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Priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Chetnik Organization in Dalmatia During the Second World War

Drawing on archival and published documents and relevant historiographical literature, this paper describes the role that the priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) had in the development of the Chetnik organization in the area of Dalmatia during the Second World War. Available sources point to the conclusion that seventeen SPC priests were actively involved in the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia, with the two most prominent members of that organization being SPC priests Sergije Urukalo and Momčilo Đujić. The Chetnik organization initially operated in the form of a humanitarian society under the name "Committee for Aid to Serbian Refugees", and from 1942 it received a military framework and operated under the designation "Dinara Division". The Chetnik organization operated with the support of the Italian authorities until the capitulation of Italy, after which it cooperated with the German authorities. With the withdrawal of the German army from Dalmatia, the Chetnik organization collapsed and the majority of SPC priests who were its officials withdrew. After the defeat of the Chetnik organization, six SPC priests who were members of its organization remained in Dalmatia. The authorities of socialist Yugoslavia sentenced three SPC priests to prison terms, while the other three priests of the SPC were granted amnesty. Due to the connections of some members of the socialist Yugoslav authorities with the SPC, the subject addressed in this paper remained concealed and historiographically unexamined.

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1. Introduction

The historiographical literature on the territory of the former Yugoslavia during the Second World War is exceptionally large. However, much of the information related to the participants of the war in that area is still largely unknown. One of the topics that has not been the subject of serious historiographical treatment are the priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) in the Chetnik organization in the area of Dalmatia. The absence of substantial works on this organization is striking, since the central figure of this organization was an SPC priest, Momčilo Đujić.

In historiography, Đujić's biography has been presented in its basic outline.² However, the names of other SPC priests who were Chetnik leaders in Dalmatia have remained largely unknown. In works dealing with Dalmatia in the Second World War, the names of only a few of them are recorded. For example, in Đujić's biography published in Yugoslavia, it is evident that the members of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia were the SPC priests Sava Gnjatović, Stevan Prostran, and Petar Stojisavljević.³ Similarly, in the book by the Yugoslav writer Dušan Plenča on northern Dalmatia in the Second World War, Savatija Mažibrada is mentioned in this context, as well as the aforementioned Stojisavljević.⁴ In the book by the Croatian historian Nikica Barić, which describes the work of the administration of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in Dalmatia, it is stated that the SPC priest Dušan Rašković was the head of the Propaganda Department of the 2nd Dalmatian Corps of the Dinara Chetnik Region.⁵

Unlike Rašković, it is not possible to draw any concrete conclusions about the four aforementioned SPC priests from the data recorded in these books. In

² Đujić's role in the Second World War is evident from Yugoslav historiographical literature, as well as from the works of contemporary authors cited in this paper. These are the works of Yugoslav writers Dušan Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], and Đujić's biography written by Jovo Popović, Marko Lolić and Branko Latas, as well as the works of Serbian historian Veljko Đurić Mišina, and Croatian historians Nikica Barić, Tomislav Jonjić, Nada Kisić Kolanović and Hrvoje Matković, whose titles are listed in the bibliography at the end of this paper.

³ Popović, Lolić, Latas, Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal], 52., 283.

⁴ Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 303.,304., 328., 393.

⁵ Barić, Ustaše na Jadranu: Uprava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u jadranskoj Hrvatskoj nakon kapitulacije Kraljevine Italije [Ustashe on the Adriatic: Administration of the Independent State of Croatia in Adriatic Croatia After the Capitulation of the Kingdom of Italy], 568.

the case of Prostran, the only evidence points to the fact that his sons Draško and Jovo served as brigade commanders in the Chetnik units,⁶ while for Mažibrada records indicate that in May 1942 he was the Chetnik representative in Zadar to the Italian authorities there.⁷

Taking the above into account, it is obvious that in addition to Đujić, there were also other SPC priests active in the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia. The names of five of them are known from the aforementioned historiographical works, while the exact function he had in that organization is known for only one. Consequently, it can be concluded that the topic of SPC priests in the Chetnik organization in the area of Dalmatia remains unexplored in historiography.

Therefore, the aim of this paper is to fill the existing historiographical gap, that is, to open up a topic that has so far been unaddressed in historiography. The paper is based on archival materials from the Croatian State Archives (HDA) in Zagreb, published sources from various collections of documents, and relevant contemporary historiographical literature. Key archival documents used in this paper, which were previously unknown, are published in the form of copies at the end of the paper, and in the text, along with their signature, they are marked with the term "appendix" in bold letters. Three such documents are published in this paper.

2. Main Features of the Chetnik Organization in Dalmatia During the Second World War

The Chetnik organization in Dalmatia during the Second World War was formed at approximately the same time as the Chetnik structures in other areas of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia, mostly in the spring and summer of 1941. In historiographical literature from the Yugoslav era, its emergence is described as a consequence of the activities of local politicians, teachers, and priests of the SPC. This feature of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia is significant because the social structure from which this organization emerged differed from the Chetnik organization in Serbia and Montenegro, or rather from the Chetnik movement of Ravna Gora. Namely, that movement was formed by officers of the former army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, that is, by military officials and not by civilians.

⁶ Popović, Lolić, Latas, Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal], 285.

⁷ Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 304.

⁸ Marjanović, Draža Mihailović između Britanaca i Nemaca [Draža Mihailović Between the British and the Germans], 205.; Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 275.-276., 568.

The aforementioned difference between the two organizations came to the fore at the political level during 1942 and 1943 in Dalmatia. In the period from autumn 1941 to summer 1942, 18 members of the Chetnik organization from Serbia and Montenegro arrived in Dalmatia. These were 11 officers and 7 non-commissioned officers of the former Royal Yugoslav Army who considered Dragoljub Draža Mihailović, the leader of the Ravna Gora Chetniks, to be their commander. Their task was to participate "in the organization and actions of Đujić's people's army", and to create the conditions for Đujić's Chetniks to acquire "military characteristics". Also, the aforementioned group had a clear political goal – to force Đujić and other prominent Chetnik officials from Dalmatia to recognize Mihailović as their superior and to readily carry out his orders. This political goal was not achieved, because Đujić's Chetniks resisted. According to the writings of a prominent member of that group, Đorđe Nikolić, three of his comrades who came to Dalmatia together with him died a "mysterious death", while most of the others, including himself, were forced to leave Dalmatia. 10

In addition to Nikolić's record, Đujić's resistance to Mihailović's leadership is also recorded in German documents. In one of these documents, intercepted radio communications established that Đujić "sent false reports" to Mihailović with the intention of "extricating himself from his influence". The document is a report sent by the leadership of the German 15th Corps to the leadership of the German 2nd Army on October 25, 1943.11 The information in this document is highly likely accurate, since the German 15th Corps had its envoy in the command of Đujić's Chetniks. It was a German officer with the rank of captain, Wilcke Rösenmann, who was known among the Chetniks in Dalmatia under the name Lazarević. 12 Probably under the influence of Rösenmann or some other German officer who knew Đujić personally, the described differences between the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia and the Chetniks of Ravna Gora were presented as a consequence of the different political views of its commanders, Đujić and Mihailović. In that same document from the German 15th Corps, Đujić is described as a supporter of Dimitrije Ljotić, one of Mihailović's main opponents in Serbia.¹³

⁹ Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 282.

¹⁰ Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 291.

¹¹ NARA, T314-566, 343.

¹² Popović, Lolić, Latas, Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal], 284.

¹³ NARA, T314-566, 343.

The aforementioned information regarding Đujić's devotion to Ljotić is important because the German military authorities considered Ljotić their main ally in Serbia. In terms of worldview, Ljotić was the closest of all the politicians in the former Yugoslavia to the German ideology of the time, namely, National Socialism. Đujić and the Chetnik organization under his command benefited significantly from the aforementioned position of the German military authorities. Namely, as a result, the Germans provided substantial assistance to Đujić and his Chetniks in two main ways. Firstly, German troops in Dalmatia supplied Đujić's Chetniks with various military equipment, with the German officer Rösenmann in charge of logistics. ¹⁴ Secondly, Đujić and his Chetniks retreated at the end of the war together with German troops from Dalmatia, thereby avoiding capture by their wartime opponents - the armed forces under the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), that is, the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ). ¹⁵

Although the nature of the influence of Ljotić's movement on the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia has yet to be historiographically examined, available sources suggest that a connection existed between that movement and Đujić's Chetniks. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that Đujić was not the only supporter of Ljotić among the Chetnik leaders in Dalmatia. Along with him, there were also Nikanor Kalik and Draško Prostran. For the topic of this paper, their names are important because they were both associated with the SPC. Nikanor Kalik was an SPC priest, that is, a "monk", 6 while Draško Prostran was the son of an SPC priest and Chetnik leader in Dalmatia, Stevan Prostran.

The authorities of socialist Yugoslavia designated Nikanor Kalik as Ljotić's most important supporter, or rather, something of a "Ljotić's delegate for Dalmatia". This information appeared in a public notice from the "National Commission for Determining the Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Helpers" dated December 15, 1945. In addition to his position in Ljotić's movement, Kalik held prominent positions in the structure of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia. Specifically, he was head of the Knin district, that is, head of the self-pro-

¹⁴ Popović, Lolić, Latas, Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal], 284.

