

Nepoznate hladnoratovske analize Ante Pavelića

Unknown Analyses of Cold War by Ante Pavelić

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UDK/UDC: 327.54-047.44
doi: 10.15291/misc.4740

Izvorni znanstveni rad / Original scientific paper
Primljeno / Received: 8. X. 2024.



Ključne riječi: Ante Pavelić;
hladni rat; SAD; SSSR;
Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo.

U ovom radu autori analiziraju neistražene tekstove Ante Pavelića, koji su objavljivani pod pseudonimom „Planina“ u emigrantskom glasilu *Hrvatska* u razdoblju od 1950. do 1957. godine. Tekstovi se fokusiraju na hladnoratovske međunarodne odnose i poziciju hrvatskog naroda u tom kontekstu. Pavelićevi tekstovi, motivirani njegovim ratnim porazom i slomom Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, često obrađuju ključne političke teme poput odnosa između SAD-a, Sovjetskog Saveza i Velike Britanije, s posebnim naglaskom na potrebi suprotstavljanja komunizmu. Pavelić izražava kritičke stavove prema pojedinim političkim grupacijama u zapadnim zemljama prikazujući ih kao odgovorne za širenje sovjetskog utjecaja. U svojim analizama Pavelić se prvenstveno fokusira na politiku Sjedinjenih Američkih Država prikazujući ih kao glavnog aktera u borbi protiv komunizma. S druge strane, Pavelićev stav prema Sovjetskom Savezu i komunističkom bloku ostaje nepokolebljivo negativan, karakteriziran strahom od globalne komunističke ekspanzije. Smatra da se komunizmu ne može vjerovati, a svaku inicijativu za mir tumači kao pokušaj prijevare i manipulacije. Pavelić promatra Jugoslaviju kroz prizmu Tita kao sovjetskog agenta koji, unatoč prividnom sukobu s Moskvom, ostaje privržen SSSR-u.

Keywords: Ante Pavelić; Cold War;
USA; USSR; United Kingdom.

The authors of this paper analyse the unexplored texts by Ante Pavelić, published under the pseudonym „Planina“ (Eng. the Mountain) in the émigré journal Hrvatska, in the period from 1950 to 1957. The texts focus on international relations during the Cold War, and the position of the Croatian people in that context. Pavelić's texts, motivated by his defeat and the collapse of the Independent State of Croatia, often address key political topics such as the relations between the USA, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, with a special emphasis on the necessity of opposing communism. Pavelić expresses critical attitudes towards certain political groups in Western countries, portraying them as responsible for the spread of Soviet influence. In his analyses, Pavelić primarily focuses on the policy of the United States of America, portraying them as the main actor in the fight against communism. On the other hand, Pavelić's attitude towards the Soviet Union, and the communist bloc remains decidedly negative, characterized by fear of global communist expansion. He believes that communism cannot be trusted, and interprets any initiative for peace as an attempt at deception and manipulation. Pavelić views Yugoslavia through the prism of Tito as a Soviet agent, who, despite the apparent conflict with Moscow, remains loyal to the USSR.

U literaturi je poznata činjenica da se djelatnost bivšeg poglavnika Ante Pavelića u prvim godinama poslije njegova dolaska u Argentinu 6. studenoga 1948. uvelike svodila na publicističko djelovanje u kojem je iznosio svoje poglede na prošlost i sadašnjost, ali i na mogući budući razvoj međunarodnih odnosa i položaj hrvatskog naroda u tom hladnoratovskom kontekstu. Organizacija Hrvatski domobran pokrenula je u Buenos Airesu glasilo *Hrvatska* na čiju je uređivačku politiku Pavelić imao određeni utjecaj. S obzirom na okolnosti u kojima se nalazio, svoje tekstove u glasilu *Hrvatska* potpisivao je različitim pseudonimima te su neki od njih odavno poznati istraživačima, dok se za neke tek u novije vrijeme otkrilo da pripadaju Paveliću.¹ Jedan od tih je i pseudonim „Planina“ kojim je potpisivao kolumnu isprva pod naslovom „Dva tjedna svjetske politike“, a kasnije „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“ u *Hrvatskoj* gdje je komentirao i analizirao međunarodnu politiku i međunarodne odnose. Zahvaljujući toj spoznaji istraživačima je otvorena mogućnost za raščlambom i tih Pavelićevih tekstova da bi mogli cjelovitije zaključivati o njegovu djelovanju za vrijeme boravka u Argentini. Naime, u Pavelićevoj ostavštini nalazi se fascikl naslovljen „A.P. (Planina) Dva tjedna politike u svijetu, 1950-1957, Buenos Aires – Argentina“ u kojem je njegova kćer Višnja sabrala i kronološki posložila objavljene tekstove, odnosno njihove novinske izreske. U ovom radu prikazat ćemo glavne Pavelićeve stavove iz navedene kolumne koja je objavljivana u razdoblju od rujna 1950. do ožujka 1957. godine. Dakle, namjera je ovog rada analizirati najvažnije teme kojima se autor bavi, prepoznati točke zanimanja koje autor pokazuje izborom tema koje komentira, način na koji autor oblikuje diskurs u duljem periodu o nekim temama te prepoznati motivaciju autora u izborima tema i načinu pisanja. U radu će se koristiti tematski pristup te će se promatranjem određenih aktera u međunarodnim odnosima, odnosno njihove percepcije u Pavelićevu diskursu, razraditi slika autorovih političkih stavova i želja. Svi korišteni dijelovi Pavelićevih tekstova donose se u izvornom obliku, poštujući autorov pravopis, a ispravljene su jedino očite tiskarske pogreške.

Zbog velikog broja tema kojima se Pavelić u svom pisanju bavi, u ovoj analizi naglasak će biti na ključnim hladnoratovskim protagonistima i njihovim

It is well known in literature that the activities of the former *poglavnik* (Eng. supreme leader) Ante Pavelić in the first years after his arrival in Argentina on November 6, 1948, were largely limited to publishing activities in which he expressed his views on both the past and the present, as well as on the possible future development of international relations, and the position of the Croatian people in the context of Cold War. The Croatian Home Guard organization launched the journal *Hrvatska* in Buenos Aires, on whose editorial policy Pavelić had a certain influence. Given the circumstances in which he found himself, he signed his articles in the journal *Hrvatska* under various pseudonyms, and some of them have long been known to researchers, while some have been recently discovered as pertaining to Pavelić.¹ One of these pseudonyms is „Planina“ by which he signed a column in *Hrvatska* initially titled „Dva tjedna svjetske politike“ (“Two Weeks of World Politics”), and later “Dva tjedna politike u svijetu” (“Two Weeks of Politics in the World”) where he commented on, and analysed international politics and international relations. Thanks to this discovery, researchers have been able to also analyse these texts in order to draw more complete conclusions about Pavelić’s activities during his stay in Argentina. Namely, Pavelić’s legacy includes a folder titled “A.P. (‘Planina’) Two Weeks of Politics in the World, 1950-1957, Buenos Aires – Argentina” in which his daughter Višnja collected, and chronologically arranged the published texts, that is, the newspaper clippings. In this paper, we will present Pavelić’s main views from the aforementioned column, which was published in the period from September 1950 to March 1957. Therefore, the intention of this paper is to analyse the most important topics the author deals with, to recognize the points of interest that the author shows through the choice of topics he comments, the way the author shapes discourse over a longer period of time around certain topics, and to recognize the author’s motivation in the choice of topics, and the manner of writing. The paper will present a thematic approach, and through the observation of certain actors in international relations, or rather their perceptions in Pavelić’s discourse, it will also depict the author’s political views and desires. All excerpts of Pavelić’s texts are presented in their original form, respecting the author’s spelling, and only obvious typographical errors have been corrected.

Due to the large number of topics that Pavelić deals with in his writing, the emphasis in this analysis will be

¹ Delić 2016: 159, 175.

¹ Delić 2016: 159, 175.

najvažnijim politikama. Ovaj rad neće analizirati sve teme kojih se Pavelić dotiče, već će se usmjeriti na ključne međunarodne aktere i procese koji se mogu identificirati u promatranom razdoblju. Također, rad neće ulaziti u analizu svih podataka i interpretacija te njihove podudarnosti s kasnijom znanstvenom literaturom o tim temama jer to izlazi iz okvira ovog rada. Prvenstveni je cilj rada, iz Pavelićeva pisanja, uz jasno znanje o tome da se obraća čitateljstvu koje u najvećoj mjeri čine njegovi politički istomišljenici, ali i oni koji tu ne spadaju, ocrtati sliku političkih odnosa i nastojanja skupine koja se našla na marginama političkih zbivanja.

U radu će se obilato koristiti citati da bi se jasno prikazalo Pavelićevo pisanje pri čemu treba uvijek imati na umu da je najvažnija svrha Pavelićevih tekstova bila održavanje živom političke ideje o ponovnoj uspostavi nezavisne hrvatske države i slomu socijalističke Jugoslavije, a praćenje međunarodnih odnosa trebalo je pridonijeti održanju dojma da je takav rasplet situacije potencijalno moguć u budućem razvoju događaja. Odnosno, nedvojbeno namjera bila je uvjeriti čitateljstvo u realnost takvog scenarija i da se ukaže na neprincipijelnost u međunarodnim odnosima, osobito u kontekstu istočnoeuropskih naroda.

Sjedinjene Američke Države (SAD)

Promatrajući ukupni korpus tekstova, vidljivo je da se u središtu Pavelićeva zanimanja nalazi SAD, a veliki je prostor posvetio upravo njegovoj unutarnjoj i vanjskoj politici. Autor u svojim tekstovima analizira unutarnju političku situaciju s jasno izraženim simpatijama za Republikansku stranku i njezine političke stavove, dok prema Demokratskoj stranci ima negativan odnos. U tekstovima se često ističu teme međustranačkih sukoba u SAD-u i iz njih se izvlače konsekvencije za međunarodne odnose. Naravno, za poznavatelje unutarnje politike SAD-a, i tada i danas, jasno je da je vanjska politika samo jedna od tema u međusobnim političkim obračunima demokrata i republikanaca, a kada stranke preuzmu administraciju, najčešće se vidi kontinuitet vanjske politike bez radikalnih promjena smjera. U tom kontekstu vrijedi razmotriti sljedeće razmišljanje koje se oblikovalo tijekom ljeta 1950. kada je došlo do invazije sjevernokorejskih snaga na Republiku Koreju čime je započeo prvi posrednički sukob u hladnom ratu:

on the key Cold War protagonists and their most important policies. This paper will not analyse all topics that Pavelić touches on, but will focus on the key international actors and processes that can be identified in the observed period. Also, the paper will not go into the analysis of all the data and interpretations, and their correspondence with the later scientific literature on these topics, because this is beyond the scope of this paper. The primary goal of the paper is to present from Pavelić's writing the political relations and efforts of a group on the margins of political events, with the clear knowledge that he is addressing a readership that is largely composed of his political like-minded peers, but also those who do not belong to that group,

The paper will make extensive use of quotes in order to clearly present Pavelić's writing, while always keeping in mind that the most important purpose of Pavelić's texts was to keep alive the political idea of the re-establishment of an independent Croatian state and the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, and his observation of international relations was to contribute to maintaining the impression that such an outcome was potentially possible in the future development of events. In other words, the undoubted intention was to convince the readership of the reality of such a scenario, and to point out the lack of principles in international relations, especially in the context of Eastern European nations.

United States of America (USA)

Looking at the entire corpus of texts, it is clear that the USA is at the centre of Pavelić's interest. Consequently, a large space is dedicated to the domestic and foreign policy of the USA. In his texts, the author analyses the domestic political situation with clearly expressed sympathy for the Republican Party and its policies, while on the other hand he holds a negative attitude towards the Democratic Party. The texts often highlight the topics of inter-party conflicts in the United States, and draw conclusions regarding international relations. Of course, for those familiar with US domestic politics, both then and now, it is clear that foreign policy is merely one of the topics in the political showdowns between the Democrats and the Republicans, and when parties took charge of the administration, the continuity in foreign policy is most often seen without radical changes in direction. In this context, it is worth considering the following contemplation which was formed during the summer of 1950, when the North Korean forces began to invade the Republic of Korea, which initiated the first proxy conflict during the Cold War:

„Rat u Koreji i obći međunarodni položaj vrše i dalje jak utjecaj na kristaliziranje javnog mnijenja na Zapadu, osobito na unutarnji-politički život Sjedinjenih Država i Englezke. Ovih dana izašli su američki republikanci sa oštrim zahtjevom, da se ukloni sadanji ministar vanjskih poslova Acheson, protiv koga se digla težka obtužba da je krivac svim dosadanjim vanjsko-političkim neuspjesima u minulih dvije godine dana. U istoj izjavi, izjavi koju su potpisali svi republikanski političari, označuje se vanjska politika demokratske stranke u vrijeme rata i poslije rata katastrofalnom po državne interese. Republikanci traže odlučniju politiku prema Sovjetskoj Uniji. (...) Republikanci ujedno zahtijevaju radikalnu promjenu američke politike u pravcu, koji bi omogućio tiesno povezivanje svih protukomunističkih snaga u svijetu, prelazeći preko toga, da li je u nekoj zemlji politički režim više ili manje različit od vladavinskog sustava u Sjedinjenim Državama. (...) te se sada u toj razmahanjoj borbi radi o tome, hoće li biti potpuno i konačno likvidiran utjecaj onoga duha u američkoj vanjskoj politici, koji je kobnu ulogu odigrao u Teheranu i Jalti...“²

Kritike članova Republikanske stranke, koje autor ističe, a usmjerene su prema državnom tajniku Deanu G. Achesonu u drugom Trumanovu mandatu, treba promatrati u kontekstu političke borbe u zemlji. Na početku hladnog rata krajem 40-ih rasprava o metodama i intenzitetu suprotstavljanja SAD-a sovjetskim prijetnjama bila je jako živa. U tom periodu SAD formira temeljne postavke svojih hladnoratovskih politika. Upravo Trumanova administracija pokreće Marshallov plan, artikulira politiku zadržavanja (*containment*), donosi izvješće NSC-68, osniva NATO, pokreće intervenciju u Koreji itd. Svi ti procesi i odluke u velikoj će mjeri odrediti strateški smjer SAD-a do kraja hladnog rata, a sve administracije s oba kraja političkog spektra koristit će se njima kao alatima u svojoj vanjskoj politici.³ Vidljivo je da Pavelić ističe pozive na pragmatično ujedinjavanje svih antikomunističkih snaga bez obzira na političko uređenje koje može biti demokratsko, ali i ne mora nužno. Primjena takvog vanjskopoličkog pragmatizma vidjet će se u vanjskoj politici SAD-a

“The war in Korea and the general international situation continue to exert a strong influence on the crystallization of public opinion in the West, especially on the internal political life of the United States and England. These days, the American Republicans came out with a sharp demand to remove the current foreign minister Acheson, who has been heavily accused of being the culprit of all the previous foreign policy failures in the past two years. In the same statement, a statement signed by all Republican politicians, the foreign policy of the Democratic Party during and after the war was described as disastrous for the national interests. The Republicans demand a more decisive policy towards the Soviet Union. (...) The Republicans also demand a radical change in American policy in a direction that would enable the close association of all anti-communist forces in the world, regardless of whether the political regime in a country is more or less different from the system of government in the United States. (...) and now in this raging struggle the question is whether the influence of that spirit in American foreign policy that played a fatal role in Tehran and Yalta will be completely and finally eliminated...”²

Criticisms by the members of the Republican Party, as singled out by the author, and aimed at the Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson during Truman's second term, should be seen in the context of the political struggle in the country. At the beginning of the Cold War at the end of the 1940s, the debate about the methods and intensity of the USA's opposition to the Soviet threats was very lively. In that period, the USA formed the basic principles of its Cold War policies. It was the Truman administration that initiated the Marshall Plan, articulated the containment policy, passed the NSC-68 report, established NATO, initiated the intervention in Korea, etc. All these processes and decisions would largely determine the strategic direction of the USA until the end of the Cold War, and all administrations from both ends of the political spectrum would use them as tools in their foreign policy.³ It is evident that Pavelić emphasizes the calls for the pragmatic unification of all anti-communist forces regardless of the political system, which may or may not be democratic. The application of such foreign policy pragmatism will be seen in the foreign policy of the United States in a

² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna svjetske politike“, *Hrvatska*, 2. rujna 1950: 2.

³ Miscamble 1996: 437–468.

² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna svjetske politike“, *Hrvatska*, September 2, 1950: 2.

³ Miscamble 1996: 437–468.

na čitavom nizu primjera tijekom hladnog rata. U prilog tomu mogu se navesti primjeri Čilea, Argentine, Španjolske, Irana, Saudijske Arabije, Zaira, Indonezije itd. Zanimljiv je i Pavelićev komentar o sudjelovanju američke politike na konferencijama u Jalti i Teheranu. Tim konferencijama autor pridaje negativan predznak i američku ulogu na njima negativno ocrtava jer smatra da je tada došlo do prepuštanja velikih dijelova Europe SSSR-u.⁴ Svakako treba istaknuti da se u sklopu tih konferencija među saveznicima usuglasila politika koja je u kasnijem razvoju situacije dovela do eliminacije Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH) koja je bila vrhunac Pavelićeva političkog djelovanja. Posljedično se može zaključiti da je animozitet koji Pavelić pokazuje prema vodećim članovima demokratske stranke u SAD-u posljedica njegova osobnog iskustva s njihovom politikom u Drugom svjetskom ratu. U tom kontekstu treba promatrati i sljedeći odlomak iz jedne od njegovih kolumni iz rujna 1952. gdje navodi:

„Veliki je dojam proizvela izjava republikanskog kandidata generala Eisenhowera u pogledu boljševičke okupacije istočne Evrope. On je naime, prigodom jednog izbornog govora izjavio, da Sjeverna Amerika ne će dozvoliti, da boljševička vlast ostane u zemljama istočne Evrope, koje se danas nalaze pod komunističkim režimima i još je posebno iztakao, da narodi istočne Evrope mogu biti sigurni, da će biti oslobođeni. Predsjednik Truman i ministar vanjskih poslova Acheson izjavili su, da je ta Eisenhowerova izjava najlošija, što je ikad sa strane koga Amerkanca dana. Predsjednik senatskoga odbora za vanjske poslove Tom Connally, je pako izjavio da Sjedinjene Američke Države ne kane slati svoju vojsku preko Oceana, da oslobadjaju od komunizma narode Istočne Evrope, nu da će se veseliti, ako ti narodi slobodu zadobiju (...) Medjutim je ovaj demokratski političar zaboravio, da su ovi narodi po komunizmu zarobljeni izravnom pomoći, što su je boljševičkoj Rusiji dali njegovi šefovi Roosevelt i Truman, i da ti narodi ne bi nikad u tu situaciju bili došli, da Sjeverna Amerika nije unišla u drugi svjetski rat, i da nije postala boljševičkim saveznikom. (...) Izporedivši tu žalosnu izjavu s onom generala Eisenhowera, vidi se, da je ovaj potonji svestan krivnje demokratskog Rooseveltova i Trumanova režima za nesreću naroda istočne i jugoistočne Evrope,

number of examples during the Cold War. Examples are: Chile, Argentina, Spain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Zaire, Indonesia, etc. Pavelić's comment on the participation of American politics in the Yalta and Tehran conferences is also interesting. The author gives these conferences a negative connotation and negatively portrays the American role in them, because he believes that large parts of Europe were surrendered to the USSR in that period.⁴ It should certainly be noted that within the framework of these conferences, the Allies agreed upon a policy that in the later development of the situation led to the elimination of the Independent State of Croatia which was the peak of Pavelić's political activity. Consequently, it can be concluded that the animosity that Pavelić shows towards the leading members of the Democratic Party in the USA is a consequence of his personal experience with their policy in the WWII. In this context, the following passage from one of his columns from September 1952 should also be observed, where he states:

“A great impression was made by the statement of the Republican candidate General Eisenhower regarding the Bolshevik occupation of Eastern Europe. During an election speech, he said that North America would not allow the Bolshevik government to remain in the Eastern European countries, which are currently under communist regimes, and he also emphasized that the peoples of Eastern Europe can rest assured that they will be freed. President Truman and Foreign Minister Acheson stated that this statement by Eisenhower was the worst statement ever been given by an American. The president of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tom Connally, said that the United States of America does not intend to send its army across the ocean to free the peoples of Eastern Europe from communism, but that it would be happy if these peoples gain their freedom (...) However, this Democrat politician forgot that these nations were captured by communism by direct aid, which was given to Bolshevik Russia by his bosses Roosevelt and Truman, and that these nations would never have gotten into that situation if North America had not entered the WWII, and had not become a Bolshevik ally. (...) Comparing that sad statement with the one given by General Eisenhower, it can be seen that the latter is aware of the culpability of the Roosevelt and Truman Democrat regimes for the unhappiness of the peoples of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe,

⁴ Pogue 1952: 356–368.

⁴ Pogue 1952: 356–368.

te tu krivnju želi izpraviti, ako bude izabran za predsjednika.“⁵

Da bi se poštovala kronologija i uzročno-posljedični niz, potrebno je spomenuti tijek događaja koji je NDH doveo u sukob sa SAD-om. Japan je 7. prosinca 1941. napao SAD, a zatim je SAD objavio rat Japanu koji je bio u savezu s nacionalsocijalističkom Njemačkom. Kao saveznica Japana, Njemačka je bila ta koja je objavila rat SAD-u 11. prosinca 1941., a Nezavisna Država Hrvatska s Pavelićem na čelu, s obzirom na obvezu koju je imala kao potpisnica Trojnog pakta, 14. prosinca 1941. također objavljuje rat SAD-u.⁶ Vidljivo je da Pavelić pridaje veliku važnost Eisenhowerovim predizbornim izjavama i da promiče ideju i nadu da će eventualno nova republikanska administracija imati aktivniju ulogu u pokušaju promjene geopolitičke situacije iza željezne zavjese.⁷ Nekoliko tjedana nakon Eisenhowerove pobjede na izborima Pavelić u svojoj analizi potkrepljuje svoje stavove prema demokratima u SAD-u, a pokušava generirati optimizam vezano za politiku buduće administracije:

„Već dvadeset godina vladala je u Sjevernoj Americi Demokratska Stranka, koja je napose davala smjer događajima za vrijeme Drugog svjetskog rat, koji je i omogućio Sovjetskoj Rusiji i svjetskom komunizmu doći u položaj, da ugrozi sve narode. Što više, nakon svršenoga Drugog svjetskog rata, zavisilo je od politike i političara te stranke, da li će komunizam u svijetu napredovati (...) ili će se naći način, da čovječanstvo stane na kraj toj pogibelji. Svi narodi i svi politički krugovi, koji su protivnici komunizma, osjećali su, da dosadnji sjevernoamerički režim ne može, ili možda ni ne će ništa ozbiljnoga poduzeti (...) i radi toga su želili, da ovim izborima bude zamijenjen dosadnji režim (...) U tim narodima i u tim krugovima pozdravljena je s oduševljenjem pobjeda republikanskog kandidata generala Eisenhowera. (...) Predstavnik ljevičarskog diela engleske laburističke stranke dao je odmah izjavu, da pobjedu Eisenhowera smatra velikom nesrećom. (...) Moskovsko je novinstvo naravno izrazilo svoje veliko nezadovoljstvo, a

and wishes to correct that fault if he is elected as the President.”⁵

In order to respect the chronology and cause-and-effect sequence, it is necessary to mention the course of events that brought the Independent State of Croatia into conflict with the USA. The USA was attacked by Japan on December 7, 1941, and the USA subsequently declared war on Japan, which was in alliance with National Socialist Germany. An ally of Japan, Germany declared war on the USA on December 11, 1941, and the Independent State of Croatia, led by Pavelić, due to its obligation as the Tripartite Pact signatory, also declared war on the USA on December 4, 1941.⁶ It is evident that Pavelić attributed great importance to Eisenhower's statements during campaign and promoted the idea, and hope that the new Republican administration would eventually play a more active role in trying to change the geopolitical situation behind the Iron Curtain.⁷ A few weeks after Eisenhower's election victory, Pavelić's analysis reinforces his views on the Democrats in the US, and he attempts to generate optimism about the policies of the future administration:

“For twenty years, the Democratic Party had ruled North America, which especially directed the events during the WWII, which enabled Soviet Russia and world communism to come into a position to threaten all nations. Moreover, after the WWII was over, whether communism would advance in the world (...) or whether a way would be found for humanity to put an end to this danger, depended on the policies and politicians of that party. All nations and all political circles that were opponents of communism felt that the previous North American regime could not, or perhaps would not, undertake anything serious (...) and therefore they wished that the previous regime would be replaced in these elections (...) In these nations and in these circles, the victory of the Republican candidate, General Eisenhower, was greeted with enthusiasm. (...) The representative of the left-wing part of the English Labour Party immediately made a statement that he considered Eisenhower's victory a great misfortune. (...) The Moscow press, of course, expressed its great dissatisfaction, and so did the press of all countries under

⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 19. rujna 1952: 2.

