



Book Reviews

**Pavo Barišić,
Jörg-Wilhelm Wernecke (eds.)**

Welt und Wahrheit / World and Truth

In memoriam Arno Baruzzi

Nomos, Baden-Baden 2024

This collection of papers, dedicated to philosophical reflections on the world, is content-wise and thematically connected with a special section of the conference “World in Philosophy” (30th Days of Frane Petrić, Cres, September 25 – October 1, 2022) which was dedicated to the memory of the German philosopher Arno Baruzzi (1935–2016). Along with the editor of this publication, Pavo Barišić, Baruzzi initiated the Augsburg-Zagreb philosophical discussions in 1988, where he played a key role. As part of this valuable framework, named *Welt in der Philosophie – Philosophie in der Welt* (“World in Philosophy – Philosophy in the World”), three conferences were held between 1988 and 1993 in Augsburg and Zagreb. Selected papers presented at these three conferences were published in special sections of the journal *Filozofska istraživanja* (27 [1988], 38–39 [5–6/1990], and 50 [3/1993]). The Augsburg-Zagreb philosophical discussions and the published works, however, were not the beginning of reflections on the world in contemporary Croatian philosophy, nor were they, by any means, the end. The vitality of the idea of the world in contemporary Croatian philosophy is also evidenced by the 30th Days of Frane Petrić, where the world was the main theme of the conference. The international context and relevance of this topic are further demonstrated by the collection of papers presented here, marking the culmination of Baruzzi’s initiative.

The book opens with a comparative article by Mislav Ježić titled “The World in Indian and

European Philosophy”. Ježić begins with a fundamental assertion about the world as an encompassing concept of objects that appear external to consciousness. The world, therefore, is posterior, a realm of arising, enduring, and ceasing; beyond it lies the a priori sphere of being, the sheer fact of existence, which neither begins nor ends. In addition to this approach, Ježić distinguishes another perspective where the law of reason determines and organizes the experience of the external world. This means that cognitive faculties structure experience by approaching the world from within, through experience. The article, in three sections, evaluates and compares these two ideas – one which could be conditionally termed cosmological and ontological, and the other epistemological. Ježić begins with the oldest cosmological layer, comparing the Vedic cosmology of the *Puruṣasūkta* and the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* with Plato’s dialogue *Timaeus*. Both accounts assume a creator who grants deities the authority to shape the mortal part of beings, while the creator himself is responsible for the soul, the immortal part of mortal beings. Through detailed philological analysis, Ježić sees parallels as differing realizations of ancient ideas inherited from Indo-European or even deeper antiquity. In a second comparison, Ježić elaborates on the epistemology of the classical Indian *Sāṃkhya* school, juxtaposing it with Schopenhauer’s concept of the world as representation and Husserlian phenomenology. In *Sāṃkhya*, a system of cognitive and active faculties is developed; from the perspective of cognitive faculties, the world is no longer a realistic, object-based world but is articulated into five spheres of sense objects. From the information provided by these five areas, the material phenomenal world is constructed. In this sense, the external world is a representation. In the section on early Buddhism, Ježić develops the Buddhist idea of the world as a path leading to liberation from suffering. Buddhism developed a nuanced articulation of experience, emphasizing inner experience; consequently, Buddhism does not aim

to transform the world but to reshape one's inner experience. The climax and conclusion of the article focus on the practical ramifications of world-conceptions in the ethics of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and Aśoka's edicts. These texts shape a sort of categorical imperative: in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the imperative to act without desire for the fruits of one's actions, and in Aśoka's inscriptions, Ježić highlights a universal ethical legislation promoting actions for the welfare of the world.

