdvojeno/vai-prilozi/i-lj/letica-marito-mihovil/40944-m-m-letica-100-godina-od-dolaska-fasizma-na-vlast.html> (accessed on 10 February 2023).

as a development of the ideology of “political correctness” (PC). So far the CC movement is primarily localized on digital social media and still does not possess legitimate legal power. However, CC logic, agenda and demands are indicating that ideologically there is a deeper practical intention with concrete objectives in social transformation. This aspect shows CC ambitions that extend beyond mere conversational criticism.

The first part of this work focuses on specifics of CC, PC and “wokeism” as ideologies with tendency of excessive legalism. The second part demonstrates two distinct practical approaches to the questions of rights and morals. These are: 1) social and 2) humanistic approaches. The prior prioritizes socio-political order, while the latter focuses on ethical self-actualization of the individual. Third part examines the problem of juridical codification of morality, demonstrating that such practice is not only neglectful of individual judgment as an indispensable aspect of humanity and morality, but is also impractical and pragmatically inefficient in achieving its goal designated as societal change. Therefore, this deliberation is not a lamentation about morality but has a practical purpose. It asserts that ideological attempts of repressive regulation of worldview through censorship, without an indispensable educational component are technically incapable of eradicating unwanted ideas and opinions. At best, such attempts can temporarily marginalize undesired narratives while treating a human being as an object of behaviour. Contrary, the assumption is that conceptual change depends on the subjective capacity for critical thinking based on the power of understanding the argument. On that point, the philosophical concept of ethical intellectualism is introduced as an adequate solution to the conceptual controversies in question. Methodologically, the concept of ethical intellectualism rests on a philosophical tradition in which freedom is understood as an internal subjective principle. Accordingly, from ethical and legal perspectives belonging to the philosophical tradition presented in this work, virtue is achieved through education, not by imposition. Conclusion of the research is that it is essential for humanity that people can discuss morals, while it is dangerous to legalize ethics.

2. CANCEL CULTURE, POLITICAL CORRECTNES, “WOKEISM”

Since the late 2010s a new movement known as CC, critical of freedom of expression, has gained public and even political importance, mainly in Western societies, with the yet biggest impact in the United States as its cradle. Its modern origins are related to the movements that seek to highlight problems of social inequalities by directly calling out the cases, people or groups that in some way oppressed (racially) or abused (sexually) other people or members of social groups.⁹ In that particular sense, “cancel culture” has a common origin with a “call-out culture”, with which however it should not be equalized, due to its logic and key features, which will be addressed towards the conclusion of the paper. In its own particular shape of “cancellation” rather than “calling out”, CC originated in 2014 from the tweets, resting however on the controversy that was related to the problematic history of racism in the United States. The controversial case started with the American comedian and television host, Stephen Colbert’s tweet that was intended as a satire of the Washington Redskins Original Americans Foundation,¹⁰ which read:

“I am willing to show #Asian community I care by introducing the Ching-Chong Ding-Dong Foundation for Sensitivity to Orientals or Whatever”¹¹

Colbert’s tweet provoked a reactive tweet from Suey Park that marked the beginning of the so-called “hashtag activism” campaign, which followed:

⁹ Cf. Buchanan, L., Bui, Q., Patel, J. K., “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History”, *The New York Times* (3 July 2020), URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html> (accessed on 11 May 2023).

¹⁰ A non-profit organization started by Daniel Snyder in 2014 with “The mission [...] to provide meaningful and measurable resources that provide genuine opportunities for Tribal communities” (Snyder, D. M., “Letter From Dan Snyder”, *The Washington Redskins Original American Foundation* (24 March 2014), URL: <https://washingtonredskinsoriginalamericansfoundation.org/> (accessed on 11 May 2023)). This organization was formed due to the controversies around the name of one of the football teams participating in National Football League (NFL), which was considered offensive towards the Native Americans.

¹¹ Kang, J. C., “The Campaign to ‘Cancel’ Colber”, *The New Yorker* (30 March 2014), URL: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-campaign-to-cancel-colbert> (accessed on 11 May 2023).

“The Ching-Chong Ding-Dong Foundation for Sensitivity of Orientals has decided to call for #CancelColbert. Trend it.”¹²

The tweeting culminated in the polarization of supporters, where those on the Park’s side – the protesters offended by Colbert’s initial tweet – were advocating the position according to which satire that rests on cultural stereotypes and is disrespectful to the history of oppression is unacceptable, turning it into the problem of “white comedians and their fans” who “believe they are above reproach”.¹³ On the opposite side of this spectrum were the “supporters of Colbert”, or advocators of “freedom of speech” in the particular case and from this body sprung several attributions that have marked the perspective on the CC up to the present days, such as: “hypersensitivity”, “hostility”, “offensiveness”, etc.¹⁴ The reaction also saw calling upon the violation of The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which states that the “Congress shall make no law [...] prohibiting the free exercise [...] or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; [...]”;¹⁵ which however brought questions of the limits of the speech, i.e. expression already addressed in the introduction of this paper.

