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Original scientific paper

Re-Imagining Anti-Fascist Internationalisms: Bandung, Belgrade and Havana

Three separate, but interlinked, attempts at progressive planetary internationalism all trace a direct lineage from struggles against fascism, colonialism, and racism: the Bandung Afro-Asian conference of April 1955, the Belgrade Non-Aligned summit of September 1961, and the Havana Tricontinental conference of January 1966. Revisiting the three events, and tracing their 'afterlives', allows for a more nuanced understanding of the contradictions, challenges, and achievements of global anti-fascism and, in particular, the tensions between reformist and revolutionary transformations and between struggles 'from above' and 'from below'. An analytical discussion of fascism and anti-fascism is followed by a critique of the methodological nationalism and entrenched Eurocentrism of much of the study of fascism and anti-fascism to this day. The article then outlines some aspects of fascism and anti-fascism emerging in, or traveling to, the Global South and the importance of addressing the transnational dimension of anti-fascism before exploring what the study of these three events may bring to our understandings of anti-fascism now and in the future.

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KEYWORDS:

anti-fascism, internationalism, Bandung, Non-Aligned Movement, Tricontinental

Introduction¹

If fascism² is, indeed, “the major political innovation of the twentieth century, and the source of much of its pain,”³ emerging in Italy in 1919 with Mussolini’s *Fasci di Combattimento* or, literally, “fraternities of combat,”⁴ the afterlives of fascism and anti-fascism remain prescient more than a century later. In this text, through a focus on three events that constituted important moments of “antisystemic worldmaking,”⁵ between 1955 and 1966, I seek to address fascism and, more directly, anti-fascism, in ways that question the dominance, still, of Eurocentric analytical frames and geographical cases. Through a spatio-temporal journey from the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in April 1955, via the Belgrade summit of Non-Aligned States in September 1961, to the Tricontinental Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, held in Havana in January 1966, the relationship between anti-fascism, anti-colonialism, and anti-racism can be teased out both historically and politically.

In my attempt to address anti-fascist internationalisms in this period, I adhere to a preferred ontology of a “double movement,” of both bringing socialist Yugoslavia back into the study of global social relations and, at the same time, decentring its positionality, ensuring that other sites of struggle are also explored⁶. As such, the text is part of a broader work that has gained a foothold in Yugoslav studies in recent years, of addressing socialist Yugoslavia concerning questions of colonial and imperial relations, on the one hand,⁷ and racialized structures of oppression, on the other.⁸ It matters that, at the start of the period I focus on, only some ten years had elapsed since socialist Yugoslavia had emerged from the Partisan struggle in the Second World War, and only seven years since the “historic no” as the break with Stalin and the Soviet Union is commonly known. Throughout this period then, the real political and symbolic importance of the anti-fascist struggle within Yugoslavia itself, encompassing both the broad population

¹ This text is the result of the collaborative research project Models and Practices of Global Cultural Exchange and the Non-aligned Movement. Research in the Spatio-Temporal Cultural Dynamics (IPS-2020-01-3992), supported by the Croatian Science Foundation and the Slovenian Research Agency. This is a modified English-language version of a text that was first published, in Croatian, as “Promišljanje antifašističkih internacionalizama: Bandung, Beograd, Havana” in Lada Duraković and Andrea Matošević (eds.) *Antifašizam: Zbornik odabranih radova s Petog međunarodnog znanstvenog skupa Socijalizam na klupi* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2023). I want to thank Chiara Bonfiglioli, John Clarke, Aida A. Hozic, Nimi Hoffmann, Ljiljana Kolešnik, Rada Iveković, Mislav Žitko and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

² Unless a direct quote, I have used “fascism” rather than “Fascism” throughout this essay to draw attention to its shifting discursive configurations and unsettled characteristics.

³ Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*. (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 11

⁴ Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, 12.

⁵ Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-determination*. (Princeton: University Press, 2019), 3.

⁶ Paul Stubbs, “Yugocentrism and the study of the Non-Aligned Movement: towards a decolonial historiography,” *History in Flux* 3 (2021): 133-55.

⁷ Cf. Bojana Piškur, Bojana “Yugoslavia: Other Modernities, Other Histories.” *Cultural Studies* 20, no. 1 (2019): 131-39.

⁸ Cf. Catherine Baker, (2018) *Race and the Yugoslav Region: Postsocialist, Post-Conflict, Postcolonial?* (Manchester: University Press, 2018).

and the political elite, remained strong even as others superseded the Partisan generation with no direct lived experience of the Second World War.

The text begins with an analytical discussion of fascism and anti-fascism underpinned by the work of the Greek Marxist Nicos Poulantzas. This is followed by a critique of the methodological nationalism⁹ and entrenched Eurocentrism¹⁰ of much of what still passes for studying fascism and anti-fascism today. I attempt to outline, albeit sketchily, some aspects of fascism and anti-fascism emerging in, or traveling to, the Global South and the importance of addressing the transnational, even global, dimension. Each of the three “moments” of Bandung, Belgrade, and Havana are addressed in turn before attempting to synthesize what the study of these events may bring to our understanding of anti-fascism now and in the future.

A Poulantzian frame

At first sight, rooting a non-Eurocentric approach to the analysis of fascism, especially one committed to avoiding the pitfalls of “methodological nationalism,” in the work of Nicos Poulantzas, may seem a strange choice. Nevertheless, in his book *Fascism and Dictatorship*, Poulantzas outlines a theoretical framework the value of which even he does not appear to fully appreciate. Expanding Horkheimer’s critique of narrow understandings of the origins of “totalitarianism,” Poulantzas takes issue with the famous maxim that “anyone who does not wish to discuss capitalism should also stay silent on the subject of fascism.”¹¹ Poulantzas argues:

“Strictly speaking, this is incorrect: it is he who does not wish to discuss imperialism who should stay silent on the subject of fascism. ... Fascism in effect belongs to the imperialist stage of capitalism. The point is therefore to try to elucidate certain general characteristics of the stage, and their impact on fascism. The primary causes of fascism are not the factors often seen as its basic *sine qua non*, such as the particular economic crises Germany and Italy were caught in when fascism was establishing itself, the national peculiarities of the two countries, the consequences of the First World War, etc. These factors are important only in relation to the stage of imperialism, as elements of *one of the possible conjunctures* of this stage.”¹²

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Seeking to understand fascism in terms of its “essential features,”¹³ as a particular political phenomenon, and rejecting economic explanations, Poulantzas’ choice of the “concrete situations” of Germany and Italy, although typical of the extant literature, is quite limiting. However, the idea of fascism

⁹ “Methodological nationalism” refers, in broad terms here, to “the naturalization of the global regime of nation-states by the social sciences” (Andreas Wimmer and Nancy Glick Shiller “Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology.” *The International Migration Review* 37, no. 3 (2003): 576–610, 576).

¹⁰ “Eurocentrism” is used here to mean “the belief that, amongst the intersecting dualisms of West–East and North–South, it is the global North West that has a monopoly on, or at least a prior claim to, theory that portends to be universal.” (Stubbs “Yugocentrism,” 141).

¹¹ Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism*. (London: Verso, 2018, first French edition 1970), 94.