⁶ Opš. o tom „papirnatom ratu“ u: Jonjić 2000: 751–773.

⁷ Položaj i uloga koju je u američkoj politici igrao Eisenhower bila je mnogo složenija od one koju je ocrtavao Pavelić: Bundy 1952: 1–14.

⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, September 19, 1952: 2.

⁶ More on this “war on paper” in: Jonjić 2000: 751–773.

⁷ The position and role that Eisenhower played in American politics was much more complex than the one outlined by Pavelić: Bundy 1952: 1–14.

tako i tisak svih država pod komunističkim režimom (...) Protu komunistički svijet očekuje sada, da će pod vodstvom Sjeverne Amerike biti povedena politika usmjerena na ozbiljni otpor proti komunističkoj navali i da će prije ili kasnije komunističkim težnjama biti učinjen kraj bilo milom bilo silom.”⁸

Očekivanja koja Pavelić gaji prema novoj američkoj administraciji velika su i on pokušava iščitati i prepoznati odluke, imenovanja i politike koje bi bile u skladu s njegovim nadanjima.⁹ Tako se često ističu pojedinci koji imaju antikomunističku retoriku kao osobe koje su sposobne preusmjeriti dotadašnju politiku prema SSSR-u, čak pod cijenu izbijanja općeg rata:

„S jedne se strane izražava mišljenje, da će novi predsjednik povesti jednu energičniju politiku prema Rusiji i svjetskom komunizmu i pod uvjetom, da se time poveća pogibelj novoga obćeg rata, dok se s druge strane drži, da će on nastojati, da dodje do definitivnoga sporazuma sa sovjetskom Rusijom, i da se na taj način izbjegne ratu. (...) Eisenhower međutim pospješno organizira svoju buduću vladu i izabire osobe svoga povjerenja, koje će uz njega vršiti najvažnije funkcije u javnom životu nacije. Po do sada izabranim imenima ne izgleda, da će novi aparat biti jako pacifistički oličen. Među inim je zanimljivo, da je novi predsjednik za stručnjaka u pitanjima Rusije predvidio nećaka generala MacArthura.”¹⁰

Pavelić se u svom pisanju referirao na Douglasa MacArthura II. koji je bio nećak poznatog generala Douglasa MacArthura koji se istaknuo svojim djelovanjem u Drugom svjetskom ratu na Pacifičkom bojištu, a kasnije je obnašao dužnost vrhovnog zapovjednika savezničkih snaga tijekom okupacije Japana. Nakon izbijanja Korejskog rata imenovan je zapovjednikom snaga Ujedinjenih naroda gdje se zalagao za snažno suprotstavljanje komunističkoj prijetnji. Zbog sukoba s predsjednikom Trumanom o načinu

the communist regime (...) The anti-communist world now expects that, that, under the leadership of North America, a policy aimed at serious resistance against the communist onslaught will be launched, and that sooner or later the communist aspirations will be put to an end, either by kindness or by force.”⁸

Pavelić's expectations of the new American administration are high, and he tried to discern and recognize decisions, appointments, and policies that would be in line with his hopes.⁹ Thus, individuals with anti-communist rhetoric are often highlighted as people capable of redirecting the previous policy towards the USSR, even at the cost of a general war breaking out:

“On the one hand, it is believed that the new president will pursue a more energetic policy towards Russia and world communism, even if this increases the danger of a new general war, while on the other hand, it is believed that he will strive to reach a definitive agreement with Soviet Russia, and thus avoid war. (...) However, Eisenhower is successfully organizing his future government and choosing people he trusts, who alongside him will perform the most important functions in the public life of the nation. Judging by the names chosen so far, it does not seem that the new apparatus will be very pacifist in character. It is interesting, among other things, that the new president has appointed General MacArthur's nephew as an expert on Russian affairs.”¹⁰

Pavelić was referring to Douglas MacArthur II in his writing, who was the nephew of the famous General Douglas MacArthur, who distinguished himself in WWII on the Pacific Theatre, and later served as Supreme Allied Commander during the occupation of Japan. After the outbreak of the Korean War, he was appointed as the Commander of the United Nations Forces, where he advocated strong opposition to the communist threat. Due to a conflict with President Truman over the conduct of the war in Korea, and the possible use of nuclear weapons, he was removed from office in April 1951.¹¹

⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 25. studenoga 1952: 2.

⁹ Pavelić je svoje interpretacije o mogućem sukobu između blokova temeljio na dijelu retorike koja je postojala i u političkim krugovima na zapadu: Foster Dulles 1954: 353–364.

¹⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 21. siječnja 1953: 2.

⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, November 25, 1952: 2.

⁹ Pavelić based his interpretations of a possible conflict between the blocs on a part of the rhetoric that also existed in political circles in the West: Foster Dulles 1954: 353–364.

¹⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, January 21, 1953: 2.

¹¹ Perret 1996: 566–577.

vođenja rata u Koreji i mogućoj upotrebi nuklearnog oružja smijenjen je s dužnosti u travnju 1951. godine.¹¹

Sustav međunarodnih odnosa koji u svojim analizama kreira Pavelić izražen je binaran i oblikuje se oko dihotomije između komunizma koji je utjelovljen u pojavi SSSR-a i svih ostalih slobodnih naroda okupljenih oko SAD-a. U ideološkom smislu prvi je tabor jasno definiran i omeđen, dok u slučaju drugog tabora autor nema jasne okvire. On ističe slobodu kao najviši cilj kojem teže svi narodi svijeta, dok je za njega komunizam najveća prijetnja toj slobodi.¹² Smatra da demokracija nije u stanju adekvatno se suprotstaviti komunističkoj prijetnji zbog svojih urođenih slabosti koje omogućuju Sovjetima da se igraju sa zapadom. Kritika demokratskih institucija ogleda se u Pavelićevu pisanju kada se referira na političke procese u Francuskoj, Velikoj Britaniji i SAD-u, među ostalim primjerima, gdje ističe lijeve političke stranke, ili Demokratsku stranku u slučaju SAD-a, kao slabe i popustljive prema komunistima. Nerijetko insinuira da Sovjetski Savez ima izravan utjecaj na njih. Kritizira i glasove koji pozivaju na smanjivanje napetosti s Istočnim blokom ili kao izdajice ili kao naivce. Takvo stanje na zapadu, koje smatra problematičnim, vidi dijelom i kao rezultat demokratskog procesa koji omogućava razvoj takvih pojava. Isto tako, on izražava određeni stupanj simpatije prema autoritarnim oblicima vlasti koji postoje u npr. Argentini i Španjolskoj u tom vremenu. Simpatija koju Pavelić izražava u slučajevima navedenih dviju država može se objasniti na više načina. U prvom redu te su dvije države pružile utočište njemu i mnogobrojnim hrvatskim izbjeglicama, a bile su i antikomunistički nastrojene, dok je vezano za Španjolsku bilo važno što je ta zemlja iz položaja izolacije u razdoblju hladnog rata započela svoj put prema suradnji sa zapadom, osobito s SAD-om.¹³ U tom smislu Pavelić piše u siječnju 1954. godine:

„Za Francuzku je u ovom, sporu najteži momenat držanje Sjeverne Amerike. Ova ima veliki interes na tome, da Maroko, i time ujedno sjeverna Afrika, bude u dobrim i pouzdanim rukama, jer će to biti od odsudne važnosti

The system of international relations that Pavelić created in his analyses is distinctly binary, and it is shaped around the dichotomy between communism, which is embodied in the emergence of the USSR, and all other free nations gathered around the USA. In ideological terms, the first camp is clearly defined and delimited, while in the case of the second camp, the author has no clear framework. He emphasizes freedom as the highest goal to which all the peoples of the world aspire, while for him, communism is the greatest threat to that freedom.¹² He believes that democracy is unable to adequately confront the communist threat, due to its inherent weaknesses that allow the Soviets to play with the West. The criticism of democratic institutions is reflected in Pavelić's writing when referring to political processes in France, Great Britain and the USA, among other examples, where he highlights left-wing political parties, or the Democratic Party in the case of the USA, as weak and lenient towards communists. He often insinuates that the Soviet Union has a direct influence on them. He also criticizes voices calling for a reduction in tensions with the Eastern Bloc, labelling them as either traitors or naive. Pavelić sees this situation in the West, which he considers problematic, partly as a result of the democratic process that allows such phenomena to develop. He also expresses a certain degree of sympathy for the authoritarian forms of government that existed in, for example, Argentina and Spain at that time. The sympathy that Pavelić expresses in the cases of the two aforementioned countries can be explained in several ways. First and foremost, these two countries provided refuge to him and numerous Croatian refugees, and they were also anti-communist, while in the Spanish case it was important that the country began its journey from a position of isolation during the Cold War towards cooperation with the West, specifically with the USA.¹³ In this sense, Pavelić writes in January 1954:

“The most difficult moment for France in this dispute is the position of North America. [It/The USA] has a great interest that Morocco, and thus North Africa, falls into good and reliable hands, because this will be of crucial military and strategic importance in the war conflict with Russia and communism in general, and it [the USA] believes that the most reliable hands are Spanish. In addition, it is predicted that the command of the European Army will also be transferred to Spain, as the safest and most reliable

¹¹ Perret 1996: 566–577.

¹² Svoje mišljenje o boljševičkoj prijetnji slobodnom svijetu obrazložio je još u međuratnom razdoblju u: Mrzlodski 1938.

¹³ Fernsworth 1953: 648–662.

¹² He explained his opinion on the Bolshevik threat to the free world in the interwar period in: Mrzlodski 1938.

¹³ Fernsworth 1953: 648–662.

vojničke i strateške u ratnom sukobu sa Rusijom i komunizmom u obće, a ona smatra, da su najpouzdanije španjolske ruke. Osim toga se predviđa, da će i zapovjedništvo Evropske Vojske biti premješteno u Španjolsku, kao najsigurniju i najpouzdaniju sredinu. Radi svega toga je sigurno, da će Amerika u ovom sporu stajati na strani Španjolske.“¹⁴

Ideja o osnivanju Europske vojske nastala je 1950. godine, a inicijator je bio francuski premijer René Pleven na temelju plana Jena Monneta. Europska vojska trebala je biti nadnacionalna organizacija koja bi u sklopu NATO-a okupljala objedinjene vojne snage šest europskih zemalja: Francuske, Italije, Nizozemske, Belgije, Luksemburga i SR Njemačke. Plan se temeljio na želji Francuske da kontrolira proces ponovnog naoružavanja Njemačke i zadrži stratešku kontrolu nad planiranjem obrane od sovjetske prijetnje u Europi. Ipak, na koncu plan nikad nije realiziran jer ga Francuska nije ratificirala 1954.¹⁵ Pavelić špekulira s ulogom Španjolske u budućoj Europskoj vojsci i mogućnosti da zapovjedništvo bude uspostavljeno u Španjolskoj. Te informacije ne korespondiraju sa stvarnim stanjem jer Španjolska nije bila u planovima za formiranje navedene institucije. Vidljivo je da Pavelić pokušava istaknuti proces približavanja SAD-a i Španjolske, što je iz njegove perspektive svakako bilo značajno i stoga je pažljivo pratio tu dinamiku, te piše o tome sljedeće:

„Prema viestima iz Amerike i iz Španjolske, u mjesecu svibnju [1954.] će biti započeti radovi postavljanja američkih zrakoplovnih i pomorskih baza u Španjolskoj u smislu nedavno sklopljenoga ugovora između Amerike i Španjolske. Time će s jedne strane priticati velike svote novaca iz Amerike u Španjolsku, nestati će nezaposlenosti i podići se znatno šstandard života te ojačanja španjolske ekonomije, a s druge će strane biti pospješeno osiguranje Evrope proti boljševizmu. Za razliku od gore navedene berlinske konferencije¹⁶, ovo je doista ozbiljan događaj u

environment. Due to all this, it is certain that America will side with Spain in this dispute.”¹⁴

The idea of establishing a European Army arose in 1950, and the initiator was the French Prime Minister René Pleven, based on Jean Monnet's plan. The European Army was supposed to be a supranational organization that, as part of NATO, would bring together the combined military forces of six European countries: France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and FR Germany. The plan was based on France's desire to control Germany's rearmament process, and to retain strategic control over defence planning against the Soviet threat in Europe. However, in the end, the plan was never implemented because it was not ratified by France in 1954.¹⁵ Pavelić speculates on the role of Spain in the future European army, and the possibility of the command being established in Spain. This information does not correspond to the real situation because Spain was not in the plans for the formation of the aforementioned institution. It is evident that Pavelić is trying to highlight the process of rapprochement between the USA and Spain, which, from his perspective, was certainly significant, and therefore he carefully followed this dynamic and wrote about it as follows:

“According to news from America and Spain, in May [1954] the work on establishing American air and naval bases in Spain will begin in accordance with the recently concluded agreement between America and Spain. On the one hand, this will bring large sums of money from America to Spain, eliminate unemployment and significantly raise the standard of living and strengthen the Spanish economy, and on the other hand, it will help secure Europe against Bolshevism. Unlike the Berlin Conference¹⁶ mentioned above, this is truly a serious event in world politics, which every conscious anti-communist, and especially all admirers of Franco and Francoist Spain are looking forward to.”¹⁷

¹⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 27. siječnja 1954: 2.

¹⁵ Pastor-Castro 2006: 386–400.

¹⁶ Berlinska konferencija održana je početkom 1954., a okupila je ministre vanjskih poslova SAD-a, Britanije, Francuske i Sovjetskog Saveza da bi raspravljali o sigurnosti u Europi te statusu Njemačke i Austrije, ali nije donijela dogovor o europskoj sigurnosti. Postignut je jedino napredak po pitanju Austrije, gdje su Sovjeti

¹⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, January 27, 1954: 2.

¹⁵ Pastor-Castro 2006: 386–400.

¹⁶ The Berlin Conference was held in early 1954, bringing together the ministers of foreign affairs of the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union to discuss security in Europe and the status of Germany and Austria, but failed to reach an agreement on European security. The only progress made was on the issue of Austria, where the Soviets agreed to withdraw on the condition that Austria becomes neutral. Some authors see the conference as a last chance attempt at German unification: Rupieper 1986: 427–453.

¹⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, February 10, 1954: 2.

svjetskoj politici, s koga se raduje svaki sviestni protukomunista i napose svi poštovatelji Franka i frankističke Španjolske.“¹⁷

„Pojavljuje se ozbiljna želja, da bi i Španjolska bila uvrštena u sjeveroatlantski Pakt. Kako je poznato državni poglavar Franko je svojedobno izjavio, da mu nije ni malo stalo do toga, da sudjeluje u tim evropskim društvima, a da će Španjolska sa svoje strane već izvršiti svoju dužnost u obrani od komunizma. Ta je njegova izjava bila razumljiva nakon svega onoga, što su te tako zvane zapadne demokracije poslije svršetka rata poduzimale proti Franku i Španjolskoj, htijući na svaki način njegov režim srušiti, što im, na njihovu sreću nije uspjelo, jer ne bi danas imali ni jedne zemlje u Evropi, na koju bi u celosti mogli računati u sukobu s Moskvom...“¹⁸

Imajući na umu prije iznesene stavove o komunizmu, ne bi trebala biti iznenađujuća činjenica da je Pavelić u republikanskom senatoru Josephu McCarthyu prepoznao izrazito pozitivnu osobu na američkoj političkoj sceni. McCarthy je izražavao snažna anti-komunistička uvjerenja i kritizirao američku politiku kao pomirljivu prema SSSR-u. Kao rezultat takvih stavova McCarthy je u razdoblju od 1950. do 1954. inicirao čitav niz istraga u Senatu koje su imale za cilj pokazati infiltraciju komunističkih utjecaja u američke institucije i društvo.¹⁹ Pavelić je veliki naglasak stavljao na McCarthyja i pratio je njegovo djelovanje pa tako u listopadu i prosincu 1953. piše:

„ZNAMENITI sjeveroamerički senator M. Carthy, koji stoji na čelu senatskoga povjerenstva za suzbijanje protu državnoga rada, zatražio je, da se obustavi svaka podpora onim državama, koje podržavaju trgovačke odnose s komunističkim vladama. Razumljivo je, da je posve paradoksn, da izvjestne zapadnoevropske vlade s jedne strane dobivaju američku pomoć u ogromnim dolarskim svotama u svrhu naoružanja i organizacije vojnih snaga za predviđenu ratnu obranu od sovjetske Rusije, a s druge strane da trguju sa komunističkom

“There is a serious desire to include Spain in the North Atlantic Treaty. It is known that the head of state Franco once stated that he did not care at all about participating in these European societies, and that Spain, for its part, would already fulfil its duty in defending against communism. His statement was understandable after everything these so-called Western democracies did to Franco and Spain after the end of the war, wanting to overthrow his regime in every way, which, fortunately for them, they did not manage to do, because today they would not have a single country in Europe that they could fully count on in a conflict with Moscow...”¹⁸

Bearing in mind the previously stated positions on communism, it should not come as a surprise that Pavelić recognized Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy as a very positive figure on the American political scene. McCarthy expressed strong anti-communist beliefs and criticized American policy as conciliatory towards the USSR. As a result of such positions, McCarthy initiated a series of investigations in the Senate between 1950 and 1954, which aimed to expose the infiltration of communist influences into American institutions and society.¹⁹ Pavelić placed great emphasis on McCarthy and followed his activities, and in October and December 1953 he wrote:

“THE PROMINENT North American Senator M. Carthy, the head of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has demanded that all support be suspended for those countries that maintain trade with communist governments. It is understandable and quite paradoxical that certain Western European governments, on the one hand, receive American aid in huge amounts of dollars for the purpose of arming and organizing military forces for the intended war defence against Soviet Russia, and on the other hand, they trade with the communist government of Russia and its satellites, thus helping them by supplying them with funds to strengthen their war potential.”²⁰

“Accusations against former President Truman are being raised again in North America. The chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, McCarthy, these days presented the names of certain high-ranking government officials, who

pristali na povlačenje pod uvjetom da Austrija postane neutralna. Neki autori ovu konferenciju vide kao posljednju šansu za pokušaj ujedinjenja Njemačke: Rupieper 1986: 427–453.

¹⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 10. veljače 1954: 2.

¹⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 15. rujna 1954: 2.

¹⁹ Herman 2000: 113–257.

¹⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, September 15, 1954: 2.

¹⁹ Herman 2000: 113–257.

²⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, October 8, 1953: 2.

vladom Rusije i njezinih satelita, podpomažući ih tako dobavom sredstava za pojačanje njihovoga ratnoga potencijala.“²⁰

„Ponovno se dižu u Sjevernoj Americi obtužbe proti bivšem predsjedniku Trumanu. Predsjednik senatskog pododbora za iztraživanje protuameričkog djelovanje McCarthy je iznio ovih dana imena pojedinih visokih državnih dužnosnika, koje je Truman postavljao na visoka i odlučna mjesta u državnoj upravi, i ako je bilo poznato, da su oni aktivni pripadnici komunizma.“²¹

Pavelić je zapažao i isticao izjave visokih američkih dužnosnika koje su revidirale stanje nastalo kao posljedica rezultata Drugog svjetskog rata. Tu se osobito referirao na promjene u stavovima američke politike prema Njemačkoj i Japanu kao bivšim neprijateljima. Iz toga se može iščitati intencija da se održi živom nada da bi se u budućnosti na sličan način SAD mogao ponijeti i prema hrvatskom političkom pitanju. Pavelić tako zapaža u prosincu 1953.:

„Ovih su dana pale dvije vrlo zanimljive izjave sa strane dvaju odgovornih sjeveroameričkih državnika. Sjeveroamerički podpredsjednik dr. Nixon je izjavio, da je Sjeverna Amerika počinila veliku pogrešku, što je razoružala Japan. Sjeveroamerički ministar vanjskih poslova John Forster Dulles se je sa svoje strane izjavio sporazumnim s tom izjavom podpredsjednika, i što više dodao je, da je isto takova pogreška počinjena razoružanjem Njemačke. On doduše nalazi za to izpriku, jer da su tadani državnici, koji su razoružanje Njemačke i Japana u sporazumu s Rusijom proveli, vjerovali, da će poslije rata zavladati trajni mir, te da sa strane komunizma ne će zaprijetiti nikakova pogibelj. Ta je izprika naravno samo jedan stidljivi flaster na tu strašnu i sramotnu pogrešku, koja je uzrokom, da danas sav svijet strepi pred komunističkom pogibelji, jer uslied toga razoružanja i uslied okupacije istočne i jugoistočne Europe za obranu su onesposobljeni upravo oni narodi, koji su jedini kadri stati na put komunističkoj ekspanziji, dok oni drugi, u Europi, što nisu razoružani, izuzev bojkotiranu Španjolsku, pokazuju očitu nesposobnost, nedoraslost i neodlučnost

were appointed by Truman to high and important positions in the state administration, and if it was known, that they were active members of communism.“²¹

Pavelić noted and highlighted statements by high-ranking American officials that reviewed the situation that had arisen as a result of the WWII. He particularly referred to changes in American policy towards Germany and Japan as former enemies. This suggests an intention to keep alive the hope that the United States might act similarly towards the Croatian political issue in the future. Pavelić thus noted in December 1953:

“These days, two very interesting statements have been made by two competent North American statesmen. North American Vice President Dr. Nixon stated that North America had made a great mistake by disarming Japan. North American Secretary of State John Forster Dulles, for his part, expressed his agreement with the Vice President’s statement, and what is more, he added that a similar mistake had been made by disarming Germany. He does find an excuse for this, however, because the statesmen of the time, who carried out the disarmament of Germany and Japan in agreement with Russia, believed that after the war there would be lasting peace, and that communism would pose no threat. This excuse is, of course, only a timid Band-Aid for that terrible and shameful mistake, which is the reason why the whole world today fears the communist peril, because as a result of this disarmament, and the occupation of Eastern and South-eastern Europe, those nations that are the only ones capable of standing in the way of communist expansion, are rendered incapable of defence, while the others in Europe that are not disarmed, with the exception of boycotted Spain, show obvious incompetence, inadequacy and indecisiveness for serious resistance. Dulles’ apology is not capable of excusing the statesmen of the time, because if they did not foresee the communist peril, it means that they were completely incompetent, and if they did foresee it, it means that they acted in bad faith, and deliberately provided support for communism.“²²

A significant place in the columns was also devoted to the discussion of a future war between the West and

²⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 8. listopada 1953: 2.

²¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 2. prosinca 1953: 2.

²¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, December 2, 1953: 2.

²² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, December 2, 1953: 2.

za jedan ozbiljni odpor. Dullesova izprika nije kadra izpričati tadanje državnike, jer ako nisu komunističku pogibelj predvidjeli, znači, da su bili podpuno nesposobni, a ako su je predvidjeli, znači, da su radili u zloj vjeri i hotimice pružili podporu komunizmu.“²²

Značajno mjesto u kolumnama posvećeno je i raspravi o nekom budućem ratu zapada s komunističkim zemljama. Vidljivo je da je autor iščekivao takav razvoj događaja jer je on otvarao perspektivu za promjenu položaja Hrvatske kao političkog faktora, ali i prostor za ponovnu legitimizaciju hrvatske političke emigracije koja je nosila stigmatu poraza iz Drugog svjetskog rata. U tom smislu Pavelić piše u kolovozu 1954. godine:

„Američki ministar vojske je izjavio, da Amerika treba prekinuti diplomatske odnose sa sovjetskom Rusijom. Već sama ta izjava je teške naravi, kada ju je dao jedan odgovorni ministar. Nu on je pošao još i dalje te je izjavio, da Amerika treba povesti proti sovjetskoj Rusiji preventivni rat. Preventivni rat znači predusretni rat, to jest, bezodvlačni rat već sada i bez obzira na koji neposredni povod, dok je još na vrijeme, dakle dok se Rusija još više ne ojača i ne stvori za sebe bolje i na uspjeh izglednije uvjete (...) Kada su novinari o tom upitali predsjednika Eisenhowera, on je izjavio, da se ministar ne mora s njime slagati u mnijenju gledom na to pitanje, i da on nije niti za prekinuće diplomatskih odnosa niti za preventivni rat. Neki su razočarani s tom izjavom predsjednika Eisenhowera, nu naravno, on kao predsjednik države nije mogao drugačije ni reći obzirom na odgovornost koju on nosi. Treba bez dvojbe za mogućnost ulaza u rat imati izvršene izvjestne pretpostavke od kojih su na primjer važne sljedeće: Uglaviti u prvom redu odgovornost komunizma i sovjetske Rusije za rat; pripremiti dovoljno javno mnijenje, pučanstvo Amerike, i osvjedočiti ga, da mu prijeti strašna pogibelj robstva, ako komunizam zavlada celim svijetom s metodama, s kojima sada zadobiva pristaše, to jest s propagandom za tobožnji mir; i konačno, treba u drugim krajevima svijeta, i napose u Evropi imati pouzdanje i sigurnost u druge narode, da će svoju dužnost u ratu proti komunističkoj pogibelji doista i izvršiti, a koju sigurnost ovoga časa ne pružaju

communist countries. It is clear that the author anticipated such a development, as it opened up the prospect of changing the position of Croatia as a political factor, but also the space for the re-legitimization of the Croatian political emigration, which bore the stigma of defeat in WWII. In this sense, Pavelić wrote in August 1954:

“The American Secretary of War has declared that America should break off diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. This statement in itself is a serious one, when it comes from a competent minister. But he went even further and declared that America should wage a preventative war against Soviet Russia. A preventative war means a pre-encounter war, that is, a war without delay, immediate and regardless of the indirect cause, while there is still time, that is, until Russia strengthens even further and creates better and more likely conditions for success (...) When reporters asked President Eisenhower about this, he stated that the Secretary of State did not have to agree with him on the issue, and that he was neither in favour of breaking off diplomatic relations nor starting a preventative war. Some were disappointed with President Eisenhower's statement, but of course, as the head of state, he could not have said otherwise, given the responsibility he bears. Without a doubt, certain assumptions must be made for the possibility of entering war, and the following are important, for example: First of all, to establish the responsibility of communism and Soviet Russia for the war; to sufficiently prepare public opinion, the people of America, and to convince them that they are threatened with the terrible danger of slavery if communism takes over the entire world with the methods by which it is now gaining supporters, that is, with propaganda for an alleged peace; and finally, in other parts of the world, and especially in Europe, we must have confidence and certainty in other nations that they will actually fulfil their duty in the war against the communist menace, and this certainty is not provided at this time by the likes of the French Mendès' in the company of the six million French communist voters, nor by Italian politicians who would like to draw nearer to the leftists and their five million voters.”²³

In terms of reinterpreting the circumstances of WWII, and especially its final phase, Pavelić relied heavily on criticism of the Allied conferences. This criticism was

²² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 2. prosinca 1953: 2.

²³ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, August 18, 1954: 2.

francuzki Mendezi u društvu s francuzkih šest miliona komunističkih izbornika ni talijanski političari, koji bi se rada približili ljevičarima i njihovim petmilionskim brojem izbornika.“²³

U reinterpetaciji okolnosti Drugog svjetskog rata, a osobito njegove završne faze, Pavelić se u velikoj mjeri oslanjao na kritiku savezničkih konferencija. Ta kritika nije bila samo njegova, ona je postojala i u konzervativnim krugovima u SAD-u, a osobito je dobila na važnosti nakon što je SAD 1955. deklasificirao dokumente povezane s konferencijom u Jalti koja je održana u veljači 1945.²⁴ Iz Pavelićeve perspektive takav je stav razumljiv jer je među ostalim odlukama na Jalti odlučeno o uspostavi zajedničke jugoslaven-ske vlade Tita i Šubašića. U SAD-u pitanje Jalte bilo je dio rasprave o tome je li SAD učinio previše ustupaka Sovjetima i na koji je način popustljiva politika potakla agresivnost druge strane. Ta je tema bila jako prisutna u američkoj javnosti, a Pavelić je svakako prepoznao argumentaciju koje je išla u prilog njegovim idejama i interpretacijama. Nerijetko su njegovi komentari bili s izraženim animozitetom, osobito kad su se odnosili na lidere kao što su Churchill i Roosevelt koje je smatrao odgovornima za politiku koja je oblikovala poslijeratnu sudbinu istočnoeuropskih naroda:

„Najveći događaj u međunarodnoj politici ovih dana jest objava tajnih klauzula konferencije i ugovorna u Jalti, koje je sada deset godina nakon svršetka rata objelodanilo sjeveroameričko ministarstvo vanjskih poslova. Kako je poznato, u proljeću godine 1945. sastali su se u Jalti Staljin, Roosevelt i Churchill na dogovor za posvemašnje uništenje Njemačke. Tom su zgodom između njih stvoreni i tajni zaključci, koji su sada objelodanjeni a koji su zaprepastili cijeli svijet. Napose je Churchill, te ostali englezki državnici jako pogodjeni tim objavama, jer iz njih proizlazi, da se je na toj konferenciji nepravedno postupalo ne samo proti njemačkom narodu, nego i proti vlastitim saveznicima, napose prema Poljacima i Francuzima. Tako iz tih tajnih zaključaka proizlazi, da se na Francuze nije uzimao nikakovi obzir, a glede Poljaka se je Churchill izrazio, da ga oni ne zanimaju. On je tu izjavu dao prigodom Staljinova zahtjeva na pripojenje

not only his own; it also existed in conservative circles in the United States, and it gained particular importance after the United States declassified documents in 1955 related to the Yalta Conference held in February 1945.²⁴ From Pavelić's perspective, such an attitude is understandable, because among other decisions at Yalta, it was decided to establish a joint Yugoslav government between Tito and Šubašić. In the USA, the Yalta issue was part of the debate about whether the USA had made too many concessions to the Soviets, and how such lenient policy had fuelled the aggressiveness of the other side. This topic was very present in the American public, and Pavelić certainly recognized the arguments that supported his ideas and interpretations. His comments were often marked with animosity, especially when they referred to leaders such as Churchill and Roosevelt whom he held responsible for policies that shaped the post-war fate of Eastern European nations:

“The biggest event in international politics these days is the publication of the secret clauses of the Yalta conference and treaty, which has now been disclosed by the North American Ministry of Foreign Affairs ten years after the end of the war. As is known, in the spring of 1945, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill met in Yalta to agree on the total destruction of Germany. During this event secret agreements were concluded between them, which are now disclosed and which shocked the whole world. Particularly Churchill and other English statesmen were very affected by these announcements, because it follows from them that not only the German people, but also their own allies, especially the Poles and the French, were unfairly treated at the conference. Thus, from these secret agreements, it follows that the French were not taken into account at all, and with regard to the Poles, Churchill expressed that he was not interested in them. He made this statement on the occasion of Stalin's demand for the annexation of a large part of Poland to Russia. This statement on Churchill's part fell through, although the English government had pushed Poland into the war against Germany, despite the English obligation to defend Poland and despite the fact that tens of thousands of Polish soldiers had died in Africa and Italy fighting for the English side. All in all, Churchill and Roosevelt gave Stalin and Bolshevik Russia everything without asking for any return favours, everything he asked for and what he did not, which thereby strengthened communism

²³ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 18. kolovoza 1954: 2.

²⁴ Sontag 1955: 615–623.

²⁴ Sontag 1955: 615–623.

velikoga diela Poljske Rusiji. Ta je izjava sa strane Churchilla pala, iako je englezka vlada gurnula Poljsku u rat proti Njemačkoj, unatoč obveze, da će Poljsku Englezka braniti i unatoč okolnosti, da je na desetke tisuća poljskih vojnika poginulo u Africi i u Italiji na strani Englezke. Sve u svemu, Churchill i Roosevelt su Staljinu i boljševičkoj Rusiji davali sve bez ikakvih protuusluga, što je on tražio i što nije, i time su toliko ojačali komunizam, da on sada prijeti uništenjem cijeloga čovječanstva.²⁵

„Čovječanstvo se medjuti nada, da se na toj konferenciji 'Velikih' ne će ponoviti događaji i obnoviti tajni ugovori preslavne konferencije održane godine 1945. u Jalti, kada su, kako sada izjavljuje jedan od tada prisutnih funkcionera, Roosevelt i Churchill izkapljivali liep broj čašica vodke, što im ih je lukavi Georgijac natakao, 'zapili' polovicu Europe i otvorili širom vrata svjetskom komunizmu ne samo u drugim, nego i u vlastitim državama.“²⁶

Zanimljiv je način na koji je u jesen 1956. Pavelić pratio razvoj Sueske krize koja se odigravala paralelno s gušenjem revolucije u Mađarskoj iza željezne zavjese. Nakon godina pisanja o međunarodnim odnosima bilo je vidljivo da se Pavelićeva nadanja o konačnom obračunu između zapada i svjetskog komunizma ne ostvaruju. Dapače, čak se i Eisenhowerova administracija u koju je polagao nade, i prikazivao ju kao spremnu za sukob s komunizmom, ponijela oprezno prema zbivanjima u Mađarskoj, a izvršila je pritisak za mirno rješenje sueske spora. Time je postajalo sve jasnije da se hladnoratovska podjela svijeta etablira i da obje strane prihvaćaju interesne sfere koje su se oblikovale u prethodnom razdoblju.²⁷ To je imalo jasne posljedice i na Pavelićevu političku viziju. U tom kontekstu Pavelić razočarano piše da se pogreške zapada stalno ponavljaju:

„Gotovo sve države osudjuju postupak Engleze i Francuzke, a na čelu svih Sjeverna Amerika. Svi se naime boje, da bi se iz ovog slučaja doista mogao poroditi novi svjetski rat, a političari i državnici raznih slobodnih naroda nisu

to such an extent that it now threatens to destroy all of humanity.”²⁵

“However, humanity hopes that the events of the conference of the 'Great ones' will not be repeated, and that the secret agreements of the famous conference held in 1945 in Yalta will not be renewed, when, as stated by one of the officials present at the event, Roosevelt and Churchill drained a large number of glasses of vodka, poured by the cunning Georgian, 'drank' half of Europe, and opened the door wide to world communism not only in other countries, but also in their own.”²⁶

It is interesting how in the autumn of 1956 Pavelić followed the development of the Suez Crisis, which was taking place simultaneously with the suppression of the revolution in Hungary behind the Iron Curtain. After years of writing about international relations, it was obvious that Pavelić's hopes for a final showdown between the West and world communism were not being realized. In fact, even the Eisenhower administration, in which he had placed his hopes and portrayed it as ready for a conflict with communism, behaved cautiously towards the events in Hungary, and exerted pressure for a peaceful resolution of the Suez dispute. This made it increasingly clear that the Cold War division of the world was becoming established, and that both sides were accepting the spheres of interest that had been shaped in the previous period.²⁷ This had clear consequences for Pavelić's political vision. In this context, Pavelić writes with disappointment that the mistakes of the West were constantly being repeated:

“Almost all countries condemn the actions of England and France, and North America is at the forefront of all of them. Everyone fears that this incident could indeed give rise to a new world war, and the politicians and statesmen of various free nations are not yet aware that humanity cannot be saved from the Soviet and general communist peril in any other way than with a total war of all nations, and which war must destroy the breeding ground of that peril. (...) And this mistake is the consequence of the fact that all free Western nations, including England, generously sacrificed all the nations of Eastern and South-eastern Europe to the Soviet and communist Moloch at the end of the World War,

²⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 23. ožujka 1955: 2.

²⁶ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 10. travnja 1955: 12.

²⁷ Westad 2021: 215.

²⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, March 23, 1955: 2.

²⁶ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, April 10, 1955: 12.

²⁷ Westad 2021: 215.

još svjestni, da se čovječanstvo ne može spasiti od sovjetske i obće komunističke pogibelji na nijedan drugi način neog sa obćim ratom sviju naroda, u kom ratu treba razrušiti leglo te pogibelji. (...) A ta je pogreška posljedica, što su svi slobodni zapadnjački narodi, pa medju njima i Englezka, svršetkom svjetskog rata velikodušno žrtvovali sovjetskom i obćekomunističkom molohu sve narode u iztočnoj i jugoiztočnoj Europi, te brinući se samo za to, da saćuvaju rezultate svoje 'pobjede', željeli suživljenja i suradnju sa sovjetskom Rusijom...²⁸

Sovjetski Savez (SSSR)

Pavelićeva perspektiva na ulogu SSSR-a u međunarodnim odnosima i na politiku koju provodi prema zemljama lagera i zapadnim zemljama bila je jedno-dimenzionalna i, očekivano, izrazito negativna. Pavelić često ističe da se Sovjetima ne može vjerovati, upozorava na njihove tajne postupke i zavjere, svaku poruku koja dolazi s te strane, a usmjerena je na deeskalaciju ili pronalaženje kompromisnih rješenja, karakterizira kao siguran pokušaj prijevare.²⁹ Pavelić je tako u rujnu 1952. analizirao tekst iz sovjetskih novina u kojem Staljin najavljuje neke buduće kapitalističke ratove:

„Medjutim je veliku senzaciju izazvao u cielelomu svijetu jedan članak, što ga je u 'Bolševiku' napisao sam glavom Stalin. U tom članku veli boljševički diktator, da boljševička Rusija ne kani nikako izazvati rat, nu unatoč tome da do rata mora skoro doći, i to ne do rata izmedju boljševičke Rusije i kapitalističkih država nego upravo izmedju samih kapitalističkih država medjusobno, i to u prvom redu izmedju Francuzke i Englezke s jedne strane, te Sjeverne Amerike s druge strane. Novinstvo je komentiralo na široko tu tvrdnju Stalinovu, a vodeći političari davali su o njoj izjave, i svi se više-manje slažu u tom, da Stalin ozbiljno ne će rata. To je i moguće, ali Stalinovu pravu misao vjerojatno nisu pogodili. Iz njegovih se rieči medjutim može lahko razabrati, da on misli, da doista ne će biti potrebno, da Rusija ulazi u rat, kao što je slučaj i u Koreji, nego da će u danom slučaju biti dovoljno, da organizirani komunisti u

and concerned only with preserving the results of their 'victory', they desired coexistence and cooperation with Soviet Russia...²⁸

The Soviet Union (USSR)

Pavelić's perspective on the role of the USSR in international relations and on the policy it pursued towards the socialist camp countries and the Western countries, was one-dimensional, and predictably, extremely negative. Pavelić often emphasized that the Soviets cannot be trusted, warned of their secret actions and conspiracies, and characterized all messages coming from that side, aimed at de-escalation or finding compromise solutions, as sure attempts at deception.²⁹ Thus, in September 1952, Pavelić analysed a text from a Soviet newspaper in which Stalin announced some future capitalist wars:

“However, an article caused a great sensation in the whole world, written in 'Bolshevik' by Stalin himself. In that article, the Bolshevik dictator says that Bolshevik Russia has no intention of causing a war, despite the fact that war must soon come, and not a war between Bolshevik Russia and the capitalist countries, but precisely between the capitalist countries themselves, primarily between France and England on the one hand, and North America on the other. The press commented extensively on Stalin's claim, and leading politicians made statements about it, and everyone more or less agreed that Stalin seriously did not want war. That is possible, but they probably did not get Stalin's real thought. However, it can be easily understood from his words that he thinks that it really will not be necessary for Russia to enter the war, as was the case in Korea, but that in the given case it will be enough for the organized communists in the European countries to take over the fight against North America...³⁰

A special place in the narrative about the USSR is occupied by the fact that in the West, especially in France and Italy, there are strong communist parties that Pavelić identifies as levers of Moscow. Such an opinion was in line with the distrust shown towards these political organizations by other political actors in their countries or by the USA. In addition, in his interpretations, Pavelić

²⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 7. studenoga 1956: 6.

²⁹ Kissinger 1956: 44–45.

²⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, November 7, 1956: 6.

²⁹ Kissinger 1956: 44–45.

³⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, September 14, 1952: 2.

evropskim državama zaposjednu borbu proti Sjevernoj Ameriki...³⁰

Posebno mjesto u naraciji o SSSR-u zauzima činjenica da na zapadu, osobito u Francuskoj i Italiji, djeluju snažne komunističke stranke koje Pavelić identificira kao poluge Moskve. Takvo mišljenje bilo je u skladu s nepovjerenjem koje su prema tim političkim organizacijama pokazivali drugi politički akteri u njihovim zemljama ili SAD-u. Osim toga, Pavelić u svojim interpretacijama pridaje Moskvi velik utjecaj na oblikovanje politika zapadnih zemalja, pa i SAD-a. Često ističe da SSSR tajnim kanalima utjecaja i javnim postupcima manipulacije usmjerava politiku zapada onako kako to njemu odgovara. U jesen 1952. Pavelić tako interpretira događaje vezane za diplomatske sastanke unutar organizacije Ujedinjenih naroda:

„Početkom ovoga zasjedanja diplomatski krugovi i svjetski tisak izražavali su nadu, da će ruski delegat na ovom zasjedanju biti pristupačan razlozima, te da će postići sporazum, da se taj rat dokrajči (op. a. Korejski rat). Međutim je držanje ruske delegacije oborilo te nade i do sada nije u tom pravcu postignut nikakav rezultat. Nije razumljivo zašto ti krugovi i svjetsko novinstvo neprestano želi stvarati nekakvi optimizam (...) da će se s Rusijom i komunizmom ipak doći do sporazuma, kada se svaki put događa obratno, i kada ne treba nikakve diplomatske mudrosti, da se vidi, da je Rusiji stalo prije od svega, nego li da se stvar u Koreji dovrši. Ta još je u svježoj uspomeni događaj kada je bio sa zapovjedništva u Koreji maknut general MacArthur. Još se nije tako reći bilo ni posušilo crnilo Trumanova podpisa (...) a cijelom je svijetu bilo javljeno, da je primirje i po tom miru Koreji gotova stvar. Očito su Rusi bili američkoj vladi podvalili, da će odmah obustaviti neprijateljstvo, samo ako se makne pogibeljnog im MacArthura...“³¹

U analizi slučaja američkog generala Douglasa MacArthura vidljivo je autorovo precjenjivanje sovjetskog utjecaja na unutarnje američke odnose. MacArthur je imao dugu povijest političkog sukobljavanja s predsjednikom Trumanom do te razine da je čak

attributes great influence to Moscow in shaping the policies of Western countries, including the USA. He often emphasizes how the USSR, through secret channels of influence and public manipulation, directs Western policy in a way that suits them. In the fall of 1952, Pavelić interprets events related to diplomatic meetings within the United Nations in the following way:

“At the beginning of this session, diplomatic circles and the world press expressed hope that the Russian delegate at this session would be receptive to reason, and that an agreement would be reached to end that war (note: the Korean War). However, the behaviour of the Russian delegation has dashed those hopes and so far there have been no results in that direction. It is incomprehensible why these circles and the world press constantly want to create some kind of optimism (...) that an agreement will be reached with Russia and communism after all, when the opposite happens every time, and no diplomatic wisdom is needed to see that Russia cares above all else about ending the matter in Korea. The event when General MacArthur was removed from command in Korea is still fresh in memory. The ink on Truman’s signature had not yet dried, so to speak (...) and the whole world was told that an armistice and peace for Korea were a done deal. Apparently the Russians had tricked the American government into saying that they would immediately cease hostilities only if the dangerous MacArthur was removed...”³¹

In the analysis of the case of American General Douglas MacArthur, the author’s overestimation of Soviet influence on internal American relations is evident. MacArthur had a long history of political conflict with President Truman, to the point of even expressing ambitions for a presidential candidacy, and there were other frictions in that relationship that are beyond the focus of this paper.³² The explanation of how the Soviets conditioned a possible peace agreement on MacArthur’s dismissal is quite flawed, but it fits into the overall narrative that is systematically being built about Truman and the Democratic Party.