¹⁵ Barić, *Ustaše na Jadranu* [*Ustašhe on the Adriatic*], 571.-573.; Popović, Lolić, Latas, *Popizdaje* [*The Priest of Betrayal*], 350.-355.

¹⁶ Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 249., 294., 363., 400.; Popović, Lolić, Latas, Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal], 52., 186., 334.

¹⁷ Popović, Lolić, Latas, Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal], 285.

¹⁸ Dizdar, Sobolevski, *Prešućivani četnički zločini* [The Concealed Chetnik Crimes], 663.

claimed administrative body that Đujić's Chetniks established in the village of Kosovo near Knin in April 1944.¹⁹ In addition to the mentioned function, Kalik, together with Stevan Prostran, was one of the organizers of the German unit "Konrad".²⁰ By all accounts, it was the most important function that Kalik had during the Second World War.

The importance of the "Konrad" unit lay in the fact that it was a military formation that fell into the category of "troops" (hrv. trupova),²¹ or sabotage units composed of 30 to 40 soldiers whose task was to liquidate prominent members of the People's Liberation Movement (NOP), the revolutionary movement led by the KPJ. The units called "troops" were formed by German military bodies. while their composition was mixed. They were mostly made up of German soldiers and the local population, politically opposed to the KPJ. The unit that operated under the name "Konrad" was probably the most famous unit of its kind that operated in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. A brief description of the activities of the "Konrad" unit appears in Đujić's biography, and Croatian historians Nikica Barić and Nada Kisić Kolanović also partly addressed it. According to their information, this unit was established in Šibenik in March 1944, and its founder was the German intelligence officer Reinhard Kopps, known by the nickname Konrad. The unit consisted of "about thirty Chetniks" who wore "German uniforms", as well as six soldiers of German nationality.²² The unit operated in Dalmatia until August 1944, when it was transferred to Serbia by the German authorities.²³ In the period before the departure to Serbia, the unit's headquarters was located in the village of Zablaće near Šibenik, while a smaller number of unit members were stationed in the village of Arbanasi near Zadar.²⁴

Along with Kalik, Draško Prostran also played an important role in the organization of the German unit "Konrad". He arrived from Serbia to Dalmatia in mid-May 1943 as part of a group of members of the Ljotić movement.²⁵

¹⁹ Information about Kalik's duty was recorded in the records of the NDH authorities, namely in the report of the Velika župa Bribir dated April 29, 1944. *Ibid.*, 601.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 663., 665.

²¹ Popović, Lolić, Latas, Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal], 321.

²² Kisić Kolanović, *NDH i Italija* [*NDH and Italy*], 303.; Popović, Lolić, Latas, *Pop izdaje* [*The Priest of Betrayal*], 321.-322. According to the data from the NDH authorities, the Chetniks in the "Konrad" unit wore "German uniforms" but had a "Chetnik cap" on their heads. Barić, *Ustaše na Jadranu* [*Ustashe on the Adriatic*], 569.

²³ Barić, Ustaše na Jadranu [Ustashe on the Adriatic], 443.

²⁴ Branica, *NOB u Dalmaciji* [*NOB in Dalmatia*], Book 10, 1414., note 2.; Popović, Lolić, Latas, *Pop izdaje* [*The Priest of Betrayal*], 321.-322.

²⁵ Popović, Lolić, Latas, Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal], 268.

Immediately upon arrival, he and other supporters of Ljotić accepted Đujić's command and joined the ranks of the military wing of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia. Đujić entrusted Draško Prostran with the position of commander of a Chetnik unit called the "Split-Šibenik Battalion". ²⁶ This function was extremely important for the organization of the German unit "Konrad", because most of the members of that unit had previously been part of the battalion under Prostran's leadership. ²⁷ Consequently, it can be concluded that the basis for the formation of the "Konrad" unit was precisely the "Split-Šibenik Battalion".

Based on the information above, it can be concluded that the leadership of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia was to a significant extent tied with Ljotić's organization. In addition to the similarity in political views, another reason for this is most likely the fact that Ljotić, unlike Mihailović, had no intention of challenging Đujić's authority. A combination of these two factors can be considered the reason for the success of Ljotić's movement among the Chetnik leaders in Dalmatia, as well as the cause of the resistance offered by the Dalmatian Chetnik leadership to the envoys of the Ravna Gora Chetniks, that is, members of Mihailović's movement.

3. The Origins of the Chetnik Organization in Dalmatia

In historiographical literature from the Yugoslav era, the origin of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia is connected with the activity of two SPC priests. One was Momčilo Đujić, while the other was Sergije Urukalo.²⁸ However, in this literature, Urukalo is not mentioned as a member of the Chetnik organization, but only as one of the initiators of the movement from which that organization emerged.²⁹ Consequently, it can be concluded that the priests of the SPC, apart from being prominent officials of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia, also played an important role as its initiators. In the case of Sergije Urukalo, this conclusion can be accepted with certainty, since his importance in the development of that organization is also confirmed by the available documents.

For example, the importance of Urukalo in this context was stated by the commissioner of the Ravna Gora Chetnik movement for Dalmatia, Mladen Žu-

²⁶ Ibid., 268.-269.

²⁷ Ibid., 321,-322.

²⁸ Marjanović, *Draža Mihailović*, 86., 205.; Plenča, *Kninska ratna vremena* [*Knin War Times*], 275.-276., 396.; Popović, Lolić, Latas, *Pop izdaje* [*The Priest of Betrayal*], 77., 212.

²⁹ Marjanović, *Draža Mihailović*, 205.; Plenča, *Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times*], 568.; Popović, Lolić, Latas, *Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal*], 24.

jović, in his report dated August 6, 1943. According to him, Urukalo, together with Jakša Račić and Silvije Alfirević, was "the only invited forum of our Chetnik organization" recognized by the Italian authorities in Split.³⁰

Similar to Žujović, Urukalo was also described in a letter sent by Dominik Mandić to prominent Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) member Juraj Šutej on December 16, 1942. In that letter, four Chetnik leaders were mentioned, with Mandić placing Urukalo in third place, while as the fourth most important he mentioned "some other Orthodox priest, who was recently decorated by the Government in London",³¹ that is, by the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in exile. By all accounts, that Chetnik leader was Momčilo Đujić. The basis for this conclusion is a report by Fitzroy Maclean, commander of the British military mission to the Supreme Headquarters of the NOVJ, dated November 6, 1943, in which Đujić was listed as a person who had received a decoration from the Yugoslav government.³²

Valuable information about Urukalo was also recorded in party documents, namely in the records of the main political body of the KPJ for Dalmatia, which operated under the name "Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia for Dalmatia". The first record of that party body mentioning Urukalo is a report sent to the main body of the KPJ for Croatia, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia (KPH), on September 19, 1941. The report mentions four names on the subject of Chetniks, among which "priest Urukalo" is listed in second place.³³ Interestingly, Momčilo Đujić's name is not mentioned in that report. In a report by the same body written less than a month later, on October 10, 1941, the names of the Chetnik leaders in Dalmatia were again listed. In that report, Urukalo was placed first, while Đujić's name, as in the previous report, was not mentioned.³⁴

In order to understand the mutual relationship between Đujić and Urukalo, it is worth mentioning that in the documents of the Provincial Committee of the

³⁰ Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 397.

³¹ Boban, Hrvatska u arhivima izbjegličke vlade 1941-1943. [Croatia in the archives of the government in exile 1941-1943], 241.

³² In that report, Đujić was described extremely negatively, that is, as a Chetnik commander who "first collaborated with the Italians, and now collaborates with the Germans". Biber, *Tito-Churchill*. 34.

³³ Vujošević, Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda [Collection of documents and data on the National Liberation War of the Yugoslav Peoples], V/1, 92.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 186.

KPH, Đujić was mentioned for the first time in a report dated December 20, 1941. In that document, Đujić was listed as the first of three "Chetnik elements" who allowed the Italian army into the town of Drvar, which had until then been held by armed units of the KPJ.³⁵ From the cited party documents, it appears evident that the leadership of the Provincial Committee of the KPH for Dalmatia, as early as late 1941, considered Urukalo one of the main Chetnik leaders for the whole of Dalmatia, while Đujić was regarded as a local commander operating in the peripheral area of northern Dalmatia and western Bosnia. However, since this area at the time possessed the greatest potential for the spread of an armed rebellion led by the KPJ,³⁶ Đujić's importance continuously grew in the subsequent period. A clear indicator of this is the fact that *Vjesnik*, the leading newspaper of the KPJ for all of Croatia, in its March 1942 issue defined Đujić as the most important "traitor" through whom the Italian policy was being implemented not only in Dalmatia, but also in Lika.³⁷

From the above information about Urukalo, it can be concluded that he was not a soldier, or rather a commander of guerrilla units like Đujić, but primarily a politician. Also, unlike Đujić, he did not operate in the area that was part of the NDH, but lived in Split, a city in Dalmatia that was annexed by the Kingdom of Italy after the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. It was in that city that Urukalo formed the political body from which the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia developed. Information about this appears in the previously mentioned report of the Provincial Committee of the KPH for Dalmatia dated September 19, 1941. In that document, Urukalo is described as an influential figure who received permission from the Italian authorities in Split to form a "committee that collects aid for Serbs" in Split.³⁸ The fact that Urukalo was the central figure of that committee was mentioned in works by Yugoslav writers Marjanović and Plenča,³⁹ Serbian historian Veljko Đurić Mišina,⁴⁰ as well as Croatian historians

³⁵ Vujošević, Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda [Collection of documents and data on the National Liberation War of the Yugoslav Peoples], V/2, 215.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 215.

