FROM ASCRIPITIVE TO PARTICIPATORY CITIZENSHIP: SOCIAL CONFLICT, POLITICAL BELONGING, AND THE LIBERAL NATION-STATE

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Recent decades have witnessed waves of populism, diverse civil conflicts as well as political, economic, demographic, and environmental disruptions. While both scholars and the general public often talk about the 'crisis of citizenship', we chart several important elements of this 'crisis' and explain why they can be viewed as an important and, perhaps, promising transformation. In view of this transformation, the current understanding of citizenship should be decoupled from the normative ideals which associate it with the liberal nation-state, reconsidered to include conflict as its constitutive dimension, expanded by incorporating a diverse array of forms and ways of participation in community life and interactions with the environment, and grounded in a realistic understanding of political psychology.

Keywords: a crisis of citizenship, liberal citizenship, national citizenship, participatory citizenship, social conflict

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Several global historical trends pose profound challenges to the conventional model of citizenship. This traditional model tends to prioritise shared values and culture, rights, legal protections, and civic engagement within the confines of nation-state institutions. Recent decades have witnessed diverse civil conflicts, from domestic polarisation to civil war, which have affected the ways in which we define and understand citizenship. While both scholars and the general public often talk about the ‘crisis of citizenship’, it is still not that clear what the elements of this ‘crisis’ are, and how the ‘crisis’ can be overcome. Moreover, behind the public concern with the burst of civil conflicts that undermine the conventional model of citizenship, there is little understanding of how citizenship and conflict are connected.

Given the current confusion in the field of citizenship studies, this article seeks to demonstrate the necessity of developing an alternative model of citizenship by way of two critical approaches. The first is to assess what is wrong with the current ascriptive notion of citizenship. The second is to establish a stronger analytical connection between citizenship and conflict. Regarding the first approach, we specifically discuss five challenges that signal the transformation of contemporary citizenship and point at the inadequacy of conceptual instruments which are used to theorise it: 1) the historical and political contingency of social inclusion predicated on a strong liberal nation-state; 2) the social and technological nature of political reasoning which questions the concept of the informed citizen; 3) the historical and political contingency of the distinction between adulthood and adolescence which deprive the latter of full political rights, and the process of adolescents becoming political actors; 4) the rise of new social movements circumventing the tradition of protest politics and the nation-state; 5) the rise of non-national approaches to environmental protection.

We argue that an alternative model of citizenship which can account for these challenges is needed. This model should be based on a renewed understanding of both ascriptive and participatory dimensions of citizenship. On the one hand, it should allow for considering attachment to various entities, such as local communities, subaltern spaces, and the environment as the foundation of citizenship. On the other hand, it should consider consensus- and age-based voting as only one out of many possible historically contingent forms of political participation. As institutional political participation decays with the eroding significance of the nation-state, it should be expanded to include many diverse forms, such as the politics of recognition, the performance of rights, community activism, environmental activism, and youth activism, as forms of political participation and active citizenship.
Regarding the second approach, we seek to show that citizenship has historically been the product of tensions between consensus and conflict within set political and institutional limits. Typically, consensus and conflict have been seen as oppositional—where conflict arises consensus is impossible and where consensus emerges dissenting voices and minorities are in actuality being oppressed. We argue that both of these two dimensions should be seen as a constitutive source of citizenship.

**TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF CITIZENSHIP**

In the academic literature, citizenship is mostly conceptualised through the lens of the political tradition of nation-states as the legal ascriptive status of political belonging and as people's civic engagement through traditional political-institutional channels—elections, parties, courts, etc. (see: Brubaker, 1992; Bloemraad, 2000; Joppke, 2010). However, numerous recent international and domestic phenomena challenge this conception of citizenship.