It is also evident that Pavelić has no dilemmas regarding the ultimate goals and ambitions of the USSR.³³ He *a priori* rejects any idea of the coexistence of two superpowers and blocs. He persistently and consistently emphasizes

³⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 14. rujna 1952: 2.

³¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 4. studenoga 1952: 2.

³¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, November 4, 1952: 2.

³² Brands 2016.

³³ Wiles 1953: 566–580.

izražavao ambicije za predsjedničkom kandidaturom, a bilo je u tom odnosu i drugih trvenja koja su izvan fokusa ovog rada.³² Objašnjenje da su Sovjeti mogući mirovni sporazum uvjetovali MacArthurovom smjenom poprilično je promašeno, ali se uklapa u ukupni narativ koji se o Trumanu i Demokratskoj stranci sustavno gradi.

Također je vidljivo da Pavelić nema nikakvih dilema vezanih za krajnje ciljeve i ambicije SSSR-a.³³ On *a priori* odbacuje bilo kakvu ideju suživota dviju velesila i blokova. Uporno i dosljedno ističe da je primarni cilj SSSR-a globalna dominacija i širenje komunizma:

„S jedne strane cieli se svijet nalazi u jednoj strašnoj političkoj, ekonomskoj i socialnoj krizi, izazvanoj po sovjetskoj Rusiji i svjetskom komunizmu, koji su više-manje jedini koristnici izhoda drugog svjetskog rata, te koji, suglasno s komunističkom ideologijom (...) hoće tu svoju prednost izkoristiti do kraja, te komunističku ideologiju, i svoju vladavinu nametnuti celom svijetu te sve narode i zemlje podvrći ruskoj obće komunističkoj strahovladi.“³⁴

U travnju 1953., nakon Staljinove smrti, Pavelić analizira novonastalu situaciju. Činjenica da je došlo do promjene vodstva u Sovjetskom Savezu ne utječe na njegove zaključke te on i dalje ustraje na temeljnim pretpostavkama o prirodi sovjetskog režima i komunizma u širem smislu:

„U prvom redu novi boljševički predsjednik vlade Malenkov je izjavio, da je spreman stupiti u izravni dodir sa američkim predsjednikom Eisenhowerom, da bi se tako našao način za dovršenje tako zvanoga 'mrzloga rata'. Iza toga je uslijedio prijedlog ministra vanjskih poslova komunističke Kine Chou En-lai za ponovni započetak pregovora glede primirja u Koreji, koji su pregovori bili vodjeni preko godinu dana, i prekinuti pred pola godine, jer se pregovaratelji ratujućih stranaka nisu bili mogli baš u ničemu složiti. (...) Ima doduše ljudi, koji i ovoga puta sumnjaju u iskrenost komunističkih liepih rieči, te misle, da se pod svim tim opet krije kakova nova komunistička makinacija. Može biti da takovom mišljenju što doprinaša i viest, prema kojoj je vlada komunističke Kine izjavila da će u

that the primary goal of the USSR is global domination and the spread of communism on a global scale:

“On the one hand, the entire world is in a terrible political, economic and social crisis, caused by Soviet Russia and world communism, which are more or less the only beneficiaries of the outcome of WWII, and which, in accordance with communist ideology (...) wants to use this advantage to the fullest, and impose communist ideology and its rule on the entire world, and subject all peoples and countries to the general Russian communist reign of terror.”³⁴

In April 1953, after Stalin's death, Pavelić analysed the new situation. The fact that there had been a change in leadership in the Soviet Union did not affect his conclusions, and he continued to insist on his fundamental assumptions about the nature of the Soviet regime and communism in a broader sense:

“First of all, the new Bolshevik Prime Minister Malenkov declared that he was ready to enter into direct contact with American President Eisenhower in order to find a way to end the so-called “Cold War”. This was followed by a proposal by the Foreign Minister of Communist China, Chou En-lai, to resume negotiations on an armistice in Korea, which had been ongoing for over a year, and which were interrupted six months ago because the negotiators of the warring parties could not agree on anything. (...) However, there are people who once again doubt the sincerity of the communist fine words, and who believe that beneath all this again lies new communist machination. Possibly the news that the government of communist China has declared that it will soon arm twelve million soldiers in order to ostensibly prevent any possible attack by Chiang Kai-shek on the Chinese shores, contributed to this belief. (...) What wonder, then, that the Western world, after such a good defence of Europe, is delighted and carried away by the slightest friendly sneer or kind word from the Russian and Chinese communists, who have such an army at their disposal, even though these Westerners have already experienced so many times the disappointment immediately behind the optimism produced by communist friendliness and their peaceful proposals, which were always hiding some new machinations. If Western statesmen also believe this time in communist ‘good will’, then indeed, in this case too, one can without fear fall into error again and apply that

³² Brands 2016.

³³ Wiles 1953: 566–580.

³⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 25. studenoga 1952: 2.

³⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, November 25, 1952: 2.

najkraće vrijeme staviti pod oružje dvanaest milijuna vojnika, da na taj način tobože spriječi kakovu eventualnu navalu Chan Kai Chek-a na kineske obale. (...) Kakovo dakle čudo, da se zapadni svijet kraj tako dobre obrane Evrope oduševljava i zanosi i najmanjim prijaznim podsmjehom ili ljubaznom rieči ruskih i kineskih komunista, koji razpolazu s tolikom vojskom, pa makar su ti zapadnjaci već toliko puta doživili razočaranje neposredno iza optimizma proizvedenog komunističkom prijaznošću i njihovim miroljubivim prijedlozima, iza kojih se je uvijek skrivala koja nova makinacija. Ako i zapadnjački državnici i ovaj put povjeruju u komunističku 'dobru volju', onda se sbilja i u ovom slučaju može i bez straha pasti opet u pogrešku i primieniti onu staru i rimsku poslovicu: *quam parva sapientia mundus regitur* (s kako se malo pameti vlada sa svijetom)."³⁵

Često se ističe da Sovjeti pokušavaju razbiti jedinstvo zapada ciljajući na partikularne interese pojedinih zemalja. Uvijek se pritom navodi krajnji cilj sovjetske politike, a to je globalna dominacija i širenje komunizma. Kao voljni za suradnju sa Sovjetima na zapadu uvijek se primarno ističu Ujedinjeni Kraljevstvo i Francuska te se pomno analiziraju njihovi postupci s naglaskom na sve akcije koje se iz Pavelićeve perspektive vide kao suradnja sa komunizmom. Također, apostrofira se i utjecaj SSSR-a s pomoću simpatizera i suradnika koji postoje na zapadu u kulturnim, medijskim i znanstvenim krugovima.³⁶ Ističe se da te osobe svojim istupanjima oblikuju javno mnijenje na način koji koristi sovjetskim interesima. Kao prilog takvom viđenju Pavelić objašnjava postupke Vjačeslava Molotova, dugogodišnjeg sovjetskog ministra vanjskih poslova:

„Da bi pako onemogućio 'atlantski pakt' i stvaranje 'evropske vojske', nastoji Molotov razbiti slogu među zapadnim silama na način, što Francuzkoj nudi, da će odmah biti obustavljen rat, što se proti njoj vodi u Indokini, a istodobno se Englezkoj nudi velike trgovačke poslove s Rusijom, što je za englezke trgovce vrlo zamamna stvar, a zna se, da trgovci u Englezkoj imaju veliki upliv na vanjsku politiku. (...) Medjutim, što se god na toj, konferenciji u Berlinu dogodilo, i bili donešeni kakvi

old Roman proverb: *quam parva sapientia mundus regitur* (the world is ruled by little wisdom)."³⁵

It is often emphasized that the Soviets are trying to break the unity of the West by targeting particular interests of individual countries. The ultimate goal of Soviet policy is always stated, which is global domination and the spread of communism. The United Kingdom and France are always primarily highlighted as willing to cooperate with the Soviets in the West, and their actions are carefully analysed, with an emphasis on all actions that are seen as cooperation with communism from Pavelić's perspective. The influence of the USSR through sympathizers and collaborators who exist in the West in cultural, media and scientific circles is also emphasized.³⁶ It is highlighted that these individuals shape the public opinion through their statements in a way that benefits Soviet interests. As a contribution to such a view, Pavelić explains the actions of Vyacheslav Molotov, the long-time Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"In order to hinder the 'Atlantic Pact' and the creation of a 'European army' Molotov is trying to break up the unity among the Western powers by offering France an immediate cessation of the war that is being waged against it in Indochina, while at the same time offering England large trade deals with Russia, which is very tempting for English merchants, and it is known that merchants in England have a great influence on foreign policy. (...) However, whatever happens at that conference in Berlin, and whatever apparent conclusions are reached, not a single important issue will be resolved, because Russia will not give up its ultimate goal of conquering the entire world, nor will it vacate for good the countries it has occupied in Eastern and South-eastern Europe."³⁷

In the same tone, Pavelić comments on the events related to the 1955 Geneva Conference, which was the first summit of the leaders of the great powers after the Potsdam conference ten years earlier:

"The latest phenomenon in world politics is an extraordinary onslaught of world-renowned scientists on the members of the Geneva Conference, to force them to draw conclusions to ensure peace, because if war were to occur, all of humanity would be in

³⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 10. travnja 1953: 3.

³⁶ Erler 1956: 393; Oppenheimer 1953: 525–535.

³⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, April 10, 1953: 3.

³⁶ Erler 1956: 393; Oppenheimer 1953: 525–535.

³⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, February 10 1954: 2.

god prividni zaključci, ne će time ni jedno važno pitanje biti riješeno, jer Rusija ne će odustati od svojega konačnoga cilja osvajanja celoga svijeta, a niti će po dobru izprazniti zemalja, što ih je okupirala u iztočnoj i jugoistočnoj Evropi.“³⁷

U istom tonu Pavelić komentira događaje vezane za odvijanje Ženevske konferencije 1955., a koja je bila prvi susret na vrhu vođa velikih sila nakon konferencije u Potsdamu deset godina ranije:

„Najnovija pojava u svjetskoj politici jest jedna izvanredna navala naučenjaka svjetskoga glasa na članove ženevske konferencije, da ih prisili na stvaranje zaključaka za osiguranje mira, jer da je, ako bi do rata došlo, čitavo čovječanstvo došlo absolutno u pogibelj, da bude potpuno uništeno. I to je najnoviji manevar sovjetske Rusije (...) Svi su ti 'naučenjaci' više manje ili djelatni članovi komunističkih stranaka u pojedinim narodima (...) Da je njima stalo do čovječanstva, u prvom bi se redu morali zalagati za to, da se stotine milijona ljudstva oslobodi robstva, u kojem čami pod komunističkim režimima...“³⁸

Što se tiče intenziviranja susreta zapadnih i sovjetskih čelnika u razdoblju nakon Staljinove smrti, Pavelić zauzima stavove u skladu sa svojim ranijim razmišljanjima. Svaki se susret interpretira kao prilika Sovjetima da prošire svoj utjecaj i postignu svoje ciljeve, dok se zapadne zemlje ocjenjuju kao nejedinstvene i bez mogućnosti da realiziraju svoje ambicije u kontaktu sa SSSR-om. Često je konačni zaključak da ti susreti nisu proizveli nikakve rezultate i da se stvari ne pomiču s mrtve točke. Realnost je, naravno, bila drugačija, a diplomatski kontakti na najvišim razinama imali su za cilj produbljivanje komunikacije između SAD-a i SSSR-a te su služili kao platforma kako bi se iznijeli pogledi na probleme i na vrijeme izbjegli mogući sukobi.³⁹ Kao jasna ilustracija takvih stavova može poslužiti Pavelićev komentar već spomenute Berlinske konferencije iz veljače 1954. kada su se sastali ministri vanjskih SAD-a, Velike Britanije, Francuske i Sovjetskog Saveza:

absolute danger of being completely destroyed. And this is the latest maneuver by Soviet Russia (...) All of these 'scientists' are more or less active members of the communist parties in individual nations (...) If they cared about humanity, they would first of all have to advocate for the liberation of hundreds of millions of people from the slavery in which they languish under communist regimes...“³⁸

As for the recurrent meetings between Western and Soviet leaders in the period after Stalin's death, Pavelić takes a view in line with his earlier thoughts. Each meeting is interpreted as an opportunity for the Soviets to expand their influence and achieve their goals, while Western countries are assessed as not united and unable to realize their ambitions in contact with the USSR. Often the final conclusion is that these meetings did not produce any results and that things did not move from the deadlock. The reality was, of course, different, and diplomatic contacts at the highest levels were aimed at deepening communication between the USA and the USSR, and served as a platform to communicate views on problems, and avoid possible conflicts in time.³⁹ A clear illustration of such positions can be depicted by Pavelić's comment on the aforementioned Berlin Conference in February 1954, when the foreign ministers of the USA, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union met:

“There were people who, reading the newspapers and the biased news spread by various journalistic charlatans, still believed that something positive would come out of the 'BIG FOUR CONFERENCE' in Berlin. Among the emigrants of all nationalities, who escaped the communist terror in Eastern and South-eastern Europe, there were also faint-hearted ones, who had already seen that a full agreement had been reached between the Westerners and Soviet Russia which forever destroyed any possibility of liberating their homelands. And what happened? What had to happen, and what any reasonable person could have expected: much ado about nothing. The conference ended in a complete debacle (a shameful failure). Molotov used this conference as an opportunity to once again humiliate the governments and regimes of the Western superpowers before the whole world, and what is more, to sow an apple of discord between them, so that in their discord they would be as little resistant as possible to

³⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 10. veljače 1954: 2.

³⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 20. srpnja 1955: 2.

³⁹ Dexter 1953: 34–47.

³⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, July 20, 1955: 2.

³⁹ Dexter 1953: 34–47.

„Bilo je ljudi, koji su čitajući novine i tendenciozne vijesti, što su ih razni novinarski šarlatani širili, ipak vjerovali, da će iz lakrdije pod imenom 'KONFERENCIJE ČETIRIJU VELIKIH' u Berlinu ipak nešto pozitivnog izići. Među emigrantima sviju narodnosti, koji su izbjegli izpod komunističkoga terora u izotčnoj i jugoistočnoj Evropi, bilo je i malodušnika, koji su već vidjeli postignut podpuni sporazum između zapadnjaka i sovjetske Rusije, i prema tome za uvijek likvidiranu svaku mogućnost oslobodjenja njihovih domovina. A što se je dogodilo? Ono, što se je dogoditi moralo, i što je svatko razuman mogao očekivati: tresla se brda, a rodio se smiešni miš. Konferencija svršila sa podpunim debaklom (sramotnim neuspjehom). Molotov je upotriebio priliku ove konferencije, da Još jedanput ponizi pred celim svijetom vlade i režime zapadnjačkih vevlasti, i što više, da ubaci kamen smutnje među njih, kako bi oni u svojoj neslozi bili čim manje neodporni proti boljševičkom osvajanju celoga svijeta. Za tu mu je svrhu dobro poslužila dvolična igra engleskih predstavnika i vječni strah francuzke politike pred eventualnim ojačanjem njemačkoga naroda.“⁴⁰

Sukladno narativu koji je autor stvarao o SSSR-u objašnjavale su se različite mijene u njihovim postupcima. Zanimljiv je slučaj Austrije i njezina međunarodnopravnog statusa. Pavelić često ističe da je Austrija okupirana i podijeljena slično kao i Njemačka i da tu nikad neće doći do promjene.⁴¹ Ipak, kada do dogovora dolazi, a Austrija postaje neutralna, to se objašnjava kao još jedna sovjetska pobjeda:

„Što se tiče Austrije, Molotov je još jednom otvoreno rekao, da se ruska vojska ne će povući iz Austrije (a ima naivnjaka, koji misle, da će se jednoga dana Rusi povući svojevóljno i po dobru iz zemalja iza željeznoga zastora), i da prema tome ima namjeru imati u srdcu Evrope već postavljene prve redove vojske za navalu na zapadnu Evropu u času, kada joj se to prićini oportuno i poželjno. Naravno, da ministar vanjskih poslova Sjeverne Amerike Dulles nije mogao pristati na takove priedloge, a predstavnici Englezke i Francuzke, kako god bi im bilo drago, da do kakovog rezultata dodje, nisu mogli učiniti ništa

the Bolshevik conquest of the whole world. For this purpose, the duplicitous game of the English representatives and the eternal fear of French politics before the possible strengthening of the German people served him well.“⁴⁰

According to the narrative about the USSR created by the author, various changes in their actions were explained. The case of Austria and its international legal status is also interesting. Pavelić often emphasizes that Austria was occupied and divided similarly to Germany and that there will never be a change.⁴¹ However, when an agreement was reached and Austria became neutral, this is explained as another Soviet victory:

“As for Austria, Molotov once again openly stated that the Russian army would not withdraw from Austria (and there are naive people who think that one day the Russians will withdraw voluntarily and for good from the countries behind the Iron Curtain), and that he therefore intends to have the first lines of the army already positioned in the heart of Europe, ready for an attack on Western Europe at an opportune and desirable moment. Of course, the North American Foreign Minister Dulles could not agree to such proposals, and the representatives of England and France, no matter how much they would have liked to see the result, could do nothing in the face of the resolute stance of the North American representatives.”⁴²

“On the part of Moscow, and also on the part of the Austrian government, a great propaganda is being carried out around the world, which glorifies this step by the Moscow government, and which is presented as a great success for Austria. Russia has two goals in mind to achieve the following: first, that on the basis of the conclusions on the termination of the occupation, American and other Western troops withdraw from Austria. Considering the circumstance that Austria is committed to neutrality, these troops will not be able to return to Austria even in the event of a war with Soviet Russia, that is, the Western troops in such case would require a relatively long time, and the contribution of large forces for the occupation

⁴⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 21. veljače 1954: 2.

⁴¹ Hallstein 1952: 58–66.

⁴⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, February 21, 1954: 2.

⁴¹ Hallstein 1952: 58–66.

⁴² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, February 21, 1954: 2.

u oči odlučnoga držanja predstavnika Sjeverne Amerike.⁴²

„Sa strane Moskve, a i sa strane austrijske vlade, vrši se velika propaganda po svijetu, kojom se veliča taj korak moskovske vlade i prikazuje ga se velikim uspjehom za Austrija. Rusija ima pred očima dva cilja, koja s time hoće postići: prvo, da na temelju zaključaka o prestanku okupacije budu iz Austrije povučene američke i ostale zapadnjačke trupe. Obzirom na okolnost, da se Austrija obvezuje na neutralnost, te se trupe ne će moći više u Austriju povratiti ni u času ratnoga sukoba sa sovjetskom Rusijom, odnosno zapadnjačke bi trupe u takovom slučaju trebale razmjerno mnogo vremena i ulog velikih snaga za okupaciju, da tako dodju u položaj neposredne fronte s ruskim, odnosno inim komunističkim trupama.“⁴³

Još jedan značajan trenutak urušavanja narativa koji Pavelić gradi događa se u jesen 1956. kada je izbila revolucija u Mađarskoj, a odvijala se paralelno sa Sueskom krizom. Pavelić manje izvještava o tom događaju zbog problema s pristupom informacijama, ali ističe da nije došla pomoć sa zapada, a pokret je ugušen u krvi uz mnogobrojne komunističke zločine. Način rasplitanja situacije u Mađarskoj i pitanja Sueza ukazivao je na to da je koegzistencija dvaju blokova mnogo realniji smjer razvoja situacije od konfrontacije koju je Pavelić toliko očekivao:

„Nenadano je odjeknuo svitom glas, da se je u Mađarskoj podigao narod na noge i da se bori svoju slobodu. (...) Mladost i rodoljubi povelili su borbu za slobodu i ustrajno se borili te svoju krv i živote davali na oltar domovine i narodne slobode ... a uz to su se nadali i pomoći od zapadnih slobodnih naroda ... Nu ta im pomoć nije došla, a zna se i za što. Posljednje viesti glase, da su sovjetske trupe izvršile nad mađarskom zemljom i mađarskim narodom strašne zločine sa svim vrstama oružja...“⁴⁴

in order to get into a position of direct front with Russian and other communist troops.”⁴³

Another significant moment of collapse of the narrative built by Pavelić occurs in the autumn of 1956, when the revolution broke out in Hungary, and it took place simultaneously with the Suez Crisis. Pavelić reports less about this event due to problems with access to information, but he emphasizes that no help came from the West, and the movement was suffocated in blood with numerous communist crimes. The way the situation in Hungary and around the Suez issue unfolded indicated that the coexistence between the two blocs was a much more realistic situation development than the confrontation much expected by Pavelić:

“Suddenly, a voice rang out that the people in Hungary had risen to their feet and were fighting for their freedom. (...) The youth and patriots led the fight for freedom and fought persistently and gave their blood and lives on the altar of the homeland and people's freedom ... and they also hoped for help from the free Western nations ... But that help did not come to them, and it is known for what reason. The latest news is that Soviet troops invaded the Hungarian land and committed terrible crimes with all kinds of weapons against the Hungarian people...”⁴⁴

Yugoslavia

Of course, one of the frequent topics of Pavelić's writing was Yugoslavia. By analysing the entire corpus of texts published over a long period of time, it can be clearly stated that the author most often expressed his emotional and value judgments within these topics. There is a high level of sarcasm, the use of pejorative expressions that clearly express the author's views, and a clear difference in the methodological approach used to analyse other actors in international relations in this context. In September 1952, Pavelić wrote:

“Finally, world politics would not be complete if from time to time, Tito and Serbian communist Yugoslavia did not appear with their usual announcements that 'Yugoslavia' is threatened by attacks by Soviet Russia and the Cominform

⁴² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 21. veljače 1954: 2.

⁴³ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 4. svibnja 1955: 2.

⁴⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 7. studenoga 1956: 6.

⁴³ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, May 4, 1955: 2.

⁴⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, November 7, 1956: 6.

