Blund's *Treatise on the Soul* in a Medieval Manuscript from Zadar*

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Summary

In the present contribution, I expand on my initial report of 2013 on an intriguing case of a Medieval manuscript dated in the 14th century. The manuscript has been catalogued as belonging to the Dominican monastery in Zadar, its authorship attributed to a friar by the name of Martin, a member of the Lombardian Province and a lector in the Dominican monastery in Split. Since it turned out that the second part of the codex contains a compilation of passages from John Blund's *Treatise on the Soul*, a piece of Avicennian philosophical psychology written at the very beginning of the 13th century, the discovery raised several questions regarding the origin, purpose and distribution of the compilation. After presenting the case, I give a detailed, chapter-by-chapter analysis of its content, compared to the critical edition of Blund's Treatise, trying to discern the logic behind Martin's selection of passages from this work. In the final section, I consider some historical-philosophical reasons why the occurrence of such a compilation might present even a greater peculiarity than initially thought.

Keywords: Martin of Zadar (Martin de Iadera), John Blund (Iohannes Blund), soul and its powers, Avicenna, Aristotle, analysis of content

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Introduction

In 2013, I have reported on an interesting misattribution of a medieval manuscript dated in the 14th century.[1] The manuscript was recovered in 1981 from a capitol library in Urbania, a village near the Italian town of Urbino, by a Croatian medieval historian and a Dominican friar Franjo Šanjek. It consists of two parts, separable solely by their contents: a longer "theological" (comprising 167 pages) and a much shorter "philosophical" (comprising 30 pages). The former has been identified as a commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* (*Abstractiones de Libro sententiarum*), one of several hundred contributions to the popular medieval genre; the latter, according to the last sentence of the manuscript, is "a treatise on the powers of the soul" (*de potentiis animae tractatus*). The authorship of both pieces has been ascribed to a certain Martin of Zadar (Martinus de Iadr(i)a), identified as a member of the Lombardian Province and a "lector" in the Dominican monastery in Split.[2] This attribution derives from two bibliographical notes by two historians of the Dominican order, Herman D. Christianopulo (Zadar 1730–1788) and Thomas M. Kaeppeli (1900–1984). According to Christianopulo's inventory of the Dominican cultural treasures of the Eastern Adriatic coast, the codex originated in the 13th or 14th centuries ("seculi XIII vel XIV") and belongs to "the 23 most valuable codices of the Dominican monastery in Zadar" (listed as item no. 9).[3] Kaeppeli, Christianopulo's successor at the position of the principal bibliographer of the Dominican order in the 20th century, cites the title of the codex as "Abstractiones de libro

[1] Tomislav Janović, "Martin Zadranin *alias* Ivan Blund: Nepoznati srednjovjekovni spis o duši i njezinim moćima", *Croatica Christiana Periodica* 37/71 (2013), pp. 171–191.

[2] Franjo Šanjek, "Počeci teologije u Hrvata", *Croatica christiana periodica* 5/7 (1981), pp. 134–135; Marijan Biškup, Franjo Šanjek, "Martin Zadranin (13./14. st.)", in: Martin Zadranin, OP, *Abstractiones de libro Sententiarum* (13./14. st.), edited by Marijan Biškup (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 2006). See also the English summary ("Dominican Martin of Zadar (Zara)") and the note on the paleographic analysis of the manuscript by Jakov Stipišić ("Paleografska analiza rukopisa"), both in the same volume (pp. 11–13 and pp. 163–165, respectively).

[3] H. D. Christianopulo, *Index codicum manuscriptorum qui extant in bibliotheca Iadrensi* O.P. AGOP, scr. IX, br. 21700. Christanopulo's dating of the codex—"13th or 14th century"—does not square well with the first recorded appearance of Martin's name dating to the 1st of December 1343 in Split. It is theoretically possible that he wrote the two pieces 50 years before the mentioned date, but that contradicts the results of the paleographic analysis of the codex according to which at least 10 different hands contributed to its copying, and that the type of script "clearly points to the 14th century". (See: Stipišić, "Paleografska analiza rukopisa", pp. 11–12). Ironically, it turned out that Christianopulo was right, at least regarding the authorship (not the transcription) of the second part of the manuscript whose real author lived in 12th and 13th centuries.

Sent. Fr. Martini de Iadria ord. fr. Pred.".[4] Notwithstanding its displacement from Zadar (most probably in the 19th century), I will hitherto refer to it as "the Zadar manuscript" or, abbreviated, „ZM".[5]

Doubts regarding the authorship of the ZM arise already at Kaeppeli's bibliographical note. Why should the name mentioned at the first page of the codex ("Martinus de Iadrima") be taken to refer to the author of *both* parts of the manuscript and not only to the author of its first part—the commentary to Peter Lombard's *Abstractiones*? Since the manuscript comprises two very different texts, why isn't the second text mentioned—if not in the codex itself, then at least in Kaeppeli's bibliographical note? Whatever the answer, it seems that neither Christianopulo nor Kaeppeli looked more closely into its content; if they did, they would certainly have identified the second, shorter part as a separate, self-contained text. That the ascription of that piece to Martin is problematic, at least by contemporary standards of authorship, was indicated in a short obituary article from 1995 in which it is described as "a compilation of the most renown scholastics of the 13th century".[6] Indeed, it is a compilation, but not of works of the 13th century scholastics. Rather, as it turned out, it is a compilation from a single source, one that predates the first mention of Martin's name (1343) by more than a century. The only source used in putting together the second, shorter, philosophical part of the manuscript is a work known as *Tractatus de anima*, the first original piece of Aristotelian-Avicennian philosophical psychology in the Latin West, most probably written between 1200 and 1204 by a Paris and Oxford student, teacher of liberal arts at these two universities, and the elected (but never consecrated) Archbishop of Canterbury, John Blund (Iohannes Blundus).[7]

But how did it come about that this very piece had been chosen by a Dominican friar from a quite distant shore of continental Europe? What drew the compilator, despite the abundance of more recent works in philosophical

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[4] See: Thomas M. Kaeppeli O.P., *Scriptores Ordini Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, vol. III (I–S) (Rome: Santa Sabina, 1980), p. 113.

[5] Biškup, Šanjek, "Martin Zadranin (13./14. st.)", p. 8. The circumstances of the transfer of the codex from Zadar to Urbania, where it is classified as "codex senza segnatura", are unclear. They are most probably related to Napoleon taking control over Dalmatia at the beginning of the 19th century.

[6] "Zadar – kolijevka hrvatskog visokog školstva: Petstota obljetnica prvog hrvatskog sveučilišta (1495.–1995.)", *Croatica Christiana Periodica* 18/33 (1994), pp. 193–195.

[7] On scarce biographical facts on John Blund (c. 1175–1248) see the Introduction to the first critical edition of his *Treatise* by R. W. Hunt (Iohannes Blund: *Tractatus de anima*, edited by D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. vii–viii).

psychology, including those written by some of the most revered Dominican minds of all times—the likes of one Albert the Great or Thomas Aquinas—to take up a rather outdated piece, hardly representative of its kind? And even if the mysterious Martin, identified by scarce and inconclusive data from Croatian historical records, is not himself the person behind the compilation, a 14th century "abridged" version of Blund's *Treatise* presents a curiosity in its own right—if for no other reason than for the supposedly limited diffusion period of this work. So, the authorship issue notwithstanding, the puzzle of the Zadar manuscript remains. In what follows, I try to shed some light on this puzzle and expand on the conjectures and arguments offered in my 2013 report.