³⁷ Vujošević, Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda [Collection of documents and data on the National Liberation War of the Yugoslav Peoples], V/3, 409.

³⁸ Vujošević, Zbornik [Collection of documents], V/1, 92.

³⁹ Marjanović, Draža Mihailović, 86.; Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 212.

⁴⁰ Đurić, Golgota Srpske pravoslavne crkve 1941-1945 [Golgotha of the Serbian Orthodox Church 1941-1945], 320.

such as Tomislav Jonjić and Hrvoje Matković.⁴¹ Consequently, it can be concluded that in the relevant historiographical works on the topic of Dalmatia in the Second World War, there is a kind of consensus regarding what is probably the most important piece of information from Urukalo's wartime biography.

However, the aforementioned authors did not describe in more detail the working methods of this committee. Only Plenča devoted particular attention to it. He described the committee under Urukalo's leadership as an organization that, in addition to its headquarters in Split, had branches in Šibenik, Benkovac, Obrovac and Kistanje, that is, in other cities in Dalmatia that were annexed by the Kingdom of Italy in 1941.⁴² According to Plenča's interpretation, the committees in these cities had a humanitarian purpose, but over time they acquired a political framework and became a "nest of the Chetnik idea".⁴³ Along with propagating "Chetnik ideas", Plenča published data from which it can be concluded that members of the committees in those cities collected weapons and ammunition. In these places, in the period from April 13 to July 27, 1941, that is, the day the armed rebellion began in western Bosnia, 817 rifles, 6 machine guns, 54 crates of hand grenades, 39 crates of ammunition and 46 pistols were collected.⁴⁴

Taking the above into account, it is certain that Urukalo, by creating a network of committees located on the immediate border of the Kingdom of Italy and the NDH, formed an organization that gradually acquired a military framework. By all accounts, this organization operated during 1941 under the name "Committee for Aid to Serbian Refugees", and from 1942 it began to operate under the name "Dinara Division". Direct evidence for this is the content of the report which the Main Headquarters of the National Liberation Partisan Detachments of Croatia (NOPOH) sent to the Supreme Headquarters of the Partisan and Volunteer Army of Yugoslavia on May 25, 1942. The body that compiled the aforementioned report was the main institution of the military wing of the NOP for the territory of Croatia. Consequently, it can be concluded that this NOP body which, along with the Provincial Committee of the KPH for Dalmatia, probably had the most accurate information about the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia.

⁴¹ Jonjić, Hrvatska vanjska politika 1939.-1942. [Croatian foreign policy 1939-1942], 671.; Matković, Između Mačeka i Pavelića: politički portret Davida Sinčića [Between Maček and Pavelić: a political portrait of David Sinčić], 62.

⁴² Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 212.

⁴³ Ibid., 212.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 224.

The report of the Main Headquarters of the NOPOH described the internal structure of the Chetnik organization, stating that its political center was in Split, while armed members of that organization were located in smaller groups in the peripheral areas of Bosnia, Lika and Dalmatia. Ten Chetnik leaders were named as prominent officials of the Chetnik organization, i.e. the "Dinara Division" as stated in the report, and a distinction was made between those who operated "in the cities" and those who operated "in the field". Among the members of the first group, Urukalo is listed in third place, while among the members of the second group, Đujić was listed in second place. In addition to the internal structure of the Chetnik organization, attention in the report was also focused on the propaganda of the organization's prominent officials. In this context, Dujić was mentioned, as a Chetnik official who in his public proclamations attacked the KPJ with slogans that its officials acted "in agreement with Pavelić", that is, according to an agreement with the leadership of the NDH.⁴⁵ The propaganda employed by Đujić against the KPJ was apparently devised by Urukalo, and adopted the foundation of that propaganda from Urukalo. The basis for this conclusion is the content of the aforementioned report of the Provincial Committee of the KPH for Dalmatia dated October 10, 1941. In that document, it was stated that a group of prominent Serbs from Dalmatia, led by Urukalo, had been negotiating with the Italian authorities "in the matter of a joint fight against us", and that they acted under the slogan of "protecting the Serbs from the Ustashe", that is, in the name of armed resistance to the NDH authorities. 46

Urukalo's propaganda against the KPJ was very likely described in a credible manner, because Urukalo was the subject of attention of the leading officials of the Provincial Committee of the KPH for Dalmatia, Ivan Lučić-Lavčević and Vicko Krstulović. In addition to the content of the aforementioned report, a clear indication of this is found in the meeting organized by the two leading Dalmatian communists with Urukalo in Split in August 1941. The goal of that meeting was to reach an agreement on cooperation with Urukalo, and through him with the entire Chetnik organization in Dalmatia. However, the meeting ended unsuccessfully, and no agreement was reached. This important piece of information from the wartime past of Dalmatia remained absent from Yugoslav

⁴⁵ Trgo, Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda [Collection of documents and data on the National Liberation War of the Yugoslav Peoples], V/4, 322.-323.

⁴⁶ Vujošević, Zbornik [Collection of documents], V/1, 186.

historiography until 1981. It was only then published as a short note in the editorial preface to a Yugoslav collection of documents published in Split.⁴⁷

For the topic of this paper, the information about that meeting is important for two reasons. Firstly, the fact that the meeting was held at the initiative of the communists was an indication that the leadership of the KPJ for Dalmatia were ready to cooperate with Urukalo, as well as with other Chetnik leaders from that area. Secondly, the fact that leading officials of the Provincial Committee of the KPH for Dalmatia invited Urukalo to the meeting can be considered the main argument supporting the conclusion that Urukalo was the main figure of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia in the summer of 1941. From the available sources, it remains unknown why Urukalo rejected the agreement with the leading Dalmatian communists. However, the most likely reason was Urukalo's assessment that cooperation with the KPJ would adversely affect his position with the Italian authorities in Split. For this reason, he likely rejected the offer of cooperation from the leading Dalmatian communists, and from then on began accusing them of collaborating with the NDH authorities.

In conclusion, regarding Urukalo's role in the development of this organization, as well as his wartime biography in general, it is worth mentioning that Urukalo was killed very soon after the capitulation of the Kingdom of Italy. After NOVJ troops took Split, he was arrested and executed. According to Yugoslav records, he died on September 25, 1943.⁴⁸ With Urukalo's death, Đujić's importance further increased, and in addition to his position as commander of the military wing of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia, he also became the central figure of that organization in political terms.

4. Priests of the SPC in the Chetnik Organization in Dalmatia

The Chetnik organization in Dalmatia was formed after the proclamation of the NDH, i.e. during the first half of 1941. Initially, this organization operated in the form of a humanitarian society, and by the beginning of 1942, it had acquired its military framework. The priests of the SPC were leading members of that organization, and in addition to their political functions, they also played a

⁴⁷ Branica, NOB u Dalmaciji [NOB in Dalmatia], Book 1, 173.; Jonjić, Hrvatska vanjska politika [Croatian foreign policy], 630.

⁴⁸ Branica, NOB u Dalmaciji [NOB in Dalmatia], Book 1, 65. note 2.; Vujošević, Zbornik [Collection of documents], V/1, 92., note 10.

prominent role in its military wing, namely, within the Chetnik units. As shown in the preceding chapters, the names of a few of them are known. They are, in alphabetical order, Momčilo Đujić, Sava Gnjatović, Nikanor Kalik, Savatija Mažibrada, Stevan Prostran, Dušan Rašković, Petar Stojisavljević and Sergije Urukalo. Apart from them, nine more priests of the SPC can also be identified as members of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia, namely Ilija Bulovan, Milorad Dobrota, Vladimir Garić, Naum Miljković, Nikola Sinkijević, Aleksandar Skočić, Jovan Sunajko, Valerijan Štrbac and Jona Veinović.

This list does not include those SPC priests who, according to some historiographical works, were members of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia, but their affiliation with that organization is not corroborated by available documents. Such is the case with Danilo Bukorović, ⁴⁹ Simo Knežević and Ilija Zečević. ⁵¹ For this reason, these three are omitted from this list.

