



Reflections on Technological Advances

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Why AI Art Is Not Art – A Heideggerian Critique

Abstract

AI's new ability to create artworks is seen as a major challenge to today's understanding of art. There is a strong tension between people who predict that AI will replace artists and critics who claim that AI art will never be art. Furthermore, recent studies have documented a negative bias towards AI art. This paper provides a philosophical explanation for this negative bias, based on our shared understanding of the ontological differences between objects. We argue that our perception of art depends on our understanding of the context of its creation: human-made art is experienced as an interplay between the artist and nature. In AI-generated art, this interplay is either absent or minimised. We conclude that the displacement of the "human factor" in art will not lead to an evolution of art, but to the end of art.

Keywords

artificial intelligence, Martin Heidegger, AI art, philosophy, aesthetics, ontology

1. Introduction

Artificial Intelligence in its, for now, most powerful form, that is, in its adaptation of Machine Learning (ML), challenges the traditional understanding of creativity, authorship, and the meaning of the work of art like nothing before ever did.¹ At an increasing rate, it can produce objects that are

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Nantheera Anantrasirichai, David Bull, "Artificial intelligence in the creative industries: a review", *Artificial Intelligence Review* 55 (2022), pp. 589–656, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10462-021-10039-7>; Marian Mazzone, and Ahmed Elgammal, "Art, Creativity, and the Potential of Artificial

Intelligence", *Arts* 8 (2019) 1, art. no. 26, doi: <https://doi.org/10.3390/arts8010026>. Cf. Francisco Câmara Pereira, *Creativity and Artificial Intelligence. A Conceptual Blending Approach*, De Gruyter Mouton, Berlin – New York 2008.

indistinguishable from human-made artworks: AI-generated paintings are sold at exhibitions and win prices at art competitions, AI-written novels and poems are read and published, and AI-produced compositions are celebrated.² And yet the general public still feels that there is something missing in the artificial art.³ While the majority feel that this scepticism is a natural and temporary reaction to something very new, comparing it to the common reaction to photography and the reluctance to accept photography as ‘real art’ when it first appeared, we want to defend this intuition by showing how AI-generated art differs from human-made art. In other words, we offer a philosophical explanation for what empirical studies have documented as a negative bias towards AI art.⁴

By AI-generated art we mean two things: 1) the (more or less) futuristic idea of fully autonomous production of art by machines; the assumption that there could be an emancipation of the tool to become the creator of art, and 2) art generated by using AI as a tool (for example DALL-E, Imagen, StableDiffusion or Midjourney). Our arguments are not semantic. Rather, they are arguments based on perceived ontological differences between different kinds of objects. We defend two positions:

1. Artificial Intelligence cannot create art – not in 10 years and not in 10,000 years – because there is an essential (unproducible) human element in art that AI lacks, an inability that has nothing to do with technical ability;
2. when AI is used as a tool to create art, a dissociation occurs between the artist and the creation that leads to a devaluation of our experience of the artwork.

We will support these claims by showing that a specific kind of intentionality underlies every creation of artworks. The more this intentionality is lacking in the creation of artworks, the less we will perceive it as an artwork. To counter possible objections from people who argue that machines can or will have similar intentionality, we will show, with reference to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, that this intentionality is linked to human mortality. We will show that this mortality, insofar as it shapes and determines the creation of artworks, is essential for our perception of art as art.⁵ This mortality, we argue, is something that no machine can ever possess. Our claims are based on a specific Heideggerian understanding of what art is: an interplay between the human world and nature in the broadest sense.⁶

With this approach, we oppose the widely accepted assumption of the father of computer science and AI, Alan Turing, who suggested that the ability to persuade humans and pass the “Turing Test” is equal to or amounts to a transformation of what AI is.⁷ Again, this is not a matter of “how we name things”, but rather a matter of pointing out differences in our experience of existing objects. This also means that our human ability or inability to visually distinguish between produced AI art and human-made art is not the criterion by which we should decide what art is. Rather, the criteria for this distinction are conceptual. What is or is not art is not decided by our visual apparatus alone. It is decided by our (shared) understanding of the artwork in its historical and social context, sometimes trans-generational.⁸ The *context* of the artwork, i.e., mainly the context of its creation, distinguishes the artwork from objects of any other kind.⁹ Artists were always playfully moving the boundaries of what is perceived as art: think of Maurizio Cattelan’s famous “a banana duct-taped to a wall”. Knowing and understanding that this object is the product of an

interpretative genesis within (or maybe even against) the tradition of art, is essential for our perception of it as art. Its interpretative genesis makes it art, or at least: a borderline case of what artworks are (an artistic display of not-being-art).¹⁰

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Ahmed Elgammal *et al.*, “CAN: Creative Adversarial Networks, Generating ‘Art’ by Learning About Styles and Deviating from Style Norms”, *arXiv* 1706.07068 (2017), doi: <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1706.07068>. For AI-literature, see: Guoxi Liang *et al.*, “A text GAN framework for creative essay recommendation”, *Knowledge-Based Systems* 232 (2021), art. no. 107501, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.knsys.2021.107501>. For AI-music, see: Artemi-Maria Gioti, “Artificial Intelligence for Music Composition”, in: Eduardo Reck Miranda (ed.), *Handbook of Artificial Intelligence for Music. Foundations, Advanced Approaches, and Developments for Creativity*, Springer, Cham 2021, pp. 53–73, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72116-9>. For an overview over the existing AI-art industry and economy, see: Mikel Arbiza Goenaga, “A critique of contemporary artificial intelligence art: Who is Edmond de Belamy?”, in: *AusArt Journal for Research in Art* 8 (2020) 1, pp. 49–64, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1387/ausart.21490>.