Jugoslavija

Naravno, jedna od čestih tema Pavelićeva pisanja bila je i Jugoslavija. Analizom ukupnog korpusa tekstova objavljenih u duljem razdoblju može se jasno tvrditi da je emocionalne i vrijednosne sudove autor najviše izražavao upravo u sklopu te teme. Prisutna je visoka razina sarkazma, upotreba pejorativnih izraza koji jasno izražavaju autorove stavove, vidljiva je jasna razlika u metodološkom pristupu kojim se analiziraju drugi akteri međunarodnih odnosa. U tom kontekstu Pavelić u rujnu 1952. piše:

„Konačno svjetska politika ne bi bila podpuna, da se od vremena do vremena, Tito i srbokomunistička Jugoslavija ne pojave sa svojim običajnim obaviestima, da 'Jugoslaviji' prieti pogibelj od napadaja sovjetske Rusije i kominformskih zemalja. To se događa napose uvijek u oči kakove nove financijske pomoći angloameričke.“⁴⁵

Ime Jugoslavija u prvim tekstovima redovito se nalazi u navodnim znakovima, a kasnije stoji bez njih. Nije moguće utvrditi je li ta promjena slučajna ili ima nekakvu pozadinsku konotaciju. Uz navođenje imena Jugoslavija koristi se izrazima kao „srbokomunistička“, „Titoslavija“, „Mošarankovičtitoslavija“ i slični. Osim lako uočljivog prezira koji autor neskriveno adresira prema Jugoslaviji, na dubljoj razini primarni je cilj dokazati da ta zemlja nije pouzdan partner zapada. Često se navodi da Jugoslavija igra dvostruku ulogu, da je ona, zapravo, sovjetski trojanski konj i da bi u slučaju sukoba između istoka i zapada stala uz Istočni blok. Pritom se ističe da je sukob između Jugoslavije i SSSR-a 1948. insceniran te da su veze između bivših saveznika i dalje snažne⁴⁶:

„Naravno, ne može proći ni jedan tjedan, a da i komunistička 'Jugoslavija' ne bi dala što čuti o sebi. Za vrijeme razprave o tehničkoj pomoći slabo razvijenim državama, ruski je delegat Arkadijev u Ujedinjenim Narodima obtužio 'Jugoslaviju', da je prodala zemlju za zlato, našto je jugoslavenski delegat [Leo] Mates odgovorio, da 'Jugoslavija' nema nakane

countries. This happens especially in the face of new Anglo-American financial aid.”⁴⁵

The name Yugoslavia in the early texts is regularly found in quotation marks, and later without them. It is not possible to determine whether this change is accidental or has some kind of background connotation. In addition to mentioning the name Yugoslavia, expressions such as “Serbocommunist”, “Titoslavija”, “Mošarankovičtitoslavija” and similar are used. Apart from the easily noticeable contempt that the author openly holds towards Yugoslavia on a deeper level, the primary goal is to prove that the country is not a reliable partner to the West. It is often stated that Yugoslavia plays a double role, that it is, in fact, a Soviet Trojan horse and that in the event of a conflict between East and West, Yugoslavia would side with the Eastern Bloc. In doing so, it is emphasized that the conflict between Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1948 was staged and that the ties between the former allies are still strong⁴⁶:

“Of course, not a single week can pass without communist 'Yugoslavia' making a statement about itself. During the discussion on technical assistance to underdeveloped countries, the Russian delegate Arkadyev at the United Nations accused 'Yugoslavia' of selling the country for gold, to which the Yugoslav delegate [Leo] Mates replied that 'Yugoslavia' had no intention of allowing the establishment of military bases in the country. This statement is certainly a defeat for the previous American regime, which has been providing aid in dollars to the Serbo-communists, although they have no intention of giving the Western powers the possibility of military bases to defend Europe from communism in the event of a war with Soviet Russia.”⁴⁷

“However, Belgrade continues to play its old game and once again screams that 'Yugoslavia' is threatened by Soviet Russia and its satellites, in order to have more effect in seeking help from the West, and that there are seventy-one 'enemy' divisions on the borders of 'Yugoslavia', and which huge army could attack Tito's 'democratic' state at any moment.”⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 19. rujna 1952: 2.

⁴⁶ U svojoj interpretaciji Pavelić zanemaruje mišljenja koja valoriziraju status Jugoslavije iz zapadne perspektive: Gordon East 1953: 629.

⁴⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, September 19, 1952: 2.

⁴⁶ In his interpretation, Pavelić ignores the opinions that valorise the status of Yugoslavia from a Western perspective: Gordon East 1953: 629.

⁴⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, November 25, 1952: 2.

⁴⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, January 21, 1953: 2.

dozvoliti postavljanje vojničkih baza u zemlji. Svakako je ta izjava porazna za dosadašnji američki režim, koji je srbokomunistima davao dolarsku pomoć, premda ono ni ne misle na to, da u slučaju rata sa Sovjetskom Rusijom dadu zapadnim silama mogućnost vojničkih baza za obranu Evrope od komunizma.⁴⁷

„Beograd međutim nastavlja svoju staru igru i opet više, da je 'Jugoslavija' ugrožena od sovjetske Rusije i satelita, ovaj puta, da bi traženje pomoći od Zapada imalo čim bolji uspjeh, na granicama 'Jugoslavije' stoji sedamdeset i jedna 'neprijateljska' divizija, koja bi ogromna vojska mogla svaki čas napasti 'demokratsku' Titovu državu.“⁴⁸

„U svim je političkim krugovima u svijetu izazvala začuđenje viest, da na određeno vrijeme nije došlo do potpisa vojničkoga pakta između Turske, Grčke i Jugoslavije, kako je to bilo predviđeno i objavljeno još pred vrlo kratko vrijeme. Mi smo uzadnjem broju rekli, da taj pakt ne će imati nikakove vrijednosti ni koristi za Grčku i Tursku, a isto tako ni za zapadne sile u obrani proti Rusiji i komunizmu, jer da se Jugoslavija ne će održati ni nekoliko dana u času ratnoga sukoba, budući će ju razrušiti narodi, koji su u nju silom i proti njihova pristanka uključeni, i napose hrv. narod, koji hoće bezuvjetno opet uzpostaviti svoju Nezavisnu Državu Hrvatsku. (...) Tito se je osobito uzvrpoljio zbog toga događaja, te urgira, da pošto po to dodje do potpisa toga pakta da bi mogao dobivati daljnju podporu u oružju i dolarima, da ne bude potpuno razkrinkan. Vidjet će se, ne će li Titov protektor i zagovornik Churchill praviti pritisak na Tursku, da pakt potpiše, da bi tako spasio kako tako svoga štićenika.“⁴⁹

Pavelić u istom tonu komentira i događaje vezane za osnivanje Varšavskog pakta u svibnju 1955., a u kojem Jugoslavija nije sudjelovala. Na taj način ponovno je potvrđen raskid iz 1948., ali Pavelić u nastavku ističe najavu posjeta sovjetskog političkog vrha Beogradu koji je najavljen za nekoliko mjeseci. Time potkrepljuje svoje stavove o tome da je Jugoslavija i dalje privržena Sovjetskom Savezu:

“The news that the military pact between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia had not yet been signed for a certain period of time, as foreseen and announced a very short time ago, has caused astonishment in all political circles in the world. In last edition we have said that this pact will have no valuable use for Greece and Turkey, nor for the Western powers in defense against Russia and communism, because Yugoslavia will not hold out for even a few days in a war, since it will be destroyed by the peoples who were included in it by force and against their consent, and especially by the Croatian people, who want to unconditionally re-establish their Independent State of Croatia. (...) Tito was particularly agitated by this event, and he urged the signing of this pact so that he could receive further support in arms and dollars, without being completely exposed. It remains to be seen whether Tito's protector and advocate Churchill will put pressure on Turkey to sign the pact, in order to somehow save his protégé.”⁴⁹

Pavelić also comments in the same tone on the events surrounding the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955, in which Yugoslavia did not participate. In this way, the 1948 breakup was reaffirmed, but Pavelić goes on to highlight the announcement of a visit by the Soviet political leadership to Belgrade, which was announced in a couple months. This reinforces his views on how Yugoslavia is still loyal to the Soviet Union:

“There was no delegate from Yugoslavia at that conference, and what do you say, the Moscow newspaper 'Izvestiya' published the official news that the President of the Soviet Government Bulganin and the Secretary of the Russian Communist Party Khrushchev are going to Belgrade at the end of May to visit Tito, at the head of a 'mission for peace'. Will the Western world still believe that Tito has turned renegade? There will certainly be some journalists who will still write that Bulganin is going to ask Tito for forgiveness.”⁵⁰

The examined material provides an excellent insight into Pavelić's view of Tito. He presents a picture of Tito as a frivolous actor in the complex of international relations,

⁴⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 25. studenoga 1952: 2.

⁴⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 21. siječnja 1953: 2.

⁴⁹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 21. srpnja 1954: 2.

⁴⁹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, July 21, 1954: 2.

⁵⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, May 18, 1955: 2.

„Sa strane Jugoslavije nije bio na toj konferenciji nikakav delegat, nu vidi kume vraga, moskovski list 'Izvestja' donio je službenu viest, da predsjednik sovjetske vlade Bulganjin i tajnik ruske komunističke stranke Kruščev idu koncem svibnja u Beograd u posjet Titu, na čelu jedne 'misije za mir'. Hoće li zapadni svijet još uvijek vjerovati, da se je Tito odmetnuo? Sigurno će se naći nekih novinara, koji će još napisati, da Bulganjin ide moliti Tita za oprostjenje.“⁵⁰

Iz promatranog materijala dobiva se izvrstan uvid u Pavelićev pogled na Tita. On servira sliku o Titu kao neozbiljnom akteru u kompleksu međunarodnih odnosa i opisuje ga uz snažnu dozu podozrenja i cinizma. Vidljivo je to na više mjesta, a kasnije će biti opisan ilustrativan slučaj susreta s britanskom kraljicom Elizabetom II. do kojeg je došlo u ožujku 1953., a koji će, uz ostale primjere, jasno potkrijepiti iznesene teze:

„Narodi, što se nalaze pod beogradskom komunističkom tiranijom doživjeli su opet jedan radostan događaj, to jest da je Tito ponovno izabran po 'parlamentu' za predsjednika države. Proti njemu je pao samo jedan glas. Doista takove 'sloge' nema nigdje na svijetu. Medjutim viesti govore, da se Gjilas nalazi u zatvoru, Dedier u ludnici, a neki drugi 'drugovi' na prisilnom radu.“⁵¹

„Budući je u svjetskoj političko-vojnoj dinamici sada atomska oružje dobilo konkretni oblik i postalo predmetom dnevnih izjava državnika, nije mogao ni maršal Tito preko toga prieći mučke, pa je izjavio, da svi narodi moraju biti upućeni u proizvodnju atomske energije, i dodao je, da Jugoslavija ima veliko obilje prve materije za tu energiju, i samo što nije rekao, da će i on skoro praviti atomsku i hidrogenu bombu. Vidila žaba, kako se konja kuje, pa i ona digla nogu, kako ono narod veli.“⁵²

„Beograd je otvoreno uzpostavio dobre diplomatske veze s Moskvom i sa svim ostalim komunističkim državama, i iztaknuti režimski prvaci, pa i sam Tito opetovano izjavljuju, da doduše sa zapadom ne prekidaju, nu da su veze i odnosi s

which is described with a strong dose of suspicion and cynicism. This is evident in several places, and later an illustrative case of a meeting with the British Queen Elizabeth II, which took place in March 1953, which, along with other examples, will clearly corroborate the presented theses:

“The peoples under the Belgrade communist tyranny have experienced another joyful event, namely, Tito was re-elected by the 'parliament' as the president of the state. Only one vote fell against him. Indeed, there is no such 'unity' anywhere in the world. However, the news says that Gjilas is in prison, Dedier in a madhouse, and some other 'comrades' are doing forced labour.”⁵¹

“Since atomic weapons have now taken on a concrete form and became the subject of daily statements by statesmen in the world's political and military dynamics, even Marshal Tito could not remain silent about it, so he declared that all nations must be trained in the production of atomic energy, and he added that Yugoslavia has a great abundance of the first material for that energy, and he was about to say that he too would soon make an atomic and hydrogen bomb. Monkey see, monkey do, as the people say.”⁵²

“Belgrade has openly established good diplomatic relations with Moscow and all other communist states, and prominent regime leaders, including Tito himself, repeatedly state that although they are not breaking off relations with the West, ties and relations with communist regimes are a completely natural thing. (...) And where is Tito? A brief piece of news recently appeared in the newspapers that Marshal Tito had boarded the training ship 'Galeb' and travelled to India. Anyway, Tito went on a visit to India at the very moment when a conference of all communist states for the 'defence' against the Western powers was being held in Moscow, and at the very time when it was officially established that the harvest in Yugoslavia had failed so badly that without a loan to purchase hundreds of thousands of tons of grain, the entire population, of course except for the circles in power, was in danger of starving to death. (...) Who will believe that Tito went to India, to bathe in the holy water of the river Ganges, as prescribed by the laws of the deities Vishnu and Shiva, and that it is not just a facade. Which is

⁵⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 18. svibnja 1955: 2.

⁵¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 10. veljače 1954: 2.

⁵² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 23. ožujka 1955: 2.

⁵¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, February 10, 1954: 2.

⁵² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, March 23, 1955: 2.

komunističkim režimima posve naravna stvar. (...) A gdje je Tito? Kroz novinstvo je prošla nedavno kratka viest, da je maršal Tito sjeo na školsku ladju 'Galeb' i odputovao u Indiju. Elem, Tito otišao u posiet Indiji upravo u času kada se u Moskvi drži konferencija svih komunističkih država za 'obranu' proti zapadnim silama, i baš u vriem, kada je službeno ustanovljeno, da je žetva u Jugoslaviji toliko podbacila, da bez zajma na nabavu stotine tisuća tona žita prieti smrt od gladi cielome pučanstvu, naravno osim krugovima na vlasti. (...) Tko će vjerovati, da je Tito otišao u Indiju, da se okupa u svetoj vodi rieke Ganges, kako to propisuju zakoni božanstva Višnu i Šiva, i da to nije tek maska. Pod kojom se krije put u Moskvu na raport Malenkovu pred kojim Tito još nije bio, odkada je ovaj preuzeo u svoje ruke uzde nakon smrti Staljinove."⁵³

Pavelić tijekom cijelog promatranog vremena ustraje na mišljenju da Jugoslavija igra dvostruku igru i da izigrava zapad.⁵⁴ Ponekad je ta argumentacija bila temeljena na analizi sastanaka, političkih poruka, izjava i slično, a ponekad i na špekulacijama koje nisu bile utemeljene na činjenicama, već su se vezivale za osobno znanje i promišljanje. Na taj način Pavelić 1955. promatra i interpretira sukobe Milovana Đilasa i Vladimira Dedijera sa službenom linijom SKJ:

„Opet Gjilas i Dedier. Dosjetili se komunci, da bi moglo skoro biti kakove veselice, pa vele, bilo bi dobro založili se za 'pravu' demokraciju. Mogu biti samo dva slučaja: ili je režim već na psu, pa ne može spriječiti bune u svojim redovima, ili je stvar dogovorena, da se vanjskom svijetu 'dokaže' da pod beogradskim komunističkim režimom vlado tolika sloboda, da se proti njemu može po gdjetko i buniti. U stvari je jedno i drugo, a najvažnije je, da se Jugoslavija nalazi u nečuvenom katastrofalnom gospodarskom i financijskom stanju, da vlastodržci upravo ne znaju, što bi učinili i kako bi iz te katastrofe izišli. U svim zemljama te Jugovine vlada glad, nema kruha, a nema niti nikakove zaštite proti zimi, jer nema ruha a ni ogrieva. I podpredsjednik centralne vlade Vukmanović je izjavio, da Jugoslavija nije u stanju s normalnim sredstvima izići iz financialne krize, u kojoj se

hiding the trip to Moscow to report to Malenkov, whom Tito has not yet faced, since the latter took the reins after Stalin's death."⁵³

Throughout the observed period, Pavelić insists on the opinion that Yugoslavia is playing a double game and is playing tricks on the West.⁵⁴ Sometimes this argumentation was based on the analysis of meetings, political messages, statements and the like, and sometimes on speculations not based on facts but which were based on personal knowledge and reflection. This is how Pavelić observes and interprets the conflicts of Milovan Đilas and Vladimir Dedijer with the official line of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1955:

“Gjilas and Dedier again. The commies came up with the idea that there could soon be some kind of celebration, and they say it would be good to advocate for 'real' democracy. There can only be two cases: either the regime is already in a state of collapse and cannot prevent rebellions within its ranks, or the matter has been arranged to 'prove' to the outside world that there is so much freedom under the Belgrade communist regime that one can even rebel against it. In fact, it is both, and the most important thing is that Yugoslavia is in an unheard of catastrophic economic and financial situation, and those in power do not know what to do or how to get out of this catastrophe. In all the countries of Yugoslavia there is famine, there is no bread, and there is no protection against the winter, because there is no clothing or heating. And the deputy prime minister of the central government, Vukmanović, stated that Yugoslavia is not able to use normal means to get out of the financial crisis, which occurred as a result of accumulated debts, which were created through loans obtained abroad, because it no longer has enough funds to be able to pay the interest, so the government will be forced to call all creditors to an agreement, in order to achieve a change in loans from medium to long terms.”⁵⁵

Pavelić comments in a similar tone the meetings that Josip Broz Tito had with representatives of various countries. Criticism of Tito is clearly evident, but also of those

⁵³ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 20. prosinca 1954: 2.

⁵⁴ O odnosu Jugoslavije i zapada, osobito SAD-a, u ovom razdoblju postoji obilje literature: Lees 1997 i Jakovina 2003.

⁵³ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, December 20, 1954: 2.

⁵⁴ There is an abundance of literature on the relationship between Yugoslavia and the West, especially the USA, during this period: Lees 1997 and Jakovina 2003.

⁵⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, January 12, 1955: 2.

nalazi uslied nagomilanih dugova, koji su nastali putem zajmova dobivenih u inozemstvu, jer nema više ni toliko sredstava, da bi mogla podmirivati kamate, pa će vlada biti prisiljena sazvati sve vjerovnike na dogovor, kako bi se postigla promjena zajmova od srednjih na duge rokove.“⁵⁵

Pavelić u sličnom tonu komentira susrete Josipa Broza Tita s predstavnicima različitih zemalja – jasno se očituje kritika samog Tita, ali i onih aktera koji ne dovode u pitanje njegovu vjerodostojnost, nego mu daju međunarodni legitimitet susrećući se s njim. Osvrće se tako na Titova putovanja, ali i na njegova viđenja međunarodnih odnosa. Komentira pojedine Titove izjave i njegove komentare pojedinih procesa u međunarodnim odnosima: od Ženevske konferencije 1954. gdje se odlučivalo o statusu Francuske Indokine pa do unutarnje politike SAD-a:

„Tito se ne vraća iz Indije sam, nego u društvu dvaju slonova, koje mu je darovala vlada Birmanske, s kojom je napravio ugovor, da će joj naružati jednu brigadu (sdrug) vojske. Kako se u zapadnom svijetu porodila sumnja, da će on Birmaniji [Burma/Mijanmar] prodati oružje, koje Amerika dariva Jugoslaviji, on je izjavio, da će birmanska divizija dobiti oružje izključivo proizvedeno u tvornicama Jugoslavije. Blaženi, koji vjeruju! Bila je viest, da će se na povratku iz Indije svratiti u Egipat. Medjutim francuzka ga je vlada takodjer pozvala, da dodje u Pariz, i to onda, kada on nadje za shodno.“⁵⁶

„Naravno, svjetska politika ne bi značila ništa, da se u njoj od vremena do vremena ne javi glas neizbježivoga Josipa Broza Tita. Kako se može razpravljati o tome, da li ima komunistička Kina biti pozvana na konferenciju 'velikih' u Ženevu ili ne, a da se za to ne pita njega. Budući ga pako nije nitko za to pitao, požurio se je sam dati novinarima izjavu, i autoritativno je izjavio, da ga osobito veseli, da komunistička Kina bude od zapadnih saveznika priznata. A on se brine i za ugled Sieverne Amerike, pa se stoga nedavno izjavio, da bi makartyzam mogao podkopati ugled Sjeverne Amerike, naravno stoga (sadržji se čitaoče od smieha!), jer su komunističko-filske novine MacCarthy-ev postupak nazvale

actors who do not question his credibility and give him international legitimacy by meeting with him. Pavelić thus looks back on Tito's travels, but also on his views on international relations. Pavelić comments on individual Tito's statements and the latter's comments on individual processes in international relations, from the Geneva Conference of 1954, where the status of French Indochina was decided, to comments on domestic policy in the USA:

“Tito is not returning from India alone, but in the company of two elephants, which were given to him by the government of Burma, with which he concluded an agreement to arm a brigade (companion) of the army. As suspicion arose in the Western world that he would sell Burma [Myanmar] the weapons that America was giving to Yugoslavia, he declared that the Burmese division would receive weapons exclusively produced in Yugoslav factories. Blessed are those who believe! There was news that he would stop in Egypt on his return from India. However, the French government also invited him to come to Paris, and at a time when he saw fit.”⁵⁶

“Of course, world politics would mean nothing if the voice of the inevitable Josip Broz Tito was not heard from time to time. How can one discuss whether communist China should be invited to the conference of the 'greats' in Geneva or not without asking him about it? Since no one asked him about it, he himself hastened to give a statement to the press, and authoritatively stated that he was particularly pleased that communist China would be recognized by the Western allies. And he is also concerned about the reputation of North America, and so he recently stated that McCarthyism could undermine the reputation of North America, of course (dear reader, refrain from laughing!), because communist-friendly newspapers called McCarthy's actions dictatorial. Furthermore, he recently stated that he has nothing against Greece and Turkey (with whom he is in the so-called Balkan Pact) being members of the European Community for the Defence against Soviet Aggression, but he did not 'want' to state that the 'People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' would also join that community. There now, since Tito gave Greece and Turkey permission to join that organization, they can do so without worry. However, Tito also stated one more serious matter. He gave a speech in front of the Serbian communist leaders, in which he said the

⁵⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 12. siječnja 1955: 2.

⁵⁶ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 26. siječnja 1955: 2.