Of the SPC priests who can be identified with complete certainty as members of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia, the majority held military functions, while only a few served in exclusively political duties. However, for some individuals, the available evidence does not allow for a conclusion on this issue, and that is why this question remains unresolved. Such is the case with Nikola Sinkijević and Jona Veinović. From the list of convicted Orthodox priests in Croatia from 1945 to 1950, as well as from the text of the verdict, it is evident that they were members of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia. However, the available data does not allow for a precise determination of the specific functions they performed within that organization.⁵²

Unlike them, it is certain that a relatively large number of SPC priests had primarily military duties in the Chetnik organization. Apart from Chetnik leaders such as Momčilo Đujić and Dušan Rašković, whose functions have already been discussed, this conclusion can also be made with respect to Ilija Bulovan, Milorad Dobrota, Vladimir Garić, Sava Gnjatović, Nikanor Kalik, Savatija Mažibrada, Naum Miljković, Aleksandar Skočić, Petar Stojisavljević, Jovan Sunajko and Valerijan Štrbac.

For example, Milorad Dobrota, Vladimir Garić, Sava Gnjatović and Alek-

⁴⁹ Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 278., 568.

⁵⁰ Popović, Lolić, Latas, Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal], 285.

⁵¹ Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 568.

⁵² Car, "Srpska pravoslavna crkva u Hrvatskoj: oduzimanje imovine i odnosi s državom od 1945. do 1967." ["The Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia: confiscation of property and relations with the state from 1945 to 1967"], 205.

sandar Skočić are listed in the order of the Dinara Chetnik Region dated February 7, 1944. From the text of that order, it is evident that Dobrota was appointed assistant to the "national commissioner" of the Krupa Brigade, while Garić held the same position in the Obrovac Brigade. In that same order, Gnjatović was appointed "national commissioner" of the Kistanje Brigade, and Skočić as the "president of the Chetnik committee" in the Bjelina Brigade. Si Similarly, in the decision of the commander of the Dinara Division, Momčilo Đujić, dated July 4, 1944, on the introduction of military ranks, a number of SPC priests were mentioned as members of various Chetnik units under his command. In addition to the SPC priests from Lika, the decision also included SPC priests from Dalmatia. They were Ilija Bulovan, Nikanor Kalik, Naum Miljković, Petar Stojisavljević and Valerijan Štrbac. With that decision, Bulovan, Miljković and Stojisavljević were given the rank of major, while Kalik and Štrbac were given the rank of captain. 4

Of the mentioned SPC priests, the duties performed by Valerijan Štrbac in the Chetnik organization are notable. He was the head of a self-proclaimed municipality founded by the Chetniks near Vrlika. The source for this information is a report sent by the NOP command for Vrlika to the leadership of the District Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia (KPH) for Knin on October 9, 1943. By all accounts, Štrbac was appointed to this position by a decision of Stojisavljević, since Stojisavljević was the commander of the Chetnik units in the area of Vrlika. In addition to this duty, Štrbac also held a military function in the Chetnik organization. Direct evidence for this is the content of the aforementioned Đujić's order from July 1944. From the text of that document, it is evident that in the period from October 1943 until the passing of that order, Štrbac was the president of the committee in the Cetina Brigade. It was a function similar to the one assigned to Dobrota, Garić, Gnjatović and Skočić in their parent brigades.

Unlike the aforementioned SPC priests, Savatija Mažibrada and Jovan Sunajko are not listed in the published documents of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia as its officials. However, the affiliation of the two mentioned SPC

⁵³ Branica, NOB u Dalmaciji [NOB in Dalmatia], Book 10, 1665.-1667.

⁵⁴ Đurić, Golgota Srpske pravoslavne crkve [Golgotha of the Serbian Orthodox Church], 310.

⁵⁵ HR-HDA-1834, Box 1, KP-310/3297: Komanda mjesta Vrlika Okružnom komitetu KPH Knin od 9. 10. 1943 [The command of the town of Vrlika to the District Committee of the KPH Knin from 9 October 1943].

⁵⁶ Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 303.; Popović, Lolić, Latas, Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal], 105., 284.

⁵⁷ Đurić, Golgota Srpske pravoslavne crkve [Golgotha of the Serbian Orthodox Church], 310.

priests to that organization, as well as the exact functions they held in that organization, can be determined from the available records of the NOP bodies and the NDH authorities. The exact name of the function that Savatija Mažibrada held in the Chetnik organization remains unknown. However, from the available sources, one gets the impression that it was some kind of military duty. From the information published by Dušan Plenča, it is evident that Mažibrada was Đujić's representative to the Italian authorities in Zadar, precisely in the period when the Italian authorities began to form their auxiliary units in that area. These units operated under the name "Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia", and were composed of the local population.⁵⁸ Consequently, it is certain that Mažibrada participated in the formation of some of these units, which is why he went to Zadar. However, it remains unknown from the available sources whether Mažibrada was placed in command of any of the units that were formed at that time. According to the data published by Plenča, it is obvious that six companies of this militia were formed at that time. The companies formed in Benkovac and Kistanje were formed by Serbs, while the other companies were formed by Croats. 59 Consequently, it is possible that Mažibrada was appointed to the leadership of one of these two units.

Although this question remains open, the argument supporting the conclusion that Mažibrada had a military function in one of these two units is that he, together with the Chetnik military commander Obrad Bianko, gave an oral report to Italian military officials in Zadar about the capture of members of the NOP unit known as the "Bude Borjan Battalion". After their capture, a total of 27 members of this unit were handed over by the Chetniks led by Bianko and Mažibrada to Italian soldiers stationed in the town of Gračac, located in Lika. 60 The described capture of members of the mentioned NOP unit is important because in the autumn of 1942, NOP units captured Mažibrada in Gračac. Consequently, it can be assumed that until his capture, Mažibrada operated in a wide area between Gračac in the north and the wider surroundings of Zadar in the south.

The information about the capture of Mažibrada was recorded in a report sent by the Main Headquarters of the NOPOH to the Supreme Headquarters of the NOVJ on 8 November 1942. In that document, it stated that Mažibrada was captured in Gračac on 24 October of that year, and he was described as the

⁵⁸ Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 304.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 305.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 328.

"alleged deputy of Pop Đujić". Although the fact that Mažibrada was Đujić's deputy is not confirmed in the available Chetnik documents, the fact that Mažibrada was captured together with members of the headquarters of a Chetnik military unit is a clear indication that his function in the Chetnik organization was primarily a military one. From the contents of this document, it is evident that the unit was called "Vožd Karađorđe" and was organized as a regiment, and it is very likely that Mažibrada was a member of its headquarters.

Regarding Mažibrada's biography, it is worth mentioning that in addition to the aforementioned functions in the Chetnik organization, he was also the hegumen of the Krupa monastery. The priestly office held by Mažibrada is important because in the area of Krupa, another SPC priest was a prominent Chetnik official. As previously stated, Milorad Dobrota was among the leadership of the Krupa Brigade. Unlike Mažibrada, Dobrota survived the Second World War. This is evidenced by a letter Đujić sent to the Patriarch of the SPC Gavrilo Dožić on 14 April 1945. In that letter, SPC priests are listed in different categories, including those who retreated under Đujić's leadership from Dalmatia to Slovenia at the end of the war. According to the information in that letter, twelve SPC priests withdrew from Dalmatia, including, in addition to Đujić, Ilija Bulovan, Milorad Dobrota, Vladimir Garić, Sava Gnjatović, Nikanor Kalik, Stevan Prostran and Valerijan Štrbac. Sava Gnjatović, Nikanor Kalik,

Of the Chetnik leaders from Dalmatia who were SPC priests, apart from Urukalo and Mažibrada, Petar Stojisavljević also did not survive the Second World War. In Đujić's letter to Dožić, he was said to have been executed by members of the NOP,⁶⁴ while in a publication from the Yugoslav era, it was reported that he died in a traffic accident in Serbia in September 1944.⁶⁵ The version of his death published by the Yugoslav authorities seems more likely, because Stojisavljević went to Serbia on 18 August 1944, to obtain financial and material assistance for the Chetnik units in Dalmatia from Milan Nedić, the prime minister of the government that acted as an auxiliary body of the German military administration in Serbia.⁶⁶ According to Đujić's biography, Stojisav-

⁶¹ Trgo, Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda [Collection of documents and data on the National Liberation War of the Yugoslav Peoples], V/9, 78.

⁶² Plenča. Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times]. 304.

⁶³ Đurić, Golgota Srpske pravoslavne crkve [Golgotha of the Serbian Orthodox Church], 320.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 320.

⁶⁵ Branica, NOB u Dalmaciji [NOB in Dalmatia], Book 2, 383., note 6.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 383., note 6.

ljević was one of the couriers whom Đujić sent to Serbia to supply his Chetniks.⁶⁷ Consequently, it is certain that he died on one of these journeys. Given that Serbia was then under German military administration, going to Serbia to supply Chetnik troops was not possible without the permission of the German authorities. Based on this, it can be concluded that Stojisavljević was one of the Chetnik leaders in Dalmatia trusted by the German authorities.

