

# INTRODUCTION TO THEMATIC ISSUE: SPATIALIZING SEDIMENTATIONS AND EROSIONS OF TIME IN URBAN LANDSCAPES

## UVOD U TEMATSKI BROJ: PROSTORNO ODREĐIVANJE SEDIMENTACIJE I EROZIJE VREMENA U URBANIM KRAJOLICIMA

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### INTRODUCTION

The articles in this thematic issue are the product of research on '(Re)Constructing Religioscapes as Competing Territorial Claims in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina,' funded by the National Science Foundation (USA). The project was developed from earlier comparative and interdisciplinary research that had led to the development of a model of 'Antagonistic Tolerance' (AT) to understand relations over multiple generations between members of religiously-based heritage communities who lived intermingled but rarely intermarrying (Hayden et al., 2016). Major conclusions of that earlier work were that such interactions were often peaceful for long periods, even decades, as long as it was clear which

community was dominant over the other(s) in a region, or that an external power held all of them under control, but that violence was likely when such dominance was threatened or changed. The AT model predicts that in any location, dominance is indicated by the location and physical features of the sites associated with each religion: centrality in the settlement being the main indicator, but also taking into account perceptibility through features such as size, height, sound amplification, and bright colouring, among others. The religious sites were seen as nodes on networks of competing religioscapes, which change through time, and might even intersect.

The project on (Re)Constructing Religioscapes in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina was meant to test this model in circumstances

in which there had been massive destruction of religious sites during the 1992–95 war, and then much international and local support in re-building them (Walasek, 2015a, 2015b). A key variable of the project was meant to be the extent to which a location had retained or re-acquired substantial numbers of members of more than one religious heritage community. However, as the research developed it became increasingly clear that very few cities or towns had such heterogeneous populations. In an analysis at the municipality level of the 2013 census of Bosnia and Herzegovina compared to the census of 1991, the sociologist Mirko Pejanović concluded that the “multi-ethnic structure of the population has been preserved” only in the city of Mostar, in Brčko District and in nine others of the 142 municipalities of the country (Pejanović, 2017). Considering that Mostar, Brčko District and the majority of the municipalities that Pejanović lists are also ethno-territorially divided at sub-municipality levels (such as a ward [*mjesna zajednica*] or settlement [*naseljeno mjesto*]) there are very few remaining locations where the original predictions of the AT model could be tested.

Cultural anthropology, however, is an abductive science in which research problems evolve through observations, leading to efforts to detect robust empirical regularities that had not until then been anticipated, and then to generate potential explanations for them (Haig, 2008; Magnani, 2017). In the current research, the AT conceptualizations of religioscapes and the variable indicators of centrality and perceptibility were validated as being of very great utility for understanding specific religious structures as indicators of dominance, but not only on local levels. Pejanović had argued that the ethnic territorialization of Bosnia and Herzegovina had resulted in large spatial concentrations as follows: Republika Srpska for Serbs, five Bosniak Cantons (Tuzla, Una-Sana, Sarajevo, Zenica-Doboj, Bosnian Podrinje) and three Croat cantons (Zapadna Hercegovina, Hercegovina-Neretva, Posavina). While true enough on the large scale, each of these larger geographical designations contains within it some localities, of differing sizes, in which the minor-

ity communities form localized majorities. We have found that the AT measures of dominance within localities work on varying geographical scales, including what we refer to in other work as ‘land archipelagos,’ villages or towns in which members of a minority community in one of the larger land concentrations (e.g., non-Serbs in RS, or non-Bosniaks in Zeničko-dobojski canton or non-Croats in Zapadnohercegovački canton) form a local majority. We have also found that the religioscapes of localities have also changed and developed through time. These changes are especially obvious in the period since the start of the war in 1992; but they also took place in earlier periods, and evidence of them can often be found.

