

## *Intentionalism and the Natural Interpretation of Discourses*

ALEXANDRU RADULESCU  
*University of Missouri, Columbia, USA*

*Intentionalism is the view that a demonstrative refers to something partly in virtue of the speaker intending it to refer to that thing. In recent work, Una Stojnić has argued that the natural interpretation of demonstratives in some discourses is that they do not refer to the objects intended by the speaker, and instead refer to other things. In this paper, I defend intentionalism against this charge. In particular, I argue that the data presented by Stojnić can be explained from an intentionalist point of view. The explanations take two forms: either the audience's reaction to the discourse does not concern reference, or the natural interpretation is wrong. This latter claim has been defended by Stojnić in other work as applied to word identification and is neutral between intentionalism and Stojnić's objectivism. It is also very plausible. But it takes away the import of the argument from natural interpretation, at least in the form discussed here.*

**Keywords:** Demonstratives; reference; intentionalism; objectivism.

### 1. *The issue, briefly*

Intentionalism about the referential mechanism of demonstratives is the claim that the speaker's intentions play a role in determining the referents of demonstratives when they use them. It is fair to say that intentionalism has been the dominant family of views in the metasemantics of demonstratives, with most of the discussion made up of disagreements between different kinds of intentionalism: about the nature of these intentions, about the extent of their role, about factors

other than intentions, if there are any, etc.<sup>1</sup> One main reason why intentionalism has become the default view is that it seems difficult to come up with alternatives: what else could guide a demonstrative to its referent? We use demonstratives in the company of pointing gestures, but also on their own. We use demonstratives when one particular object is salient to everyone, but also when there is no such object. We use demonstratives, and care about the audience figuring out the referents, but we know that they can get it wrong, and we do not always defer to their opinions. By contrast, it seems reasonable to say that speakers always have intentions when they use demonstratives. So we have no obvious competitors for offering such explanations, or a natural candidate.

In recent work, Stojnić has presented a radically anti-intentionalist view, or what she calls an “objectivist” view (Stojnić 2021a: 4).<sup>2</sup> This view takes issue with both of the alleged advantages of intentionalism: it claims that other features of the discourse are more natural candidates for determining the referents of demonstratives, and that intentionalism often gets things wrong anyway.

Stojnić’s defense and development of the objectivist view contain many interesting, interwoven claims, and they should be judged as a whole. My goal in this paper is more modest: I only aim to defend intentionalism from a particular objection relating to intuitions about natural interpretations. Furthermore, I think that objectivism can survive without this argument, and would be better off without it, so the paper could also count as a way to improve objectivism.

Here is Stojnić’s argument, in a nutshell: plausible, natural, seemingly unavoidable interpretations of various discourses assign to demonstratives in those discourses certain referents that were not intended by the speakers. It follows that the speaker’s intentions cannot play any role in determining these referents.

I will offer two types of rejoinders on behalf of intentionalism. First, I go through the details of these cases, and I argue that they can be interpreted in an intentionalist-friendly way. Then, I argue that if we change the cases slightly, the intuitions go away, although according to objectivism they should not. Finally, and more broadly, I argue that metasemantic theories must allow the audience to get things wrong. So figuring out the natural interpretation of a discourse is not the end of the story; the question that should be answered is whether the natural interpretation is the correct interpretation. If the intentionalist can always explain away the intuitions that Stojnić appeals to, they cannot be used to show that intentionalism is false.

<sup>1</sup> Much of the modern literature can be traced back to Kaplan (1989); for a more recent overview, see Braun (2017).

<sup>2</sup> Stojnić’s view has been presented in two papers and a book (Stojnić et al. 2013, Stojnić et al. 2017, and Stojnić 2021a, respectively.)