In relation to the mentioned Chetnik leaders, relatively few sources have been preserved on Jovan Sunajko. From the Chetnik documents published in the Yugoslav period, it is recorded that Sunajko was an official of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia is recorded in only one document. It was a report by the Chetnik unit called "3rd Brigade of the 501st Corps" sent to the leadership of the Dinara Chetnik Region on 10 September 1943. That report describes the details of a meeting between two Chetnik leaders, one of whom was Sunajko, with an unnamed German officer in Drniš. The topic of the meeting was the securing of a section of the railway line between Drniš and Unešić, which was supposed to be taken over by the Chetniks in that area. Taking this into account, it is certain that the Chetnik unit led in part by Sunajko operated in the wider area of Drniš, with the task of securing railway traffic there.

In addition to the aforementioned report, another document suggests that Sunajko was a Chetnik leader from Drniš. It was a report the General Directorate for Public Order and Security of the NDH sent to the Presidency of the Government of the NDH on 29 August 1944. The report was published in Croatia after the breakup of Yugoslavia, and it is significant for Sunajko's wartime biography, as it states that the "Serbian priest Jovo Sunajko" was one of the more prominent members of the Chetnik unit located in the village of Kričke near Drniš. Although it was a relatively small unit, a Chetnik group of only "about 100 people", its importance lay in the fact that it was "very active" in terms of propaganda. ⁶⁹ By all accounts, that unit was part of a larger Chetnik formation, or rather one of the brigades that operated in the area of Drniš.

Concluding Jovan Sunajko's biography, it is worth mentioning that he was

⁶⁷ Apart from Stojisavljević, the names of two other people who went to Serbia with the same task are known. They were Mihajlo Zaklanović and Nada Stanić. Popović, Lolić, Latas, *Popizdaje* [The Priest of Betrayal], 284.

⁶⁸ Trgo, Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije [Collection of documents and data on the National Liberation War of the Peoples of Yugoslavia], XIV/4, 445.-446.

⁶⁹ Dizdar, Sobolevski, Prešućivani četnički zločini [The concealed Chetnik crimes], 633.

one of the Chetnik leaders who did not withdraw from Dalmatia to Slovenia.⁷⁰ Besides him, five other SPC priests who were members of the Chetnik organization did not withdraw from Dalmatia to Slovenia. Along with Naum Miljković, Nikola Sinkijević and Jona Veinović, i.e., the three SPC priests who were sentenced to prison terms, 71 they were Dušan Rašković and Aleksandar Skočić. 72

5. Amnesty for Chetnik Leaders in Dalmatia

With the withdrawal of Đujić's Chetnik forces from Dalmatia, alongside German units, the Chetnik organization in that area ceased to exist. Among the small number of Đujić's Chetniks who did not retreat with the German army were several SPC priests. Information about them appears in the list of convicted Orthodox priests in Croatia from 1945 to 1950. From the contents of that list, it is evident that it concerned three priests: Naum Miljković, Nikola Sinkijević and Jona Veinović. All three were sentenced to prison terms, and one of them, Nikola Sinkijević, died while serving his sentence in Stara Gradiška prison in 1948.⁷³ By all accounts, the three SPC priests mentioned were the only members of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia who were convicted by the Yugoslav authorities after the war. The rest either retreated with the German troops to Slovenia, and emigrated from there, or were granted amnesty.

In the group of SPC priests amnestied by the government of socialist Yugoslavia, three can be named with complete certainty: Dušan Rašković, Aleksandar Skočić and Jovan Sunajko. From the data published in this paper, it is evident that all three had military duties in the Chetnik organization. The available sources do not allow a clear conclusion regarding the reasons for their amnesty, and therefore this question remains open. In order to understand the circumstances of their amnesty, it is worth noting that publications from the Yugoslav era, as well as contemporary historiographical literature that mentions court verdicts against Orthodox priests,74 do not mention their amnesty at all.

⁷⁰ Durić, Golgota Srpske pravoslavne crkve [Golgotha of the Serbian Orthodox Church], 321.

Car, "Srpska pravoslavna crkva u Hrvatskoj: oduzimanje imovine i odnosi s državom od 1945. do 1967. "[,,The Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia: confiscation of property and relations with the state from 1945 to 1967"], 205.

72 Durić, Golgota Srpske pravoslavne crkve [Golgotha of the Serbian Orthodox Church], 321.

⁷³ Car, "Srpska pravoslavna crkva u Hrvatskoj: oduzimanje imovine i odnosi s državom od 1945. do 1967. "["The Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia: confiscation of property and relations with the state from 1945 to 1967"], 209.

⁷⁴ Akmadža, Car, Zapisnici sjednica Komisije za odnose s vjerskim zajednicama NR / SR Hrvatske 1955.-1961. [Minutes of the sessions of the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities of the NR / SR Croatia 1955-1961], Volume I., 17.

Taking this into account, it is obvious that the authorities of socialist Yugo-slavia systematically suppressed all information related to them. A clear indicator of this is that Yugoslav literature first mentioned the amnesty of Chetnik leaders from Dalmatia only in the last years of Yugoslavia, that is, immediately before the collapse of the state and the war that followed. This information was published in 1986 in Dušan Plenča's book about northern Dalmatia in the Second World War and in 1988 in Đujić's biography.

In Plenča's book, the topic of amnestied Chetniks is approached with great caution and in vague terms. Namely, the data published there suggests that members of the KPJ conducted negotiations with "Pop Sunajko - a supporter of the Ravna Gora movement" about his transfer to the NOP.75 The data about these negotiations appeared in a note at the bottom of the page, without explaining who the person with whom the negotiations were conducted was. Namely, Sunajko's first and last name, as well as the position he held in the Chetnik organization, were not mentioned there. Also, no information was provided regarding the identity of the negotiator from the ranks of the KPJ. nor the outcome of those negotiations. In contrast to Plenča's book, the information about the amnestied Chetniks in Đujić's biography is stated more precisely and clearly, but also without going into details. In that book, it is stated that two prominent Chetnik officials, Petar Klicov and Franc Kovač, defected to the NOP in the spring of 1944. According to the authors of the book, the two of them were the only Chetnik leaders serving as brigade commanders "in the 2nd Corps" of Đujić's army who were amnestied by the KPJ. Until leaving the Chetnik ranks, Klicov was the commander of the Benkovac Brigade, ⁷⁶ while Kovač was the commander of the Skradin Brigade. ⁷⁷ For the topic of this paper, the data on the amnesty of Petar Klicov and Franc Kovač is important for two reasons. Firstly, the information that two prominent Chetnik officials were amnestied by the KPJ raises the question of amnesty for other members of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia, including SPC priests who held prominent positions in that organization. Secondly, by comparing the way in which the amnesty of Klicov and Kovač was presented on the one hand and the way in which the negotiations with Sunajko were described on the other hand, one gets the impression that the authorities of socialist Yugo-

⁷⁵ Plenča, Kninska ratna vremena [Knin War Times], 472.

⁷⁶ Popović, Lolić, Latas, Pop izdaje [The Priest of Betrayal], 287.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 322.

slavia considered the amnesty of Klicov and Kovač less problematic than the amnesty of Sunajko.

The main argument for the conclusion that in Sunajko's case involved deliberate concealment rather than a lack of relevant information is the fact that the Yugoslav authorities had detailed information about him. A clear indication of this is found in documents included in Yugoslav collections of documents. In one of these documents, Sunajko is also mentioned, as a prominent Chetnik official who held meetings with German officers regarding the protection of the railway line in the vicinity of Drniš. This refers to the document discussed in the previous chapter of this paper, namely, the report of the Chetnik unit called the "3rd Brigade of the 501st Corps" sent to the leadership of the Dinara Chetnik Region on 10 September 1943. From the contents of that document, it is evident that members of the command of that Chetnik unit, including Sunajko, held a meeting with German officers in Drniš and that the topic of the meeting was the supervision of the section of the railway line between Drniš and Unešić to be taken over by the Chetniks.⁷⁸

Also, the conclusion that the authorities of socialist Yugoslavia had very detailed information about Sunajko is confirmed by the available archival material. For example, Sunajko is mentioned in a letter that the leadership of the District Committee of the KPH for Knin sent to its members on 3 July 1944. In that letter, Sunajko was described as a prominent person from the area of Drniš who should be attracted to the side of the NOP. Since Drago Beader was also included in that list, immediately after Sunajko,⁷⁹ it is clear that they were regarded as leading figures in the military wing of the local Chetnik organization. Namely, Beader is identified in the records of the Yugoslav security services as the commander of Chetnik units from the village of Žitnić near Drniš,⁸⁰ and he was described in the same way by the authorities of the NDH.⁸¹

In addition to documents from the period of the Second World War, Sunajko's basic biographical data can also be traced in postwar records of various government bodies of socialist Yugoslavia. From the content of those documents, it is evident that the Yugoslav authorities had precise information about Sunajko. A clear example of this is Sunajko's statement of 14 December 1945

⁷⁸ Trgo, Zbornik [Collection of documents], XIV/4, 446.

⁷⁹ HR-HDA-1834, Box 2, KP-311/3505.

⁸⁰ Dizdar, Sobolevski, Prešućivani četnički zločini [The concealed Chetnik crimes], 673.