The authors of these articles analyse the development of religioscapes in three urban localities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, beginning with establishment of Muslim dominance in them with the Ottoman conquest, and then focus on changes of the religioscapes from 1878 until the present, as measured in specific census years. The broadest pattern of changes of dominance are from that of Islam under the Ottomans, to that of Roman Catholicism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1878–1918), of Serbian Orthodox Christianity in the first Yugoslav state (1918–1941), of state atheism under socialism (1945–1992), and since then of separate nationalist parties defined by religious heritage: Bosniaks (Bošnjaci) by Islam, Croats (Hrvati) by Roman Catholicism and Serbs (Srbi) by Serbian Orthodox Christianity. Socialism of course, marked a period in which religious heritage was largely de-emphasized by creating memorials to the struggles of the working class and all working people, and of the Partisan forces said to have defeated both foreign occupiers and domestic fascists, thus carrying out a socialist revolution. The anti-religiosity of socialist secularism makes the sedimentations and erosions of state secularism a *secularscape*, comparable to other religioscapes (Hayden et al., 2016). This comparability is confirmed by the actions of the post-socialist governments in eroding the secularscape and re-sedimenting religioscapes. We return to this phenomenon in the conclusion to this introduction.

## THE THREE URBAN CASES

The three cities studied are Banja Luka, Zenica and Mostar. These were chosen because they share some common features:

- 1) Urban development of each can be followed from the Ottoman Empire through the Austro-Hungarian imperial times, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (under its several names), Socialist Yugoslavia, and the contemporary state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are well mapped, and there are or have been in the past sacral architecture from all four religions present in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- 2) All three locations have above 100k population, and are thus among the largest urban locations in the country.
- 3) The three cities were political centres of power throughout history, especially during the time periods in focus of this special issue: Late Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Socialist Yugoslavia, and especially in the modern state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Banja Luka is the administrative capital of Republic of Srpska and the political centre of Bosnian Serbs, Zenica is the capital of a Muslim-dominated canton, and Mostar is unofficially the capital of Bosnian Croats and the capital of a Bosnian Croat dominated canton.
- 4) All three locations had strong socialist industrial and urban development, with accompanying markings of the urban landscapes with monuments that, we argue, are communist atheistic equivalents of sacral architecture.

In each of these cities, the history of the places has often involved the construction, modification or destruction, and reconstruction of edifices that are iconic to one of the religious traditions: mosques, tekijas and turbes for Muslims; differently styled churches and saint shrines for the Christian communities; synagogues for the Jews, and cemeteries with differing styles of grave markers for each of the four communities. During the period of state socialism, war monuments and statues of Partisan heroes were interspersed

with monuments to the working class, and socialist cemeteries had their own non-religious stylizations. As one looks at these changes through time, as evidenced by structures still perceptible on the ground, or through photographs, drawing and other forms of evidence, the changes in their physicality show changes that we analogize to those of hydraulic geography: when built the structures are literally sediments of the flows of cultural practices which may then be eroded by other such flows, and then re-sedimented, even more than once.

## SEDIMENTATIONS AND EROSIONS OF PHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF CULTURE THROUGH TIME

But what are the social processes that caused sedimentations and erosions? A conceptual innovation of this project is in seeing expectations held generally by members of communities as determining the parameters of what individual people, claiming to be acting on behalf of their respective communities, are able to construct, modify, potentially destroy and re-construct on the ground. We do not, of course, see agency in the communities, which being conceptual and not physical in nature do not of themselves build or raze anything. However, the conceptual communities described by this model are incarnated, literally, in the bodies and minds of their adherents, and thus leave tangible markers of their presence. But the expectations of community leaders and members, of what actions are preferred, permitted or at least accepted, do determine the parameters in which physical change to sites are performed, and larger religiouscapes developed or deconstructed.

To be more specific, communities are composed of individuals who self-identify as members of them and are present, at least for a time, at a given location. Such a community has an identity exemplified by multiple practices that its own members and members of other communities see as indicative of it, such as names, iconic dress, food preferences or prohibitions, ritual practices and ritual calendars, and strong-

ly preferred marital endogamy. In the realm of architecture of religious sites, there are usually patterns of iconic features found on larger scales and even at times mandated by a central religious authority, those these may often be tempered by local expectations and local geography. The physical structures of land use iconic to such communities can thus be deposited and eroded. We see the changing religiouscapes of such communities being marked by such deposits, which might indicate dominance, and can also be used to demarcate territories under the control or domination of such a community. These practices are carried out by the community's members, whose collective individual lives flow through space over time. The collective identity of such a community and the individual identities of its members are fluid, but viscous: they change, but slowly, their configurations supported by the multiply interlinked nature of their iconic practices (Hayden & Katić, 2023).