Here is the plan: in §2, I present a case against intentionalism discussed in Stojnić et al. (2013), and I argue that the basic intuitions can be explained in an intentionalist-friendly way. In §3, I address a later discussion of a similar case from Stojnić (2021a). This longer presentation contains three arguments against intentionalism, based on variations of the original case, and I discuss them in separate subsections. In §4, I present my own variation on the case, which generates no objectivist intuitions, although by objectivist standards, it should. I take this to show that the earlier cases do not work against intentionalism either. Finally, in §5, I argue that any plausible metasemantic theory must allow audiences to misinterpret any feature of an utterance, a requirement that both intentionalism and objectivism can accept. If this requirement is accepted, the arguments addressed in this paper cannot help us decide between intentionalism and objectivism.

## 2. *An earlier discussion of Stuck Arms*

In this section, I discuss two cases offered by Stojnić, where the natural interpretation of a discourse seems to go against intentionalism. For the purposes of this paper, I am interested in two features. In this section, I challenge the robustness of those intuitions, by pushing back against those intuitions. In the next section, I offer a dilemma, and argue that one horn should be avoided by any metasemantic account, and the other horn makes the current argument irrelevant.

I begin with a case discussed by Stojnić et al. (2017):

*Stuck Arm:* Consider a speaker who intends to refer to Ann, but her hand becomes suddenly stuck, and so, she accidentally points at Sue, while uttering, “She is happy.” It would be odd to say she intended to refer to Sue, or indeed, anything in the general direction of her pointing gesture. Quite clearly, though, intuitively, it is Sue, not Ann, who is the referent of ‘she’. After all, the audience can follow up her utterance with “So, you are saying Sue is happy” and can challenge her with “That is false. Sue is not happy at all.” (Note, the audience could not felicitously ask, “So, are you saying that Ann is happy?” or follow up with “That’s false; Ann is not happy,” or “True! Ann is happy.”) The speaker cannot felicitously deny she said Sue is happy (or claim she said Ann is happy). (Stojnić et al. 2013: 508)

The claim is that our intuitions would have it that, contrary to the speaker’s intentions, Sue is the referent of the demonstrative.

The notion of *felicity* does a lot of work here. We will come back to the intuitions themselves; for now, I will grant that there is something infelicitous with the mentioned reactions. We have two kinds of reasons offered in support of the authors’ claim. First, we have appeals to intuitions about what *the audience* can felicitously say next, and what it cannot. Second, we have appeals to intuitions about what *the speaker* can felicitously say. I will take them in turn.

What can the audience felicitously say? If they take the speaker to have said something about Sue, it would be strange of them to ask something about Ann, and it would be quite appropriate to continue

the conversation as if it was about Sue. This only reinforces the claim that the audience interpreted the demonstrative in a particular way. But misinterpretation is always possible. So we have no reason yet to think that intuitions about what that audience would naturally say tell us anything about the correctness of that interpretation.

What can the speaker go on to say? Note that we are imagining that the audience has already made manifest that they take it that the speaker was talking about Sue. So the speaker is in the following situation: she intended to refer to Ann and was taken to have referred to Sue. If you prefer, we can move to a formal mode of speaking: the speaker intended for the demonstrative to refer to Ann, but the audience takes it that the demonstrative refers to Sue, and, presumably, that this is what the speaker had intended. The speaker can let things go, and go on as if the audience's interpretation was correct. Since the audience thinks that she intended Ann, not Sue, as the referent, by continuing as if the intended referent was Sue, the speaker is misleading about her original intentions. Stojnić et al. can insist at this point that the intuitions they are interested in are not about what the speaker had intended, but about the referent of the demonstrative. But is it all that easy to separate the two? If the audience later finds out that the speaker was deceitful about her intentions, will they be content to stick to their intuitions about the referent of the demonstrative? I am not so sure. And I really do mean it: I am not sure that they would care to make the distinction, or that they would have much clarity on the issue. Claims about the referent of a demonstrative are theoretical. Intuitions, like the law, are highly pragmatic: people care about what they care about (often, speaker intentions), and they will care about other things only if they have to (e.g. truth value, what is said, etc.). Appeal to intuitions about how a simple conversation would naturally continue will not decide intra-semantics disagreements.

