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How Demands Shape Morality

SUMMARY

Although Kant's ethics excludes non-human animals from direct moral concern, animal ethics can still benefit from it. Some of Kant's statements provide incentives for developing moral obligations towards non-human animals, rather than simply concerning them. These incentives are primarily found in two of his statements. Firstly, Kant defines duty as "the necessity of an action from respect for law," but also as "moral constraint [*Nötigung*] by [another] subject's will." Therefore, the duty can be understood as a demand. In the Kantian framework, this demand can only come from another person, not non-human animals. However, Kant also acknowledges that man's "reason certainly has a commission from the side of his sensibility which it cannot refuse." Suppose this demand, arising from sensibility, can be interpreted as a demand of our animality in its own right. In that case, there should be no obstacles to rejecting the moral consideration of demands presented to us from the standpoint of a non-human being's animality. The paper categorizes demands as either articulated or silent and as either moral or related to self-realization. It argues that non-human animals can indirectly shape moral demands by expressing their silent demands for self-realization. They do so indirectly because moral demands can only be articulated in our practical reason.

Keywords: Immanuel Kant, duty, non-human animals, ethics, self-realization, articulated demands, silent demands.

INTRODUCTION

Most of the history of Western philosophy suggests, and more often simply implies, that only human beings are considered moral patients, or beings worthy of direct moral concern. This idea is further emphasized in Immanuel Kant's ethics, which states that only moral agents can be moral patients. However, this perspective may be considered outdated. Therefore, Kant's ethics is often ignored when seeking

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solutions for expanding the circle of moral patients, despite notable contributions that challenge this notion (e.g. Korsgaard, 2018; Wood & O'Neill, 1998).

The purpose of this text is not to provide a new interpretation of Kant's ethics to demonstrate that it may include direct moral consideration of non-human animals (although it is clear that it indirectly considers them), but rather to identify certain elements that can help reflect on the moral status of non-human animals within the framework of what could be called an *ethics of self-realization*.[1] The search for Kantian incentives for animal ethics often overlooks these selected elements. One of them, in which Kant speaks of an amphiboly in the concepts of reflection, is explicitly opposed to the mentioned goal. However, in the same thought, Kant introduces a frequently overlooked determination of duty as a constraint by another subject's will. This serves as an incentive for reflecting on what constitutes a moral demand. This paper argues that moral demands can also be derived from the demands for self-realization of non-human living beings. Although Kant may not be a helpful ally in this endeavor, his statement regarding a commission to reason from the side of human sensibility can provide a new perspective.

DEMAND AS DUTY IN KANT

What should a person demand of us in a *moral* sense? Recognizing a demand in a general sense requires no further explanation. However, determining what is moral can be difficult. What if I ask you not to hurt my feelings, even if they are based on irrational grounds such as unreflected tradition? If this request can be categorized under a specific ethical theory, it can be referred to as a *moral demand*. Otherwise, it is simply a *demand*.

At first glance, Kant's ethics does not make room for irrational demands. Moreover, it may seem that the language used in his work does not express interest in demands whatsoever. Duty is defined as "*the necessity of an action from respect for law*" (Kant, 1996, p. 55 / GMS 4: 400), which is practical, i.e. moral. However, Kant offers other determinations of duty, including one that has not received sufficient attention. This can be found in the following passage of *The Metaphysics of Morals*:

> "As far as reason alone can judge, a human being has duties only to human beings (himself and others), since his duty to any subject is moral constraint [*Nötigung*] by that subject's will. Hence the constraining (binding) subject must, *first,* be a person; and this person must, *secondly*, be given as an object of experience, since the human

[1] My initial thoughts on the ethics of self-realization are discussed in: Gu ć, 2023. Some elements of this paper, including significant portions of the chapter on the "Demand for Self-Realization," are derived from the book. However, some of these elements have been substantially revised.

