

Manipulation and Goal Setting Motivation: An Unexamined Ethical Relationship

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Summary

Manipulation is well-studied in psychology and philosophy, and there is substantial literature on organizational motivational theories. Yet, a thorough examination of whether organizational motivational practices are manipulative is lacking. This paper defines manipulation and applies the definition to Goal Setting Theory. It addresses two questions: is Goal Setting Motivation manipulation and is it wrong? We also explore how non-manipulative ideal motivational practices could be altered to become manipulative.

Keywords: *manipulation; motivation; goal setting; Edwin Locke; Gary Latham*

Introduction

At first glance, most people have a strong sense of what it means to be manipulated. However, arriving at a comprehensive definition to cover the many and varied aspects of manipulation is more complicated. Current manipulation literature offers some insight in mostly psychological or philosophical contexts. However, to our knowledge, almost none examines the manipulation of employee motivation in workplace settings. In this paper, we explore a legitimate, non-manipulative way in which employers might induce employees to do something and the circumstances under which that legitimacy may be compromised. We also investigate ways in which these non-manipulative methods might be perverted into forms of unethical manipulation.

Some employees are intrinsically motivated to do a great job out of commitment to what they believe is a higher purpose or perhaps due to the very nature

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of the work itself. They are totally self-motivated, meaning that no external inducement is required for them to do everything in their power to perform at their highest level. The only inducement necessary is an inducement to remain within the organization.

On the other hand, there are employees who comply only with the minimum requirements when absolutely compelled to do so by the possibility of being disciplined. For them, the effort and contribution put forth is to the least that is expected. We would say that the relationship is simply transactional: “They pay; we work. Full stop”.

Unfortunately, this form of transactional relationship impedes the success of most organizations. To address this reality, various theories known as “motivational theories”, emerged to try to persuade employees to extend their discretionary work effort and contributions for the greater benefit of the organization’s goals. Such motivational literature and research has grown significantly since the original study efforts of Frederick Taylor in 1895 (Taylor, 1997, 17).

This paper examines a common motivational practice — formal goal setting — by asking, “Is this practice a form of manipulation?” and “If so, is its use immoral?” We first define manipulation in the context of employer–employee motivational attempts. Next, we set forth the theoretical frameworks and practical applications of goal setting. Thirdly, we evaluate the ethics of this motivational approach at the organizational level and also the possible individual managerial application of these organizational attempts at motivation inducement.

1. Understanding Manipulation

Manipulation is a complex and context-dependent action encompassing various techniques that occur in almost all aspects of human interaction. This paper examines the phenomenon from the perspective of influencing others to action in the workplace. Following Noggle (2022), two central questions emerge for our purposes: How is one to define and identify it in the workplace and how to evaluate its moral implications?

Regarding the first question, and mainly following Noggle (2022), commentators offer many possible ways to define manipulation.¹ Some authors see manipulation as by-passing rational deliberation, setting it apart from persuasion, which directly engages the rational capacities of its target. Susser et al. (2019) define manipulation as a hidden influence where individuals are covertly influenced in ways they cannot easily perceive. Similarly, Strudler (2005) describes manipulation as altering behaviour through processes of which the individual

1 For clarification, manipulation — etymologically speaking — means to handle something manually skillfully, much like using a toaster to make toast. In this paper, we do not consider this neutral meaning of the term. Instead, we focus on the characteristic of being manipulative, whether in regard to people or to situations. In this context, manipulation can become immoral, as we can see in the paper.

is unaware. However, not all manipulative tactics are covert. For example, peer pressure seems very manipulative, but it is not covert at all. In other instances, people may be fully aware they are being made to feel guilty in order to get them to do something they do not wish to do.

Many forms of manipulation can be seen as trickery, influencing beliefs, desires, or emotions against norms. Noggle (1996) suggests beliefs are manipulated when they stray from truth or reason. Attention is inadequate if too much is given to irrelevant factors; emotions are inappropriate if they do not suit the situation. Barnhill (2014, 55) following Noggle (1996), suggests that manipulation often contradicts the self-interest of the manipulee. She argues it influences beliefs or emotions away from an individual's ideal state. It does not matter what the ideal state entails. Her framework distinguishes between direct manipulation of individuals and indirect manipulation of situations to elicit non-ideal responses.

