

of “Buddha-nature”, which encompasses the idea that all beings possess Buddha-nature and should therefore be treated with respect and compassion. Hashi discusses how this idea is relevant in a time of ecological crises and how it can contribute to an ethic of sustainability and respect for the natural world.

To conclude, *Living Zen – Living Philosophy* is an extraordinary work that sets new standards both in content and form. Hisaki Hashi succeeds not only in translating and commenting on Dōgen’s complex teachings but also in bringing them into dialogue with the philosophical and ethical questions of the present. The book not only offers a profound engagement with *Zen* Buddhism it also brilliantly demonstrates how Dōgen’s teachings can remain relevant in a global, interconnected world.

For readers interested in *Zen* Buddhism, philosophy, and the intersection of these two fields, this book is an indispensable work. It challenges the reader to engage in deep reflection and to understand the principles of *Zen* not only intellectually but also in practice. Hashi’s book is not just an academic treatise but an invitation to living practice and to the development of a philosophy that meets the demands of our time.

Jana S. Rošker

Philipa Rothfield

Dance and the Corporeal Uncanny

Philosophy in Motion

Routledge, London 2022

Dance is both basically and exhaustively inefable. The art of dancing stands at the primary source of all the arts that manifest themselves first in the human person. The magnitude of dancing, in the broad sense, thus indicates the fact that it is plainly a particular objective plea to that common rhythm which characterizes all the physical and spiritual manifestations of life. The art of dancing, additionally, is inextricably interwoven with all human traditions, while some of the enlightened philosophers and the most ancient civilizations

have considered the dance as the pattern in accordance with which the moral life of man must be entwined. Dance and philosophy, moreover, are two poles that sometimes draw close, twisting together in an intimate web of the strongest silk, and at other times they drift apart, an ocean of indecipherable depths separating them. The philosophy of dance is a flourishing ground of inquiry, and this enlightening book seeks to portray something of the breadth of dance studies, cultural critique, ethnography, and postcolonial theory pursuing an interdisciplinary audience in philosophy, dance, and cultural surveys.

Paralleling the focus of dance scholarship on the body, this entrancing book entitled *Dance and the Corporeal Uncanny: Philosophy in Motion*, masterfully written by Philipa Rothfield (a senior lecturer at La Trobe University (Melbourne), and a professor at the University of Southern Denmark), takes the philosophy of the body into the field of dance via the lens of subjectivity and its critique. Through pursuing two kinds of approaches, it mainly revolves around dance and performance as its devoted territory of practice to enunciate a philosophy of agency and motion. This is articulated through the figure of the dancer. For phenomenology, the subject is the key; it is argued that the separation of the dancer and the dance is out of question; without the dancer, there would be no dance. Nietzschean philosophy takes a different view, though. It illustrates that the dance can be reckoned without the dancer. The book’s underlying aim is, thus, to bring up a discussion of the body in dance without “settling on a singular solution, not only to fully explore the subject-position of the dancer but also to open up a corporeal conversation beyond the plane of the subject” (p. 2).

The current book is both practice-based and philosophical in its orientation. Structurally, the book consists of seven chapters, a prologue as an introduction, and an epilogue as a conclusion, each of which has its own outstanding merit. Thematically, this book intends to cover and consider two alternative, pertinent paradigms through Part I (with four chapters) and Part II (with three chapters), as follows. The two conceptual prospects it traverses are “both corporeal in focus, but divided on the question of subjectivity” (p. 4) and its affiliation to the body. Both are explored to fathom the figure of the dancer: the first paradigm is phenomenological, while the second is interpretation of Nietzschean philosophy. Their disparities lie in the place of the subject within a philosophy of action. The book clearly delineates how dissimilarity, privilege, power, and politics influence dance practices,

whether in the studio, at the performance venue, or on the dirt floor.

The focal point in Part I is upon the figure of experience, in particular, the experience of the dancer. It inspects the activity of dancing from the dancer's perspective, applying Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological philosophy in order to elucidate the dancer's experience of motion. The first half of the book explores an account of the body in subjective terms. It employs the figure of experience as it appears in practice, in the body of the dancer. It endeavours to acknowledge the difference(s) in affective and systematic details and terms, and is clearly displayed through the structure of movement subjectivity (MS) and "its allied modes of kinaesthetic sensibility" (p. 7). Practice is refracted in the body, entrenched in the dancer's demeanour, and demonstrated in action. Even though characterized by broader social and political forces, and located in connection with numerous realms of practice, its domain of analysis remains on the plane of the subject. Part II draws on a quite different conceptual landscape, representing a critique of the subject. It begins with Nietzsche's famous quotation that "there is no doer behind the deed". Subjectivity is, for Nietzsche, "symptomatic, a pathological formation imbued with morality if not agency" (p. 7).

