



# *From Odyssey to Cosmopolis – Movements in German Idealism and Its Critique*

Original paper UDC: 101(045)

doi: [10.21464/sp40201](https://doi.org/10.21464/sp40201)

Received: 3 January 2025

**Barişcan Demir**

Hacettepe University, Faculty of Letters, Philosophy Department,  
Beytepe Campus, Beytepe Mahallesi, TR–06800 Ankara  
[bariscandemir01@gmail.com](mailto:bariscandemir01@gmail.com)

## **Shedding Odysseus’s Hegelian Skin**

### **A New Model for Philosophical Moves**

#### **Abstract**

*Adorno and Horkheimer revealed that Hegel had dragged thought into a labyrinth with no exit with his myth of the Absolute, and saw Odysseus as an archetype of this tendency of confinement. It has become nearly impossible to talk about the progress of Odysseus in philosophy without emphasising its similarities with those of Hegel. In this article, I will first set out the problems with Hegel’s answer to the question “What path is philosophy taking?”. Afterwards, I will show that an interpretation of Odysseus that opposes the archetype which Adorno and Horkheimer identify with Hegel is possible and how such an interpretation could create a new model for philosophical moves.*

#### **Keywords**

*Odyssey-Odysseus, Iliad-Odysseus, closing-becoming, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno*

## **Introduction**

It is perhaps not a coincidence that the concept of *horos* means both “definition” and “boundary” in Greek.<sup>1</sup> As in every “what is” question, the question “what is philosophy” calls for a definition as an answer prior to being answered and is a question that aims to limit that which is to be answered with a definition by this very call. The “what is” question desires to stop the movement of concepts, which wander aimlessly, with definitions, and to discipline them. On the other hand, from the perspective of different past and present

1

In Ancient Greek, the concept of *horos* held different meanings such as *definition, measure, limit, boundary, middle term* and *horizon*. – Henry G. Liddell, Robert Scott (eds.),

*A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford University Press, New York – Oxford 1996, pp. 1255–1256.

answers to the question “what is philosophy”, we see that definitions of philosophy fail to draw boundaries around it. Not only philosophy, but every element that contains becoming within itself, such as motion, change, dance, history and time, tends to break away from the boundaries that are attempted to be drawn around it by definitions. Said definitions, let alone halting the movement of these concepts that possess the character of becoming, can only move, change and dance with them.

Drawing absolute boundaries around philosophy that is in the state of becoming means bypassing the element of “wonder”, which is the sole concept that is said to have originated philosophy itself since Plato and Aristotle.<sup>2</sup> An idea that is brought to the Absolute, or an absolute definition, no longer has a side that sparks wonder, or in other words, has concluded its motion. For this very reason, the definition Jaspers formulated as “Philosophy means to be on the way”, is considered to be one of the rare definitions that take into account philosophy’s characteristic of existing in movement.<sup>3</sup> Saying that philosophy means being on the way both saves the concept from absolute *khaos* by stating that it moves on *topos* and makes it possible to consider different models of progress by avoiding constricting it within absolute *kosmos*.<sup>4</sup> With this definition, which binds *kosmos* to a symbiotic relationship<sup>5</sup> with *khaos*, we can now leave aside the question “what is philosophy” which tries to arrest the movement of philosophy, and make it possible to ask the question “what kind of a path does philosophy take” and compare different answers that may be given to this question.

So, what kind of path does philosophy take? I will seek to answer this question in this article by linking philosophy and literature in a way that will not stop the motion of either, and I will advance in two stages. First, I will show the route set for philosophy by the myth of the Absolute created by Hegel and how, despite addressing thought making its way through this path as an element constantly in motion, it destroys the retrospective sense of wonder and locks philosophy into a form of sleepwalking. After that, I will examine how Adorno and Horkheimer’s evaluation of Odysseus as an archetype of the Hegelian tendency itself creates a myth and in what ways this new myth leads to a retrospective literary closure. Secondly, I will show that the question “What kind of a path does philosophy take?” can be answered with an interpretation of Odysseus that, let alone being identified with Hegel, can be diametrically opposed to him. By doing so, I will present an Odysseus-of-the-*Iliad* model that moves by finding intervals that do not submit to dead ends, as an alternative to Adorno and Horkheimer’s model, which follows the path of classical critics and reduces Odysseus’s progress solely to his journey back home in the *Odyssey*.<sup>6</sup>

### Hegel’s Closing-Becoming and *Odyssey*-Odysseus

One can say, emphasising that there is no single answer, that Hegel’s model is obviously one of the answers to the question “What path does philosophy take?”, because it seems like the motion of thought is not hindered in this model, and even rendered permanent, at first sight. As early on as in the preface of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel states that an aim by itself is a lifeless universal, and that the bare result is the corpse of a system which has left its guiding tendency behind and he seems to genuinely desire to address philosophy as a continuous flow.<sup>7</sup> For this reason, Hegel emphasises that the truth, which he identifies as the end of the Spirit, should be understood not only as a substance,

but also as a subject whose action continues, and repeatedly underlines that the Spirit should never be understood as something that has already happened/concluded, but something whose very essence is action.<sup>8</sup> This emphasis on constant motion, which describes the progress of the Spirit towards its end, the Absolute Spirit, was first ontologically grounded in *The Science of Logic* after the philosopher's first *magnum opus*, and then was repeated in *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* – a posthumously compiled text mainly based on student transcripts – as the founding element of the philosophical world history.<sup>9</sup>

2

Plato stated that the main element that motivates philosophers is nothing but wonder. Plato, *Theaetetus*, transl. Francis M. Cornford, in: Edith Hamilton, Huntington Cairns (eds.), *The Collected Dialogues Including Letters*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1973, 155d. Aristotle also stated that philosophy starts with wonder and can only continue with it. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, transl. William D. Ross, in: William D. Ross (eds.), *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. VIII, Oxford University Press, London 1966, 925<sup>b</sup>11.

3

Karl Jaspers, *Way to Wisdom*, transl. Ralph Manheim, Yale University Press, New Haven 1959, p. 12.

4

In Ancient Greek, the word *khaos* means *abyss, unformed matter and the infinite*; the word *kosmos* means *order, duty and the universe*; and the word *topos* means *place, region, ground and the whole earth*. – H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 985, 1806, 1976.

5

The symbiotic relationship between *khaos* and *kosmos* refers to the concept of *chaosmos*, a term borrowed by Deleuze from Joyce in *The Logic of Sense*, and defined as the following: "Finally, we reach the most important point, a very special and paradoxical case, which ensures the relative displacement of the two series, the excess of the one over the other, without being reducible to any of the terms of the series or any relation between these terms." – Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, transl. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, Continuum, London – New York 2004, pp. 47–48. As we will see in the following sections of this study, this paradoxical element – emerging from the symbiotic relationship between *khaos* and *kosmos* – will help us understand Odysseus in the *Iliad* as a figure who paradoxically partakes in the both poles of binary structure.

