

Cancel Culture and Heritage in the Perspective of EU Enlargement to the Southeast Europe

Saša Poljanec-Borić

Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences Zagreb, Croatia

e-mail: sasa.boric@pilar.hr

ORCID: 0000-0002-8076-5008

Jordi Datzira Masip

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain

e-mail: jordi.datzira@ddservices.eu

ORCID: 0000-0002-3889-8878

ABSTRACT The economic, social and political importance of the European Union (EU) and the expected enlargement of the EU to Southeast Europe has led to the need for an informed understanding of the reception of modern social movements in the European hemisphere. In this context, this article discusses differences in the intensity of the social reception of “cancel culture” between the North American and European hemispheres that became visible through social movements in 2020. The article is a descriptive analysis carried out using the desk research method. Castell’s concept of the internet society paradigmatically frames the article as it justifies a simultaneous analysis and description of the intensity of new social movements in two hemispheres. Differences were found in the reception of new social movements in the European and North American hemispheres through an analysis of the demolition of statues of Christopher Columbus, while the situation in Southeast Europe was analysed in order to find the territorial limits of the reception of new social movements. Christopher Columbus was chosen as a relevant historic figure because he connects the North American and European hemispheres through the collective memory concept, while Southeast Europe was relevant for the analysis because of the expected enlargement of the EU to that region. The analysis corroborated the differences in the collective memory related to the historic figure of Christopher Columbus in the two hemispheres, as well as the limited reach of the new social movements in Southeast Europe. The obvious differences in the reception of new social movements in continental Europe give rise to some particular questions related to heritage protection policies in the EU and Southeast Europe. Furthermore, the examples of anomic heritage protection in Croatia, and controversies related to heritage production in North Macedonia suggest the emergence of a cultural parallax in the European hemisphere. The article suggests that this cultural parallax has implications for the credibility of the Treaty on European Union and the application of the Copenhagen criteria. In conclusion, it is argued that heritage protection policies should become mandatory in accession negotiations in future cycles of EU enlargement.

Key words: cancel culture, heritage, social movements, European Union, enlargement, Southeast Europe.

1. Introduction

The purpose of this article is to analyse the reception of new social movements rooted in cancel culture with a double hemispheric perspective. This perspective is of relevance because new social movements are embedded in the interconnectivity inherent to the internet society (Castells, 1996, 2012). The aim of the article is to provide an informed insight into the different receptions of new social movements in the North American and European hemispheres, and to develop arguments for fostering heritage protection policies in Southeast Europe. Heritage and its meaning in collective identities and social groups is at the core of this discussion. In such circumstances, cancel culture becomes relevant for the analysis as it challenges the collective memory concept (Halbwachs, 1992). Evidence from contested heritage (Jelincic, Reap, 2022) demonstrates that social movements rooted in cancel culture are propagated mostly in countries with colonial past. In such context, three hypotheses guide the narrative of this article. The first hypothesis is that the social movements (Diani, 1992) connected to heritage contestation, which gained ground in North America between 2013 and 2023, currently have limited hemispheric reach (Dorais, 2020). The second hypothesis suggests that heritage protection policies should be reinforced by the European Union (EU) because the enlargement process has not yet finished and nation building has not yet “steamed out”, as suggested by Fukuyama’s end of history political theory (Fukuyama, 1992). The current political dynamics in Ukraine, coupled with the efforts of Southeast European countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, and Eastern European Moldova to join the EU as independent nations, support the hypothesis that dominant social shifts within the European hemisphere are substantially different from those involving cancel and woke cultural shifts in North America (Foss and Klein, 2023). The difference lies in the structure of the processes. Nation-building produces cultural homogenization (Kuzio, 2003; Garde, 2009), while the cancel/woke cultural shifts produce segmentation of social structure (Castells, 1996) and increased cultural autonomy (Castells, 2012: 228). Thus, the first process homogenizes, while the second differentiates cultural practices. The literature review suggests that nation-building efforts lead by default to increased heritagization (Jokilhetto, 1999; Harvey, 2001; Gleddenning, 2013, Cvitković, Kline, 2017). Therefore, heritage protection and regulation policies should be mandatory in Europe, to ensure that government of the EU is consistent with the Treaty on European Union (Eur-lex, 2016) and the Copenhagen criteria (Eur-lex - Glossary, 2023), and to ensure consistency of EU enlargement. The third hypothesis suggests that strong heritage protection policies should become part of the accession agenda for all the Southeast Europe countries aspiring to EU membership to avoid the cultural parallax (Žižek, 2006) currently emerging on the European continent and already visible in that region. After the introduction, the second chapter elaborates the theoretical framework and methodology used. The third chapter explains the results of the analysis, and elaborates the limited reach of the phenomenon of social movements rooted in cancel culture. The fourth chapter is a discussion on the emerging cultural parallax,

addressing heritage protection deficits in Croatia and controversy of heritagization in North Macedonia. The fifth chapter concludes by reiterating the risks of having weak heritage protection policies in continental Europe, and elaborating research implications of this analysis.

