

An Inquiry into the Nature of “Soft” Oikophobia

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Summary

In this paper the author discusses the concept of oikophobia as defined by the English philosopher Sir Roger Scruton. The primary aim of the paper is to demonstrate that one may justifiably differentiate two kinds of oikophobia, which are referred to in the paper as “hard” and “soft” oikophobia. There is a special emphasis on proving the latter to be a valid construct. The distinction is proposed by examining Scruton’s original notions of oikophobia and oikophilia through the lens of Max Scheler’s phenomenology of love and hate. In addition, several other authors who have written on phenomena meaningfully related to oikophobia in the West are discussed in a comparative manner so as to provide the means for further nuancing of the primary concept of oikophobia. Finally, as an example of “soft” oikophobia, the author has taken the current issue of the Kosiinj Valley in Croatia.

Keywords: Roger Scruton; Max Scheler; oikophobia; oikophilia; xenophobia; xenophilia; Kosiinj; Kosiinj Valley

Introduction

Scruton defines oikophobia as a state of mind or a disposition of repudiation or even hatred of one’s own home or inheritance — hence the Greek root word *oikos* (Scruton, 1993, 96; 2004, 36).¹ The emergence of oikophobia as an intellectual phenomenon, Scruton argues, can be traced all the way back to the Enlightenment. An oikophobe »sees that which is his ‘own’, his inheritance, as alien; he has fallen out of communication with it and feels tainted by its claim on him. He wants to be free of that claim — free from the pressure to belong, to be with ‘us’, to love something, believe in something, accept something which is his« (Scruton, 1993, 96–97).

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1 This paper is a modified and extended article which, under the title *Soft Oikophobia*, was awarded second prize in the 2024 Oxford University Competition for Central and Eastern European Perspectives on Science, Theology and Philosophy.

There have been some interesting developments in Scruton's writings on the subject of oikophobia across the years, not least with regards to those whom today one might justifiably consider oikophobes. The purpose of this paper is to build on this development by suggesting an important and useful distinction between two considerably different kinds of oikophobia, namely, "hard" oikophobia and "soft" oikophobia. In order to do this, the paper will first examine two levels of analysis in the Scrutonian understanding of oikophobia: 1) phenomenological, and 2) cultural. Subsequently, the proposed notion of "soft" oikophobia, as distinct from the "hard" oikophobia prevalent in Scruton's writings, will be demonstrated by examining the case of the Kosinj Valley in Croatia. In the final part of the paper, it will be suggested that this more nuanced understanding of oikophobia can open the way to an interesting and somewhat ironic view of how large scale global dynamics, including international politics, law and environmentalism, could lead to favourable outcomes for the ultimate object of both oikophobia and oikophilia — the *oikos*.

Prior to any of this, however, it is worth noting that oikophobia is a negative phenomenon — the negative here meaning that which negates, that which asserts itself by going against something which is already there, and which depends for its own identity on the very thing it seeks to oppose or abolish. It is for this reason that, if one wants to get to the bottom of the issue of oikophobia, one must start from oikophilia.

1. *Oikophilia*

In his *Green Philosophy*, Scruton defines oikophilia as »the love of home, a motive that comprehends all our deepest attachments, and which spills out in the moral, aesthetic and spiritual emotions that transfigure our world, creating in the midst of our emergencies a shelter that future generations also may enjoy« (Scruton, 2012, 214–215).

Oikophilia is, Scruton expands, a family of motives that together express our inherent need for belonging and attachment to what we consider our home (Scruton, 2012, s. v. oikophilia). A closer examination of the use of the word in classic Greek literature shows that the word *oikos*² stood for a plethora of different meanings, including: house, home, family, substance, inheritance, property, dwelling–place, and even temple (Liddell et al., 1968, s. v. oikos). Understandably, the word is also the root of two modern day words which are central to our discussion: ecology and economics. Likewise, the word *philia*, with all its derivatives, for the Greeks meant not just any kind of love, but affectionate regard, amiability, fondness, friendship between equals, familial affection, but also a sense of dependence upon those or that which is superior to me (Liddell et al., 1968, s. v. philia). Oikophilia is an intrinsic disposition of all human persons which binds

2 All instances of Greek etymology in this paper are referenced according to Liddell et al., 1968.

them to some place and to someone, to a locality and to a community. This disposition includes, among other things, the sense of belonging, rootedness, memory, identity, and perhaps most importantly, to borrow from Buber, the encounter with the “Thou” through which I can know myself as “I”. Scruton refers to the latter as the sense of first-person plural, the sense of “we”. From these then arises, as a matter of course, a sense of personal responsibility towards all these objects of our deepest affections — towards, in a word, the *oikos* (Scruton, 2012, s. v. *oikos*). However, if both the *oikos* and *philia* are so intrinsic to human nature, how is it that they get to be replaced by their sheer opposites? This, of course, is a difficult question, and so a deeper insight into the phenomenology of these fundamental aspects of human nature is necessary before continuing in search for an answer.