Schopenhauer's concept of the world as representation, broadly outlined in Ježić's comparative article, is further developed in Yasuo Kamata's study "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung in der Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers". In this article, Schopenhauer's fundamental notion of the Will is examined from the perspective of transcendental idealism. The paper is structured into five chapters. The introduction presents Kamata's interpretation of Schopenhauer's core ideas – "will" and "representation" – as intrinsically linked to two forms of consciousness: self-consciousness (awareness of oneself) and object-consciousness (awareness of external things). The second chapter defines the key concepts of consciousness and representation. The third chapter explores consciousness in relation to experience, moving towards the subjective dimension – the constitution of consciousness – where Schopenhauer extends Kant's argument for the transcendental priority of the inner sense over the outer. The fourth chapter analyses the connection between consciousness and the Will, further exploring how self-consciousness recognizes itself as Will and how the world, as Will, manifests within the domain of object-consciousness. Kamata focuses on *Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde*, which he regards as the foundation of Schopenhauer's entire philosophical system, along with the theoretical expositions in his magnum opus, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, particularly the first book and the first halves of the second and third books. He aligns the forms of self-consciousness and object-consciousness with the inner and outer senses, as well as with the subject-object dichotomy, both of which are fundamentally structured by time and space. Kamata argues that this immediate experience serves as the philosophical foundation for Schopenhauer's notion of Will. In contrast, object-consciousness organizes external objects according to the formal conditions of time, space, and causality. Schopenhauer denies that objects of the external world exist independently in themselves. The designation of representation as an "object for a subject" signifies the fragmentation of consciousness

into object and subject, a division encapsulated in Schopenhauer's famous assertion that the world is one's representation. Kamata concludes that Schopenhauer's conception of the world as representation emerges from this dual structure of consciousness.

Stjepan Radić's article "Welt und Leben als ästhetische Phänomene in der Philosophie Friedrich Nietzsches" ("World and Life as Aesthetic Phenomena in the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche") explores the concepts of World and Life within Friedrich Nietzsche's aestheticizing philosophy. Radić begins by clarifying Nietzsche's assertion that art holds primacy over philosophy, arguing that philosophy itself should adopt a literary-poetic mode of expression. For Nietzsche, both the world and life must be approached as aesthetic phenomena. Aesthetic experience is conceived as a shared engagement – an act of co-creation and fusion with the artwork – implying that World and Life can only be grasped artistically, transforming them into aesthetic phenomena. In discussing the World as a continuum of Becoming, Radić interprets Nietzsche's departure from a scientifically structured and principle-governed reality. The world, in Nietzsche's view, resists conceptualization through fixed categories of order and structure, as it is an elusive process of constant flux. Consequently, it can only be comprehended – and endured – through an artistic lens. From the perspective that reality is not the realm of ideal forms but rather the world traditionally dismissed as mere appearance, Nietzsche develops his vision of the world as a self-generating work of art. Within this framework, the creator and the created (the world) are ultimately one. For Nietzsche, art and life are inextricably linked. Radić elaborates on this connection through the concept of embodied life, rejecting the notion of a Self or substance. Life manifests through the body as the energy of artistic creativity. This creative force is an expression of the will to power – the drive through which life overcomes itself. In this sense, Life can either be lived and endured or artistically experimented with, as an affirmation of its own transformative potential.

Following comparative and post-Hegelian themes, the volume continues with an article by Harald Bergbauer, a student and doctoral candidate of Arno Baruzzi, titled "Die Bedeutung der Theorie der Achsenzeit für die Geschichtsphilosophie von Eric Voegelin" ("The Significance of the Theory of Axial Age for Eric Voegelin's Philosophy of History"). Voegelin's political philosophy, influenced by Karl Jaspers and Hannah Arendt, underlies Baruzzi's philosophical project. After World War II, a profound existential crisis spurred