⁵⁶ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, January 26, 1955: 2.

diktatorskim. Nadalje je nedavno izjavio, da on nema ništa proti tomu, da Grčka i Turska (s kojima nalazi u tako zvanom balkanskom paktu) budu članice Evropske Zajednice za obranu od sovietske agresije, ali nije 'htio' izjaviti, da bi i 'Narodna Federativna Republika Jugoslavija' u tu zajednicu stupila. Eto sada, kada je Tito Grčkoj i Turskoj dao dozvolu, da u taj organizam stupe, mogu to bez brige učiniti. Izjavio je međutim Tito i jednu ozbiljniju stvar. Održao je govor pred srbokomunističkim prvacima, u komu je među inim pamćenja vriednim rekao i sljedeće: 'Neka se nitko ne da smesti time, što mi očajujemo sa zapadnim vevlastima. Ta mi za to primamo dolare i oružje, a da ipak nismo niti ćemo ikada odstupiti od komunizma, nego ćemo uvijek ostati ono, što smo i bili. Pa i Rusija je isto tako dobivala pomoć od Amerike u novcu i u oružju!'"⁵⁷

SR Njemačka

Status i položaj Zapadne Njemačke unutar Zapadnog bloka bila je jako važna geopolitička tema tog vremena. Sukladno tome veliku pozornost posvetio joj je i Pavelić u svojim analizama. Tematika se prvenstveno odnosila na formiranje zapadnonjemačke vojske i njezinu integraciju u sustav zajedničke obrane u Europi. U tom kontekstu ističe se stalno inzistiranje SAD-a o potrebi naoružanja Zapadne Njemačke i otpor koji tome pruža Francuska. Glavni modaliteti organizacije europske obrane bili su NATO i pokušaj osnivanja Europske obrambene zajednice koja nikad nije zaživjela zbog francuskog političkog otpora. Vidljivo je da Pavelić u svom pisanju nije uvijek bio najprecizniji pa se ponekad koristio istim terminima za različite stvari. Na primjer, termin Europske vojske koristi kao naziv za stvaranje institucije ujedinjene vojne sile u zapadnoj Europi prema ranije spomenutom Plevnovu planu, ali i kao kolokvijalni izraz za vojne snage pod zapovjedništvom NATO-a. U tom kontekstu početkom 1953. piše o generalu Matthewu Ridgwayu, koji je od svibnja 1952. obnašao funkciju vrhovnog savezničkog zapovjednika za Europu u sklopu NATO-a, i njegovim nastojanjima:

„Zapovjednik evropske vojske general Ridgway ponovno traži, da se čim prije u tu vojsku

following, among other things worth remembering: 'Let no one be bothered by the fact that we are flirting with the Western powers. We receive dollars and weapons for that, and yet we have not, and will never deviate from communism, but we will always remain what we were. Even Russia received help from America in money and weapons!'"⁵⁷

West Germany

The status and position of West Germany within the Western Bloc was a very important geopolitical topic of the time. Accordingly, Pavelić also paid great attention to it in his analyses. The topic primarily related to the formation of the West German army and its integration into the system of joint defence in Europe. In this context, the constant insistence of the USA on the need to arm West Germany, and the resistance offered by France to it, is noteworthy. The main modalities of the organization of European defence were the NATO alliance and the attempt to establish a European Defence Community, which never came to life due to the French resistance. It is evident that Pavelić was not always most precise in his writing, and sometimes he used the same terms for different things. For example, he uses the term European Army as a signifier for the creation of a unified military force in Western Europe according to the previously mentioned Plevnen Plan, but also as a colloquial term for military forces under NATO command. In this context, in early 1953, he writes about General Matthew Ridgway, who had held the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe within NATO since May 1952, and his efforts:

“The commander of the European army, General Ridgway, again demands that German forces be incorporated into that army as soon as possible and claims that the army in its current state would not be able to withstand a possible Soviet invasion of Europe.”⁵⁸

Pavelić also follows the processes of the re-formation of the German army because this topic is very important from his perspective. This example shows how a former enemy can be integrated into Western security structures and become a full partner. Thus, in August 1954, he writes about the recruitment of volunteers for the

⁵⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 10. ožujka 1954: 2.

⁵⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, March 10, 1954: 2.

⁵⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, January 21, 1953: 2.

inkorporiraju njemačke snage i tvrdi, da ovakova, kakova je sada, ta vojska ne bi mogla nikako izdržati eventualnu sovjetsku navalu na Evropu.⁵⁸

Pavelić prati i procese ponovnog formiranja njemačke vojske jer je ta tema iz njegove perspektive jako važna. Na tom primjeru vidljivo je da bivši neprijatelj može biti integriran u zapadne sigurnosne strukture i postati punopravni partner. Tako u kolovozu 1954. piše o regrutaciji dobrovoljaca za njemačku vojsku i reakcijama zapadnih zemalja na taj proces. Iste godine, ali u listopadu, donosi izjave šefova diplomacije SAD-a i Velike Britanije koji upozoravaju na važnost Njemačke za zapadni savez i potrebu da se izgradi konstruktivan odnos s nekadašnjim neprijateljem:

„Kako donasaju novine, već se je za ulazak u vojsku prijavilo preko sto petdeset tisuća bivših vojnika kao dobrovoljci. U ovom tako reći sporu između Amerike i Francuzke drži se englezka vlada, što bi se reklo, neutralno, dok se iztaknuti političari iz opozicije (demokratske stranke) izražavaju pokudno o francuzkom držanju i vele, da je bezsmisao protiviti se naoružanju Njemačke.“⁵⁹

„...zanimljiva izjava, što ju je dao englezki ministar vanjskih poslova Antony Eden. On je rekao: 'Ako se Niemce ne uvrsti u zapadni savez, oni će poći svojim putem, a znamo dobro, što je to donielo u prošlosti'. U pogledu ujedinjavanja Njemačke, dao je pako izjavu sjeveroamerički ministar vanjskih poslova Forster Dulles na sjednici Ujedinjenih Naroda, koja glasi: 'Naša je volja u duhu mira popraviti okrutnu nepravdu, nanesenu Njemačkoj'. Komentarista jednih novina primjećuje, da su Eden i Dulles predstavnici Englezke i Sjeverne Amerike, koje su zajedno sa sovjetskom Rusijom tu nepravdu Njemačkoj naniele.“⁶⁰

Govoreći o Zapadnoj Njemačkoj, Pavelić se koristi sličnim narativnim sklopom kao kad govori o Italiji, o kojoj će biti više kazano kasnije u tekstu. Može se primijetiti da je isticanje nacionalsocijalizma kao ide-

German army, and the reactions of Western countries to this process. Also, in the same year, but in October, he presents statements by the heads of diplomacy of the USA and Great Britain who warn of the importance of Germany for the Western alliance, and the need to build a constructive relationship with the former enemy:

“According to the newspapers, over one hundred and fifty thousand former soldiers have already volunteered to join the army. In this so-called dispute between America and France, the English government is maintaining a neutral stance, so to speak, while prominent politicians from the opposition (Democratic Party) are criticizing the French position and saying that it is pointless to oppose the armament of Germany.”⁵⁹

“... an interesting statement was given by the English foreign minister, Antony Eden. He said: 'If the Germans are not included in the Western alliance, they will go their own way, and we know very well what this has brought in the past'. Regarding the unification of Germany, the North American Foreign Minister Forster Dulles made a statement at the United Nations session, which read: 'We wish to repair the cruel injustice inflicted on Germany in the spirit of peace.' A newspaper commentator notes that Eden and Dulles are representatives of England and North America, which, together with Soviet Russia, inflicted this injustice on Germany.”⁶⁰

In the case of West Germany, Pavelić uses a similar narrative structure as in the case of Italy, which will be discussed in more detail further in text. It can be noted that the emphasis on National Socialism as an ideology is visible to a much lesser extent than in the context of Italy and fascism. However, he emphasizes that the importance and role of Germany should primarily be viewed in the context of its military contribution to the defence against a possible communist threat in Europe, and that historical experiences should be left aside. We see how the argumentation, in this regard, coincides with the pragmatic views on international relations that were definitely prevailing within the framework of American politics at the time⁶¹:

⁵⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 21. siječnja 1953: 2.

⁵⁹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 4. kolovoza 1954: 2.

⁶⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 6. listopada 1954: 2.

⁵⁹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, August 4, 1954: 2.

⁶⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, October 6, 1954: 2.

⁶¹ The debate about German armament was a very important issue in the West at that time Fish Armstrong 1956: 60–61, Baudissin 1955: 1–13 and Bussche 1953: 68–79.

ologije vidljivo u mnogo manjoj mjeri nego u kontekstu Italije i fašizma. Ipak, ističe da se važnost i uloga Njemačke prvenstveno trebaju promatrati u kontekstu vojnog doprinosa obrani od moguće komunističke prijetnje u Europi, a da se povijesna iskustva trebaju ostaviti po strani. Vidimo da se argumentacija u ovom pitanju poklapa s pragmatičkim pogledima na međunarodne odnose koji su tada definitivno bili prevladavajući u okvirima američke politike⁶¹:

„Njemački je parlament odglasovao zakon, kojim se mjenja klauzula ustava, po kome je bilo zabranjeno uzpostavljanje, njemačke vojske. Po tom zakonu bit će postrojena njemačka vojska, koja će sudjelovati u zajedničkoj evropskoj vojsci za obranu od komunizma. Pitanje i sudjelovanja Njemačke, odnosno njezina naoružanja, povlači i se već dulje vremena u međunarodnoj politici. Pogibelj, koja Evropi prijeti od komunističkoga napada, dovela je do stvaranja zajedničke evropske vojske raznih naroda zapadne Evrope, nu Njemačku i Španiju nije se u početku u toj stvari uzimalo u obzir, i to Španjolsku, jer su se neke nacije tome odupirale s tobožnjega razloga, da u Španjolskoj ne vlada demokratski režim, a Njemačku radi vječnoga straha izvjestnih naroda od tobožnje njemačke pogibelji.“⁶²

Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo

Pogled na Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo (za koje Pavelić u svojim člancima rabi naziv Engleska) i njegovu ulogu u međunarodnim odnosima bio je snažno obilježen iskustvom Drugog svjetskog rata, a napose ulogom britanske politike u predaji hrvatskih civila i vojnih zarobljenika Jugoslavenskoj armiji kod Bleiburga. Posljedično, autor oslikava Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo kao aktera sa skrivenim namjerama koji uvijek primarno štiti svoje političke i poslovne interese. Možemo kazati da Pavelić implicitno nameće stav da ispravljanje prošlih pogrešaka, kako ih on vidi i definira, u britanskoj politici, ali i politici drugih zapadnih zemalja mora biti imperativ u formiranju vanjske politike. Ipak, iz drugih ideja koje prezentira dalo bi se zaključiti da je bio jako dobro svjestan pragmatizma međunarodnih odnosa i upravo je u

“The German parliament voted the law, which changes the clause of the constitution, according to which it was forbidden to establish the German army. According to this law, the German army will be formed, which will participate in the joint European army for defence against communism. The question of Germany’s participation, that is, its armament, has been dragging on in international politics for a long time. The peril of a communist attack that threatens Europe, led to the creation of a joint European army of various nations of Western Europe, but Germany and Spain were not initially taken into account in this matter, particularly Spain, because some nations resisted this for the alleged reason that there is no democratic regime in Spain, and in the case of Germany because of the eternal fear of the supposed German destruction by certain peoples.”⁶²

United Kingdom

Pavelić’s view of the United Kingdom (which he refers to as England in his articles) and its role in international relations was strongly influenced by the experience of WWII, and in particular by the role of British policy in the surrendering of Croatian civilians and prisoners of war to the Yugoslav Army at Bleiburg. Consequently, the author portrays the United Kingdom as an actor with hidden intentions, always primarily protecting its own political and business interests. It can be said that Pavelić implicitly imposes the view that correcting past mistakes, as he sees and defines them, in British politics, but also in the politics of other Western countries, must be an imperative in the formation of foreign policy. However, from other ideas presented by Pavelić, one could conclude that he was very well aware of the pragmatism of international relations, and that it was in this pragmatism that he saw the possibility of realizing his political program. In his considerations, Pavelić attempts to paint a picture in which the United Kingdom is trying to play a double game, collaborating with communists around the world, and deceiving naive American administration by presenting itself as a reliable ally. For example, he describes the engagement of the British Navy in East Asia, where the British are assigned the role of defending communist China from the threat coming from Taiwan (Formosa), creating the impression is that Chinese nationalist forces

⁶¹ Rasprava o njemačkom naoružavanju bila je vrlo važno pitanje na zapadu u tim trenucima: Fish Armstrong 1956: 60–61, Baudissin 1955: 1–13 i Bussche 1953: 68–79.

⁶² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 24. ožujka 1954: 2.

⁶² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, March 24, 1954: 2.

tom pragmatizmu vidio mogućnost za realizaciju svog političkog programa. Pavelić u svojim razmatranjima pokušava ocrtati sliku u kojoj Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo pokušava igrati dvostruku igru suradjući s komunistima diljem svijeta i varajući naivnu američku administraciju predstavljajući se kao pouzdan saveznik. Tako se, primjerice, opisuje angažman britanske mornarice u istočnoj Aziji gdje se Britancima dodjeljuje uloga obrane komunističke Kine od prijetnje koja dolazi s Tajvana (Formoze) i gdje se stvara dojam da se snage kineskih nacionalista pripremaju svaki trenutak izvesti napad na kontinentalnu Kinu.⁶³ Pavelić u svojim analizama zanemaruje interese koje Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo ima u Aziji, u prvom redu u Hong Kongu, i koliko to oblikuje njihovu politiku prema Kini:

„Predsjednik Eisenhower izdao zapovied, da se digne smjesta blokada, koju je do sada vršila američka mornarica oko otoka Formoze, na kojem se otoku nalazi nacionalistički kineski predsjednik Chank Kai Shek sa svojom nacionalističkom vojskom, a svrha je te blokade bila, da se sprieči kineskim nacionalistima, da napadaju komunističku okupaciju Kine i komunistički režim u Kini. Ova je viest iznenadila čitav svijet, i to ne s toga, što je predsjednik Eisenhower tu blokadu dokinuo, nego stoga, da je bilo moguće, da je po nalogu Trumanovu englezka mornarica već pet godina branila komunističku Kinu od kineskih nacionalista i od Chank Kai Shekn, i to istodobno, dok američki vojnici ginu na Koreji u borbi proti kineskim komunistima. Ej, logiko, nigdje te ne bilo!”⁶⁴

„Eto takvi su Englezi, i takva je uvijek bila i bit će njihova politika. Njima je draže, da njemački narod pravi oružje i da s njim u ruci opet gine, a da proizvodnju onoga, na čemu se zaradjuje i obogaćuje, prepušta Englezima.”⁶⁵

U istom tonu nižu se Pavelićevi komentari o različitim epizodama u međunarodnoj politici kada interpretira britanske poteze kao izdaju ili dvostruku igru u odnosu na saveznike, osobito SAD. Postoji jasna namjera da se Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo ocrtava kao nepouzdanog partnera koji potkopava ideju o

are preparing to attack mainland China at any moment.⁶³ In his analyses, Pavelić ignores the interests that the United Kingdom has in Asia, primarily in Hong Kong, and how much this case shapes their policy towards China:

“President Eisenhower issued an order to immediately lift the blockade, which until now had been carried out by the US Navy around the island of Formosa, on which the nationalist Chinese president Chiang Kai-Shek is located with his nationalist army, and the purpose of that blockade was to prevent the Chinese nationalists from attacking the communist occupation of China and the communist regime in China. This news surprised the whole world, and not because the president Eisenhower ended the blockade, but because it was possible that the English navy had been defending communist China from Chinese nationalists and from Chiang Kai-Shek for five years, while American soldiers were dying in Korea in the fight against the Chinese communists. Hey, logic, where have you gone!”⁶⁴

“That’s how the English are, and that’s how their policy has always been and will be. They prefer that the German people make weapons and die with them in their hands, and that they leave the production of the things that bring money and riches to the English.”⁶⁵

In the same tone, in following Pavelić’s comments about different episodes in international politics he interprets British moves as betrayal or double play in relation to allies, especially the USA. There is a clear intention to paint the UK as an unreliable partner that undermines the idea of a joint effort to defend Europe against a potential Soviet threat.⁶⁶ That is how Pavelić explained the case of Donald MacLean, who was part of the spy network known as the Cambridge Five. They were part of the Soviet intelligence resources in Great Britain. MacLean fled to Moscow in 1951 due to fear of being discovered, and his fate was unknown for years:

“As is well known, a former Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Affairs Office disappeared in England two years ago, and it is generally believed that he is behind the Iron Curtain, and it has never been possible to establish whether he went there

⁶³ Source 1955: 360–375; Hudson 1953: 536–547.

⁶⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 10. veljače 1953: 2.

⁶⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 10. studenoga 1954: 2.

⁶³ Source 1955: 360–375; Hudson 1953: 536–547.

⁶⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, February 10, 1953: 2.

⁶⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, November 10, 1954: 2.

⁶⁶ Such rhetoric was certainly superficial: DeWeerd 1955: 102–116.

zajedničkom naporu u obrani Europe pred potencijalnom sovjetskom prijetnjom.⁶⁶ Na taj način Pavelić je objašnjavao i slučaj Donalda MacLeana koji je bio dio špijunske mreže poznate pod nazivom Petorka iz Cambridgea. Oni su bili dio sovjetskih obavještajnih resursa u Velikoj Britaniji. MacLean je 1951. zbog straha od otkrivanja pobjegao u Moskvu te se godinama nije znala njegova sudbina:

„Kako je poznato, u Englezkoj je prije dvije godine nestalo bivšega državnoga podtajnika u ministarstvu vanjskih poslova, i obćenito je shvaćanje, da se on nalazi iza željeznoga zastora, a nije nikako moglo biti ustanovljeno, da li je on dobrovoljno tamo otišao, ili je na njemu bila izvršena otmica sa strane boljševika. (...) Ima ih, koji misle, da MacLean nije ugrabljen, niti svojevolutno otišao, da izvrši kakovu izdaju na Engleskoj, nego da ga je sam Churchill poslao tamo, da izvrši neku posebnu političku misiju, jer se i onako drži, da Englezka šuruje sa sovjetskom Rusijom i da Sjevernoj Americi ubada u leđa.“⁶⁷

„Prema najnovijim viestima Churchill se sprema na put u Moskvu, htijući se sastati s Malenkovom. On još uvijek nastoji, kako bi došlo do sastanka trojice, to jest njega, Malenkova i Eisenhowera. On neprestano tvrdi, da je moguće suživo vanje između komunizma i nekomunističkih vladavima. On sigurno svjestno zatajuje činjenicu, da komunizam ima u programu zavladatai s cijelim svijetom.“⁶⁸

Churchill, koji je jedno vrijeme dok su tekstovi objavljeni bio britanski premijer, često je bio Pavelićeva meta. Churchill stavljao na teret odgovornost za predaju hrvatskih zarobljenika na Bleiburgu, popustljivost Staljinu za vrijeme rata i na konferencijama, dvoličnu politiku Britanije u odnosu na komunističku ugrozu itd. Međutim, Pavelić nikad nije spominjao, kad je govorio o Churchill, njegov snažni antikomunistički stav koji je izražavao tijekom svoje duge političke karijere.⁶⁹ Također je potrebno napomenuti da je Churchill u periodu koji se promatra izražavao stavove i ulagao napore da bi okupio zapadne partnere i utjecao na formiranje američkih

voluntarily or was kidnapped by the Bolsheviks. (...) There are those who believe that MacLean was not kidnapped, nor did he go there voluntarily, to commit some kind of treason against England, but that Churchill himself sent him there to carry out some special political mission, because he believes that England is colluding with Soviet Russia and stabbing North America in the back.”⁶⁷

“According to the latest news, Churchill is preparing for a trip to Moscow, wanting to meet with Malenkov. He is still trying to get the three of them to meet, that is, him, Malenkov and Eisenhower. He constantly claims that coexistence between communism and non-communist governments is possible. He must be consciously hiding the fact that communism has a plan to rule the whole world.”⁶⁸

Churchill, who was the British Prime Minister at the time when the texts were published, was often Pavelić's target. He accuses Churchill of being responsible for the surrender of Croatian prisoners at Bleiburg, for his leniency towards Stalin during the war and at conferences, for Britain's duplicitous policy towards the communist threat, etc. What Pavelić never mentioned when talking about Churchill was his strong anti-communist stance, which he expressed throughout his long political career.⁶⁹ It should also be noted that, during the reviewed period, Churchill expressed his views and made efforts to gather Western partners, and influence the formation of American views that could be jointly presented to the Soviet side. Such engagement was often not understood by the Eisenhower administration. With regard to the dynamics of the relationship, parallels could be drawn with Churchill's policy, which he implemented before the Yalta conference when he tried to achieve the same relationship with Roosevelt, and even then, he was not successful. With that in mind, it is interesting to read Pavelić's comments about Churchill.

“Of course, it is difficult now for Churchill to revoke the treaties that he personally concluded with the Bolsheviks, but that does not prevent North America from annulling them, after the North American people have seen all the horror that these treaties have brought not only to so many enslaved peoples in the world, but also to North America itself, whose sons

⁶⁶ Takva retorika bila je svakako površna: DeWeerd 1955: 102–116.

⁶⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 23. rujna 1953: 2.

⁶⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 7. srpnja 1954: 2.

⁶⁹ Baldwin 1954: 23–32.

⁶⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, Spetember 23, 1953: 2.

⁶⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, July 7, 1954: 2.

⁶⁹ Baldwin 1954: 23–32.

stavova koji bi se kao zajednički mogli prezentirati sovjetskoj strani. Često takav angažman nije nailazio na razumijevanje Eisenhowerove administracije. S obzirom na dinamiku odnosa mogle bi se povlačiti paralele s Churchillovom politikom koju je provodio prije konferencije u Jalti, kada je s Rooseveltom pokušavao ostvariti isti odnos, ni tada nije ostvario uspjeh. Imajući to na umu, zanimljivo je pročitati Pavelićeve komentare o Churchill.

„Naravno, teško je sada Churchill u opozvati ugovore, koje je on osobno s boljševicima sklapao, nu to ne spriječava Sjevernu Ameriku, da ih ona poništi, nakon što je sieveroamerički narod uvidio svu strahotu koju su ti ugovori donieli ne samo tolikim porobljenim narodima u svijetu nego i samoj Sjevernoj Americi, čiji sinovi ginu sada u Koreji radi pogrješaka bivše demokratske vlade.“⁷⁰

„Nedavno je englezka kraljica održala pred englezkim parlamentom svoj prijestolni govor, u kome je posebice naglasila, da je glavni cilj englezke politike očuvati mir. Očuvati mir u smislu englezkom znači naravno izbjeći dužnosti osloboditi preko sto miliona žiteljstva iztočne i jugoiztočne Evrope, što su ih Churchill i Roosevelt godine 1945. darovali komunističkom molohu, ili barem dati priliku tome jadnome svijetu, da se oslobodi iz robstva. Naravno, kraljica nije odgovorna za ono, što je rekla, jer njoj vlada propiše, što ima reći, nu odgovorni su Churchill i Eden.“⁷¹

„U Englezkoj je predsjednik vlade Churchill proslavio svoju osamdesetu godišnjicu života. Na proslavi su sudjelovali ne samo pripadnici njegove (konzervativne) stranke, nego i predstavnici opozicije. U viestima o proslavi nije bilo nigdje zabilježeno, da li su ga u veselju bunile sjene stotine tisuća hrvatskih mučenika, koje je izručio komunističkim razbojnicima kod Bleiburga, da budu na najbestijalniji način mučeni i poubijani.“⁷²

Osim izrazite kritike prema Churchill u Pavelić se negativno referira i na britansku kraljicu Elizabetu II. te je veliku pozornost posvetio njezinu susretu s Josipom Brozom Titom u Londonu. U zajedljivom

are now dying in Korea because of the mistakes of the former democratic government.”⁷⁰

“Recently, the Queen of England delivered her State Opening speech to the English Parliament, in which she particularly emphasized that the main goal of English policy is to preserve peace. To preserve peace in the English sense naturally means avoiding the duty of liberating over a hundred million inhabitants of Eastern and South-eastern Europe, whom Churchill and Roosevelt handed over to the communist Moloch in 1945, or at least give an opportunity to that poor world to free itself from slavery. Of course, the Queen is not responsible for what she said, because the government dictates to her what to say, and Churchill and Eden are responsible.”⁷¹

“In England, Prime Minister Churchill celebrated his eightieth birthday. The celebration was attended not only by members of his (conservative) party, but also by representatives of the opposition. The news about the celebration did not record anywhere whether he was disturbed in his joy by the shadows of hundreds of thousands of Croatian martyrs, whom he had handed over to the communist bandits at Bleiburg, to be tortured and killed in the most bestial way.”⁷²

In addition to his strong criticism of Churchill, Pavelić also makes negative references to the British Queen Elizabeth II, and he pays great attention to her meeting with Josip Broz Tito in London. In his scathing commentary on that meeting, Pavelić points out the guest's unworthiness, and attempts to emphasize the banality of the meeting. It is noticeable that Pavelić returns to this issue in several of his texts, commenting on the matter in a similar way:

“(…) and the English Queen Elizabeth II receiving a visit and having lunch with Josip Broz Tito, a former metalworker, a former gunman in a famous gang, the murderer of hundreds of thousands of children, women, the elderly, peasants and citizens, and now the president of 'Yugoslavia' and the Marshal of 77 divisions on paper appointed by Moscow and as a hoax towards Western democracies. The entire world public mocks the security measures that the English police took to protect the head of the high guest. However, these security measures

⁷⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 24. veljače 1953: 2.