Mills (1995) adds that manipulators offer flawed arguments disguised as valid ones. While this approach — we might call it trickery — captures deception-based manipulation, it struggles to encompass non-deceptive tactics such as charm or emotional blackmail, which intuitively also count as manipulation.

A further approach views manipulation as exerting pressure, where tactics such as peer pressure and emotional coercion impose costs on targets for not complying. Feinberg (1989, 399–402) places manipulation on a spectrum between coercion and persuasion, while Kligman and Culver (1992, 173) suggest it involves exploiting vulnerabilities without crossing into coercion by using sufficiently strong incentives such that it would be unreasonable to expect any reasonable person to ignore them. This model, however, does not universally apply to all manipulative strategies and may miss those relying on deception or trickery as explained above in the text.

Some philosophers propose a composite definition combining these approaches. Rudinow (1988, 346–347) identifies manipulation as influencing behaviour through deception, pressure, or exploiting weaknesses. Furthermore, he argues that pressure qualifies as manipulative only when it is intentionally directed at a perceived vulnerability in the target, thus effectively undermining the target's ability to resist. He refines his definition of manipulation to encompass two primary elements: deception and the exploitation of a target's weaknesses, with the latter explicitly addressing tactics grounded in applying pressure.

Combining the insights of Noggle, Barnhill and Rudinow, we have developed a working definition of manipulation. We apply it exclusively in the context of an organization's motivational attempts to induce employees to exercise their discretionary efforts for the organization's mission and vision. Manipulation occurs when an agent attempts, through trickery or pressure, to divert a target's actions away from what the agent believes is the target's ideal outcome(s) in any given situation. In a workplace situation, this can happen in both directions: employers/managers towards employees and employees towards people in positions of authority. Nevertheless, this paper focuses on the top-down direction because of the power difference between managers and employees. This definition may not

be broad enough to cover possible manipulations in other contexts. However, it is sufficient to delineate manipulation in the narrow employer–employee motivational context.

2. *Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation*

In general, motivation is »a process that elicits, directs, and maintains behaviour, and motivational states are based on biological, cognitive, emotional, and social processes« (Mannell, 2014, 4159).

Motivational theories and practices are generally understood to be of two types: intrinsic and extrinsic motivators of human behaviour. Intrinsic motivation refers to the factors that prompt action based on the inherent satisfaction derived from the act rather than any external, separable consequences. Deci and Ryan (2000, 228–230) explain intrinsic motivation as being, technically, »the activities done for their own sake«. Intrinsic motivation derives from psychological rewards such as skill use, challenge, accomplishment, recognition, and respectful treatment, often influenced by management.

On the other hand, extrinsic motivation pertains to behaviours done for »reasons other than their inherent satisfaction« (Deci & Ryan, 2000, 228–230). Following Mullins and Rees (2023, 232) extrinsic motivation in the workplace arises from tangible rewards distinct from the work itself, such as salary, benefits, job security, promotions, and working conditions. These are often shaped at the organizational level and may be beyond the control of individual managers.

In this paper, we examine goal setting as one of the extrinsic theories of motivation.

3. *Extrinsic Motivation — Goal Setting*

Goal Setting as a motivational theory has primarily been developed from research experiments initiated by Gary Latham and Edwin Locke. In 1990, they published a book that presented aspects of Goal Setting Theory based on about 400 studies (Locke & Latham, 1990).

Research in goal setting demonstrates that people with specific, challenging goals will outperform those with do–your–best goals, easy goals or non–specific goals. »We concluded that the most effective goals for increasing performance are those that are specific and difficult« (Locke & Latham, 1990, 97).

Their research projects explored the counter–intuitive notion that high specific performance goals lead to higher levels of employee performance better than easy goals or exhortation to »do your best« (Locke & Latham, 2019, 99–104). Mere goal setting was sufficient; contrary to positive reinforcement claims, financial or other incentives were unnecessary to achieve these levels (Latham & Baldes, 1975; Latham & Saari, 1982).

Why does the setting of specific and difficult goals motivate people to higher levels of achievement? Researchers have suggested several possibilities. Some research suggests that attaining challenging goals leads to more internal and external benefits than other easy or non-specific goals (e.g., pride, educational credentials, better job, higher pay) (Mento et al., 1992). Furthermore, »because goals refer to future valued outcomes, the setting of goals is first and foremost a discrepancy-creating process. It implies discontent with one's present condition and the desire to attain an object or outcome« (Locke & Latham, 2006, 265). Goals may simply motivate one to use one's existing ability, may automatically »pull« stored task-relevant knowledge into awareness, and/or may motivate people to search for new knowledge. Specific goals also point people to direct their attention, energy and problem solving in a targeted direction for a greater effect than vague goals (Locke & Latham, 2006).