From the legal perspective, regardless of CC being hostile to free speech, it also is free speech and it is not a government instrument but a cultural movement, most prominently present on digital social media. Although CC rests on a particular moral feeling and a specific interpretation of criteria for legal action, this being the ultimate right to be offended and necessity in sanctioning (ideally using cancellation) the offender, as a social reaction with a certain set of demands it demonstrates recognizable legal pretensions. These legal pretensions are already noticeable in the current form of CC, which mainly is a “weaponisation of social media” through three steps. The starting point of the CC mechanism is (1) public shaming of unacceptable behaviour, followed by (2) withdrawal of support to the publicly shamed entity with final aim in (3) demand of execution of penalty, mostly in the form of either employment loss, revenue shortage or

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, Park, S., Kim, E., “We Want To #CancelColbert”, Time (28 March 2014), URL: <https://time.com/42174/we-want-to-cancelcolbert/> (accessed on 11 May 2023).

¹⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*

¹⁵ U. S. Const. amend. I.

ostracism in the digital environment.¹⁶ The results of CC campaigns with consequential cultural boycott are nonetheless impacting society, affecting not only the public opinion itself but the wilfulness to express the opinion publicly and therefore the idea of freedom of speech, i.e. expression in general.¹⁷ Given that it manifests as a social reaction with a clear aim and demand to suppress certain content and form of expression, while the “culture” component of the name suggests that the “cancel campaigns” are collective endeavours,¹⁸ CC provokes a question: “Should we impose laws on verbal and non-verbal expression?”, which in another form reads: “Does an individual have the right to a worldview?”.

CC is just a recent example with a magnitude relevant enough to make it a phenomenon. Some analysts argue that as a movement, CC is not

¹⁶ The fact that this “social media weaponisation” as a mechanism directly impacts digital identity does not make it less aggressive, given the contemporary business environment, which greatly rests and depends on digital marketing and furthermore, there is no control of stopping the boycott just on digital social media, but it can affect the targeted person in “real life” as well. These remarks that include economic and social well-being of a person, in the context of the importance and influentiality of the (social) media in shaping the public image and with it the reaction of the rest of the public towards that image and in accordance with it, are considered a valid standpoint for acknowledging legal pretensions of the CC that are worthy of consideration before its possible escalation. The movement gains even more significance as a legal subject as a direct execution of justice through social reaction and particularly as a form of ostracism, which conceptually in its extremity comes short only to capital punishment. The considerable interconnectedness of society, money and digital media as elements of individual vitality in a contemporary sense can be approached from a cultural-anthropological perspective: “Concretely, a modern man or woman doesn’t look for bio-survival security in the gene-pool, the pack, the extended family. Bio-survival depends on getting the tickets. ‘You can’t live without money,’ [...] If the tickets are withdrawn, acute bio-survival anxiety appears at once. [...] it is why exile, or even ostracism, were sufficient punishments to enforce tribal conformity throughout most of human history. [...] In traditional society, belonging to the tribe was bio-security; exile was terror, and real threat of death. In modern society, having the tickets (money) is bio-security; having the tickets withdrawn is terror.” (Wilson, R. A., *Prometheus Rising*, New Falcon Publications, Tempe (AZ), p. 52.

¹⁷ Cf. Wei Li, F., Lim, T., “Cancelling Cancel Culture: What should Legislation Look Like?”, *Law Gazette* (January 2023), URL: <https://lawgazette.com.sg/feature/cancelling-cancel-culture/> (accessed on 7 April 2023).

¹⁸ In this sense “cancel culture” as a denomination becomes a useful instrument in the politicisation of the movement from both sides of the spectrum. Through it, the pro-cancel-culturists are getting the opportunity to present it as a massive, critical social initiative with enough significance to get the legal recognition of its demands, while anti-cancel-culturists can use it as “a spook” among their supporters for motivation of resistance.

alarming nor does it pose a serious threat to fundamental civil liberties such as freedom of speech. Among them are those who point to the historical examples of similar practices, such as *damnatio memoriae*¹⁹ in ancient times, to present that CC essentially is nothing new under the sun, but rather a specific cultural context of the basic human, i.e. social reactive expression.²⁰ There are also viewpoints from which the whole phenomenon is overly politicised and inflated by the media, especially in the communities in which it has more prominence, as a diversion from the “real” problems – mainly the economic ones – such as marketised education, for example.²¹ Certainly, to the big industries, every outrage comes as an economic opportunity and the same goes with political parties on both sides of the spectrum who, in this respect as a two-part mechanism, are (1) weaponising narrative as such and then (2) weaponising their campaigns with already weaponised narrative.²² Another perspective is that the CC movement with its expansion and concrete consequences in media lynching, reputation undermining and loss of jobs as an ideology poses a direct threat to democratic values²³ and see it as a form of non-negotiable extremism.²⁴ For this analysis, the point of interest is ethically

¹⁹ Lat.: condemnation of memory.

²⁰ Cf. Waltham, L., “Damnatio memoriae: Ancient Rome’s cancel culture”, Thought Leader (20 August 2020), URL: <https://thoughtleader.co.za/damnatio-memoriae-ancient-romes-cancel-culture/> (accessed on 8 April 2023).