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Salvatore G. Chiarella *et al.*, “Investigating the negative bias towards artificial intelligence: Effects of prior assignment of AI-authorship on the aesthetic appreciation of abstract paintings”, *Computers in Human Behavior* 137 (2022), art. no. 107406, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2022.107406>. See also: Joo-Wha Hong, “Bias in Perception of Art Produced by Artificial Intelligence”, in: Masaaki Kurosu (ed.), *Human-Computer Interaction. Interaction in Context: 20th International Conference, HCI International 2018, Las Vegas, NV, USA, July 15–20, 2018, Proceedings, Part II*, Springer-Verlag, Berlin – Heidelberg, pp. 290–303, doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91244-8_24. What is documented in these studies is a negative-bias toward AI-generated artworks among the general public. There is a similar negative bias in other fields of human-AI interaction, see for example: Yuhua Liang, Seungcheol Austin Lee, “Fear of Autonomous Robots and Artificial Intelligence: Evidence from National Representative Data with Probability Sampling”, *International Journal of Social Robotics* 9 (2017) 2, pp. 379–384, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12369-017-0401-3>; Christine Rzepka, Benedikt Berger, “User Interaction with AI-enabled Systems:

A Systematic Review of IS Research”, in: *ICIS 2018 Proceedings* (2018), art. no 7. Available at: <https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2018/general/Presentations/7> (accessed on 30 November 2023). Laura Sartori, Giulia Bocca, “Minding the gap(s): public perceptions of AI and socio-technical imaginaries”, *AI & Society* 48 (2022), pp. 443–458, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-022-01422-1>; Margaret A. Boden, “Creativity and Artificial Intelligence”, *Artificial Intelligence* 103 (1998) 1–2, pp. 347–356, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702\(98\)00055-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00055-1); Ray Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near. When Humans Transcend Biology*, Penguin Books, New York 2006.

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This paper has a strong emphasis on philosophical and conceptual analysis, which can be supported by recent empirical studies of negative bias towards AI. For references, see the studies by Chiarella *et al.* and Hong mentioned in the previous footnote.

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Heidegger develops this idea that our mortality is essential for what it means to be human in his first main work *Being and Time*. See: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, transl. Joan Stambaugh, State University of New York Press, New York 1996. Hereafter cited as *BT*. We will advance on this idea to show that this mortality is also essential for the creation of art. The emphasis on “intentionality” in this approach implies that we are closer to the intentionalists in our understanding of the creation of artworks, however, we argue that intentions are only important regarding our perception of artworks. Built into our perception of artworks is an understanding *and* appreciation of the artist’s intentionality (in its interplay with “nature”).

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See: Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, in: *Off the Beaten Track*, transl. and ed. Julian Young – Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, pp. 1–56. In the following cited as: “Work of Art”.

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Alan M. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, *Mind* LIX (1950), no. 236, pp. 433–460, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433>.

The authors want to make clear from the beginning, that these elaborations on art are not meant as a normative assessment in the sense of “gatekeeping”. Instead, we claim that there is merit to making distinctions that help us orientate in our world – and that articulating the distinctions between AI and human beings is particularly helpful insofar as it helps us to understand and appreciate the role of artists, art critics, art historians, and curators. Therefore, instead of making normative statements about what people should or should not call “art”, we offer a description of essential differences between the perception of human-made art and AI-generated art that will explain attitudes toward art implicit in our perception of artworks.

The main part of this paper will be an engagement with Martin Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art”.¹¹ The goal of this engagement is to show that the creation of the work of art has an intrinsic human element that cannot be (re)produced. We will begin with a short introduction to the general ideas of Heidegger’s ontology (section 2). We then apply these ideas to make the ontological distinctions between artworks and other kinds of objects explicit. We thereby uncover three necessary conditions that the creation of artworks must meet: intentionality, mortality, and skilfulness (section 3).¹² In the final section, we demonstrate how Heidegger’s ideas apply to AI-generated art, proving that AI art is not art, and then conclude by showing how this approach can explain the negative bias toward AI art (section 4).

2. Martin Heidegger’s Ontology: Our Implicit Ontological Knowledge of Art

Heidegger’s “aesthetics” are entangled with his philosophy, and one cannot make sense of it without embedding it within the network of foundational principles that make up his “ontology”. Heidegger’s famous “The Origin of the Work of Art” is about an ontological question. He wants to know what art *is* (and not simply what people think art could be). To avoid misunderstandings, it is necessary to explain what Heidegger’s ontology is. Heidegger’s ontology is based on two fundamental claims: 1. there are different kinds of beings; 2. we can explain their differences by reflecting on our implicit understanding of these differences.¹³ Heidegger’s ontology, to be clear, is always about our experience of the appearance of things (never about how *things in themselves* “really” are).¹⁴

Heidegger argues that we can only navigate (more or less) successfully through the world and orientate ourselves in it because we have an implicit understanding of these differences between beings: we “know” that there is a difference between a wooden stick and an animal.¹⁵ If the stick, for example, suddenly begins to move on its own, we immediately know that we previously made a mistake in our basic assessment of the world. Something that moves on its own cannot be a stick (it might be a snake). The task of ontology is to reflect on what we only implicitly know when we are making these distinctions and to make these distinctions explicit: what makes a wooden stick a part of nature and what is an essential characteristic of animals?¹⁶ In the same way, we could reflect on our understanding of works of art: what is the difference between works of art and ordinary objects like rocks and trees? What is the difference between tools and works of art? What about pictures drawn by children or animals? Is it just a social convention that we either consider them to be art or not? Why is it important to know whether something is intentional

or accidental? We “know” that there are differences between, on the one hand, objects, tools, unintentional creations, and, on the other hand, “real art”, and we make our assessments of reality according to this implicit knowledge, but what exactly are these differences? Heidegger answers these questions in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Heidegger’s ontological approach to the question of what is art is an attempt to make our implicit knowledge of art explicit.¹⁷

In the following, we will present what we call three necessary conditions that make art what it is: intentionality, mortality, and skilfulness. Art is always and necessarily a combination of these three elements. This will lead us to the following definition: only the intentional and skilful transformation of objects that is shaped by an understanding of human mortality can potentially result in the creation of a work of art.

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Cf. Walter Benjamin, *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1963, p. 12: “A medieval image of the Madonna was not ‘real’ at the time it was made; it became so in the course of the succeeding centuries.” Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the authors.

9

Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, transl. Joel Weinsheimer – Donald G. Marshall, Continuum, London – New York 2006, p. 129: “There remains a continuity of meaning which links the work of art with the existing world and from which even the alienated consciousness of a cultured society never quite detaches itself.”

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See: Arthur C. Danto, *Die Verklärung des Gewöhnlichen. Eine Philosophie der Kunst*, transl. Max Looser, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1984, pp. 84–90, 150. Art critics, historians, and curators play an important role in the dynamic processes of the interpretative genesis of artworks insofar as they can help the public to understand the artworks, which, and this is the point, predominantly happens in the manner of explaining the intentions of the artists.

11

Heidegger’s essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” has been highly influential in philosophy and in aesthetics. Heidegger’s approach was developed further by Gadamer in his main work *Truth and Method*.