Land use practices that can be connected to communities might include patterns of streets and structures placed within them, such as the market plazas and associated mosques in Muslim towns. The AT model of placement and features of religious institutions predicts that those of the dominant community will be central and most perceptible. However, centrality in a settlement may change as it develops in new directions, and the perceptibility of buildings may also change through time, possibly by destruction, possibly by new construction. Similarly, the spatial distribution of nodes of religiouscapes may change, new ones being added, older ones destroyed or transformed from displaying features associated with one religion to showing those of another (Hayden et al., 2016).

We refer to such changes in the physical placement and features of settlements as being processes of sedimentation and erosion, with possible new physical sediments added to or covering the older ones. We see this usage as related to the archaeological model of percolation, in which items from a past cultural presence filter into a later one (Milosavljević & Ilijić, 2023). It may even represent an improvement, as it allows us to consider that entire structures—composed of

multiple items—can be sedimented and eroded, or even completely removed, while new sediments may accrete onto older ones.

## RELIGIOUS HERITAGE AS VISCOUS IDENTITIES

The metaphors of sedimentation and erosion of physical elements of culture are congruent with the model we have developed that extends the commonly used metaphor of the fluidity of identities by adding the attribute of viscosity, at least for group or community identities (Hayden & Katić, 2023). In physics, fluid dynamics must include reference to viscosity, the resistance of a fluid to deformation – e.g., water vs. honey. Viscosity increases as the particles that compose it, do not move freely among themselves but are bound by various forms of connection. As mentioned above, each of the religious heritage communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina is identified by multiple practices that its own members and members of other communities see as indicative of it, such as names, iconic dress, food preferences or prohibitions, ritual practices and ritual calendars, and strongly preferred marital endogamy.

We think that these multiple and reinforcing elements of identity configurations account for the notable stability of the self-partitioning of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina since at least early in the 19th century, albeit under differing names. Thus, the people known as Bosniaks since 1993 were before then called Muslims (Muslimani) by themselves and others; today's Serbs were earlier known as Pravoslavci (Orthodox Christians) and today's Croats as Roman Catholics, while Jews were sometimes broken down into Sefardi and Aškenazi. The 2013 Census of Bosnia and Herzegovina showed extraordinarily high levels of congruence between self-declared national identity and self-declared religious affiliation and language: about 98% of Bosniaks saying they were Muslims and speak Bosnian, Serbs saying that they were Orthodox Christians and speak Serbian, and Croats identifying as Roman Catholics speaking Croatian (Hayden, 2020, pp. 16–17). But similar patterns

were found in every census in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1879.

We stress that our reference is to religious heritage, not to religiosity. Thus, someone who never enters a mosque, church or synagogue may still reliably be referred to by themselves and others as being a Muslim, Christian or Jew, with these larger categories themselves being susceptible to reliable subdivision: Sunni, Shia'a, derviši of varying orders; Pravoslavci/Orthodox and Roman Catholic; Sephardic and Aškenazi. Further, the ideological atheism of state socialism generally did not overcome these religious heritage identities, though it did require that good socialists/communists needed to avoid religious practices. The socialist/ communist identities, however, proved to be less viscous than those of religious heritage. Thus, in mixed towns in Posavina region in northern Bosnia, an increase in self-identifications as Yugoslavs in the 1981 census was accompanied by decreases in Muslim and Serb self-identifications compared to the 1971 census, while the sharp decline in Yugoslavs in the 1991 census was accompanied by sharp rises in self-identified Muslims and Serbs (Hayden & Katić, 2023, p. 137). Still, the period of state socialism and its aftermath were accompanied by their own distinctive patterns of sedimentations and erosions of religious sites, as analysed in some of the articles in this issue.