In that report, I enclosed a table-form presentation of the contents of the two texts: the Callus-Hunt-Dunne critical edition of Blund's *Treatise* published in 2013 (henceforth: "CHD")[8] and the transcription of the second part of the Urbania manuscript, transcribed by Branka Grbavac, which was attributed to Martin of Zadar. By juxtaposing the two sources (broken down into chapters, passages and folia), I tried to detect certain regularities and telltale signs revealing the purpose of the compilation. Now it is my hope that a more thorough analysis, one focused on the *content* of the adopted/omitted passages, will not only confirm my general assumption regarding that purpose, but also give a more detailed insight into Matin's motives and the logic behind his compilation (Section 2). With that in mind, I try to show why the occurrence of this new, abridged version of Blund's *Treatise* presents even a greater peculiarity, from a historical-philosophical perspective, than initially thought in my 2013 report (Section 3).

The Selection of the Compiled Text and the Logic of the Abridging Process

Before the recovery of the ZM, there were three known witnesses of Blund's *Treatise on the Soul*, his only surviving work: the manuscripts from Cambridge (Cantabrigiae, Bibl. Collegii S. Iohannis, cod. 120), Prague (Pragae, Bibl. Universitatis, cod. IV. D 13 [667]) and Vatican (Civitatis Vaticanae, cod. Vat. lat. 833.), the former two from the 13th and the latter from the 14th century.[9]

[8] John Blund, *Treatise on the Soul*, edited by D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt, Introduction to the Second Edition by Michael W. Dunne, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[9] In the critical edition, the transcript of the Cambridge Manuscript is treated as the default version, the deviations in the other two manuscripts being indicated in the apparatus. It is interesting to note that the deviations from the critical edition detected in the ZM are paralleled in the

"Martin's" version is the fourth known textual source. How it relates to the three extant ones, and whether it can be taken as a fully independent witness, is a topic of a separate analysis, one requiring paleographic expertise. What becomes obvious without special expertise—by simply comparing the ZM transcribed version with the CHD—is that the former renders about a third (32%) of the integral text, measured by the number of lines as they are given in the critical edition. In light of this information, the question that immediately arises is how this abridged version came about. Was the selection of fragments from Blund's original text completely random, was it non-random but content-independent (in the sense that, for instance, the omitted parts are more or less arbitrarily distributed over the integral text), or is there a deeper logic behind the selection—a logic reflecting compilator's intention to adopt particular passages, depending on their content, and leave out others as less relevant or less suitable for the assumed purpose of the compilation?

Even a brief glance at two textual sources leaves no doubt: disregarding some apparent exceptions, the selection of passages is neither random nor content-independent. It indicates a specific intent of the compilator, viz. a specific purpose of the compilation. In this section, I offer some evidence of this intent by looking closely into the content of the two sources. Following Blund's original division, I take chapters as the basic units of my analysis.

The integral text is divided into 26 chapters (chapters I, II, XIV, XXV and XXVI are further divided into subchapters). The chapter index is given at the outset of the critical edition.[10] Smaller compositional parts are paragraphs which, as basic compositional units, are consecutively enumerated (1–415).[11] This division is artificial, to make it easier for contemporary readers to navigate the text. In the codices, as is typical of medieval sources, the text is rendered *in continuo,* i.e., without being split into visually distinguishable parts. Shorter paragraphs contain 1–5 sentences, longer 10–15 sentences. In some cases, chapters begin with a non-numerated paragraph, typically consisting of one or two sentences defining the topic of the chapter.

In many cases the ZM adopts whole paragraphs from Blund's integral text, but this is far from being a rule: in many paragraphs, one or several sentences

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Prague manuscript much more often than in the other two witnesses. This might point to the latter as the precursor of the ZM, a hypothesis that only a closer paleographic inspection can confirm.

[10] This index actually lists 27 chapters, but the last, 27th chapter ("On divine providence"), is missing from all three heretofore known sources. It is questionable whether it was written at all. See CHD, pp. xlvi–xlix.

[11] All the references to the original text of Blund's *Treatise* (according to CHD) refer to these paragraphs (given in brackets).

are missing, more often in the middle or at the end of a paragraph than at its beginning. Parts of sentences are often left out, too. Further, it is not uncommon that a sentence is interrupted, either abruptly ending or being fused with another, upcoming sentence. In many cases, the grammatical congruency is preserved, which lets us speculate about Martin's readers hardly being able to notice that they are dealing with a reworked, adapted text—especially if one considers the quality of written Latin and the number of typos and copying errors which does not deviate from an average medieval manuscript.

If there is a single regularity that can undoubtedly be discerned from the way Blund's text is rendered in the ZM, it is this: regardless of the length of the omitted text or whether a textual gap has been successfully concealed or not, the original text direction is retained in the compilation. In other words, there are no parts of the text that are cut out from a later paragraph and inserted into an earlier one, or vice versa (with a possible exception of a four-line passage inserted between paragraphs 361 and 362). The order of chapters is also retained, despite whole chapters being left out.

Finally, there is an important formal feature of Blund's *Treatise* which is also echoed in the compilation. The exposition of topics in chapters is organized as *questio disputata*—a feature typical of medieval genres like treatises, but also commentaries and summae. It is supposed to reflect the structure of an oral debate (*disputatio*) in a university setting—both in theological and liberal arts studies where both students and masters could take up the role of an *opponens* or a *respondens*.[12] The same scheme is present throughout the *Treatise*, although not always in an equally obvious way.[13] Typically, after a problem (*questio*) is defined and the preferred position revealed, objections are raised against that position which are then refuted and the preferred position reaffirmed (*solutio*). For instance, chapter XXIII (which is completely adopted in the ZM) begins by naming the problem (*Sequitur videre anima sit mortalis vel immortalis*), followed by a sentence stating the preferred position vis-à-vis the *questio* (*Quod sit immortalis sic ostenditur*). What follows are objections

[12] See: Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg, "Medieval Philosophical Literature", in: Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg, Eleonore Stump (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 13–17 and pp. 23–33.

[13] See Dunne's Introduction to CHD, pp. xiii–xiv. As Dunne points out, there are places in the text that are suggestive of the *Treatise* being a record of real *disputationes* in a university classroom. For instance, a telling passage (completely adopted in the ZM) can be found in Blund's discussion of the sensible soul to the corporeal substance (ch. XXII, 312) where a "respondent" is explicitly mentioned. Dunne also considers the possibility that there was an initial version of the text that was "a record of actual teaching" which was then "incompletely edited or partially reconstructed either by the author or by someone else, with a view to publication."

and responses, arguments and counterarguments, together with an intermediary solution which is also challenged. Finally, the ultimate solution is reached in the ending paragraph of the chapter (328)—reaffirming the immortality position.