⁸¹ Ibid., 632.

to Vjenceslav Filipović, an official of the "National Commission for Determining the Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Helpers". In the biographical information about himself, Sunajko stated that his name was "Sunajko Jovan Jovanov, a native of Knin", and that he "permanently resides in Drniš", and that he is a "priest" by profession.⁸²

Regarding the nature of this statement, it is worth noting that Sunajko did not provide information about himself in the capacity of an arrested Chetnik leader under investigation, but as a witness in the investigation into the murder of Drniš resident Vlado Đapić. Regarding the subject of the investigation, Sunajko stated that he tried to save Dapić by intervening "with the Italian authorities" but that he did not succeed, and that was why Đapić was executed in the autumn of 1942 by the Italian authorities. Sunajko named Veljko Ilijić, the commander of the Chetnik unit in the village of Žitnić near Drniš, as the culprit for Đapić's death. Although Sunajko's words may seem to condemn the Chetnik organization in Drniš, the testimony of another witness, Danilo Lončar, regarding Đapić's death, suggests the opposite. According to Lončar, Đapić was "a member of the Chetnik organization in Tepljuh", that is, a member of a unit that did not participate "in major Chetnik actions" during 1942. The members of that unit generally spent most of their time at their homes, and sometimes "in small groups and independently of the Chetnik command, they carried out individual robberies primarily in Catholic villages".83 Taking into account the above information, it is obvious that the murdered Đapić was an active Chetnik, and that is probably why Sunajko decided to give a statement to clarify the circumstances surrounding his death.

Apart from Sunajko's testimony, another post-war document showing that the authorities of socialist Yugoslavia had detailed information about Sunajko is a letter from the Public Prosecutor's Office for the Šibenik District dated 9 July 1945. In that document, it is stated that Sunajko was spreading propaganda that "Ustashe are returning and that the government is protecting them". Although Sunajko "should have been arrested" for such accusations, the Yugoslav security service OZNA (Department for Protection of the People) prevented this. The content of the aforementioned letter was completely unknown in the historiographical literature until it was published by the Croatian historian

⁸² HR-HDA-306, Box 153, 1578/45.

⁸³ HR-HDA-306, Box 153, 1578/45.

Zdenko Radelić. However, he did not pay much attention to that event, nor did he state who Sunajko was, but merely noted in passing "it is not known why" Sunajko's arrest was stopped. 84 The third document from the period of Yugoslavia, confirming that the authorities had detailed information about Sunajko, is a 1951 record of the Yugoslav police. That year, Sunajko was recorded because he blessed the "Chetnik emigrant Blaško Tunić". 85

Taking into account the aforementioned documents, it can be concluded that the authorities in Yugoslavia knew very well who Sunajko was. Also, the documents clearly show that the Yugoslav authorities considered Sunajko their political opponent, and that for this reason they closely monitored his activities. Despite this, Sunajko was not arrested. Considering the character of the communist regime in Yugoslavia, especially in the first post-war years, it is certain that Sunajko avoided arrest because he enjoyed the protection of powerful political circles. Consequently, it is understandable why Sunajko's wartime role was concealed in the Yugoslav collections of documents and in the historiographical literature. Namely, this concealment was an integral part of the protection that Sunajko, despite his role in the Chetnik organization during the war and his verbal statements against the Yugoslav authorities after the war, enjoyed in socialist Yugoslavia.

A position similar to Sunajko's was held by another priest of the SPC who was a member of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia during the war: namely Aleksandar Skočić. As previously stated, during the war he was the president of the "Chetnik committee" in the Bjelina Brigade, but, regardless of that, he was amnestied by the authorities in Yugoslavia. Although information about him is scarce, the conclusion about his amnesty can be made from two mutually unrelated sources. The first source is Đujić's letter to Dožić. In that letter, Skočić was listed as one of six SPC priests who began their cooperation with the NOP during the war. Therefore, it can be assumed that Skočić was amnestied by the leadership of the KPJ even before the end of the Second World War. Another source supporting this conclusion is a note on Škočić's conversation

⁸⁴ Radelić, Križari: Gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945.-1950. [Crusaders: Guerilla in Croatia 1945-1950], 440.

⁸⁵ Car, "Srpska pravoslavna crkva u Hrvatskoj: oduzimanje imovine i odnosi s državom od 1945. do 1967." ["The Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia: confiscation of property and relations with the state from 1945 to 1967"], 64.

⁸⁶ Branica, NOB u Dalmaciji [NOB in Dalmatia], Book 10, 1665.-1667.

⁸⁷ Đurić, Golgota Srpske pravoslavne crkve [Golgotha of the Serbian Orthodox Church], 321.

with the Yugoslav official Ilija Nedić, dated 7 November 1960. For the topic of this paper, the record of that conversation is important, because it shows that at the time Skočić was serving as an SPC parish priest in Zagreb, the capital of federal Croatia. Namely, he was a parish priest in the capital of federal Croatia. Based on the two sources mentioned, it is obvious that Skočić was amnestied by the Yugoslav authorities. However, the exact time and specific reason for this amnesty remain unknown.

Unlike Skočić and Sunajko, in the case of the third amnestied SPC priest from Dalmatia, more concrete conclusions can be drawn. Namely, the amnesty of Dušan Rašković differs from the previous two cases in that the name of the Yugoslav official whose intervention secured it can be identified. Also, Rašković's case differs from the amnesty of Skočić and Sunajko in that Rašković participated in the new government, while they did not. By that alone, it is obvious that he was a more significant, or more socially relevant personality compared to the two of them.

Rašković's biography after the end of the Second World War, as well as the functions he held in the new government, can be followed through the work of two important institutions in Yugoslav society. The first was the Serbian Cultural and Educational Society Prosvjeta, and the second is the Commission for Religious Affairs of the Government of Federal Croatia. Rašković was appointed to the leadership of Prosvjeta at its founding assembly in Glina, held on 18 November 1944. He was appointed to the position of a member of the presidency of that society, and Milan Macura, ⁸⁹ who was then the "deputy Bishop of Dalmatia" within the SPC, was appointed to that body alongside him. ⁹⁰ The fact that in the leadership of Prosvjeta Rašković held the same position as Macura indicates that at the end of the war Rašković was a member of the narrowest elite of the SPC in Dalmatia.

Another important institution of which Rašković was a member was the Commission for Religious Affairs in Croatia. This body functioned as a subsidiary of the federal commission of the same name. Its task was to regulate

⁸⁸ HR-HDA-310, Box 41, 151/60. – Appendix 1.

⁸⁹ Spehnjak, "Prilog istraživanju Srpskog kulturno-prosvjetnog društva "Prosvjeta" ["Contribution to the research of the Serbian Cultural and Educational Society "Prosvjeta" 1. 113.-115.

^{30 &}quot;The first People's Government of Croatia was appointed at the historic emergency session of the Presidency of the State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia in Split", *Vjesnik Jedinstvene narodno-oslobodilačke fronte Hrvatske* [Gazette of the United National Liberation Front of Croatia] (Split), 15. 4. 1945., 3.

relations "between the state and religious communities at both the federal and republic levels". Catholic priest Svetozar Rittig, SPC priest Ilija Ćuk and lawyer Ivan Tremski were in the leadership of that commission at the level of Croatia. Unlike Rašković's membership in Prosvjeta, information about his participation in the aforementioned commission has not been mentioned in historiographical works. For this reason, it is necessary to cite a document from which it is evident that Rašković was a member of that body, that is, a "delegate of this commission". This is a letter that the commission sent to the City People's Committee for Zagreb on 26 July 1945. In that letter, the committee, that is, its supply department, is requested to issue a "REMITTANCE for the acquisition of the following things" to "priest DUŠAN RAŠKOVIĆ", in his capacity as "delegate of this Commission", which includes "material for one suit with accessories, one pair men's shoes and two pairs of underwear". 92

The official of the KPJ and NOP, through whose intervention Rašković was amnestied and subsequently integrated into the new government, was Boško Šiljegović. The document that points to this conclusion is Rašković's request for a pension from December 12, 1964. In this request, Rašković stated that during the Second World War he worked on recruiting Chetniks "for the NOB" in the area of Benkovac, and actively participated in two NOVJ units, the 13th Primorje-Gorski Kotar and 19th Dalmatian Divisions. Rašković pointed out two officials of the NOP as witnesses for this information. They were "general Boško Šiljegović and Nikola Rački". 93

In addition to being mentioned in Rašković's request for pension, the main reason for the conclusion that Šiljegović was responsible for Rašković's amnesty is the duty that Šiljegović held in the NOVJ. Namely, from January 1944 until the end of the war, Šiljegović was the political commissar of the 8th Dalmatian Corps of the NOVJ,⁹⁴ that is, the highest-ranking party official in Dalmatia. Consequently, no major decision could have been made without his knowledge,

⁹¹ Akmadža, Car, Zapisnici sjednica Komisije za odnose s vjerskim zajednicama NR / SR Hrvatske 1955.-1961. [Minutes of the sessions of the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities of the NR / SR Croatia 1955-1961], Volume I., 11.