⁷¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 18. studenoga 1953: 2.

⁷² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 20. prosinca 1954: 2.

⁷⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, February 24, 1953: 2.

⁷¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, November 18, 1953: 2.

⁷² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, December 20, 1954: 2.

komentaru Pavelić ističe nedostojnost gosta, a pokušava se naglasiti banalnost tog susreta. Primjetno je da se tom pitanju Pavelić vraća u nekoliko svojih tekstova te sve komentira na sličan način:

„(...) a englezka kraljica Elizabeta II. time, što je primila u posjet i ručala s Josipom Brozom Titom, bivšim kovinarom, bivšim pistolerom u jednoj znamenitoj bandi, krvnikom stotina tisuća djece, žena, staraca, seljaka i gradjana, a sada predsjednikom 'Jugoslavije' i po Moskvi imenovanim Maršalom od 77 divizija na papiru i u podvali zapadnim demokracijama. Cijela se svjetska javnost izruguje mjerama sigurnosti, koje je englezka policija poduzela, da sačuva glavu visokoga gosta. Medjutim te mjere sigurnosti, ne samo da su smiješne, nego su ponešto i tragične. Već na putu su se srušila tri ratna zrakoplova, koja su osiguravala život kraljičina, Churchillova i Edenova gosta iz zraka, i četiri su englezka aviačara tom sgodom izgubila život. (...) Do sada je jedina korist englezke vlade u tome, što joj je gost savjetovao, neka počeka još neko vrijeme, pa da će onda moći razgovarati s novim ruskim i obće komunističkim diktatorom Malenkovim. Time je gost očito htio reći, da pričekaju, dok im on priredi put i izhodi audijenciju kod Malenkova.“⁷³

„Abesinski car Haile Selasie putuje po svijetu. Nedavno je bio u posjetima kod Tita, a sada je posjetio englezku kraljicu u Londonu. Ona mu je priredila banket, na kome je bilo prisutnih dvije stotine gostiju. Zlobnici su primijetili, da je kraljica, kada je Tito bio kod nje u posjetu, bila priredila mnogo čedniju večeru, jer nije bilo prisutno više od desetak osoba. Ili je kraljica u slučaju Tita štedila, ili nije našla za vrijedno, da radi njega pozove toliko gostiju...“⁷⁴

Francuska

Francuska vanjska politika bila je često predmet rasprave u Pavelićevim tekstovima. Može se, bez pretjerivanja, primijetiti da je osobito kritičan bio prema Francuskoj, čak i više nego prema Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu. Rijetko kada nalazi teme koje bi u njegovim tekstovima imale pozitivnu konotaciju. Ne

are not only ridiculous, but also somewhat tragic. Already on the way, three warplanes crashed, which were providing air support for the Queen, Churchill and Eden's guests, and four English airmen lost their lives in the incident. (...) So far, the only benefit to the English government is that the guest advised them to wait a little longer, so that they could then talk to the new Russian and communist dictator Malenkov. By this, the guest obviously meant that they should wait until he had prepared the way for them and had an audience with Malenkov.”⁷³

“The Abyssinian Emperor Haile Selassie is travelling the world. He recently visited Tito, and now he visited the Queen of England in London. She gave him a banquet, with two hundred guests present. The ill-wishers noticed that the Queen, when Tito visited her, had given a much more modest dinner, because no more than a dozen people were present. Either the Queen was saving money in the case of Tito, or she did not find it worthwhile to invite so many guests for his sake...”⁷⁴

France

French foreign policy was often the subject of discussion in Pavelić's writings. It can be noted, without exaggeration, that he was particularly critical of France, even more so than of the United Kingdom. He rarely finds topics in his writings that have a positive connotation. He does not show understanding for the reserved attitude of the French public and politics regarding the arming of West Germany, and its integration into the Western defence system.⁷⁵ He *a priori* labels French policy as pro-communist and constantly presents arguments that support such an impression:

“France continues to oppose the armament of Germany and its inclusion in the common defence of Europe. At the same time, the French emphasize ever so strongly that they will not sign the treaty on the common defence of Europe, and prominent [French] politicians claim that it would be some kind of confused army, and that it would mean renouncing their own sovereignty. It is generally believed that this attitude was imposed on France by Soviet Russia as a condition for signing the armistice

⁷³ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 24. ožujka 1953: 2.

⁷⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 20. listopada 1954: 2.

⁷³ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, March 24, 1953: 2.

⁷⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, October 20, 1954: 2.

⁷⁵ Mollet 1954: 365–373; Mosely 1953: 27; Schuman 1953: 349–360.

iskazuje razumijevanje za rezervirano držanje francuske javnosti i politike u pogledu naoružavanja Zapadne Njemačke i njezine integracije u obrambeni sustav zapada.⁷⁵ *A priori* označava francusku politiku kao prokomunističku i stalno ističe argumente koji bi potkrijepili takav dojam:

„Francuzka se i dalje protivi naoružanju Njemačke i njezinom uključenju u zajedničku obranu Evrope. Istodobno Francuzka sve više i jače naglašuje, da ona neće potpisati ugovora o zajedničkoj obrani Evrope, a njezini iztaknuti političari tvrde, da bi to bila nekakva konfuzna vojska, i da bi to značilo odricati se svoga vlastitoga suvereniteta. Obćenito se drži, da je takovo držanje nametnula Francuzkoj sovjetska Rusija kao uvjet, za podpis primirja u Indokini, čime se je Francuzka izbavila privremeno jednoga katastrofalnoga poraza u Aziji, jer nije bila dorasla niti je bila voljna dati ozbiljan otpor komunizmu.“⁷⁶

„...ponudila je boljševička Rusija preko poljske komunističke vlade Francuzkoj sklapanje uzajamnoga obranbenog pakta proti Njemačkoj. Time bi se imalo podkupiti francuzki parlament i zvesti u bludnju francuzki narod, da je on osiguran proti svake pogibelji, to jest i proti pogibelji sa strane Rusije i sa strane Njemačke. Čitava je ova stvar uperena u prvom redu proti Sjevernoj Americi, koja nastoji, da bi pošlo po to stvorila u Evropi jednu kakovu takovu organizaciju od tako zvanih slobodnih naroda za obranu proti sovjetskoj Rusiji i svjetskom komunizmu, što se tiče paku Englezke, ona u svojoj želji za dominacijom nad svim evropskim narodima ne gleda krivim okom ovu boljševičko francuzku igru, jer ne želi, da Amerika igra kakovu ulogu u Evropi, a osim toga nije ni njoj mrzko, da Njemačka ostane za uvijek pod okupacijom, i da ne postigne svoj podpun suverenitet.“⁷⁷

„Kod francuzkih političara, bez obzira na to, kojoj stranci ili struji pripadaju kod svih bez razlike, vlada vječni strah pred njemačkom snagom, i za to se svi slažu u tome, da se ima pošto po to spriječiti njemačko naoružanje... Drugi razlog je tome, što je Francuzka jako zaražena

in Indochina, which temporarily saved the French from a catastrophic defeat in Asia, because they were not up to it, nor were they willing to give serious resistance to communism.“⁷⁶

„...Bolshevik Russia, through the Polish communist government, offered France to conclude a mutual defence pact against Germany. This would have bribed the French parliament and falsely made the French people believe that they were insured against any loss, that is, against loss from both Russia and Germany. This whole thing is aimed primarily at North America, which is trying to create some kind of organization of so-called free peoples in Europe for the defence against Soviet Russia and world communism. As for England, in its desire for domination over all European peoples, it does not look askance at this Bolshevik-French game, because it does not want America to play any role in Europe, and besides, it is not averse to Germany remaining under occupation forever, and not achieving its full sovereignty.“⁷⁷

“French politicians, regardless of which party or current they belong to, are all, without distinction, perpetually afraid of German power, and they all agree that there is a need to prevent German armaments...Another reason is that France is heavily infected with communism, and a large number of communists and communist aficionados sit in parliament, which is also the reason that no government can stay in power for long... Communists and other leftists work, of course, not for France and Europe, but for Russia and the communist victory throughout the world.“⁷⁸

It is interesting to observe the way the author analyses the process of decolonization, and the events in the French imperial system are the best example to understand the overall formation of the narrative on this topic. Namely, in the observed period, there is an accelerated collapse of French colonial power in Southeast Asia and North Africa. The political forces that were the bearers of these processes are different, which is not lost on Pavelić either. Namely, in the Asian case, the leaders of decolonization were gathered around communist ideas, while in the case of Arab countries in Africa, nationalist forces

⁷⁵ Mollet 1954: 365–373; Mosely 1953: 27; Schuman 1953: 349–360.

⁷⁶ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 4. kolovoza 1954: 2.

⁷⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 2. rujna 1954: 2.

⁷⁶ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, August 4, 1954: 2.

⁷⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, September 2, 1954: 2.

⁷⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, September 15, 1954: 2.

komunizmom, te u parlamentu sjedi veliki broj komunista i komunistofila, što je i razlog, da nijedna vlada ne može dugo vladati... Komunisti i ostali ljevičari rade naravno ne za Francuzku i Evropu, nego za Rusiju iz komunističku pobjedu u cijelom svijetu.⁷⁸

Zanimljivo je promatrati način na koji autor analizira proces dekolonizacije, a događaji u francuskom imperijalnom sustavu najbolji su primjer da bi se shvatilo cjelovito oblikovanje narativa o toj temi. Naime, u promatranom razdoblju dolazi do ubrzanog urušavanja francuske kolonijalne vlasti u jugoistočnoj Aziji i sjevernoj Africi. Političke snage koje su bili nositelji tih procesa različite su, što ni Paveliću ne promiče. Naime, u azijskom slučaju predvodnici dekolonizacije bili su okupljeni oko komunističkih ideja, a u slučaju arapskih zemalja u Africi kao protagonisti dekolonizacije ističu se nacionalističke snage. Sukladno poziciji na toj političkoj vagi Pavelić je vrednovao i procese dekolonizacije. Tako francusku politiku u jugoistočnoj Aziji ocjenjuje kao popuštanje komunistima i ističe da francuska vlada trguje sa Sovjetima i Kinezima ne bi li ostvarila svoje partikularne interese. S druge strane, ističe da se u slučaju arapskih zemalja francuske sigurnosne snage značajnije angažiraju i da ne pristaju na njihovu neovisnost:

„Konačno je dne 20. srpnja, to jest na dan, do kog se je francuzki predsjednik vlade obvezan stvar riješiti, podpisan ugovor o primirju između Francuzke i komunističkih bandi u Indokini. Naravno, ugovor je podpisan sa tim komunističkim partizanskim bandama, a zapravo su pregovori vodjeni sa komunističkom Kinom i sovjetskom Rusijom. (...) Sa podpisom primirja u Indokini Francuzka nije prestala zabrinjavati politički svijet na zapadu. Onim časom, čim je prestala privremeno pušćana vatra u Indokini, razbuktio se je jače plamen nemira proti Francuzkoj u Tunisu u sjevernoj Africi. Na dnevnom su redu nemiri, atentati i oružani napadaji tuniških Arapa proti Francuzkim kolonialno okupatorskim oblastima. Predsjednik vlade Mendez pokušava ne bi li riješio to pitanje obećavanjem Tunisu neku vrstu autonomije (recimo kao što je to bila kod nas tako zvana banovina po sporazumu Cvetković-Maček), nu teško da će taj pokušaj imati uspjeha. Arapi i u

stand out as the protagonists of decolonization. In accordance with the position on this political scale, Pavelić also evaluated the processes of decolonization. Thus, he assesses French policy in Southeast Asia as a concession to communists and emphasizes how the French government traded with the Soviets and the Chinese in order to achieve its particular interests. On the other hand, he emphasizes that in the case of Arab countries, French security forces are more significantly involved and do not agree to their independence:

“Finally, on July 20, that is, the day by which the French prime minister was obliged to resolve the matter, a truce agreement was signed between the French and the communist gangs in Indochina. Of course, the agreement was signed with those communist partisan gangs, but in fact the negotiations were conducted with communist China and Soviet Russia. (...) With the signing of the truce in Indochina, the French did not stop worrying the political world in the West. At the moment when the temporary ceasefire in Indochina ceased, the flames of unrest against France flared up even more strongly in Tunisia in North Africa. The order of the day included riots, assassinations and armed attacks by Tunisian Arabs against the French colonial occupation areas. Prime Minister Mendés is trying to resolve this issue by promising Tunisia some kind of autonomy (for example, as was the case with our so-called banovina under the Cvetković-Maček agreement), but it is unlikely that this attempt will succeed. The Arabs in Tunisia are also seeking their complete freedom and state independence.”⁷⁹

“The French Prime Minister Mendés (they say his name was once Mendoza and that he hailed from Spain) France, after having “successfully” liquidated the Indochina dispute by handing over half of the country into communist hands, has now set about resolving other issues: the dispute in Tunisia, the question of France’s entry or non-entry into the European Community, and the settlement of France’s economic situation. The dispute in Tunisia, that is, the resistance of the population, which is gradually taking the form of an open uprising against France, is the effort of the Tunisians to free themselves from French colonial rule and to achieve their freedom and state independence. It is striking that this Prime Minister acted completely different regarding the handing over of a country to the communists, and regarding the matter of the freedom of a people in

⁷⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 15. rujna 1954: 2.

⁷⁹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, August 4, 1954: 2.

Tunisu traže svoju podpunu slobodu i državnu samostalnost.”⁷⁹

„Predsjednik francuzke vlade Mendez (vele, da se je nekada zvao Mendoza i da potječe iz Španjolske) France, nakon što je „uspešno“ likvidirao indokineški spor predavši polovicu zemlje u komunističke ruke, dao se sada na rješavanje drugih pitanja: spor u Tunisu, pitanje ulazka odnosno neulazka Francuzke u europsku zajednicu i sredjenje gospodarskih prilika Francuzke. Spor u Tunisu, to jest odpor stanovništva, koji poprima po malo oblik otvorenoga ustanka proti Francuzkoj, jest nastojanje Tunizana, da se oslobode od francuzke kolonijalne vlasti i da postignu svoju slobodu i državnu nezavisnost. (...) Upada u oči da je taj predsjednik vlade drugačije postupao. kada se je radilo o izručenju jedne zemlje komunistima, a drugačije kada se radi o slobodi jednoga naroda u sjevernoj Africi, dakle o jednoj arabskoj zemlji. Jedan je satirični list u toj stvari primjetio, da će gospodin Mendez pristati, da se Francuzka povuče iz Tunisa, ako bude izgleda, da nakon toga tamo zavlada komunizam.”⁸⁰

Italija

Još jedna važna zemlja za Pavelića, čiju unutarnju i vanjsku politiku često komentira, bila je Italija. Vidljivo je da je autor dobro upoznat s događajima u Italiji, između ostalog i praćenjem talijanskog tiska. Povremeno u svojim komentarima problematizira pitanje odnosa prema fašizmu kao ideologiji i kako se taj odnos razvija u godinama nakon rata. Iz komentara se može iščitati da je Pavelić i na primjeru Italije stvarao narativ da pripadnici bivšeg, poraženog režima zauzimaju vidljivo i legitimno mjesto u političkom životu zemlje. Tako bilježi neke anegdote od kojih su izdvojene dvije koje na najbolji način ocrtavaju prevladavajuće ideje koje autor prezentira. Zanimljivo je pritom primijetiti da je Pavelić iskazivao jasno poštovanje prema pojedinim ljudima koji su ranije bili dužnosnici fašističkog režima. Autor u kontekstu navedenih tema pokušava prikazati da postoji značajna podrška unutar talijanskog društva bivšem fašističkom režimu i njegovim aktualnim predstavnicima. Na

North Africa, that is, an Arab country. One satirical newspaper noted in this matter that Mr. Mendes will agree to the withdrawal of France from Tunisia, if it is likely that communism will rule there afterwards. (...)”⁸⁰

Italy

Another important country for Pavelić, whose domestic and foreign policy he often commented on, was Italy. It is evident that the author is well acquainted with the events in Italy, among other things, through following the Italian press. Occasionally, in his comments, he raises the issue of the relationship towards fascism as an ideology, and how this relationship developed in the years after the war. It can be read from the comments that Pavelić, on the example of Italy, created a narrative that members of the former, defeated regime occupied a visible and legitimate place in the political life of the country. Thus, he records some anecdotes, two of which were singled out as the best in outlining the prevailing ideas presented by the author. It is interesting to note that Pavelić expressed clear respect for certain people who were former officials of the fascist regime. In the context of the aforementioned topics, the author attempts to show that there is significant support within Italian society for the former fascist regime, and its current representatives. Based on this information, in the text from November 1954 Pavelić emphasizes the political legitimacy of these individuals and such political ideas:

“A very interesting event took place in the Italian parliament in Rome a few days ago, which turned into a fierce fight between a group of Christian Democrats, monarchists and so-called neo-fascist representative on one side, and communists on the other. The cause of this fight was given by Christian Democrat deputy Togni...”⁸¹

Pavelić further states that representative Togni stated that he supported the Trieste Agreement due to party discipline, but that he personally did not consider it a good solution. He accused the communists of having damaged the credibility of Italian politics and reduced foreign confidence in the government through their actions. The communist representatives called him a fascist, to which

⁷⁹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 4. kolovoza 1954: 2.

⁸⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 18. kolovoza 1954: 2.

⁸⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, August 18, 1954: 2.

⁸¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, November 10, 1954: 2.

temelju tih informacija naglašava politički legitimitet koji ti pojedinci i takve političke ideje imaju. U tekstu iz studenoga 1954. piše:

„U talijanskom parlamentu u Rimu odigrao se je prošlih dana jedan vrlo zanimljiv događaj, koji se je pretvorio u jaku tučnjavu između jedne grupe demokršćanskih, monarhističkih i tako zvanih novofašističkih zastupnika s jedne strane, i komunističkih s druge strane. Povod toj bitki dao je demokršćanski zastupnik Togni...“⁸¹

Pavelić dalje navodi da je zastupnik Togni izjavio da je podržao sporazum o Trstu zbog stranačke discipline, ali da ga osobno ne smatra dobrim rješenjem. Optužio je komuniste da su svojim djelovanjem narušili kredibilitet talijanske politike i smanjili povjerenje inozemstva u vladu. Komunistički zastupnici nazvali su ga fašistom, na što je odgovorio da to ne smatra uvredom jer su u fašističkoj stranci postojali poštenu ljudi, za razliku od komunista. To je izazvalo žestoku tučnjavu u parlamentu, gdje su letjele stolice i stolovi. Pavelić na koncu prenosi da se Anfuso istaknuo u tom sukobu s komunistima.⁸² U ožujku 1955. piše u sličnom tonu:

„U Italiji su učestali sukobi i tvorno razračunavanje između komunista i novofašista, kako se obćenito naziva Talijanski Socialni Pokret [MSI] Ta je okolnost zabrinula izvjestne političke krugove u Italiji, koji po tome zaključuju, da je taj novofašistički pokret zauzeo maha, a to da predstavlja pogibelj za demokraciju i za talijansku naciju. Ti se krugovi nisu uzput ni sjetili, da bi komunizam mogao predstavljati takodjer 'neku' pogibelj.“⁸³

Ratni zločinci jučer i danas

Jedan od problema koji je zaokupljao Pavelićevu pozornost bio je status poraženih zemalja i režima iz razdoblja Drugog svjetskog rata. To pitanje bilo je važno osobno njemu, ali i njegovim političkim sljedbenicima jer su oni nosili teret poraza i breme odgovornosti za počinjene ratne zločine. Bilo je potrebno stvoriti misaoni okvir koji je omogućavao promjenu

he replied that he did not consider it an insult because there were honest people in the fascist party, unlike the communists. This caused a fierce fight in parliament, where chairs and tables were thrown. Pavelić finally reports how Anfuso distinguished himself in this conflict with the communists.⁸² In March 1955, Pavelić wrote in a similar tone:

“In Italy, conflicts and active showdowns between communists and neo-fascists, as the Italian Social Movement [MSI] is generally called, have become frequent. This circumstance has worried certain political circles in Italy, who have concluded that this neo-fascist movement has gained momentum, and that it represents a danger for democracy and for the Italian nation. These circles have not even thought about the fact that communism could also pose 'some' threat.”⁸³

War Criminals Yesterday and Today

One of the issues that occupied Pavelić's attention was the status of the defeated countries and regimes from the period of WWII. This issue was important to him personally, but also to his political followers because they bore the burden of defeat, and the burden of responsibility for war crimes committed during the war. It was necessary to create a mental framework that would allow for a change in perception, the rejection of the criminal connotations that were attached to the defeated Ustaše regime, and the creation of space for possible future cooperation, primarily with the USA. In several places, responsibility for war crimes is problematized and redefined. It also attempts to outline attitudes in the West that are changing their perspective on the role of individual actors in WWII. It can be concluded that Pavelić in this case counted on pragmatism as the primary way of shaping international policy. Pavelić writes repeatedly on the topic of the status of war criminals, and here he cites examples from February 1953, September 1952, and March 1955, where a clear continuity of thought is evident:

“President Eisenhower appeared for the first time in front of the American parliament, (...) He especially emphasized that all secret agreements concluded by the previous American government with Soviet Russia, which had the purpose of entrapping

⁸¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svietu“, *Hrvatska*, 10. studenoga 1954: 2.

⁸² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svietu“, *Hrvatska*, 10. studenoga 1954: 2.

⁸³ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svietu“, *Hrvatska*, 23. ožujka 1955: 2.

⁸² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svietu“, *Hrvatska*, November 10, 1954: 2.