My responses depend on what we think the audience and the speaker would do next, given the setup of Stuck Arm. In particular, one driving feature has been the fact that the audience were not in a good position to figure out what the speaker meant. This leaves open the question whether that latter fact should be changed, in order to provide a better case for the objectivist. Fortunately, Stojnić has done exactly that in later work, so we turn to that discussion.

### 3. *A later discussion of Stuck Arms*

§2 was focused on the earlier discussion of Stuck Arm, as presented in Stojnić et al. (2013). The case gets discussed again, with some details left out, but, more importantly, others added. I provide the full quote below. In order to organize the subsequent discussion, I added some parenthetical numbers and divided the text into more paragraphs than the original.

*Stuck Arm 2:*

- [1] Suppose I want to say that Mary is my best friend, but due to some accident, perhaps a muscle spasm, or confusion, I point at Sue while saying ‘She is my best friend.’ While you might realize that a mistake of sorts happened, because, say, you might have good reasons to think that Mary is the one I in fact wanted to talk about, it is essential to the case that a mistake happened: I accidentally said something I did not mean, just as I would have said something I did not mean to say had I uttered a wrong word.
- [2] To make the case more dramatic, suppose that I wanted to insult Ann, but accidentally pointed at Sue, while uttering ‘You are a jerk.’ It seems that in that case I would have to apologize to Sue. I could not simply say that I did not say she was a jerk, or that I said that Ann was. Of course, I could say that I meant that, but the fact that I’m apologizing and making this excuse is precisely explained by the fact that I did not say what I meant.
- [3] Notice that the predicament is analogous to the one I would be in if I were to accidentally utter a wrong name. Suppose I say ‘Sue is a jerk,’ accidentally uttering ‘Sue’ instead of ‘Ann.’ You might, in this case, if you have enough evidence, conclude that I meant to say something about Ann, rather than Sue. (Perhaps you know I dislike Ann but not Sue.) However, this does not make ‘Sue’ mean Ann on this occasion. Similarly, realizing that I made a pointing error does not make my pointing any less an instance of pointing at the person I actually pointed at, Sue, and does not make Sue any less the referent of the accompanying occurrence of ‘she.’
- [4] Note that had a pointing gesture merely served as a kind of a (defeasible) cue indicating an underlying intention to single out a particular individual (or, alternatively, had the pointing gesture itself had a context-sensitive interpretation), one would expect that if the audience had enough evidence to figure out who the speaker had in mind, the fact that the speaker obviously did not point at whomever she actually had in mind, would not result in infelicity. As always the audience would just work out the overall most plausible interpretation given their evidence; from this standpoint, the speaker would not have made an error. But this would be a wrong prediction: the speaker clearly would have made an error in such a case.<sup>3</sup>

As I see it, there are four sections in these two paragraphs, which contain three related strands that make up the later version of Stojnić’s argu-

<sup>3</sup> Stojnić (2021a: 50–51). I am focusing on Stuck Arm cases because they are discussed in detail, but talk of natural interpretations, or natural ways to understand a discourse, or related notions, is abundant in the book. See pages 11, 42, 49, 64, 68–70, 74, 75, 80, 86, 114, 122, 123, 130, 136, 149, 150, and 180.

ment from natural interpretation. I will take the three strands in turn.

### 3.1 *The speaker's alleged mistake ([1] and [4])*

The first claim about this modified case, as I understand it, comes from [1] and [4]: the speaker made a mistake, and that fact is recognized by both the audience and the speaker, even though the speaker's intentions are known to all involved.