²¹ Cf. Koram, K., “It’s not ‘wokery’ or snowflakes strangling free expression in universities – it’s the Conservative party”, The Guardian (3 February 2023), URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/feb/03/woke-snowflakes-free-expression-universities-students-academics-cancelling-speakers> (accessed on 7 April 2023).

²² Cf. Shapiro, A., Janse Marquez, A., Venkat, M., Caldwell, N., Jarenwattananon, P., “How Cancel Culture Became Politicized – Just Like Political Correctness”, National Public Radio (26 July 2023), URL: <https://www.npr.org/2021/07/09/1014744289/cancel-culture-debate-has-early-90s-roots-political-correctness> (accessed on 7 April 2023); cf. Nakić, M., “Što je ‘cancel culture’ i postoji li u Hrvatskoj?”, Liberal (10 July 2020), URL: <https://liberal.hr/?s=0&id=3316> (accessed on 7 April 2023).

²³ Cf. Vissol, T., “Why the ideologies behind ‘Woke’ and Cancel Culture are putting our democracy in jeopardy | View”, Euronews (15 September 2021), URL: <https://www.euronews.com/culture/2021/09/15/why-the-ideologies-behind-woke-and-cancel-culture-are-putting-our-democracy-in-jeopardy-vi> (accessed on 7 April 2023).

²⁴ Cf. Chapman, B., “Free Speech, Fair Speech Vs. Woke”, Discovery Institute (5 March 2021), URL: <https://www.discovery.org/a/free-speech-fair-speech-vs-woke/> (accessed on 7 April 2023).

reflected epistemological absolutism of CC built on the resentment,²⁵ once the problematic term “political correctness” has been replaced with much more evocative “wokeism” (ideologically merged with the CC), which has become a term for PC gone awry.²⁶ Both PC and “woke” concepts have gone through socio-cultural semantic transformations and have gained new prominent meaning in the context of CC.

“Since as far back as 1793, when the term appeared in a U.S. Supreme Court decision about the boundaries of federal jurisdiction, ‘politically correct’ has had an array of definitions. It has been used to describe what is politically wise, and it has been employed as ironic self-mockery. The phrase has driven contentious debates in which free speech and free choice are pitted against civility and inclusion. But it hasn’t just changed meaning, it has changed targets.”²⁷

On the European continent, the term dates back to the early 20th century, belonging to the Marxist-Leninist vocabulary as a descriptor of adherence to the Communist party, referring to the consistency in political beliefs and actions of an individual identified as a member of a party.²⁸ After World War II, with the increasing hostility of the United States administration towards the USSR and within the perception of the Communist propaganda as a national threat, the term due to its origins was recognized as an expression of negative dogmatism and loyalty to the wrong cause. Further on, during the 1960s and 1970s, as Ruth Perry wrote, the term was mainly used in

²⁵ Cf. Motica, A. D., “Is Cancel Culture the New *Damnatio Memoriae*?”, *Polemic. The Magazine of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna* (9 January 2021), URL: <https://www.polemics-magazine.com/opinion/is-cancel-culture-the-new-damnatio-memoriae> (accessed on 8 April 2023).

²⁶ Cf. Bump, P., “Why ‘woke’ replaced ‘politically correct’”, *The Washington Post* (18 January 2023), URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/01/18/woke-cancel-desantis-academics/> (accessed on 7 April 2023); cf. Romano, A., “A history of ‘wokeness’”, *Vox* (9 October 2020), URL: <https://www.vox.com/culture/21437879/stay-woke-wokeness-history-origin-evolution-controversy> (accessed on 12 May 2023).

²⁷ Chow, K., “‘Politically Correct’: The Phrase Has Gone From Wisdom To Weapon”, *National Public Radio* (14 December 2016), URL: <https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2016/12/14/505324427/politically-correct-the-phrase-has-gone-from-wisdom-to-weapon> (accessed on 7 April 2023).

²⁸ Cf. Roper, C., “political correctness”, *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (20 March 2023), URL: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-correctness> (accessed on 12 May 2023).

student circles, until it was re-politicized in the 1990s,²⁹ while today it is politically inflated to the level of a cultural global problem. “Woke” on the other hand started as a term for the alertness of socio-political issues affecting African Americans in the 1930s, but has re-emerged in the 2010s as a term encompassing all “discriminated” entities,³⁰ whether this discrimination rests on the historic oppression, or just on the sense feeling offended.

This research will not deal any further with the intricate genealogy of PC, CC and “wokeism”, but will instead focus on ethical and epistemological aspects of these initiatives and their possible consequences. Both ethical and epistemological concern here revolves around “cancelling” as the problematic idea:

“The idea of pushing someone out – because they have said or done something perceived to be offensive leaves no room for growth or learning.”³¹

Such binary, extreme and exclusive ethics contributes to the infantilisation of public discourse, resembling Melanie Klein’s splitting theory according to which little children have a tendency to mentally split objects based on frustration and gratification to “good” and “bad objects”.³² That is another indication of the prescriptive character of the CC, which has not yet been introduced into legal practice due to its incongruence with Western liberal-democratic tradition, although it parasitizes on protest right at the expense of public debate. On this point, such ideological colonisation poses a threat of becoming a critically unexamined norm and criteria for institutionalised moral discernment.

²⁹ Cf. Chow, *op. cit.* in 27.