## MARKING ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DOMINANCE THROUGH TIME IN URBAN LANDSCAPES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The articles in this thematic issue pursue these themes diachronically in each of the three case studies, which also permits making some comparisons between them. On the basis of other research in the project (Hayden & Katić, 2021; Hayden & Katić, 2023), the authors assume that the boundaries between the major religious heritage communities have remained stable as a set of distinctions, even during the period of state socialism.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was an exception among the republics of the former Yugoslavia in

not having a single ethno-national majority, the population instead self-classifying overwhelmingly in 1991 as Croats, Muslims and Serbs. As in every relatively free and fair election ever held there, beginning in 1910, the population in the 1990 elections self-partitioned politically, Croats voting overwhelmingly for one Croat party, Muslims for one Muslim party, Serbs for one Serb party (Bougarel, 1996a, 1996b; Burg & Shoup, 1999; Hayden, 1993; Woodward, 1995). Similar political partitionings have occurred in every election after the 1992–95 war, essentially rendering the population into three separate electorates, with increasing territorial concentrations of each (Hayden, 2005; Žila & Čermák, 2020). The internal ethno-territorialization of the Bosnia and Herzegovina began with the processes of forced movement that took place during the war but also immediately after it and by emigration (Kadušić & Suljić, 2018; Pejanović, 2017; Žila, 2020).

This ethno-territorialization is a manifestation of the domination of one of the three main communities in localities. Congruence between territorial concentrations of viscously bounded communities and borders can be found on varying territorial scales. As already noted, Serb ethno-territorialization is accomplished mainly in the Republika Srpska (RS), while that of the Croats is manifested in specific locations in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH), and of Bosniaks in other parts of FBH. Yet there are locations in which non-Serbs form local majorities in RS, non-Bosniaks in otherwise Bosniak-majority territories in FBH and non-Croats in otherwise Croat-majority territories of FBH. There are also a few towns where the population overall contains relatively large proportions of both Bosniaks and Croats, where the territory of the town is divided informally but very effectively between them, such as Novi Travnik (Katić & Bugarin, 2016).

In this ethno-territorialization the religious heritage communities are certainly bounded. This is clearly seen in the marriage statistics for 2019, as reported separately by the statistical agencies of the FBH and RS, as drawn directly from the local marriage registries (Komić, 2020;



Kremić, 2021). In RS, 94.2% of Serb men married Serb women, while in the FBH, 98.7% of Bosniak women married Bosniak men, while 92.3% of Croat women married Croat men. Kanton Sarajevo in FBH does not appear to be an exception: 98.5% of Bosniak women marrying Bosniaks, and 92% of Croat women marrying Croats. Similarly, in the 'mixed' Hercegovacko-Neretvanski Kanton 98.7% of Bosniak marriages were to Bosniaks and 97.6% of Croat marriages to Croats.

## MAPPING ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DOMINANCE THROUGH TIME

In this thematic issue focused on three Bosnian and Herzegovinian cities we applied the AT model to cultural geographic data to map manifestations of changing local dominance through the sedimentation and erosion of sacral sites. As noted above, our model recognizes that the anti-religiosity of socialist secularism makes the sedimentations and erosions of state secularism comparable to other religioscapes, as a secularscape. The methodological innovation demonstrated in this thematic issue is to apply geographical mapping techniques for presenting geospatial data to analyse the anthropological concept of religioscapes. We have also expanded the scope of analysis to include monuments as manifestations of socialist and post-socialist religioscapes. In doing so, we were also able to demonstrate ways in which cultural sedimentations and erosions resulting from epochal political transformations mark not only changing phases of dominance over specific sites, but also over wider areas of varying magnitudes.

The first article, by Robert M. Hayden, Ante Šiljeg and Ivan Marić, sets out the framework of the thematic issue by analysing in comparison the development of all three cities from the arrival of the Ottomans to the present. While each has developed uniquely, an unexpected finding of the research was that the initial Ottoman development of Banja Luka and Mostar seems to reflect very similar basic approaches to urban development along what had been scantily popu-

lated river valleys. The urban plans of all three cities changed with the establishment of each subsequent regime, with Banja Luka embodying increasing Roman Catholic and then Orthodox Christian domination, while Mostar's riverbank core remained dominated by Islamic sacral structures but with Christian ones made increasingly prominent on the edges of that core. Zenica remained a predominantly Muslim city but developed especially prominent secularscapes. The post-socialist cities, like the larger polities within Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Entities and within the FBH, the cantons), while officially secular, have favoured the religion of the dominant community.