⁸³ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svietu“, *Hrvatska*, March 23, 1955: 2.

percepcije i odbacivanje zločinačkih konotacija koje su se vezivale za poraženi ustaški režim te stvaranje prostora za moguću buduću suradnju prvenstveno sa SAD-om. Na više se mjesta problematizira i redefinira odgovornost za ratne zločine. Također, pokušava ocrtati stavove na zapadu koji mijenjaju svoju perspektivu o ulozi pojedinih aktera u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Moglo bi se zaključiti da je Pavelić u ovom slučaju računao na pragmatizam kao primaran način oblikovanja međunarodne politike. O temi statusa ratnih zločinaca Pavelić opetovano piše, a ovdje se navode primjeri iz veljače 1953., rujna 1952. i ožujka 1955., iz kojih je vidljiv jasan kontinuitet razmišljanja:

„Predsjednik Eisenhower je po prvi put nastupio pred američkim parlamentom, (...) Posebno je iztakao, da se ukidaju svi tajni ugovori sklapani od prijašnje američke vlade sa sovjetskom Rusijom, koji su imali za svrhu zarobljivanje pojedinih naroda. To se odnosi na ugovore u Yalti i Potsdamu, kojima su bili komunizmu žrtvovani toliki narodi i države, te u kojima je bila 'uzakojena' anomalija 'ratnih zločinaca'.“⁸⁴

„...leže u teškim pogreškama što su ih zapadni saveznici počinili za vrijeme, i napose poslije drugog svjetskog rata, kada su se međusobno upravo natjecali u izmišljanju i pronalaženju sredstava za ubijanje protukomunističkog duha u pojedinim narodima, smatrajući vrhuncem dobre politike uništavanje svakog zdravog nacionalizma i izručivanje na komunističke klaonice protukomunističkih boraca iz drugog svjetskog rata. Radi toga je danas teško pronalaziti rodoljubne vojnike, koji bi bili spremni reskirati, da budu eventualni 'ratni zločinci'.“⁸⁵

„Medjutim sada su izišle na javu i druge strašne stvari. Sada se je javio i general Charles A. Willoughby, koji je za vrijeme rata bio glavni obavještajni časnik u MacArthurovu stožeru na azijskom ratištu. On je otkrio, da je general MacArthur izvjestiu vladu u Washingtonu, da se Japan nalazi neposredno pred kapitulacijom, koja se može svakoga dana očekivati i uporabom običnoga oružja, nu unatoč tomu, da su na dva japanska grada bačene atomske bombe, koje su prouzrokovale smrt oko pola milijuna žena,

certain peoples, were to be cancelled. This refers to the agreements in Yalta and Potsdam, by which so many nations and countries were sacrificed to communism, and which 'legalized' the anomaly of 'war criminals'.“⁸⁴

“...lie in the grave mistakes that the Western allies made during, and especially after, WWII, when they competed with each other in inventing and finding means to kill the anti-communist spirit in individual nations, considering the pinnacle of good policy to destroy any healthy nationalism, and hand over to communist slaughterhouses anti-communist fighters from WWII. That is why today it is difficult to find patriotic soldiers who would be willing to risk being labelled as potential 'war criminals'.“⁸⁵

“But now other terrible things have come to light. Now General Charles A. Willoughby, who during the war was the chief intelligence officer on MacArthur's staff in the Asian Theatre, has come forward. He has discovered that General MacArthur has reported to the government in Washington that Japan is on the verge of surrender, which can be expected any day even with the use of conventional weapons, but despite this, atomic bombs have been dropped on two Japanese cities, causing the deaths of about half a million women, children and other civilians. He further revealed that Roosevelt and Churchill were informed before the Yalta meeting that Japan had appealed to Russia to mediate an end to the war between Japan and the Allies, but they nevertheless made enormous concessions to Russia in order to enter the war against Japan, because the British and American headquarters had reported that Japan would hold out for at least another year and a half. It remains to be seen what else will develop from these discoveries, and what form will the concept of real war criminals take.”⁸⁶

It is interesting in this context to highlight the German case as a key argument in the discussion of how the West made mistakes in the context of WWII and the post-war period and how the gathering of anti-communist forces is the key to any future success. For example, data is presented on how former members of the

⁸⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 10. veljače 1953: 2.

⁸⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 14. rujna 1952: 2.

⁸⁴ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, February 10, 1953: 2.

⁸⁵ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, September 14, 1952: 2.

⁸⁶ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, March 23, 1955: 2.

djece i ostaloga civilnoga pučanstva. Odkrio je nadalje, da su Roosevelt i Churchill bili prije sastanka u Jalti obaviješteni, da se je Japan obratio na Rusiju, da bi posredovala, da se obustavi rat između njega i saveznika, nu oni su unatoč tome Rusiji učinili poznate ogromne ustupke, da bi unišila u rat protiv Japanu, jer da su englezki i američki stožeri izvjestili, da će se Japan držati još najmanje godinu i po dana. Vidjeti će se, što će se još razviti iz tih otkrića, i kakvo će obličje dobili pojam pravih ratnih zločinaca.“⁸⁶

Zanimljivo je u ovom kontekstu isticanje i njemačkog slučaja kao krunskog argumenta u raspravi o tome kako je zapad pogriješio u kontekstu Drugog svjetskog rata i poraća i kako je okupljanje antikomunističkih snaga ključ bilo kakvog budućeg uspjeha. Tako se na primjer iznose podatci o tome da su bivši pripadnici režima iz nacističkog razdoblja pronašli svoje mjesto u upravi i vojsci u Zapadnoj Njemačkoj:

„U Zapadnoj su Njemačkoj obavljeni izbori, u kojima je absolutnu većinu dobila Demokratsko-kršćanska Stranka na čelu sa Adenauerom. Tvrdi se, da među izabranim zastupnicima ima i znatan broj časnika iz vojske i milicije III. Reicha. Adenauera i njegovu stranku podupirali su velikom promičbom Amerikanci, a nemalo je toj pobjedi doprinio i komunistički postupak, koji je sastojao u tome, da je nekoliko tisuća njemačkih komunista iz Istočne Njemačke nastojao prodrijeti u Zapadnu, da bi što terorom, a što promičbom na izpad izbora djelovali. Ta je okolnost djelovala međutim upravo u protivnom smjeru.“⁸⁷

Pavelić se nije o pitanju ratnih zločinaca ograničavao samo na europski kontekst već je komentirao i stanje u Japanu. U tom smislu navodi se upotreba atomskog oružja kao zločin za koji nitko nije odgovarao, a referira se i na pojedine izjave često spominjanog Douglasa MacArthura:

„U Japanu je održan spomendan na strašni događaj, kada su pred deset godina zapadni saveznici bacili na dva japanska grada atomske bombe, koje su usmratile preko pola miliona civilnoga pučanstva, napose žena i djece. Za taj

Nazi-era regime found their place in the administration and military in West Germany:

“Elections were held in West Germany, in which the Christian Democratic Party, led by Adenauer, won an absolute majority. It is claimed that among the elected representatives there is a significant number of officers from the army and militia of the Third Reich. Adenauer and his party were supported by the Americans with great propaganda, and the communist action, and the fact that several thousand German communists from East Germany tried to penetrate into West Germany, in order to influence the outcome of the elections through terror and propaganda, contributed no small part to this victory. However, this circumstance worked in exactly the opposite direction.”⁸⁷

Pavelić did not limit himself to the European context on the issue of war criminals, but also commented on the situation in Japan. In this regard, he cites the case of the use of atomic weapons as a crime for which no one was held accountable, and he also refers to certain statements by the often-mentioned Douglas MacArthur:

“A Memorial Day was held in Japan to commemorate the terrible event when, ten years ago, the Western Allies dropped atomic bombs on two Japanese cities, killing over half a million civilians, especially women and children. To this day, no one has been declared a war criminal for that act.”⁸⁸

“The North American General MacArthur recently stated that after the capitulation of Japan, Stalin, Churchill and Truman wanted to declare Hirohito, the Japanese emperor, a war criminal and have him sentenced to death. (...) MacArthur says that he was against this intention of the Allied leaders, and that he is also against declaring of anyone as a war criminal. It is likely that it was precisely because of this correct opinion that Truman removed MacArthur from his command post in the East and sent him into retirement.”⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svietu“, *Hrvatska*, 23. ožujka 1955: 2.

⁸⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svietu“, *Hrvatska*, 23. rujna 1953: 2.

⁸⁷ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svietu“, *Hrvatska*, September 23, 1953: 2.

⁸⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svietu“, *Hrvatska*, August 17, 1955: 2.

⁸⁹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svietu“, *Hrvatska*, September 21, 1955: 2.

čin nije još nitko do danas proglašen ratnim zločincem.”⁸⁸

„Nedavnu je izjavio sjevernoamerički general MacArthur, da su Staljin, Churchill i Truman nakon kapitulacije Japana htjeli i istoga Hirohita, japanskoga cara, proglasiti ratnim zločincem te ga dati osuditi na smrt. (...) MacArthur veli, da je on bio proti toj namjeri savezničkih prvaka, i da je ostalom proti svakom proglašavanju ratnim zločincem bilo koga. Vjerojatno je, da je baš radi toga izpravnoga mišljenja Truman i maknuo MacArthura sa zapovjedničkoga mjesta na Izto-ku i bacio ga u mirovinu.”⁸⁹

O hrvatskom povijesnom iskustvu u usporedbi s drugima

Pavelić se u svom pisanju često koristi metodom uspoređivanja hrvatskog povijesnog iskustva s primjerima drugih naroda. Izvrstan primjer Pavelićeva korištenja analogijom između pojedinih događaja, kako bi objašnjavao i kontekstualizirao političku situaciju u kojoj se nalaze Hrvati u Jugoslaviji, jest onaj ratnih zarobljenika u Korejskom ratu. On u više svojih tekstova prati taj problem i objašnjava da na zapadu postoji nerazumijevanje tih događaja, dok s druge strane pripadnici naroda koji su dospjeli pod komunističku vlast jasno uviđaju što je posrijedi. Navodi da bi eventualni budući rat vrlo brzo oslikao stvarno stanje jugoslavenskog režima:

„S jedne strane Amerikanci tvrde, da im komunisti nisu još predali sviju zarobljenika. S druge strane u Južnoj Koreji nalazi se oko 28.000 sjeverokorejskih i kineskih zarobljenika, koji su protukomunisti i ne žele se povratiti pod komunističku vlast. Te zarobljenike straže hinduske trupe, da osiguraju njihovu predaju komunistima. Medjutim predsjednik Južne Koreje Sigman Rhee se protivi tome, da ih se izruči, te se je zaprietio, da će ih on sa svojom vojskom oteti izpod hinduskog stražarenja i pustiti na slobodu.”⁹⁰

„Po Evropi i po Amerikama mnogima je ljudima ta stvar prilično nerazumljiva, i pitaju se, kako to. da se ti ljudi ne žele vratiti svojim kućama. To

On the Croatian historical experience in comparison with others

In his writings, Pavelić often uses the method of comparing the Croatian historical experience with the examples of other nations. An excellent example of Pavelić's use of analogy between individual events, in order to explain and contextualize the political situation in which the Croats in Yugoslavia find themselves, is the example of prisoners of war in the Korean War. He follows this problem in several of his texts and explains how there is a lack of understanding of these events in the West, while on the other hand, members of the nations that have fallen under communist rule clearly see what is at stake. He states that a possible future war would very quickly paint the real picture of the Yugoslav regime:

“On the one hand, the Americans claim that the communists have not yet handed over all of their prisoners. On the other hand, there are about 28,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners in South Korea, who are anti-communists and do not want to return to communist rule. These prisoners are guarded by Hindu troops to ensure their hand-over to the communists. However, the president of South Korea, Sigman Rhee, is against their extradition, and has threatened to kidnap them from under Hindu guard and set them free with his army.”⁹⁰

“In Europe and America, many people find this matter quite incomprehensible, and they wonder how it is that these people do not want to return to their homes. They do not understand this, just as they do not understand when they are told that communist 'Yugoslavia' does not have an army with which it could go to war against anyone, but they believe in the great military strength (countless divisions) of the 'glorious Yugoslav' army and think that there is anyone who would want to fight and sacrifice their lives for Serbian-communist Tito-slavia. What is this in Korea! If 'Yugoslavia' went to war with anyone, then the outside world would immediately see how many of its prisoners would be found who would want to return to the rule of Serbian-communist tyranny!”⁹¹

Another interesting example of the use of analogy to explain the delusions of the West at that time, and

⁸⁸ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 17. kolovoza 1955: 2.

⁸⁹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 21. rujna 1955: 2.

⁹⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 21. listopada 1953: 2.

⁹⁰ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, October 21, 1953: 2.

⁹¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, November 18, 1953: 2.

oni ne razumiju, upravo kao što ne razumiju, kada im se kaže, da komunistička 'Jugoslavija' nema vojske, s kojom bi mogla ići u rat bilo proti kome, nego vjeruju u veliku vojnu snagu (bezbrojne divizije) 'slavne jugoslavenske' vojske i misle, da ima ikoga, tko bi se htio boriti i svoj život žrtvovati za srbokomunističku Titoslaviju. Što je to u Koreji! Da se 'Jugoslavija' s kime zarati, onda bi istom taj vanjski svijet vidio, koliko bi se njezinih zarobljenika našlo, koji bi se htjeli povratiti natrag pod vlast srbokomunističke tiranije!⁹¹

Drugi zanimljiv primjer korištenja analogijom da bi se objasnile zablude zapada u tom trenutku, a posljedično time preispitale postavke kojima se objašnjava prošlost, pitanje je gerilske borbe u Francuskoj Indokini. Pavelić donosi svjedočanstvo jednog francuskog vojnika i opis gerilskog načina ratovanja u kojem objašnjava da je konvencionalni pristup u tom tipu sukoba neupotrebljiv. Zanimljivo je da autor u jednom trenutku za gerilce koristi termin *partizani*. Pavelić i ovdje stvara poveznice između trenutačnih problema u kojima se nalazi zapad i vlastitih iskustava i stanja u NDH tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata:

„Nedavno se je iz Indokine vratio jedan ranjeni legionar, koji je novinarima izjavio, da taj rat traje već sedam godina i da može trajati još daljnjih dvadeset, jer da se s redovitom vojakom i starom strategijom ne može uspješno voditi rat proti gerilcima. Tako veli, da gerilci navale na jedno mjesto i zauzmu ga, naravno, kada tamo nema nikakove obrane. Francuzko zapovjedništvo onda spremi jake snage i s njima navali na te komuniste, nu kada francuzke trupe tamo stignu, nadju u tom mjestu samo žene i diecu, a partizanima ni traga. Oni su pobrali sve mužkarce za oružje sposobne, izžezli preko noći, i međjutim navalili na koje drugo mjesto iza ledja francuzkoj vojsci. Vidi se, da zapadni narodi nisu još prozreli komunističkih metoda, i da još uvijek nisu pristupili organiziranju odgovarajućih jedinica za protugerilsku borbu i odgovarajućoj strategiji, potrebnjoj za protugerilski rat, nego se ravnaju po starim učbenicima vojničkih škola, koji su već davno zahrdjali i za ovu vrst borbe postali podpuno neuporabivim.”⁹²

consequently to reconsider the assumptions used to explain the past, is the issue of guerrilla warfare in French Indochina. Pavelić brings the testimony of a French soldier and a description of the guerrilla warfare, in which he explains that the conventional approach is unusable in this type of conflict. It is interesting that the author at one point uses the term *partisans* for guerrillas. Here too, Pavelić creates links between the current problems faced by the West, and his own experiences, and the situation in the Independent State of Croatia during the WWII:

“Recently, a wounded legionnaire returned from Indochina, who told journalists that the war has been going on for seven years and that it could last another twenty, because a war against the guerrillas cannot be successfully waged with regular soldiers and the old strategy. So, he says that the guerrillas attack a place and occupy it, of course, when there is no defence there. The French command then prepares strong forces and attacks those communists with them, but when the French troops arrive there, they find only women and children in that place, and no trace of the *partisans*. They gathered all the men capable of bearing arms, vanished overnight, and nevertheless rushed to some other place behind the back of the French army. It can be seen that the Western nations have not yet seen through the communist methods, and that they have not yet begun to organize appropriate units for counter-guerrilla warfare, and the appropriate strategy necessary for counter-guerrilla warfare, but are following the old textbooks of military schools, which have long since rusted and become completely unusable for this type of combat.”⁹²

Conclusion

Ante Pavelić's journalistic work in the new circumstances of the Cold War was primarily aimed at continuing to advocate for the policy of Croatian state independence despite the complete collapse of the Independent State of Croatia in May 1945. At the time of Pavelić's writing, international circumstances did not offer a realistic possibility for the success of such a policy, except under the condition that a new war, or a conflict between East and West, occurred. This condition was the key

⁹¹ Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 18. studenoga 1953: 2.

⁹² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, 13. siječnja 1954: 2.

⁹² Planina [Ante Pavelić], „Dva tjedna politike u svijetu“, *Hrvatska*, January 13, 1954: 2.

Zaključak

Publicistički rad Ante Pavelića u novonastalim okolnostima hladnog rata u prvom je redu imao za cilj nastaviti sa zalaganjem za politiku hrvatske državne nezavisnosti unatoč potpunom slomu NDH u svibnju 1945. U trenutku Pavelićeva pisanja međunarodne okolnosti nisu pružale realnu mogućnost za uspjeh takve politike, osim pod uvjetom da dođe do novog rata, odnosno sukoba istoka i zapada. Taj uvjet bio je ključna točka na kojoj je Pavelić temeljio cijelo svoje poslijeratno djelovanje, pa tako i ono publicističko.

Pavelićeva hladnoratovska analiza međunarodnih odnosa, sagledana kroz njegove kolumne, prikazuje autorovu jaku preokupaciju pitanjem polarizacije svijeta između istočnog, komunističkog i zapadnog, kapitalističkog bloka, gdje se SAD vidi kao ključni lider slobodnog svijeta, a Sovjetski Savez kao prijetnja globalnom miru. Pavelićeva kritika američke politike koju je provodila Demokratska stranka temelji se na njegovu osobnom iskustvu s Rooseveltovom i Trumanovom administracijom tijekom i nakon Drugog svjetskog rata, posebice zbog njihovih odluka koje su, prema Paveliću, omogućile širenje sovjetskog utjecaja. Ponekad su njegove analize i analogije bile vrlo logične, no s druge strane nerijetko i paradoksalne s obzirom na realpolitičku logiku funkcioniranja međunarodnih odnosa. Pogledi na reviziju statusa Njemačke u Europi, isticanje sovjetske prijetnje jedinstvu zapada, razumijevanje za promjene američkih stavova govore u prilog jasnom viđenju stanja. S druge strane, ideje da će Eisenhower odlučno provoditi politiku koja će posljedično dovesti do rata sa Sovjetskim Savezom, prikazivanje britanskih političkih odluka kao izigravanje Amerikanaca ili isticanje važnosti Španjolske za zapadni savez neki su od primjera koji govore o Pavelićevim nastojanjima i željama, odnosno tumačenju međunarodnih odnosa prama hrvatskom nacionalističkom okviru.

Vidljivo je da Pavelić izražava svoj skepticizam prema demokraciji u načinu na koji valorizira autoritarne režime, poput onih u Argentini i Španjolskoj. Međutim, primarno mjerilo kojim Pavelić vrednuje različite političke vođe diljem svijeta jest antikomunizam. Oni koji su imali jasne antikomunističke stavove u njegovoj su interpretaciji međunarodnih odnosa dobili pozitivne ocjene. Svi oni koji su pokazivali sklonost za dijalog s komunizmom kvalificirani su kao izdajnici ili politički naivci. Iako izražava

point on which Pavelić based his entire post-war work, including his journalistic work.

Pavelić's Cold War analysis of international relations, as seen through his columns, demonstrates the author's strong preoccupation with the issue of the polarization of the world between the Eastern communist and Western capitalist blocs, where the United States is seen as the key leader of the free world, and the Soviet Union as a threat to global peace. Pavelić's criticism of American policies pursued by the Democratic Party is based on his personal experience with the Roosevelt and Truman administrations during and after WWII, especially their decisions that, according to Pavelić, enabled the spread of Soviet influence. Sometimes his analyses and analogies were very logical, however, on the other hand, they were often paradoxical regarding the realpolitik logic of the functioning of international relations. Views on the revision of Germany's status in Europe, the emphasis on the Soviet threat to the unity of the West, understanding of the changes in American attitudes speak in favour of a clear view of the situation. On the other hand, the idea that Eisenhower will resolutely implement a policy that will eventually lead to war with the Soviet Union, portraying British political decisions as playing tricks on the Americans or emphasizing the importance of Spain for the Western alliance are some of the examples that speak of Pavelić's efforts and wishes, that is, the interpretation of international relations according to the Croatian nationalist framework.

It is evident that Pavelić expresses his scepticism towards democracy in the way he values authoritarian regimes, such as those in Argentina and Spain. However, the primary criterion by which Pavelić evaluates various political leaders around the world is anti-communism. Those who had clear anti-communist views received positive evaluations in his interpretation of international relations. All those who showed a preference for dialogue with communism were qualified as traitors or political naïves. Although he expresses hope for a more active role of the USA under Republican leadership in the fight against communism, events such as the Suez crisis, and the Hungarian revolution of 1956 have shown that world politics are not going in the direction of the open confrontation that Pavelić wished for.

Pavelić's analysis of Yugoslavia in the international context focuses on the claim that it plays a double game, portraying itself as a Western ally while at the same time remaining faithful to communist ideals. His writings on Josip Broz Tito and Yugoslavia are full of sarcasm and cynicism, with Pavelić attempting to portray Tito as a

nadu u aktivniju ulogu SAD-a pod republikanskim vodstvom u borbi protiv komunizma, događaji poput Sueske krize i Mađarske revolucije iz 1956. pokazali su da svjetska politika ne ide u smjeru otvorene konfrontacije koju je Pavelić priželjkivao.

Pavelićeva analiza Jugoslavije u međunarodnom kontekstu fokusira se na tvrdnju da ona igra dvostruku igru, prikazujući se kao zapadni saveznik, dok istovremeno ostaje vjerna komunističkim idealima. Njegovi tekstovi o Josipu Brozu Titu i Jugoslaviji obiluju sarkazmom i cinizmom, pri čemu pokušava prikazati Tita kao neozbiljnog dionika na globalnoj političkoj sceni. Zaključno, Pavelićevi hladnoratovski tekstovi nisu samo analiza međunarodnih odnosa već i političko oružje kojim pokušava održati ideju hrvatske neovisnosti živom, prikazujući svjetske događaje kroz prizmu mogućnosti ostvarenja tog cilja. Jednako tako, ako želimo razumjeti njegove tekstove, moramo postaviti pitanje koja bi bila alternativa političkom narativu koji polazi iz perspektive političara i predstavnika naroda kojem je zanjekao osnovni politički subjektivitet u međunarodnim odnosima. Na koncu treba istaknuti da bez analize Pavelićevih poslijeratnih tekstova, osobito onih do sada nepoznatih, nije moguće cjelovito zaključivati o njegovu djelovanju.

frivolous player on the global political scene. In conclusion, Pavelić's Cold War writings are not only an analysis of international relations, but also a political weapon with which he tries to keep the idea of Croatian independence alive, presenting world events through the prism of the possibility of achieving this goal. Likewise, if we want to understand his texts, we must ask what would be an alternative to the political narrative that stems from the perspective of a politician and representative of the people who was denied basic political subjectivity in international relations. Finally, it should be emphasized that without an analysis of Pavelić's post-war texts, especially those hitherto unknown, it is not possible to draw comprehensive conclusions about his work.

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