³⁰ Cf. Romano, *op. cit.* in 26.

³¹ Alexander, E., “Cancel culture: a force for good or a threat to free speech?”, Harper’s Bazaar (14 July 2020), URL: <https://www.harpersbazaar.com/uk/culture/a33296561/cancel-culture-a-force-for-good-or-a-threat-to-free-speech/> (accessed on 7 April 2023).

³² Cf. *ibid.*, Klein, M., Personification in the Play of Children, *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1929, pp. 193-204.

3. LEGALITY AND MORALITY – TWO SETS OF PRINCIPLES

This part examines differences in principle, method and aims between morality and legality from the philosophical perspective. This difference should provide the basis for the understanding of the importance of separation of legality and morality, but should also clarify the extent of this separation, i.e. it should determine in which aspects they overlap.

At the core of the distinction between morality and legality is the question of virtue, including its meaning, its bearer and the way of its achievement. Both legality and morality imply certain duties and presuppose a paradigm as a standard to be met and actualized. However, the state is a political community of people – therefore people are constitutive to the state and it is the people who are actualizing the state in its potential legality. Otherwise, the state would be ontological self-sufficiency and as such mere abstraction unrelated to its people. The empirical fact is that people exist prior to the state and that people constitute what is known as the state in the sense of the legal and political system. Yet, the question of legality and morality is not a dichotomy, because the two are not mutually exclusive, but are rather overlapping. Legality is institutionalisation of morality, while both concepts are conceived for the benefit of the society, i.e. community and at the very basis, for the individual in the community.³³ The legal state is a transcendence of the principles of reason by means of which human being overcomes its natural shortcomings and by institutionalisation they become an objective reality made through subjective autonomous self-determination. In describing the inward effect of institutions, Arnold Gehlen has used George Herbert Mead's notion of (group) "game" or "play". In a state of the game, a certain goal is set and becomes a criterion for the meaningfulness of all actions, i.e. the concern of all actions is achieving the goal. Institutions as a form of a game are designed for the internal stabilisation of the human being, through which social action becomes effective, permanent, normatively determinable, *quasi*-automatic and foreseeable.³⁴ This institutional concept of the state thus becomes an

³³ Relation (and dependence) between personal well-being and civil society is part of Spinoza's ethical doctrine demonstrated in the fourth part of his *Ethics* (cf. E4p40/G II 241, E4p73/G II 264).

³⁴ Cf. Gehlen, A., *Čovjek i institucije*, transl. Miladinov, K., Nakladni zavod Globus, Zagreb, 1994, pp. 37–42.

abstract yet consensually concrete and objective sphere, in which, in an ethical sense, through legalisation of rational moral laws human being actualises itself in the abstract. The actualisation in the abstract means that subjugation to the laws is oriented towards the idea of the common good that prevails over the idea of the private (personal) good. However, this abstraction that is necessary for the institutionalisation in most cases entails that individuals do not have a sense or the grasp of the idea of what their consent refers to, but are obedient regardless of the lack of understanding. On the other end, in the subjective sense of ethics, the individual becomes moral when it acts out of its personal motivation for the obedience to the moral law, which the individual understands and thus actualises itself in the concrete immediacy, rather than in the abstract horizon. Legislative instantiation represents self-determination from the spontaneity of the will, not of a concrete individual but of the trans-individual concept of human.

The development of this distinction between objective/legal duty on one side and subjective/moral duty on the other can also be understood through the assignation of the concept of social approach to the prior and humanistic approach to the latter. From the perspective of the social (objective-legal) approach, the virtue is in social stability, order, safety, etc., therefore, this perspective prioritising society and holding it substantial, first and foremost limits the action and expression using a regulatory frame; while the direction in a sense of moral guidance is logically secondary and temporarily speaking comes later as a by-product. The humanistic (subjective-moral) approach aims to direct action, expression and most importantly, thought, through education of intellectual virtue, which only consequently limits undesired action. Therefore the first approach prioritizes socio-political order and general human actualisation in the abstract over ethical actualisation of the real and concrete individual, which is the priority of the second approach.

Recognition of these two mechanisms might show itself significant for analysis of movements such as CC because the preference of one over the other might indicate does the initiative rests on mere censorious tendencies (which would make it a political instrument) or if there is an ethical and even enlightening imperative in its core. If the mere censorship is in question and supposedly CC succeeds in its legal enforcement, it is not only morally devastating, but it is impractical, since a reign of terror as is historically known, does not lead to social stability and in the long

run, incites resentment.³⁵ The practicality of these two frames, ((1) social approach and (2) humanistic approach), regarding the question of what is deemed acceptable for social order and morality can be put to a three-level test; these levels being: a) action, b) expression, c) thought. The assumption is that as long as thoughts are incongruent with the acceptable frame, it is only a matter of time before they will manifest in expression and even in action (in a sense of what was already mentioned about resentment as the effect of the reign of terror). Because thought is the basis of all perception and the will reflects understanding. First examination considers the (1) social approach. Although at a given moment on the levels a) (action) and b) (expression) the members of society might seem to be in line with the legally imposed social norms, level c) (thought) requires deeper examination from mere assertion based on the observation of the temporary state of affairs. The social approach, resting on the legal authority as its main resource, does not have means for the verification of civil fidelity and honesty, apart from the public surveys, which not only are a mere statistic tool but in the reign of terror results may be more in line with what needs to be true, rather than what the factual state is – the data can be deceiving. Supposing that results of such surveys are true and are demonstrating a discrepancy between public opinion and public behaviour, the means of this socially-oriented mechanism are more law enforcement. The (2) humanistic approach is more fundamental in this hierarchy; meaning that it perceives levels a) and b) as indicators of the c) level, which is the basic level. In confronting the same problem of verifiability regarding thought as a social approach, the humanistic approach interprets the consequences on the surface level of both expression and action as a reflection of thought, given that will reflects understanding, i.e. intellect.