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By “uncovering”, what is meant is that we do not set standards that artists in the future must meet (“or else!”). Our goal is to help understand the criteria that are underlying the creation of artworks and thereby provide a

useful distinction between human-made and AI-generated artworks.

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The following is based on Heidegger’s main work *Being and Time* and his lectures of the 1920s, published in the *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe* and hereafter cited as GA.

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M. Heidegger, *BT*, pp. 27–28. This ontology is therefore a “phenomenological ontology” (*ibid.*, p. 38).

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Ibid., pp. 4–5.

16

Ibid., §15. For Heidegger’s take on the difference between humans, plants, and animals, see: Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (GA 29/30).

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In *Being and Time*, Heidegger refers to specific experiences that can potentially lead to a reversal or transformation of daily life. These transformations are explained as the step from ontological structures being “implicit and non-transparent” to being “explicit and transparent”. See, for example, M. Heidegger, *BT*, p. 146. Similarly, in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, Heidegger refers to the experience of works of art and describes them as having the potential to transform one’s daily life. With the same effect: ontological structures become transparent. See: M. Heidegger, “Work of Art”, p. 21: “Close to the work [of art], we have abruptly been somewhere else than where we usually are.” – Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 103: “[T]he work of art has its very being in the fact that it becomes an experience that transforms the experiencer.”

3. The Necessary Conditions of Artworks: Intentionality, Mortality, Skilfulness

We will begin with the, supposedly, least problematic distinction: that between natural objects and objects that have been transformed into works of art. Never in history has this distinction faded. Objects like sticks, rocks, trees, and so on, have never been understood as works of art as long as they are experienced in their “natural environment” and in our “natural attitude” and as long as they are not presented in a different context. What they are lacking is an artist who did something “to” them – an artist who *transforms* these objects into works of art (e.g., by presenting these objects in a particular way).¹⁸

We can ask further if *any* transformation of these objects is understood as a transformation of objects into art. The transformation of wood and stone into a tool, for example, even if it is done with high “artistry” and skill, is usually not considered to be “art”.¹⁹ If the tool has (purposefully or not) become a work of art, then people are hesitant to use it as a tool. As Heidegger points out, the difference is that tools are created to serve a specific use. Their essence, Heidegger would say their “being”, lies in their usability.²⁰ He adds that the fact that tools are created is hidden by their usability.²¹ Tools are understood from within their particular context of utility. If they are created in an exquisite and beautiful manner, this potentially outshines and hides their usability.²² There must be something else then, something different from the sheer fact of a transformation, that makes objects works of art.

Let us look at a more difficult example: the difference between paintings that animals have painted and paintings that artists have painted. Again, this is not a normative assessment of what should or should not count as art. In fact, an established classification goes by the term “animal art”. However, the question must be if there is a difference between a painting that the famous pig jokingly named “Pigcasso” painted and paintings by the artist Picasso. How does the fact that in the first case a pig has painted something, and, in the second case, that the painting was created by the artist Picasso change our perception and our experience of these two objects?²³ We suggest that the main difference between animal art and human art can be described by looking at the underlying intentionality. Human-made art is created with an intention within a specific social and historical context. Our experience of art – in particular, our experience of modern art – is often a search for traces of that intentionality within the artwork. “Explaining artworks” often takes the form of interpreting the intentions of the artists. The “intention” of the artist does not have to be a finalized concept or the self-transparent wish to create “art”. Nor does it have to be a specific plan to present something in a particular way that the recipients must then perceive in that way and none other. Rather, it is sufficient that the artist has the intention to create something that is not *primarily* determined by its utility. The creation of art, in other words, is the *intentional* transformation of an object into something that is not a tool, something that cannot be used; or more specifically: something that does not have its *telos* (goal) in something outside of itself. A tool like a hammer has its goal outside of itself: the hammer is used (for example) to hammer nails into the wall. The artwork has no other use or goal outside of itself.²⁴

Let us look at a potential objection. What can be replied to people who claim that this “intentionality” is not a necessary element in the creation of art because not all artworks are (fully) intentional creations?

There always was an attempt to playfully move the boundaries of what counts as art and what does not, especially in modern art and avant-garde artworks. For example, in “accidentalism” or in the composition technique called “aleatorics”, artists are trying to reduce any kind of human input or “intentionality”. They create borderline cases of artworks that challenge our understanding of what art is. But even artworks like the famous “4:33” by John Cage are only demonstrating that what we are (painfully) missing is (more of) the intentionality of the artist; the intentionality to transform something into an artwork.²⁵ Even these artworks display a minimum of intentionality, for example, why this object? Why this kind of presentation? If someone questions whether these artworks can legitimately be called “art”, what they are missing is a “higher degree” of that intentionality. Intentionality that is not the fully self-transparent plan to create x out of y , nor the 1-to-1 execution of this plan. Rather, it is simply the intention to create something that does not *fully* resign within its utility. What has been created in this manner, almost always exceeds the “intentions” of the artist.²⁶

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M. Heidegger, *BT*, p. 70. Even drawing someone’s attention to a particularly beautiful tree must be understood as a modification of the natural attitude and hence as a modification of the understanding of this tree. Here, the appreciation of the beauty (or sublimity) of nature could also be modified, for example in the case of a bonsai tree, where the tree’s “natural beauty” was nurtured or enhanced by years of meticulous caretaking. These examples are intended to show that the shift in our appreciation of objects is intrinsically linked to our understanding of what they are.

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Cf. Martin Heidegger, “Work of Art”, pp. 13–14.

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M. Heidegger, *BT*, §15.

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M. Heidegger, “Work of Art”, p. 32.

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Ibid.

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See: S. G. Chiarella *et al.*, “Investigating the negative bias towards artificial intelligence”. The authors of that paper have documented a negative bias towards AI in comparison to human-made artworks. A similar study of “animal art” vs. “human art” has not been done yet (to our knowledge).

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Cf. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1958, 167: “Whether this uselessness of things of art has always existed, or whether in early times art served the so-called religious needs of man in the same way and was

tailored to them in the same way as objects of everyday use were tailored to everyday needs, is irrelevant here. For even if it were true that the historical origin of art was exclusively religious or mythical, the fact would still remain that art has most gloriously survived the detachment from magic, religion, and myth.” Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Erstes Buch, Erster Abschnitt, §2, Georg Reimer Verlag, Berlin 1913, pp. 204–205. For Kant, aesthetic judgments must be disinterested, derived from any inclinations or utilitarian concerns; Cf. M. Heidegger, “Work of Art”, pp. 13–14. In the case of “eco-art” or “activist art”, this means that these objects are considered to be artworks despite – and not because – they serve a specific purpose.