⁹² HR-HDA-310, Box 124, 283/45. – Appendix 2.

⁹³ HR-HDA-310, Box 169, 81/65. – Appendix 3.

⁹⁴ Lukić, "Boško Blagoja Šiljegović", *Narodni heroji Jugoslavije* [*People's heroes of Yugoslavia*], Book 2, 252.; Šumanović, "Priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Units of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia", 109. On March 1, 1945, the 8th Dalmatian Corps of the NOVJ was reorganized into the 4th Yugoslav Army. Šiljegović retained the position of political commissar in the leadership of that army. Broz Tito, *Sabrana djela* [*Collected works*], Volume 27, 3.-4.

which in this case indicates that he personally decided on Rašković's amnesty. Although the exact reason for this amnesty remains unknown, two important details from Šiljegović's biography should be considered when examining his motives.

The first piece of information is vocation of Šiljegović's father, namely, that Blagoje Šiljegović was a priest of the SPC. 95 This information is significant because it shows that the SPC played an important role in the Šiljegović family. In the case of Rašković's amnesty, the significance of this fact was further emphasized by the circumstance that Blagoje Šiljegović survived the war. 96 By this alone, it is obvious that at the time when Rašković was granted amnesty, Blagoje Šiljegović was still alive, which raises the question of the extent of his personal influence on the decision.

The second detail concerns the role Šiljegović held in the NOVJ units before taking over the position of political commissar of the 8th Dalmatian Corps of the NOVJ. From available sources he appears to have held the same function in the 4th Krajina Division of the NOVJ. The duty that Šiljegović performed there is significant because in that unit the identity associated with the SPC was very strongly pronounced. In addition to the fact that the leadership of that division included a SPC priest serving as religious officer, lear evidence of this is Josip Broz Tito's speech during the celebration of Orthodox Christmas with members of that unit on 7 January 1943. In that speech, Tito emphasized the connection of Serbs in western Bosnia "with their brothers Serbs and Montenegrins". 99

Based on the above data, it can be concluded that in Šiljegović's life and work, the SPC was an important institution. Consequently, it is certain that Šiljegović was a member of a group of KPJ and NOP officials who protected the interests of the SPC. In that group, along with Šiljegović, there were SPC

⁹⁵ Ibid., 252.; Ibid., 110.

⁹⁶ Stojnić, Pilipović, *Izvori za istoriju Srpske pravoslavne crkve u Bosni i Hercegovini: Zbornik dokumenata [Sources for the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Collection of documents]*, 258. From the list of Orthodox priests in the First World War, it is evident that Blagoje Šiljegović, a priest in the town of Međuvođe near Banja Luka, was born in 1871, which means that in 1945 he was 74 years old. Radić, Isić, *Srpska crkva u Velikom ratu 1914-1918 godine [The Serbian Church in the Great War 1914-1918*], 595.

⁹⁷ Lukić, "Boško Blagoja Šiljegović", *Narodni heroji Jugoslavije* [*People's heroes of Yugoslavia*], Book 2, 252.; Šumanović, "Priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church", 110.

⁹⁸ That SPC priest was Rufim Žižić. Broz Tito, Sabrana djela [Collected works], Volume 13, 363.; Šumanović, "Priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church", 107.

⁹⁹ Broz Tito, Sabrana djela [Collected works], Volume 13, 148.-150.; Šumanović, "Priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church", 110.

priests who served as religious officers in the NOVJ units, as well as lay people who, like Šiljegović, had SPC priests among their family members.

To understand the influence that the aforementioned group had in the NOP bodies, it is necessary to note that all NOVJ units that were considered elite had an SPC priest as their religious officer.¹⁰⁰ Also, an SPC priest served as the religious officer in the very leadership of the military wing of the NOP, namely, in the Supreme Headquarters of the NOVJ.¹⁰¹ Therefore, the evidence shows that the aforementioned group was present in the leadership of the NOVJ, and thus was able to influence key decisions.

In a historiographical sense, the aforementioned group is still unexplored. and therefore its goals and internal structure remain unknown. However, based on the available sources, it is possible to draw a general conclusion about its core interests. Namely, since the key defining characteristic of this group was its connection with the SPC, its main interest appears to have been securing the most favorable position for the SPC after the war. In doing so, the implementation of this interest was carried out on two levels. The first level was the amnesty of those SPC priests who were political and military opponents of the NOP during the war. In the area of Dalmatia, the amnesty applied to SPC priests in the ranks of the Chetnik organization there. In addition to the physical protection of the SPC priests who were prominent Chetnik officials, the term "amnesty" also implied the creation of a kind of collective amnesia related to their wartime role. As the earlier examples show, this type of amnesty was carried out in Dalmatia in the case of three priests of the SPC. The second level of protection of the SPC's interests involved the creation of a narrative according to which the SPC played a loyal and patriotic role during the war. The newly constructed narrative was also accepted by Josip Broz Tito, and he clearly articulated it in his famous statement from November 1945. 102 The spread of the narrative about the patriotic role of the SPC during the Second World War depended on the creation of a clearly defined system of censorship. Such a system of censorship ensured that the real role of SPC priests from Dalmatia was concealed, and any mention of that role in public was strictly prohibited.

¹⁰⁰ Šumanović, "Priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church", 104.-107.

¹⁰¹ The SPC priest in that position was Pop Vlada Zečević. Ibid., 101.

¹⁰² Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945.-1991*. [Croatia in Yugoslavia 1945-1991], 125.; Šumanović, "Priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church", 97.

6. Conclusion

The Chetnik organization in Dalmatia was formed during the Second World War. Although the exact date of its creation is unknown, it was likely established very soon after the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), that is, at the end of the first half of 1941.

From the available sources, the evidence shows that the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia initially operated as a humanitarian society, under the name "Committee for Aid to Serbian Refugees", in the part of Dalmatia that was annexed by the Kingdom of Italy. However, during 1942, the organization gradually acquired a military structure, thereafter operating under the name "Dinara Division". The center of the organization was in Split, while the organization's more important strongholds were smaller towns in that area such as Šibenik, Benkovac, Obrovac, and Kistanje. The central figure of this organization was a priest of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), Sergije Urukalo, who received permission from the Italian authorities in Split to form a humanitarian society.

Along with Urukalo, a number of other SPC priests were also active in the leadership of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia. The most influential among them was Momčilo Đujić. In the available sources and relevant literature, he appears as the commander of the military wing of that organization, and after Urukalo's death, also as the central figure of the entire organization. Sergije Urukalo was arrested and executed in Split in September 1943 by members of the People's Liberation Movement (NOP), a revolutionary movement organized by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ). By all accounts, Urukalo was liquidated because, back in the summer of 1941, he refused an offer from leading Dalmatian communists Ivan Lučić-Lavčević and Vicko Krstulović to cooperate with the KPJ.

After Urukalo's death and Đujić's assumption of the role of the central figure of the organization, its officials began cooperating with German units that arrived in Dalmatia after the withdrawal of the Italian army. From the autumn of 1943 until the end of 1944, when the German troops withdrew from Dalmatia, the Chetnik organization in that area operated under the auspices of the German military authorities. This cooperation was so close that prominent members of this organization participated in the organization and activities of the German sabotage unit, known as "Konrad". According to data from the Yugoslav authorities, two prominent officials of that organization, Nikanor Kalik

and Draško Prostran, participated in the formation of this unit. Both were connected with the SPC, because Kalik was a priest of the SPC, while Draško Prostran was the son of a priest of the SPC and the Chetnik leader Stevan Prostran.

In addition to the history of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia, the names of the two organizers of the "Konrad" unit are important for the history of the political movement Zbor. Namely, both Kalik and Prostran were members of that movement. Founded in Serbia by Dimitrije Ljotić, the movement was ideologically close to German National Socialism. Regarding the connection between the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia and Ljotić's movement German documents also identify Đujić as a supporter of that movement.

Although Đujić's connection with that movement is unclear, the strongest argument for his closeness to Ljotić is the way he suppressed the activity of the Ravna Gora Chetnik movement within his ranks, a movement from Serbia and Montenegro that conflicted with Ljotić's organization. Namely, in the period from autumn 1941 to summer 1942, a group of members of the Ravna Gora Chetniks arrived in Dalmatia with the aim of placing the organization led by Đujić under control. However, this attempt proved unsuccessful, and a small number of members of this group died under unclear circumstances, while a larger number of them withdrew from Dalmatia. A record of the event was left by a member of that group, Đorđe Nikolić. In order to understand the described relationship between the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia and the Ravna Gora Chetnik movement, it is important to note that, beyond differences in geographical origin, the two organizations also differed in social composition. Namely, the Ravna Gora Chetniks were led by officers of the army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, while the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia was mainly led by civilian figures from the public life of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, among whom the priests of the SPC had the greatest influence.