Global economic flows, geopolitical contestations, the securitisation and commodification of naturalisation (Lori, 2017; Orgad, 2017; Shachar, 2017), and refugee and migration crises (Weinstock, 2017) have dissolved the boundaries of nation-states' political communities. Thus, they demolish the 'sacral' status of citizenship (Brubaker, 1992). Rapid global warming raises questions over including the natural environment into the category of citizenry and whether allegiance to a specific nation impedes our capacity to develop global collaboration (Cao, 2015, pp. 11–36, 72–103). Additionally, concerns over the cultural identity of national citizenry have brought about the expansion of denizenship and stateless population worldwide (Bosniak, 2017; Lori, 2017; Vink & Bauböck, 2013). The growing level of political polarisation and electoral apathy narrow down the institutionalised means of participation in community governance (Dumbrava, 2017). As Brigit Meyer and Peter Geschiere (1999, p. 6) note, recent decades have been marked by "the dialectics of flow and closure:" "[Global] flow goes hand in hand with a closure of identities which often used to be much more fuzzy and permeable." In other words, by facing ever-increasing global issues from without, national citizenship is encountering the challenges of fragmentation, low popular support, and diminishing institutional backing from within (Roudometof, 2005, pp. 122–123, 128).

**Questioning the Nation-State?**

As a prominent scholar of globalisation and development, Björn Hettne (2000, p. 36) pointed out two decades ago that, "the principle of citizenship, as we know it, is being under-
mined as the protective shelter constituted by the nation-state ... the modern form of state, is being eroded." This erosion has had nontrivial implications for ascriptive citizenship regimes. It is no surprise that scholars in various fields have mapped out the growing challenges to the contemporary form of citizenship that is both national and liberal. They often refer to the broad domains of economic globalisation, cultural denationalisation, migration, and the rise of transnational institutions (Tambini, 2001, pp. 198–202).

Richard Falk (2000, pp. 6–7) focuses on the role of economic globalisation, which undermines territorial ties between people and the state, thus, "shifting the locus of political identities, especially of elites, in such a manner as to diminish the relevance of international frontiers." On a broader level, the very sovereign power of liberal states has been slowly put into question (Behnabib 2005). The continued development of militarised security communities, regional trade blocs, and global telecommunication systems have profoundly undermined the traditional sovereignty structures of liberal states. The view of the state as a political entity that is tidily contained within discrete borders no longer reflects the complex linkages between modern liberal states.

Commenting on the growing disjuncture between the "nation" and "state," Michael Shapiro also notes that national citizenship is currently challenged in both spatial and cultural terms. Since the liberal national citizenship "is located both in a legal, territorial entity, which is associated with the privileges of sovereignty and the rights of individuals, and in a cultural community where it is associated with a history of shared ethnic and social characteristics" (Shapiro, 2000, p. 81), it directly clashes with many 'organic' models of membership practised by transnational and trans-local populations, such as migrants, refugees, globalised or global activists, and cosmopolitans. According to Nancy Fraser, the growing spatial and cultural challenges to citizenship and the demos more broadly put in question the conceptions of legitimate public opinion-forming, which is paramount to the liberal theory of public engagement. She writes: "The assumption that a public coincides with a national citizenry, resident on a national territory, which formulates its common interest as the general will of a bounded political community... is counterfactual... Every state now has non-citizens on its territory; most are multicultural and/or multinational, and every nationality is territorially dispersed" (Fraser 2007, p. 16). Proponents of ecological citizenship and an eco-social state go even further by noting that a whole cluster of principles underlying the modern liberal citizenship, such as political territoriality, individual freedom, representative democracy, and equality before the law have become com-
promised due to the fact that humanity is approaching the limits of the ecosystem (Dobson et al., 2014; Matijević, 2015).

Many theorists see the crisis of citizenship not in macro-social transformations *per se*, but rather in the way embattled nation-states react to them. They argue that the nation-state has fuelled social conflict by turning citizenship into the locus of exclusion, securitisation, and over-policing (see: Hassain & Bagguley, 2012). While the boundaries of states and nations are becoming increasingly permeable and mutable, particularly for the elites, the governments have been relentlessly turned on those living within their territorial and legal reach (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Many liberal nation-states have redoubled surveillance mechanisms to ostensibly ensure domestic security. In the post 9/11 world, legal-liberal citizenship has been increasingly entangled with securitisation (Nyers, 2013). According to Pramod Nayar (2015, p. 12), these measures implemented by the emerging surveillance state have resulted in "constructing the vulnerable citizen." In short, as Christian Joppke (2021, p. 6) observes, "states' symbolic parading at the immigration and citizenship front... compensates for their loss of power in a neoliberal order."