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John Cage’s composition for piano “4:33” consists of 4:33 minutes of sitting at the piano. In the next sections, we will show that this intentionality can be described in more detail as an interaction between the artist and the material substrate. We will call this the “skillfulness” of the artist which consists in creating something unique. In the case of Cage’s “4:33” what many people might be missing, we suggest, is this kind of skilful intentionality.

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H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 125. This broader understanding of “intentionality” is meant to give space for “chance” within the creation of artworks. More important than having a specific desired outcome is the intention to create art. As one of the reviewers rightfully pointed out, John Cage aimed for an unimaginable outcome.

3.1. *Mortality – The Context of Creations of Art*

There is more to say about the intentionality of the artist – there is something that shapes and determines this intentionality. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger shows that human intentionality is always accompanied by a specific understanding of the human condition, namely of the finitude or mortality of human life. In this section, we want to show that this understanding is a second necessary condition for the creation of art and that without this understanding, art cannot be. We will explain what we mean by this and why an “understanding of the human condition” is essential for the creation of art by referring to and discussing two aspects: 1) the sociality of the artists, and 2) the human mortality.

Artists are part of a community, part of a culture, and part of a tradition, which is also a tradition of art. This is the *context* of the artwork that we mentioned above. Neither animals nor machines, for the reasons we will discuss in the following pages, are part of such a community. Even the hypothetical “first artwork that came into existence” was shaped by the artists’ sociality. As Danto puts it: The “causal history” of the creation of the artwork is essential to art, and this history is different from the causal history of the creation of animal art.²⁷ The main point is that the creation of artworks is always and necessarily in an implicit or explicit relation to the tradition, to the culture, to the history of art – or, more generally: to the history of human creations. What Walter Benjamin says about the necessary link between the artwork and the “nexus of tradition” in his famous essay about the “aura” of original artworks is very similarly explained by Heidegger as the “world” of the artwork.²⁸ The main point here is that creations of art are embedded in a nexus of social relations (Benjamin) and that these creations are created with an implicit or explicit understanding of one’s sociality (Heidegger). Creations of art are presentations of objects; they are presentations within a social and historical context, even in the factual absence of people.

We want to deal with a possible objection here: in the hypothetical case that someone lived on an island for their whole life, and they have never seen any artwork and do not even know that artworks exist, can they create art? We argue that this is indeed possible. To make sense of our claim that the hypothetical island-dweller can create art, we only need to argue that even in their loneliness, this island-dweller is a “social creature”, and that every creation is an expression of this essential sociality.²⁹ Regarding art, this would mean that the explicit knowledge of the existing social practice of looking at, selling, and creating art, is *not* the determining factor. Existing social conventions are not what constitutes art. What is more important is 1) the willingness to create something that does not fully reside within its utility, and 2) that this intentional act is, in some way or form, shaped by the human’s (implicit) understanding of their sociality. As Heidegger (and Gadamer) would claim, the artist’s understanding of this sociality is what shapes and determines the creation of art. The creation of art, for Heidegger, is an intentional creation within a social context (history).³⁰

Why this sociality is essential for the creation of art only becomes fully comprehensible when looking at the second aspect of the “understanding of the human condition”: the understanding of one’s mortality. It complements the understanding of one’s sociality and gives our actions their specific weight.

Let us begin by saying that intentionality is an essential feature of being human: the term “intentionality” is used as “being directed towards something”. This directionality becomes “intentionality” by adding the element of motivation. We, as humans, always want to do something and sometimes we want to do nothing. We avoid things and we are attracted to other things. While there must not always be an existing actual intentional object that we are directed towards, it is still a necessary condition that there is directionality (even in the lack of objects). In existential angst, depression, or boredom, when we are convinced that there is nothing we could do (that makes sense), what we experience is the lack of objects which could potentially “attract” us. The lack of potential options on how to act can only be experienced in this way because of our intentionality.

Phenomenologists have shown that this intentionality is embedded in the normativity of our lives.³¹ It is never the case that we are directed toward completely neutral objects. Rather, we always already experience things as normative. It is because normativity is “primary”, that things in our world can mean something to us.³² They even mean something to us when they are experienced as meaningless (lack of meaning is still a normative assessment). Normativity, in this sense, is not the outcome of a (conscious) evaluation. Rather, it is the precondition for us to experience anything in a meaningful way.³³ This “normativity-first” approach has been a common wide-held position in phenomenology for decades.³⁴ What is unique about Heidegger’s point of view, is the connection between this kind of intentionality-embedded-in-normativity with human mortality. This will provide us with the final element that we need for our claims about AI-generated art.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger explains this approach by showing that intentionality is best understood as “caring” about something.³⁵ “Care”, for Heidegger, is the precondition for anything in our world to show up in a

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A. C. Danto, *Die Verklärung des Gewöhnlichen*, 84.

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See: W. Benjamin, *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit*, p. 7. Cf. M. Heidegger, “The Work of Art”, pp. 26–27.

29

M. Heidegger, *BT*, pp. 156–157: “Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factually no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be *missing* only *in* and *for* a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its very possibility is the proof of this.”

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M. Heidegger, “Work of Art”, pp. 58–59. Cf. H.–G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 108.

31

Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Erster Teil, Ullrich Melle (ed.), Springer, Dordrecht 2002, §47. Cf. Bernhard Rang,

Kausalität und Motivation. Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Perspektivität und Objektivität in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1973; Steven Crowell, *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013.

32

M. Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie (GA 56/57)*, pp. 72–73.

33

M. Heidegger, *BT*, §18.

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See for example, Matthew Burch, Irene McMullin, *Transcending Reason. Heidegger on Rationality*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2020.

35

M. Heidegger, *BT*, §41. “Care” is used as a technical term by Heidegger for an intrinsic feature of human existence.

meaningful way.³⁶ He demonstrates that “care” is primarily “self-care”, which he understands as caring about one’s existence. For him, this kind of self-care is the precondition for the normativity of the world.³⁷ The example he uses is the kind of fear some people might feel when being barked at by a big dog. Heidegger describes this feeling initially as a feeling that is directed at the barking dog. However, in a more detailed analysis, he points out that we could only feel fear in this case, if we also had an understanding (implicit or explicit) of the danger that comes with the possibility that an animal might attack us. This feeling of “fear” that is directed at the barking dog, is at the same time the state of being fearful of being harmed. It is a concern about one’s well-being. Fear that one might get hurt and an understanding of what this would imply.³⁸ A feeling we would not have if we did not care about ourselves. We do not only care about our survival but, as Heidegger puts it, we always care about a certain way of existing.