Chapter 1 commences with an analysis and a strategy developed by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological philosophy, and discusses dancing from the perspective of the dancer in order to certify the relation between concept and the body. According to this strategy, every person experiences their body differently and that our senses have an impact on how we think and behave. This way of thinking can be applied while dancing as well. The author highlights how an individual's thoughts, emotions, and experiences shape their distinctive style as a dancer.

Chapter 2 introduces the concept of MS, which refers to a dancer's particular characteristics and tendencies. It adopts Shaun Gallagher's differentiation between body image and body schema in order to explicate Merleau-Ponty's comprehension of these two moments, "one perceptual, the other organizational" (p. 5). It is argued that MS is generated via practice, but also that the body is an active participant in that practice, bringing to the encounter the dancer's history, orientation, preferences, and projects. MS is thereby the offshoot of practice but also a mode of individual variation.

The third chapter tackles the perceptual ramifications of thinking the subjectivity of the dancer in association with her kinaesthetic situation. It commences with the corporeal ethnography of Thomas Csordas, who builds

on Merleau-Ponty's perceptual philosophy to characterize the ethnographic encounter. It sifts through the impact of diversity on dance, and delves into the potential political and ethical difficulties. It contends that MS is inextricably linked to the perception of politics and investigates kinaesthetic sensibility and approaches to dance research on bodily variation through a social and political lens. It conceptualizes numerous findings of dance ethnographers, suggesting that the perceptual subject is no longer a blank slate.

The fourth and last chapter in Part I investigates Korean dance's kinesthetic sensibility, perception, and spectatorship using Dipesh Chakrabarty's project of postcolonial history, and proposes a pluralized approach towards the categorization of Korean dance. It also probes the ways in which Korean dance has been characterized, regarding questions of modernity, modernism, and tradition. It exploits the work of Luce Irigaray to represent the strategic interventions of dance critic Daisuke Muto in staging work in Asia for an Asian spectatorship.

Chapter 5, "Nietzsche and the Ontology of Force", features "an ontological break with the phenomenological approach to dance" as that which associates the activity and agency of the dance with the dancer (p. 122). To do so, it proposes a substitute conception of dance, one which inspects the workings of force in the formulation of movement. The switch to a conception of relational force, as that which demonstrates and creates the body, intends to re-evaluate what a body is and what a body performs. Deleuze's delicate amplification of force commences with an ontological recreation of dance in terms of bodies and forces. In accord with this procedure, the body is a fleeting creation, "a provisional resolution of relations of force" (p. 122). Such a perspective will constitute the foundation for a focus on particular routes in which forces amalgamate so as to generate movement. This chapter is in attempt to construe the given terms with respect to "the activity of dance, the force of history, habit formation and kinaesthetic provenance" (p. 9). The dancer's agency, central to phenomenological thought, is devised and reproduced here amongst relations of force.

In Chapter 6, Nietzschean typology is extended into the field of dance, its types are elaborated and, ultimately, the character of subjectivity and its role within the activity of dance are explored. The chapter reinterprets the dancing body and shifts the emphasis from the dancer's agency to force interactions using a typological framework. The concepts of Foucault and Deleuze are combined in this framework to conceptualize cultural formation as a type of subject construction based

on force. The author also looks at the development of kinesthetic forms, and the use of subjectivity in postmodern and somatic methodologies.

The seventh and final chapter is “a work of context, of a situated, colonial history and the survival, agency and creative expression of its First Nations peoples” (p. 11). It states that to break in a dance studio, walk, run, or jump in Australia is to set foot on Aboriginal land. It relies on the work of Toula Nicolacopoulos and George Vassilacopoulos, who reverse the colonizing gaze of concurrent Australian culture to concentrate on the being of the colonizer. The chapter complements and enhances their task with the writings of Indigenous scholars Gary Foley, Larissa Behrendt and Aileen Moreton-Robinson, and delves into the emotive terrain of white spectatorship in connection with two effective remarks of

Indigenous sovereignty, the performance work of SJ Norman, and the on-field dancing of footballer, Adam Goodes. The book sums up with a thorough conclusion recapping the main given points.

Even though enunciated along philosophical lines, this book is an invaluable compendium of useful information about dance and philosophy in motion. As a medium of learning, it can appeal to educators, scientists, dancers, and those who are curious about new ways of understanding dance and its underpinnings, as well as to parents, teachers, and policymakers concerned about effective pedagogical strategies. It is an essential companion for students and professionals in dance, cognitive psychology, sport psychology, and movement science. It is highly recommended.

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