The phenomenological underpinning of this part of the inquiry is the phenomenology of love and hate in the writings of the German philosopher Max Scheler, which is used here as a lens for closer examination of Scruton’s notions of *oikophilia* (a form of love) and *oikophobia* (a form of hate). When analyzed psychologically, love and hate are generally understood as two equally fundamental, albeit opposite and divergent emotional states. Phenomenologically speaking, Scheler argues they are »entirely primitive and immediate modes of emotional response to the value-content itself« (Scheler, 2017, 149). Nevertheless, a closer phenomenological inspection shows that the two are not equally primordial nor equally foundational modes of relation. If one analyzes the fundamental structure of how the person relates to reality as a whole, one finds that prior to cognition, judgement, or volition there is a »primal act of abandoning the self and its conditions, its own ‘contents of consciousness’, of *transcending* them, in order to come to experiential contact with the world«, and this primal act is precisely *love* (Scheler, 1973, 110). Implicit in this act of love-inspired will-to-attend-to-value is a self-existent order of attending which, for Scheler, is imposed on the person from the outside, from within the »world of essential values [which] circumscribes and defines the being he can know« (Scheler, 1973, 111). This leads to the conclusion that at the core of the world-order, or the whole of reality, is what Scheler calls *ordo amoris* — the order of love. The fact that love, as an act of world-attending which has »an intrinsic reference to *value*« (Scheler, 2017, 141), is so foundational to the whole of human experience, means that hate, although antithetical to love in psychological terms, also partakes in this process of the primordial act of loving. Scheler even goes so far as to claim that »hate is only a reaction against a love which is in some way false« (Scheler, 1973, 126). The phenomenology of hate is a subject which will be revisited in the next part of the paper.

Following this very brief phenomenological outline, it is reasonable to assert that *oikophobia* is to *oikophilia* what hate is to love. The latter two, though generally considered as polar opposites within the realm of human affection, actually share the same phenomenological structure, as they are both kinds of attention. The obvious difference, of course, is that love is a force that creates, preserves,

cares, nurtures, and saves, while hate is a force that destroys, spoils, corrupts, distorts, and ruins. More importantly, however, to put Schelerian phenomenology in the simplest of terms — first there is love, then there is hate. Thus, oikophilia as a particular kind of *philia* is not only inherent to each individual, but is the predominant disposition. However, with enough neglect, misguidance or deceit, this immensely powerful force can easily go astray and miss its natural mark. Its original object, *oikos*, remains in place, but now it is met with a different kind of affection, what Scruton calls oikophobia. The innate *philia* does not go away either. It is merely redirected. Its object is no longer *oikos*, but *xenos* — the other. Hence, Scruton's third concept in this constellation — *xenophilia*.

Following what has been said so far, and in order to provide the means for the subsequent case of “soft” oikophobia, a closer examination of the nature of oikophobia is necessary. For this reason, the inquiry will follow two levels of analysis: 1) phenomenological and 2) cultural.

2. *Oikophobia*

2.1. *Phenomenological analysis*

As previously stated, oikophobia is to oikophilia what hate is to love. The identity of the former depends on the identity of the latter. Since a Scrutonian understanding of the concepts of *oikos* and *philia* has already been established, the inquiry now turns to the word *phobos*. The Greek word itself was predominantly used to describe a state of fear, panic flight, terror, and dread (Liddell et al., 1968, s. v. *phobos*). In the context of oikophobia, however, clearly the word is not to be understood as fear. This disposition is far more complex and nuanced. It is a spectrum, ranging from mere neglect and repudiation, all the way to outright hatred and desire for destruction. As oikophilia, it is still attending to the same object, but it is a completely different kind of attention. Xenophilia, on the other hand, can be understood as an attitude of excess attention, affection, compassion, and love towards the strange, the foreign, the novel, the unusual, the not-ours, which are all included in the classical understanding of the word *xenos* and its derivatives (Liddell et al., 1968, s. v. *xenos*). As such, xenophilia functions as a sort of a replacing mechanism. When the *oikos*, as the primordial object of a person's most inherent and most intimate affection, is as it were dethroned, one is left with an *oikos*-shaped void to be filled with something else. This “something else” is precisely why *xenos* is a fitting word.