**Crisis or Transformation?**

In view of numerous challenges to liberal national citizenship, the calls are growing to leave the attempts to construct any durable forms of citizenship or even abandon the very idea of citizenship altogether. As Ackelsberg claims, the idea of citizenship itself "has been constructed through a variety of exclusions, based on gender, class, race, etc." (Ackelsberg, 2010, p. 117; also see: Lister, 2003, p. 1–10). Similarly, Amy Brandzel (2016, p. 12) points out that "while the list of non-normative citizen-subjectivities is historically contingent, it is also purposefully endless; citizenship works to continuously mark Otherness because normative structures depend on the production of new kinds of difference."

The above criticisms mostly problematise the cultural and legal aspects of political membership and its link with the nation-state. They cast serious doubts about how one might meaningfully engage in active or participatory membership within the context of conventional state institutions. At the same time, the bottom-up practices of contentious politics, counter-movements, the struggles of ethnocultural minorities, or even civil wars, signal both political participation and can ultimately result in a political change or even lead to the creation of more diverse and inclusive citizenship regimes. This means that the predicted marching of citizenship towards 'crisis' is far from unidirectional and unequivocal.
Often the rise of ethnocultural minorities leads to, first, questioning the existing model of citizenship, and then, to its reestablishment in a new form (Sadiq, 2008; Shevel, 2017; Tabachnik, 2019). Similarly, people in democratic states massively withdraw from the traditional mainstream means of participation in community governance (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002). However, new ways of participation have emerged, such as 'e-democracy' and other technologically driven ways of involvement (Dahlgren, 2000; Price, 2013). In addition, environmental citizenship which implies being the citizen of one’s own community, country, and the whole planet and behaving in an environmentally-responsible way has become a more prominent phenomenon (see: Cao, 2015). How can these new processes grounded in empirical reality be studied in relation to citizenship? And how might such research refine our understanding of citizenship?

Towards a Better Understanding of Citizenship through Transformation

Focusing on 'transformation' instead of 'crisis' highlights the importance of looking at the current processes as they unfold in reality, which somehow challenges our understanding of citizenship. Usually, scholars speak of four main dimensions of citizenship: rights/responsibilities, membership/status, identity, and participation (Bloemraad, 2000; Joppke, 2010). Given this typology and the recent challenges posed to legal, liberal citizenship of the nation-state, this article focuses on the five neglected aspects within the realms of state membership and political participation. Notably, we do not set out to exhaustively list and analyse all aspects of citizenship transformation. However, we notice that at a time when legal state membership is increasingly more territorial but offers to its holders an ever-diminishing package of rights, participatory citizenship acquires pervasive local and global dimensions through operating above and apart from the state.

Reassessing the Nation and Legal Membership: Territorial Membership and Beyond

Legal citizenship can be understood as a set of rights and obligations that formally define the status of an individual within a state (Turner, 1990). Legal citizenship entails not only the means by which one acquires that formal legal status but also the mechanisms of protection and enforcement. In this sense, legal citizenship is predicated on the formal, documentary mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. In line with the Westphalian nation-state’s sovereignty, while the specific bundle of protections and duties vary from state to state, they are ne-
vertheless grounded in the duty of the political sovereign to differentiate those 'within' and 'without' the political community. Historically, this differentiation has been accomplished through national passportisation and other documentary practices which have led to the state's "monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement" (Torpey, 2018, p. 5).

This liberal conception of citizenship conflicts with the current developments on the ground and leads many scholars to profess a crisis of citizenship. The first challenge comes to the imperatives of the nation-states for boundary-making and cultural homogenisation. Transnational migration flows, ethnocultural mobilisation, and an overall rise of identity politics force not only liberal democracies but also transition states and authoritarian polities to move towards a territorial rather than cultural understanding of the nation and citizenship. The decline of cultural nation-building has manifested itself in the growing tolerance of dual citizenship, the spread of the *jus soli* principle in citizenship acquisition, and the public accommodation of non-state languages (Tambini, 2001, p. 207–211; Tabachnik, 2019).