The status of each paragraph within this rhetorical structure is typically indicated by standard words or phrases playing the role of logical connectors—*sequitur ut dicamus*, *sequitur ut videre*, *sed obicitur*, *contra*, *si concedatur*, *item*, *ad aliud*, *instantia tertie argumentationis*, *preterea*, and, of course, *solutio* (as the most frequent ones). These rhetorical devices, typically placed at the beginning of paragraphs, are supposed to help the reader to follow the exposition of the *questio* from its beginning to the final *solutio* (typically given in the ending paragraph of the chapter). However, in many cases the strict logical form is no more than an unrealized didactic ideal—some obvious counterarguments are left uncontested, or only superficially answered, or simply glossed over; or the entire logical structure of the argument is unrecognizable. Although this kind of sloppiness is not atypical for medieval texts, in Martin's compilation it makes things worse for his hypothetic reader, since the argument may be additionally garbled by parts of text being omitted. In other words, what is rendered in the abridged version is sometimes just a torso of the original argument, so the *disputatio* structure is doubly compromised. This makes one wonder how much of the conveyed content, beyond a simple doctrinal point, Martin's readers, most probably students, were able to understand, still less appreciate. That said, it should be conceded that parts of the text dealing with typical philosophical issues and containing typical philosophical arguments—and these are primarily, but not exclusively, the chapters devoted to the higher powers of the soul—are the ones minimally abridged. So, in these chapters, the argumentative structure of the original text, whatever it is worth, has at least been preserved.

I start my comparative analysis with Martin's most obvious and most indicative intervention in the structure of the original text. Both the beginning and the concluding parts of Blund's *Treatise*—more precisely, the first five and the last chapter (consisting of two rather long subchapters, both extensively drawing on Abelard)—are missing in the ZM. So, in the form in which it has come down to us, Martin's compilation begins with the opening sentence of the sixth chapter of the integral text, i.e., at the point where Blund concludes his discussion of the vegetative soul and announces his next topic: the sensible soul and its powers. Of course, it is not inconceivable that for some non-substantial reason—a reason having nothing to do with the contents of these chapters—only the middle part of Blund's *Treatise* was available for transcription. This is a possible scenario, but not a likely one. The first four chapters, taken together,

serve as a kind of preliminary inquiry into the main theme of the *Treatise*.[14] It comprises more general issues like the following: voluntary vs. involuntary movements, essence of bodies, the existence of the soul and its essence (the famous Aristotelian definition from *De anima* II.1), the distinction between different approaches to its study (metaphysical, natural-philosophical and theological)[15], incorruptibility of rational soul and its unity. Since they clearly constitute a distinct, self-enclosed part within the overall structure of the work, it makes sense that these four chapters are omitted together. If one were to speculate about the reason for their omission, the first thing that comes to mind is a kind of didactic prudence—Martin's resolve to bring his readership as directly as possible, avoiding any preliminary clarifications and redundancy, to what he might have considered the central topic of their interest.[16]

What about the fifth chapter, the one describing the vegetative soul and its powers? Why was that chapter, together with the introductory ones, dropped out? My guess is that the vegetative soul was of little interest to Martin and his audience, contributing little to one's understanding of the higher powers of the soul which were, presumably, of greater theological significance.[17] The higher powers refer not only to those of the rational soul, but also those of the perceptual soul, like estimation and memory, which, from a theological point of view, might be more relevant than the details of physiology or functioning of the outer senses. This hypothesis is plausible from a broader point of view, i.e., when one considers it together with other selective interventions into the integral version of Blund's *Treatise*.

This leaves us with the exclusion of the very last, 26th chapter to be accounted for. Even more than the four opening chapters, this chapter presents a self-enclosed piece of text which could be read independently of the rest of the *Treatise*. Moreover, its topic, freedom of the will (*De libero arbitrio*), was

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[14] In their introductory essays to their own translations of Blund's *Treatise*, Dorothée Werner (German) and Michael W. Dunne (English) each give a structural summary of its content, and in both summaries the first four chapters are grouped together under the same label ("introduction"). See: John Blund, *Traktat über die Seele*, edited and translated by Dorothée Werner (Freiburg in Breisgau: Herder, 2005), and Dunne's introduction in CHD, pp. xv–xvi.

[15] See note 46 bellow.

[16] Regarding redundancy, some of the topics addressed in this introductory part (e.g., the status of the rational soul or the three-souls-vs.-one issue) reappear in later chapters where they are examined in depth.

[17] According to Hasse (*Avicenna's* De anima *in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160 – 1300*, (London – Turin: Warburg Institute, 2000, p. 232), "[t]the vegetative faculties received little attention [in the period 1160 – 1300] because Christian theologians thought that this issue did not pertain to their field of enquiry". Blund was obviously an exception.

treated as a distinct philosophical issue already in Blund's time as it is treated today. If for any reason Blund himself decided not to include it in his *Treatise*, or/and let it be copied as a separate piece, which he could certainly have done, hardly anyone would notice. In other words, if his *Treatise* were to end with a discussion of the two special issues pertaining to the rational soul (i.e., with subchapters XXV.iii and iv), this would be a perfectly cogent ending.[18] So, if Martin decided to omit the discussion of the freedom of the will from his compilation, i.e., if this was his deliberate decision and not something imposed on him by fortuitous circumstances, it hardly requires special explanation.

In any case, the ZM begins with a sentence announcing the topic of chapter VI—the sensitive soul and its powers (*Sequitur ut agamus de anima sensibili et de eius viribus*). In the exposition of this topic, Blund strictly follows Avicenna's division, as he does elsewhere too. But before going into details, he gives some general remarks (with reference to Aristotle's *Topica*) about the sensible soul, starting from its desiderative and motive powers, and then proceeds to its perceptual abilities—the five outer and the five inner senses. Martin adopts the entire introductory passage (55) but then skips a longer chunk of text (five paragraphs) in which Blund discusses a typical metaphysical *questio*—whether different senses belong to the same *species* or not (56–60). One could speculate about this topic appearing to Martin as rather superfluous, a digression from the main line of his exposition. Whether or not this is the reason for its omission, he picks up Blund's text again at the last paragraph (61) of the chapter. This particular passage is a good illustration of Martin's abridging technique and thus deserves a short digression.

Although the paragraph consists of only two sentences, Martin adopts just the first sentence—the one listing the inner senses: the common (central) sense, the imaginative power, the estimative power, and the power of memory.[19] The second sentence (*De istis dicetur inferius secundum ordinem*), serving as an intratextual reference, is left out, presumably, for reasons of parsimony and congruency. But even the first sentence is not rendered in its entirety: instead of *vis memorialis et reminiscibilis*, the two last items on Blund's inner senses inventory, Martin leaves just *vis memorialis*. Was that an oversight? I don't think so. Since Blund himself, in chapter XX, discusses both memory and recollection

[18] This is not to say that his discussion of the freedom of the will is superfluous, unoriginal or philosophically uninteresting. My point is just that the *Treatise* functions as a coherent whole without that part of the text.

[19] By the way, it is far from clear why this sentence appears *at this particular place* of Blund's *Treatise*, given that the inner senses are not discussed before chapter XVII. Whatever the reason, it obviously suited Martin's purposes—regarding his presumed general attitude about the greater importance of the inner vs. the outer senses.

under the common heading (*De memoria*), it is entirely conceivable that Martin, to make things easier for his readers, treats the two capacities as manifestations of a single power, *memoria*. In addition, and perhaps more plausibly, Martin omits the power of recollection here because it belongs, as Aristotle himself maintains, to the rational soul, which would disrupt his presentation of the powers of the sensitive soul. In fact, this explains also why Martin left out the last paragraph of that chapter (275), where Blund makes it clear, by citing passages from *De memoria et reminiscentia* (453a6–11), "that Aristotle [himself] distinguishes between remembering and recollecting".[20]

The next chapter (VII) deals with the basic motive powers of the sensible soul—the desire to go for (*vis concupiscibilis*) and to avoid (*vis irascibilis*) as two parts of the motive power (*vis motiva*)—together with the important distinction between non-rational and rational desire. His sources here are also the most frequent ones in the whole text: Aristotle (*Topica* and *De anima*) and Avicenna (*De anima*), but his interpretative framework, as in the entire *Treatise*, is clearly Avicennian.[21] In Martin's rendering, this chapter is minimally abridged—here and there a single sentence, or part of a sentence, is missing, but no longer portions of text are left out. By contrast, the next chapter (VIII), on the cognitive powers of the sensible soul, despite being one of the shortest in the *Treatise*, is considerably abridged—only three sentences from the first two paragraphs are adopted. The omitted part contains an important distinction (with references to Avicenna and Boethius) between sensory and conceptual knowledge, viz. between grasping particulars and grasping universals—presumably, a topic too demanding for Martin's readership.