¹² Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, 94. Emphasis in original.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 87.

as one form of “the exceptional capitalist state”¹⁴ is more productive. For Poulantzas, it is the “profound changes in *politics* and *ideology*”¹⁵ in the imperialist stage of capitalism that matter more than supposedly pure economic factors “such as monopoly concentration, the fusion of banking and industrial capital into finance capital, the export of capital, and the search for colonies.”¹⁶ Further, it is the internationalization of imperialist social relations that is crucial, with imperialism conceived as “a chain”¹⁷ consisting of a specific kind of “uneven development” in which “*the strength of some depends on the weakness of others, and vice versa.*”¹⁸

Poulantzas’ focus on debates within the Third International and, indeed, some Western European Communist Parties, distracts from any broader discussion of “imperialism” and, strikingly, of colonialism, only occasionally noted in terms of Germany’s failure, unlike Italy, to carve out “a colonial empire.”¹⁹ As I seek to demonstrate below, the inextricable links between fascism and colonialism render the connections between anti-fascism and the decolonial project across the Global South, in particular Africa and Asia but also, to an extent, Latin America, absolutely pivotal. The axiom that “the roots of modern fascism lie within the tyrannies of colonialism”²⁰ relies, in part, on Aimé Césaire’s conceptualization of fascism as bringing colonialism back home to Europe.²¹ Pontus Järvstad argues that it is important to trace the multiple ways colonialism and imperialism informed fascism and represented continuity in terms of both ideology and systems of rule.²² These can be traced historiographically through specific connections but, also, more importantly perhaps, in terms of “colonialism as a global system that had many different and often contradictory practices.”²³

The treatment of racialized structures and racism is even more marginalized in Poulantzas’ account. Although antisemitism and racism are noted as general features of fascist ideology, Poulantzas cuts off all discussion with just eight words: “I cannot of course start examining racism here,”²⁴ the response to which should be a loud “Why on Earth not?” As Paul Gilroy has argued, although there is a need to avoid the quest for “a uniform, extrahistorical, formula for fascism that would enable us to test for its presence or absence,”²⁵ all “supremacist regimes” rely, to an extent, on “eugenic

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¹⁴ Ibid., 83.

¹⁵ Ibid., 99.

¹⁶ Ibid., 99.

¹⁷ Ibid., 104.

¹⁸ Ibid., 105. Emphasis in original.

¹⁹ Ibid., 116.

²⁰ Malory Nye, “The brutal friendship between colonialism and fascism: some thoughts from Aimé Césaire, on systematic racism,” *Medium* (1 January 2017).

²¹ Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 3

²² Pontus Järvstad, *Portraying Fascism as a Colonial Understanding of Europe: How Continuities of Imperial Expansion Shaped Fascist Ideology and Practices*, MA thesis, Haskoli Islands, School of Humanities, Kt: 180487-3879, (2017). <https://skemman.is/bitstream/1946/27116/1/Portraying%20Fascism%20as%20a%20Colonial%20Understanding%20of%20Europe.pdf>, accessed 7 March 2024.

²³ Ibid., 7-8.

²⁴ Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, 560.

²⁵ Paul Gilroy, “Black Fascism,” *Transition* 81/82: 70-91 (2000), 89.

racial science," such that fascism is, at the very least, a latent presence "in any attempt to organize social life according to raciological principles."²⁶ In other words, any failure to acknowledge how fascism is "entangled in global 'raciality'"²⁷ implicated in the creation of "moral geographies of belonging" based on "concentric gradations of putatively decreasing humanity,"²⁸ is a serious omission indeed.

Poulantzas argues that fascism can be understood "as one of the possible conjunctures" of the imperialist stage of capitalism that is, perhaps, most analytically fruitful. Conjunctural analysis, "not a Theory, but an orientation," focuses on "the multiplicity of forces, accumulated antagonisms, and possible lines of emergence"²⁹ at work in particular spatiotemporal sites. It is attuned to "the historical-concrete alignments of political strategies of collective actors that reflect structurally inscribed tendencies, relations of forces, institutional and ideological formations, and circumstantial factors."³⁰ As such, conjunctures are, always, more than nation-state specific. Gillian Hart has attempted to trace specific "global conjunctures ... major turning points when interconnected forces at play at multiple levels and spatial scales in different regions of the world have come together to create new conditions with worldwide implications and reverberations."³¹ Crucially, Hart frames this, via Lenin, Gramsci, Lefebvre, and Hall as "not a slice of time or a period" but, rather the "condensation of contradictions ... scaled in multiple ways."³²

For this text, the key conjuncture, following the Second World War, is the coming together of the Cold War and processes of decolonisation, complicated by continued, albeit uneven, colonial oppression, the emergence of neo-colonial social relations, and the consolidation of US imperialism alongside the emerging role of the Soviet Union and China as global powers, themselves also seeking influence in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Later, it is also important to address the collapse of the already weakened global governance of the United Nations and its agencies and the growth of the power of International Financial Institutions, trialling Structural Adjustment in Latin America and Africa.

Fascisms are only some of many possible outcomes of a conjuncture, never forged through the unravelling of iron laws of history and with no necessary correspondence between economic conditions and political practices. Any conjunctural political economy of fascism, therefore, has to capture "multi-layered ideological and/or contingent practices underpinning

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Baker *Race and the Yugoslav Region*, 1.

²⁸ József Böröcz, "'Eurowhite' Conceit, 'Dirty White' Resentment: 'Race' in Europe." *Sociological Forum* 3 no. 4 (2021): 1116-34. <https://library.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/socf.12752>, accessed 7 March 2024.

²⁹ John Clarke, "Conjunctures, Crises, and Cultures: Valuing Stuart Hall." *Focaal* 70 (2014): 113-22, 115.

³⁰ Alexander Gallas, "Revisiting Conjunctural Marxism: Althusser and Poulantzas on the State," *Rethinking Marxism*, 29 no. 2 (2017): 256-80, 257.

³¹ Gillian Hart, "Why Did it Take So Long? Trump-Bannonism in a global conjunctural frame." *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 102 no. 3 (2020): 239-66, 242.

³² Ibid., 259.

fascist economic policies"³³ or, as Milward argued succinctly: "economic policy remained not only subordinate to but also an integral part of the ideological and political ambitions of the fascist movement."³⁴ Going beyond the German and Italian cases, it may not at all be the case that the "expansionist impulse of fascism" was only "politically inspired."³⁵ Even Baker acknowledges that there remained a linkage between the political and the economic in terms of an ideology of "the wider world as the mere object of conquest, domination, and exploitation, through an inevitable clash of inferior and superior nations and civilizations"³⁶ returning us, again, to the powerful interconnectedness of fascism, colonialism and racism.

Anti-fascist internationalisms

It would be a mistake to see anti-fascism as merely a mirror image of fascism; it is that, of course, but so much more, with the historical paths of anti-fascism exhibiting their own relatively autonomous dynamics. Similarly, a sole focus on specific forms of anti-fascist resistance limited to particular spatiotemporal frames would be in danger of failing to recognise the internationalist dimensions, historical legacies and afterlives. A reduction of anti-fascism to exclusively left politics would also be problematic, not least because of the importance, globally, of broader anti-fascist coalitions, whether "united fronts from below" or "popular fronts from above,"³⁷ as well as the manoeuvrings of different communist parties.

What has been termed "the transnational turn in anti-fascism studies"³⁸, alongside the transnational turn in studying fascism, concentrates on "the interplay between multiple ... flows (national, transnational, global) and the agency of national and transnational actors."³⁹ Again, a conjunctural framing helps us to address the fracturing of global anti-fascism directly related to the creation of two "camps" during the Cold War, as well as the complex relations between anti-fascism and anti-imperialism, whilst at the same time alerting us to possible historical interconnections between memories and tropes of anti-fascism in forging new transnational solidarities. In a sense, nothing less than the study of processes of fascisation and anti-fascisation is needed, understanding that the relations between them are always conjunctural and contextual.

In short, there is no substitute for rigorous conjunctural analysis of various forms of "anti-fascist engagement" encompassing "different meanings, representations and legitimation processes"⁴⁰ and diverse tactics

³³ David Baker, "The Political Economy of Fascism: Myth or Reality: or Myth and Reality." *New Political Economy* 11 no. 2 (2006): 227-50, 231.

³⁴ Alan S. Milward, "Towards a Political Economy of Fascism," in *Who Were The Fascists? Social roots of European fascism* ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 61 and 63.