6

The general tendency of Homer scholars has been to evaluate the *Iliad* as a major narrative of war that describes Greek culture and

consider the *Odyssey* as a narrative of a journey that focuses on a single hero. Odysseus' actions or progress as a theme were thus reduced to an interpretation which is almost always centred around the *Odyssey* and the different movement in the *Iliad* is ignored. – Jasper Griffin, *Homer*, Oxford University Press, Toronto – Melbourne 1980, pp. 46–47; Moses I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, Penguin Book, Harmondsworth – Middlesex 1972, p. 17, pp. 37–38. Adorno and Horkheimer also followed this general tendency and interpreted Odysseus' progress based on the *Odyssey*. – Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, transl. John Cumming, Verso Books, New York 1997, p. 46.

7

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, transl. A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 1977, pp. 2–3.

8

*Ibid.*, p. 17, 33, 266–267.

9

Hegel, who emphasized that classical logic containing the identity principle inevitably creates tautologies that hinder thought, and thus Spirit can never bring about the actuality, which is its freedom, or in other words, Becoming, found the ontological grounds for this Becoming, which represents constant motion, in equating Being and Nothing. Since Being, which Hegel takes *per fiat* as pure, indeterminate immediacy, is in itself equal to Nothing in its uncertainty; and that Nothing, which is not equal to anything except for itself, is equal to Being in its own uncertainty, the single, unique object of thought emerges as Becoming, which means the continuous transition of Being into Nothing and Nothing into Being. – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, transl. George di Giovanni, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, pp. 17–19, 51, 58–60. Hegel's idea of Becoming, which finds its ontological basis in the continuous transition of concepts, reappears in his book *Reason in History*. It is a posthumously compiled text based on



But what may be the reason why many philosophers who took the floor after Hegel saying that Hegel's thought points to a type of closure, despite all his emphasis on Becoming, process and constant motion? For instance, in the renowned second preface to *Capital*, Marx articulates, immediately following his assertion that his own method not only diverges from Hegel's dialectic but also represents its antithesis:

"With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."<sup>10</sup>

According to Marx, the inversion in Hegel's dialectics lies in the transformation of the process of thought into an autonomous subject under the guise of the "idea";<sup>11</sup> in other words, it involves the closure of reality with a demi-urgically constructed idealism. A similar interpretation can also be found in Heidegger's work. In one of his short pieces, Heidegger says:

"With the name 'the Greeks' we are thinking of the commencement of philosophy; with the name 'Hegel,' of its completion. Hegel himself understands his philosophy according to this determination."<sup>12</sup>

How can a way of thinking that brings the uninterrupted nature of Becoming into the forefront simultaneously point to completion? One may *prima facie* think that Jaspers, who uttered the sentence, "Philosophy means to be on the way", would wholeheartedly embrace Hegel's philosophy, which always emphasises Becoming. However, Jaspers elegantly summarised how the seemingly contradictory elements of "constant motion" and "completion" converge in Hegel as follows:

"But because of its Hegelian principles it penetrates but also kills. All the philosophers of the past live for a moment as in a wonderfully illuminating spotlight; but then it suddenly becomes apparent that Hegelian thinking cuts the heart out of them and buries their remains in the vast graveyard of history. Hegel was finished with the past because he believed he had encompassed the whole of it. His rational penetration is not candid exploration but destructive surgery, it is not enduring questioning but conquest and subjection, it is not a living-with but domination."<sup>13</sup>

Hegel's idea of Becoming, in other words, the constant motion of the Spirit, cannot be contemplated separately from the concept of Absolute Spirit, which the philosopher postulates from the very start and describes as an "end".<sup>14</sup> As Jaspers also emphasised, when Hegel was done with the thinkers of the past, there was no longer anything left for him to call upon them again; every chosen figure was transformed into a mandatory stage leading the Spirit to the Absolute. Each stage was now reduced to a moment that helps the Spirit become more concrete, closer to the Absolute.<sup>15</sup> It was for this reason that Hegel stated in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* that both the inwardly reflected consciousness is for itself and for the other, and that consciousness of the otherness of its self is consciousness of its self.<sup>16</sup> As otherness is addressed as belonging to the primitive stages that create the Absolute assumed from the start, in the end all otherness can be reduced to the identity of consciousness in itself. The Becoming in this sense is the Becoming of a teleological necessity, while the process is a process of teleological necessity oriented toward the Absolute as its goal. When we accept the pre-assumed Absolute and view the past from the perspective of the necessity emerging in it, there remains nothing in the philosophers to make us wonder. This is the very reason why the model brought forward by Hegel is likened to a dominating and destructive surgery.

The only element in Hegel's thought whose motion is impossible is any way of thinking that differs from the model he put forward. As the thing that

emerges in the Absolute as the end of the Spirit is necessity, following this model the history of thought may only be taken up as Hegel did. Following this model, it is possible neither to see any philosopher, as a stage leading to the Absolute, other than Hegel saw them, nor to wonder about anything. At every turn, Hegel states that the main purpose of philosophy is to eliminate what is coincidental – or, rather, to subordinate what is coincidental to necessity in every case – and openly states that he desires, retrospectively, to get rid of everything that can be an object of wonder in the progress of thinking, to busy the mind with an absolute end and reduce philosophy to what is absolutely necessary.<sup>17</sup> For this reason, I find it appropriate to name Hegel's way of thinking as closing-Becoming.<sup>18</sup> Everything that his Becoming leaves

lecture notes and manuscripts, as a movement that traverses the world philosophically. Here, just as in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it was emphasised that Spirit is not something that happened-concluded, that its essence is action, and that it is a product of itself in the sense that it is both its beginning and its end. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* – vol. 1, transl. Robert F. Brown, Peter C. Hodgson, Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York 2011, pp. 88–89.

10

Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, transl. Ben Fowkes, Penguin Books, London 1959, p. 103.

11

*Ibid.*, p. 102.

12

Martin Heidegger, “Hegel and the Greeks”, transl. Robert Metcalf, in: William McNaill (eds.), *Pathmarks*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, pp. 323–336, here p. 323.

13

K. Jaspers, *Way to Wisdom*, pp. 173–174.

14

G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 265–266. The Absolute Spirit, which brings together the finitudes of the Subjective Spirit that has a relationship with itself as the other, and the Objective Spirit that exists for itself, and supersedes them, is referred to as an “end” because it appears as the identity of concept and reality. In other words, as the infinite form of truth. – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, transl. W. Wallace – A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 2010, pp. 21–22.

15

G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, vol. 1, pp. 110–111.

16


G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 74, 102.