The next intervention into Blund's text is most telling. Of the 10 chapters (of which two are enumerated as subchapters in CHD) of the *Treatise* in which physiological aspects of our senses and physical and geometrical aspects of their stimuli are meticulously described and extensively discussed, five are completely left out (X, XI, XIII, XIV.ii, and XIV.iii). The fully omitted chapters include two chapters on light and on shadows, respectively, a long chapter on reverberation of sound (echo), and two shorter chapters on odors and their sensing. Notably, each of these chapters can be read as a separate treatise, representing the state of the natural-philosophical knowledge of the time. Of the other five chapters (IX, XII, XIV.i, XV, and XVI), only a single sentence (typically the first one) is adopted from each. In terms of content, what survived of these chapters in Martin's compilation are five short definitions (89, 145, 193, 208,

[20] As his source, Blund here explicitly cites Aristotle's *De anima*, but his reference is mistaken since the cited passage is from *De memoria*.

[21] See chapter "Blund's use of Avicenna" in Dunne's introduction to CHD, pp. xxv–xxviii.

217) of the five outer senses: the sense of sight, the sense of hearing, the sense of smell, the sense of taste, and the sense of touch, in that order, which reflects the order of Aristotle's account in *De anima* (II.7–11). If anything, this strongly suggests a specific motive behind the compilation. For, these 10 chapters clearly form a compact and self-enclosed part of Blund's *Treatise*—as is the case with the opening chapters. What makes them conspicuous in the present context is not just their subject matter (outer senses), but also the way this subject matter is treated and the type of evidence used. Blund here deploys a wealth of empirical or quasi-empirical data and a host of insights regarding the functioning of the senses taken primarily, but by no means exclusively, from Avicenna. Apart from the sources typically referred to by 12th century scholars writing on such matters in Paris and Oxford—the ancient (Plato, Aristotle, Euclides, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Calcidius, Macrobius, Boethius), patristic (Augustinus, Nemesius of Emesa, John of Damascus), Arabic (Avicenna, Al-Ghasali, Al-Farabi), and the Latin medieval authors (Abelard, Peter Lombard, William de Conches)—there is a group of sources that deserve special attention. These are the natural-philosophical writings of "domestic", i.e., English provenance, identified already by father Callus, the main editor of the first critical edition of Blund's *Treatise* (1970).[22] I will have more to say about this in the next section. In any case, the text omitted here makes exactly 1/3 of the total length of the *Treatise*, which clearly illustrates the importance of the topic of the outer senses to Blund, and its unimportance to Martin.

The central part of Blund's *Treatise*, dealing with the higher powers of the sensible soul ("inner senses") (chapters XVII–XXI) and the intellectual soul (chapters XXII–XXV), respectively, starts with a long chapter on the common sense (*sensus communis*). This chapter is only partially adopted in the ZD, the lacunae being rather evenly distributed over the text. Nevertheless, the logic of the selection, again, is evident. The chapter starts with a *questio* pertaining to the difference between sense and intellect regarding the ability of abstracting forms from matter (232). The *questio*-sentence is adopted, but not the discussion of the counterarguments which is left out (233–235). The *solutio*, again, is adopted. It says, "that sensation is not abstractive, since it treats only of individual things", while "the intellect … is abstractive because it treats of universals by

[22] According to R. W. Hunt, father Callus's co-editor, there is "little doubt that the *Tractatus* was written by an Englishman. Its peculiar mark is a fondness for dwelling on topics of natural science, which is a special characteristic of English scholars at this period." The three most prominent scholars that Callus and Hunt are referring to are Alexander Nequam, David Morley, and Adelard of Bath. (See Hunt's Introduction to the 1970 edition of Blund's *Treatise*, p. xi, or p. xxxiv in the 2013 edition). See also Werner's chapter on natural-philosophical sources (pp. 18–27) in her introduction to the German translation of the *Treatise*.

abstracting them from individual things and from the accidents of individual things only" (236). In a similar vein, Martin adopts Blund's remark that the outer senses are not able to perceive that they are perceiving—"through sight we cannot perceive ourselves to see", "by touch we do not perceive ourselves to touch, and the same is the case in regard to the other external senses" (238). He then skips Blund's discussion of the issue (including anatomical details, for the most part borrowed from Avicenna), which extends over several passages, but includes the solution—that "in accordance with Aristotle in the book of *On the Soul* and according to other philosophers… there is a central sense" (244). Further, he adopts a few sentences describing the common sense and its function, after which a longer passage (245), containing possible counterarguments to the postulation of such a sense, is left out. Of the rest of the chapter, he adopts a passage (enclosing a reference to Avicenna) in which Blund discusses the receptive and retentive powers of the outer senses (on the example of the eye) in contrast to these powers being used by imagination (246), then skips a longer passage including the solution of the issue at hand, and ends the chapter by adopting the second part of the last sentence (249). Here, again, one must wonder about how much sense could the abridged version of Blund's text make to Martin's readership, notwithstanding the grammatical congruency between the pieces of the reworked text.

Dorothée Werner notes that for Blund "the existence of the common sense … is not only evident from established authorities like Aristotle, Augustinus or Avicenna, but is also deemed necessary due to phenomena such as the perception of one's own perceptual act".[23] It is certainly true that Blund's argumentation, as it is laid down, leads to that conclusion. However, his basic argument, which is partly rendered in the MZ (238), can be traced back to Aristotle's *De somno* 2, so it probably reached Blund either directly (which is less probable) or indirectly (via Avicenna, most probably).[24] In any case, arguments in the second part of this chapter are used to draw subtle distinctions between the inner senses—the common sense and imagination, imagination and memory, imagination and estimation—as well as the one between estimation, as the most sophisticated power among the inner senses, and judgment, as a power already belonging to the rational soul. The two relatively short chapters on imagination and estimation, respectively, are taken over in the MZ almost verbatim.

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[23] See Werner's introduction to the German translation of the Treatise, p. 15.

[24] *De somno et vigilia* 2, 455a12–b2. See: Pavel Gregorić, "Perceiving That We Are Not Seeing and Hearing Reflexive Awareness in Aristotle", in: Pavel Gregorić, Jakob Leth Fink (eds.), *Encounters with Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind* (New York – London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 119–138.

In contrast to the common sense and imagination, which are both recognized by Aristotle, the estimative power is Avicenna's invention—as is the idea that these powers, together with the other two[25], should be categorized under the same *genus* called "inner senses". To illustrate how *vis estimativa* works, Blund chooses Avicenna's famous example of the wolf and the sheep (254–261): when seeing a wolf, the sheep connects the sense data gathered from its visual organ to "estimate" wolf's intentions and act accordingly—to flee, in this case. The execution of this capacity, however, should not be confused with an act of judgment, since the former applies only to individual things and is never able to rise to the conceptual or, in contemporary terms, propositional level—the level where things are judged as true or false.[26] For Blund, as for Avicenna, this distinction is important to maintain estimation as an independent function of the mind.