However, what compels the individual to not only redirect the intrinsic *philia* from the *oikos* as its natural object onto the *xenos* as a replacement, but to turn against the *oikos* with all the negative affection at his or her disposition? What does it take for attention to the same given object (*oikos*) to turn from positive to negative, from creative to destructive, from value-affirming to value-negating? Again, it is useful to consider the phenomenology of love and hate. To reassert, hate is a phenomenologically subsidiary phenomenon. It is a distortion of the pri-

mal and all–experience–grounding act of love as attention directed at an object as a bearer of value. Hate, Scheler argues, is always »the result of some *incorrect* or *confused* love«, and »every act of hate is founded on an act of love« (Scheler, 1973, 125). Like love, hate is also a *movement* towards a given object as a bearer of value. It is not mere negation of value. Much like love, it is »a *positive act*, involving a presentation of *disvalue*... a *positive* preoccupation with lower possibilities of value« (Scheler, 2017, 152–153). And since hate is itself deeply dependent on the primal act of love–driven attention, it likewise tends to produce a peculiar form of love, or rather a “pseudo–love”. This state is what Scheler refers to as »*ressentiment*–love«, wherein »everything which is ‘loved’ in that way is loved only because it is the opposite of something else which one has already come to hate« (Scheler, 1973, 125–126).

As both Scheler and Scruton observe, resentment, being the highest and most affectionate form of hate, cannot be directed at just any given object of attention. A person cannot be resentful towards a brick, or the colour red, or rain. Much like our deepest positive emotions and spiritual states, such as trust, admiration, veneration, and awe, resentment also demands a suitable object to which it can attach itself, and this is necessarily either an individual person, or that which we can in some way at least refer to as a person or a collective of persons (Scheler, 1973, 126–127; Scruton, 2017, 25–26). In other words, to that which can be referred to as *You*, and not *It*. Apart from an individual person, this can also be God, family, community, nation — in a word, the *oikos*. Drawing on Nietzsche’s view on *ressentiment* as a survival or adaptation mechanism, which through Christianity has come to pervade the modern world order, Scruton argues that it is precisely resentment that is fueling the modern–day revolutionary soteriologies of the radical left, in which the actors are divided into masters and slaves, or the oppressor and the oppressed, and the destiny of the latter entirely hinges on the failure of the former. In such a constellation, the political solutions need to be instantaneous, radical and total — all indispensable features of the politics of the left from the French revolution onwards (Scruton, 2012, 77–78). And this brings us to our second level of analysis.

2.2. Cultural analysis

In his earliest writing on the subject, Scruton states: »Oikophobia, I believe, comes about with the secularization of society, and the final loss by the intellectual of his once priestly role. There seems to be no special place for the intellectual in a capitalist democracy; lacking the religious feelings that enable men to bear their isolation, he sinks into an agitated melancholy and resentment towards the ordinary human world. It is then that he begins to invent his magisterial stereotypes of home, in order to take his revenge on it« (Scruton, 1993, 97).

As Peter Augustine Lawler suggests in his paper on *Roger Scruton’s Conservatism*, there has been a noteworthy development in Scruton’s understanding of oikophobia, not least with regards to those whom today one might reasonably consider oikophobes. Scruton used to associate the oikophobes mainly with