17

G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, vol. 1, p. 110, 127. Hegel displays his tendency to eliminate the accidental, which is the only element that can bring thought to the new, in many other texts. For example, his words “unsystematic philosophy is accidental, fragmentary thinking, and its direct consequence is a rigid attitude to true content”, in his letter to Niethammer, shows that there is no place for the accidental in his system. – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Letters*, transl. Clark Nutler – Christiane Seiler, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis 1984, p. 279. Similarly, in one of his letters to Altenstein, Hegel states that a study of the history of philosophy that progresses without assuming the speculative idea can bring forward nothing but an accidental impression of ideas and opinions, and it is an impression of philosophy that deserves scorn. – *Ibid.*, pp. 392–393.

18

It should be particularly emphasised that in referring to Hegel's way of thinking as a closing-Becoming, we do not mean that he forecloses the future of Spirit or history. What we aim to underscore is that Hegel restricts the possibilities of retrospectively reinterpreting the past. As is clearly emphasized in the following passage from the preface to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, philosophy cannot transcend its own time and speak from the standpoint of the future; it can only comprehend its present in thought: “Whatever happens, every individual is child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over Rhodes.” – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, transl. Thomas M. Knox, Oxford University Press, London 1962, p. 11. While the future in Hegel's thought remains fundamentally inaccessible -philosophy, as Hegel insists, cannot speak from the standpoint of the future but only comprehend its own time in thought



behind is closed off to wonder, the only element where philosophy originates and continues from, closed to what is contingent or accidental, and any new models of thought that can be eventualized through these concepts. In this context, it is naturally not a coincidence for Hegel, who praised Democritus and Leucippus who took necessity as their main principle, to try to exclude Epicurus, who finds the cause of all events in contingency, from philosophy, and embraced the famous phrase in the Ecclesiastes that reads, “There is nothing new under the sun”.<sup>19</sup> By doing so, Hegel finds a way to both make the motion of philosophy permanent and to close it off retrospectively. When it comes to the past, thought can only move under his absolute sun, but only without wondering or encountering anything it does not expect. This motion can only be evaluated as the progress of a sleepwalker.

At this point, it is useful to recall Walter Benjamin’s statement that “there is no document of civilisation which is not at the same time a document of barbarism”.<sup>20</sup> Hegel provides us with the assurance of a civilisation that has reached the truth, the map leading to the Absolute he assumes from the very start. This map leads thought under such a sun that it is no longer possible to find anything new under the whole illuminated by it. For this reason, addressing the document of a civilisation that is illuminated by Hegel as a document of barbarism standing against the new, the other and the contingent becomes inevitable. The sentence, “yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant” in Adorno and Horkheimer’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment* precisely targets this Hegelian understanding, which radiates disaster by illuminating.<sup>21</sup> Although they stand on opposite sides, it is true that Jaspers and Heidegger agree with Bloch, Adorno and Horkheimer that Hegel’s thinking leads to a type of closing-Becoming. As Bloch identified with splendid rigor, Judeo-Christian philosophy from Augustine to Hegel defined the genesis of the content of the absolute under the category of the *Ultimum (Last)*, in which the *Novum (New)* may never be included, and always tried to lead a pre-conceived *Primum (First)* to this *Ultimum*.<sup>22</sup> Although said *Primum* appears to always progress in a state of constant Becoming as it will reach *Ultimum* through repeated revelations of its own absoluteness, which is assumed as an “end” from the very start, it will lead to a *Totum (Whole)* which closes itself, along with all possibilities, to the *Novum*.<sup>23</sup>

Inspired by Bloch’s forceful analysis, Adorno and Horkheimer stated that the idea of progress put forward by the Enlightenment, which reached its peak with Hegel, gradually sank into the very myth it created.<sup>24</sup> The idea of Absolute as an *Ultimum* shapes *Primum*, the Spirit, which is assumed to move towards it from the very start and directs it like a self-fulfilling prophecy. Progress within this closed structure, just like the endings of tragedies that are known beforehand, determines that “everything is repetition” as an immanent principle and sees an element that resembles itself every time it looks back on its progress and will be able to say that there is “nothing new under the sun”.<sup>25</sup> An eye that perceives only the elements that are similar to its own myth will be blind to the different, the accidental and the new. As expressed by Adorno in one of his short pieces, one should not underestimate the matter of Homer’s blindness, because the myth-teller always resists the interchangeability of meaning and this resistance itself stimulates a blind logic that equates everything with itself.<sup>26</sup> For this reason, Adorno states that finding the simplicity of Homer risible is both very easy and difficult, as the analytical spirit that finds it absurd, just as positivism does, might always be creating a different myth of the Absolute.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, one

might say that finding the state of sleepwalking, into which Hegel's closing-Becoming drags philosophy, risible is just as easy and difficult, as every intervention that confronts Hegel should always pay attention to take the negative and the different into account so as to not create a new closing-myth.<sup>28</sup>

We can thus say that Adorno and Horkheimer's thinking includes the creation of a myth that leads to a literary closure; not in the strong objection to

– this does not imply an openness to the unrestricted reinterpretation of the past. On the contrary, once a teleological necessity oriented toward the Absolute has been established, any past thinker is positioned as a necessary moment that has already been surpassed. As long as one remains within the Hegelian way of thinking, it becomes impossible to retrospectively reinterpret such a figure in a way that deviates from Hegel's account without disrupting the chain of necessity itself. In this sense, Hegel's system closes off not the future, but the possibility of rethinking the past otherwise. It will be noticed that Badiou also points to this subtle distinction in the following statement: "So [in Hegel] I have the sense of a closure that insinuates itself into the heart of the dispersive and creative process of negativity – not exactly in the form of a pregiven totality, but rather in that of an integral fulfilment, a completed pathway. Yes, Hegel really does think that philosophy is a completed pathway. At the end of the day, the absolute is with us from the outset." – Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy, *German Philosophy. A Dialogue*, Jean Völker (ed.), transl. Richard Lambert, The MIT Press, Cambridge – London 2018, p. 24.

19

G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, vol. 1, p. 82, 108. As conveyed by Diogenes Laertius, the main difference between the thoughts of Democritus and Epicurus is that the former adopted necessity as his principle while the latter adopted the accidental. – Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, vol. II, transl. Robert D. Hicks, Harvard University Press, London – New York 1925, p. IX, 45, and X, 133. Meanwhile, Hegel praised Leucippus and Democritus for freeing science from the sense of groundlessness, thanks to the principle of necessity they established, and states that there is no need for sorrow over the loss of the almost 300 works of Epicurus. On the contrary, we should be grateful for it. – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–6*, volume II, transl. & ed. Robert F. Brown, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 2006, pp. 89–90, 281. Hegel, who initially did not state why we should be grateful, fills in the gap by saying that he finds it meaningless that Epicurus chose the accidental as his principle for

confronting the idea of the "ultimate purpose of the world" that belongs to Democritus. – Ibid., p. 285. By saying that Epicurus, who tried to bring accidental to the forefront, utters empty words when in fact these words would necessarily disappear and then re-appear as "non-philosophical elements" after a careful look, Hegel thus pairs the "accidental" and the "non-philosophical". – Ibid., p. 284.