To summarize, for our purposes, those organizations that set specific, difficult goals for their employees who are committed to the goals, who have the requisite know-how, and who receive regular information on their performance will motivate their employees to higher performance levels.

4. Manipulation and Goal Setting

Our definition of manipulation holds that manipulation occurs when an agent attempts, through trickery or pressure, to divert a target's actions away from what the agent believes is the target's ideal outcome(s) in any given situation.

Goal setting shows that organizations with specific, challenging goals for committed employees who have the necessary skills and receive regular performance feedback motivate higher performance

So, does an organization practising goal setting attempt to manipulate its employees? It depends, and it may be hard to tell. First and foremost, it may be challenging to determine if the organization intends to divert their employees' actions away from the employees' "ideal outcome."

4.1. Case

The organization setting goals in the prescribed way, as defined above, clearly intends to improve the employees' job performance in the area specified by the goal setting. Let us assume they do this in the prescribed way and are clear, honest and transparent about why they are doing this and what they hope to accomplish. Let us also assume the organization does not attach either an incentive or a punishment, rather just a straightforward description of the specific difficult goals and purpose.

Is there anything that the organization has done that indicates what the organization is attempting to do regarding the employees' "ideal outcome" (self-interest)? The organization expects that the employees will follow the program and reach the company's goals either a) without even considering the employees'

interest at all or b) believing that the employees will see that in some way this coincides with or is compatible with their own self-interest. Of course, the organization is fully aware that the goal setting program covers a number of different employees, all of whom will have a variety of self-interests. As we saw in the section above on goal setting, some research suggests that attaining challenging goals leads to internal and external benefits, e.g., a sense of accomplishment and satisfaction, pride, educational credentials, a better job, and higher pay (Mento et al., 1992). The organization may legitimately believe that any or all of these either are or could be in the employees' self-interest.

As we have seen from the goal setting literature, goal commitment is vital to the success of goal setting. It does not appear that the organization has tried to deceive or trick the employees into committing to the organization's goal. The organization has clearly and transparently described the "what" and "why" of the goals.

What about diverting their attention away from that which the organization thinks is in the employees' self-interest through pressure? Again, it is hard to see how, especially as no punishment is attached to non-achievement. One could argue that even though there is no explicit mention of negative consequences, nonetheless, such pressure is inherent in the unequal power relationship between employers and employees.

There are two possible responses to this. Let us suppose the organization put forth the goal setting program and added an "or else" threat to it. Non-compliance will mean dismissal. In this case, we would argue that this is not manipulation but coercion. Perhaps the counter-argument might be that since no such clear threat was issued, then it is not coercion, however precisely because it was left unarticulated, employees will still nonetheless feel a kind of presumptive organizational pressure to comply. Our response would be that some employees may believe this, while others may not. In either case, what the target of the persuasion attempt believes is irrelevant to the issue of manipulation. What matters is the organization's intention. So, we think in our case, goal setting is a non-manipulative form of persuasion to increase employee motivation.

4.2. Altered Case Scenario

However, if the organization changes some of the goal setting design elements, the possibility of manipulation may arise. The most common example of a change is the inclusion of an incentive for successful goal achievement, typically bonus money. However, other inducements can include trips, time off, tickets to sporting or entertainment events, gift cards, etc.

Easily available professional sources, like blogs or websites, suggest that adding contests increases motivation in addition to existing goals or as a way to set goals. Here are three of more than two dozen examples. »Check out this list of sales contest ideas and execution to motivate your sales team and make selling fun again« (Tyre, s. a.). Or, »below you will find a list of 25 sales contest ideas managers can use to motivate reps and increase performance. You will see the

goal for each one, as well as how they work« (Guerra, 2024). Or, »choosing the right prizes for your sales contests can make all the difference in motivating your team. Here are some effective prize ideas, along with their pros and cons: Monetary prizes, like significant cash rewards, are always a hit because, let's face it, who doesn't love extra money? The downside is that cash prizes can sometimes feel a bit impersonal and might not build long-term motivation« (Lohr, 2024).