The distinction between the two described modes of behaviour is essential. Subjugation to the exterior rule of law in which the individual does not understand the moral behind its action is compliance – i.e. mere technical capacity for interpreting the legal code into basic “do” and “do not” behavioural mechanism. Besides the obvious dehumanisation (if understanding, reasoning, judgment, autonomy, freedom and morality are

³⁵ Cf. Spinoza, B., *Theological-Political Treatise*, in: Morgan, M. L., *Spinoza. Complete Works*, transl. Shirley, S., Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis/Cambridge, 2002, *Caput V*: pp. 435–444, *Caput XVI*: pp. 526–535.

considered as categories of humanity, which in compliance are evidently absent or reduced to the very minimum for required functioning), on this point becomes clear that legality can be functional in itself, while it does not need to be moral. From the humanistic perspective, for the action to be wilful, it requires an understanding of the act itself. Therefore, morality represents will in understanding the act, while legality represents will in understanding regulation. These are the basis on which CC as a form of logocracy³⁶ evokes images similar to the dystopian society like the one described in George Orwell's SF novel *1984*.³⁷

“New words, euphemisms, periphrases, appear to replace those now deemed offensive. As in George Orwell's ‘1984’, the idea is to prevent the expression of critical ideas by changing vocabulary.”³⁸

Among the historically relevant thinkers on the subject of the distinction between morality and legality is Immanuel Kant.

“While the prevailing view today treats law and morality as intersecting sets of rules and rights, the Kantian view treats the two as distinct and nonintersecting. The moral does not petition for inclusion in the legal and the legal cannot determine the moral.”³⁹

One of the crucial elements of Kant's ethics is the determination of the will, which is the criterion for the morality of action.⁴⁰ Kant has distinguished the notion of the legality of actions from the morality of character and within it the possibility of performing legal actions, which yet remain to be proven of moral character.⁴¹ This possibility rests on the understanding of the moral action, regarding which Ante Čović pointed out that:

³⁶ The rule over words, their usage, meaning and acceptability of discourse (with ultimate effect in totalitarianism).

³⁷ Cf. Chapman, *op. cit.* in 24.

³⁸ Vissol, *op. cit.* in 23.

³⁹ Fletcher, G. P., Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 87, No. 3, 1987. URL: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2046&context=faculty_scholarship, p. 534.

⁴⁰ Guć, J., Moralitet i legalitet u Kantovoj etici, *Theoria*, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2002017G>. p. 18.

⁴¹ Cf. Kant, I., *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and other works on the Theory of Ethics*, transl. Abbott, T. K., Longmans, Green and Co LTD., London, 1909, p. 249.

“Moral is not a special kind of action but only a specific dimension in which each human act gets quality of value and becomes a morally determined act. The moral judgment of the correctness of the procedure takes place in the closed structure of the act itself, which is formed by three elements: judgment – decision – performance. We call that reflection that is immanent in action, which evaluates the moral correctness of the intention, a moral reflection.”⁴²

This clarifies that judgment as individual understanding is a necessary prerequisite for action to have moral significance. Contrary to that, compliance may be legal, but without internal deliberation, it is not yet essentially moral and therefore can easily lead to non-legal action, if the individual acts from its understanding, which can be motivated by personal affects that in the given situation prevail over the sense of legality. Furthermore, compliance without understanding makes a perfect tool of an individual (in comparison with the machines designed to operate according to the operator’s will), which in a socio-political sense makes it easy to manipulate. Ernest Jones demonstrated this aspect of non-understanding (while participating) on the example of persecutions based on the accusations of witchcraft and public opinion then and now:

“Further, when the general attitude towards a question changes in the course of time, this is often due at least as much to modification of the prevailing affective influences as to the accumulation of external evidence; for instance, the average man of to-day does not hesitate to reject the same evidence of witchcraft that was so convincing to the man of three centuries ago, though he usually knows no more about the true explanation of it than the latter did.”⁴³

The conclusion is that the public accommodates to moral standards based on their legality.

⁴² Čović, A., Pojmovna razgraničenja: moral, etika, medicinska etika, bioetika, integrativna bioetika, [transl. author], in Čović, A., Radonić, M. (eds.), *Bioetika i dijete. Moralne dileme u pedijatriji*, Pergamena, Hrvatsko društvo za preventivnu i socijalnu pedijatriju, Zagreb, 2011, p. 12.

⁴³ Jones, E., The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, *The American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1911. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1412796>. p. 524.