20

Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History", transl. Harry Zohn, in: Hannah Arendt (ed.), *Pathmarks*, Schocken Books, New York 1969, pp. 353–364, here p. 356.

21

T. W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 3.

22

Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, vol. 1, transl. Neville Plaice – Stephen Plaice – Paul Knight, The MIT Press, Cambridge & Massachusetts 1995, p. 203.

23

Ibid., p. 223.

24

T. W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 11.

25

Ibid., p. 12.

26

Theodor W. Adorno, "On Epic Naiveté", transl. Shierry W. Nicholson, in: *Notes to Literature*, vol. 1, Columbia University Press, New York 1991, pp. 24–29, p. 25, 27.

27

Ibid., p. 26.

28

Ulrich Plass states that Adorno particularly emphasised the following in his literary works: "... for a thought in question to not get stuck in 'already', the dearest house of nostalgia, in other words, to not create a myth that is self-enclosed, it should always take into account its negative dialectical reverse." – Ulrich Plass, *Language and History in Adorno's Notes to Literature*, Routledge, London – New York 2006, pp. 136–137.

Hegel himself, but in the interpretation of Odysseus applied in this objection.<sup>29</sup> Considering the *Odyssey* to be the oldest representative witness of the Western bourgeois civilisation, and Odysseus-of-the-*Odyssey* both as the main figure at the beginning and the end of the bourgeois society and an inevitable archetype of Hegelian thought makes interpreting Odysseus an element that is closed to the *Novum*.<sup>30</sup> So, how was the interpretation shaped that shut Odysseus off in this single meaning? Right after stating that Hegelian thought aims to subdue the past under the present by reducing it into mere beneficial information and by doing so, free the present from the past forever, Adorno and Horkheimer said that the allure of the Sirens in the *Odyssey* alludes to losing oneself in the past.<sup>31</sup> In this way, the Sirens before Odysseus are paired with the moments of the past, which Hegel tries to close off by determining them as necessary stages. However, the past is there waiting, just like the Sirens; always able to allure thought with a new interpretation. Meanwhile, the Enlightenment has to somehow find a way to render blind both the captain and the crew to this novelty and difference harboured in the past so as to protect the absoluteness of the map it has drawn. As it is well known, Odysseus tightly tied himself to his ship's foremast during the encounter he had with the Sirens and the ears of his crew, whose sole duty was to make sure that Odysseus did not break free from the ties, were sealed with wax.<sup>32</sup> In the sense Adorno and Horkheimer address it, since Odysseus's famous cunning was already identical with the Reason of Enlightenment and this reason had already blinded his sight with a preconceived myth, Odysseus failed to break free from his binds, even though he was allured and could not reach the otherness he had kept out from the very beginning.<sup>33</sup> Similarly, the crew, whose ears were clogged with wax, remained solely within the model provided to them by the myth, knowing not the beauty of the song but its danger, doing nothing other than trying to calm their boss and carrying on their way.<sup>34</sup> By doing so, Adorno and Horkheimer saw that the movement of paradoxical self-realisation, which Hegel argued emerges as a type of struggle for recognition in the master-slave dialectic, was not at all as described but on the contrary, both the master and the slave are trapped in their roles and are unfree.<sup>35</sup>

Although the Odysseus-of-the-*Odyssey* appears to have embarked on a journey with no clear ending, and the approaches he will take to the challenges he encounters seem uncertain, at heart, the blindness accompanying him along the journey helped him stay the same, without being affected by otherness. In this sense, similar to the narrative of Spirit that moves towards the Absolute, which Hegel assumes from the start, a sleepwalker's progress – one that pertains to the retrospective interpretation of the past – is revealed. Discerning this very parallel, Adorno and Horkheimer state that not only the episode of the Sirens, but the entirety of the *Odyssey* embraced the Enlightenment, because it is just as possible to associate Odysseus, interpreted within this framework as the Enlightenment, with Hölderlin's "Where there is danger, there salvation grows too".<sup>36</sup> The "same" will never change by being affected by the "other" and the "difference" it carries, and continues its journey by using it solely as sustenance to develop itself. Against the blindness of this progressing same, otherness only exists as a corpse that has no effect other than as a stage leading to the Absolute. Just as it is the case with the closing-Becoming that emerges from Hegel's view of the past, in the sense Adorno and Horkheimer address it, Odysseus's celebrated reason appears as a *mimesis* that is only directed at what is dead.<sup>37</sup> The myth of necessity, blinded by

the desire to completely eliminate the *accidental*, the only element that can lead thought to the new, is only able to bring about the *mimesis* of death. In Adorno and Horkheimer's words, similar to the mythological replacing of the inanimate with the animate, the Enlightenment replaces the animate with the inanimate in order to create a mythology that equates everything to itself.<sup>38</sup> In this sense, Odysseus appeared as an archetype of Hegelian thought and provided a useful model to the Enlightenment so it can move forward by believing that every move of the game has been realised, all major thoughts have been concluded and all discoveries have been made.<sup>39</sup>

This remarkable interpretation of Adorno and Horkheimer that shows how the emphasis on constant motion of thought brought forward with Hegel actually describes a closing-Becoming, opened a giant door for philosophy to once again take into account the accidental, wonder, and in Adorno's words, the negative. On the other hand, despite being used as an example, in the sense addressed by the duo, Odysseus was drawn away from this *novum*, which philosophy contains in itself, and the interpretation that appears as if all the moves concerning Odysseus's game were made, all major thought was concluded and all possible discoveries were uncovered. Adorno and Horkheimer, who say that this Hegelian understanding of unity dispersed across the scattered pages of the *Odyssey* is also applicable for the entirety of the *Iliad*, appear to be sure that Odysseus's form of progress cannot be addressed in any way that does not resemble Hegel.<sup>40</sup> For this reason, I will reply to the question, "what path does philosophy take" for the rest of this article with an

29

Here, I would like to specifically point out that I by no means agree with scholars such as George di Giovanni, who claim that Adorno and Horkheimer's criticism of Hegel itself creates a myth just like Hegel's and that the only solution to get rid of this blockade of creating myths once again lies in Hegel's phenomenology. In both the political and the philosophical context, it is clear that Adorno's negative dialectic is a move that frees thought from sleepwalking against the closing dialectic of Hegel. I place emphasis on closing-myth-making only in relation to the fact that duo's interpretation of Odysseus closes off a literary model to anything other than a single interpretation. – George di Giovanni, "Hegel's Phenomenology and the Critique of the Enlightenment. An Essay in Interpretation", *Hegel aujourd'hui* 51 (1995) 2, pp. 251–270, doi: <https://doi.org/10.7202/400913ar>.