Blund's treatment of memory is a thorough and complex one and it extends over two long chapters (XX–XXI), the latter devoted to a single *questio*: Whether one can recollect that one has forgotten? The first of the two chapters begins with a paragraph (262), almost fully adopted in the MZ, containing the definition and location of the power of memory in the brain. The discussion following the definition centers around the relation of memory to knowledge: if one can remember only things one has previously come to know, i.e., "has preserved in the soul …by means of their images" (266), then how "does someone come to a knowledge of any thing" (267)? This is Plato's famous "Meno's paradox", to which Blund refers as "Menonis ambiguitas" (268). All three of these paragraphs are adopted in the MZ. Strangely, however, its *solutio* (269), which brings in the dimension of time ("presentness" and "pastness") to

[25] One of these two is memory, but from Blund's exposition it is not clear which, if any, is the second one, i.e., the fifth inner sense: is it recollection (which also Aristotle treats as different from memory), or is it a special form of imagination ("formative imagination") which Avicenna sometimes calls "cogitative power" (*vis cogitativa*). Since Blund discusses the latter in the chapter on intellect (345–347) and treats it as a faculty belonging to the rational soul, the former assumption seems more probable. See: Alfred Ivry, "Arabic and Islamic Psychology and Philosophy of Mind", in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/arabic-islamic-mind/>.

[26] See: Juhana Toivanen, "Perceiving As: Non-conceptual Forms of Perception in Medieval Philosophy", in: Elena Băltuță (ed.), *Medieval Perceptual Puzzles: Theories of Sense Perception in the 13th and 14th Centuries* (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2020), p. 27. See also: Anselm Oelze, *Animal Minds in Medieval Latin Philosophy, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind* (Cham: Springer, 2021), p. 61, and Dunne's Introduction to CHD, pp. xv–xvii. Dunne, drawing on D. N. Hasse (*Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West*, sees Blund's conception of grasping *intentiones* by *vis estimativa* as original, going beyond Avicenna's treatment of this inner sense which merely identifies the problem (of sensible recognition of other's intentions), but does not offer a solution.

the alleged resolution of the paradox, is left out. In its stead, Martin takes the next paragraph (270), in which Blund rejects a straightforward causal relation between perceptual knowledge (recognition) and memory, thus opening a new *questio*. The discussion of this problem is, again, omitted in the MZ, and so is everything else (i.e., five long paragraphs) until the end of the chapter—including the problem of remembering that one has remembered (274) and a citation from Aristotle (275) on the difference between remembering (*memorare*) and recollecting (*reminiscere*). As its title suggests, the next chapter (XXI) deals with a follow-up question: Whether one can recollect that one has forgotten? Most of this chapter, which is surprisingly long considering the rather specific problem it focuses on, has been omitted in the MZ, including the last 9 paragraphs. What has been retained, significantly, are paragraphs 282–284 and 286, in which Blund discusses "why is God, who is the first cause of all, grasped by the soul in its understanding and memory" (282).

With the chapter on the rational soul (XXII) begins the penultimate part of Blund's *Treatise* and the one most faithfully rendered in the MZ. Except for a few sentences or parts of sentences, the entire text of this chapter is adopted in Martin's compilation. The sources used by Blund in writing this part of his *Treatise* are the usual and expected ones, but there are also traces of the already mentioned natural-philosophical sources. In this chapter, besides a general clarification of the relationship between the body and the soul, two mutually connected issues crystalize as the most prominent ones (310–316): the first is the "distribution" of the soul over the body; the second is the relationship of the three types of the soul to the body as a spatial entity. In elaborating on the former, Blund offers a humorous *reductio* against an ontological position we would call "holenmerism" (311), that an entity (in this case the soul) can be "spread throughout", i.e., wholly present in, more than one part of space (in this case in different bodily parts) at the same time. If that would be possible, then any part of the human body capable of sensation—Blund's example is human finger capable of touch—should be treated as a separate animal (sensitive) soul, which leads to the, in his time already famous, "too-many-animals problem".[27] All this is adopted in the MZ.

[27] It seems that this is not an original argument, since there are traces of it already in the 12th century. In any case, it became very popular in the 13th and 14th centuries. See: Andrew Arlig, "The Complexity of the Soul and the Problem of Unity in Thirteenth-Century Philosophy", in: Margaret Cameron (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages: The History of the Philosophy of Mind*, vol. 2 (London – New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 204. See also: Andrew Arlig: "Medieval Mereology," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (online), 2015. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/mereology-medieval/.

The next two chapters (XXIII and XIV), as discernible already from their titles, are devoted to two theologically most relevant metaphysical dilemmas pertaining to the rational soul: is it mortal or immortal and is it simple or composed. As expected, Blund argues for the former solution to each dilemma. In the simplicity question, almost all the argumentative work is done by the assumption that God himself, as the origin of the soul, is the simplest being possible. The text of these chapters is almost entirely adopted in the ZM, as is the text of the following (XXV.i) short subchapter on the powers of the rational soul. The latter, although consisting of only two paragraphs, is important because it lays down the basic functional organization of the rational soul and then shows how the lower powers of the human soul, elaborated in the previous chapters, fit into this scheme. Two crucial powers of the rational soul are the theoretical capacity (*virtus sciendi*) and the practical capacity (*virtus agendi*), the former being the necessary condition for the development of the Aristotelian intellectual virtues which are, in turn, crucial for the right kind of agency. The chapter ends with a paraphrase of Avicenna's two-faces metaphor (338): one face of the human soul is directed downwards, towards acting virtuously, the other upwards, toward grasping truths.

The basic functional scheme of the rational soul is further developed in the following long subchapter (XV.ii) devoted to the intellect itself. In the first paragraph of this subchapter (337), Blund lays down the Avicennian fourfold structure of the intellect, derived by applying the Aristotelian metaphysical framework to the highest type of soul. The four kinds or stages of intellect are: (1) material or potential intellect, (2) formal or acquired intellect, (3) intellect in actuality, and (4) the habitual intellect or *intellectus agens*. The rest of the subchapter is devoted to the (not always expedient!) clarification of this scheme—for instance, by showing how cogitative (*vis cogitativa*) and intellective powers (*vis intellectiva*) are one and the same thing in the case of human beings, how different perceptual powers are to be integrated into the scheme, or how the so-called "World Soul" (*anima mundi*) relates to the human body. The text of this chapter is adopted in the ZM more or less faithfully, except for one paragraph (352), on distribution of nutriment to different parts of the body, which is left out[28].