debates on historical and intellectual epochs. Within this context – outlined in the article’s introduction – Jaspers formulated his concept of the Axial Age. He proposed that history provides a framework for understanding the present, situating the axial shift around 500 BCE, with pivotal spiritual developments occurring between 800 and 200 BCE, including figures like Confucius, Laozi, Buddha, the Hebrew prophets, Homer, the Pre-Socratic, and Greek tragedians. In *The New Science of Politics* (1952), Voegelin entered into a discussion with Jaspers’ theory just three years after the publication of *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*. The article meticulously traces the evolution of Voegelin’s critique across three phases: the early 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s. While largely adopting Jaspers’ theory, Voegelin integrates it with Bergson’s notion of the transition from closed to open societies. However, he argues that this transition occurred only in the West, not in China, India, or Persia. He also contests the idea that the Axial Age coincides with the emergence of philosophy, claiming its origins are uniquely Greek. Furthermore, his chronological analysis challenges the idea of the axis around 500 BCE. In addition, Voegelin believes that a Philosophy of History that does not take into account Moses and Christ, whose era lies outside the boundaries of the Achsenzeit period, has a serious flaw. For Voegelin, the Axial Age – or *Ökumenische Zeitalter* (Ecumenical Age) – is one component in the search for a higher order. It is not merely a historical event but a basis for discourse on universal humanity. Despite divergences, Bergbauer demonstrates that Voegelin saw Jaspers’ theory as a decisive companion on his path toward an independent philosophy of history.

Klaus Mainzer, President of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts, contributes to the volume with his article “Innovation and Democracy. Phase Transition of Europe in Competitiveness with Worldwide Technological, Societal, and Value Systems”. The article begins with a dedication to Arno Baruzzi, Mainzer’s colleague at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Augsburg. In the introduction, the author outlines the contemporary landscape of globalization and technological innovation within the framework of economic growth and the imperative for innovation. He argues that Europe’s capacity for innovation, within the legal structure of democracy, relies on interdisciplinary collaboration through problem-oriented research that transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries. The core of the article consists of eleven key points, beginning with the philosophical foundations of science and extending to the dynamics of innovation, referencing figures

such as Franjo Petrić and Ruder Bošković. It then explores themes of socio-dynamics, phase transitions, innovation, and disruption, with a particular focus on sustainable innovation portfolios and their intersection with pressing global issues, including future challenges, sustainability, energy technologies, information and communication systems, artificial intelligence, and global competitiveness. The article also examines Europe’s profile in sustainable innovation and democracy in relation to major geopolitical competitors such as the United States, Russia, and China. Mainzer concludes by asserting that action and decision-making in complex systems must be examined through the lens of mathematical modelling. However, given the unpredictability of conflict and disruption, mathematical models alone are insufficient, necessitating human agency and decision-making. Political and economic decisions operate at a deeper level, where individuals, consciously or unconsciously, act based on legal, cultural, and religious values – values shaped by centuries of tradition that influence socialization and governance. The article presents these values as structural parameters within legal, cultural, and religious dynamics. Finally, in light of global challenges, Mainzer calls for the promotion of peaceful coexistence and cultural balance to prevent the potential collapse of civilization.

Hiroshi Kabashima, another of Arno Baruzzi’s doctoral students, contributes to the volume with a comparative and synthetic article, “Gesetz des Universums” (“Law of the Universe”), in which he integrates themes from contemporary science, European metaphysics, and Buddhism. Dedicated to Baruzzi, the article explores whether a universal law of the cosmos can be comprehended from both a physical and a meta-physical perspective. The meta-physical law for the soul and the physical law of nature for the body belong to the same overarching principle. In an age dominated by science and technology, human understanding is often confined to what is measurable, possessable, and ultimately feasible. Yet, the law governing the soul would be freedom itself. In the third, fourth, and fifth chapters, Kabashima engages in a well-informed discussion of contemporary physics, focusing on relativity theory, quantum mechanics, and the pursuit of unification through string theory. However, as superstring theories remain purely mathematical hypotheses unverified by experimental evidence, a fundamental challenge persists: What, precisely, constitutes the universe, and what is its governing natural law? Following a critical discussion of natural law in theoretical physics, Kabashima turns to the question of what concept of law