Heidegger’s main point is that this “double structure” (“forward” directed at the object and “backward” directed at the one who is experiencing the feeling) applies to all our experiences and that every time we experience something in any kind of normative quality, this experience is made possible by a synchronous feeling of ourselves.³⁹ For Heidegger, this self-feeling is based on, or better, is an expression of the more fundamental care for one’s existence. And this is where we finally get to make the connection to our mortality.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger also demonstrates that this kind of self-care must not be understood in terms of the egotistical “I only care for myself”, but rather as an underlying (emotion-based) *understanding* of one’s existence. For Heidegger, this understanding of one’s existence is not something akin to scientific fact, nor is it something that needs to be spelled out to affect us. Rather, we must think of it as an essential underlying understanding of the human condition in the broadest sense, which means it entails an understanding of the context of one’s actions (sociality) and an understanding of human mortality.⁴⁰ It is only because we have this, for the most part, implicit understanding of “what our existence is about” that we care about ourselves and in consequence care about beings in this world.⁴¹

This is how, for Heidegger, caring, self-care, and our mortality are intertwined and how they constitute human intentionality: We “know” that we are not immortal. We “know” that our lives take place within a social context of relationships with others. We “know” that the choices we make matter because they affect other people *and* cannot be undone. We “know” that our lives can potentially end abruptly and randomly, at any given point, and that our lives are determined by this constant possibility and absurdity of death. It is only because we have this knowledge or, better: the understanding of our mortality and our sociality that our decisions have their particular weight. Only because we are mortal social creatures, do our decisions matter. It is this understanding (that differs in degrees) that shapes and determines human intentionality. It is this understanding that is essential for the creation and, in turn, for our perception of art.

Heidegger’s account of this intentionality provides us with the essential conceptual tools that we need to make sense of the distinction between AI-generated and human-made art. With reference to Heidegger, we have shown how the human creation of art is something that is embedded in our understanding of the human condition, namely an understanding of our sociality

and our mortality. This understanding is what makes the creation of art possible and without this kind of understanding, art cannot be created.

But before we go into detail about how this kind of intentionality underlies the creation of works of art, we need to deal with a possible objection: one could argue that even if this intentionality is essential for the creation of art, why not just build it into AI? If the creation of art is so important, why not produce mortal, finite AIs, give them an understanding of their mortality, and then have them create billions of works of art? Again, Heidegger could give a convincing answer by showing how the finitude of humans is fundamentally different from machines, which are subject to entropy and anything we could potentially program into a machine. While it might be technically possible to give an AI an expiration date and feed it the information it needs to simulate and express “what it means for humans to feel mortal”, the key difference would still be that this “expiration date” is something that we as humans have decided to design into the machines. It is an arbitrary human decision that has made this AI expire, which means that its finitude is qualitatively different from human mortality. In this case, we would potentially perceive AI as “human-made” and still think of it as fundamentally different from human beings who are born into this world. Even more important than what the machine “thinks” or “feels”, is that we know that we decided to design “mortal machines” with an understanding of their mortality. A decision that could potentially be altered. This means that even in this hypothetical case of a machine with an expiration date and an understanding of its mortality, what this machine creates is still perceived and experienced very differently from human creations, because it is not something created by a being with the same kind of mortality. It is perceived as created by an artificial machine and not as an intentional, skilful creation within a social-historical context of mortal creatures. We conclude, therefore, *that more important than the design of the machine is the context of our perception of the artwork*. If we assume that a machine created an artwork, we cannot help but make our assessments on the basis of our understanding of the differences between human intentionality (sociality and mortality) and machine code.⁴²

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M. Heidegger, *BT*, pp. 193–194. See also: Steven Crowell, *Normativity and Phenomenology*, p. 184. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (GA 9), p. 170.

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M. Heidegger, *BT*, p. 84.

38

M. Heidegger, *BT*, pp. 140–142.

39

M. Heidegger, *BT*, p. 141. See also: Jan Slaby, “Affektive Intentionalität – Hintergrundgefühle, Möglichkeitsräume, Handlungsorientierung”, in: Jan Slaby, Achim Stephan (eds.), *Affektive Intentionalität. Beiträge zur welterschließenden Funktion der menschlichen Gefühle*, mentis, Paderborn 2011, pp. 23–48.

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Cf. Steven G. Crowell, “Competence over Being as Existing”, in: Zed Adams, Jacob

Browning (eds.), *Giving a Damn. Essays in dialogue with John Haugeland*, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2017, pp. 73–102.

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M. Heidegger, *BT*, p. 270: “Understanding belongs equiprimordially to attunement (mood). In this way Da-sein ‘knows’ where it stands [...]”

42

The question remains if this understanding of differences can potentially change “over time,” as relativists could argue, and that, in whatever timeframe, our understanding of these differences will have changed completely. Heidegger would respond that our perception of these fundamental differences between machines and humans is “relatively stable,” based on the fact that the ontological make-up of machines and human beings cannot be altered. Human beings are born into this world.



If this is true, we can already conclude that AI will never be able to create art, because our perception of art is bound up with human mortality. But talking about our perception of art brings us to the second claim we made, namely the devaluation of our experience of art in the case of art made using AI as a tool. To further show how this intentionality is essential for the creation of art, to support our conclusion, and to shed light on our negative bias towards AI art, we want to show that there is a third condition for the creation of art, which has to do with how the artwork is created. This condition is the skill of creation.

3.2. *Skilfulness – The Uniqueness of the Creation*

Not every intentional creation of non-useful things is considered art. How the artwork was made is also important. “How” in the sense of: did the artist create something that no one else could have created? Did the transformation of the object lead to the creation of something truly unique? We argue that there is a third condition for the creation of works of art, which has to do with the skill of the artist and the uniqueness of the creation. A uniqueness that is not a mere novelty. Whether AI or humans can truly produce something new has little to do with the question of what art is. Something that is new and has never been seen before is not automatically considered art. Rather, the uniqueness of a work of art has to do with the skill of the artist in transforming the object.⁴³ There are a number of positive feelings that arise when we experience this kind of uniqueness and skill: a feeling of joy, respect, humility or, as we will call it from now on, awe. We are in awe that this work of art has been created.⁴⁴

We want to argue in the following that we lose this feeling of awe the moment we get to know that we are facing (re-)productions of artworks. We are not in awe of the uniqueness of the artwork if we know that we are looking at or listening to something AI has produced. In “The Origin of the Work of Art”, Heidegger offers an explanation of why we are experiencing these different kinds of positive feelings only in the case of human-made art. He does that by making the differences in the transformation of objects in toolmaking and art explicit.