In the United States, the total sales expenditures were estimated to be over 26 billion dollars in 2000 (Lim et al., 2009). By 2013, the amount grew to almost 80 billion dollars (Poujol et al., 2016). This is despite the goal setting research literature that concludes rewards do not increase higher performance (Latham & Baldes, 1975, 123–124; Latham & Saari, 1982, 784–785).

4.3. *Becoming Manipulative*

Unfortunately, adding these various rewards opens the possibility of manipulation through trickery. There are several ways this might be done. One way would be to convince employees to believe they will get the bonus inducement if they reach the goal. Unbeknownst to the employees, the organization (or the individual manager) has designed the payout so it is nearly impossible to achieve. Another designed manipulation would include hiding or skewing the feedback data so the employees were never sure of their progress. This could also be done by creating a payout scheme so convoluted that the employees cannot be sure whether they have achieved the bonus. Another technique would change the end goal after the employees have started to work toward the goal. The goal recedes as the employees get closer to it.

Under these kinds of conditions, the organization might intend to divert the employees' actions away from what the organization believes is the employees' interest in getting the reward. The organization knows that the employees are generating extra effort (which is what the organization wants) while fooling the employees into believing that they will get rewarded for their efforts. We are not saying that the inclusion of a reward inducement is manipulative per se. We suggest it opens up the possibility of manipulation in ways that do not exist without an unrewarded goal setting.

So, we have established that these are all forms of manipulation, but are they unethical? In all of these instances, the manipulation takes the form of trickery through deception. The organization is attempting to get the employees to believe something that it does not believe. »When we undertake to deceive others intentionally, we communicate messages meant to mislead them, meant to make them believe what we ourselves do not believe. We can do so through gesture, through disguise, by means of action or inaction, even through silence« (Bok, 1999, 13).

Our position is that deception is *prima facie* wrong which means it is unethical unless there is some overriding compelling reason that there is no other way to achieve a higher good than truthfulness. The classic example is deceiving the Nazi authorities that one is hiding a Jewish family to keep them from being killed. We

see no such justification when an organization deceives — through any method — employees in an attempt to increase their performance. Like coercion, this significantly diminishes the employees' ability to make decisions based on their own calculation of importance to them. The research is clear that the proper implementation of goal setting will produce the organization's desired outcome in a non-manipulative way. So, this is an additional reason that it is wrong, because the organization can accomplish its goals in an ethical way.

There are other ways that employees may be manipulated under the guise of goal setting. Our examples have suggested that people in positions of higher authority operating in the name and interest of the organization as a whole have designed deceptive reward schemes. However, in many cases, the actual management of the goal setting actions is overseen by specific managers closer to the actual employees doing the work under the goal setting scheme. Their individual self-interests may not align with either the organization's interests or the organization's belief about the employees' interests. Let us assume that the organization has designed a non-manipulative goal setting scheme as described in our specific case. An individual manager holds a position of authority which makes it possible to manipulate employees in a variety of ways.

The individual manager could possibly, either through trickery or pressure, subvert the organization's non-manipulative design. Let us say, a manager wishing to increase his or her own status and visibility in the organization decides that having more of "my people" achieve the high-performance goal will make the manager look better. The manager goes to the individuals involved under the goal setting scheme and tells them "off the record" that while the organization has said that there will not be penalties for not achieving the high levels of performance, they have heard that it is not true. "Slackers will be sacked." The manager believes this extra pressure will spur the employees on to even higher levels of performance. In this instance, the manager uses trickery to increase the pressure on the employees. The attempt to do this is manipulative.

Or the manager could simply say that while the organization has not attached any penalty for not achieving the goals, they will not forget who has and who has not worked at a higher performance level. No need for the manager to specify what they will do with that knowledge, but the implied threat of negative consequences is clear enough.

The manager may decide to add some additional pressure, under the guise of providing feedback on progress toward the goal, by publicly posting and commenting on everyone's results (Tyre, s. a.). The manager intends to increase the pressure by making the results public but claims they are simply giving the necessary feedback. The manager could compound the pressure attempt through supposedly private one-on-one "coaching" sessions in which they imply, with plausible deniability through words and tone, additional pressure.