The arguments for the distinction between morality and legality are not suggesting that these two spheres are in a dichotomy. In Kant's understanding, morality includes legality, while legality does not need to necessarily include morality. As Josip Guć pointed out:

“Morality signifies both subjective and objective determination for acting in accordance with the moral law. Legality signifies only objective determination (...) it is not relevant does that subjective determination takes place in it simultaneously, but by no means does this signify that it is excluded [...].”⁴⁴

In the article “Aspects and Implications of Kant's Notion of Freedom”, Emil Kušan has clearly described three outcomes from three possible variations in which will can exercise its freedom:⁴⁵ (1) Will that is determined morally both objective and subjective produces morality. (2) Will that is objectively determined by moral law, but subjectively by another prescriptive reason produces legality, which by itself is not already necessarily moral.⁴⁶ (3) Will that is determined exclusively subjectively is immoral (not necessarily “bad” or “evil”). For the subject of this paper, the most interesting is case (2) – the one considering legality of action.

4. TOWARDS THE ETHICAL INTELLECTUALISM (INSTEAD OF INEFFICIENT MORAL LEGALISM)

If subjectivity is to be fully restrained⁴⁷ then the threshold between legality and morality becomes uncertain and the system of relations is out of balance, which means that the governing forces are overstepping into the private sphere. In that case, the public space of expression in its totality becomes uniform within one epistemological frame. This then becomes a problem of uniformed truth to which governing authorities claim their sole right. The standardized worldview as a norm becomes the new criterion for the

⁴⁴ Guć, *op. cit.* in 40, p. 27 [transl. author].

⁴⁵ Cf. Kušan, E., Aspekti i implikacije Kantova pojma slobode, *Filozofska istraživanja*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2012, p. 88.

⁴⁶ Cf. Čović, A., *Etika i bioetika*, Pergamena, Zagreb, 2004, p. 100.

⁴⁷ And control over thought and expression presents such full restraining, which extends way beyond restraining of action that is necessary for the state stability, just society and general safety.

distinction between sanity and insanity.⁴⁸ The walls of asylum are spreading and the government becomes a legislatively authorized psychiatrist with authority over mentality by means of its executive power. This demonstrates that legality not only does not need to be moral, but it does not have the capacity for morality because its primary function is codification, not ethical evaluation, which is complementary to epistemology and ontology.

Operating, not acting, according to one single *ratio* is the definition of singlemindedness equal to machine functioning and as such is neglectful of the autonomy of the concrete, truly living individual. Furthermore, it is practically impossible to simply give up all worldviews. Instead, rejection of a worldview implies its replacement with the new one, or its development with the elements integrated from a different worldview. Therefore, prohibition of the worldview through censorship or sanctions is a categorical and absolutist method with pretensions to the ultimate truth. It is primarily a practical act of producing the conditions for the specific truth profitable to the system, rather than striving for the theoretical truth of the problem at hand. One could argue for a “progressive-flexible legal system” that reacts to spatiotemporal actualities that are threatening to social stability. However, such argument meets its practical insufficiency in two aspects: (1) the question of “which society” becomes a political question of resolving differences while maintaining multitude and diversity; (2) sociability, representing that which underlies and enables society as such, as a *condicio sine qua non* of society, is jeopardized by the act of censorship. Ultimately, the resolution falls within the scope of the concept of tolerance. When it comes to tolerance, it is important to see that the concept itself serves to support the creation, preservation and those guarantees that are indispensable for a more complex and diverse explication of existence. Self-cancelling tolerance, that which provides space for intolerant agencies, whose intolerance reflects in unequivocally destructive intentions, is a forgery and misapplication of the concept of tolerance. Thus it becomes clear that there is a significant line between expression and presentation of idea and action that is harmful to others in the sense that it limits the freedom of another individual. As long as the thought or expression of thought represents actuality on the level of idea, it is conceptual – a

⁴⁸ Cf. Jones, *op. cit.* in 43, p. 521.

reflection of a possible *modus cogitandi*. Therefore, refutation of thought or expression has to be dealt with on the intelligible level of idea as well. Dogmatic activism, which on the ideal level disposes only with the ability to proclaim something as insulting in order to gain justification for the forceful silencing of the idea, excludes itself from the communication, does not elaborate the concept and immediately brings the conclusion. Such a conclusion is inadequate because it is brought on a completely different level – the material one – while on the abstract, intelligible level, the idea is eternal and if it is not dealt with as such, it might, and usually does, backfire on the higher scale infused with resentment.⁴⁹

Political, but also legal and ethical impracticality of censorship was recognized by Spinoza, about which he wrote in the *TTP*, in chapter XX in which “*It is shown that in a free commonwealth every man may think as he pleases, and say what he thinks*”:

“... it is impossible for the mind to be completely under another’s control; for no one is able to transfer to another his natural right or faculty of reason freely and to form his own judgment on any matters whatsoever, nor can he be compelled to do so. [...] So however much sovereigns are believed to possess unlimited right and to be the interpreters of law and piety, they will never succeed in preventing men from exercising their own particular judgment on any matters whatsoever and from being influenced accordingly by a variety of emotions. [...] If no man, then, can give up his freedom to judge and think as he pleases, and everyone is by absolute natural right the master of his own thoughts, it follows that utter failure will attend any attempt in a commonwealth to force men to speak only as prescribed by the sovereign despite their different and opposing opinions. Not even men well versed in affairs can keep silent, not to say the lower class. [...] Therefore the most tyrannical government will be one where the individual is denied the freedom to express and to communicate to others what he thinks, and a moderate government is one where this freedom is granted to every man.”⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Cf. Špoljarić, B., Perspektive i izazovi satire u masovnim medijima, in Vigato, M., (ed.), *Bioetika, umjetnost i mediji*, Udruženje studenata filozofije Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 2021, Zagreb, p. 30.