In addition, contemporary population flows, popular mobilisations, and community activities put in question state strength and institutional capacity as key factors facilitating social inclusion. The traditional model of the nation-state implies non-overlapping sovereignties, equal distribution of state power over the country's territory, deep penetration of the state into society, and its control over citizenship practices. Despite the fact that the historical emergence of the nation-state and of modern legal citizenship has been subject to critical scrutiny, highlighting their culturally exclusivist and homogenising pedigrees (Mann, 2012, p. 60-92, 200–214; Torpey, 2018; Wimmer, 2002), the idea of infrastructurally strong nation-states, setting borders, controlling their populations and serving as the ultimate guarantors of just, inclusive, and empowering citizenship still underwrites the contemporary literature on ethnicity and migration. Consequently, the readiness of states to institutionalise inclusive citizenship practices becomes reconciled with their organisational capacity to 'embrace' the country's population. It is the extent and identity of those who should be 'embraced' by the nation-state that is being contested in current research and public opinion, not the idea of 'embracing' itself.

Contrary to this view, emerging research shows that infrastructurally weak states may also offer inclusive formal citizenship and new ways of participation. The first mechanism of infrastructurally weak states opting for inclusion is found in the work of David FitzGerald and David Cook-Martin (2015).
They show that autocracies with a complex structure of national elites may submit to the economic and reputational pressures of powerful interest groups that advocate for citizenship de-ethnicisation (also: Escobar, 2015). Another road to inclusive citizenship known in weak states is the gradual transition of migrants towards citizenship through the semi-legal acquisition of residence and social security documents (Sadiq, 2008).

The challenges to cultural homogenisation, institutional nation-building, and centralised documentary oversight suggest that the connection between a strong nation-state and social inclusion in the form of rights and welfare is a historical contingency. Thus, the current developments might be normatively seen as an evolution of citizenship rather than a 'crisis'. In addition, they erode not only empirically, but also normatively, even the territorial grasp of the state, although states as territorial entities are not disappearing. Rather, these developments are shaping the transformation of the modern nation-state citizenship model towards a regime that allows for bottom-up pressures, multiple legal systems, and overlapping sovereignties.

From National Civic Engagement to Multiple Forms of Participatory Citizenship

While legal status is most commonly associated with citizenship, active participation in the community's life is another cornerstone of the concept of the citizen (see an overview in Jurlina Alibegović & Slijepčević, 2018, pp. 156–161). 'Active citizenship' is the most common way to conceptualise the participation aspect of citizenship. Active citizens, thus, are those who exercise "civic, political and social rights through participatory practices at various levels" (Haahr, 1997, p. 8, cit. ex. Jansen et al., 2006). Camilia Stivers (1990) identifies four elements of active citizenship based on an extensive review of available literature: citizens are legally empowered to make decisions; they should have a concern for the public interest; they learn how to be political beings through their actions; by manifesting all these elements, citizens together form a political community.

Empirical evidence from current processes related to 'active citizenship' is confusing. On the one hand, in recent decades we have witnessed widespread withdrawal from active participation in electoral politics (Abramson & Aldrich 1982; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002), particularly so for young people (Cowley & Denver, 2004; Chan & Clayton, 2006; McAllister, 2014). On the other hand, many new social movements have concurrently arisen, in which not only young people but even
children have taken an active stance. Does this mean that people
do not trust the current democratic institutions of nation-states
and would rather protest against them than participate in com-
community governance with their help? Might protest, as a means
of participation, be considered an ‘alternative’ active citizen-
ship practice? Are the youth’s current political actions a vivid
prognostic of this alternative?

There is also a long and venerable tradition of bottom-up
or anarchist modes of self-governance that have been largely
neglected in mainstream research on active citizenship. For
instance, Peter Leeson (2007, p. 706) shows that local commu-
nities in Somalia experienced increased quality of life and higher
degrees of participatory governance after the state collapsed,
suggesting that that state may be an obstacle to meaningful
show how subaltern spaces ultimately redefine group mem-
bership by inverting the locus of political belonging, creating
novel spaces of performative, active citizenship, and in the
process challenge the meaning and value of the conventional
liberal statist framework.