These pressure attempts may amount to manipulation depending on the intention of the manager. This can be harder to determine than the deception examples. The manager may not intend to manipulate the employee because he

or she is not trying to divert a target's actions away from what the agent believes is the target's ideal outcome(s). He or she is only focused on pressuring the employees to do more for the organization's outcome. Not every pressure example is a manipulation. Given the severity of the threat, it may rise to the level of explicit coercion. In the instance of posting the results publicly, the manager may believe and intend to simply introduce some excitement and fun into the goal attainment attempts (Crawford, 2024). In all of these pressure attempts, if we exclude those examples where the manager has an ulterior motive, the claim that the pressure is manipulative is harder to prove.

Once again, we might ask if they are unethical. Unlike trickery, pressure carries a kind of implied threat of undesirable consequences for the employee receiving the pressure. It is not even necessary that the threat ever be carried out or even intended to be carried out. The manager believes that this pressure may increase the motivation of the employees to higher levels of performance by overriding any other interests they may have.

This kind of pressure is a more subtle form of coercion, let us call it implied coercion. As such, like deception, this diminishes the employees' ability to make decisions based on their own calculation of importance to them. Just how much it diminishes any given employee's decisions depends completely on that employee's situation in life. It could have little or no effect, or it could significantly alter their choices. Even if an employee knows this is a manipulation, he or she may decide that a chance cannot be taken on the implied threat being actualized. From the manager's perspective, it only matters that this will alter their choices in the desired direction of the manager.

Both forms of manipulation, trickery or pressure, exhibit a degree of selfishness and callousness on the part of the manager. The manager's desired outcomes are thought to be more important than those of the employees. Thus, we suggest that attempts to add or to neglect aspects of a goal setting scheme should be looked upon with a high degree of ethical scrutiny.

5. Discussion of the Case

The case being dealt with in this paper focuses on manipulation within organizations from different angles. One case examines misleading reward and goal setting systems at the company level and one at the individual manager level. Manipulation is using deceptive or coercive tactics to divert individuals from what the manipulator believes is their ideal course of action. This understanding highlights unethical practices that diminish employee autonomy, exploit power imbalances, and undermine trust.

While these cases describe different scenarios, by analyzing the details in each case, we can extract a set of criteria that clearly indicate when manipulation is taking place. This is crucial because, in ethical organizational behaviour, actions should respect employees' autonomy and align with their genuinely expressed preferences. Instead, when manipulation enters the picture, open communicati-

on and genuine collaboration are replaced by tactics that distort reality or push employees into uncomfortable positions.

Summarizing from the case and its variants, we can identify the following criteria that signal manipulation is at play. Each criterion underscores how either trickery or pressure serves to divert employees from what they genuinely want or believe to be in their best interest.

Table 1. Explication of Criteria for Manipulation

Tablica 1: Eksplikacija kriterija za manipulaciju

Criteria for manipulation	What it looks like	Why it is manipulative
Intentional Concealment or Distortion of Information	A manager or organization withholds or skews important details about goals, rewards, or job responsibilities.	Employees cannot make truly informed decisions without a complete picture of the terms.
Misleading Goal Setting or Moving the Goalposts	Establishing a performance target that employees believe is legitimate, only to raise the threshold at the last minute. Alternatively, changing reward criteria without adequately informing employees.	Employees commit time and energy under the impression that they will gain something tangible or meaningful. The constant shifting of targets results in wasted effort and frustration, as employees never actually reach what they were promised.
Use of Deception in Reward Schemes	Promising a bonus or other incentive but designing the program so that it is nearly impossible to win or, in some cases, faking the existence of a reward altogether.	This kind of trickery directly exploits employees' desire for a fair incentive, pushing them to work harder under false pretenses.
Exploitation of Power Imbalances via Pressure or Threats	A manager hinting that failing to meet new performance expectations — despite no formal penalty — might still jeopardize an employee's career prospects. Alternatively, posting team results publicly to shame underperformers while praising those who comply without question.	Employees are pressured into compliance for fear of negative consequences, even if those threats remain vague. This fear can override employees' consideration of their own professional interests.

The hallmark of manipulation is the knowingly deceptive or coercive redirection of employees' efforts away from what they would personally consider ideal. The criteria for manipulation — intentional distortion or concealment of information, misleading goal setting, and exploitation of power imbalances — show how an organization or manager can manufacture a façade of opportunity.

In each of these examples, employees believe they are working toward a fair reward, a transparent goal, but in reality, they are being misled. These cases conclude that manipulative tactics are unethical, not only because they involve deception, trickery, and pressure but also because there are well-researched, non-manipulative ways to increase motivation through proper goal setting design and intent.