⁵⁰ Cf. Spinoza, *op. cit.*, in 35, pp. 566-567.

Instead – and this is where the concept of ethical intellectualism gains its importance – Spinoza adds:

“It is not, I repeat, the purpose of the state to transform men from rational beings into beasts or automats, but rather to enable them to refrain from the strife and the vicious mutual abuse that are prompted by hatred, anger and deceit. Thus the purpose of the state is, in reality, freedom.”⁵¹

To enable the human being in becoming free and rational, it has to be allowed to deliberate, reflect and discuss morals and develop its judgment. This is not only due to the preservation of morality as a humanistic category, but it also has its practical purpose. It asserts that the initially mentioned ideological attempts of repressive regulation of worldview through censorship, without an indispensable educational component, are technically incapable of carrying out the desired societal changes. At best, such attempts can temporarily marginalise undesired narratives while treating a human being as an object of behaviour. Contrary, the assumption is that conceptual change depends on the subjective capacity for critical thinking based on the power of understanding the argument. Since legality in its proper application should not and cannot produce morality, education has to gain its importance in developing moral virtue – which springs from the same source as understanding and that is intellect. The concept of ethical intellectualism, which is ascribed to Socrates’ understanding of virtue and was later adopted by stoic philosophers but is present in Spinoza’s ethics as well, stands for understanding that our thinking and acting consciousness depends on our intellect as the power of understanding. This concept is especially potent when freedom of speech is presented as an issue.

“Crudely, free speech is the freedom to ‘[s]peak what we feel, not what we ought to say.’ It axiomatically includes provocative, heretical and unwelcome speech: ‘[f]reedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having’.”⁵²

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Coghlan, N., *Are Our Laws on Freedom of Speech Fit for Purpose in the Age of ‘Cancel Culture’?*, Jonathan Brock QC Memorial Prize Essay, 2020. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3760389>. p. 1.

5. CONCLUSION

Based on the presented argument on legality and morality it can be concluded that in a society consisting of a multitude of various individuals and groups, with different inclinations, identities and worldviews, legislation is not conceived as an instrument for the institutionalisation of one set of morals to the level of general validity. The purpose of the legal system is to establish and preserve a right and just society; whereas justice “as commonly defined, is the steadfast and constant will to render to each his own”.⁵³ With thought as an inalienable individual property common to all human beings comes the faculty of judgment and moral reflection as an essentially human characteristic. Naturally, thoughts are translated into expression through different media and means of communication and as such these expressions reflect many of the possible worldviews held by any number of individuals. As it applies generally, to society, the law cannot favour one moral sentiment at the expense of others, since that would signify entering into the sphere of ethics, which as a philosophical discipline with adequate form has in relation to ontology and epistemology. Therefore, legal codification of one particular morality epistemologically would mean a reduction of all rationality to one reason, i.e. singlemindedness. Instead, if for the right reasons, some worldviews are considered to be nonsensical, inadequate, misrepresenting, wrong and erroneous, they are to be dealt with through logical argument, use of evidence, education and dialogue. The aim should be to arrive at a resolution to a discussion and not to a person. Furthermore, from an ethical perspective human being as an individual is responsible for the development of reason and the moral responsibility that comes with it. By complete transfer of the faculty of judgment, which is present in the logic of excessive legalism, the individual reduces itself to the level of a machine obedient to the prescribed code of behaviour, thereby ethically disregarding humanity in human being.

Given another practical obstacle to discourse policing, namely the sheer amount of content that may contain inappropriate speech or express inappropriate thoughts, the battle is already lost for the CC initiative. Instead, if the intellectual virtue of the individual is at centre of this concern, the very faculty that would enable each person to discern the logically and

⁵³ Spinoza, *op. cit.*, in 35, p. 427.

scientifically informed content apart from the junk content, both the society and the individual would benefit, chances of resentment would become drastically reduced and the whole method would not neglect individual autonomy, understanding and freedom as prerequisites for morality. It is well known that by denying the freedom of a person holding the idea, the idea is suppressed only temporarily. Many philosophers, thinkers, dissidents, political figures and other influential individuals or organisations were denied of their freedom, some even of their life, but the ideas that sprung from these sources have maintained themselves and have found new fertile ground in new supporters. Often greater martyrdom means greater support, appeal and intolerance motivated by resentment and rarely, if ever, serves a purpose in eradicating the ideology. If the discussion focuses on problems of bigotry, cultural stereotypes or inappropriate humour, which are all forms of misrepresentation, the concept of ethical intellectualism, being the one that deals with morals of intentionless thought and expression is fully applicable, regardless of the political orientations. If, however, the matter at hand is speech that includes hatred that calls for violence or slander, then as a fully action-intentional speech it becomes the subject of the legal matter.