Since the sedimentations, erosions and sometimes re-sedimentations of religious structures in the three cities are described and mapped in the Introduction, the remaining articles focus instead on monuments. Some of these have religious components, while others are secular. In this regard, Mirza Džananović's analysis of the movements of monuments in Zenica from the Austro-Hungarian period to the present raises several important issues. One is the ways in which a specific monument might be completely eroded when the political-social milieu under which it was constructed changed, but also how some monuments 'migrated,' being moved from one location to another, an interesting form of both erosion and re-sedimentation. The other important issue is the way monuments to workers and the workers' movements were erected in this highly industrialized city, a secularscape pre-dating state socialism and intertwined always with the religioscapes sedimented and eroded in Zenica.

Zenica attracted substantial numbers of non-Muslims during its rapid industrialization, but Muslims/Bošnjaci remained the largest community. In contrast, Banja Luka's post-Ottoman transformation was to becoming a town in which Christians were dominant, first Roman Catholics, then Orthodox Christians. During the period 1919–1993, Banja Luka also had the distinction of being a focus of ethno-national and secular state building projects, of Serbs in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1919–1941), of Croats

in the NDH (1941–45), of secular communists (1945–1990) and of Serbs again in Republika Srpska (1991–date). Vladan Vukliš's article analyses in close detail the patterns of sedimentations, erosions and re-sedimentations of monuments and sacral structures reflecting these changing socio-political environments. Some of the monuments in Banja Luka 'wandered' as much as those in Zenica, to adopt Džananović's metaphor. But what distinguished Banja Luka from either Zenica or Mostar was the change in the structure manifesting dominance at the centre of the Austro-Hungarian extension of the town. The Serbian Orthodox Church of the Holy Trinity, finished in 1939 but destroyed by the Ustaša regime in 1941, was replaced by a monument to the fallen Partisans, which was displaced by a reconstruction of the 1930s church, now named the Church of Christ the Saviour. The Partisan monument wandered across the main street, adjacent to a collection of busts of Narodni Heroji who also wandered into that place. Other monuments to national cultural figures also meandered in the centre of the city. A monument to the fallen combatants of the region, those killed in World War 2, was built on what had been a site of reverence for Muslim warrior saints, but was a failed project; this site is also discussed at length in Mario Katić's article.

Post-Ottoman Zenica remained Muslim/Bosniak dominated and Banja Luka cycled through periods of Serb/Orthodox Christian, Croat/Roman Catholic, secular socialist and again Serb dominance. However, Mostar's trajectory left the original Ottoman town dominated by Muslims/Bosniaks with Serbs/Orthodox structures mainly on the hill above the east bank and Croat/Roman Catholic domination in the newer sections of the city on the west bank of the river and further to the west. Bogdan Dražeta's article shows how these transformations were manifested in sedimentations, erosions and re-sedimentations of monuments throughout this period. The distribution of monuments and memorials to those killed in the 1990s war shows how divided between Bosniaks and Croats this formally unified city is, as of 2024.

The final article in this thematic issue, Mario

Katić's study of the graves of *šehidi* in Banja Luka and Zenica, differs from those preceding it, which focussed on trajectories of cultural sedimentations and erosions in single cities. Katić instead develops a methodology of palimpsesting to make a comparative analysis of saints' graves and *musalas* in these two cities. The complexes date to the earliest period of Ottoman conquest in each case, when the settlements that became these cities were first established. What were apparently similar complexes at their origin went through processes of sedimentation, erosion and re-sedimentations that reflected the larger processes of ethno-religious domination in the towns as revealed in the studies of the changing patterns of memorials and monuments in each that were shown in the single-city studies. Katić thus demonstrates that the theoretical model of sedimentations and erosions, originally developed for analyses on municipal and regional scales, is also useful for understanding social history of specific sites.