> being is to strive for the end of this person's will and this can happen only in a relation to each other of two beings that exist (for a mere thought-entity cannot be the *cause* of any result in terms of ends). But from all our experience we know of no being other than a human being that would be capable of obligation (active or passive). A human being can therefore have no duty to any beings other than human beings; and if he thinks he has such duties, it is because of an *amphiboly* in his *concepts of reflection*, and his supposed duty to other beings is only a duty to himself. He is led to this misunderstanding by mistaking his duty *with regard to* other beings for a duty *to* those beings." (Kant, 1996, p. 563 / MS 6: 442)

Therefore, one's duty "to any subject is moral constraint [*Nötigung*] by that subject's will." Does this mean that any demand whatsoever can produce a moral constraint? To answer the question, one should first find out what Kant means under the concept of 'will'. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant defines will as "a faculty either of producing objects corresponding to representations or of determining itself to effect such objects (whether the physical power is sufficient or not), that is, of determining its causality" (Kant, 1996, p. 148 / KpV 5: 15) This determination does not provide clear evidence for affirming or denying the capacity of will in non-human animals. However, according to another determination of will, one from the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, where it is equated with practical reason, Kant denies the capacity of will in non-human animals:

> "Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act *in accordance with the representation* of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a *will.* Since *reason* is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, the actions of such a being that are cognized as objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary, that is, the will is a capacity to choose *only that* which reason independently of inclination cognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good." (Kant, 1996, p. 66 / GMS 4: 412)

Having no reason, non-human animals cannot have a will, and since "duty to any subject is moral constraint by that subject's will", they are not subjects, at least in the moral sense. This does not mean that moral agents cannot have duties *regarding* them, but those are only duties *to* the moral subjects, i.e. persons.

The question that arises is what does it mean to be morally obliged by *another subject's will*? According to Kant, the will [*Wille*] or practical reason *can* (and it does not *have to*) determine itself only by pure practical reason, although it can also follow inclinations. If it determines itself only by the mere form of the moral law, it becomes *pure will* [*reine Wille*] (Kant, 1996, p. 164 / KpV 5: 31). Should we then take as a moral duty whatever another subject's will *demands*? Or only what it *should demand* according to the pure practical reason (as if pure practical reason speaks through another person's demand)?

Perhaps a solution can be found in Kant's assertion that the will of a rational being "cannot be a will of his own except under the idea of freedom" (Kant, 1996, 96 / GMS 4: 448). Therefore, the will can only realize itself if it is free; otherwise, it strives to realize something else. Thus, one should promote the freedom of others rather than the expression of their will that has been influenced by inclinations. Christine Korsgaard's interpretation suggests that treating another person as an end in itself involves making her ends my own. However, the Formula of Humanity also implies that "to treat another as an end in itself is to respect her autonomy – to leave her actions, decisions, and ends to her own choice". An important constraint is that the Kingdom of Ends is based on the idea that my autonomy cannot be realized if my ends are not the possible objects of universal legislation (Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 192–193). "When I make a moral claim on you, I appeal to a purported moral law which says that you must treat me in the way that I demand" (Korsgaard, 2018, p. 123). Korsgaard is trying to say that I can demand something from you in a moral sense if we both acknowledge the authority of a shared moral law. And since this law is universal, it "can extend its protection to someone who did not participate, and could not have participated, in its legislation" (Korsgaard, 2018, pp. 124–125).[2]

Let's take a step back to the subject or moral agent. It would be incorrect to assume that pure practical reason "disregards" our organic nature. Already in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant acknowledges the constraints that arise from our animality:

> "The human being is a being with needs, insofar as he belongs to the sensible world, and to this extent his reason certainly has a commission [*Auftrag*] from the side of his sensibility which it cannot refuse, to attend to its interest and to form practical maxims with a view to happiness in this life and, where possible, in a future life as well." (Kant, 1996, p. 189 / KpV 5: 61)

Reason certainly does not only serve this purpose – it is always also the bearer of human beings' higher purpose, in deliberating good and evil (Kant, 1996, pp. 189–190 / KpV 5: 61–62). Nevertheless, if we can discern specific demands made by our sensible nature *in its own right*, why should we ignore the nature of other sentient beings in this regard? Although humans make moral demands in the form of freedom, these demands do not exclude the demands of our animality on our reason. What prevents non-human animals from making a similar demand on our reason?

[2] Kant recognizes this in his political philosophy, where he introduces a category of "passive citizens", who are not able to vote, but are still covered by the laws of the state (Korsgaard, 2018, p. 126).