The next subchapter (XXV.iii) of the chapter on the rational soul is also surprisingly long, considering that it deals with a very specific, although intriguing, question—whether a new or old soul is infused into the body. The infusion theory derives from the conception of God as the Giver of Forms—a

[28] Notably, the same paragraph is also left out in one of the three extant versions of Blund's *Treatise*—the Prague manuscript.

being capable of infusing the soul into the body which, in turn, "is suitable by nature to be vivified by the soul" (362). Blund here tackles a speculative issue whether "it would be a good thing to infuse an old soul burdened by the weight of sin" into a new body, considering that this soul would thus be able to "acquire merit through purging itself from its sins and acquiring a highest good for itself" (363). His answer is negative for moral (or, better to say, moralistic) reasons—he prefers the infusion of a new, untainted soul (apart from the original sin) into the body, so that this soul gets a new opportunity to "preserve the uprightness of its will by the choice of reason" (365). Another issue raised by Blund in this chapter is the *anima separata* problem: whether a soul separated from the body, i.e., incapable of forming any images of the things in the outer world, would be capable of intellectual knowledge.[29] In trying to resolve this issue, which seems tightly connected to issues arising from Avicenna's famous "floating man" thought experiment, he considers several interesting criteria. One is "being illuminated by the light of Pure Truth" (372), another capability of "receiving knowledge from another soul" (373). The entire discussion from this chapter is adopted in the ZM, save missing or altered parts of sentences here and there.[30]

The last part of the chapter on rational soul (subchapter XXV.iv) is the last chapter of the ZM (since, as already noted, the chapter on free will is left out of Martin's compilation). It addresses the famous seat-of-the-soul puzzle. Four solutions are considered: brain, heart, blood, and the whole body. The result is indecisive, although the text gives us reason to view Blund as inclined towards the brain as the most plausible solution.[31] The chapter consists of five short and a one long paragraph which all seem to be adopted in the ZM. The adoption is not unambiguous because the last folio of the ZM (f. 205) is hardly readable due to damages to the manuscript. Nevertheless, its last sentence unmistakably reads: *Explicit de potentiis anime tractatus*. Notably, this sentence is absent from all three integral versions of Blund's *Treatise*.[32]

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[29] Or, to cite a more humorous version of the same *questio* (from 370): "whether the soul of any philosopher is wiser when separated from the body than the soul of any idiot after [its separation?] from the body"? For whatever reason, only the first part of this question is adopted in ZM.

[30] These sentences are left out from four paragraphs. Interestingly, all four sentences are missing in the Prague manuscript, too.

[31] According to Dunne (p. xxiv of his introduction to CHD), the issue remains unresolved. According to Werner (p. 17 of the introduction to her German translation of Blund's *Treatise*), the brain is the solution preferred by Blund.

[32] The Vatican Manuscript also ends with a self-referential sentence („Explicit iste liber: sit scriptor crimine liber.") that does not appear in the other two witnesses, but this sentence comes after the free will chapter which is absent from the ZM.

In conclusion, it is safe to say that the chapter-by-chapter analysis of the two manuscripts confirms the assumption regarding the intent behind Martin's compilation. Five indicators of this intent have been identified: (1) uneven distribution of the selected passages over the integral text, (2) the logic of selection at the macrolevel (chapters), (3) the logic of selection at the microlevel (paragraphs and sentences), (4) grammatical congruency between the cut-and-pasted pieces of text, (5) preserved direction of text flow.

Ad 1. Roughly, after skipping the opening part of Blund's *Treatise* (chapters 1–5), and adopting just a few passages and sentences from the following eleven chapters (6–16), its central part (chapters 17–21) is much more represented in Martin's compilation than its preceding part, but not as much as the concluding chapters (22–25), which are adopted almost verbatim, with the exception of the very last chapter (26) of which there is no trace in the compilation.

Ad 2. The content-sensitive features of Martin's abridging technique are most obviously manifested in the fact that all of the selected-out chapters (except the last one) are dealing either with general questions of the soul or with the five outer senses—their function, location and inner workings, together with the physical and geometrical descriptions of the phenomena pertaining to their respective stimuli (light, sound, odor) and the media of their transmission (e.g., air, water). From the theological point of view, this reveals the insignificance of the lower, viz. the significance of the higher, powers of the soul. In that scheme, the position of the Avicennian "inner senses"—common sense, imagination, memory, estimation—is an intermediary one. Accordingly, this is reflected in the structure of the compilation, i.e., in the degree to which the corresponding parts of the integral text are represented in the ZM. The same applies to the powers of the rational soul and the corresponding parts of the text which are almost completely reproduced in the compiled version. As to the last, entirely omitted chapter, its subject matter (free will) presents a relatively specialized and self-contained philosophical issue—so much so that its absence from the MZ cannot be seen as affecting either the general design or the purpose of Martin's compilation.

Ad 3. At the microlevel, the logic behind the compiled text manifests itself in the selection of passages, sentences, and parts of sentences in accordance with, presumably, Martin's doctrinal and didactical commitments. For instance, in the chapters dealing with the outer senses, the selection principle is obvious: only the opening sentences are adopted, i.e., the definitions of the five senses, which apparently sufficed as a preparation for what follows and was clearly considered as more important. As to the logic of selection in those, subsequent chapters, although being less obvious, it still discernable, primarily in how individual

topics are chosen and discussed. For instance, Blund's habit to formulate each topic as a distinct *questio* at the outset is typically retained in the compilation, while other parts of the *disputationes*-scheme, e.g., particular objections and their refutations, are more often left out or shortened, the *solutio*-passages, or parts thereof, again, typically retained. In this case, it is a kind of principle of parsimony that seems to have guided the abridging process. Whether and to what degree the thus reworked text was comprehensible to Martin's readership seems to have played a secondary role.

Ad 4 & 5. The preserved direction of text flow and the grammatical congruency between pieces of cut-and-pasted text have contributed, to some degree at least, to the impression of fluency and compactness of the resulting product.[33] If nothing else, the traces of the abridging process might have been erased—provided that such a "coverup" could have played any role at all, which is dubious considering the nonextant standards of authorship in Martin's time.

None of the five listed indicators, except for the last one, is flawless; nor is the described logic of selection detectable in each and every intervention to the original text. Nonetheless, they provide a relatively solid support for the hypothesis, proposed in my 2013 report, about the compilation being put together for a specific, most probably educational purpose—e.g., a compendium to philosophical psychology at a Dominican educational establishment or a liberal arts study. The probability that it has been used in a faculty of theology is very small, considering not only Blund's "liberal" attitude on the division of explanatory work between philosophy and theology, but also a "growing competition between the faculties of arts and theology at the newly founded universities".[34]

Blund's Early Avicennian Conception of the Soul and the Puzzle of Martin's Compilation

A closer paleographic inspection of the Zadar Manuscript, compared to the three integral versions of its template, will, hopefully, confirm or disconfirm at least some of the conjectures of the previous section, and perhaps generate new ones. This, however, will hardly resolve the enigma of the 14th century copy of an incomplete text of Blund's *Treatise*.

Assessing the importance of this work in the context of medieval philosophy, Michael Dunne concludes that it "marks the entry of Aristotle's psy-

[33] An apt example of an inconspicuous overbridging of the omitted text is the transition from passage 275 to passage 279 (page 184 of the ZM).

[34] Hasse, *Avicenna's* De anima *in the Latin West*, p. 19.

chological theories to the Latin West and into the universities" (p. xiv). With this conclusion, Dunne probably expresses a consensus in the community of scholars who have studied this piece of medieval scholarship closely connected to the universities in Paris and Oxford[35]—places where Blund both studied and taught. What is, however, less clear is the real impact of his *Treatise*, especially outside the mentioned centers of learning. By all accounts, this impact must have been limited—both in temporal and spatial terms. This is judged not only by the nearly invisible traces of the work in the preserved texts of other authors of the period,[36] but also by its limited physical circulation, as indicated by only three survived copies.[37] So, if there was any initial impact, it should have started to wane already a few decades after the *Treatise* was written, i.e., by the mid 13th century, and should have faded away by, latest, the first half of the 14th century—by the earliest estimated time of origin of the ZM. Hence, the puzzle of Martin's compilation.