can provide moral orientation for human existence, offering a path toward a meaningful and self-assured life. He invokes Plato, for whom the laws of the Polis unify truth, justice, and beauty under a single principle – the Idea of the Good. Thomas Aquinas' concept of law similarly integrates the natural law governing humanity in this world with the divine law guiding salvation in the afterlife. Kabashima then examines the Calvinist predestination and Weber's Protestant-capitalist ethic, questioning whether a law for a meaningful life, ultimate happiness, and eternal peace can be postulated. As a counterbalance, he introduces Buddhism, presenting its fundamental principles in broad strokes. In Nāgārjuna's doctrine of emptiness, Kabashima identifies a crucial insight: material phenomena do not exist as independent substances but as interdependent conditions and effects, flowing seamlessly within the undifferentiated unity of the cosmos. Similarly, the self exists only in relation to all material and sentient beings, conditioned by internal and external forces. Recognizing this interconnectedness, a conscious human being affirms existence in every relational encounter. To attain this state of awareness is the perfection of wisdom in the heart – enlightenment.

Jesús Padilla Gálvez's article, "World, Reality, and State of Affairs", explores the concepts of world and reality in Wittgenstein's philosophy. The author begins by posing the question: What does world mean for Wittgenstein? He refers to Wittgenstein's definition in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*: "The world is everything that is the case." Wittgenstein approaches this by asserting that any statement we make about observations of reality – hence about the world – is expressed as a fact. The article highlights Wittgenstein as the first philosopher to establish a concept of the world based on a triangulation of facts and events. However, this being the case does not reside in things themselves but in the existence of facts. These facts configure a world embedded within logical space, implying that the world as a whole must possess an internal structure. This structure ensures that different subjective realities share a common logical form. The author interprets Wittgenstein's view of the self as a drive toward constructing a self-image of the world, which it then takes to be its reality. Reality, therefore, is not merely a model of the world but an ethical model of it. This distinction is crucial: while the world itself is ethically neutral, reality is ethically characterized. Any state of affairs – such as beliefs, assumptions, or hypotheses – can be either positive or negative. However, the positive facts imposed by the world cannot be overridden by the positive and negative

aspects that shape reality. For Wittgenstein, this process precedes our knowledge of the world as a sum of positive facts. Furthermore, he suggests that a rigorous conceptualization of the world can provide the same kind of subjective certainty that religion does – offering not only structure but also a sense of assurance or existential certainty.

Pavo Barišić, Baruzzi's doctoral student and co-initiator, alongside him, of the Augsburg-Zagreb philosophical discussions, contributed a paper titled "Welt, Ordnung und Wahrheit" ("World, Order, and Truth"). Barišić begins by reflecting on the concepts of order and truth as fundamental frameworks for understanding the world, in contrast to notions such as illusion, appearance, and chaos. Examining the development of ancient cultures and philosophy, he emphasizes the discovery of the world as order and truth as a cultural dominant. Following Baruzzi's insights, Barišić focuses on truth as a prerequisite for order in the world. Baruzzi, through his studies across various cultural domains, explored the struggle between truth and falsehood. The destructive power and violence of lies led Baruzzi to concentrate on the phenomenon of falsehood, culminating in his book *Philosophie der Lüge* (*The Philosophy of the Lie*). For Baruzzi, philosophy was a critique of its time, and above all, he sought to understand why and how falsehood – rather than truth – assumed such a fundamental place in human affairs. However, as Barišić's paper argues, truth is essential to the world's order. His central thesis is that falsehood is the source of disorder – a force that threatens the world's structure. According to Augustine, falsehood is a rebellion against God and the cosmic order, while for Kant, it represents an act of self-exaltation and defiance against the moral order. By contrast, Heidegger's understanding of truth, which sought to move beyond Plato's conception, is cantered on the metaphor of clearing/lightning (*Lichtung*). This concept highlights illumination as the defining feature of truth. In the contemporary "post-truth" era, Barišić identifies mass communication as a site of truth's suppression. However, he does not see this as a novel phenomenon, but rather as one of the recurring crises of truthfulness that have always afflicted humanity, differing only in the techniques and media through which they manifest. The digitalization of communication has exponentially increased the speed and reach of information, and with it, the space for falsehood has expanded. Falsehood erodes trust in the institutions of the political community. Yet, at the heart of this world of order and truth stands the human being, the true bearer of values. Thus, well-organized