The assumption that citizens must be active and must
hold sophisticated political opinions originates from an En-
lightenment-driven idealised normative framework. This frame-
work is derived from a traditional model of active citizenship
with at least three important elements. First, it is the duty of
individuals to make political choices. Second, this framework
assumes that these choices should be well-informed and based
on available data or at least ideology. Third, these choices
should be based on the knowledge about the political structure
of representative democracies, such as parties, political leaders,
and issues on the public agenda. However, over the last 50
years, all of these assumptions have been put into question by
political psychologists. Since the 1960s, scholars of political
cognition have demonstrated that the structure of political
beliefs as held by the majority of people is quite different from
the ideologies possessed by those highly involved in politics,
such as elites, politicians, and activists. They do not reason
ideologically (Campbell et al., 1960) and do not make judg-
ments based on the available data. Rather, the majority of cit-
izens are ‘cognitive misers’ (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) who employ
tricks to overcome time and resource constraints. Nor do peo-
ple make choices as individuals. Their opinions are a result of
validation through others (Popkin, 1991) and a broader cog-
nitive ecology including media, institutions, and objects (Hutch-
is, 1995; Hurley, 1998). Finally, recent research shows that
political cognition is a form of social cognition rather than an
independent phenomenon. A wide range of key elements un-
derlying political participation, such as political partisanship, political values and ideologies, and coalitional cognition, grow out of social cognition practised in small social group settings, which are then adjusted to national politics (Schreiber, 2007).

In this context, political institutions of representative democracy are just historically contingent forms that channel this spontaneous, non-ideological, economising, and social cognition, attaching it to the elements of national politics, such as parties, policies, agendas, and elites. Respectively, when the infrastructural foundation of institutional political participation – the nation-state – erodes, the boundaries of what it means to reason about and participate in politics blur. Three phenomena epitomise the current crisis of institutional political participation – the political participation of minors, new social movements, and environmental activism.

Since politics is no longer an independent arcane realm but rather a form of social cognition, it is logical that minors can be considered as political actors as they learn and develop social cognition early on. This tension is reflected in the discussions about the political participation of minors. Young people are interchangeably accused of being "too passive" or "too radical" and viewed as "better citizens" or "not good enough citizens." As Ruth Lister shows, the two extremes in the conceptualisation of the political participation of minors are represented by childhood studies and citizenship studies. Citizenship studies "either tended to ignore children altogether, implicitly equating citizenship with adulthood, or portrayed children as citizens of the future" (Lister 2007, p. 696). At the other extreme, childhood studies "challenge such future constructions by simply asserting that children are citizens," while they obviously cannot practice active citizenship in the same manner as adults (Lister 2007, p. 697).

We believe that a more appropriate way of conceptualising the youth's political involvement in the context of the eroding institutional political participation would start with the rejection of the view that 'children', 'adolescents', or 'young people' are groups inherently possessed by a particular set of qualities, such as 'being passive' or 'being radical', 'being political subjects' or 'being not mature enough to practice active citizenship'. As one of the author's research on adolescents in protest politics shows (Erpyleva, 2021), the fact of being an adolescent in itself does not determine a specific way of political participation. Particular historical-institutional circumstances rather than age itself dictate the way of political participation of adolescents. When socialised in 'routine' apolitical periods of a political system's functioning, adolescents do not consider themselves political actors authorised to act and
to judge. They perceive themselves as not mature enough to be full-fledged political actors and citizens. Yet in politicised times of the opening of nation-state institutions, when the political socialisation of adolescents changes, they participate in protest politics in a manner no different from their adult counterparts and consider themselves as citizens in their own right.

The emergence of new social movements (NSM) is another symptom of eroding institutional political participation. As politics is no longer limited to the independent arcane realm populated by parties, politicians, and policies, a diverse variety of issues people are interested in as social beings become legitimate subjects of political interest. While the anti-regime protest has been historically considered as the archetypal form of active citizenship, NSMs have dramatically expanded the repertoire of bottom-up contestation beyond institutional political participation and incorporated very diverse issues into the public agenda, such as gender and sexuality, animal rights, attitudes towards the environment, consumer choice, lifestyle, and many others. In recent years, theoretically-minded anarchists within the NSM renaissance have rehabilitated the anarchist tradition of small councils or communities of people directly engaging with each other as equals (Ojeili, 2001; Gurran, 2006; Gordon, 2010; Dixon, 2012). These movements circumvent traditional anti-regime struggles and attempt to achieve broader goals that align with the social nature of human cognition rather than institutionally confined limits of traditional politics.