³⁵ Baker, "The Political Economy of Fascism," 246.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Antonino Scalia, "The Manifold Partisan: Anti-fascism, Anti-imperialism, and Leftist Internationalism in Italy, 1964-76," *Radical History Review* 128 (2020): 11-38, 14.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Victor Lundberg, "The Antifascist Kick: A Signifying Cultural Practice in the History of

and practices⁴¹. A concern with “cultures of antifascism,” incorporating an “aesthetics of resistance”⁴² is unable, in and of itself, to explain the recent ability of far-right and authoritarian politics, notably Trumpism, to demonise anti-fascism as “antifa.”⁴³ Hence, a focus limited to “the ways in which antifascism evolved with and adapted to various cultures”⁴⁴ cannot address the complexities of anti-fascism within conjunctural power relations. At the same time, outlining the forms that anti-fascism takes in the contemporary conjuncture – as Dimitrakaki attempts for contemporary Greece through a three-fold distinction between street protests, subcultural styles, and zones of heterotopian aspirations – is always in danger of becoming an inventory meaningless outside of its particularistic context. Her Poulantzian invocation of the capitalist state as a (potential) cradle of fascism and, therefore, of anti-fascism as “a stance that necessarily opposes the entire state apparatus of repression”⁴⁵ does, at least attempt to overcome crude action/inaction binaries. Nevertheless, it still begs the questions of how repression should be defined, of the relationship, as Althusser would have it⁴⁶, between repressive and ideological state apparatuses and, of course, what kinds of transnational anti-fascisms may oppose transnational state-like repressive practices.

In her analysis of Cuban antifascists’ support for the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War, Ariel Mae Lambe distinguishes between “negative antifascism” as the movement against fascism, and “positive antifascism” in terms of shared political goals of “freedom from strongman governance, independence from neocolonial control, and attainment of economic and social justice.”⁴⁷ She is surely correct to assert that all accounts of anti-fascism need to be sensitive to complex lineages and continuities across time and space as well as significant ruptures or breaks. The edited collection *Anti-Fascism in a Global Perspective*⁴⁸ seeks, through a series of case studies, to address cultural and political articulations of anti-fascism across the world. Whilst committed to giving space “to African, Asian, Latin American, Caribbean and Middle Eastern anti-fascist voices that have often been ignored or rendered peripheral in international histories of

Transnational Antifascism?” *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 9 (2020): 272-87, 78.

- ⁴¹ Lundberg’s focus is on links between the “anti-fascist kick” as a gestural form of violence, conveying both “activism” and “masculinity,” and its connections to more peaceful forms of protest.
- ⁴² Mattie Fitch, Michael Ortiz and Nick Underwood, “Editorial Introduction: The Global Cultures of Antifascism, 1921-2020,” *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 9 (2020): 1-7, 2.
- ⁴³ Jonathon Hyslop, “Trumpism, Zumaism, and the fascist potential of authoritarian populism,” *Safundi: the Journal of South African and American Studies* 21 no. 4 (2020): 464-72.
- ⁴⁴ Fitch et al., “Editorial Introduction,” 7.
- ⁴⁵ Angela Dimitrakaki, “Antifascism,” Paper presented at the conference Greece / Precarious / Europe, (2013). <https://www.academia.edu/2605615/ANTIFASCISM> accessed 8 March 2024.
- ⁴⁶ Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (London: Monthly Review Press, 1971).
- ⁴⁷ Ariel Mae Lambe, *Cuban Antifascism and the Spanish Civil War: Transnational Activism, Networks, and Solidarity in the 1930s*, Doctoral dissertation (Columbia University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2014), 9-10.
- ⁴⁸ Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey, and David Fetherstone, eds., *Anti-Fascism in a Global Perspective: Transnational Networks, Exile Communities, and Radical Internationalism* (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2021).

anti-fascism,⁴⁹ it is remarkable that the three events discussed in this text – Bandung, Belgrade, and Havana – are all completely ignored, despite the book discussing key figures whose ideas impacted on some or all of them. As Garcia suggests, emerging research within “the transnational turn” includes a focus on the anti-fascism of international organizations and events, the circulation of anti-fascist ideas, the role of exiles in anti-fascist activism, and the rise of anti-fascist spatial politics prefiguring the alter-globalization movement⁵⁰. What is most important is to counter the marginalisation, even silencing, of non-European anti-fascism, to challenge the continued use of a Eurocentric frame to understand anti-fascism and, crucially, to re-envision the importance of transnational anti-fascist internationalisms centred on the Global South.

The two decades between the two World Wars were a period of the transnational spread, not only of anti-fascist ideals, but of their institutionalization in a wide range of international organizations and events, many explicitly linking not only anti-fascism and anti-imperialism but, also, anti-racism, pacifism and feminism. Whilst nationally-oriented “cultures of exile”⁵¹ were important in this period,⁵² there were genuine attempts to go beyond this. Tracing the complex relationship, not only, between space and time but, also, between people⁵³ shows that these movements were more than merely “Europe reaching out to the rest of the world.”⁵⁴ In many ways, the Congress Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism, held in Brussels in February 1927, leading to the establishment of the League Against Imperialism,⁵⁵ whilst a key moment in and of itself, cannot be understood outside of the growing importance of Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism and, indeed, the International Anti-Fascist League, formed in October 1922 as a response to Mussolini’s march on Rome.⁵⁶ The strong links between many anti-fascist organizations emerging in this period and the Comintern, sometimes leading to crude labeling of all non-Communists as “social fascists” or “agents of imperialism,”⁵⁷ whilst not decisive in the 1920s, certainly led to significant problems later in the context of real-world events.

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⁴⁹ Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey and David Fetherstone, “Introduction: Towards a Global History of Anti-Fascism,” in *Anti-Fascism in a Global Perspective: Transnational Networks, Exile Communities, and Radical Internationalism*, eds Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey and David Fetherstone (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis 2021), 1-20, 1.

⁵⁰ Hugo García, “Transnational History: A New Paradigm for Anti-Fascist Studies?” *Contemporary European History* 25 no 4 (2016): 563-72, 564.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 566.

⁵² Cf. on Paris, Jennifer Anne Boittin, *Colonial Metropolis: The Urban Grounds of Anti-Imperialism and Feminism in Interwar Paris*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010).

⁵³ Garcia, “Transnational History,” 568.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 572.

⁵⁵ Michele Louro et al, eds, *The League Against Imperialism: Lives and Afterlives* (Amsterdam: University Press, 2020); Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World* (New York: The New Press, 2007), 16-30; Juergen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 16-41.

⁵⁶ Garcia, “Transnational History,” 569.

⁵⁷ Fredrik Petersson, “Anti-imperialism and Nostalgia: A Re-assessment of the History and Historiography of the League Against Imperialism,” in *International Communism and Transnational Solidarity: Radical Networks, Mass Movements and Global Politics, 1919-1939*, ed. Holger Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2017, 191-255), 238.

One of these was, undoubtedly, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in October 1935. Italy was already a colonial power in Eritrea and parts of Somaliland but Mussolini was keen to expand Italian colonial power on the ground, use the territory as a testing ground for policies of “racial separation,” and augment his symbolic position by avenging the defeat of Italian forces in Adowa in 1896, an event remembered as a moment of national humiliation.⁵⁸ Emperor Haile Selassie was, initially, able to rally strong resistance but a new Italian offensive in spring 1936 forced him to flee on 3 May 1936, with Italian troops entering the capital Addis Ababa two days later. On 10 May 1936 Ethiopia was declared a part of the Italian empire, to be governed as part of “Italian East Africa.” The situation was complicated for anti-imperialists precisely because their only point of appeal was to the League of Nations and other colonial powers, both of whom treated the Italian actions as a *fait accompli*.