Conclusion

This study explores the connection between manipulation and motivation in organizational settings, utilizing Goal Setting Theory. The paper develops a context-specific definition of manipulation as occurring »when an agent attempts, through trickery or pressure, to divert a target's actions away from what the agent believes is the target's ideal outcome«. This definition is fine-tuned for organizational settings, providing a clear conceptual tool for distinguishing legitimate motivational practices from manipulative ones.

From the viewpoint of extrinsic motivation, our review of goal setting literature demonstrated that specific, challenging goals can legitimately boost performance. Unfortunately, they can be twisted into manipulative schemes when organizations or individual managers distort feedback or shift targets without transparency. Through hypothesized cases, the paper shows how deceptive reward structures and implied penalties push employees to meet organizational ends at the expense of their own interests.

The ethical fault line lies in whether organizations or management respects employees' autonomy and accurately represents the nature and consequences of new tasks, goals, or incentives. These motivational techniques can yield heightened performance and deeper engagement when practised aligned, transparently and clearly, with employees' expressed interests. However, when they rely on misinformation, coercion, or hidden agendas, they cross the boundary into unethical manipulation as defined by our working concept. It is about the employers' perception, not about the truth of the situation. We can think of examples of employers who are just wrong in perceiving their employees' self-interest. And while this might result in actions that go against employees' wishes, it is not manipulation. Recognizing this distinction is critical for fostering organizational trust and building a sustainable culture premised on fairness, informed consent, and genuine collaboration.

This paper's limitation is its narrow focus on one motivation model, goal setting, and a specific definition of manipulation from select philosophical sources. While this targeted approach allows for case construction, it does not exami-

ne other influential motivational theories like Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory, Self-Determination Theory, Vroom's Expectancy Theory, or Behavioural Consequence Management (Positive Reinforcement). Additionally, the paper lacks empirical validation of the definitions and scenarios, relying on largely hypothetical examples from prior research, which limits generalization across diverse organizational contexts. Finally, the discussion mainly addresses hierarchical workplaces, potentially excluding non-hierarchical structures like start-ups or flat organizations.

Future studies extending beyond goal setting could utilize both quantitative and qualitative approaches to assess manipulative tactics across various organizational contexts. Comparative analyses across cultures could determine if non-hierarchical structures or distinct cultural norms impact the frequency of manipulation. Additionally, empirical evaluation of ethical interventions (such as oversight committees or training programs) might unveil effective strategies to reduce these behaviours. Lastly, employee-focused research utilizing interviews or focus groups would provide a deeper understanding of how individuals perceive, interpret, and react to manipulation, thus guiding the development of more ethical and impactful organizational strategies.

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Manipulacija i motivacija postavljanjem ciljeva: Neistražen etički odnos

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Sažetak

Manipulacija je dobro proučena u psihologiji i filozofiji, a postoji i važna literatura o teorijama motivacije u organizacijama. Ipak, nedostaje temeljita analiza o tom jesu li organizacijske prakse motivacije manipulativne. Ovaj rad istražuje kako teorija postavljanja ciljeva, jedna od temeljnih ekstrinzičnih tehnika motivacije, može biti etički neupitna ili može postati neetična manipulacija. Na temelju filozofskih perspektiva u radu je motivacija definirana kao upraba trikova ili pritiska kako bi se odvratili zaposlenici od onoga za što manipulator vjeruje da su njihovi idealni ishodi. Analiza je usredotočena na to kako organizacije ili menadžeri mogu osmisliti obmanjujuće ili prisiljavajuće programe postavljanja ciljeva — kroz promjenu ciljeva, iskrivljene povratne informacije ili iskorištavanjem razlike u moći — te kako takve prakse kompromitiraju autonomiju i povjerenje zaposlenika. U suprotnosti tomu, transparentno postavljanje ciljeva koje poštuje interese pojedinaca i komunicira objektivne i potencijalne nagrade može, etički prikladno, poboljšati izvedbu zato što istraživanja pokazuju da postavljanje ciljeva radi bez manipulativnih taktika. Zbog toga je manipulacija i nepotrebna i neetička. Rad završava ističući potrebu za jasnom, iskrenom komunikacijom i poštivanjem istinskih ciljeva zaposlenika u svrhu održavanja poštenih i učinkovitih praksi u organizacijama.

Ključne riječi: manipulacija; motivacija; postavljanje ciljeva; Edwin Locke; Gary Latham

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