Finally, a shift away from the emphasis on the institutional forms of claiming rights and active participation can also be seen in the proposed neoliberal and consumer models of environmental citizenship (see: Cao, 2015, pp. 99–100, 213–223, 232–234). According to these models, environmental citizenship is mostly actualised in individual, private behaviour towards the global ecosystem, thus putting an emphasis on responsibility towards an abstract entity. In this context, one may ask whether politically inactive but environmentally engaged individuals should truly be seen as not enacting their citizenship duties. However, even at the time of the erosion of nation-state political institutions, the cultivation of the attachment to a non-national geographic place and local community (e.g., a particular neighbourhood) can strengthen people’s environmental concern and, thus, lead to sustained practices of active citizenship (e.g. Kudryavtsev et al., 2012).

While political participation of minors, new social movements, and the rise of environmental citizenship emphasising allegiance to the entire ecosystem can seem to be unrelated
phenomena, they illustrate the growing expansion of the participatory model of citizenship and its decoupling from the membership model. In addition, the focus on political reasoning and behaviour as a form of social cognition allows one to see these bottom-up phenomena as elements of the same process. When the nation-state is put into question, the historically contingent institutional political participation predicated on it no longer funnels social cognition and behaviour into narrow channels of official politics. Detached from parties, politicians, and policy issues, citizens focus on what is 'naturally' socially close to them.

**CITIZENSHIP UNDER CONFLICT**

In working towards building a new alternative conception of citizenship, we should pay attention to conflict which has been an essential dimension of citizenship and will remain such in the future. 'Conflict' is always present in one way or another when we think and talk about citizenship, but at the same time, it is both under-theorised and understudied empirically.

Indicatively, even in major social theories, the answer to the question of what role conflicts play in societal development is far from straightforward. Even though there is a strong current in conflict resolution research that sees social/intergroup conflict as always destructive (Deutsch, 2006; Rothbart & Cheburin, 2009), another established scholarly tradition stresses that conflict is complementary rather than antithetical to cooperation. Conflict is necessary for change and, thus, often brings benefits to society (Coser, 1998; Oberschall, 1978; Wieviorka, 2013; Dovidio et al., 2009). Hence, we ask: What is the role of conflict in the current transformation of citizenship? Does conflict enhance citizenship and political belonging, or does it undermine it?

**Conflict and Citizenship: Current Discussion**

The discussion about the role of conflict is present with regard to all four dimensions of citizenship: membership status, rights, and responsibilities, participation, and identity. The focus of this article is on the legal membership status and active participation aspects of citizenship. We review two major approaches to citizenship: consensus-based and conflict-based ones.

The literature in political sociology and political science is marked by a debate on the role of interstate and civil wars in shaping legal citizenship regimes and the politics of inclusion of different modern states. A number of influential macro-sociologists find that interstate competition and conflict have
historically led to the expansion of citizenship to disenfran-
chised social strata and, thus, to social and political inclusion. 
Others note that the inclusion of the broad masses has often 
been accompanied by cultural homogenisation, and ethnic 
cleansing (Malešević, 2013; Mann, 2012; Tilly, 1990, Wimmer, 
2002). Another strand of literature assesses the effects of civil 
wars on the citizenship, cultural pluralism, and migration po-
lies of contemporary states. Specifically, a model connecting 
inclusive and de-ethnicised naturalisation policies with the 
absence of ethnic conflict, border issues, and pressing 'nation-
al q uests' has long dominated the literature (Weil2001, Jop-
pke 2010). On the contrary, recent research suggests that in 
many cases large-scale ethnic confrontations and armed strug-
gles result in the moderation of nationalist politics of central 
governments (Shevel, 2017; Tabachnik, 2019).