The exact number of SPC priests who were active in the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia remains uncertain. However, from the available documents, it can be concluded with complete certainty that there was a total of seventeen SPC priests in the ranks of this organization. In addition to the previously mentioned Sergije Urukalo, Momčilo Đujić, Nikanor Kalik and Stevan Prostran, they were Ilija Bulovan, Milorad Dobrota, Vladimir Garić, Sava Gnjatović, Savatija Mažibrada, Naum Miljković, Dušan Rašković, Nikola Sinkijević, Aleksandar Skočić, Petar Stojisavljević, Jovan Sunajko, Valerijan Štrbac and Jona Veinović.

Most of them performed military duties in that organization, while only a small number of them had exclusively political functions. Most of the mentioned SPC priests managed to survive the war. From their biographies it is evident that during the war, members of the NOP killed two, Urukalo and Mažibrada, while one died under unclear circumstances in Serbia. That was Petar Stojisavljević. Eight of them withdrew together with the German troops from Dalmatia. In that group were Ilija Bulovan, Milorad Dobrota, Momčilo Đujić, Vladimir Garić, Sava Gnjatović, Nikanor Kalik, Stevan Prostran and Valerijan Štrbac.

In contrast, a certain number of SPC priests did not withdraw from Dalmatia. This group included Naum Miljković, Dušan Rašković, Nikola Sinkijević, Aleksandar Skočić, Jovan Sunajko and Jona Veinović. Of the six, Yugoslav authorities sentenced three to prison terms, with Sinkijević dying in 1948 while serving his sentence. The other three SPC priests were amnestied by the authorities of socialist Yugoslavia.

During the Yugoslav period, the information about their amnesty was suppressed, and therefore the circumstances of that amnesty are still unknown today. However, from the few preserved documents, especially in the case of Dušan Rašković, some conclusions can be drawn. Namely, in Rašković's request for a pension from 1964, he stated that during the Second World War he worked to recruit Chetniks in Dalmatia for the NOP, and that he participated in two units of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ). He cited Boško Šiljegović, the political commissar of the 8th Dalmatian Corps of the NOVJ, as a witness to his claims. Consequently, Šiljegović certainly secured Rašković's amnesty and very likely influenced that of Skočić and Sunajko as well.

To understand the political context in which the amnesty took place, it is necessary to state that Šiljegović's father was a priest of the SPC and that Šiljegović was very likely a member of an influential group of KPJ and NOP officials connected to the SPC. In that group there were SPC priests who performed the duties of religious officers in the NOVJ units, as well as members of the NOP who, like Šiljegović, had direct family ties to SPC priests. By all accounts, this group was extremely influential in the NOVJ. The main argument for this conclusion is the fact that in the Supreme Headquarters of the NOVJ, as well as in all units of the NOVJ that were considered elite, the religious officers were SPC priests.

Probably due to their influence, a narrative was created in socialist Yugoslavia that the role of the SPC in the Second World War was loyal and patriotic. This narrative was also accepted by Josip Broz Tito, the leading figure of the KPJ and socialist Yugoslavia. An integral part of this narrative was the suppression of the wartime biographies of those SPC priests who were prominent members of the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia during the war. Probably for this reason, Yugoslav historiography did not pay significant attention to the Chetnik organization in Dalmatia, and as a result, much important information about its structure, leading figures, and aims remains unknown.

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Note

on the conversation held between the priest Aleksandar Skočić, an Orthodox parish priest from Zagreb, and the clerk in the Religious Commission of the NRH Ilija Nedić.

The conversation took place on November 7, 1960, from 12 to 12.45 pm in the Commission's premises.

The conversation took place after Skočić came to the Commission accompanying Metropolitan Damaskin, who was visiting the President of the Commission and conducted the conversation without Skočić's presence, so Skočić, while waiting for the Metropolitan, spoke with Nedić.

Initially, the conversation concerned repairs to the church in Zagreb, where Skočić noted that the church was in quite poor condition, because its roof was leaking, causing the plaster in the interior to fall off the ceiling. He also said that the church does not have any financial resources at its disposal. Regarding the aid the church receives from abroad, Skočić says that these funds are provided by our emigrants, who have been living abroad for a long time as economic emigrants, and that there are also those who have fled as political emigrants and are still sending aid. He is in favor of not accepting any aid, noting that the aid the priests receive from the Red Cross should also not be accepted. But, Skočić says, they are forced to accept everything, because they are in a very difficult financial situation.

Regarding the religious activities of Orthodox priests, Skočić says that they are not as narrow-minded as the Catholic ones, but that they have to act accordingly vis-à-vis the Catholic ones, because Catholic priests say that they are sold souls and that the Serbs are to blame for communism, noting that it is a pity that the Professional Association of Catholic Priests cannot be strengthened, which would help in dispelling such rumors about them. Skočić says that previously there were all kinds of prejudices among Orthodox priests as well, but that this was eliminated through the Professional Association.

Speaking about himself, Skočić says that he is in a poor financial situation, because the church community is poor, and there is little income from the faithful, because it is difficult with city people, so even if someone calls a priest or brings a child to be baptized, they do not do it for the sake of others.

After that Metropolitan Damaskin finished the conversation and Skočić left with Damaskin.

PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF CROATIA PRESIDENCY

Commission for Religious Affairs.

No. 283 of 26 July 1945

TO THE CITY PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE

(supply department)

ZAGREB.

- 1) material for one suit with accessories
- 2) one pair of men's shoes
- 3) two pairs of underwear

S.FS.N.	
	For the commission
Member:	

Transcript

Dear Comrade!

After everything that the VIII Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia gave us, I politely address you - You know me, remember: Rijeka, Orthodox parish priest, information about Petar H. Zečević from Tinj - Benkovac, who died in the NOB.

I took part in the NOB, from the beginning to the end of the war, as an organizer and informer. Comrade Tito, on his first visit /to my parish/ in Jagodnja Gornja, told me: "You work independently, as you think best!". I worked and I succeeded best! In the 19th and 13th Divisions!. They know me well: General Boško Šiljegović and Nikola Rački.

I was at two Chetnik assemblies, thereby breaking up their action, and gaining fighters for the NOB from their ranks. I visited the Ustasha camp in Benkovac /hey: crazy, crazy/ and managed to prevent them from committing further atrocities. In Gradski district, I gathered Roman Catholic priests for the NOB, etc. The Italians burned my house down, without compensation they took me and my two sons to be shot, my people - the fighters - saved us, the Germans in Benkovac took me to be shot, the help of the Croats saved me. Then Topusko, Gorski Kotar, Rijeka, religious teacher in all general education schools and called: Communist - Udbaš!!

I have a contracted monthly pension of 26,000 dinars, with a university degree, work experience of 37 years, 4 months, 27 days. I have the Order of Merit of the NOB.

Please draw up for me a legal pension for a civil servant from January 1, 1965 onwards, so that I have the means to live!

In advance, thank you very much!

Dušan Rašković, pensioner

In Kraljevica - Oštro 8/I

Rijeka, 12 December 1964

P.S. My political combat from 1910 to 1941 is excellent, painstaking and secret!!

Svećenici Srpske pravoslavne crkve u četničkoj organizaciji u Dalmaciji tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata

Sažetak

U radu se na osnovi arhivskih i objavljenih dokumenata te relevantne historiografske literature opisuje uloga koju su svećenici Srpske pravoslavne crkve (SPC) imali u razvoju četničke organizacije na području Dalmacije u razdoblju Drugoga svjetskog rata. Dostupni izvori upućuju na zaključak da je u četničkoj organizaciji u Dalmaciji aktivno djelovalo sedamnaest svećenika SPC, pri čemu su dvojica najistaknutijih pripadnika te organizacije bili svećenici SPC, Sergije Urukalo i Momčilo Đujić. Četnička organizacija je prvo djelovala pod formom humanitarnog društva, te je imala naziv "Odbor za pomoć srpskim izbieglicama", a od 1942. dobiva vojni okvir i djeluje pod naziv "Dinarska divizija". Četnička organizacija je do kapitulacije Italije djelovala uz podršku talijanskih vlasti, a nakon kapitulacije Italije uz podršku njemačkih vlasti. Povlačenjem njemačke vojske iz Dalmacije dolazi do sloma četničke organizacije i do povlačenja većine svećenika SPC koji su bili njezini dužnosnici. Nakon poraza četničke organizacije, u Dalmaciji su ostala šestorica svećenika SPC koji su bili pripadnici njezine organizacije. Vlast socijalističke Jugoslavije osudila je trojicu svećenika SPC na zatvorske kazne, dok je trojicu svećenika SPC amnestirala. Jedan od njih trojice, Dušan Rašković, ušao je u strukture nove vlasti. Njega je, prema svemu sudeći, amnestirao istaknuti dužnosnik Komunističke partije Jugoslavije Boško Šiljegović, čiji je otac Blagoje bio svećenik SPC. Zbog povezanosti dijela pripadnika vlasti socijalističke Jugoslavije sa SPC tema koju obrađuje rad ostala je prešućena i historiografski neobrađena.

Ključne riječi: četnička organizacija, Dalmacija, Srpska pravoslavna crkva, Momčilo Đujić, Sergije Urukalo.