30

T. W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. XVI, 69.

31

*Ibid.*, p. 32.

32

Homer, *The Odyssey*, vol. 1, transl. A. T. Murray, Harvard University Press, Cambridge – Massachusetts 1984, p. XII.

33

T. W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 33.

34

*Ibid.*, p. 34.

35

G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 15–19. For a similar perspective, see: Katie Fleming, "Odysseus and Enlightenment: Horkheimer and Adorno's 'Dialektik der Aufklärung'", *International Journal of the Classical tradition* 19 (2012) 2, pp. 107–128, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12138-012-0312-5>.

36

T. W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 43, 47.

37

*Ibid.*, pp. 56–57. In Ancient Greek, the word *mimesis* has meanings such as *imitation* and *representation*. – H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 1134.

38

T. W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 16.

39

*Ibid.*, p. 12.

40

*Ibid.*, p. 42.

alternative interpretation of Odysseus that not only dis-pairs with Hegel but can even be positioned against him, in an attempt to free philosophy, as well as literature, from a siege that is redolent of Hegel.

### ***Iliad*-Odysseus: A New Model for Philosophical Moves**

In almost every situation where Odysseus's form of progress is taken as a metaphor or a theme, thought has been preoccupied with the emphasis on the journey surrounding the *Odyssey* and, just as Adorno and Horkheimer did, has paired Odysseus's motion with this blind journey whose end is determined from the beginning. Although it is understandable that the *Odyssey*, with Odysseus as its protagonist, is the first thing to come to mind when we talk about him, as Vernant clearly stated, we have no reason to consider the texts where certain characters are mentioned more often, that are longer or richer, as the only valid narratives when considering myths.<sup>41</sup> The way to break up such holistic narratives concerning myths, turning myths into open literary areas, so to speak, is structural analysis.<sup>42</sup> Structural analysis proceeds by including all texts, rich or poor, in the same plan regardless of looking for any difference of value between them, and comparing them to discover different sets of meaning.<sup>43</sup> In this part of the article, where I will look for an answer to the question "what path does philosophy take" referencing Odysseus, I will follow the method of structural analysis. Using this method, I will try to develop a model of "Odysseus-of-the-*Iliad* progression" that points to intervals, intersections and transitions to the new as opposed to the "Odysseus-of-the-*Odyssey* progression" that hints at closing-Becoming. Thus, in the myth of the Odysseus – which might seem to yield a single interpretation regarding the progress of philosophy – I will have traced, in Deleuze's and Guattari's terms, lines of flight.<sup>44</sup>

As I mentioned in the introduction, *wonder*, as the only element that reveals and advances philosophy, cannot exist either in the field of absolute *khaos*, which drags all semantic possibilities into the abyss with itself, or in the field of absolute *kosmos*, which reduces them to one. In the first example, wonder itself would lose its meaning, while in the second case sleepwalking's apathy to the new would take over. In order to distance thought from these bipolar tendencies, philosophy needs to establish a symbiotic relationship between *khaos* and *kosmos*, and proceed by exploring third types, intervals and intersections that open the *kosmos* to *khaos*, as well as lead *khaos* to *kosmos*. Suppose such semiotic signs of *chaosmos* can be identified in the case of Odysseus. In that case, the myth will, in direct proportion to these identifications, generate lines of flight. In other words, it will undergo *detrterritorialization*. Let us now turn to the question of how these signs might be uncovered. If we take capital-R Reason as paired with absolute *kosmos*, and Stupidity as paired with absolute *khaos*, we see that Odysseus's trademark cunning (or wiles) points exactly to such a third type, an interval that finds the middle point between the two. We should remember that the wiliness (or cunning) which Homer ascribes to Odysseus is qualified with the adjective "godlike" in many cases.<sup>45</sup> What is emphasised with the suffix "-like" in this adjective is similarity and not identity with "god". This similarity, unlike identity, is an element that contains difference in itself. In other words, just as Adorno and Horkheimer stated, we have reason to consider Odysseus's cunning not as something identical with the Enlightenment's Reason, which alludes to absolute *kosmos*, but an element that is different from it.

So, what may be one thing that separates Odysseus's cunning from Reason? To develop a more nuanced of the question at hand, one might, as Plato does in the *Republic*, construct an analogy between the opposition of *sea* and *land*, and the conceptual pair of *khaos* and *kosmos* as articulated in this study.<sup>46</sup> We can say that the sea, which contains no ground in itself, symbolises *khaos*, and philosophy standing against *khaos* is naturally searching for a type of land, meaning it moves towards *kosmos*. On the other hand, we should not forget that searching for land, even finding a particular land, does not mean that you cannot embark on a new journey afterwards. Every piece of land, which can be considered as a model of thinking, can only preserve its permanence until the new *aporia* it will reveal.<sup>47</sup> When *aporias* in a certain model suffocate thought, it means that the piece of land is now worn out and it is time to set sail again to be able to deliver these *aporias* to a new *euporia*.<sup>48</sup> This new journey will once

41

Jean-Pierre Vernant, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece*, transl. Jenet Lloyd, Zone Books, New York 1990, p. 8.

42

*Ibid.*, p. 7.

43

*Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

44

The Term translated into English as “lines of flight” or “lines of escape” is first used by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*, where they position it in opposition to the territorializing “blue line”. – Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus – Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, transl. Robert Hurley – Mark Seem – Helen R. Lane, Continuum, London – New York 2004, p. 306. In *Dialogues*, Claire Parnet approaches the concept “lines of flight” in the following manner: “It is not the elements or the sets which define the multiplicity. What defines it is the AND, as something which has its place between the elements or between the sets. AND, AND, AND – stammering. And even if there are only two terms, there is an AND between the two, which is neither the one nor the other, nor the one which becomes the other, but which constitutes the multiplicity. This is why it is always possible to undo dualisms from the inside, by tracing the line of flight which passes between the two terms or the two sets, the narrow stream which belongs neither to the one nor to the other, but draws both into a non-parallel evolution, into a heterochronous becoming. At least this does not belong to the dialectic.”. – Gilles Deleuze, Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, transl. Hugh Tomlinson – Barbara Habberjam, Columbia University Press, New York 2002, pp. 34–35. Deleuze did not object to this interpretation, but he did feel the need to add the following clarification: “The line of flight is a deterritorialization.” – *Ibid.*, p. 36.

In this study, I will attempt to identify certain lines of flight by revealing the operations of Odysseus in the *Iliad* – operations that, much like the conjunction “and” both connect and separate two poles – thus countering his reterritorialization in the *Odyssey* and enabling a process of deterritorialization for Odysseus.