The emphasis on social cohesion rather than conflict as a 
permanent transformative force is also emphasised in the lit-
erature on active citizenship. At the beginning of the twen-
tieth century authors such as, for example, Emile Durkheim, 
perceived social cohesion as first and foremost a consensus 
between different groups of a population. Later on, however, 
a shift "from consensus to the art of coping with diversity and 
dissensus" took place (Jansen et al., 2006, p. 191). The question 
arises, then: How to achieve social cohesion while communi-
cating different opinions, beliefs, and values?

In a nutshell, the answer to this question may be expres-
sed in two ways. The first suggests that violent conflict is not only 
opposed to politics but that it is an existential threat to the very 
possibility of politics (Arendt, 1970). According to this type of 
reading, citizenship is constructive or generative; it is what 
happens when discursive communities generate forums for 
deliberation (Habermas, 1984). Conflict is thus seen as poten-
tially disruptive for building a rational consensus. According 
to Jerry Tew (2005, p. 82), "enfranchising more of the popula-
tion in participatory citizenship, and a belief in rational de-
bate and the power of argument, may have underpinned 
emancipatory tendencies within modernity, such as repres-
representative democracy."

The second position is usually based on the works of such 
theorists as Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière, and Jacques 
Derrida. The adherents of this position see conflict as being 
opposite to consensus, where the latter is meaningless, and 
the former is a crucial part of democratic active citizenship. 
According to Mouffe (2000, p. 17), consensus often just re-
flexes the dominant ideology, thus repression marginal inter-
est and opinions. Mouffe writes that consensus may exist as 
"a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as stabilisa-
tion of power." 'Antagonism', as Mouffe and Laclau put it, is necessary for any political activity; 'agonism' challenges the status quo and produces alternative solutions (Castle, 1998). In Rancière's words, democracy itself should be defined as "whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it" (Rancière, 1999, pp. 29–30), and that is why conflict as something that breaks dominant consensus is needed for democratic citizenship practice. Or, as Derrida put it, there is "no democracy without deconstruction" (Derrida, 2005).

Empirical research on active citizenship may be situated within the debate on the consensus-conflict relationships as well. Some scholars contribute to this debate by looking at the different citizenship models from a historical and cross-national perspective. Thus, Bryan Turner (1990) shows that several types/models of citizenship could be differentiated depending on the history of citizenship's development in a particular county. For example, the French model of citizenship was a result of a long revolutionary struggle of people against the absolutist conception of sovereignty. The very violence of this social transformation, Turner argues, "resulted in a highly articulated conception of active citizenship" combined with "an attack on the private space of the family, religion, and privacy" (Turner 1990, pp. 208–209). Thus, popular violent struggles, according to Turner, may lead to more open, active, and publicly-oriented models of citizenship: "Historically, the growth of social citizenship [the rights of citizens for welfare] has been typically an outcome of violence" (Turner, 1990).

However, some scholars explore the micro-level of actual active citizenship practice in contemporary states. Thus, for example, Hugo Monteiro and Pedro Daniel Ferreira (2011) try to evaluate the role of conflict in citizenship education in Brazilian schools. Drawing upon interviews with teachers, they show that teachers tend to exclude or at least to limit conflict during citizenship education lessons. However, the authors do not hide their criticism towards such teaching practice. Without conflict, they argue, the result would be "citizenship converted into politeness, or civics converted into rules of etiquette." "The conflict as polemos or as a certain impoliteness is at the core of democratic processes" (Monteiro & Ferreira, 2011, p. 7). To give another example, Santiago Eizaguirre and his co-authors (2012) study urban governmental practices in contemporary Europe. They argue that it is almost impossible to achieve social cohesion without recognising different interests and power relations that are in conflict: "It is necessary to recapture conflict as well as multilevel and territorial governance analysis in assessing how cities are currently dealing with urban social cohesion" (Eizaguirre et al., 2012, p. 2012).
Obviously, the question of how citizenship and conflict are connected empirically is far from being answered yet. However, an integrative approach to various views on conflict in the context of citizenship suggests that the tension between conflict and consensus within set political and institutional limits is constitutive, rather than destructive, of inclusive citizenship. In the end, even the critics of conflict in political theory often base their arguments on simplified readings of Habermas. After all, he does not deny the importance of conflict, he just emphasises the mechanisms necessary for adjudicating conflict. According to Habermas, "morality and law are specifically tailored to check open conflict in such a way that the basis of communicative action – and with it the social integration of the lifeworld – does not fall apart" (Habermas, 1984, p. 173). Notably, Habermas is highly critical of violence but not of mere conflict.