There are three circumstantial factors that make the discovery of the ZM even more enigmatical, from a historic-philosophical perspective: (1) the declining authority of Avicenna, not only as a commentator of Aristotle but also as a philosopher of the soul, in the second half of the 13th century; (2) Blund's abundant drawing on natural-philosophical ("empirical") sources, especially in his descriptions of the sensible soul and its powers, (3) the explosion of new philosophical and theological works in high scholastics, many of them exposing the Aristotelian conception of the soul in a new key—not only by taking advantage of the multitude of new translations of his corpus but also of the new, more sophisticated interpretations thereof. These three points could also count as reasons, though possibly not the only ones, why Blund's place in the history of medieval philosophy is a modest one, perhaps undeservedly. In the rest of this section, I will elaborate on these three points.

Ad 1. There is no shortage of comprehensive studies trying to reconstruct the diffusion of Avicenna's psychological writings in the Latin West. His earlier influence dates in the second half of the 12th century and besides Gundissalinus, the translator of his *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus* into Latin,

[35] See also: Hasse, *Avicenna's* De anima *in the Latin West*, p. 20.

[36] The single author identified with some certainty as directly influenced by Blund's *Treatise* is Alexandar Nequam (or Neckam) (1157–1217), Blund's older contemporary. See Hunt's Introduction to the 1970 critical edition of the *Treatise*, pp. viii–xi (also reprinted in CHD, pp. xxxi–xxxiv).

[37] For comparison, Gundissalinus' *De anima*, which is older than Blund's, is preserved in six manuscripts. See: Hasse, *Avicenna's* De anima *in the Latin West*, p. 13.

includes also Blund, who had direct access to that translation.[38] But what about Avicenna's influence in the following, 13th century? According to Hasse,[39] even though Avicenna's authority as Peripatetic philosopher was undisputable, almost equal to that of Aristotle, in the first decades of the century—in the period of the early diffusion of Blund's Treatise—the situation changed considerably in the subsequent period, when psychological and physiological issues and explanations were to a great degree supplanted by the metaphysical ones. It is not that the study of Avicenna's corpus in general became unpopular or obsolete; it is that his psychological writings fell out of favor to the advantage of his metaphysical works—notwithstanding the fact that the two parts of his corpus became available in Latin (under the common label *Philosophia prima*) approximately by the same time, i.e., in the second half of the 12th century. Bartolacci, drawing on Hasse, expresses this attitude as a supposition about "a general shift in cultural climate at the middle of the thirteenth century from more concrete, physiological issues, to more abstract, metaphysical concerns".[40] If there are reservations regarding this supposition, and Bartolacci himself expresses some (e.g., that the alleged shift was more continuous rather than abrupt, involving many nuances and meanders), there is little doubt about Averroes gradually replacing Avicenna as the most authoritative interpreter of Aristotle, especially his theologically most utilizable conceptions. In the second half of the 13th century, this process has undoubtedly gained momentum. So, if at the turn of the 14th century Avicennian conception of the soul became an outdated version of Aristotelian psychology, Blund's *Treatise*, being through and through Avicennian, was certainly not the most appropriate text—among so many others available—for students to read from and their instructors to copy from. It is not that its author had nothing interesting to contribute to the study of the

[38] The translation of Avicenna's Kitāb al-Nafs by Dominicus Gundissalinus (Gundisalvi) and his collaborator Avendauth is dated in the period between 1150 and 1160. Besides, Gundassalinus has written his own *Treatise on the Soul*—unsurprisingly, in Avicennian spirit—of which six copies survived. In contrast to Blund's *Treatise*, in this work the theological issues—the special ontological status of the soul, its origin and its immortality—have priority over philosophical and especially physiological themes. For Gundissalinus, the soul's individual powers are interesting only insofar as they have theological ramifications. Accordingly, in his treatise, the rational soul and the inner senses are given far more space than the outer senses and the powers of the vegetative soul. (See Werner's introduction, pp. 25–26 and 61. See also: Sander W. de Boer, *The Science of the Soul: The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's* De anima*, c. 1260–c. 1360* (Leuwen: Leuwen University Press, 2013), p. 23.) Given this fact, one is allowed to speculate that Gundissalinus' *De anima* would have been a far better option as a template for Martin's compilation than Blund's piece.

[39] Hasse, *Avicenna's* De anima *in the Latin West*, pp. 225–226.

[40] See: Bartolacci, *On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, pp. 199–200.

soul. It is simply that it was not the kind of source that, for all we know, one would deem as standard at the assessed time of origin of Martin's compilation.

Ad 2. Blund's reliance on natural-philosophical sources is well documented, primarily by Fr. Callus, the editor of the first critical edition of the *Treatise*, and by Werner, the editor of the German translation.[41] These sources comprise several layers of influence: (1) the ancient natural-historical and medical knowledge, mediated through authorities like Plato (*Timaeus*), Seneca, Constantine the African and, of course, Avicenna himself; (2) Aristotle's natural-philosophical writings available in Latin already in Blund's time;[42] (3) the continental-European medical, physiological and natural-philosophical legacy (the School of Medicine of Salerno, Willhelm of Conches, William of St. Thierry); and (4) the autochthon English corpus of natural-philosophical texts of the second half of the 12th century (Adelard of Bath, Daniel of Morley, Alfred of Sarashel).[43] One of the manifestations of the changing cultural climate during the first decades of the 13th century, especially in Paris,[44] was a general disfavor of the empirical type of evidence, not only in explanations and discussions of theologically relevant issues, but also in solving problems pertaining to the Aristotelian conceptions of the soul. Even though Martin has left out of his compilation precisely the parts of Blund's *Treatise* which were almost exclusively written under the mentioned (natural-philosophical) influences, the very fact that he did so speaks to the peculiarity of Blund being the sole source of his, presumed, compendium to philosophical psychology.

Ad 3. In his introduction to the second edition of Blund's *Treatise*, Michael Dunne modifies the theological relevance of the natural-philosophical influences mentioned in the previous paragraph: "From a religious point of view <…> much of this medical and philosophical information is neutral; the crisis when

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[41] See Fr. Calus's references to the sources in the Latin text of the 2013 critical edition of Blund's *Treatise* (CHD) together with Hunt's introduction to the Latin edition of 1970 (pp. vii–xi or pp. xxx–xliv in CHD) and Werner's introduction to: John Blund, *Traktat über die Seele*, ch. II.1. "Naturphilosophische Quellen".

[42] Werner in her introduction to the German translation of the *Treatise* tries to reconstruct concrete traces of individual writings in Blund's work (pp. 23–25).

[43] This tradition was first researched and reported by Richard W. Southern. See his *Robert Grosseteste. The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 101–102. See also Werner's Introduction to the German translation of the Treatise, pp. 26 and 42.

[44] Notably, this change coincides with the prohibition on teaching Aristotle's natural-philosophical works at the University of Paris passed by the ecclesiastical synod in 1210 and supplanted in 1255. See: David Luscombe, *Medieval Thought* (History of Western Philosophy II) (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 75–76.

it comes, will centre on the personal nature of the human intellect, and the associated issues of free will, personal immortality, reward and punishment".[45] The alleged "theological neutrality" of Blund's philosophical position[46], however, could have hardly been maintained under the changing conditions—the "shift in cultural climate", in Bartolacci's words—which had brought about the "crisis" referred to by Dunne. These conditions include the occurrence of new conceptions of the soul and, even more importantly, new sensitivity towards integrating *any* such conception into the gradually emerging doctrinal framework. How is this relevant for the puzzle of Martin's compilation?