ARTICULATED AND SILENT DEMANDS

The concept of non-human beings making demands of us is not new. Plutarch discussed it at some length, and even suggested that they are making moral demands on us in an *articulate* way:

> "Then we go on to assume that when they utter cries and squeaks their speech is inarticulate, that they do not, begging for mercy, entreating, seeking justice, each one of them say, 'I do not ask to be spared in case of necessity; only spare me your arrogance! Kill me to eat, but not to please your palate!'" (Plutarch, 1957, pp. 548–551)

To be articulated typically means to be clearly and distinctly pronounced in language. Several philosophers, including Plutarch, argue that certain animals possess language. According to Plutarch, starlings, crows, and parrots can learn to talk. This could make them the "advocates of the other animals in their ability to learn, instructing us in some measure that they too are endowed both with rational utterance and with articulate voice" (Plutarch, 1957, pp. 400–401). However, Plutarch is not so naive as to believe that non-human animals express their demands on humans strictly in terms of articulate moral claims (such as "You should not hurt me!") or even ethical claims (such as "You should not hurt me because of…"). Nevertheless, they are making demands of us. To deny this would be like saying that a mute person makes no demands of us because they cannot articulate them in voice. Of course, we assume they articulate them in their reason (and we cannot be sure that animals do the same). However, in many cases, we express someone else's moral demands because we can tell that they are reacting negatively to something (without rationally articulating a moral demand), or we can make a demand on their behalf even if they do not react. It is important to distinguish between what Tom Regan (1983) refers to as *preference-interest* and *welfare-interest*. While one's preference can be fulfilled, their welfare can be compromised. The most obvious example when this is the case is when deprived individuals are unaware of their deprivation. In such cases, there is no articulated demand from the deprived individual, nor any conscious interest, desire, or mental state that can be classified as a 'demand'. However, we are morally obliged to create a demand for a certain being ourselves. This demand from the other being can be referred to as a *silent demand*[3] (as well as any other demand that is not expressed by a rational human being), while it is *articulated* in our reason.

Finally, any demand, whether articulated or silent, is ultimately expressed in our reason to become a moral demand. Similarly, in the aforementioned quote from Plutarch, non-human animals are said to be "seeking justice" – a morally mature

[3] The term 'silent demand' is used by Hans Jonas to refer to the idea that nature silently pleads for the preservation of its integrity (Jonas, 1984, p. 8). However, in this context, the term is used to describe the demands of individual living beings.

(human) being interprets their (silent) demands and converts them into moral demands by resolving the conflict of the grounds of obligation. What demand should be considered a sufficient ground of obligation? Is it the human demand to eat or the non-human demand to live without suffering? According to Plutarch's character, it depends on the reason behind the human demand to eat. If the reason is to prolong life, then it is sufficient ground for killing a non-human animal. However, it is not sufficient if the reason is simply to enjoy food.

How can we determine if one ground is sufficient for obligation while another is not? Kant's ethics can provide guidance on duties with regard to non-human animals. However, Kant's ethics would be overstretched on the bed of Procrustes by deducing *duties to* non-human animals from it. Therefore, in the search for the basis of direct moral duties towards non-human animals, I give priority to the richness of self-realization as a crucial criterion for the evaluation of the grounds of obligation. *Moral demands* are ultimately created in the moral subject's reason, but only after *demands for self-realization*, originating from both human and non-human animals, are articulated and scaled in our practical reason.

DEMAND FOR SELF-REALIZATION

It could be argued that Kant implies that we have a moral duty not only to fulfill the articulated demands of human beings but also their silent demands (articulated in our reason). Additionally, our animalistic demands, which are inherently silent, have an interest of their own, i.e., they are not to be understood as merely constitutive of reason or as a kind of infrastructure of rational nature. Both silent and articulated demands of human beings constitute a person's demands for self-realization, which should become a moral demand when articulated as a sufficient ground for obligation. The exceptional nature of a person's demands for self-realization lies in its form, which can be simply termed as *freedom* or *autonomy*. However, how can constraints originating in our animality be put under the form of freedom? I believe they can be, starting from the fact that needs, and even instincts, can be manipulated:

> "In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves, but only in the last analysis; that is, if and when they are free to give their own answer. As long as they are kept incapable of being autonomous, as long as they are indoctrinated and manipulated (down to their very instincts), their answer to this question cannot be taken as their own. By the same token, however, no tribunal can justly arrogate to itself the right to decide which needs should be developed and satisfied." (Marcuse, 2002, p. 8)