intellectuals. »Now«, writes Lawler (2016), »they're more characteristic of the cosmopolitan elite that does globalized intellectual labour — 'urban elites'« (Scruton, 2016). Though Scruton never mentions the term *oikophobe* in the paper that Lawler is here referring to, he is nevertheless right to suggest that the "urban elites" are a mere variation on the theme. To take an obvious example for comparison, Scruton never uses the term *oikophilia* in his essay on *Conserving Nature*, but instead writes of the »love of home« (Scruton, 2021, 152). More importantly, Lawler is also right to detect a development in Scruton's understanding of oikophobia. This brings us closer to the main point of the paper, which is that oikophobia, as Scruton defines it, can manifest itself on the cultural or civilizational level in such various ways and on a spectrum so broad that it is necessary to expand the concept, at least in terms of "hard" and "soft" versions of oikophobia. Since the focus of this paper is "soft" oikophobia, it would be useful firstly to inspect and define the notion of "hard" oikophobia, in contrast to which one can then define its "soft" counterpart. Here it will be helpful to take a brief look into several other recent writings on the history of ideas that similarly deal with the same phenomenon at the cultural level. These works, written from different points of view and applying different conceptual tools, together can provide further insight into the nuanced nature of oikophobia.

In his book *Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault*, American philosopher Stephen R. C. Hicks argues, to some extent similarly to Scruton, that the roots of postmodernism can be traced back to the Counter-Enlightenment. Hicks' fundamental claim is that the Enlightenment as an overarching movement had been »philosophically incomplete and vulnerable«, this being its »fatal flaw« that would soon set in motion the Counter-Enlightenment movement. The latter will in turn lead to, among other instances, the unsparing critique of reason itself in Kant's philosophy, the critique of the patriarchal capitalist society in Marx, and finally to the overtly anti-Western postmodernism of Foucault, Derrida, Rorty, and others (Hicks, 2004, 24–27, 80–83). Much unlike Hicks, English historian Tom Holland argues in *Dominion: How the Christian Revolution Remade the World* that postmodernism, particularly in the form of the social justice movement and *woke*, as its 21st century offspring, are quintessentially a late product of a deeply Christian worldview. In Holland's analysis, not only did Christianity help shape notions such as *secularism* and even *West* itself, but, more importantly, it was Christianity that first introduced some of the most fundamental aspects and values of the West today: institutionalized care for the poor and deprived, universal human rights and human dignity, legal protection of the weak against the powerful, separation of Church and state, etc. Following the Enlightenment, in a centuries-long turn of events that far exceeds the scope of this paper, this all-pervasive and all-encompassing Christian worldview eventually gave rise to some instances of the most seemingly anti-religious or anti-Christian kind in the West, such as Enlightenment humanism, Marxism, and even the postmodernist *woke* culture. All of these, Holland argues, would be inconceivable in a pre-Christian or a non-Christian world. Thus, much like

Nietzsche, though by no means sharing in his revolt against Christianity, Holland claims that Christianity alone is to blame, in a way, for the culture of guilt, victimization and self-denigration prevalent in the West today (Holland, 2019, 515–542). Lastly and most recently, in the *Western Self-Contempt: Oikophobia in the Decline of Civilizations*, American philosopher Benedict Beckeld presents an interesting, though seemingly non-Scrutonian view of oikophobia. Unlike Scruton, who clearly sees oikophobia as a postmodern phenomenon of the modern-day West (Scruton, 1993, 96–97; 2004, 36–37), Beckeld sees it as a cyclically recurring phenomenon, with instances traceable throughout history: from ancient Greek and Rome, through rises and falls of empires and states, all the way to the modern-day West. The cycle is as follows. In the early stage of each society, the members group together against any given foreign enemy. If it manages to overcome the still primarily external challenges, the society enters a stage of relative peace and prosperity. The elites and intellectuals, who were once concerned with the survival of their society and the fight against the common foreign enemy, led by vanity and snobbery now turn against each other, and eventually against their own society, the *oikos*. Thus, oikophobia becomes a late stage of “cultural decadence”, a stage that, in Beckeld’s view, is now recurring in the West yet again (Beckeld, 2022, 5–10, 156–160).

Notwithstanding obvious nuances, and even more obvious points of divergence among these instances of cultural analysis of oikophobia, the point of clear convergence is evident in their respective implicit or explicit portrayals of oikophobes. Scruton’s multicultural urban elites, Hicks’ neo-Marxist postmodernists, Holland’s pseudo-Christian *woke* social justice warriors, Beckeld’s self-contemptuous oikophobes of the modern-day West — all exhibit a strong resentful attention towards or reaction against the *oikos* (phenomenological component), and all have embedded in them, to a higher or lesser extent, some form of a guilt complex (cultural component). Hence, his type of oikophobia, which combines these two phenomenological and cultural components, should be referred to as “hard” oikophobia. The reason for this claim is not only in the similarities, but also in the fact that there are phenomena which arguably have all the characteristics of oikophobia, but which do not have the same blueprint of hard oikophobia — neither on the phenomenological, nor the cultural level. An example of this will now be examined, before arriving at the definition of what the paper proposes should be called “soft” oikophobia.