societies must establish legal frameworks that safeguard truth, ensuring the stability of order. Zdravko Radman's article, "The 'Enworlded' Mind. An Outline of a Mundane Corporeality", examines the problem of the world in relation to the body/brain-mind complex. Body/brain-mind are frequently discussed in philosophy but less so in the context of the world itself. The author starts from the premise that the concept of the world should be understood as a constitutive part of the phenomenon of the mind, rather than as an external horizon or mere addition to the mental. Furthermore, Radman seeks to establish a closer connection between the body and the world in order to develop an integral approach to the phenomenon of the spirit – one that is attuned to environment. He critiques views that treat the mind as an internal processing system. Instead, Radman argues for a shift away from a brain-centric perspective, asserting that the life of the mind cannot be reduced solely to brain activity. Rather, a broader, world-inclusive framework is philosophically more appropriate, as it suggests that the "home" of the mind lies within a wider existential structure to which it is intrinsically directed. In cognitive science, there has been increasing recognition that the mind is not merely an internalized entity but is actively engaged with its environment. Radman further elaborates on the 4E framework, according to which the mind is embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended. While the 4E approach acknowledges the role of the environment, it tends to treat it as a given rather than as an integral aspect of cognition. Special attention is given to the concept of the Extended Mind, yet even this does not fully account for the ultimate horizon that defines the scope of human cognition – the world itself. To address this limitation, Radman supplements the 4E model with a fifth element – the 'Enworldment'. Paraphrasing Kant, he asserts that a world without a mind would be empty, just as a mind without a world would be blind. He concludes that mind and world are co-constituted, forming a single 'humiverse' – a world that actively shapes the creativity and imagination of the mind.

The article "Body and The Limit of Human Enhancement" by Jin-Woo Lee begins with the assertion that the human body is at the centre of discussions on transhumanism. The author raises several questions, two of which play a key role. The first is: what happens to the body when it is enhanced by technology, and what is the cost of such enhancement? The second concerns the moral role of the body in making our lives more humane. The author's response is that the ethical question of how to live must be based on the cultivation of our bodies. If advanced technology

can improve human nature, then it is clear that the goal of human enhancement technologies is to overcome the physicality of human nature. Referring to transhumanist apologetics, the author describes what aspects of the body can be "enhanced" through technology and to what extent. However, the more transhumanism seeks to eliminate the body, the more it is confronted with the problem of embodiment. The author distinguishes and explains three types of embodiment: "treatment," "improvement," and "enhancement." By embodiment, he refers to the way in which humans are connected to the world through technology, which enhances us and integrates machines into our biological world. If we seek to enhance our existence in the world, the central problem is the Body, which transhumanists see as the main source of obstacles and limitations to human life and happiness. If we wish to live a long and happy life, we must overcome our bodies. The author emphasizes that the body is the limit of human enhancement, supporting this claim with an analysis of what happens to a body that has been technologically modified.

Jörg Wernecke, who was Baruzzi's assistant at the University of Augsburg, participated in all Augsburg-Zagreb conferences between 1988 and 1993. In his article "Von der Kosmologie der Algorithmen und algorithmisierten Kosmogonien" ("On the Cosmology of Algorithms and Algorithmized Cosmogonies"), he examines how contemporary developments in computer science – particularly artificial intelligence and big data – shape our perception and understanding of the world. Wernecke begins with a surprising claim: despite prevailing classifications of our era as modern or postmodern, we are actually living at the end of the Baroque period. He argues that the Baroque era, which saw the emergence of mechanical computers, is now culminating in advanced thought and illusion machines – completing a developmental trajectory that began centuries ago. His diagnosis of our time as a continuation of the Baroque is based on Arno Baruzzi's thesis about the connection between thinking and machines: that human thought is fundamentally shaped by the concept of the machine. Wernecke adopts this idea but modifies it in light of contemporary algorithmic machines. He explores how these modern machines reshape not only our present reality but also our broader understanding of the world itself. This shift in perspective – from thinking about machines to understanding the world through machines – leads to a transformation in how we perceive technology. The classical machine has evolved into the algorithmic machine, which now defines our world in two key ways: (a)