Although the Spanish Civil War is largely presented as a European struggle, the importance of Spanish Morocco, the first region to declare in favour of Franco in July 1936, cannot be understated. The concessions made by the Nationalists to Arab elites brought home to many that the anti-imperialist struggle was more complex than simple faith in the colonised rising against the colonisers. George Padmore, a key Pan-African intellectual, understood that the Moors fought alongside Franco for economic reasons and as a result of disillusionment with the Republican government that had not taken the opportunity earlier to pursue a more progressive policy towards the colony.⁵⁹ What is also, often, forgotten concerning the Spanish Civil War was the importance of support for the Republican side from within the Global South. Nehru and the Indian Congress Party, for example, explicitly linked the struggle in Spain with India’s struggle for independence, henceforth articulating “anti-fascism as the cornerstone of an emerging worldview and foreign relations initiative.”⁶⁰

A third key event was the all-out war between Japan and China from July 1937 onwards, a kind of ‘proxy war’ between the imperialist powers and Japan for control of China.⁶¹ itself divided between nationalists led by Chiang Kai-Shek and Mao’s communists. Japanese fascism, certainly, borrowed elements from its Italian and German counterparts but was also fuelled by a right-wing push for a return to an oligarchical monarchy.⁶² Until Japan was enrolled on the Nazi side in World War II, however, this was not a war that attracted great interest in Europe although, again, Nehru, who was in the

⁵⁸ Aristotle Kallis, “Ethiopia.” *World Fascism: An Historical Encyclopedia*, eds. Cyprian P. Blamires and Paul Jackson (Santa Barbara: ABC Clío, 2006, 202-3), 202.

⁵⁹ Tom Buchanan, “The Dark Millions in the Colonies are Unavenged: Anti-Fascism and Anti-Imperialism in the 1930s,” *Contemporary European History* 25, no. 4, (2016): 645-65, 659.

⁶⁰ Michelle I. Louro, “Anti-fascism and anti-imperialism between the two world wars: The perspective from India,” in *Anti-Fascism in a Global Perspective: Transnational Networks, Exile Communities, and Radical Internationalism*, ed. Kasper Braskén et al. (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2021), 115-32, 115.

⁶¹ Buchanan, “The Dark Millions,” 656.

⁶² Gregory Kasza, “Japan.” In *World Fascism: An Historical Encyclopedia*, ed. Cyprian P. Blamires with Paul Jackson. (Santa Barbara: ABC Clío, 2006), 351-53, 352.

Chinese city of Chungking when the invasion began,⁶³ understood that this was an important struggle and offered material and humanitarian, though not military, aid.

In the face of these and other events, notably the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact between the Soviet Union and Germany, signed in August 1939, the tight bond between anti-fascism and anti-imperialism, and their linkages to communist internationalism, became much more “flexible and ambiguous.”⁶⁴ At times, a tactical position amongst some anti-fascists that colonial power was crucial to the fight against fascism spilled over into broader support for imperialism *per se*; as black activist Wallace Johnson suggested, imperial defense often merged into “the defence of imperialism.”⁶⁵ The left usually supported the French position that colonies should be the frontline bulwark against fascism. Crucially, the betrayal of the anti-fascist struggle by the Comintern led black intellectuals including CLR James and George Padmore towards a more radical anti-imperialism. Padmore had criticised the opportunism of the Communist International as early as 1934, leading to his expulsion from the Communist Party, for its willingness to slow down anti-imperialist work “and thereby sacrifice the young national liberation movements in Africa and Asia.”⁶⁶

In 1938, in an essay on labour conditions in Trinidad and Tobago, Padmore coined the term “Colonial Fascism” about the British authorities’ passing of a Sedition Bill taking away even the most basic of civil rights,⁶⁷ an important intervention pointing to “the co-production of fascism and colonialism.”⁶⁸ Earlier, Cuban communists had labeled the Machado regime as a form of “tropical fascism”⁶⁹ with Julio Antonio Mella seeing the Cuban regime as “the classic nationalism of European fascists and the agents of America’s imperialist capital.”⁷⁰ Nehru’s view that “to condemn fascism while defending imperialism was “illogical and absurd”⁷¹ led to the Indian National Congress withdrawing support for the Allies in World War II already in 1939, “unless the metropole promised unconditional independence ... once the war ended.”⁷² The defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan did, of course, provide the impetus for decolonial movements around the world: Haile Selassie was able

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⁶³ Louro, “Anti-fascism,” 125.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁶⁵ Quoted in Buchanan, “The Dark Millions,” 665.

⁶⁶ Quoted in James R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary: George Padmore's Path from Communism to Pan-Africanism* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), 37.

⁶⁷ George Padmore, George “Fascism in the Colonies.” *Controversy* 2 no. 17, February 1938. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/padmore/1938/fascism-colonies.htm>, accessed 8 March 2024.

⁶⁸ Braskén et al, *Anti-fascism*, 3.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Quoted in Sandra Pujals, “‘Con saludos comunistas’: The Caribbean Bureau of the Comintern, Anti-Imperialist Radical Networks, and the Foundations for an Anti-Fascist Culture in the Caribbean Basin, 1927–1935,” in *Anti-Fascism in a Global Perspective: Transnational Networks, Exile Communities, and Radical Internationalism*, ed. Kasper Braskén, Nigel Coplesey and David Fetherstone. (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2021), 58–76, 68.

⁷¹ Quoted in Buchanan, “The Dark Millions,” 651.

⁷² Louro, “Anti-fascism,” 116.

to return to Ethiopia in 1940 and steer its path to independence in 1941, and India gained independence from the British in June 1947 but at the expense of partition between India and Pakistan.

Bandung

Almost thirty years after they had met for the first time in Brussels in 1927, leaders of many of the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia became key drivers of the Conference of Afro-Asian states held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. In total, 29 states were represented in what was, at the time, the biggest international conference outside the United Nations.⁷³ President Sukarno of Indonesia, in his opening remarks, explicitly compared and contrasted the Bandung meeting with the Brussels congress at which “many distinguished delegates who are present here today met each other and found new strength in their fight for independence.” He went on to note that delegates had assembled in Brussels “not ... by choice, but by necessity,” continuing:

“Today the contrast is great. Our nations and countries are colonies no more. Now we are free, sovereign and independent. We are again masters in our own house. We do not need to go to other continents to confer.”⁷⁴

Elisabeth Armstrong has argued persuasively that the 1949 Conference of the Women of Asia, held in Beijing, and hosted by the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF), represents the beginnings of anti-imperialist solidarity after World War II that culminated in the Bandung event.⁷⁵ Radicalizing the terrain of women’s struggles, the WIDF had begun to consider anti-fascist struggles as central to struggles for gender equality and democracy. The Conference enabled women delegates from Africa and Asia to “define ... “fascism” through the lens of imperialism” focusing on “the political economy of colonialism”⁷⁶ over and above particular national struggles. Critical of the priorities even of the new postcolonial ruling elites, the WIDF reconfigured the linkages between imperialism, racism, and fascism that would be front and central, although with the gender dimension marginalised, in Bandung.

As many authors have suggested, there were, in effect, at least two Bandungs co-existing simultaneously. One represented “a new spirit for world affairs ... decrying racism, colonialism, and dependency upon the great powers.”⁷⁷ The other was, to all intents and purposes, “a Cold War conference

⁷³ Darwis Khuduri, “The Rise of Asia and the Polarisation of Global Forces: western galaxy and Bandung constellation,” 2000, 8., https://bandungspirit.org/IMG/pdf/the_rise_of_asia_and_the_polarisation_o_bandung_constellation___kapital_afrik.pdf accessed 11 March 2024.

⁷⁴ Quoted in Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 41.

⁷⁵ Elisabeth Armstrong, “Before Bandung: The Anti-Imperialist Women’s Movement in Asia and the Women’s International Democratic Federation,” *Study of Women and Gender: Faculty Publications*, Smith College, Northampton, MA., 2016, 360. https://scholarworks.smith.edu/swg_facpubs/1 accessed 11 March 2024.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 321.