The presented analysis of the CC phenomenon addresses its prescriptive ideology and pretension to legalisation of expression, which however remains at the level of social activism and currently, from the legal point of view, is itself a form of free expression without immediate legitimate legislative power. Furthermore, in a more rational form of “call-out” rather than that of “cancel” culture, such an initiative can raise awareness about certain misconceptions and prejudices existing in public opinion, alerting the individual to reflect on them before passing judgment. Therefore, besides demonstration of philosophical understanding of law and morality on the example of “cancel culture”, this article serves the purpose of calling out CC and the dangers its hypothetical escalation may bring.

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ETIČKI INTELEKTUALIZAM I AMORALNI LEGALIZAM

Sažetak

Temeljno pitanje rasprave razvijene oko etičkog intelektualizma i amoralnog legalizma glasi: „Ima li pojedinac pravno na svjetonazor?“. Rasprava se prvenstveno tiče suvremenog fenomena poznatog kao „kultura otkazivanja“ (CC) u kojemu se očituje zajednička ideološka podloga s „woke“ pokretom, a koji je prepoznat kao razvoj ideologije „političke korektnosti“ (PC). Takva analiza PC ideologije usredotočuje se na diskurse koji u sebi otkrivaju određene pravne sklonosti koje upućuju na to kako se u toj ideologiji nalazi dublja namjera s konkretnim ciljevima u društvenom preobražaju pomoću sredstava prepoznatljivih kao cenzura. Ovaj aspekt ukazuje na to da PC ideologija u susretu s oprečnim svjetonazorima pokazuje ambicije koje sežu dalje od same razgovorne kritike. Na tom se mjestu liberalna kritika suočava s PC ideologijom, zagovarajući slobodu pojedinca u pridržavanju svjetonazora i izražavanju – dokle god taj izraz ne ugnjetava temeljne građanske slobode. Pristup predmetu je filozofijski osloncem na odabrane povijesno važne rasprave o moralnosti i legalnosti te na suvremene kritičke osvrte na njih. Rasprava ponovno uvodi koncept etičkog intelektualizma kao protumjeru pretjeranom legalizmu. U tom smislu etički intelektualizam predstavlja humanistički pristup pravima i moralu kojim se želi usmjeriti te (posljedično) ograničiti djelovanje, izražavanje i mišljenje putem obrazovanja intelektualne vrline; umjesto oslanjanja na represivni regulatorni okvir. Argumentacija zaključuje kako je bitno za čovječnost to da ljudi mogu raspravljati o moralu, a da je pritom opasno legalizirati etiku.

Ključne riječi: *kultura otkazivanja, cenzura, čovječnost, legalizam, moralnost, društvo.*

ETHISCHER INTELLEKTUALISMUS UND AMORALISCHER LEGALISMUS

Zusammenfassung

Die Grundfrage in der Diskussion um den ethischen Intellektualismus und den amoralen Legalismus lautet: „Hat ein Individuum das Recht auf eine Weltanschauung?“ Primär bezieht sich dies auf das zeitgenössische Phänomen, das als „Cancel Culture“ (CC) bekannt ist und eine gemeinsame ideologische Grundlage mit dem „Wokeismus“ aufweist, der als Weiterentwicklung der Ideologie der „politischen Korrektheit“ (PC) anerkannt ist. Diese Analyse der PC-Ideologie konzentriert sich auf Diskurse, die bestimmte rechtliche Tendenzen manifestieren und darauf hinweisen, dass in dieser Ideologie eine tiefere Absicht mit konkreten Zielen in der sozialen Transformation durch Mittel, die als Zensur anerkannt werden, besteht. Dieser Aspekt legt nahe, dass die PC-Ideologie in Bezug auf die konfrontierten Weltanschauungen Ambitionen zeigt, die über bloße Konversationskritik hinausgehen. An diesem Punkt stellt die liberale Kritik sich der PC-Ideologie entgegen und befürwortet die Freiheit der individuellen Weltanschauung und Äußerung – solange diese Äußerung nicht grundlegende Bürgerrechte unterdrückt. Der Zugang zum Thema ist philosophisch und stützt sich auf Diskurse über Moral und Legalität mit historischer Bedeutung und ihre zeitgenössischen kritischen Bewertungen. Das Argument führt das Konzept des ethischen Intellektualismus als Gegenmaßnahme gegen übermäßigen Legalismus wieder ein. In dieser Hinsicht stellt der ethische Intellektualismus einen humanistischen Ansatz zu Rechten und Moral, der darauf abzielt, Handeln, Äußerungen und Denken durch die Bildung intellektueller Tugend zu lenken und folglich zu begrenzen, anstatt sich auf den repressiven regulatorischen Rahmen zu verlassen. Das Argument kommt zu dem Schluss, dass es für die Menschheit entscheidend ist, über Moral diskutieren zu können, während es gefährlich ist, Ethik zu legalisieren.

Schlüsselwörter: Absagekultur, Zensur, Menschlichkeit, Legalismus, Moral, Gesellschaft.