45

Homer describes Odysseus as “Odysseus of many wiles” in many instances. – Homer, *Iliad*, vol. 1, transl. A. T. Murray, Harvard University Press, Cambridge – Massachusetts 1978, I, p. 300, 340; II, p. 408; XI, p. 430. In certain cases, we see that Odysseus is attributed the adjective “godlike”. – *Ibid.*, II, pp. 335; IX, p. 218; X, p. 243; and XI, p. 140.

46

In the *Republic*, Plato compared philosophy to a ship sailing at sea and, on the one hand, placed Socrates as a philosopher who steers the ship towards the land, at the helm, while on the other, compared the sophists to drunkards who seized the helm in the absence of the philosopher and steered the ship without a route, keeping philosophy in the realm of absolute *khaos*. – Plato, “*Republic*”, transl. Francis Paul Shorey, in: Edith Hamilton, Huntington Cairns (eds.), *The Collected Dialogues Including Letters*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1973, 488a–494d.

47

In Ancient Greek, the word *aporia* has several meanings such as *dilemma*, *difficulty of passing*, *difficulty* and *impossibility*. – H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 215.

48

In Ancient Greek, the word *euporia* means *solution of difficulties*, *ease* and *abundance*. – H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 727.

again be towards a new land. In other words, it will move from deterritorialization toward reterritorialization. In this sense, we can say that it is necessary for philosophy to continuously go back and forth between the land and the sea, in other words, always travel between *khaos* and *kosmos*.<sup>49</sup> The Enlightenment in general, and specifically Hegel's Reason, in particular, appears to desire to turn the entire sea into land. The difference in Odysseus's cunningness in contrast to Reason and Stupidity reveals itself right at this point, as *metis*, which positions it between *khaos* and *kosmos*, or the sea and land.<sup>50</sup>

"Cunning" as *metis* comes forward as the main sign that enables Odysseus to move away from bipolar tendencies and become open to symbiotic relationships and provides him with models of transition to chaomic intervals, intersections, lines of flight and the new. The first example of the series of finding intervals created by this sign and moving towards the new can once again be captured using the analogy of the sea and land mentioned above. Achilles, described as the strongest warrior alive, is unable to do anything against Agamemnon even though he took Briseis from him; he can neither use his weapons against Agamemnon nor leave his comrades behind and return to his homeland.<sup>51</sup> If he attacked Agamemnon, he would eventually die, and if he abandoned the war and returned home, his reputation as the strongest warrior would be stained with cowardice. The strongest sign of this state of paralysis emerging from bipolar edges reveals itself when Achilles desperately cries near the sea as he stands on the shore.<sup>52</sup> As a creature of land, Achilles has his limits despite being superior to others in terms of his swordsmanship and muscle. He can only stand on the edge of these characteristics, which is the shore. The only possible solution lies in the sea, which breaks down the solidity of the land that contains the possibility to include differences in thought. For this reason, Achilles stands on the shore as if revealing his limits and begs for help from his mother Thetis, the goddess of the sea.

Unlike Achilles, Odysseus represents being both able to leave the land and bring the fluidity of the sea back to the solidity of the land, as evinced by his words being compared to the waves hitting the coast.<sup>53</sup> Thus, we encounter a third type, which neither steers towards absolute *kosmos* nor absolute *khaos*, but proceeds at the intersection of the two. In this sense, the Odysseus-of-the-*Iliad*, in a matter of speaking, appears both as a creature of the land and the sea. Since in ancient Greece, identity was considered to be the main element that makes a person a human being, namely their name, heroism, lineage and glory, a person who loses it can no longer be anyone.<sup>54</sup> In this sense, the reason why Achilles could only walk up to the coast and failed to set sail was this exact devotion to his identity. The sea represents *khaos*, being without an identity. Unlike all other warriors who limit themselves only to the land in the face of the horrors of the absolute sea, Odysseus is the only figure who realises that he can go back and forth between identity and no identity, the land and the sea, the *kosmos* and *khaos*. Examples from the *Odyssey* such as Odysseus replying, "outis" (nobody) when the Cyclops asks who he is in order to break the deadlock and then revealing to the giant that his name is Odysseus after succeeding in defeating the giant show us the source of the transitive sign.<sup>55</sup> One should remember that the binding element between "nobody" and "somebody" is *metis* and that *outis* emerges only as a perfect trick of *metis*.<sup>56</sup> While Reason chooses land in the absolute sense, that is a necessary identity, Stupidity will absolutely choose to set sail, that is, to lose its identity for eternity. Transitioning between the sea and the land, or as I

have just mentioned, being a creature of both the land and the sea, is a third type that can only be born through *metis*, that is, Odysseus's cunning. Thus, we generate a line of flight that has evolved into a creative metamorphosis.<sup>57</sup>

Following this transitive sign as a line of flight, we come to realise that different third types, intervals and openings to a new start become more evident with Odysseus. For example, an interval is revealed with him, which is not stuck between the opposites of "fighting" and "not fighting". Odysseus is also a warrior, but compared to Diomedes, who even wounded Ares, war itself, or Aias, who is regarded as the strongest warrior after Achilles, he is far behind in terms of swordsmanship and muscle.<sup>58</sup> Odysseus's cunning is praised in the context of turning his words into a sword rather than his swordsmanship, as in the examples where it is emphasised that he says the final words that ended Thersites's measureless speech or despite being shorter than Menelaus, he appears like a mountain when he starts to speak even while sitting.<sup>59</sup> The same interval appears in both examples. This rift of the plane, which appears to be limited to the opposites "fighting" and "non-fighting", brings about a third

49

As previously discussed in reference to Plato's *Republic* (fn. 43), it is particularly significant for our purposes that Socrates is depicted as a figure who 'searches for *land*' while nonetheless 'advancing at *sea*'. This imagery is crucial to our argument. By situating philosophy precisely in the interval between *sea* and *land* – or, in the conceptual terms of this study, between *khaos* and *kosmos* – we can avoid the tendencies that pull the thought toward either extreme. So long as we remain, like the Socrates in this example, the beings of both sea and land, we resist two opposing dangers: on the one hand, the absolute meaninglessness into which the sophists sought to drag philosophy; on the other, the closed and absolute *kosmos* envisioned by Plato or Hegel. When the land begins to harden, we are drawn back into the sea through the aporia we uncover in it. And when the sea becomes overwhelming, it is again through aporia that we find ourselves seeking solid ground.

50

In Ancient Greek, the word *metis* means *wisdom, skill and craft*. – H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 1130.

51

Homer, *Iliad*, vol. 1, I.

52

*Ibid.*, I, pp. 350–400.

53

*Ibid.*, II, p. 210.

54

M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, p. 32. For a similar perspective, see: Jean-Pierre Vernant, James Ker, "Odysseus in Person", *Representations* 67 (1999) 1, pp. 1–26, here p. 18, doi: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2902884>.