⁷⁷ Robbie Shilliam, “From Ethiopia to Bandung via Fanon.” *Bandung: Journal of the Global South* no. 6, 2019: 163-189, 163. Also <https://robbieshilliam.files.wordpress.com/2019/04/draft-1.2.pdf>, accessed 11 March 2024.

that reproduced colonial fault lines and divisions.”⁷⁸ Vijay Prashad goes further to suggest that delegations in Bandung could be classified as “leftist” (led by Zhou En-lai and China), “centrist” (led by Nehru and India), and “rightist” (a heterogenous grouping including pro-US and Islamic states, including the Philippines and Saudi Arabia)⁷⁹. An important figure was the first Prime Minister of independent Burma, U Nu, who had played a leading role in the anti-fascist mobilization to fight the Japanese occupation and, along with Nehru, Nasser, and Sukarno, began to understand the need for a strong orientation against Cold War polarization alongside the moral force of anti-imperialism⁸⁰, that later came to frame non-alignment. Shilliam focuses on Ethiopia’s delegate Yilma Degressa who had led a guerrilla war against the Italian occupation when Haile Selassie had been in exile. Through a re-reading of World War II, via Fanon, which traces its origins precisely to “the fascist invasion of an African polity,” Shilliam suggests that it is possible to locate “a spirit at Bandung that exceeded the conference’s diplomatic impasses and postcolonial tragedies.”⁸¹ Bandung was a key moment in the articulation of a new moral authority, a kind of “Black humanism,” expressed specifically in the condemnation of the French presence in Algeria, serving to internationalize this and other national liberation struggles. For this reason, Khuduri, for example, makes a distinction between a “Bandung of States,” mostly governed by particularistic, and often nationalistic, self-interest, and a “Bandung of Peoples.” He sees the latter as articulating five key principles of a “Bandung Spirit:” peaceful coexistence, liberation, equality, solidarity, and emancipation⁸² within a “Bandung constellation” of multi-layered meanings. In a similar vein, Walter Mignolo sees the enduring legacy of Bandung in its practical and theoretical “delinking” of the Global South from Western meta-narratives and productive, again not unlike Fanon’s work, of “epistemic disobedience.”⁸³

At the same time, Claudio is surely correct that the Bandung conference “cannot be reduced to singular narratives.”⁸⁴ For Claudio, focusing on the Filipino diplomat Carlos Romulo, it is at Bandung that a coherent anti-fascism that also condemns Stalinism, and on occasions Soviet communism more generally, is developed. Romulo’s concerns about future Chinese aggression proved correct. In the end, Chinese intentions proved correct, and Chinese aggression against India became, in fact, one of the major obstacles to any continuation of the Bandung process. Relying, in part at least, on the pull of Bandung for African American writer Richard Wright, Pham, and Shilliam are surely correct to assert that the meanings of Bandung are by no

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World* (New York: The New Press, 2007), 36-7.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 48.

⁸¹ Shilliam, “From Ethiopia to Bandung,” 164.

⁸² Khuduri, “The Rise of Asia,” 8.

⁸³ Walter Mignolo, “Geopolitics of Sensing and Knowing: On (De)Coloniality, Border Thinking, and Epistemic Disobedience,” *Transversal Texts* 09, 2011, <https://transversal.at/transversal/0112/mignolo/en>, accessed 11 March 2024.

⁸⁴ Lisandro E. Claudio, “The Anti-Communist Third World: Carlos Romulo and the Other Bandung,” *Southeast Asian Studies* 4, no. 1 (2015): 126.

means exhausted by “the standard narratives of geopolitics, diplomacy and ethics.”⁸⁵ They refer, instead, to a set of counter-hegemonic “political and cultural intimacies”⁸⁶ and “affective-corporeal relations.”⁸⁷

The nature of Bandung as “a break in the narrative of modernity/ coloniality”⁸⁸ also rests on challenging fascism in general, and Nazism in particular, as a spatio-temporal exception. At the same time, as Prashad also reminds us, the entire *modus operandi* of Bandung reinforced a decoloniality premised on the logic of sovereign nation-states, not necessarily in tune with popular, grassroots, demands and not unusually a vehicle for violent repression of minorities of one kind or another. As we shall see below, this nation-state logic was also present in the Non-Aligned Movement although, arguably, less so in the Tricontinental. If Bandung was both “an aspiration” and “a failure,” the terms of its failure, surely, “resided in their confinement in the Westphalian prison-house with its internal logics of nationalism and embrace of the teleology of development.”⁸⁹

In his brilliant book *Out of Time: The Queer Politics of Postcoloniality*, Rahul Rao interrogates momentous transitions in the imagination of the nation, as occurred for many states gathered in Bandung, through gendered signifiers of modernity and backwardness. Noting that caste “rarely enters into theorisations of Indian foreign policy and international relations,”⁹⁰ decolonised India emerges as an “an increasingly masculinising nation that must demonstrate its ‘pulsating dynamic’ nature in ever more visible ways to obtain the international recognition that it seeks”⁹¹ in contrast to both British colonial and, indeed, Gandhian, forms of “emasculatation.” Whilst avoiding any path dependency, the fascist nature of Modi’s India cannot be completely detached from this discursive construct of the emergence of a “great power.”⁹²

As Christopher J. Lee has suggested: “Bandung contained both the residual romance of revolution, as well as the *realpolitik* of a new world order in the making.”⁹³ In a sense, a “mythical Bandung” competed with an “evidence-

⁸⁵ Quynh N. Pham and Robbie Shilliam, “Reviving Bandung,” in *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions*, ed. Quynh N. Pham and Robbie Shilliam. (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 3-19, 3.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁸⁸ Rosalba Icaza and Tamara Soukotta, “Bandung as a Plurality of Meanings,” in *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions*, ed. Quynh N. Pham and Robbie Shilliam. (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 185-97, 189.

⁸⁹ Mustafa Kamal Pasha, “The Bandung Within,” in *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions*, ed. Quynh N. Pham and Robbie Shilliam (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 201-9, 202.

⁹⁰ Rahul Rao, *Out of Time: The Queer Politics of Postcoloniality* (Oxford: University Press, 2020), 200.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 203.

⁹² Preeti Sampat, “Make in India: Hindu Nationalism, Global Capital, and Jobless Growth,” in *Beyond Populism: Angry Politics and the Twilight of Neoliberalism*, ed. Jeff Maskovsky and Sophie Bjork-James (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2020), 61-77.

⁹³ Christopher J. Lee, “Introduction. Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung,” in *Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives*, ed. Christopher J. Lee. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010, 1-42), 3.

based Bandung” for representational legitimacy.⁹⁴ It is worth recalling that along with the newly decolonized, attendees at Bandung included not only parts of Sub-Saharan Africa that were still seeking to escape from colonial rule but, also, Japan, a mere decade after its last imperial adventurism, and alliance with Nazism, had ended. Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and NATO member Turkey all attended after signing the Baghdad Pact with the United Kingdom to form the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) to thwart Soviet interests in the Middle East⁹⁵. Whilst setting the stage for “a new historical agency,”⁹⁶ then, it did so within a continued *realpolitik* of international relations. Lee suggests, indeed, that, in the absence of a follow-up meeting, both the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Movement (AAPSO), established in Cairo in December 1957, and the Non-Aligned Movement had a far greater direct impact on world affairs.

Belgrade

The Summit of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries held in Belgrade, the capital of socialist Yugoslavia, from 1-6 September 1961, was conceived, or at least presented, as a one-off event. Indeed, it was guaranteed that it would not lead to the formation of a new international organization that secured Nehru’s attendance.⁹⁷ Ironically, although Bandung was meant to be only the first meeting of Afro-Asian states, there was never a Bandung II so it was NAM that became formalized instead. After a hiatus following the Cairo summit in 1964, the Non-Aligned Movement embarked on regular, numbered, conferences from the Lusaka summit of 1970 onwards and, indeed, still exists today. Here, the focus is more on the Belgrade event and subsequent meetings in the heyday of the movement, particularly throughout the 1970s, paying close attention to the role of socialist Yugoslavia.

The myth that Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah was present in Bandung⁹⁸ is matched by the myth that Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito was also there, a story perpetuated in his wife Jovanka’s own memoirs.⁹⁹ Some ten years after coming to power in the wake of the victory of his Partisan forces, and seven years after the “break with Stalin,” Tito, although not in attendance, certainly watched events in Bandung closely, noting it as “an historical turning-point ... in harmony with our conceptions ... in respect of international co-

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⁹⁴ Cf. Antoinette Burton, “The Sodalities of Bandung: Toward a Critical 21st-century History,” in *Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives*, ed. Christopher J. Lee (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 351-61, and Robert Vitalis, “The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung,” *Humanity*, 4, no. 2 (2013): 261-88.