## CONCLUSION: FORWARD FROM PARTISANS AND SOCIALIST WORKERS TO HOLY WARRIORS OF THE PAST

While the articles in this thematic issue focussed on only three cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, their analyses and conclusions about the local trajectories of cultural sedimentations and erosions are relevant for considering such processes on larger scales. For example, after 1989, one of the leading scholars of what had been 'actually existing socialism,' famously asked 'What was socialism and what comes next?' (Verdery, 1996). We don't propose to answer the first question, and others are now working on what Yugoslav socialism was (Jović, 2023). What our research has shown, however, is that what came next, at least in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was an ideological return to mythicized religiously-inspired warriors of the past, as represented in these three photographs, each manifesting the (re)turn to ethno-religious nationalism following socialist state secularism (Fig 1).



FIGURE 1 From left: Street signs, Maglaj; *Spomenik braniocima Republike Srpske* (Monument to Defenders of Republika Srpska), Foča; *Croatian King Tomislav* (10th century), Tomislavgrad

Source: Photos by Robert M. Hayden

The street signs near Maglaj, marking the intersection of Radnička and Šehidska streets, embody with Muslim referents the choices made by all three communities at the end of Yugoslavia. Socialism was a workers' state – Radnička. In 1990, Muslims (now Bošnjaci, Bosniaks) overwhelmingly voted for a Muslim party, and their soldiers wound up being commemorated as Martyrs of Islam – Šehidi. But the same turn to a religiously-defined community was also made by the Croats and Serbs. Thus, the statue in Tomislavgrad to the first Croat king, Tomislav, holding his medieval sword and crowned with crosses, is matched by the mythicized Serbian warrior in Foča. The latter holds a cross, and while his sword is medieval, his cap models that of the Serb soldiers of World War I and World War II, this giving an image of the VRS (Army of Republika Srpska) continuing a tradition of Serbian warriors defending the nation from medieval times to the present (Fig. 1):

We think that this movement from socialism into militarized iconography of the holy warriors of the past is itself evidence of the viscosity of the national identities involved. The multiple characteristics that mark belonging to the Bosniak, Croat and Serb communities – e.g., names, religious holidays, rites of passage, foods favoured or prohibited, overwhelmingly endogamous marriage practices – are all based on the differences of practices tied to religion. Socialist secularism clearly weakened the pull of some of these factors,

but not sufficiently to replace the separate heritage identities with any common one. Indeed, the utilization of the militarized imagery shows that the divisions have been reinforced.

Being viscous for these identities also means that their institutionalized manifestations in politics, and their geographical ones in what we have called ethnic archipelagos, are robust. This does not mean that Bosnia and Herzegovina is an impossible amalgam of communities inherently hostile to each other. After all, modern European history has seen multiple states in which religious communities with a history of antagonism have consolidated as polities of citizens, albeit with the communities often concentrated territorially – e.g., Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Switzerland. And there have also been failures to consolidate: Cyprus/Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Ireland/Northern Ireland. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, both possibilities seem to be open. In our extensive fieldwork we have not found much evidence of many people in any part of Bosnia and Herzegovina who have any desire for further conflict. Perhaps the directions after socialism had to be from Radnička (Workers' road) to the separate paths of the holy warriors of the past, but the way forward may well be in efforts of the members of these viscous communities to flow socially in tandem. As we finalize this introduction to the thematic issue on cultural sedimentations and erosions,



monuments of historical figures that could serve as unifying factors for the entire country are being erected in both the Federation and in Srpska. However, it seems these are being re-interpreted by various actors for their own political agendas. Thus, Sarajevo municipality erected a monument to Bosnian King Tvrtko I in front of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency in 2023. In response, in 2024 Banja Luka municipality put up a monument to Kulin ban, one of the oldest Bosnian medieval rulers and claimed as a Serb, and announced a new monument to king Tvrtko I, stating that the one in Sarajevo does not rep-

resent the king properly. At issue, of course, are claims that Tvrtko was a Serb king, or a Croat one, or the first Bosnian one. The complex religious and political identities of many medieval rulers make them easy subjects of such conflicting claims, and perhaps also of the content of new sedimentations. How these sedimentations may intertwine with those of the Partisans and socialist workers, those of the Bosniak Martyrs of Islam, the Defenders of the Croat Homeland, and the Fighters for the Serb Fatherland, and those of the Christian and Muslim religioscapes, remains to be seen.

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