In [1], Stojnić characterizes the mistake as one about what was said: the speaker said something other than what she intended. But this is just the claim that the intentionalist denies, so it cannot be the end of the story. Other ways of grouping the arguments are possible, but I think that the most direct reason for the claim in [1] is given by [4]: if both semantics and the audience's interest were limited to the speaker's intentions, there would be no intuition of infelicity, or of the speaker making a mistake. Since, by hypothesis, everyone knows all that there is to know about the speaker's intentions, it follows that the mistake must be at the semantic level. In other words, it must be that what was said is different from what was intended.<sup>4</sup>

Intentionalists can choose between two responses. First, they can say that the mistake happened in the pointing: the speaker did not point at the person they intended to point at. Stojnić describes the situation as one in which the audience "realize[s] that a mistake of sorts happened", but presumably cannot tell exactly which mistake and why. That could be explained either by the speaker being confused about whom they are pointing at (e.g. by confusing Ann for Mary), or by some error in the gesture itself (which is what in fact happened). If confusion is unlikely in that situation, it would be reasonable of the audience to suppose, or even to figure out, that the pointing had somehow gone awry. In that situation, although the audience have good evidence that the speaker intended to say something about Mary, there is the seemingly contrary evidence coming from the pointing. That leaves what is said to be fully determined by the speaker's intentions, and allows that a mistake did indeed happen.

Second, intentionalists may prefer to insist that no mistake happened. The speaker did everything she could to refer to Mary, and to make her intentions clear to the audience. Her arm got stuck, but if that was not within her control, nor something she could have predicted, she made no mistake. When the audience finds out what happened, it would be strange for them to insist that the speaker made a mistake. They may say that it was difficult to figure things out, and that might be correct. But if we describe their reaction this way, there is little room for them to also insist that the demonstrative referred to Ann.

<sup>4</sup> I assume that "what I meant", which is the expression used in the text, amounts to the same thing as "what I intended."

### 3.2 *The speaker's apology ([2])*

Stojnić then asks us to imagine that the speaker uttered the sentence “You’re a jerk”, while intending to point at Ann, but accidentally pointing at Sue. The claim is that the speaker would need to apologize to Sue, even if she makes it clear that her intention was to point at and insult Ann.

I do not think that the switch to “you” is innocent here. I have argued elsewhere that “you” is a pure indexical, not a true demonstrative (Radulescu 2018). In short, the reason is that “you” picks out the addressee, where the addressee may well be fixed by the speaker’s intentions but is not fixed in order to give “you” its referent. By contrast, according to intentionalism, a demonstrative gets its referent because the speaker intended that referent for that particular demonstrative. Utterances often have addressees, and if they contain a “you”, it will pick out whoever the addressee is. If they contain no pronouns, they may still have an addressee, which is why it makes sense to ask who the addressee is, concerning an utterance of “ $2+2=4$ ”, while it makes no sense to ask what the referent of “that” is with respect to that utterance. So, if Stojnić’s case works, it is at best an objection against intentionalism about fixing the addressee, not about the referential mechanism of the second person pronoun.

But we can set that aside. The intentionalist, whether of the reference-determining kind, or of the addressee-determining kind, might respond that you can insult someone unintentionally, without saying anything about them. The idea here would be that insults happen out in the open, and the fact that an utterance would naturally be interpreted as an insult may well be enough for the addressee to be insulted by it. I do not find this response very convincing, because it should be possible for the audience to say later “I thought I was being insulted, but it turns out I wasn’t”. I find a different intentionalist response more plausible. Suppose that the speaker’s apology is appropriate, or even required. What is she apologizing for? Stojnić’s interpretation is that she is apologizing for insulting the addressee, by having said something insulting about her. The intentionalist may prefer a different option: that the speaker is apologizing for the addressee’s reasonably feeling insulted by her utterance. If I make someone feel bad, and if it is reasonable for them to think I did it on purpose, the right thing for me to do is to repair the unintentional damage. It is right for me to apologize for certain things I did unintentionally. What needs to be resisted is the claim that I’m apologizing for an actual insult. So, the apology is focused on the effects of the utterance, and the content of the utterance is addressed separately. When the speaker says “I didn’t mean you!”, they are focusing on their own part in the whole situation, and they are trying to repair the person’s interpretation of the utterance. This is an intentionalism-friendly analysis of the case that makes sense of the original intuitions, while retaining a non-objectivist metaseantics for demonstratives.