CONCLUSION

Our work attempts to critically challenge the ascendant notion of citizenship, which tends to be both top-down and ascriptive, and both liberal and national. The past two decades of research critically addressing various aspects of citizenship have, in fact, opened new windows of theoretical engagement on this front. Our approach differs in that, rather than dealing in detail with the 'crisis of citizenship' research, we attempt to provide an analytical expression of what appears more like a transformation than a crisis. At this time, when the social power and explanatory value of the liberal nation-state model of citizenship are diminishing, our work points to alternative models and empirical anomalies that provide useful counterpoints and help to reconceive the contemporary phenomenon of citizenship.

While remaining territorial units, nation-states are losing their power to economic, environmental, demographic, and ideological forces above and below: globalisation and neoliberal governance, climate change and resource exhaustion, massive population flows, social polarisation, and electoral apathy. We show how these historical circumstances set in motion the transformations of citizenship towards a multilayered model of political belonging. In this model, ascriptive and participatory dimensions coexist in a new asymmetric way. The ascriptive, legal dimension of citizenship does not disappear but by retaining merely territorial scope, becomes culturally 'thin' and socially inconsequential. At the same time, participatory and performative citizenship expands and dissociates from the nation-state. It involves a broader public (e.g. youth), new rationality, new forms of political expression (e.g. NSM), and new loci of attachment (e.g. natural environments).
Therefore, we identify five shortcomings of liberal nation-state-based theoretical conceptualisations of citizenship: the coupling of inclusive citizenship and institutionally strong liberal nation-states; the assumption that individual informed citizens are the foundation of citizenship; the practice of disenfranchising minors as not deserving full political rights; the assumption which reduces bottom-up mobilisations to protest and anti-regime struggle; and the conceptualisation of citizenship which does not take into account interactions with the environment. We review research focused on each particular aspect which points at inadequacies of liberal nation-state-based theoretical conceptualisations and suggest alternatives.

We argue that instead of declaring the crisis of citizenship, this analytical concept and social institution can be salvaged if several requirements are met. Contemporary citizenship should be (a) decoupled from the normative ideals of the Enlightenment and Western political philosophy tradition which associates citizenship with the liberal nation-state; (b) expanded by including a diverse array of forms and ways of participation in community life and interactions with the environment; (c) grounded in a realistic understanding of the cognitive capacities and political psychology of citizens. This model will increasingly include non-national social spaces based on more collectivist republican principles, communal rationality, and non-materialist lifestyle choices, the social spaces that are often placed above or below the nation-state, into cross-cutting national legal systems and overlapping sovereignties.

Finally, the current transformation of citizenship is not and will not be devoid of social conflicts. Moreover, citizenship has historically been a function of tensions between consensus and conflict within set political and institutional limits. Then and now conflict is as necessary for functional and inclusive citizenship as communication and the minimisation of violence.

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Od askriptivnog do participativnog građanstva: socijalni sukob, politička pripadnost i liberalna nacionalna država

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Zadnja desetljeća obilježena su valovima populizma, raznim građanskim sukobima, kao i političkim, gospodarskim, demografskim i ekološkim izazovima. Iako znanstvenici i šira javnost često govore o aktualnoj "krizi građanstva", u ovome radu ističemo nekoliko važnih elemenata te "krize" i objašnjavamo zašto se na njih može gledati kao na važnu i, možda, obećavajuću transformaciju. Imajući u vidu tu transformaciju, sadašnje razumijevanje građanstva trebalo bi odvojiti od normativnih modela koji ga povezuju s liberalnom nacionalnom državom, razmotriti uključivanje sukoba kao njegove sastavne dimenzije, proširiti ga uključivanjem različitih oblika i načina sudjelovanja u životu zajednice i interakciji s okolišem te ga utemeljiti na realnom razumijevanju političke psihologije.

Ključne riječi: kriza građanstva, liberalni model građanstva, nacionalno građanstvo, participativno građanstvo, socijalni sukob

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