⁹⁵ Lee, “Introduction,” 13-14.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁹⁷ Paul Stubbs, “Introduction: Socialist Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement: contradictions and contestations,” in *Socialist Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement: social, cultural, political and economic imaginaries*, ed. Paul Stubbs (Montreal: McGill-Queens’ University Press, 2023), 3-33.

⁹⁸ Vitalis, “Midnight Ride.”

⁹⁹ Aida A. Hozić, “False Memories, Real Political Imaginaries: Jovanka Broz in Bandung,” in *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions*, ed. Quynh N. Pham and Robbie Shillian (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 95-100.

operation and the strengthening of peace."¹⁰⁰ By then, Tito was well known to many Third World leaders following extensive trips to Africa and the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America.¹⁰¹ Needing allies to bolster the country's independence away from the Soviet sphere of influence, with the break with Stalin having hit hard economically and politically, and without wanting to fall completely under the United States' influence, forging a relationship with newly decolonised states based on mutual respect emerged as a viable alternative. When Tito and Nehru had met in New Delhi in December 1954, their joint communique noted the two countries' emergence "as independent nations, through powerful movements of national liberation" stating that their common stance of 'non-alignment' was not 'neutrality' but, rather, "a positive, active and constructive policy seeking to lead to collective peace, on which alone collective security can rest."¹⁰² The meeting on the island of Brijuni in July 1956 between Nasser, Nehru, and Tito cemented, at least symbolically, socialist Yugoslavia's central position in demands for a new international order based on "equality, ... disarmament, (and) international economic and financial co-operation ... following the basic principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations."¹⁰³ Whilst Nehru downplayed the event as little more than "a meeting between friends,"¹⁰⁴ the Brijuni meeting became "one of the constitutive myths of socialist Yugoslavia"¹⁰⁵ and, indeed, of the Non-Aligned Movement itself.

The symbolic capital that Tito, and socialist Yugoslavia, possessed from the nature of the Yugoslav Partisans' struggle against Fascism was considerable, with a reasonable claim to have been the only country, at least in Europe, to have liberated themselves from German and Italian occupation,¹⁰⁶ resonating with leaders in the Global South fighting for their national liberation. As Gal Kirn has argued, "the term Partisan stands as a collective struggle ... for liberation"¹⁰⁷ such that the internationalism of the Yugoslav communist leadership, with many actors engaged actively on the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War,¹⁰⁸ exhibited a broader decolonial logic and strategic focus. This is clearly expressed in terms of the political imaginary of a popular front against reactionary forces, in a "struggle

¹⁰⁰ Josip Broz Tito, *Selected Speeches and Articles, 1941-1961* (Zagreb: Ognjen Prica, 1963), 175-6.

¹⁰¹ Peter Willetts, "The Foundations of the Non-Aligned Movement: the trouble with history is that it is all in the past," in *Socialist Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement: social, cultural, political and economic imaginaries*, ed. Paul Stubbs (Montreal: McGill-Queens' University Press, 2013), 59-83.

¹⁰² Quoted in Nataša Mišković, "The Pre-History of the Non-Aligned Movement: India's first Contacts with the Communist Yugoslavia, 1948-50," *India Quarterly* 65, no. 2 (2009): 185-200, 185.

¹⁰³ Brijuni Communique, 19 July 1956.

¹⁰⁴ Tvrko Jakovina, *Treća strana hladnog rata* (The Third Side of the Cold War) (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011), 39.

¹⁰⁵ Vladimir Petrović, *Jugoslavija stupa na Bliski Istok: stvaranje jugoslovenske bliskoistočne politike 1946-1956* (Yugoslavia's Presence in the Middle East: The Making of Yugoslav Middle Eastern Policy 1946-1956) (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2007), 139.

¹⁰⁶ Willetts, "The Foundations of the Non-Aligned."

¹⁰⁷ Gal Kirn, *The Partisan Counter-Archive: Retracing the Ruptures of Art and Memory in the Yugoslav People's Liberation Struggle* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 35.

¹⁰⁸ Vjeran Pavlaković, *The Battle for Spain is Ours: Croatia and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2014).

... for survival and freedom,¹⁰⁹ to bring into being a new, radically different, political order. Partisan struggles, often defined in terms of what they were “against” were also, in this conjuncture at least, forms of “affirmative politics that entailed the emancipation of culture ... and at the same time launched a transformative process of the very conception of ‘the land’.”¹¹⁰ The decision to hold a non-aligned summit in the Yugoslav capital Belgrade was, itself, meant to symbolise the possibilities of renewal, reconstruction and modern state building, of industrialization and the liberation of the peasantry, after the defeat of fascism and, by extension for many of those who attended, colonialism.

By the time of the XV United Nations General Assembly in September 1960, Tito’s standing had been buoyed by support for Nasser during the Suez crisis of 1956, and consistent material support for the FLN against the French in Algeria. In his speech to the General Assembly, Tito suggests “that the United Nations will achieve real and complete universality in the near future through the attainment of independence by all the peoples now under colonial rule.” He argues that “the process of the national, economic, political and cultural emancipation of former colonies is a historical necessity.” However, the struggle against colonialism has become “entangled with East-West antagonisms,” reaching its most dangerous denouement in “the ruthless policy of racial discrimination and oppression” by the Government of South Africa. Underdevelopment must be tackled, he argues, through “technical, financial, and economic assistance.” He then moves on to the need for “general and complete disarmament” before outlining principles of international relations based on “peaceful and active co-existence,” “non-interference” in the affairs of others, and the right of countries to choose their own social and economic systems.¹¹¹ The General Assembly provides another symbolic moment, of course, in terms of the meeting of the five “founding fathers” of non-alignment: Tito, Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Sukarno.

The experience of the fight against fascism, the onset of the Cold War, and the tenacity of colonial powers’ attempts to maintain their global hegemony come together in a movement highlighting the need for ‘peaceful co-existence,’¹¹² a new era of equality in international relations, based on sovereignty, independence, self-determination, and territorial integrity. Promoting non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, general and complete disarmament, and peaceful resolution of disputes based on the UN Charter, rested alongside a clear anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist orientation. Indeed, socialist Yugoslavia prioritised support, as much material as ideological, for national liberation movements and, indeed, their

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¹⁰⁹ Tito, “Selected Speeches,” 9 (original speech from 1941).

¹¹⁰ Gal Kirn, “The Ruptures of Non-Alignment and Socialist Yugoslavia: Ten Theses on Alternative Pasts and Futures,” *Socialist Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement: social, cultural, political and economic imaginaries*, ed. Paul Stubbs (Montreal: McGill-Queens’ University Press, 2023), 84–107.

¹¹¹ Tito “Selected Speeches,” 322–42.

¹¹² Lars Nord, *Nonalignment and Socialism: Yugoslav Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice*. (Stockholm: Raben & Sjogren, 1974), 29.

right to wage liberation wars,¹¹³ enrolling its public sphere and citizenry in the decolonial struggle.