In addition, individuals are capable of experiencing a wide range of authentic needs, even those that may seem to contradict what is commonly understood as basic human needs such as food and sex, as seen in the case of hermits. There is no basis for dismissing these needs as inauthentic, nor for concluding that a hermit's self-realization is less rich than that of a typical human being. My point is similar to Korsgaard's (even though I am not sure if it can be derived from Kant's ethics), where I refer to "self-realization" as what she calls "good":

> "Our duty to promote the good of other people, or other rational beings, is not something added to our duty to respect their autonomy, as it is on the first option. Nor is our duty to respect their autonomy a mere part of our duty to promote their good as it is on the second. Instead, our duty to promote the good of other rational beings takes the *form* of respecting their autonomy – although of course only once they are adults. In the case of rational beings, we are not confronted with two separate grounds of duty. This is not because we cannot identify things that in a general way are good for human beings apart from the lives they choose autonomously – like physical health, for instance. It is because it is up to the human beings *themselves* to decide whether to include those goods in their own conception of the good, and how to rank them against other, perhaps more idiosyncratic, goods." (Korsgaard, 2018, p. 149)

Some authors argue that non-human animals, and even all living beings, can possess freedom. One notable proponent of this view is Hans Jonas. He finds the rudiments of great contradictions that we find in ourselves, one of which is freedom/necessity, even in the most primitive forms of life – metabolism (the basic level of every organic existence) is the first form of freedom. Since every living being is balancing between being and non-being (as a fundamental contradiction), it has an inner horizon of transcendence. An organism cannot be reduced to mere matter, as it "has taken itself out of the general integration of things in the physical context, set itself over against the world, and introduced the tension 'to be or not to be' into the neutral assuredness of existence." Therefore, "intrinsically qualified by the threat of its negative it must affirm itself, and existence affirmed is existence as a concern" (Jonas, 2001, pp. xxiii, 4).

Although I tend to limit the concept of freedom to describe only a particular form of human self-realization, I find Jonas' arguments valuable in expanding the notion of self-realization. It is not only expressed through the mentioned *self-affirmation* of living beings, but also through their *fulfillment* which Jonas mentions while criticizing Cartesianism, the crucial fault of which lays "in denying organic reality its principal and most obvious characteristic, namely, that it exhibits in each individual instance a striving of its own for existence and fulfilment, or the fact of life's willing itself" (Jonas, 2001, p. 61).

Although human demand for self-realization is undoubtedly richer than that of non-human animals, one cannot claim that the latter does not exist and that it does

not oblige us. If our respect for human self-realization is inseparably connected to respect for human autonomy, that does not mean that self-realization is there only to promote autonomy, as some spiritual entity above our concrete lives. Autonomy is the form in which human self-realization occurs and should be respected in rational beings. Thus, there cannot be a strict demarcation between the sensible (animal) and autonomous (rational) parts of our self-realization. Claiming that sensibility makes commissions to rationality could be misleading in the case of persons. However, this idea can help us understand the commission of non-human sensibilities to our rationality, as their self-realization lacks rationality and autonomy. The existence of different forms of self-realization in non-human animals does not exclude their demands from our moral universe. This is already obvious by the fact that we find the same or very similar elements in both variants of self-realization. Simple avoidance of physical pain does not make our demand any less natural or more noble than one expressed by a pig. Once a law is established that obliges us not to cause physical pain, except when necessary to promote richer self-realization, it becomes universal and does not privilege only its legislators.

LEGISLATION AND CONFLICTS

Plutarch believed that animals possess both emotions and intellect and that emotions cannot exist without intellect, which varies in degree among different beings (Marić, 2014, pp. 65–77; Plutarch, 1957). This idea is echoed by Porphyry, who also asserts that non-human animals have virtues, but also vices (Marić, 2014, pp. 78–93). Many centuries later, after the emergence of Darwinism, the idea found its supporters in the writings of some evolutionary biologists (e.g. de Waal, 1997).