Both creations, that of tools and that of artworks are purposeful and intentional transformations of objects. However, there is a difference: In the case of toolmaking, whatever material is used in the transformation, is “used and consumed”⁴⁵ in the process. Heidegger says that the material that was used disappears “behind” or “within” the usability of the tool, and the better the material is suited for the specific task, the better it is hidden by its utility. While using the axe to chop wood, the fact that it is made from wood and stone is neither apparent nor obvious.⁴⁶ If this fact was drawing most of our attention to it, it would draw our attention away from the task at hand. The obtrusiveness of this fact would be an obstacle to using the tool as a means to specific ends. The opposite is the case, Heidegger claims, in the creation of artworks: there, the transformation does not “use up” the material (this only happens when the creation fails),⁴⁷ but the material is brought up to the surface as *what it is*: Heidegger claims that within this transformation the “material” comes forth as “the earth”.⁴⁸

“Earth”, for Heidegger, is neither simply used in reference to the planet we are living on, nor simply another name for nature (“mother earth”). “Earth” is

used for the metaphorical “materiality” of the world of human beings, what Heidegger, in his early philosophy, calls their “facticity”.⁴⁹ It stands for everything that is part of the broader context of the artwork which is not humanly produced but that is nevertheless the foundation for the artwork and for everything humans do. In the words of Heidegger, the earth is that “in which man finds his dwelling”.⁵⁰ “Earth” is what makes the creation of art possible.⁵¹ It allows itself to be transformed into artworks.⁵²

Why is it important for our experience of art that the artwork allows the “earth” to come forth as what it is? Because, as Heidegger argues, the “earth” is always “silent”, “unexplained”, and “concealed” and therefore always in need of something else;⁵³ something that allows it to come forth as what it is. What makes the artwork unique and the reason for the feeling of awe that occurs when experiencing art is that the earth has been put forth and brought to a stand within the artwork. Not as something that the earth is not, but as what it is: as self-concealing, silent, and inexplicable.⁵⁴ According to Heidegger, the feeling of awe is linked to the belief that the artists managed to “capture” these aspects of the earth and somehow succeeded in bringing them into view within the artwork. The artists found a way to create something out of that which conceals itself, thereby showing the earth as what it is.⁵⁵

Even if one might not agree on the merits of using the term “earth” in this context, there still is, in our opinion, merit to Heidegger’s distinction regarding different kinds of transformations: in the case of tool-making the material aspect is covered up by its utility, but in the case of artworks this aspect is built into the artworks as something that can be experienced. We are not only in awe because of the greatness of the artist’s idea or the brilliance of the execution, but also because the artist created something out of “nothing”, if by

Machines are produced. See: Iain Thomson, *Heidegger on Ontotheology. Technology and the Politics of Education*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (MA) 2005, p. 19, 59.

43

We want to stress that “has to do” means that the creation of artworks does not fully reside within the ability of the artists. There are always external, i.e., non-subjective, non-controllable aspects that play into the creation of artworks. Cf. Walter Benjamin, *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit*, 12. These external aspects will be emphasized in the following by showing that the creation is always an *interplay* between the artist and the material.

44

M. Heidegger, “The Work of Art”, pp. 52–53.

45

Ibid., p. 32.

46

Ibid.

47

Ibid., p. 34.

48

Ibid., p. 32.

49

Martin Heidegger, *Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität (GA 63)*, p. 8.

50

Martin Heidegger, “The Work of Art”, p. 28.

51

Cf. H. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 168: “[T]he objectifying reification that the work of art inflicts on its underlying content is a transfiguration, a metamorphosis of such a radical kind that it is as if the natural course of things could be reversed in it.” Cf. Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 8: “Art negates the categorical determinations of the empirical and yet contains empirical being [*empirisch Seiendes*] in its own substance.”

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M. Heidegger, “The Work of Art”, p. 19.

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Ibid.

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Ibid., p. 35.

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Ibid., pp. 28–29.

“nothing” we mean that which hides itself and its meaning – a “nothing” that nonetheless is the foundation for everything we do. This “nothing”, by which we mean the self-concealing, wordless, and therefore mysterious “earth”, is put in our view and becomes visible as what it is. The artwork becomes a way of expressing the self-concealment of the earth.⁵⁶

Instead of speaking in these metaphorical terms, we could simply explain this as the artwork becoming an expression of our facticity. When Heidegger says that the artwork gives us an outlook of our “dwelling in this earth”; we could instead say that the artwork offers a (new) perspective on the human condition and that artworks make something explicit that was implicit before. Heidegger’s concept of “earth” stands for our fragility, vulnerability, finality, temporality, and dependence on something non-human in the strongest sense. “Earth” also stands for a peculiar non-human productivity which is at the heart of everything that is. If we try to avoid any evocation of something metaphysical in this regard, we could speak of the passage of the seasons, of growth and thriving; something that does not only underlie and make possible the things around us, but also the genesis and the perishing of our own world. The Greeks described this productivity, this principle of growth in nature, as *physis*.

This is not the full explanation of (our reaction to) the uniqueness of the work of art yet. When Heidegger says that the earth cannot come forth as what it is without the assistance of human beings, he draws our attention to a second aspect:⁵⁷ because the earth cannot come into our view *without* the skilfulness of an artist, we always experience the material aspect of the work of art together with the fact of the creation. Heidegger describes this idea as an *interplay* of the “world” of human beings and the “earth”.⁵⁸ “World” here does not single out the individual artist who created the artwork. More important than whoever individual created the artwork, is our experience of the fact that the artwork was created.⁵⁹ “World” does not refer to the specific conscious intentions of a particular artist, but rather refers to the world that we as humans share with each other. “World” therefore stands for the kind of embedded intentionality that we talked about in the previous sections: intentionality that is embedded in the social context of an understanding of the human condition.