The Cosmology of Algorithms – Algorithms function as autonomous, self-generating, and self-replicating entities, creating a cosmos – a world governed by algorithms. If the world is understood as a “cosmos,” then it can be described as an algorithmic machine world. (b) Algorithmized Cosmogony – This refers to the generation of worlds through semiotic machines, meaning that our lifeworlds are increasingly constituted by algorithms. The central focus of these discussions is the concept and phenomenon of the “world” – specifically, the ways in which algorithmic machines actively create worlds. Wernecke explores how these machines define and shape our reality, fundamentally altering the modes of world creation in the digital and technological age.

“Gedenkschrift” *Welt und Wahrheit* concludes with the article “Der Weltcharakter der Erfahrung” (“The Worldly Character of Experience”) by Niels Weidtmann. At the beginning, the author programmatically states that the world cannot become the object of experience because all experience takes place within the world and, therefore, presupposes it. Likewise, the world cannot be constituted or constructed, as it is always already assumed in any such attempt. The knowing subject is itself embedded in the world, and since the world is already presupposed, we can only have an “idea” of it. The world does not precede experiences; rather, it arises with and through them. Phenomenology identifies the world as a structural moment of experience. The author then discusses the worldly character of experience by introducing the perspectives of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Nishida. Merleau-Ponty challenges the assumption that science can teach us to see things in the world more clearly. Instead, he argues, science alienates us from the world because it refrains from “being present” with things. A way of seeing is capable of grasping the “deep life” of things, in which the interwoven nature of things in the world becomes evident. Thus, seeing always perceives more than what is actually “there”; it has the power to reveal the world. The world-opening power that Merleau-Ponty attributes to perception is similarly applied to language and play by Heidegger and Fink. Japanese phenomenology also presents a philosophy that takes experience as the fundamental reality. Weidtmann then introduces the philosophy of “pure experience” developed by the Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitarō. Nishida understands pure experience as an experience that neither enters into a distinction with the experiencer, as occurs in reflection, nor does it refer to anything beyond itself. Since it is complete presence and relates to nothing external, pure experience cannot open the world.

Phenomenology of experience and the philosophy of pure experience seem to contradict each other. However, Weidtmann argues that they reflect each other in their contradiction and can therefore serve as mutual correctives. Nevertheless, Nishida’s philosophy of “pure experience” does not aim at the power of experience to open the world; rather, it shows that experience, by its very nature, refers to nothing and is therefore meaningless in the strictest sense.

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Lebendiger Zen – Lebendige Philosophie

Dōgen: shōbō genzō – Besinnen im wahrhaften dharma Buddhas

LIT Verlag, Wien 2020

Living Zen – Living Philosophy by Hisaki Hashi is an extraordinary work that reinterprets the teachings of Zen master Dōgen within a modern philosophical context. The book is aimed at readers who are interested in both the profound philosophy of Zen Buddhism and the connection of these ideas to the challenges of the global present. Hashi succeeds in building bridges between traditional Zen teachings and contemporary philosophical questions by transforming Dōgen’s teachings into a living and current philosophy.

The work is divided into three main sections, each addressing different aspects of Zen Buddhism and its application in the modern world. Each of these sections is carefully crafted and reflects Hashi’s deep understanding and long engagement with Dōgen’s teachings.

In the first section, “Living Zen – Zen and the Present”, Hashi lays the foundation for understanding Zen practice and its significance in today’s world. She begins with an introduction that highlights the challenges of translating and interpreting Dōgen’s work. Dōgen’s *Shōbō Genzō* is considered one of the most difficult works of classical Japanese literature, particularly due to its specific terminology and the unique way Dōgen combines Chinese