### 3.3 *Demonstratives and proper names ([3])*

A central challenge to intentionalist responses is that they overgeneralize. I take this to be the point of part [3] of the quotation, where Stojnić points out that if we substitute a name for a pronoun in cases like this, we go back to the dispute between Donnellan and Kripke about the possibility of using a name to refer to a person who does not have that name.<sup>5</sup>

One option for intentionalists is to accept the comparison and take it in the opposite direction to Stojnić. They can just bite the bullet, and claim, against Kripke, that in certain circumstances, the referent of “Sue” is Ann, namely whenever the speaker so intends.<sup>6</sup>

The other option, which I prefer, is to reject the comparison. People have names; when you use a name, it seems reasonable to say that the name cannot refer to someone who does not bear that name. People do not have demonstratives; when you use a demonstrative, it can refer to anyone, or indeed, for some demonstratives, to *anything* (modulo gender, proximity, and such other coarse-grained restrictions). And names have something like that feature too: in some sense, many people bear the name “Ann”, so when we say that it refers to Ann, a particular Ann, we need to explain why it refers to her, rather than any other Ann. Famously, Kripke (1972: 7–8) sets aside that issue, but others have taken it up.<sup>7</sup> And taking it up might require an appeal to speaker intentions, as Kaplan argued. That is a separate intentionalism, and I am not planning on defending it here. My point is only that to the extent that the comparison between names and demonstratives works, it can be appropriated by the intentionalist.

Stojnić is not saying that people bear demonstratives, of course. Her claim is that a demonstrative just refers to whatever it refers to, no matter what the speaker intends, and names do the same. That one can refer to one person rather than an intended other person with a demonstrative just as well as with a name. And, of course, the intentionalist denies this. My point here is only that claims about how an utterance is naturally interpreted will not help decide the dispute.

## 4. *A different Stuck Arm*

Thus far, I have been granting Stojnić’s intuition that something goes wrong with the speaker’s attempt to use the demonstrative to refer to Ann while the arm was pointing at Sue. In response, I argued that the feeling of infelicity can be explained at a level that tells us nothing about the referent of the demonstrative. In this section, I present a

<sup>5</sup> See Donnellan (1966, 1978), Kripke (1977).

<sup>6</sup> See Pepp (2019) and Capuano (2020) for recent defenses of such Donnellan-inspired views.

<sup>7</sup> See Strawson (1950), Evans (1982), Kaplan (1990), Matushanski (2008), and Cumming (2014), for example.



modification of the original case, where it seems to me that the intuition of infelicity goes away. I then argue that reflecting on this case puts pressure on the earlier intuitions as well.

*Transparently Stuck Arm:* The speaker intends to refer to Ann, and her hand gets stuck in Sue's direction, while she utters "She is happy". The audience know that the speaker has poor control over her arm movements, and do not take the hand movement as good evidence of the speaker's intentions. Furthermore, the audience know that the speaker intends to say something about Ann. Quite clearly, it would be infelicitous for the audience to follow up with "So, you're saying that Sue is happy", and cannot follow up with "That is false. Sue is not happy at all". The speaker herself can also, if challenged by the audience, felicitously deny that she said anything about Sue.<sup>8</sup>

In the earlier version of *Stuck Arm*, the audience were not in any position to recover the speaker's intentions. In the later version, they are in a position to know something about it, but they are ignorant about the arm control issue. In this last version, they know everything there is to know. These differences should not matter, according to the objectivist. After all, the referent it determined by the arm's pointing, so the things that the audience can go on to say should just track those facts. Yet this is not what we find by making these subtle adjustments to the initial scenario. The more the audience knows about the situation, the less inclined they will be to interpret it as containing an utterance about Sue. This is just what the intentionalist would say: interpretation can fail, but when it succeeds, it correctly tracks the referent of the demonstrative.