The interplay of “world” and “earth” is explained as the *skilful* intentional transformation of objects that allows the earth to come to a stand within the artwork. The material aspect (“earth”) is always appearing together with the fact of the creation. Our reaction to art is thus a reaction to the material aspect (the earth coming forth as what it is) *and* a reaction to the creation itself (the intentionality and skilfulness of the artist).⁶⁰ Heidegger describes this as the experience of the “simple ‘factum est’”.⁶¹ The artwork becomes an expression of its own creation. This fact is underlying our experience of the “uniqueness” of the artwork. We are in awe that the artwork is *at all*.⁶² We are in awe because we experience the artwork as an expression of the interplay between the world of humans (the unspecified, often unknown artist) and the eluding earth.

What we call the third condition for the creation of artworks, namely the skilfulness in the process of the creation, is the (learned and acquired and not necessarily self-transparent) ability to bring this interplay of the world of humans and the self-concealing earth into a stand within the artwork. Heidegger describes this as allowing the metal that was used to “come to shine and glimmer” and “the colours to glow, the sound to resound, the word

to mean [something]”.⁶³ For Heidegger, the individual artist is less important than the fact that the artwork was created at all. He thereby makes the context of the creation the main determining factor for our experience of art (and not the intentions of the artist). Heidegger argues that we perceive the artwork as being created by human beings and thus as an interplay between an artist with a certain kind of intentionality – one that is embedded in a socially shared understanding of the human condition – and something that is the ground of this intentionality (“the earth”).

At the beginning of this paper, we mentioned empirical studies that demonstrate a negative bias toward AI art. What these studies prove is that a statistical majority of people altered their evaluation of artworks based on who they believed the creator of the artwork was. Heidegger’s philosophy explains this negative bias by tracing it back to what is essential to our experience of artworks. The point that follows from Heidegger’s understanding of art is that if we know that the work of art has been produced by machines or if we are told that the particular work of art is not an original but a reproduction, the artwork loses its uniqueness *for us* in our perception of it. It loses what Benjamin famously called the artwork’s “aura”, which is not so much an objective attribute of the artwork, but, according to Heidegger, a result of our experience of the uniqueness of the interplay between a specific kind of intentionality and the self-concealing earth.

To conclude, we want to propose the following “formula” to explain any kind of bias in our perception of art: The more we experience the work of art as an interplay between the world of humans and “the earth”, the stronger our positive feelings toward it. And, by the same token, the less a human is involved in the creation of art, the stronger our negative bias will be. This is not a sociological or psychological explanation of this bias but a philosophical one that is based on (the articulation of) our understanding of ontological differences between different kinds of beings.

The next and final part is the “application” of the previously developed ideas about what art is and about how essential our understanding of the ontological differences is for our perception of objects.

56
Ibid., pp. 34–36.

57
Ibid., p. 28.

58
As Feige points out, the ongoing transformation within the creation of an artwork is not only a transformation of the “material”, but also of the intentionality of the artists. What comes into view in this creation is, in the words of Feige, “what it means, to act at all”. See: Judith Siegmund, Daniel Martin Feige (eds.), *Kunst und Handlung. Ästhetische und handlungstheoretische Perspektiven*, transcript, Bielefeld 2015, p. 190.

59
M. Heidegger, “The Work of Art”, pp. 52–53.

60
Ibid., p. 57.

61
Ibid., p. 52.

62
Ibid., p. 53.

63
Ibid., “The Work of Art”, p. 32.

4. Can AI Create Art?

According to the Heideggerian definition of art as the finite and socially shaped intentional skilful transformation of objects, are (re-)produced artworks art? The key to answering this question lies in our explanation of the skilfulness of the artist as the ability to create something truly unique “out of nothing” which we also described as the interplay between human intentionality (“the world”) and nature in the broadest sense (“the earth”).

We argued that one feels awe (or similar positive feelings, in general: appreciation) over the fact that something has been created “out of nothing”. The interplay between “world” and “earth” was explained as the skilful intentional transformation of objects. A transformation that does not consume the material to make something useful out of it, but rather, a transformation that makes the material visible “as what it is”. If one agrees to say that this interplay is responsible for our feeling of awe (appreciation), then one could potentially argue that there is the same (or at least a similar kind of) interplay between the “world” and “earth” in the case of AI art. After all, is it not the case that AI could copy the way great artists have worked with specific materials and produce something out of any given material that cannot be visually distinguished from any existing artwork? Even in the case of AI art, mustn’t we then assume that there is an interplay between a “creator” with certain intentions and a material substrate that perhaps could be understood as “the earth”?

How do we counter this strong objection? We would argue that these transformations – the artist transforming an object into art and AI transforming objects – are *qualitatively* different and should therefore not be equated. In the Picasso vs. Pigcasso example, we pointed out 1. that the context of the transformation matters and 2. that there are different kinds of intentionality (the intentionality of pigs differs from that of humans). In Heidegger’s perspective, this also means that their respective “worlds” are different and that therefore only in the case of the skilful transformation of objects (which is shaped by sociality and mortality), what has been “used” in the transformation of objects, can come forth as “the earth”. Hence, what is essential for the creation of art is the kind of intentionality that we described above and that is only possible for human beings who are born into this world. This argument is not so much about the ontological status of artworks but more about what is implicit in our factual experiences of artworks: constitutive of our appreciation of artworks is the understanding of the now often described interplay between “world” and “earth”.

This is where an unbridgeable gap becomes visible between human-made art and AI-generated art. What AI will always be lacking is the socially shaped intentionality of mortal artists. Its creations, even though they can be creations of something completely “new” and even if they are “visually indistinguishable” from human-made masterworks, cannot be perceived as art. Why not? Because AI is and will never be capable of bringing the interplay of “earth” and “world” to a stand within an artwork because of its lack of intentionality that only humans (not even highly intelligent animals) possess.

4.1. *The Devaluation of our Experience of AI Art*

In the case of art created using AI, the tool is neither a brush, nor paint, nor canvas, but a computing device that transforms any input (data, text prompts, commands) into paintings, poems, stories, etc. At a high level of abstraction,

one could argue that there is no difference between an artist using a brush and a text-to-image prompter using a computer. However, we want to show that what kind of tools artists use and how they use them matters. In what follows, we show how the use of AI dissociates the artist from the artwork, and how this dissociation in turn devalues our experience of AI art.

One first observation is that the interaction between the “world” and “earth” is strongly reduced in the case of AI-generated art. There still is an interaction between the artist and the machine, but the artist is not “directly” working with the material anymore. Only the machine is in actual contact with the material. Experienced “prompters” might have an expectation but do not exactly know how the outcome will come together “within the machine”. The machine is “doing the work”, and the “skill” of the artist is determined by their ability to operate the machine.