55

Homer, *The Odyssey*, vol. 1, IX, pp. 364–367, 505. For classical studies of the transition between Odysseus and *outis*, see: George E. Dimock, "The Name of Odysseus", *The Hudson Review* 9 (1956) 1, pp. 52–70; Norman Austin, "Name Magic in Odyssey", *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 9 (1972), pp. 1–19. As seen in the examples of Odysseus appearing ugly to King Alcinous' daughter and after his arrival in Ithaca, like a stranger to his wife and the residents of the city at first, the *Odysseus* – *outis* transition is a recurring theme. – Homer, *The Odyssey*, vol. 1, VI, pp. 135–140. For a section containing another example, see: Homer, *The Odyssey*, vol. 2, transl. A. T. Murray, Harvard University Press, Cambridge & Massachusetts 1980, p. XIII.

56

J-P. Vernant, J. Ker, "Odysseus in Person", p. 7.

57

As Tamsin Lorraine points out, "While the supple segmentarity of the molecular line operates by deterritorialisations that may permit reterritorialisations that turn back into rigid lines, the line of flight can evolve into creative metamorphoses of the assemblage and the assemblages it affects." – Tamsin Lorraine, "Lines of Flight", in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, ed. Adrian Parr, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2005, p. 145.

58

Homer, *Iliad*, vol. I, V, p. 855; II, p. 767.

59

*Ibid.*, V, p. 855; II, p. 767.

type that can be described as “fighting with words”. With the discovery of the third, Odysseus is neither a complete warrior nor not one; in other words, he is a somebody who is a nobody for other warriors. He advances thought from the interval he found to the new by introducing an element, namely to continue the battle with words, which had no place both in other warriors’ muscle and sword and of the silence of those who do not fight. In the discovery of this interval, what emerges is not a model of thought that moves towards an Absolute that is determined as an end from the very start such as Hegel’s, but a model that progresses by transforming the cracks in the approaches that constrain philosophy within such absolute extremes into main paths.

Another example that connects to this set of signs is to be found in the idea of Odysseus’s device of the Trojan Horse. In the thirteenth book of the *Iliad*, Homer compares the inability of either the Trojans or the Achaeans to gain the upper hand in the ongoing war to a knot that neither breaks nor becomes undone.<sup>60</sup> The knot implies the difference between a *problema* that can be overcome and an *aporia* without a way out and stands as a wall against the Achaeans that appears to be insurmountable at first.<sup>61</sup> They would have to choose, as the attacking side aiming to seize the city, either to continue this knot of a battle, risking their own destruction or to flee. The words of Aias, “we must either perish utterly or find deliverance by thrusting back the peril from the ships”, or Agamemnon saying, “better it is if one fleeth from ruin and escapeth, than if he be taken” let alone overcoming *aporia*, but only serve to reproduce the extremes which give birth to it in the first place.<sup>62</sup> Although creatures of the land, which progress only by swordsmanship and muscle, can overcome *problemas*, they fail to go beyond *aporias* that constrain thought within the extremes of “to fight or to die”. Knots cannot be untied simply by pulling at the ends. The fact that even the deaths of Hector and Achilles, the most extreme figures of the opposing sides, fail to end the war to the benefit of either side is the most obvious sign that dealing with extremes cannot conclude this war. To untie knots, one needs to stop busying with the ends and instead engage with the intervals and create expansions that will lead thought to the new by progressing in these intervals. Odysseus’s move, which untied the said knot and brought destruction to Troy, delivers thought, which was stuck in extremes, to *euporia* with the discovery of exactly such an interval. The Trojan Horse represents neither being able to fully escape nor stay and continue the battle – it is a discovery of moving between these two extremes. This sign, which emerges with the Trojan Horse and can be conceptualised as “winning by appearing to be escaping”, is an interval positioned against thought stuck between the extremes of “fleeing” or “perishing”, a third type that leads to the new. The horse is not the discovery of escape, but of the impression of escape. This impression leads us to another line of flight. Thanks to this impression, the warriors carried in the belly of the horse were able to get past the walls of Troy, which Achilles, Diomedes or Agamemnon failed to penetrate by force of arms, and brought victory to the Achaeans by transforming the option of “perishing” into the option of “destroying”.<sup>63</sup>

Another example of the set of signs activated by *metis* as cunning I will address in this article is the third type Odysseus reveals as the interval of the duality between the “passive prey” and the “active hunter”. On a night when the war had quietened down, Nestor suggested sending a spy to the Trojan camp, while Hector suggested one be sent to the Achaeans.<sup>64</sup> The volunteer who would act as a spy for Trojans was Dolon.<sup>65</sup> Meanwhile, Diomedes, who

volunteered to be the spy for the Achaeans, picked Odysseus to accompany him on this mission over Aias and Menelaos, even though the latter were superior to Odysseus in swordsmanship and muscle.<sup>66</sup> It is unclear at first how Odysseus would reveal *metis* in this example, since the two sides seem to be matched, as the unequal number of spies can be an advantage or a disadvantage. For the Achaeans, Diomedes and Odysseus are each a hunter and the Trojans are the prey, while Dolon is the hunter for the Trojans and the Achaeans are the prey. Although it seems like the positions of the hunter and the hunted are interchangeable based solely on perspective, in fact, thought is limited in the sameness of the theme in all cases, just as in Hegelian philosophy. What breaks this equalising logic lies in the fact that with Odysseus seeing Dolon between the two camps, the hunter (Dolon) now faces the danger of becoming the prey.<sup>67</sup> Odysseus, who is the prey for Dolon, hunts his hunter halfway through and leads thought that is stuck between the extremes of the “passive prey” and the “active hunter” to the new with the discovery of a third type that can be conceptualised as “the prey that hunts its hunter”.<sup>68</sup>

Considering together the *chaosmos* signs formed of these intervals, which are the discoveries of Odysseus, we now have an answer to the question “what path does philosophy take” that is quite different from Hegel’s. Now, this literary model not only provides a compass to philosophy so it can focus on intervals, intersections and transition to the new, but also saves Odysseus from the holding cell that Adorno and Horkheimer specifically designed for him. Looking at the past with this model created jointly by literature and philosophy, we can now dare to enter the intervals by establishing symbiotic relationships instead of pulling at the bipolar knots and save thought from the myths of the Absolute, which are the source of sleepwalking.

## Conclusion

In one of her pieces, Pache elegantly identifies two characteristics that distinguish the Odysseus-of-the-*Iliad* from other characters:

“... he does not cry, and against all conventions, he smiles at an enemy.”<sup>69</sup>

60

Homer, *Iliad*, vol. II, transl. A. T. Murray, Harvard University Press, Cambridge – Massachusetts 1985, p. XIII, 355–360.