Not unlike Bandung, this sometimes downplayed the gendered dimensions of non-alignment, with socialist Yugoslavia contributing to this precisely as a result of the deradicalization of women's movements within its borders from the mid-1950s onwards. The Antifascist Women's Front (AFŽ), established in 1941, became a less radical Union of Women's Societies (SŽD) in 1953. Nevertheless, having been expelled from the pro-Soviet WIDF in 1949, as Chiara Bonfiglioli has shown,¹¹⁴ Yugoslav women's organizations, held up as exemplars of anti-fascist, revolutionary socialist activity until the break with Stalin, forged a new internationalism identifying with women's struggles within anti-colonial national liberation movements in the Global South, even if the popular reporting of this tended to reproduce imaginaries of mainstream political work, and sometimes even domesticity, above participation in violent conflicts. As Bonfiglioli argues:

"Yugoslav activists could easily identify with activists from the Global South not only due to their common experience as revolutionary and freedom fighters, but also due to their similar efforts in emancipating women in new postcolonial states. Women's struggles for their political, social and economic rights, and their attempt to overcome conservative religious norms and illiteracy, was part and parcel of this modernization effort in the 1950s and 1960s, and Yugoslav activists frequently exchanged impressions with activists from the Global South concerning legal obstacles to women's equality, and ongoing challenges to women's emancipation and modernization."¹¹⁵

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Returning to Lambe's idea of "positive antifascism" including "attainment of economic and social justice,"¹¹⁶ the role of the Non-Aligned Movement in demands for a New International Economic Order, expressed in a UN General Assembly Resolution in 1974, is extremely important. The 1970 Lusaka summit communique included a Statement on Economic Progress referring to 'the poverty of developing nations' and their 'economic dependency' as a 'structural weakness of the world economic order', seeing the colonial past as leading to a 'neo-colonialism that poses insurmountable difficulties in breaking the shackles of economic dependency'. It called on the UN to bring about "a rapid transformation of the world economic system, particularly in the fields of trade, finance and technology, so that economic domination yields to economic co-operation."¹¹⁷ The extension of economic demands to include a level playing field for terms of trade, the regulation of commodity prices, and development financing and debt reduction for

¹¹³ Ibid., 51.

¹¹⁴ Chiara Bonfiglioli, "Representing Women's Non-Aligned Encounters: A View from Yugoslavia." *Socialist Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement: social, cultural, political and economic imaginaries*, edited by Paul Stubbs (Montreal: McGill-Queens' University Press, 2023), 37-58.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 46.

¹¹⁶ Lambe, "Cuban Anti-fascism," 10.

¹¹⁷ Bojana Tadić and Miroslav Drobnjak, eds, *Documents of the Gatherings of the Non-Aligned Countries Volume 1* (Belgrade: Međunarodna politika, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 1989), 47.

the least developed countries was, as Getachew points out, a key part of struggles for a more egalitarian global economy. In a logic linking opposition to fascism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, demands for an NIEO were part of a quest for “political and economic institutions that promised to displace, transcend, or at least constrain” the nation-state. This involved full awareness of the limits of postcolonial nation-building and statehood “in the face of persistent dependence and domination,”¹¹⁸ and a recognition of the need to shift the balance of economic power from the core to the periphery,¹¹⁹ even as NAM Member States’ shifting loyalties can be traced to evolving national self-interest in the context of shifting geopolitical alliances.

The racial politics of non-alignment, not least given the “liminal hegemony”¹²⁰ of Yugoslav leadership, was somewhat contradictory and far from resolute anti-racism. Catherine Baker has suggested, rightly, that Yugoslavia’s identification with the global anti-colonial struggle was often “race-blind.”¹²¹ Socialist Yugoslavia showed no particular interest in furthering “the convergence of different strands of Third Worldist mobilisation, including Afro-Asianism, non-alignment, Arab nationalism, and pan-Africanism.”¹²² Tito’s response, in a 1964 meeting with Algeria’s Ahmed Ben Bella against the idea that “all blacks are good and all whites bad”¹²³ (*ibid.*) suggests the lack of an understanding of the racialised structurings of capitalism, colonialism, and fascism although, as Byrne himself suggests, this was more a ‘non-racial’ than an explicitly ‘racist’ stance.¹²⁴ Subotić and Vučetić¹²⁵ have suggested that socialist Yugoslavia failed to appreciate the racialised structuring of global society at the same time as being self-consciously anti-colonialist and, indeed, ‘agitational’ in support of anticolonial liberation movements that certainly held a radical position on racialised oppressions. Non-Aligned summits largely failed to engage with racism other than in terms of its most dramatic manifestations in apartheid Southern Africa. In the crisis years of the 1980s, critiques of Yugoslavia’s non-aligned focus from the northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia contained elements of racism within broader calls for a more European orientation.¹²⁶

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¹¹⁸ Getachew, “Worldmaking,” 100.

¹¹⁹ Craig N. Murphy, “What the Third World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the New International Economic Order Ideology,” *International Studies Quarterly* 27 no. 1 (1983): 55-76.

¹²⁰ Paul Stubbs, “Socialist Yugoslavia and the Antinomies of the Non-Aligned Movement,” *LeftEast* 17 June 2019, <https://lefteast.org/yugoslavia-antinomies-non-aligned-movement/>, accessed 18 March 2024.

¹²¹ Catherine Baker, *Race and the Yugoslav Region: Postsocialist, Post-Conflict, Postcolonial?* (Manchester: University Press, 2018), 111.

¹²² Jeffrey James Byrne, “Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment,” *The International History Review*, 37, no. 5 (2015): 912-32, 924.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 921.

¹²⁵ Jelena Subotić and Srdjan Vučetić, “Performing Solidarity: Whiteness and Status-Seeking in the Non-Aligned World,” *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 22, no. 5 (2019): 722-43.

¹²⁶ Tvrtko Jakovina, “Not Like a Modern Jesus Christ’: Pragmatism and Idealism in Yugoslav Non-Alignment,” in *Socialist Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement: social, cultural, political and economic imaginaries*, ed. Paul Stubbs (Montreal: McGill-Queens’ University Press, 2023), 108-29.

Havana

Although largely under-researched, at least until very recently, a strong case can be made that the Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian and Latin American Peoples (OSPAAAL), held in the Chaplin Hotel, Havana, Cuba from 3–15 January 1966, profoundly reinvigorated, if not reinvented, contemporary global anti-fascism and underpinned, in radical ways, its firm interconnection with the fight against colonialism, imperialism and racism. Whilst building on the work of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), the conference struck a far more militant tone than either Bandung or Belgrade, bringing in Latin American countries through the Latin American Solidarity Organisation (OLAS), as well as both the Soviet Union and communist China. Indeed, the presence of the latter two countries was probably decisive, above and beyond ideological disagreements, in the failure to invite socialist Yugoslavia to the conference.

Over 500 delegates came from some 82 countries and articulated what Young calls "a radical imperialism located firmly in the socialist camp,"¹²⁷ working through an agenda that prioritised the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism; the development of anti-imperialist solidarity, including co-ordinating actions of workers', students' and womens' organisations; economic planning including agrarian reform; cultural collaboration; and the discussion of a large number of "burning issues" including "Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, the Congo, the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia, southern Arabia and Palestine, Laos, Cambodia, South Africa, Korea, Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, Cyprus, Panama, Southwest Africa, and North Kalimantan."¹²⁸

The panic contained within a report produced, soon after the event, by a Subcommittee of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee is obvious to see; nevertheless, many important aspects of what it described as "probably the most powerful gathering of pro-Communist, anti-American forces in the history of the Western Hemisphere"¹²⁹ can be gleaned from it. Crucially, and radically different from the formal discourse of the Non-Aligned Movement, it was United States imperialism, manifesting itself in aggressive interventions in all corners of the three continents, that was perceived as the greatest threat to the anticolonial struggle. A mere twenty years after the end of World War II, when the United States had seemed, to many, as a force for liberation, it had now taken the place of the "old" colonial powers and become the global hegemon. As the conference framed it, a kind of uncontrolled "Yankee power" appeared willing to intervene to stop the spread of communism not only in Latin America but everywhere in the world, even if this meant destabilising democratically elected left-wing governments and supporting conservative regimes including brutal right-wing dictatorships

¹²⁷ Robert J. C. Young, "Disseminating the Tricontinental," in *The Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties*, (London: Routledge, 2018), 517–547, 517.

¹²⁸ United States Senate "The Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian, and Latin American Peoples." Cttee on the Judiciary, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1966). <http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/tricontinental.htm>, accessed 13 March 2024.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

“at any cost.”¹³⁰ Although never spoken directly at the conference, but, rather, alluded to in some of the films and texts that emerged afterward, the United States was portrayed, to all intents and purposes, as “fascist” so that challenging its hegemony represented a renewed anti-fascism.