Of course, Stojnić can respond that in *Transparently Stuck Arm* the audience are attending to speaker reference, not to semantic reference. I have said nothing that would argue otherwise. But at this stage we have a disagreement between the two views about how to categorize certain cases and certain intuitions, not an argument against one of the views. And that suffices for the purposes of this paper.

## 5. *A dilemma*

Are we at the stage where neither view has an advantage in this arena? It may look like any argument based on intuitions about interpretation can be spelled out so that it comes out favorable to either side. But let us zoom out a bit. The broader issue concerns the use of intuitions about the natural interpretation of a discourse by an audience who may or may not know everything that we, the observers, know.

So, I propose a dilemma: either the audience can get things wrong, or they cannot. At one end, we could have the view that the audience can get nothing wrong; so long as their interpretation is the reasonable

<sup>8</sup> For more on cases where the audience is in a position to figure out the speaker's intentions, or where the speaker falsely assumes that that is the case, see Radulescu (2019).

one, or the best one, given their epistemic situation, that is the correct interpretation. At the other end, we have the view that the audience can get everything wrong, at all levels of interpretation: force, implicatures, reference, word identification, etc., even when that is the best interpretation, or even the only reasonable interpretation.<sup>9</sup>

In other work, Stojnić has defended the view that which word is uttered depends on certain facts about the process by which the utterer comes to produce certain sounds, facts that are determined neither solely by the speaker's intentions, nor solely by the audience's interpretation (Stojnić 2021b). The claim is that the speaker may utter a word they did not intend to utter, and the audience may mistakenly, but reasonably, take the speaker to have uttered a different word than what actually got uttered. So she agrees that some natural interpretations are incorrect.

Must the objectivist hold this? Not necessarily. But there is at least one level of interpretation where objectivism is just too implausible. We have been going along with Stojnić's description of the case as one where the speaker pointed to the wrong person. But did she? We were only told that the arm got stuck. Was the speaker in the process of pointing, and the arm only went halfway? Or was it a muscle spasm that ended up looking like a pointing? If it was a spasm, it was not a pointing, since pointings are intentional actions, whereas spasms are not.<sup>10</sup> In which case, that arm movement should not pick out anything, since there is no convention that mere positions of arms have the power to refer. The audience may naturally interpret the arm's movement as a pointing; if it is not, they would be wrong. So at least at the level of identifying whether an arm movement constitutes a pointing, objectivism strays too far from our conception of which things in the world have representational powers.

So, at some point, natural interpretations must be allowed to go wrong. The question is where. Must reasonable, natural interpretations be correct at the level of reference? Must they be correct, at least in cases where there is no competing, equally reasonable interpretation? What about force, or implicature, and so on?

I submit that more basic than the debate between intentionalism and objectivism is the intuition that the audience can always get things wrong, whether it be the identity of the words uttered, the force of the utterance, the referents of terms, etc. And they can get it wrong even when that is the only plausible interpretation, given what they know. This intuition is strictly weaker than either view, since it is compatible with both. After all, both intentionalists and objectivists agree that the referent of the demonstrative is fixed by facts that are independent of the state of mind of the audience, whether that be the actual audience

<sup>9</sup> An even more extreme view, that the reasonable interpretation is never correct, can be set aside as too implausible to discuss.

<sup>10</sup> I do not focus on this aspect of the case here; but see Pavese and Radulescu (2023).

or an idealized version thereof.<sup>11</sup> Any plausible metasemantic account needs to allow audiences to get it wrong. Otherwise, if some ants in the sand spell out "help!", we would need to count that as them asking for help, or at least as uttering the word "help". Nothing can be a sign merely in virtue of looking like a sign. Similarly, nothing can *refer* merely in virtue of being naturally taken to refer. And, finally, nothing can refer to a *particular thing* merely in virtue of naturally being taken to refer to that thing.