61

In Ancient Greek, the word *problema* means *hindrance*, *obstacle* and *barrier*. – H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 1471. Therefore, compared to *aporia*, which alludes to a type of impassable difficulty, it can be said *problema* refers to a lesser difficulty.

62

Homer, *Iliad*, vol. II, XV, p. 500, XIV, p. 83.

63

Homer, *The Odyssey*, vol. I, IV, pp. 270–290, VIII, pp. 285–520.

64

Homer, *Iliad*, vol. I, X, p. 200, 305.

65

*Ibid.*, X, pp. 320–325.

66

*Ibid.*, X, pp. 225–245.

67

J. P. Vernant, P. Vidal-Naquet, *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece*, p. 167.

68

Homer, *Iliad*, vol. I, X, pp. 340–455.

69

Corinne Ondine Pache, “War Games: Odysseus at Troy”, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 100 (2000), pp. 15–23, here p. 15, doi: <https://doi.org/10.2307/3185206>.

All characters in the *Iliad*, including gods, cry due to loss, woes, wounds and fate, and they only smile at their own allies.<sup>70</sup> Meanwhile Odysseus never performs the act of weeping, and only smiles in the face of Dolon's preposterous hope that they will release him, creating rifts in the tradition to which he belongs.<sup>71</sup> Recalling the example of Achilles crying near the sea I mentioned above will serve us in interpreting Pache's twin signs. Thoughts such as Hegel's, which are closed to setting sail to sea in their relation to the past, may either be blind to problems caused by land itself or weep before it. This crying will be towards the sea, meaning the accidental, *khaos*, which holds the possibility of disrupting the solidity of the land. Since the Odysseus-of-the-*Iliad* is both a creature of the land and the sea, thought will be able to find in him the intervals between the acts of crying and smiling, which appear to close him off from the necessities of past models. This is just one example of bringing together *kosmos* and *khaos*, creating breaches in the solidities to make it move. Smiling only at allies and only crying for their losses, just as Hegel's closing-Becoming, means equating the past with a corpse, and progress with endless sleepwalking towards the Absolute. However, just as the series of intervals created by Odysseus through *metis* such as "fighting with words", "winning by pretending to escape", "the prey that hunts the hunter" and "smiling at the enemy" reveal, the Odysseus-of-the-*Iliad* appears always as the creator of a type of opening-Becoming model. This model shows that there is a strong answer to the question "what path does philosophy take" that also involves Odysseus. Early in the fifth book of the *Odyssey*, we encounter an example where Odysseus, just like Achilles, stands on the shore coast and cries towards the sea, during his half-captivity on the island-home of Calypso (*HOI*, V, 80). It is apparent that Odysseus in this example was a creature of the land, just as Achilles and the others, that he cried or became blind by closing himself off in his own myth. Adorno and Horkheimer, with incredible meticulousness, exhibited that the progress revealed not only in the episode with Calypso, but also in almost every other episode of the *Odyssey*, can be interpreted as progress that is thus blind. The problem lies not in the Odysseus-of-the-*Odyssey* model the duo created to reveal Hegel's closing-Becoming, but in the very myth that takes this model as the only model of Odysseus that may possibly be paired with the progress of philosophy. However, with the Odysseus-of-the-*Iliad* model whose boundaries I tried to draw here, we can now smile in the face of a type of thought that leads to a literary closure by defending the absoluteness of this myth, just as easily as the Odysseus-of-the-*Iliad* did.

**Barişcan Demir**

### **Odbacivanje Odisejeve hegelovske kože**

#### **Novi model za filozofijske pomake**

#### **Sažetak**

*Adorno i Horkheimer pokazali su da je Hegel svojim mitom o Apsolutu odveo misao u labirint bez izlaza te su u Odiseju vidjeli arhetip te sklonosti zatvaranju. Gotovo je nemoguće govoriti o napretku Odiseja u filozofiji, a da se ne naglase njegove sličnosti s Hegelovim. U ovom ću radu najprije izložiti probleme Hegelova odgovora na pitanje »Kojim putem ide filozofija?«. Potom*

70

Ibid., p. 16, 19.

71

Ibid.

*ću pokazati da je moguća interpretacija Odiseja koja se suprotstavlja arhetipu što ga Adorno i Horkheimer poistovjećuju s Hegelom, te kako bi takva interpretacija mogla stvoriti novi model filozofskih pomaka.*

#### **Ključne riječi**

Odisej *Odiseje*, Odisej *Ilijade*, zatvaranje-postajanje, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno

**Barişcan Demir**

### **Odysseus' hegelsche Haut abstreifen**

#### **Ein neues Modell philosophischer Bewegungen**

#### **Zusammenfassung**

*Adorno und Horkheimer enthüllten, dass Hegel mit seinem Mythos des Absoluten das Denken in ein Labyrinth ohne Ausgang gezogen hatte, und erkannten in Odysseus ein Urbild jener Tendenz zur gedanklichen Gefangenschaft. Es ist nahezu unmöglich geworden, über die Fortschritte des Odysseus in der Philosophie zu sprechen, ohne die Ähnlichkeiten mit denen Hegels hervorzuheben. In diesem Beitrag werde ich zunächst die Probleme darlegen, die sich aus Hegels Antwort auf die Frage ergeben: „Welchen Weg nimmt die Philosophie?“. Anschließend werde ich zeigen, dass eine Deutung des Odysseus denkbar ist, die dem Archetyp entgegensteht, den Adorno und Horkheimer mit Hegel identifizieren, und wie eine solche Interpretation ein neues Modell philosophischer Bewegungen eröffnen könnte.*

#### **Schlüsselwörter**

*Odyssee*–Odysseus, *Ilias*–Odysseus, Schließung–Werden, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno

**Barişcan Demir**

### **Se débarrasser de la peau hégélienne d'Ulysse**

#### **Un nouveau modèle pour les mouvements philosophiques**

#### **Résumé**

*Adorno et Horkheimer ont montré que Hegel avait entraîné la pensée dans un labyrinthe sans issue avec son mythe de l'Absolu, et ont vu en Ulysse l'archétype de cette tendance à l'enfermement. Il est devenu presque impossible de parler du parcours d'Ulysse en philosophie sans en souligner les similitudes avec celui de Hegel. Dans cet article, je présenterai d'abord les problèmes que pose la réponse de Hegel à la question : « Quel chemin la philosophie emprunte-t-elle ? ». Ensuite, je montrerai qu'il est possible de proposer une interprétation d'Ulysse qui s'oppose à l'archétype qu'Adorno et Horkheimer identifient à Hegel, et comment une telle interprétation pourrait engendrer un nouveau modèle pour les mouvements philosophiques.*

#### **Mots-clés**

*Odyssée*–Ulysse, *Iliade*–Ulysse, fermeture–devenir, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno