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Review article

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## Critical assessment of the influence of the USSR on the European countries of the “Socialist camp” in modern Russian historiography

### *Abstract*

The paper analyses the work of Russian historians of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s who demonstrated a critical approach to the analysis and assessment of the influence of Soviet institutions on the countries of Eastern, South-eastern and Central Europe. The works of historians of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s demonstrate a critical approach to the analysis and assessment of the influence of Soviet institutions on the countries of Eastern, Southeastern and Central Europe. These trends in historiography were an integral part of reflections on the shortcomings of the Soviet system as a whole, and were associated with the reflection of their own development. However, there is a diversity of opinions in it regarding seemingly canonical plots for the modern Russian authorities.

**Key words:** Socialist Camp, historiography, USSR, historical science, Cold War

### Introduction

Firstly, the topic requires defining the chronological boundaries of “modern Russian historiography.” We turn to the works of historians written mostly in post-Soviet period. It is important to say that many of the historians began their careers and research within the framework of Soviet historical science, but later changed or showed their real views. Within the chronological framework, we can distinguish three periods that have a number of specific features and directly correlate with changes in socio-political realities in the Russian Federation – the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s, the characteristics of which we will present during the report. This paper examines the work of scholars working primarily within the Russian Federation and belonging to the Russian

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academic world; however, attention has also been paid to the studies of historians who left Russia a long time ago or have done so recently for one reason or another, but who continue to consider themselves an integral part of the Russian historiographical tradition.

### **The historiography of the late 1980s and 1990s: framing the problem**

The first approaches to a critical rethinking of the Soviet legacy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe began in 1988 – the era of «Perestroika» and «Glasnost». In many ways, they triggered a process of revision of established historical concepts – when V.K. Volkov (then Director of the Institute of Slavic Studies, specialist in conflicts between socialist countries in the Post-War period) in collaboration with L.Ya. Gibiansky (another specialist in international relations in Eastern and Central Europe) published an article (Gibiansky & Volkov, 1988) on the crisis phenomena in the socialist camp in the context of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict of 1948.

The main points of this article were later reproduced in a discussion in 1990 on the pages of the academic publication “Soviet Slavic Studies” (such discussions – and with frequent participation of historians from the countries of the socialist camp – were the trend of the time). Here, Mr. Volkov directly stated there were “giant revolutionary changes” in Central and South-Eastern Europe, and Soviet historical science “looks at it with completely different eyes.” This new view was about equating the processes of South-Eastern Europe countries entering the socialist camp and the imposition of the administrative-command system of Stalin’s totalitarianism into them, the ideologization of foreign relations (“in a sectarian-dogmatic manner”), and “ignoring the objective existence of national-state interests.” The scientists also formulated the main prospective tasks:

“And here we, both as observers of events and as historians...will have to ask the question: why were virtually all command and administrative systems (despite the significant differences between them) inherently incapable of deep internal reforms? In fact, none of these regimes was actually reformed, they were simply broken (or broken and then dismantled by other social forces) <...> The question arises here about the quality of leadership of the political forces in power, which were formed into leadership groups over four and a half decades” (ibid.).

After 1991, the research on the topic has gained its relevance – quantitatively and qualitatively (Kazarina, 2000) – in conditions of pluralism, which replaced the strongly ideological character of the study of historical narratives, and liberation from the rigid Marxist frames in the study of history, monopolistically dominant in Soviet historiography. The materials of open archives are being comprehended, both of former Soviet archives and archives of the Socialist camp countries; there is an erasing of the

boundaries between traditional local studies and foreign ones (including the works of emigrant historians who had previously left Soviet Russia). This is the era of “great” collective works (*Soviet foreign policy in retrospect, 1917-1991*, 1993; *At the origins of the “socialist commonwealth”: the USSR and Eastern European countries in 1944–1949*, 1995) – specific points of “meeting” of Soviet and Post-Soviet, Russian and European specialists, which continued the late Soviet academic tradition.

In 1991 an article by Y.S. Novopashin was published in the collection “Eastern Europe at the Historical Turning Point” (Novopashin, 1991). Novopashin is a Soviet-Russian historiosophist (though, in the Soviet period he wrote about the falsity of “bourgeois” historiography about communism). He formulates the idea of a negative selection of elites imposed by Moscow in the countries of the socialist camp. The emerging “partocracy” is expressed in the omnipotence of the party-state regime, inextricably connected with the security-repressive system (Trotsky called this mix the “new communist order of the samurai”, and Stalin the “order of the sword-bearers”) and with complete withdrawal from public control. In the economic sphere, the dominant positions of state property were formed, which propaganda presented as “national property.” On the external contour, a “left-wing extremist model...of foreign policy behavior” was imposed. The elites of this configuration, according to the author, inevitably led their countries into a “quagmire of deep and comprehensive crisis”, after that, the society inevitably refused to trust the local socialists, promoted the withdrawal of the state from the sphere of Soviet influence and launched the processes of decommunisation.

In one of the most, in our opinion, important works of the 1990s, “Conflicts in the Post-War development of Eastern European countries,” (Novopashin, 1997) Y.S. Novopashin summarizes his own early remarks:

“... the Post-War history of Eastern Europe... was connected with the Marxist-Leninist experiment of creating a so-called new social system... Destructive conflicts are an immanent part of such a method of state and entire social reorganization, because this method practically leads to even more all-encompassing alienation, a system of total exploitation of man, feudal orders resuscitation by the authorities”.

The author observes the first conflict with the described parameters already at the dawn of the formation of the Socialist camp – in the German Democratic Republic of June 1953, when the Socialist United Party of Germany began to implement the “Soviet People’s Economic Model of building socialism” with its emphasis on the defence economy. In practice, this resulted not only in a total disregard for the needs and expectations of the German people, but also in a very specific inflation and food crisis:

“...Contradictions were accumulating in the interaction between society and power structures due to anti-democratic policies...in the socio-economic field and in

ensuring the rights and freedoms of the individual,' – author reports. – '...June 1953 was the boundary from which a long period of cyclical crisis development began in the region (Central and Eastern Europe – Iurii Zhukov's note), leading to acute political and social conflicts in one country and another. The latter not only dealt tangible blows to the totalitarian-communist system of a given country, but also had a destabilising effect on this system in other Eastern European countries...".

Similar processes, according to Y.S. Novopashin, are taking place, for example, in Poland, where the actions of the the Polish United Workers Party not only led to the deterioration of the economy, but also created a situation of permanent distrust on the part of the population; as well as in Hungary, where popular discontent was almost immediately quelled by the use of Soviet troops.

In the first half of the 1990s, Volkov-Gibiansky-Novopashin triumvirate – in the status of classics – actually had already formed a discourse that, in general terms, would be followed by further generations of historians, in many ways, until today. Its core was the idea of the transfer of Stalinist totalitarianism to the countries of the socialist camp in the late 1940s – early 1950s and the analysis of their adaptation in new realia of the socio-political, socio-economic and ideological spheres.

The mainstream of this historiographical period is the idea that during the period of Sovietization of Central-Eastern Europe "the contours of the well-known ... totalitarian ruling type appeared – not with the National Socialist sign, but with the International Bolshevik one" (*Totalitarianism in Europe of the 20th century. From the history of ideologies, movements, regimes and their overcoming*, 1996) (as G.N. Rykun notes in his dissertation (Rykun, 2005)), this is generally a common place for research of that time which shows a change in orthodox priorities: "socialism was put on a par with regimes that hated its essence".

The same pattern was pointed out by the famous historiographer V.D. Kamynin: "...most of the adherents of the civilisation approach to history began to explain the Soviet part of the history of the 20th century from the perspective of the theory of totalitarianism. It was in the first half of the 1990s that the largest number of studies popularising the essence of this concept and extending it to the history of Russia" (Kamynin, 2008).

Another researcher V.A. Kozlov explained this phenomenon as follows: "The change of scenery, the collapse of the USSR, the collapse of the communist regime and the transition of power to Gorbachev's opponents, combined with calls for the trial of the CPSU, turned „totalitarian” interpretations into historiographical fashion" (Kozlov, 1996). According to him, the popularity of this and many other new ideas that penetrated Russian historical science in the first half of the 1990s "had a purely political origin and had little to do with their heuristic possibilities and cognitive value". It is another matter that the defeat of communism and the need to fill the resulting

ideological vacuum created a special demand for “totalitarian” interpretations among the authors of new studies – not only were they in line with the prevailing mass sentiments and expectations of the political elites at the time, but they were also relatively easy to combine with practical skills.

At the same time, many historians have voiced purely negative assessments of Soviet historiography, up to the interpretation of it as “a means of reprisal against dissenters, against creative trends in science”, as “a kind of tribunal, passing judgement on honest historians” (Blinov, 1998). This, in particular, argued the need for new historiographical studies, which would present a “real” and “objective” assessment of the state of historical science (Alekseeva, 1994).

The “Archival Revolution” leads to an increasingly extensive use of statistics, which helps to analyse the economic losses of the CEE republics in the context of accelerated collectivization and the skew of the economy towards the priority of heavy industry; the decline in the standard of living of the population (food crises, rising food prices, episodes of the introduction of a coupon-card distribution system), the scale of emigration processes (in East Germany alone, estimated in the millions during the period of forced collectivization (Shanshieva, 2010)), and the failure of the CMEA (The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), whose slogans did not even come close to matching the tasks of rebuilding the countries of the socialist commonwealth after the Second World War and ensuring their further economic development.

On the eve of the anniversary of the events of 1968, the plot of the suppression of the “Prague Spring” takes on special significance. According to V.K. Volkov, this event finally discredited the idea of the possibility of reforming a socialist society and ensured the transfer of Brezhnev’s “stagnation” to the countries of the socialist camp, the tragic increase of the gap from Western Europe, the replacement of ideas about building “socialism with a human face” with the idea of inevitable dismantling (Volkov, 1997). “The intervention of the troops of five socialist countries in Czechoslovakia,” the author writes, “was a common tragedy for the peoples of all these countries”.

## **Historiography of the 2000s: in search of balance**

By the 2000s, in connection with the socio-economic upheavals of the 1990s and their painful reflection, as well as in connection with the beginning of the formation of Putin’s governmental system, we can see an attempt to develop a more restrained historiographical approach without a total denial of everything Soviet. A number of historians are beginning to criticize the “ultra-liberal” assessments of their colleagues of the era of the 1990s and early 2000s. There are the following assessments of economic research in post-Soviet historical science:

"...Today one can feel both an information vacuum...and a categorical bias in modern assessments aimed at finding and highlighting negativity. Thus, for example, the assessments of the main liberal centre – the Institute for the Economy in Transition of E.T. Gaidar – are based on the understanding of the fundamental unreformability of the socialist economic system, and thus the complete failure and doom of socialism as an international system of economic relations. The dominance of liberal economic ideology in the highest political circles, the denunciatory and rather cynical position of the domestic mass media, the unfriendly policy of the former „brotherly countries” and Russia’s corresponding response have created an atmosphere of negativism, a „black streak” in the political and economic relations of our recent socialist past. Today there is a clear lack of analytical literature...unbiased, non-ideologised studies” (Shirokov, 2006).

The first attempts to rehabilitate the Soviet past are noticeable, including through the thesis that the USSR was largely “forced” to establish a Soviet zone of influence in the post-war Europe in response to the “expansionist” aspirations of the United States of America, and the characteristics of the political systems being installed were appropriate to the complexity of the moment and the intensity of the confrontation (Utkin, 2000; Utkin, 2003).

At the same time, this period is devoted to a qualitative deepening of the historiography about the repressive practices introduced by the Soviet side into the political systems of partners in the socialist camp. R.G. Pihoya shares a series of “exposures of anti-republican and anti-democratic conspiracies,” including those of an anti-Semitic nature: Jews are being excluded from government, foreign policy and state security services. In this context, the case of the Hungarian socialist leader M. Rakosi is interesting, who, according to the author, “did not limit himself to his own state, but claimed a commissar-procuratorial role in other countries of the ,socialist camp”” (Pihoya, 2000).

In the introduction to the work “Totalitarianism: The Historical Experience of Eastern Europe,” V.V. Maryina (2002) claims that the permanent search for “enemies of the nation” in Post-War Central and Eastern Europe, as in the USSR, had a “step-wise”, ever-deepening character. First it was the political and physical destruction of the forces of right-wing totalitarianism, then the partners of the communists in the fight against it, and finally, comrades in the party. Later it resulted in repressions against ministers of the Catholic Church, soldiers, peasants resisting the beginning of collectivization, small urban entrepreneurs who opposed the nationalization of their property, and participants in labour strikes. Repression took various forms, including deportation, the exact extent of which is still unknown. A parallel process was a powerful purposeful, essentially coercive indoctrination, i.e., the imposition of communist doctrine on society, an integral element of which was the formation of an „enemy im-

age”. Finally, the historian notes the illusory nature of the concept of “people’s democracy” in Central and Eastern Europe: “because the existing international realities...did not give the slightest chance to establish this form of democracy, different from the Soviet one and, in the Kremlin’s view, inferior to it” (Maryina, 2002). If we talk about the diversity of views on social development that enjoyed greater or lesser internal support in the countries of the region, and if we call these views alternative to the communist programme, then, in the author’s opinion, we can also talk about alternative options for the development of these countries at that time.

“However, given the international situation and the „economic hand” of the Kremlin in the region, it can be stated that there was no chance for the victory of a programme other than the communist one here. People’s democracy as a transitional regime, in which both democratic and totalitarian alternatives were present, evolved in the direction of communist unity of power. Evolved...at a much faster pace than was seen by Soviet leaders and their creatures in the countries of the region at the end of the war and immediately after it” (ibid.).

V.V. Maryina also made an important clarification: the Sovietisation of Eastern Europe, contrary to the established opinion, did not begin in the late 1940s, when the monopoly of communist power was established there, but earlier, immediately after the War, when the programmes prepared by the Communists with the participation of Moscow began to be implemented, “when representatives of the Communist Parties took more or less firm positions in the power structures of the countries of the sub-continent”.

## **Historiography of the 2010s: the era of mature Putinism**

The 2010s became a period of “putinism” crystallization which has led to a number of changes in historical science. There is a ban on comparing Soviet and German totalitarianism of the middle of the 20th century. The law on “foreign agents” is wilfully interpreted, as a result of which the first historians-foreign agents appear (T. Eidelman, M. Sokolov, M. Kuzakhmetov). “Rubber” (as the oppositionists name it) articles on the rehabilitation of Nazism are applied. There is an attack made on a number of organizations that have studied the most unsightly aspects of the Soviet past, for example, Memorial. Finally, the outbreak of war in Ukraine largely deforms or even paralyzes the activities of modern historians, who are obliged to be extremely careful with each of their scientific and literary statements. The emphasis in research is being shifted – often not only “soviets”, but also the collective West (or even only it) are recognized as responsible for negative phenomena in the socialist camp; the halo of the Soviet Empire 2.0 forces at least academic circles to treat the Soviet zone of influence with “respect.” During the same period, we see cases of “reverse transformation,” as can be

traced in the work of Yu. Knyazev – first a consistent critic of the Soviet system, and then its apologist.

While in the 2000s we noted the first attempts to rehabilitate Soviet historiography and the Soviet past in general, the 2010s saw the emergence of works that almost entirely reproduced Cold War rhetoric. Some authors directly argued that

“...contrary to the ‘soporific’ statements of a number of foreign (and some domestic) scholars and politicians that at the end of the twentieth century, with the collapse of the USSR and the socialist system, the ideological confrontation came to an end, the penetration of Western values and ideas into Eastern Europe, which began to be opposed to the values of society, continued and intensified. History is increasingly becoming one of the platforms for fierce discussions. It is around the issues of the development of civilisations and change of formations, the origins and course of changes in individual countries and in the world arena as a whole, around the issues of the historical past and their assessment that a global, in fact, global discussion has intensified, the course and results of which are interpreted differently, often biased, by politicians, the media and academia”. (Moshnyaga, 2016).

The works of “exposing nature” appear, in which “some engaged centres and institutions” are branded in the Soviet manner, which allegedly profess “historical aggressiveness of the Russians”, are not afraid of falsifying facts and shifting accents. “At the same time, they try to whitewash the obvious criminals and aggressors, to blame one side for certain difficulties and even tragedies, to keep silent about the obvious scale of the USSR’s troubles and victories,” the same author writes. – “A real information war has unfolded around a whole range of issues, which was overlaid by not the first wave of hysteria in connection with Russia’s taking an independent position on the most important world problems, defending the security of the state and demonstrating decisive measures to prevent destabilisation in the world and in certain regions” (Moshnyaga, 2016).

The multidimensional and at the same time rather critical view of Soviet policy in the context of the East European crises (primarily 1956 and 1968) that prevailed in the Russian literature of the 1990s and early 2000s has been increasingly replaced since the late 2010s by a rather apologetic approach that largely follows the traditional Soviet paradigm, which, in accordance with the “doctrine of limited sovereignty”, asserted the right of the USSR to control the countries in its sphere of influence in opposition to the West by any means, not excluding force.

However, this does not mean a complete abandonment of retrospective criticism. One of the leading and currently writing modern Russian Sovietologists A.S. Stykalin (2019), following the works of the previously mentioned R.G. Pikhoi and L.Ya. Gibiansky on the same topic, explores the emergence of the Soviet doctrine of intra-bloc politics, with the establishment of regimes that were in strict vassal dependence on



Moscow in a number of countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. Deprived of any independence in the international arena, the Eastern European “national democratic” regimes actually turned into direct conductors of the USSR’s foreign policy line, which, in the conditions of a sharply escalated Cold War, was increasingly confrontational in nature. As a key intra-bloc punitive instrument, A.S. Stykalin considers the “doctrine of limited sovereignty”, which finally took shape during the period of Leonid Brezhnev’s leadership of the USSR. “Such an urgent need (to formulate a new bloc doctrine – Iurii Zhukov’s note) arose first of all because a forceful intervention in the internal affairs of one of the Soviet bloc countries (the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact Organisation troops in 1968 – Iurii Zhukov’s note) caused serious disagreements in the world communist movement, threatening not just a mass withdrawal from the Western Communist Parties of persons disillusioned with Soviet policy, as had happened in 1956, but a much deeper split,” notes the author.

Moscow, in the scholar’s view, became increasingly weary of its function as “supreme arbiter” responsible for the fate of the entire socialist camp and with the right to insist on the eradication of anything that diverged from the world communist movement’s accepted notions of an uncontaminated socialist quality. On the one hand, it persisted in its rhetoric: in the autumn of 1986, at the time of the 30th anniversary of the “Budapest Autumn”, there was only one version of the counter-revolution in the Soviet press. Under the conditions of declared Perestroika, the formerly guarded approach in assessing the USSR’s role in resolving the crisis within the Soviet bloc was commented on in the West as evidence of the USSR leadership’s continued adherence to the “Brezhnev doctrine” and its unwillingness to undertake a conceptual revision of its East European policy. On the other hand, the Romanian dictator Ceausescu’s appeal against the background of a catastrophic crisis in Romania (the same decreasing living standards and dissatisfaction with the party and its leader, who were unable to change anything) to persuade the Soviet leadership to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine to his country ended in failure. And with the fall of regimes in a number of Eastern European countries in the last months of 1989 that were not interested in revising their assessments of the former Soviet bloc policy, the new forces that came to power expected Moscow to officially revise the “doctrine of limited sovereignty”.

Among recent works, the studies of N.M. Kurennaya (2020) and A.I. Zhurova (2022) are worth noting. The first seeks to study the cultural influence of the USSR in the form of “socialist unification” – the imposition of socialist realism as “the only possible cultural program”, the formation of national unions of writers according to Soviet models, the transformation of culture into a propaganda tool, “party management and strict discipline” introduced into cultural life (however, in the author’s opinion, such a “literary-ideological import” was doomed to failure from the start). The second refers to the conflict between the “mentalities” of the republics’ residents and the

institutionalization imposed by Moscow in the form of CMEA and the Warsaw Department. "The historical experience of the Polish government, commitment to democratic institutions and a strong national idea," according to the author, determined the "fragility and ephemerality" of the transformations. The same circumstances explain the aspirations and permanent attempts of the Polish elites to build "socialism with a human face". However, these measures in the execution of the then Polish authorities led to the opposite results: prices increased, strike movements continued, and foreign debts grew. The crises which shook Poland, the strikes, the mass protest movements among the most diverse social strata (the intelligentsia and students took an active part in the resistance of the PUWP) pushed the Polish leadership towards emergency measures and the use of violence, which, in turn, only intensified the national discontent with the pro-Soviet model of state structure.

In 2011, a landmark collective work „Revolutions and Reforms in Central and South-Eastern Europe: 20 Years Later” was published, which not only seeks to assess the past from a greater distance, but also provides a kind of assessment of Soviet-Russian historiography during this period; and not only Russian, it is worth noting, as among the numerous authors we see colleagues from Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and even Austria. It is not at all by chance that we see the same familiar Y.S. Novopashin and A.S. Stykalin on the editorial board of this book. Y.S. Novopashin stated: "...the question of why the almost half-century-long socialist experiment in the countries of this region (Central and Eastern Europe) ended in widespread collapse remains open. Relevant concrete-historical research is still in great short supply..." (*Revolutions and Reforms in the Countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe: 20 Years Later*, 2011). The same Y.S. Novopashin, relying on his earlier works, considers the impact of the USSR on the countries of the Socialist camp as "Bolshevisation", based on the total destruction of all horizontal ties in the societies under this impact, as well as the imposition of the Leninist-Stalinist identification of the class struggle with violent-terrorist policy and its opposition to peaceful reformism on the political elites of the controlled countries. Subsequently, it came as a huge revelation and disappointment to the Bolshevised elites that this "ultra-leftist" approach, with its use of revolutionary "storm and onslaught" and permanent mobilisation of the population, was not at all conducive to the prosperity of the socio-economic and cultural spheres. The author describes the process of "de-Bolshevisation" (or "desovietisation") as the transition of Eastern and Central European societies from the era of "post-communism" to the era of a "normal" post-industrial society oriented towards European institutions.

It is noteworthy that considerable attention is paid in the texts of the collection to criticising the "historiographical revanchism" observed within the decade; one presentation, for example, focuses on the impact of "Putinism" on the politics of historical memory.

## Conclusion

In summary, it can be noted that for more than 30 years, Russian historical science has come an impressive path: from attempts to get rid of Soviet reality through its radical critical analysis in the 1990s, through the search for new guidelines and balance in the “noughties”, to the formation of “neo-Soviet historiography”, “splitting” of the community of Russian historians into “system” and “opposition” (including those who left the country and were recognised as „foreign agents”), translation into the historiography of political polarization in the country in the 2010s and especially the 2020s.

During this time, conceptual approaches were formed to explain both individual aspects of the negative impact of the USSR on the Central and Eastern European countries – political, economic, cultural (according to a number of historians, even mental) – and the general failure of the imposed system, which condemned the CEE countries to a difficult and lengthy transit from the Soviet past to the European present, as a number of Russian historians have also written about. L.N. Shanshieva, for example, notes:

“a significant factor in the development of the candidate countries on the path of rapprochement with the countries of Western Europe were economic and political reforms due to the change of systems in the course of social transformation. Since the pace and results of these reforms in specific countries were different, this also affected the pace of progress on the path of integration...The consequence of this was the subsequent growth of differences in various indicators, in the degree of success of integration in this or that country. In some of them it was possible to observe significant economic successes, effective political reforms, while in others – insurmountable lag, which still creates an impressive gap in the living standards of the population. It is not surprising, therefore, that in recent years there has been increasing talk of a Europe of ‘two speeds’” (Shanshieva, 2019)

In the context of the continuing military actions in Ukraine (the duration of which is frankly unpredictable), the destruction of the system of scientific relations between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic world (aptly enough called “Iranisation” of Russian science), attempts to create a new monodctrinal humanitaristics (based on the imperial discourse and translation of “traditional Russian values”) – the prospects for further development of critical historiography of the topic are very vague. However, it is clear that its further development is possible only and exclusively with a fundamental change in the behaviour of the Russian Federation in the foreign and domestic political arena, the revival of a full-fledged scientific discussion without the influence of the administrative factor, the depoliticization of historical science and an increase in its autonomy. Ultimately, successes in this area of research correlate with the search for options for a “democratic” and Europeanized Russia of the future; Russia, abandoning imperial resentment in favour of taking the experience of its companions in the

socialist experiment of the 20th century, with consolidated rhetoric in understanding the post-totalitarian past.

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## Kritička procjena utjecaja SSSR-a na europske zemlje lagera u modernoj ruskoj historiografiji

### Sažetak

Ovaj rad analizira rad ruskih povjesničara 1990-ih, 2000-tih i 2010-ih koji su kritički pristupili analizi i procjeni utjecaja sovjetskih institucija na države istočne, jugoistočne i srednje Europe. Radovi povjesničara 1990-ih, 2000-ih i 2010-ih pokazuju kritični pristup analizi i ostavštini utjecaja sovjetskih institucija u državama istočne, jugoistočne i srednje Europe. Takvi trendovi u historiografiji bili su neodvojiv dio osvrta na nedostatke sovjetskog sustava u cjelini, te povezani s osvrtima na njihov vlastiti razvoj. Pri tome, postoji raznovrsnost mišljenja nasuprot gotovo dogmatskog jedinstva suvremenih ruskih vlasti o temi.

**Gljučne riječi:** socijalistički lager, historiografija, SSSR, povijesna znanost, Hladni rat