If this is correct, the argument from Stuck Arm, in all its versions, fails. Even if we agree that the natural interpretation of such cases is the one posited by Stojnić, a claim that I have offered some reasons to doubt, it cannot be used to decide between intentionalism and objectivism.

## 6. Conclusion

When we discuss cases, we need to start somewhere. We start with our own intuitions, and sometimes we ask others too, in a more or less organized manner. The clearest reactions to cases happen when something has gone wrong. The difficulty is diagnosing exactly what went wrong, and why. Couple that with the fact that the way we describe the case can make a significant difference in the audience's judgment, and we have a complicated situation.

Appeals to natural ways to interpret a discourse are a good place to start. In this paper, I have argued that intentionalists have good responses to these initial judgments. They can reject them, either as a matter of reporting intuitions, or by deflecting the charge, and saying that the intuitions of infelicity are about something else. Finally, there must be room for the audience to get things wrong. And if there is, pointing out the natural interpretation of a discourse does not suffice to distinguish between objectivism and intentionalism.

I find intentionalist explanations of the various cases we have been discussing to be more plausible than objectivist ones. The reader may disagree. Success can only be measured by how well the overall theories deal with all manner of data. I look forward to seeing how things turn out.

## References

- Braun, D. 2017. "Indexicals." In E. N. Zalta, (ed). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Summer 2017 edition.
- Capuano, A. 2020. "In defense of Donnellan on proper names." *Erkenntnis* 85: 1289–1312.

<sup>11</sup> There are philosophers who advance audience-centered views. I cannot argue against that view here, but for a good overview, and for what I take to prove that such views do not work, see Nowak and Michaelson (2021).

- Cumming, S. 2014. "Discourse content." In A. Burgess and B. Sherman (eds.). *Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 214–230.
- Donnellan, K. 1966. "Reference and definite descriptions." *Philosophical Review* 75: 281–304.
- Donnellan, K. 1978. "Speaker reference, descriptions, and anaphora." In P. Cole, (ed.) *Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics*. New York: Academic Press, 47–68.
- Evans, G. 1982. *Varieties of Reference*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kaplan, D. 1989. "Demonstratives." In J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.). *Themes from Kaplan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 481–563.
- Kaplan, D. 1990. "Words." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 64: 93–119.
- Kripke, S. 1972. *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kripke, S. 1977. "Speaker's reference and semantic reference." In P. French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein, (eds.). *Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 2*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 255–276.
- Matushanski, O. 2008. "On the linguistic complexity of proper names." *Linguistics and Philosophy* 31: 573–627.
- Nowak, E. and Michaelson, E. 2021. "Who's your ideal listener?" *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 99 (2): 257–270.
- Pavese, C. and Radulescu, A. 2023. "Intentionalism out of control." Manuscript.
- Pepp, J. 2019. "What determines the reference of names? What determines the objects of thought." *Erkenntnis* 84: 741–759.
- Radulescu, A. 2018. "The difference between indexicals and demonstratives." *Synthese* 195: 3173–3196.
- Radulescu, A. 2019. "A defence of intentionalism about demonstratives." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 97 (4): 775–791.
- Stojnić, U. 2021a. *Context and Coherence*. Oxford University Press.
- Stojnić, U. 2021b. "Just words: Intentions, tolerance and lexical selection." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 105: 3–17.
- Stojnić, U., Stone, M. and Lepore, E. 2013. "Deixis (even without pointing)." *Philosophical Perspectives* 27 (1): 502–525.
- Stojnić, U., Stone, M. and Lepore, E. 2017. "Discourse and logical form: Pronouns, attention, and coherence." *Linguistics and Philosophy* 40: 519–547.
- Strawson, P. F. 1950. "On referring." *Mind* 59: 320–344.