A second observation has to do with the creative process itself. While in human-made art, there always is the possibility to readjust, modify, or even change an ongoing project, this possibility is lost in AI art. Once prompted, the machine takes control of the creation process. The artist is left with the curation of the outcomes. Sculptors can take cues from the material they are working with. Painters might have an idea of a certain colour they want to use but seeing the paint on their palette while mixing it, might change their minds. Architects might have a blueprint for building a house, but seeing the area, the surrounding buildings, and what is there to work with, they might adjust and modify. In short: the creation is never a direct 1-to-1 transformation of an idea into an existing object, and the potentialities in the process of creating can be essential for the creation of the particular artwork.⁶⁴ With Heidegger, we would argue that the interplay of “world” and “earth” is reduced to a bare minimum in the case of AI-generated art.

We claim that these observations can be used to explain the negative bias towards AI-generated art, providing us with the following “formula”: the less the artist is involved in the actual creation of the artwork, the less we will experience it as something unique. The more the artist loses control or gives control over the actual creation away, the less we will experience the artwork as something that was skilfully and intentionally created and the stronger our negative bias will be. The backbone of this argument is the Heideggerian description of our understanding of ontological differences and that our perception of art is based on an understanding of art as an interplay of “world” and “earth”.

The producibility of artworks with any kind of AI makes it “easier” to transform ideas into objects. However, making it “easier” on the grounds of dissociating the artist from the process of the creation leads to a devaluation of our experience of AI-generated art. The more machines take over the creation

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See also: Th. W. Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, p. 13: “Synthesis, too, has its foundation in the material and mindless [*geistfern*] side of the works, in what it works on, not merely in itself. This connects the aesthetic moment of form with non-intervention. In its difference from the thing, the work of art necessarily constitutes itself relative to what it is not as a work of art and what makes it a work of art in the first place.”

process, the less we can experience the creations as something that someone intentionally and skilfully created (within a sociohistorical context). Making art “less human” does not account for the evolution of art. Rather, it means that art is coming to an end. AI can create something completely new. But there is no reason to mistake these creations for art.

One last time, we want to emphasize that this is not a normative assessment of what we should or should not regard as art. It is a description of the criteria that are in play in our experience of art. At most, our conceptual analysis suggests that even if AI takes over the art world in the next years or decades, we will still value artworks that have been created intentionally and skilfully in the ways we described them. The work of art will survive even in the age of technological producibility.

Karl Kraatz, Shi-ting Xie

**Zašto AI-umjetnost nije umjetnost –
heideggerijanska kritika**

Sažetak

Nova sposobnost umjetne inteligencije da kreira umjetnička djela smatra se velikim izazovom za suvremeno razumijevanje umjetnosti. Postoji jaka napetost između ljudi koji predviđaju da će AI zamijeniti umjetnike i kritičara koji tvrde da AI-umjetnost nikada neće biti umjetnost. Nadalje, nedavne studije dokumentirale su negativnu pristranost prema AI. Ovaj članak daje filozofsko objašnjenje ove negativne pristranosti temeljeno na našem zajedničkom razumijevanju ontoloških razlika među objektima. Tvrdimo da naša predodžba umjetnosti ovisi o našem razumijevanju konteksta njezina stvaranja: umjetnost koju su stvorili ljudi doživljava se kao međuigra između umjetnika i prirode. U umjetnosti koju je generirala umjetna inteligencija, ova međuigra je ili odsutna ili je minimalizirana. Zaključujemo da istiskivanje »ljudskog faktora« u umjetnosti neće dovesti do evolucije umjetnosti, nego do kraja umjetnosti.

Ključne riječi

umjetna inteligencija, Martin Heidegger, AI-umjetnost, filozofija, estetika, ontologija

Karl Kraatz, Shi-ting Xie

**Warum die KI-Kunst keine Kunst ist –
eine heideggerianische Kritik**

Zusammenfassung

Die neue Fähigkeit der künstlichen Intelligenz Kunstwerke zu kreieren wird als eine große Herausforderung für das gegenwärtige Kunstverständnis angesehen. Es besteht eine starke Spannung zwischen denjenigen, die voraussagen, dass die KI die Künstler ersetzen wird, und den Kritikern, die behaupten, dass die KI-Kunst nie eine Kunst sein wird. Weiterhin haben die neuesten Studien eine negative Einstellung gegenüber der KI dokumentiert. Dieser Artikel bietet eine philosophische Erklärung dieser negativen Einstellung aufgrund unseres gemeinsamen Verständnisses der ontologischen Unterschiede zwischen Objekten. Wir behaupten, dass unsere Vorstellung von Kunst von unserem Verständnis des Kontextes, in dem sie geschaffen wird, abhängt: die Kunst, die von Menschen geschaffen wurde, wird als Zusammenspiel zwischen dem Künstler und der Natur erlebt. In der Kunst, die die künstliche Intelligenz generiert hat, ist dieses Zusammenspiel entweder abwesend oder minimalisiert. Wir schließen daraus, dass die Verdrängung des „menschlichen Faktors“ in der Kunst zu keiner Kunstevolution führen wird, sondern zu dem Ende der Kunst.

Schlüsselwörter

künstliche Intelligenz, Martin Heidegger, KI-Kunst, Philosophie, Ästhetik, Ontologie

Karl Kraatz, Shi-ting Xie

**Pourquoi l'art généré par l'IA n'est pas de l'art –
Une critique heideggérienne**

Résumé

La nouvelle capacité de l'IA à créer des œuvres d'art est perçue comme un défi majeur pour notre compréhension contemporaine de l'art. Il existe une forte tension entre ceux qui prédisent que l'IA remplacera les artistes et ceux qui portent un regard critique en affirmant que l'art généré par l'IA ne sera jamais de l'art. De plus, de récentes études ont relevé un biais négatif envers l'art créé par l'IA. Cet article offre une explication philosophique de ce biais négatif basée sur notre compréhension commune des différences ontologiques parmi les objets. Nous soutenons que notre perception de l'art dépend de la manière dont nous comprenons le contexte de sa création : l'art créé par des humains est vécu comme un jeu complexe entre l'artiste et la nature. Dans l'art généré par l'IA, cette interaction est soit absente, soit minimisée. Nous concluons que déplacer le « facteur humain » dans l'art ne conduira pas à une évolution de l'art, mais à la fin de l'art.

Mots-clés

intelligence artificielle, Martin Heidegger, art généré par l'IA, philosophie, esthétique, ontologie