In a Kantian manner, Korsgaard argues that being moral entails behaving in accordance with moral laws, which are themselves principles of reason. She does not suggest that there is no evolutionary explanation for the origins of morality. Rather, she aims to demonstrate that various attempts to trace the evolution of morality are flawed in their very object of study, which is often a particular property such as altruism or cooperation. The problem lies in tracing the characteristic *content* of morality, while the concern of Korsgaard's account of morality lies in the *form* by which something can be called morality. For her, morality is a manifestation of the capacity for *normative self-government*, which can be attributed only to human beings (Korsgaard, 2010, pp. 4–6).

> "Normative self-government is our capacity to assess the potential grounds of our beliefs and actions, to ask whether they constitute good reasons, and to regulate our beliefs and actions accordingly. In the theoretical realm, the capacity for normative self-government is expressed in the deliberate construction of systems of belief,

> employing consciously held standards of good evidence and valid argument. In the practical realm, it is expressed most obviously in the capacity to act from what we familiarly call 'a sense of obligation,' grounded in consciously held principles of good or right action. To be morally motivated in this sense is not just to have motives with a certain characteristic *content*. Moral motivation has a distinct – and I believe a distinctively human – *form*. I think that that, the human capacity for normative self-government, and not just good social behavior, is the thing whose evolution needs to be explained." (Korsgaard, 2010, p. 6)

Non-human animals cannot be moral agents, but they certainly are agents of self-realization. While they are not co-legislators of moral law due to their lack of rationality, their demands for self-realization should be taken into consideration in making concrete moral decisions, thus shaping our morality.

When considering the self-realization of individuals, moral conflicts can arise. It is important to note that not every demand for self-realization should be considered a moral demand, as other demands for self-realization appeal to us. According to Kant, it is not possible to be in the middle of a conflict of duties, as duty is constituted out of a stronger ground of obligation (Kant 1996, pp. 378–379 / MS 6: 224). The criterion for deliberating a stronger ground of obligation should be the richness of self-realization. However, determining which self-realization is richer than the other can be challenging. Despite differences in the forms and contents of self-realization, the *main principle* should be to *strive to enable self-realization of every being capable of it*. A similar formulation with a different accent would be: *Strive to promote the form of self-realization of every being capable of it!*

The principle states that a morally correct action is based on the will directed towards the mentioned enabling and an effort to achieve that goal. While it may seem that the will is *materially* determined, self-realization is left to autonomy (concerning persons) or its other forms (concerning non-human living beings). Therefore, we cannot determine the content of other beings' self-realization. The principle remains *formal*. The Kantian difference between morality and legality remains significant in this account due to its emphasis on striving rather than the results or consequences of our actions.[4] The formulation expands on Kant's emphasis on promoting autonomy to include the strides to promote any form of self-realization.

The emphasis on striving also implies the impossibility of an ideal scenario where every living being has the opportunity to achieve self-realization. Our primary goal should be to avoid moral conflicts. Therefore, we must reflect on whether our actions, which harm the self-realization of other beings, are necessary or even detrimental

[4] Ignoring Kant's differentiation between morality and legality, which emphasizes the clean determination of the will, is a significant problem in contemporary animal ethics.

to our self-realization. However, since conflicts are sometimes inevitable, we must undertake the difficult task of evaluating the richness of certain self-realizations. These values cannot be predetermined by a set of eternal rules. To improve this evaluation, we can enhance our power of judgment.

However, it may be possible to propose guidelines or criteria for determining the value or richness of specific self-realizations. It is important to note that these criteria should not be applied in a speciesist manner, despite being established by and according to the measure of rational beings. For instance, the avoidance of suffering is recognized as valuable for our self-realization. However, this same avoidance is also present in pigs with similar intensity. Therefore, it is important to consider the suffering of pigs as equally important as the suffering of humans. If it is possible to prevent the suffering of pigs by consuming plant-based foods or by limiting meat consumption to the necessary amount for one's health, it should be done. Although I find the loss of the pleasure of eating meat troubling for my personal self-realization, it cannot be a stronger ground of obligation (to myself) compared to another possible ground of obligation (to a pig), since the pig's self-realization is more severely harmed by torturing and killing it than mine is by giving up bacon. The criteria I just used are my own – I cannot value my taste more than I value my life and the avoidance of suffering. However, when faced with the unavoidable decision between my own life and that of a pig, or between causing a similar amount of suffering to each, criteria become more obviously speciesist. In such cases, we can only develop criteria from an anthropomorphic perspective, from which a pig's self-realization is not as rich as that of a human being. Therefore, I should prioritize human life over that of a pig.