2. Theoretical background and methodology

This article is based on an analysis of secondary data and sources. Thus, an extensive literature review underpins the conceptualization of the article. Castells (1996) was seminal in establishing that the instantaneous flow and exchange of information, capital and cultural communication make networks the backbone of modern social organization. Networks are defined as “a set of interconnected nodes” that follow very adaptable, open-ended and decentralized structures (Castells, 1996:470), while the content they carry is largely beyond national regulation. Thus, the rise of the network society (Castells, 1996) is crucial for understanding social dynamics in the 21st century. Given that networks operate on a pluri-hemispheric level, a dual hemispheric perspective seems to be a reasonable framework to analyse the character and reach of social movements of rage and hope in the internet age (Castells, 2012). Heritage production and protection are understood through collective memory and social movement theories (Halbwachs, 1992; Harvey, 2001; Glendenning, 2013). Halbwachs (1992: 51-53) showed that society obligated people to reproduce and complete memories to give them prestige that reality did not possess. Harvey (2001:328) demonstrated that heritage is used to legitimate a ‘national consciousness’ or a communal memory akin to an early nation state, while Glendenning (2013:65) argued that the early 19th century ascendancy of progress was founded on a new sensitivity to history where historic monuments served as a cultural anchor in turbulent times. Therefore, theoretical insights suggest that heritagization should be regarded as a complex and interactive process, deeply embedded in collective actions, inherent to modernization, and particularly linked to nation building. The nation building process has been analysed through the lens of social history and the political theory of democratization (Hobsbawm, 1990; Huntington, 1991; Garde, 2009). In the context of social history, Hobsbawm (1990:14) was crucial for understanding the nation as a political unity deeply linked to modernity. In the context of the political theory of democratization, Huntington (1991) was instrumental in defining three waves of democratization and explaining the beginning of the third wave of democratization in Portugal in 1974 that brought about political changes in Europe at the end of the 20th century. Also, in the mixed context of social history and the theory of democratization, Garde (2009) described the historic processes of modern nation building in Southeast Europe. These theoretical discussions led to the conclusions that: a) nation building and heritagization are interconnected processes embedded in modernization, b) those processes come in waves and can be expected to continue to spread. To frame the article theoretically in the EU enlargement perspective, the enlargement of the EU

is understood through the “governance by conditionality” theory (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). In that context, enlargement is explained as a combination of the desire of most Central, East and Southeast countries to join the EU on the one hand, and the high volume and intrusiveness of the rules attached to the accession process in order to attain membership, on the other hand. This convergence of the desire to access the EU and the benefits of membership allows the EU to exercise an unprecedented influence on the restructuring of domestic institutions and an entire range of public policies in accession countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004:661). Thus, this theory is instrumental in understanding enlargement as a process in which external governance could help solve historic problems and the social legacy of the past in the accessing countries. Cancel culture is analysed through the theory of cultural groups by suggesting that they have a collective identity, produced through a process in which actors create common cognitive frameworks that enable them to assess their environment and to calculate the costs and benefits of their action” (Melluci, 1989:35). Also, a social movement theory, based on Diani’s concept (1992:1), defines social movements as “networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities”. This theory is instrumental for understanding the social dynamics rooted in cancel culture as a social movement. The narrative of the conclusion related to the deficits of heritage protection in Southeast Europe, after 1990, are discussed through the perspective of “triple transition” (Offe, 1991), which suggested that East, Central and Southeast European nations underwent upheaval without a historical model, and a revolution without a revolutionary theory, thus engaging in a process in which the most conspicuous distinguishing characteristic was the lack of any elaborated theoretical assumptions and normative arguments (Offe, 1991:502). This theoretical insight was instrumental for the assumption that deregulation is a pertinent characteristic of transition. Differences in policies related to heritage protection in Southeast Europe are analysed in the context of graduality of EU enlargement cycles (Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005). In this context, graduality is explained through two metatheoretical approaches: rational choice and constructivism, both applied to the process of integration of the European Union, and the type of polity it is becoming. Each of them emphasizes a different logic, but in the process of EU enlargement they appear in combination, and are quite difficult to separate (Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005:32). This theoretical insight suggests that the conditions for accession to the EU could be re-constructed and refined, as the approach of the EU is constructivist, while the acceptance of these conditions depends on the rational choice of the country applying for accession to the EU. Such a conclusion was instrumental in advocating for EU heritage protection schemes as a precondition of Southeast European nations’ accession. Beside the theoretical framework underpinning the conceptualization of this article, an empirical search was undertaken regarding the scope of heritage contestation in North America and Europe in May, June, and July 2023, via the Google search engine. The search used the following key words: cancel culture, cancel heritage, pulling down, statues, Christopher Columbus, North

America, EU, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Europe. More than 50 internet sites provided accurate information about the focus of new social movements rooted in cancel culture, the locus of their strength, the intensity of their reception in the European hemisphere, and the limits of their territorial reach. Given that this article is based on theoretical and empirical desk research, focusing on the phenomena being studied, requiring individual tailored methods (Maxwell, 2013:88), it constitutes qualitative research that provides informed insights into the modern social movements and their different relevance for the North American and European hemispheres.

3. Results: The limited hemispheric reach of social movements linked to cancel culture

Cancel culture is rooted in online communication practices that originated in queer communities of colour, specifically from the Black Twitter platform which became visible in 2013, and started to influence institutional action (Clark, 2020). It aimed to “withdraw attention from someone or something whose values, (in)action, or speech are so offensive” (Clark, 2020: 88) and targeted people publicly accused of sexism, racism, or homophobia. Thus, in line with Melluci (1996), these groups had established collective identities strong enough to be labelled as “culture”. Later, cancel culture was encouraged by the Black Lives Matter, StayWoke and MeToo movements (Kóczé, 2022), as well as other social justice movements. Cancel culture became globally visible through the online pressure that led to public protests amid the shocking circumstances of the killing of George Floyd in 2020. On that occasion, more than 750 protests were organised in 50 states in the USA. Simultaneously, interracial solidarity protests were held in Madrid, Barcelona, Bristol, Berlin, Sydney, Melbourne, Rio de Janeiro, Johannesburg and elsewhere, coordinated by an activist group and enabled by the internet (+350org, 2020), thus corroborating the validity of Castells’ (1996) thesis on the interconnectivity of the information society. Following the killing of George Floyd in 2020, protestors pulled down statues of several Confederate figures across southern states of the USA (New York Times, 2020; Taylor, 2020). Thomas Jefferson and George Washington statues were toppled in Portland (Oregon) on 20 June 2020 (Jensen, 2020). The internet search undertaken for the purpose of this article confirmed the focus of cancel culture on Confederate monuments in the United States of America (USA). The analysis showed that an important characteristic of cancel culture is linked to the moral evaluation of the acceptable and unacceptable behaviour of publicly commemorated persons. Therefore, moral evaluation and physical action, pulling down of the monuments, allows us to define these coordinated actions as social movements or even social movements of rage (Castells, 2012), as engagement in cultural or physical conflict is a predictor of the type of social dynamics in question (Diani, 1992:1). On November 24, 2021, the New York City administration removed the statue of Thomas Jefferson because he owned slaves (Smart, 2021). This institutional action coupled with a social movement rooted in cancel culture in-