One crucial element of the Tricontinental, largely ignored in the Senate report, was its inclusion of the struggles of African Americans against racism hence extending the image of the United States as a common enemy to the peoples of the world “including those who live within its borders.”¹³¹ In line with a broad commitment to “the right ... to meet imperialist violence with revolutionary violence,”¹³² the Tricontinental tended to favour more militant Black Power movement-type responses to the explicit nonviolence of the Civil Rights Movement, suggesting opposition “by any means necessary” to combat the violence of the state, its police, and racist groups such as the Klu Klux Klan. As Mahler has argued, this led to a deterritorialised understanding of the fight against colonialism, emphasising the importance of “transnational subaltern resistance” and explicitly including “those located in the geographic North within its subjectivity.”¹³³ This formed part of an explicit anti-racism that refused racial essentialism or determinism, in which “colour” came to signify “an ideological position of anti-imperialism,” transcending any “direct relationship to physical appearance.”¹³⁴

Another element in which the trope of fascism was re-appropriated was the focus, within the Tricontinental, on the fight against Portuguese colonialism and the recognition of the importance, for the survival of the Salazar regime, of the continued dependant position of Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola, and Mozambique. Although Yugoslavia also supported guerrilla movements in Angola¹³⁵ and elsewhere, this was never part of a call for a world anti-imperial revolution. Indeed, as Young suggests, the Tricontinental represented a shift from a starting point of peaceful revolution whenever possible, as advocated, for example, by Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah, at least until deposed, and Kenneth Kaunda to name only some central Non-Aligned Movement figures, to a more explicit focus on guerrilla warfare as part of new wars of national liberation associated with Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh and with the writings of, for example, Franz Fanon. There is some truth in the Senate committee’s assessment that this was a fusion of Soviet communist organisation with Maoist ideology although this understates the role of Cuba here; as Mehdi Ben Barka, the Moroccan revolutionary leader, and architect of the conference, kidnapped and presumed killed in Paris in October 1965,

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¹³⁰ Robert J. C. Young, “Postcolonialism: From Bandung to the Tricontinental,” *Historiein* 5 (2005): 11-21, 17. <http://tricontinentale.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/historein5-young.pdf>, accessed 13 March 2024.

¹³¹ Anne Garland Mahler, “The Global South in the Belly of the Beast: Viewing African American Civil Rights Through a Tricontinental Lens,” *Latin American Research Review* 50, no. 1 (2015): 95-116, 108-9.

¹³² US Senate, “Tricontinental.”

¹³³ Mahler, “The Global South,” 96.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹³⁵ Cf. Jovan Čavoški, “‘Yugoslavia’s Help Was Extraordinary’: Political and Material Assistance from Belgrade to the MPLA in its Rise to Power, 1961-1975.” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 21, no. 1 (2019): 125-50.

had argued, Havana was chosen because it was the realization of the coming together of two great revolutionary movements, the Russian revolution of 1917 and contemporary national liberation movements.

Ultimately, of course, the Tricontinental was more successful in constructing a discourse of transnational political radicalism and, even more so, in its dissemination through the radical aesthetics of films, posters, and magazines than in establishing an operational locus for “wars of liberation” with “the inter-American system”¹³⁶ backed by pro-US global and regional institutions, proving to be rather resilient. For all its anti-racist concerns, much of the Tricontinental’s discourse was rather silent on racialized inequalities in Cuba and other socialist and decolonial states as well as tending to reference a particular “heteronormative, masculinist, subject.”¹³⁷ Indeed, perhaps the neglect of gender is the thread that connects Bandung, Belgrade, and Havana; despite including women’s organizations alongside workers’ and students’ movements in the conference agenda, if the US Senate report is to be believed, the Federation of Cuban Women played a role in the conference that reinforced, rather than challenged, gender stereotypes.

Conclusions

Although this text has only scratched the surface of a potential historiography of anti-fascist internationalisms, some broad points can be made in conclusion. Perhaps most importantly, carefully evidenced and argued spatiotemporal or conjunctural analysis, whilst vital, also carries with it some dangers, not least in terms of a tendency to label some approaches to fascism and anti-fascism as “too specific” and others as “too general.” This can create a kind of “Goldilocks and the Three Bears” method suggesting that, somewhere, at some point, there will be an approach that is “just right.” Of course, focusing only on Europe or, even more specifically, on Italy and Germany, is problematic if the aim is to address the full extent of transnational linkages. The approach developed here, perhaps best categorised as “post-comparative,” shows how, in a particular post-WWII conjuncture of the Cold War and decolonial struggles, three events not much more than a decade apart, largely ignored in an emerging literature on anti-fascist internationalisms, provide both rich empirical material and demonstrate the value of a multi-modal approach to a “confluence of colonialisms.”¹³⁸ There would be considerable value in understanding the significance of Bandung, Belgrade, and Havana for different generations of politicians, activists, and others. Within Yugoslavia, for example, there emerged, in the student protests of 1968 and beyond, a “new left” rather more enamoured of the Tricontinental’s calls to world revolutionary struggle than to the timid bureaucratic politics of NAM,¹³⁹ a pattern that was repeated, albeit in variegated ways, in other NAM Member States.

¹³⁶ US Senate, “Tricontinental.”

¹³⁷ Anne Garland Mahler, *From the Tricontinental to the Global South: Race, Radicalism, and Transnational Solidarity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 5.

¹³⁸ Daphne Taylor-Garcia, “Decolonial Historiography: thinking about land and race in a transcolonial context,” *Tensions* no. 6 (2012): 12.

¹³⁹ James M. Robertson, *Mediating Spaces: Literature, Politics and the Scales of Yugoslav*

Without lapsing into a theoretical frame in which nothing exists outside of discourse, much less the idea that the world is made up of semiotic arbitraries or “floating signifiers,” it is important to note the close connections across the cases addressed here between anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-fascism, and anti-racism. The close connections, however, co-exist in and through shifting relations, with greater emphasis being given to some, rather than other elements, in different spatiotemporal moments. Hence, analytically and politically, it is extremely important not to collapse all of these together but, rather, to be sensitive to the shifting causes and results of different relational configurations.

One term that makes fewer explicit appearances in our case studies is that of “anti-capitalism” although, in complex ways, it is present in all three moments and, of course, most radically within the moment of the Tricontinental. Interestingly, throughout the first twenty years of the Non-Aligned Movement, it was Cuba who argued that the power of multi-national corporations had a major impact within a neo-colonial economic order, a rare focus away from nation-states and transnational political governance.¹⁴⁰ Maskovsky and Ross have recently pointed to the importance of what they term “racialized and gendered capitalist relationalities and transmutations”¹⁴¹ which work alongside forms of “angry politics”¹⁴² that may, but need not necessarily, be labeled “fascist.” What is crucial, here, is the connections between grassroots and statist practices of angry politics and the reliance of right-wing movements on the production of “targeted and systematic divisions, insecurity and abandonment resting, *inter alia*, on a renewed heteronormative familialism, repatriarchialisation, national and ethnicised demographic renewal, and anti-immigrant sentiments.”¹⁴³ The potential for further work on legacies, traditions, and afterlives of anti-fascism as transnational and internationalist projects is virtually limitless and, given the spread of new authoritarianism across the globe, remains of profound political importance.

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Socialism, 1870-1995 (Montreal: McGill Queens' University Press, 2024).

¹⁴⁰ Stubbs, “Introduction.”

¹⁴¹ Jeff Maskovsky and Julian Aron Ross, “Laboring for Whiteness: The Rise of Trumpism and What That Tells Us About Racial and Gendered Capitalism in the United States.” 2021 https://www.gc.cuny.edu/sites/default/files/2024-03/Maskovsky%20and%20Ross_Laboring%20for%20Whiteness.pdf

¹⁴² Jeff Maskovsky and Sophie Bjork-James, “Introduction,” in *Beyond Populism: Angry Politics and the Twilight of Neoliberalism*, ed. Jeff Maskovsky and Sophie Bjork-James (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press 2020), 1-19.

¹⁴³ Paul Stubbs and Noémi Lendvai-Bainton, “Authoritarian Neoliberalism, Radical Conservatism and Social Policy Within the European Union: Croatia, Hungary and Poland.” *Development and Change* 51 no. 2 (2020): 540-60, 540.

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