However, despite their differing premises, the concrete results of Kant's ethical analysis are not significantly different from those arising from my account, at least if we are going to believe Collins' notes of Kant's lectures:

> "Since animals are an analogue of humanity, we observe duties to mankind when we observe them as analogues to this, and thus cultivate our duties to humanity. If a dog, for example, has served his master long and faithfully, that is an analogue of merit; hence I must reward it, and once the dog can serve no longer, must look after him to the end, for I thereby cultivate my duty to humanity, as I am called upon to do; so if the acts of animals arise out of the same *principium* from which human actions spring, and the animal actions are analogues of this, we have duties to animals, in that we thereby promote the cause of humanity." (Kant, 1997, p. 212 / V-Mo/Collins 27: 459)

To find a stronger ground of obligation, it is hard to take off the anthropomorphic lenses. We acknowledge the significance of avoiding suffering in other beings because we are capable of experiencing it ourselves. Similarly, we recognize the importance of merit in the self-realization of other human beings. When we convert this obligation into moral law, we should not stop exercising it if there is another possible recipient

of the merit. However, Kant's concept of merit is not only anthropomorphic but also anthropocentric. The merit is not owed to the dog, but my respect for this analogue of merit is exercised for respecting the merit of another person. Although Kant is correct in recognizing the impact our behavior toward animals has on our behavior toward people, I find the need for such an indirect way of treating dogs unnecessary. In other words, what should be rejected by Kant is precisely the anthropocentric part.

CONCLUSION

This paper presents a preliminary exploration of how Kant's ethical framework can inform animal ethics. While more extensive interpretations are necessary, the current analysis should not be viewed as a definitive interpretation of Kant's ethics, but rather as an appreciation of its components as a stimulus for reconsidering animal ethics. The discussion began with Kant's consideration of another person's demand as constitutive of duty. This demand is interpreted broadly to encompass all demands, whether expressed or implied, that one person makes to obligate another person. Since some of these demands are essentially no different from those coming from non-human animals, the demands of the latter are considered morally relevant. Collectively named as demands for self-realization, these demands can turn into moral demands in a moral agent's reasoning after analyzing the strength of their grounds of obligation.

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Kako zahtjevi oblikuju moralnost

SAŽETAK

Iako Kantova etika jasno isključuje ne-ljudske životinje iz neposrednog moralnog obzira, etika životinja je ne bi trebala zanemariti. Neke Kantove tvrdnje pružaju poticaje za razvijanje moralnih obaveza prema životinjama, a ne samo glede njih. Ti su poticaji prvenstveno prisutni u dvije Kantove tvrdnje. Prvo, Kant dužnost definira kao „nužnost nekoga djelovanja iz poštovanja prema zakonu", ali i kao „moralno primoravanje subjektovom voljom". Stoga se dužnost može razumjeti i kao zahtjev, koji, iz Kantova obzora, može prispjeti samo od strane druge osobe, a nikako od ne-ljudske životinje. Kant, međutim, također navodi da čovjekov um „na svaki način ima od strane osjetilnosti neotklonjiv nalog da se brine za njezin interes". Ako bi se ovaj zahtjev, koji proizlazi iz osjetilnosti, mogao tumačiti kao samostalan zahtjev naše animalnosti, ne bi trebalo biti razloga da se zataji moralni obzir spram zahtjeva koji nam pristižu od strane animalnosti ne-ljudskog bića. U radu se zahtjevi, s jedne strane, kategoriziraju kao artikulirani i tihi, a s druge strane kao moralni zahtjevi i zahtjevi za samoostvarivanjem. Tvrdi se da ne-ljudska živa bića mogu neizravno oblikovati moralne zahtjeve izražavajući tihe zahtjeve za samoostvarivanjem – neizravno, s obzirom na to da moralni zahtjevi mogu biti artikulirani samo u našem praktičkom umu.

Ključne riječi: Immanuel Kant, dužnost, ne-ljudske životinje, samoostvarivanje, artikulirani zahtjevi, tihi zahtjevi.