licated that the cultural and political shift occurring in North America challenges inherited collective memory (Halbwachs, 1992). In a double hemispheric perspective (of interest for this article) it was also relevant to analyse the pulling down of statues of Christopher Columbus in North America as this historic person has a place in the collective memory of both hemispheres, and could serve as a predictor of differences in the strength of cancel culture-rooted social movements in the two hemispheres. According to Brito (2020), at least 33 statues of Christopher Columbus were pulled down and/or removed in the USA in 2020. Shin et al. (2021) reported 40 statues being pulled down across the USA, while 130 are still in place. The demolition of those statues suggests that Christopher Columbus was judged to be morally unacceptable by some cultural groups in the USA (Maxouris, 2020). Atuire (2020:450) explained that “the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers and the subsequent Black Lives Matter protests have been accompanied by calls for the removal of statues of racists from public space. From this perspective, the Black Lives Matter movement is not a drive to remove or topple statues, but a call for an honest examination of systemic racism and the residual effects of slavery. This call can be a *kairos* to engage in a constructive dialogue about the societies we aspire to live in”. Thus, according to Atuire (2020) there is a deep link between cancel culture-rooted social movements and all social justice movements that aim to re-examine systemic racism and residual effects of slavery. Given this precise social justice agenda related to the new social movements in North America, it was of interest to analyse the propagation of those social movements in Europe in real time. The western part of Europe shares a colonial past with North America, and internet interconnectivity enables us to track events anywhere in real time, so the analysis was methodologically possible. The analysis confirmed that protests were mostly held in Western Europe and were aimed at historic personalities with a confirmed racist background (Sandford, 2020, DW, 2020). However, regarding Christopher Columbus, this analysis found the situation in Europe to be different than in North America. In Europe only “the daubing of black paint on a monument to Christopher Columbus in Galway¹ – a gift from the city of Genoa” and the “hope to reinvigorate a previous effort to remove a statue of Columbus in Barcelona, arguing it glorifies the conquest of America” (Guardian, 2020) were reported.² According to van der Krogt (2003), there are 136 monuments (statues, busts, and plaques) dedicated to Christopher Columbus in Europe. Of those erected in Europe, 45 are in Italy, 67 in Spain, and 7 in Portugal³. None of these statues were

¹ Galway is a city in Ireland.

² In this context, it is important to mention that the municipality of Barcelona did remove the statue of Antonio López due to his connections with the slavery traffic between Africa and Cuba (La Vanguardia, 2018), and changed the name of the square to Idrissa Diallo, a Guinean immigrant that died in a hospital in Barcelona in 2011 (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2022). However, Cristophor Columbus stayed at his place.

³ Van der Krogt (2003) reports that outside Spain and Italy there are 24 statues elsewhere in Europe, Austria being the eastern-most European country commemorating Christopher Columbus. Wikipedia (2023) reports that 7 are in Portugal.

pulled down. Also, there are at least five European and Latin American nations that celebrate Columbus as a national hero, while in Spain he is celebrated with a national holiday (Erichsen, 2019). Thus, in contrast to the North American hemisphere, contesting Christopher Columbus was practically inexistent in continental Europe. The scarce and weak social impulse to contest monuments devoted to Christopher Columbus in Europe suggests that there is no significant social force that would physically challenge the collective memory of this historic figure on the European continent. Thus, this analysis suggests that social movements rooted in cancel culture have limited hemispheric reach, as they are not as engaged in continental Europe as they are in North America. There will certainly be debates and/or cultural wars (Hunt, 2020) related to the legendary narrative surrounding the historical figure of Christopher Columbus. However, his presence in public spaces in Europe is not contested at this point. Given the fact that Great Britain, a country with a substantial colonial past, left the EU in 2020, while at the same time the EU continued with its deeper integration and announced further enlargement cycles, it is of specific interest to observe the reception of cancel culture-rooted social movements in Southeast Europe, a region eager to access the EU in the next circle of enlargement. Vladisavljević (2020) reports that “activists in Zagreb, Belgrade, Podgorica, Warsaw and Sofia rallied to show solidarity, but also to point out the problem of racism and police violence in their own countries”. The same report informs that in Zagreb, protests were also organised to “draw attention to the local context – vulnerable groups that suffer discrimination in Croatia such as refugees or the Roma minority” (Vladisavljević, 2020). A protest in Podgorica on June 10, 2020, stated the following: “There is no doubt that racists are also hiding among all our local Balkan fascists. That’s why Floyd is also ‘ours” (Vladisavljević, 2020). In Sofia, protests were being held “not only against racism around the world but also in Bulgaria, where discrimination is often targeted at Roma people” (Vladisavljević, 2020). However, there was no toppling down of statues. A rational explanation is that the interconnectivity of the information society galvanized some cultural groups to engage in anti-racist protests in Southeast Europe, but the absence of slave-owning figures in public spaces decompressed the galvanization induced by interconnectivity of internet society and re-directed the social energy toward current local/regional issues. Thus, difference in the force of the protest should be linked to the absence of the monuments commemorating slave owners. The most obvious socio-historic reason for the decompression is the non-colonial past of small Eastern and Southeast European nations. Instead, these countries were subject to hegemonic pretensions by their neighbours (tensions within the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918; Italian territorial pretensions regarding Yugoslavia before and during WWII, and tensions between socialist Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948). Also, within Yugoslavia there were various problems with Serbian hegemony (Pestic, 1996; United States Department of State, 2023). Thus, the hegemonic burden rather than colonial expansion was a historic problem of small nations. Therefore, the first hypothesis on the geographic limitation of the influence of social movements inspired by cancel

culture is validated as the analysis showed that historic reasons can influence the reach of new social movements. Historic conditions also explain the reason that nation building swept the continent after 1990 in the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). In addition, the war in Ukraine started on 24 February 2022 (Askew, 2023), thus suggesting that the process of nation building on the European continent will continue. When cancel culture became a phenomenon noticed by the mainstream media in the USA in 2013 (Clark, 2020), EU concluded its sixth circle of enlargement by accepting Croatia as a member state (European Union, 2020). In other words, while in North America a cultural shift rooted in the cancel culture agenda (Clark, 2020; Norris, 2020) started to re-shape North America's collective memory, the EU was oriented towards expanding into Southeast Europe, which was engaged in nation building and homogenization of collective memory. This difference in the structure of cultural focus in the two hemispheres, coupled with the EU enlargement effort, calls for incorporation of an additional cultural perspective to the dialogue suggested by Atuire (2020). In the double hemispheric perspective, the dialogue needs to address the fact that the European hemisphere deals not only with the "residual effects of slavery" (Atuire, 2020:450) characteristic of Western Europe, but also with the residual effects of neglect of heritage (Prelog, 1973; Marović, 1986) produced not only by socialism, but also by triple transition (Offe, 1991). To give a concise perspective on the problem, the third (Huntington, 1991) and fourth wave of democratization (Kuzio, 2003) will be re-visited from the heritage preservation angle.

4. Discussion

4.1. *The anomic case of Croatia*

The third and fourth waves of democratization reshaped the European political order (Huntington, 1991; Kuzio, 2003; Fukuyama, 2014). Within this historic process, the EU grew rapidly using a governance by conditionality approach (Schimmelfenning and Sedemeyr, 2004), which required countries aspiring to EU membership to comply with a list of "Copenhagen criteria": a stable democracy, the rule of law, a functioning market economy, acceptance of all EU legislation, and ultimately acceptance of a common currency (Eur-lex, 2023). The fifth round of enlargement successfully finished in 2004 and 2007 (Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005). Due to the enlargement, massive heritage rehabilitation efforts were undertaken in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria to comply with Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union stipulating that the EU "shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced" (Eur-lex, 2016: C 202/17), and to promote the idea of an integral European cultural space (Melnikas, 2014). Also, heritage was used to create and reinforce national identity (Munasinghe, 2005; Nakano and Zhu, 2020). Therefore, in the process of EU enlargement, heritage was used "to play its part as an element in managed strategies of economic regeneration" (Glendinning, 2013:422).

In this way, the unregulated logic of triple transition (Offe, 1991) was partially regulated by the common codes of the heritage rehabilitation movement. This is why it is possible today to observe the well-preserved cultural heritage across Eastern European countries that entered the EU in the fifth cycle of enlargement, despite normative deficits of triple transition. Therefore, it is rational to suggest that heritage played an important role in the socio-economic, cultural, and political revitalisation of Eastern and Central Europe. As it becomes evident that the two hemispheres are beginning to engage in the debate on the role of statues in the public sphere that were erected to represent a chosen narrative about history (Atuire, 2020:450), it should be acknowledged that the European hemisphere needs heritage to complete the historic processes of nation building and EU enlargement. In other words, while too much (racist) history in public spaces may be an issue in North America and some parts of Western Europe, in Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe the lack of relevant history present in public spaces represents a cultural deficit. The fact that EU heritage rehabilitation efforts ran out of steam after the fifth cycle of enlargement is evident in Croatia, a country that joined EU in the latest, sixth round. Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1990, successfully defended its sovereignty in the Homeland War between 1991 and 1995, and carried out the peaceful reintegration of its occupied territory in 1997. Even though accession to the EU was a strategic national political priority, the war substantially delayed the accession, making it possible only in 2013. In Croatia, as elsewhere in Eastern and Southeast Europe, heritage protection was a typical public policy problem in the second half of the 20th century (Glendenning, 2013). With such cultural legacy, EU heritage rehabilitation schemes were as much needed in Croatia as they were welcomed in countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The lack of focus on heritage in the Croatian accession process resulted in abundant examples of the neglect and destruction of cultural heritage. The list of neglected heritage so atypical for the nation building effort includes: the Frankopan Castle in Bosiljevo in central Croatia, the large number of 32 castles registered in Northern Croatia, historical and protected sites in the capital Zagreb, such as the Old Steam Mill (Grad Zagreb, 2013) or the house of the famous architect Hermann Bollé, who redesigned the Zagreb Cathedral and the Mirogoj Cemetery (Klindić, 2020), together with vast parts of the Lower Town etc. Finally, there is almost complete disregard for the heritage related to artefacts produced in the socialist period (Uskoković, 2020). Part of this neglect/destruction is politically motivated and resembles other cases in Eastern Europe (Klaic, 2011). However, Dusek (2017) reports that around 3,000 of such monuments are being left to decay or being vandalized, thus making Croatia a radical example in Europe. Even though this situation may be explained by the brutal war which engulfed the country in 1991 – 1995, it is not sustainable for a longer period due to the relevant aspects of the Treaty on European Union (Eur-lex, 2016) and to the Copenhagen criteria (Eur-lex - Glossary, 2023). Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union states that EU shall: “respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced”, while the

Copenhagen criteria define the obligations of membership: “including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies” (Eur-lex - Glossary, 2023). Thus, standards of heritage protection are vital signs of the respect for the Treaty on European Union and the Copenhagen criteria, and they should also be applied to the artefacts from the socialist period. A good example that corroborates this epistemological position is the Museum of Modern Art (2018) book that accompanied the exhibition held in New York City under the title: “Toward a Concrete Utopia: Architecture in Yugoslavia 1948 – 1980”. The volume showcases the best examples of architecture and monuments of modernist Brutalism, including the monument in Petrova Gora (Petrova Gora, Museum of Modern Art, 2018, IV) and Boris Magaš’s hotel complex in Haludovo (Museum of Modern Art, 2018, XX). David Finci’s hotels in Kupari near Dubrovnik suffered a similar fate (Benić and Žunić, 2019). The spirit of the Treaty on European Union obliges EU member states to protect their heritage. Thus, the artistic value of Brutalist architecture and monuments evidenced by the Museum of Modern Art (2018) should be sufficient to provide for their preservation in Croatia. Croatia, today a member of the EU, should be considered as an example of the deficits that could occur in the process of EU enlargement. Thus, it corroborates the second hypothesis that heritage protection policies should be strengthened within the EU territory for the sake of credibility of the Treaty on European Union and the Copenhagen criteria. On the other hand, the case of North Macedonia sends the message of an emerging cultural parallax on the European continent. This case is particularly relevant in the double hemispheric perspective because it shows that contesting commemoration of morally compromised historic figures in the North American hemisphere does not influence the absurd heritagization practices in the European hemisphere. It also signals that dialogue about the world we want to live in (Atuire, 2020) should consider the cultural parallaxes that have become visible in the European hemisphere struggling with too many (racist) monuments in the West, and too few and sometimes irrational historic monuments in Central, East and Southeast Europe.

4.2. North Macedonian heritagization, a showcase of an emerging European cultural parallax

North Macedonia achieved independence in 1991 with a peaceful breakup from Yugoslavia. Due to Greece’s contestation of the nation’s name in 1994, the country was initially named the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. To support the nation building process, a controversial project of massive heritagization was launched in the capital Skopje in 2014. Graan (2016: S70) analysed its latent characteristics and suggested that the nation-branding project that developed around Skopje 2014 included both a public relations effort targeting the international audience, and a national campaign to shape how Macedonia was being represented in the Macedonian public arena. Graan (2016: S70) suggested that such coordinated efforts to regulate

public communication constituted a wider programme of economic and social governance that could be glossed as a “nation brand regime”. The Skopje 2014 project was controversial in terms of town planning, architectural, and other space-related issues (Cvitković, Kline 2017). It was conceived on the basis of finding the deep roots of Macedonian identity in ancient Macedonia and representing Alexander the Great as a historical North Macedonian figure. Antiquization (Cvitković and Kline, 2017:42) directed toward the annihilation of an almost half-century long period within Yugoslavia (Cvitković and Kline, 2017:44), together with the redefinition of the nation brand as a direct antecedent of Alexander the Great were used as the carriers of desirable meanings with strong ideological underpinning (Cvitković and Kline, 2017:34). The result had detrimental socio-cultural consequences “with respect to internal identification and cohesion problems that can potentially lead to the political disintegration of the country” (Cvitković and Kline, 2017:47). The whole project of Skopje’s rebranding lacked two-way communication between the leaders and the people, thus creating the inability or unwillingness of people to identify with the ongoing renewal and involved destruction of newly erected buildings and monuments (Cvitković and Kline, 2017:47). Reef (2018) suggests that Macedonian “statuomania” needs to be “understood against the background of the dispute between Greece and Macedonia over who can claim ownership of the heritage of ancient Macedonia. Ultimately, “antiquization” originated in Greece’s vehement opposition to both the name of the newly independent country (Macedonia) and its international recognition, as well as to Macedonia’s use of the sixteen-pointed star of Macedonia as its new state symbol and flag.” (Reef, 2018:467). Graan’s (2016) and Reef’s (2018) claims that the construction of monuments had become a tool for the symbolical imprinting of a specific understanding of history and that the project that the North Macedonian government undertook had unprecedented scope only accentuate the importance of heritagization in nation building in Southeast Europe. Thus, the case of North Macedonia demonstrates that previously unrecognized states will use staged forms of heritagization (Cvitković and Kline, 2017) to support the creation of an internationally recognized state in the era of increased democratization (Fukuyama, 2014). In 2018, North Macedonia and Greece signed the Prespa Accord that resolved the decades-long dispute over the Republic of Macedonia’s name. Using governance by conditionality (Schimmelfenning and Sedemir, 2004), the EU opened accession negotiations with North Macedonia in 2020 (European Council, 2023). North Macedonia opened accession negotiations with the EU despite the controversial topic of heritagization of Skopje (Cvitković and Kline, 2017; Grann, 2016; Reef, 2018), which includes accusations of massive corruption connected to heritagization (Reef, 2018:452). In such circumstances, it seems rational to ask whether the concept of *damnatio memoriae* of Brutalist architecture created in the period of socialism (1945 - 1990), coupled with staged forms of heritagization connected to corruption, can be acceptable for members of the EU? The question is relevant not only because there are legitimate concerns related to the rule of law in the Western Balkans (European Court of Editors, 2022), but also because problems of

heritage production and protection in Southeast Europe could compromise the very Treaty on European Union and the Copenhagen criteria with deep implications for the cultural unity of the EU.

5. Conclusion

In this article, different social receptions of cultural shifts related to heritage were analysed through a double hemispheric perspective. Starting with a detailed literature review, the territorial reach of the new social movements was examined through desk research. Analysis of 50 internet sites covering relevant topics confirmed the focus of cancel culture-rooted social movements to Confederate monuments. Also, analysis showed that in the USA, 33 to 40 statues of Christopher Columbus were pulled down at the same time (Brito, 2020; Shin et al., 2021). On the other hand, protests in Western Europe did not include the pulling down of Christopher Columbus' statues, while the strength of the protests was weak in Southeast Europe altogether. The analysis suggests emerging cultural divergence in the attitudes toward collective memory between the European and North American hemispheres. In addition, the political reality of today's EU and its intent to enlarge to the Southeast Europe demands a broader examination of attitudes toward heritage in a situation where cancel culture challenges collective memory in North America and some parts of Western Europe (Atuire, 2020). In the era of contesting heritage related to racist historic backgrounds (Atuire, 2020) and cultural wars (Hunt, 2020), heritage policies in Europe should be devised with due diligence. This article suggests that regarding the historic figure of Christopher Columbus, the contesting of social movements in Europe does not have the same strength as in North America. Thus, the two hemispheres already diverge regarding collective memory values. On the other hand, the evidence visible in the case of North Macedonia, shows that paradoxical forms of heritagization (Graan, 2016; Cvitković and Kline, 2017; Reef, 2018) could become pertinent characteristics of nation building in Southeast Europe, and possibly in other Eastern European countries aspiring to the EU membership. This situation creates an epistemological problem related to the core values of the Treaty on European Union and the validity of the Copenhagen criteria. These are the reasons for considering the regulation of minimal standards of public sector procurement for heritage preservation for EU members, and inclusion of the issue of heritage in negotiations for further enlargement of the EU. Given the cultural complexity of the EU, inherited social baggage from socialism, and the transitional period in the Central, East and Southeast Europe, with the continuity of enlargement ambitions, it is suggested that the removal of monuments in the EU should be prudent. The dialogue about the world we want to live in should, within the European hemisphere, integrate not only the moral issues related to the colonial past, but also cultural questions of authenticity of heritage and its role in nation building efforts. The limitation of this research is its qualitative character. Therefore, the arguments and conclusions have limited validity. Nevertheless, the scope of the literature

reviewed, the complexity of the theoretical frameworks included and used to address the social dynamics developing in real time in the two hemispheres, the consistency and precision of the internet search undertaken for the purpose of this research, make this article relevant for further research into the dilemmas of heritage production and preservation. Given that scholarly literature advocating a double hemispheric perspective related to the relevancy of modern social movements is scarce or non-existent, this article fills the current gap in the literature. As such it could help open the dialogue on the cultural divergences emerging within the two hemispheres.

References

1. Atuire, C. A. (2020). Black Livesmatter and the Removal of Racist Statues: Perspectives of an African. *Inquiries into Art, History, and the Visual*, 2: 449-467. <https://doi.org/10.11588/xxi.2020.2.76234>.
2. Benić, B. and Žunić, A. (2019). Tourist Complex of the Former Military Resort in Kupai: Spatial Development and Urban Planning Features. *Prostor*, (27) 2 (58): 284-297.
3. Castells, M. (1996). *The Rise of the Network Society*. Wiley Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, England.
4. Castells, M. (2012). *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*. Malden Polity Press: Cambridge, England, 2012.
5. Clark, D. M. (2020). Drag Them: A brief etymology of so-called “cancel culture”. *Communication and the Public*, 5, (3-4): 88-92. DOI:10.1177/2057047320961562.
6. Cvitković, S. and Kline, M. (2017). Skopje: Rebranding the Capital City through Architecture and Monuments to Remake the Nation Brand. *Sociologija i prostor*, 55 (1 (207)): 33-53. <https://doi.org/10.5673/sip.55.1.2>.
7. Diani, M. (1992). The Concept of Social Movement. *The Sociological Review*, 40 (1): 1-25. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1992.tb02943.x>.
8. Dorais, G. (2020). Racisme anti-noir et suprématie blanche au Québec: deceler le mythe de la démocratie raciale dans l'écriture de l'histoire nationale. *Bulletin d'histoire politique*, 29 (1): 136-161. <https://doi.org/10.7202/1074210ar>.
9. Fukuyama, F. (1992). *End of History and the Last Man*. The Free Press: New York, USA: The Free Press.
10. Fukuyama, F. (2014). *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy*. New York, USA: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
11. Garde, P. (2009). *Balkanske rasprave*. Zagreb: Ceres. (Naslov izvornika: Garde, P. (2004) *Le discours balkanique*, Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard).
12. Glendinning, M. (2013). *The Conservation Movement: A History of Architectural Preservation Antiquity to modernity*. Abingdon, England: Routledge.
13. Graan, A. (2016). The Nation Brand Regime: Nation Branding and the Semiotic Regimentation of Public Communication in Contemporary Macedonia. *Signs and Society*, 4 (S1): S70-S105. DOI:10.1086/684613.

14. Halbwachs, M. (1992). *On collective memory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
15. Harvey, C. D. (2001). Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: temporality, meaning and the scope of heritage studies. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 7 (4): 319-338. DOI: [10.1080/13581650120105534](https://doi.org/10.1080/13581650120105534).
16. Hobsbawm, E. (1990). *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Program, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
17. Huntington, P. S. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, USA: University of Oklahoma Press.
18. Jasper, M. J. (2010). Social Movement Theory Today: Toward a Theory of Action?. *Sociology Compass*, 4 (11): 965–976. [10.1111/j.1751-9020.2010.00329.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2010.00329.x).
19. Jelincic, D. A. and Reap, J. K. (2022). Contested heritage or cancel culture? The case of Ivan Meštrović's public sculptures in Chicago. *Heritage*, Volume 5: 2732-2745.
20. Jokilehto, J. A (1999). Century of Heritage Conservation. *Journal of Architectural Conservation*, 5 (3):14-33. DOI: [10.1080/13556207.1999.10785249](https://doi.org/10.1080/13556207.1999.10785249).
21. Klaić, D. (2011). Remembering and forgetting communist cultural production, in: Anheier, H. and Yudhishtir, R. I. (Eds). *Heritage, Memory & Identity, The Cultures and Globalization Series 4*. London: SAGE Publications. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446250839>.
22. Kóczé, A. (2022). Dual attack on social justice: the delegitimization of “woke”/“wokism”. *Cultural Wars in Papers*, 33 (6):227-234. DOI:[10.53483/MOLAC8968](https://doi.org/10.53483/MOLAC8968).
23. Kuzio, T. (2003). Nationalising states or nation-building? A critical review of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence. *Nations and Nationalism*, 7 (2):135-154. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8219.00009>.
24. Maroević, I. (1986). *Sadašnjost baštine*. Zagreb: Društvo povjesničara umjetnosti SR Hrvatske.
25. Maxwell, S. J (2013). *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC: Sage.
26. Melnikas, B. (2014). Enlargement of the European Union, integral cultural space and transition processes: equal rights and the ecology of culture. *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 110: 251-258.
27. Melucci, A. (1989). *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*. London: Hutchinson Radius.
28. Munasinghe, H. (2005). The Politics of the Past: Constructing a National Identity through Heritage Conservation. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 11, (3): 251-260. DOI: [10.1080/13527250500160534](https://doi.org/10.1080/13527250500160534).
29. Museum of Modern Art (2018). *Toward A Concrete Utopia: Architecture in Yugoslavia 1948 – 1980*. New York, NY: Museum of Modern Art.
30. Nakano, R. and Zhu, Y. (2020). Heritage as soft power: Japan and China in international politics. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, Volume 26: 869-881. DOI: [10.1080/10286632.2020.1845322](https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2020.1845322).

31. Offe, C. (1991). Capitalism by Democratic Design – Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe. *Social Research*, 58 (4): 865-892.
32. Piedrafita, S. and Torreblanca, I. J. (2005). The three logics of EU enlargement: interests, identities and arguments. *Politique Europeene*, 1 (15): 29-59.
33. Prelog, M. (1973). *Prostor – Vrijeme*. Zagreb: Društvo historičara umjetnosti Hrvatske.
34. Reef, P. (2018). Macedonian Monument Culture Beyond ‘Skopje 2014’. *Südos-teuropa*, 66 (4): 451-480.
35. Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11 4: 661-679. DOI: 10.1080/1350176042000248089.
36. Uskoković, S. (2020). Destrukcija i zaborav kao kritički (motivirajući) faktor u baštini: spomenici kao mjesta odsutnosti. *Ars Adriatica*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15291/ars>.
37. Žižek, S. (2006). *The Parallax View*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Internet sites

1. Adhem, J. (2023). *EU unlocks Single Market access for Western Balkans in exchange for reforms*. Available at: <https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/17/eu-unlocks-single-market-access-for-western-balkans-in-exchange-for-reforms>. (Accessed October 20, 2023).
2. Ajuntament de Barcelona (2022). *La plaça d’Antonio López canvia de nom i passa a ser la plaça d’Idrissa Diallo*. Available at: https://www.barcelona.cat/in-fobarcelona/ca/la-placa-dantonio-lopez-canvia-de-nom-i-es-dira-placa-didrissadiallo_1157355.html. (Accessed March 5, 2024).
3. Askew, J. (2023). *Ukraine war: A month-by-month timeline of the conflict so far*. Available online: <https://www.euronews.com/2023/01/30/ukraine-war-a-month-by-month-timeline-of-the-conflict-in-2022>. (Accessed 28 July 2023).
4. Brito, Ch. (2020). *Dozens of Christopher Columbus statues have been removed since June*. Available at: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/christopher-columbus-statue-removed-cities/>. (Accessed May 28, 2023).
5. DW (2020). *Floyd killing spurs fresh protests across Europe*. Available online: <https://www.dw.com/en/george-floyd-killing-spurs-fresh-protests-across-europe/a-53706536>. (Accessed 4 July 2023).
6. Dusek, R. (2017). *Anti-Fascist Monuments: Croatia’s ‘Unwanted Heritage’*. Available at: <https://balkaninsight.com/2017/04/03/anti-fascist-monuments-croatia-s-unwanted-heritage-03-31-2017/>. (Accessed June 29, 2023).
7. Erichsen, G. (2019). *‘How Did Colón Become Columbus?’* ThoughtCo. Available online: <https://www.thoughtco.com/how-did-colon-become-columbus-3079508->. (Accessed July 26, 2023).

8. Eur-lex (2016). *Treaty on European Union*. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12016M/TXT>. (Accessed June 28, 2023).
9. Eur-lex, Glossary (2023). *Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria)*. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/accession-criteria-copenhagen-criteria.html>. (Accessed July, 18, 2023).
10. European Union (2020). *Croatia in the EU*. Available at: <https://eu2020.hr/Home/Custom?code=CroatiaEU>. (Accessed 26 July 2023).
11. European Council (2023). *North Macedonia*. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/republic-north-macedonia/>. (Accessed 13 July, 2023).
12. European Court of Editors (2022). *EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist*. Available at: <https://op.europa.eu/webpub/eca/special-reports/eu-support-to-the-rule-of-law-in-Western-Balkans-01-2022/en>. (Accessed 26 July 2023).
13. Foss, N. J. and Klein, P. G. (2023). *Strategy Under Woke Capitalism (March 24, 2023)*. Available at: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4399629> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4399629>. (Accessed April 8, 2023).
14. Grad Zagreb, Gradski ured za strategijsko planiranje i strategijsko planiranje Grada, Paromlin (2013). Available at: https://www.zagreb.hr/userdocsimages/arhiva/PAROMLIN_elaborat_final.pdf. (Accessed October 18, 2023).
15. Guardian (2020). *Activists target removal of statues including Columbus and King Leopold II*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/10/columbus-king-leopold-ii-statues-could-be-next-to-fall-black-lives-matter-protests>. (Accessed May, 26, 2023).
16. Hunt, T. (2020). *How museums can help end the culture wars*. Visited on: <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/culture/40651/how-museums-can-help-end-the-culture-wars>. (Accessed 4 May 2023).
17. Jensen, L. (2020). *Portland Man Describes Tearing Down Thomas Jefferson Statue: "It's Not Vandalism"*. Available online: <https://www.wweek.com/news/2020/06/20/portland-man-describes-tearing-down-thomas-jefferson-statue-its-not-vandalism/>. (Accessed 6 July 2023).
18. Klindić, I. (2020). *Hermann Bollé, graditelj i obnovitelj Zagreba*. Available at: <https://liceграда.hr/hermann-bolle-graditelj-i-obnovitelj-zagreba/>. (Accessed July 5, 2023).
19. La Vanguardia (2018). *Barcelona retira la estatua de Antonio López por "esclavista"*. Available at: <https://www.lavanguardia.com/local/barcelona/20180304/441253554062/barcelona-retira-estatua-antonio-lopez-esclavista.html>. (Accessed March 5, 2024).
20. Maxouris, C. (2020). *Baltimore protesters toppled a Christopher Columbus statue and threw it in a harbor*. Available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/05/us/baltimore-protests-christopher-columbus-statue-trnd/index.html>. (Accessed 4 May 2023).

21. New York Times (2020). *How Statues Are Falling Around the World*. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/us/confederate-statues-photos.html>. (Accessed 3 May 2023).
22. Norris, P. (2020). *Closed Minds? Is a 'Cancel Culture' Stifling Academic Freedom and Intellectual Debate in Political Science?*. HKS Working Paper No. RWP20-025. Available at: SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3671026> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3671026>. (Accessed April, 12, 2023).
23. Pesic, V. (1996). *Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis*. Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/1996/04/serbian-nationalism-and-origins-yugoslav-crisis>. (Accessed 22 July 2023).
24. Sandford, A. (2020). *Europe 'can't breathe': Protests continue across the continent in memory of George Floyd*. Available at: <https://www.euronews.com/2020/06/06/black-lives-matter-protesters-take-to-streets-in-europe-despite-pandemic-restrictions>. (Accessed June 15, 2023).
25. Shin, Y.; Kirkpatrick, N.; D'Ignazio, C.; So, W. (2021) *Columbus monuments are coming down, but he's still honored in 6,000 places across the U.S. Here's where*. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/interactive/2021/christopher-columbus-monuments-america-map/>. (Accessed July 10, 2023).
26. Smart, S. (2021). *A statue of Thomas Jefferson is removed from New York City Hall after 187 years*. Available online: <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/24/us/thomas-jefferson-statue-removed/index.html>. (Accessed 8 May 2023).
27. Taylor, A. (2020). *The Statues Brought Down Since the George Floyd Protests Began*. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2020/07/photos-statues-removed-george-floyd-protests-began/613774/>. (Accessed 4 July 2023).
28. United States Department of State (2023). *The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992*. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia>. (Accessed 27 July 2023).
29. Van der Krogt, P. (2003). *Columbus monuments pages, Geographical Distribution of Monuments for Christopher Columbus*. Available at: https://columbus.vanderkrogt.net/texts/shd_paper.html. (Accessed May 27, 2023).
30. Vladislavljević, A. (2020). *Balkan Protesters Show Solidarity with Black Lives Matter Movement*. Available at: <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/06/10/balkan-protesters-show-solidarity-with-black-lives-matter-movement/>. (Accessed June 15, 2023).
31. Wikipedia (2023). *List of monuments and memorials to Christopher Columbus*. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_monuments_and_memorials_to_Christopher_Columbus. (Accessed July 10, 2023).
32. +350.org (2020). *Suprématie blanche et racisme anti-Noires: une réaction mondiale s'impose*. Available online: <https://350.org/fr/suprematie-blanche-et-racisme-anti-noires-une-reaction-mondiale-simpose/>. (Accessed 10 May 2023).

Kultura otkaza i baština iz perspektive proširenja EU-a na Jugoistočnu Europu

Saša Poljanec-Borić

Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, Hrvatska

e-mail: sasa.boric@pilar.hr

Jordi Datzira Masip

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Španjolska

e-mail: jordi.datzira@ddservices.eu

Sažetak

Zbog ekonomskog, društvenog i političkog značaja Europske unije (EU) i njezinog očekivanog proširenja na Jugoistočnu Europu, važno je znati kakva je recepcija suvremenih društvenih pokreta u europskoj hemisferi. U tom kontekstu rad raspravlja o razlici u društvenoj recepciji “kulture otkaza” u sjevernoameričkoj i europskoj hemisferi vidljivoj kroz intenzitet novih društvenih pokreta koji su se pojavili 2020. godine. Rad je deskriptivna analiza provedena metodom istraživanja za stolom. Castellsov koncept internetskog društva, koji istovremenu analizu i opis intenziteta novih društvenih pokreta u dvije hemisfere čini teorijski utemeljenima, čini paradigmatički okvir rada. Razlike u recepciji novih društvenih pokreta u europskoj u odnosu na sjevernoameričku hemisferu utvrđene su uz pomoć usporedne analize rušenja spomenika posvećenih Kristoforu Kolumbu, a prepoznavanje granica recepcije novih društvenih pokreta utvrđeno je analizom situacije u Jugoistočnoj Europi. Kristofor Kolumbo odabran je zato što kao povijesna osoba povezuje sjevernoameričku i europsku hemisferu kroz koncept kolektivne memorije. Jugoistočna Europa relevantna je za analizu dosega novih društvenih pokreta radi namjeravanog proširenja EU-a na tu regiju. Analiza je ukazala na razlike u kolektivnoj memoriji vezanoj za značaj povijesne ličnosti Kristofora Kolumba u dvije hemisfere te na ograničen doseg novih društvenih pokreta u Jugoistočnoj Europi. Očite razlike u recepciji novih društvenih pokreta u kontinentalnoj Europi, otvaraju singularna pitanja povezana s politikama zaštite kulturne baštine u Europskoj uniji i specifično u Jugoistočnoj Europi. Također, primjeri anomične zaštite u Hrvatskoj, odnosno kontroverzne proizvodnje baštine u Sjevernoj Makedoniji, ukazuju na pojavu kulturne paralakse u europskoj hemisferi. U radu se upozorava da pojava kulturne paralakse ima implikacije u odnosu na vjerodostojnost Ugovora o Europskoj uniji i primjenu kopenhaskih kriterija. Zaključno se ističe da bi politike zaštite kulturne baštine trebale postati sastavni dio pregovora o pristupanju u sljedećim ciklusima proširenja EU.

Ključne riječi: “kultura otkaza”, baština, društveni pokreti, Europska unija, proširenje, Jugoistočna Europa.