The crucial point is that those succeeding Blund—and almost all of them also saw themselves as commentators of Aristotle's *De anima*—had a decisive advantage over their predecessors (i.e., the first generation of Aristotelian psychologists): They were much more aware of the theological, metaphysical and empirical constraints—Andrew Arlig calls them *desiderata*[47]—imposed on their potential solutions than their predecessors could have been, especially those, like Blund, who were exclusively under Avicenna's influence. Those younger authors moved across a much better charted theoretical landscape due to a much wider corpus of texts that became available to them—including the translations, commentaries and syntheses produced in the meanwhile. In the words of Arlig, the 13th century was critical for the emergence of the new science of the soul "because this was a time when Western arts masters and theologians were introduced to the full Aristotelian corpus in Latin translation, along with some treatises (also in translation) from Arabic philosophers such as Avicenna… It is during this period, as Western thinkers attempted to assimilate this new material, that the full range of options begins to appear."[48] Standing at the very beginning of this process, Blund's range of options was much more limited—it was reduced to what he could pick up from Avicenna and the sources available in Paris and Oxford at the turn of the 13th century. Notwithstanding his creativ-

[45] Introduction to CHD, pp. xii–xiii.

[46] There is reason to think that Blund himself believed that the "naturalistic" parts of his inquiry into the soul are theologically neutral. At the beginning of his *Treatise*, in the chapter "Whose task it is to investigate the soul" (21–22), he delineates the subject matter of the science of the soul in such a way that it clearly falls within the confines of philosophy, not theology. (Martin omitted this chapter, together with the entire introductory part of the *Treatise*, from his compilation.) See: Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200–1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), pp. 95–96. See also: Hasse, *Avicenna's* De anima *in the Latin West*, p. 19.

[47] Arlig, "The Complexity of the Soul Soul and the Problem of Unity in Thirteenth-Century Philosophy", pp. 197–200.

[48] Ibid., p. 197.

ity in dealing with these sources, his conception of the soul could hardly be seen by anybody living in the 14th century as representative, at least not for the science that, in Blund's time, was yet about to emerge through confrontations over several critical issues.

Of these issues, one stands out as the key point of divergence—the complexity/unity of the soul. Namely, this question had grave theological implications. Prima facie, it is not easy to see how something having parts ("powers") and something being connected to the bodily substance can be impervious to corruption. Blund was undoubtedly aware of the difficulty, together with its ramifications and the doctrinal constraints on the possible solutions. He explicitly addressed the issue at several places in his *Treatise*, including the chapter, rendered verbatim in the ZD, whose title already suggests its importance (*Utrum anima sit simplex vel composita*).[49] The solution he offered—rejection of the assumption that the soul has a substantive form—was later, during the long 13th century, challenged, and several alternative explanatory possibilities have been offered, one of which later proclaimed as the official position of the Catholic Church.[50] Arlig gives examples of the most representative solutions by citing authors like Siger of Brabant, Albert the Great, Bonaventure and, of course, Aquinas.[51] In a similar vein, Sender W. de Boer offers a synthetic account of the development of the science of the soul in the period between 1260 and 1360, identifying the question of unicity vs. plurality of substantial form as constituting "one of the most important backgrounds of the reception of the *De anima*" in the designated period. As one of the forerunners of this development, among several other Avicennian Aristotelians, he cites Blund showing how far the discussion has come compared to that initial period.[52]

As a final point, it should be emphasized that the philosophical-historical arguments exposed in this section, demonstrating the peculiarity of the occurrence of selected fragments of Blund's *Treatise* in a 14th century manuscript, are based on an implicit assumption: that the inclusion of these fragments was a deliberate choice—regardless whether it was actually made by a Dominican called Martin, who at some point of his life lived in a monastery on the eastern

[49] See: Arlig, "The Complexity of the Soul Soul and the Problem of Unity in Thirteenth-Century Philosophy", p. 198. Arlig cites Blund's argument from the second chapter of his *Treatise* (omitted from the ZM) in which Blund, by way of a *reductio*, exposes the assumption that a form (soul) cannot exist separated from its substance (body).

[50] This was Aquinas' solution, which has been accepted as the official position at the Church Council of Vienne held in 1311–1312. See: de Boer, *The Science of the Soul*, pp. 40–41.

[51] Arlig, "The Complexity of the Soul Soul and the Problem of Unity in Thirteenth-Century Philosophy", pp. 201–213.

[52] See: de Boer, *The Science of the Soul*, pp. 37–39.

Adriatic coast about the mid-14th century, and who is considered as the author of another text included in the same manuscript.[53] It would be reckless to take this assumption for granted. Namely, there is the possibility that the compilation was created much earlier and then found and copied in the 14th century. In that case, however, the mystery remains. Producing a manuscript like the one found in Italy, which presumably belonged to the Dominican monastery in Zadar, was a costly affair: it required not only the commodities of ink, paper and probably a slot in the scriptorium, but also scribal knowledge, time and dedication that could have been spent on copying something more valuable and more representative of the field—philosophical psychology, in this case. Of all the texts that might have been available to the alleged Martin, why did he choose to make his own, or copy someone else's, compilation of Blund's *Treatise*? Was that a kind of serendipity? Was it a choice determined by a severely limited supply of written sources—a situation not difficult to imagine for a town outside the standard routes of cultural exchange, with poor connections to the centers of learning? We will perhaps never know.

[53] In my 2013 report (p. 177, fn. 18), I have also expressed doubts regarding Martin as the author of this part of the manuscript. My skepticism was aroused by the following puzzle: If "Martin's" commentary to the *Sententiae* originated in the 14th century how come all the sources identified by the editor of that text (Marijan Biškup) predate 13th century?

Four Pages from Friar Martin's Manuscript

Blundova *Rasprava o duši* u srednjovjekovnom rukopisu iz Zadra

Sažetak

U radu se nadovezujem na svoj izvještaj iz 2013. u kojem sam opisao neobičan slučaj srednjovjekovnog rukopisa datiranog u 14. stoljeće. Prema kataloškoj bilješci, rukopis je pripadao dominikanskom samostanu u Zadru, a njegovo autorstvo pripisano je stanovitom opatu Martinu, koji je identificiran kao član Lombardijske provincije i lektor u dominikanskom samostanu u Splitu. Nakon što se ispostavilo da je drugi dio kodeksa zapravo kompilacija odlomaka iz *Traktata o duši* koji je na samom početku 13. stoljeća, a pod utjecajem Avicenine filozofske psihologije, napisao John Blund, to otkriće otvorilo je niz pitanja u vezi s podrijetlom, svrhom i načinom distribucije dotične kompilacije. Nakon uvoda u kojem predstavljam slučaj, dajem detaljnu analizu sadržaja dotične kompilacije u usporedbi s kritičkim izdanjem Blundova Traktata, pokušavajući identificirati logiku kojom se rukovodio »Martin« u svojoj selekciji poglavlja i odlomaka iz dotičnog djela. U završnom dijelu razmatram neke povijesno-filozofske razloge zašto bi pojava takve kompilacije mogla biti još neobičnija nego što se isprva činilo.

Ključne riječi: Martin iz Zadra (Martin de Iadera), John Blund (Iohannes Blund), duša i njezine moći, Avicena, Aristotel, analiza sadržaja