3. “Soft” oikophobia

3.1. The example of the Kosinj Valley in Croatia

The Kosinj Valley is a valley in Croatia, located in the Adriatic hinterland. It is a region noted for its natural beauty and its rich cultural heritage, including several medieval churches, a cemetery site dating possibly even to the 10th century (Čataj et al., 2023), and a host of various other significant and recently explo-

red medieval archeological sites (Šmalcelj Novaković, 2018). Recent research (Mance, 2013; 2023) plausibly indicates that the region was also home to the first printing house in Croatia, and thus the place of origin of the *Missale Romanum Glagolitice* from 1483 — the first book printed in the Croatian language. Most importantly, however, the Kosinj Valley is still home to the local population, who has inhabited the area for centuries. Nevertheless, after some fifty years in the making, the national government has now decided to submerge the entire valley in order to build a hydropower plant on this site. The stated goal of the project is to improve the overall stability of power supply in the region, by balancing the energy production of renewable, but overall less reliable sources that depend on wind or sunlight. The problem is that this “solution” comes at the price of destruction of populated villages, forced displacement of residents, devastation of natural landmarks, and irreversible *damnatio memoriae* of cultural heritage. The price to be paid for this alleged solution is thus a grim combination of ecocide and ethnocide, which is why some argue that the project is nothing short of “developmental violence” (Potkonjak, 2024).

To make matters worse, some experts in the field have recently claimed that there are serious indicators of the project being technically unsustainable and economically unprofitable. In a recent whistleblower interview, a high-ranking former official at the state-owned enterprise responsible for the project revealed detailed projections that show, for example, that in 40 years’ time the lake-reservoir would be operating to its full capacity for only 300 days, leaving it half-empty or even totally empty for most of the remainder of the time. This also means that the hydropower system would generally produce less than 50% of the planned energy. This is primarily due to the fact that the rivers in the surrounding area simply cannot supply the volume of water required (Tripalo, 2022). Others have pointed to challenges of such a project for biodiversity, as well as a lack of consideration of geodiversity in previous environment impact assessment studies, not least with regards to the challenges of the karst terrain of the valley in building a structure as massive as the intended hydropower system (Butorac et al., 2017; Butorac i Cvitković, 2019).

Clearly the case of Kosinj exhibits all general symptoms of oikophobia: devaluation and destruction of natural beauty and national cultural heritage, destruction and displacement of centuries-old homes of the local population, utter neglect of the rights and freedoms of the citizens of a sovereign state, etc. Furthermore, all is done for the stated purpose of the nation’s technological and economic progress, but dictated by a distant and remote center of political power, with no actual role in the process by the people who have the most — their own *oikos* — at stake. It is particularly interesting that the project of the hydropower system is classified as a national strategic investment project, which in practice elevates it above the law and, in that sense, beyond the reach of democratic procedures. This is because the purpose of the project is presented as a “national interest”, regardless of the fact that its implementation involves immense harm to the members of that same nation. The “national interest” is a problematic mo-

tive, not least because the efficiency and sustainability of the project are highly questionable. All this will surely leave any reasonable disinterested observer quite perplexed with regards to the “real” reason why a sovereign European nation state, with no existing problem in energy production whatsoever, would even consider carrying out a project with such destructive consequences. This, at last, brings us to the notion of “soft” oikophobia.

3.2. *The notion of “soft” oikophobia*

The reason for a case such as the case of the Kosinj Valley in modern-day Croatia (or at least one of the reasons) becomes somewhat more intelligible if one considers the broader economic and geopolitical context and the current state of instability in the field of energy production in the whole of Europe, especially within the European Union. A massive project such as the Kosinj hydroelectric power plant, which promises stable energy production and so exemplifies the technological prowess and economic strength of a relatively small country such as Croatia, if properly executed has reasonable potential to become, or at least to be presented as, a project of transnational interests. A project like this can be a good opportunity for drawing the attention of foreign investments, or for promotion and exportation of technological solutions to foreign powers. Another possible reason would be that the members of the current government see this type of project merely as an item in their personal political portfolio, something to show for at the international level, especially should they be inclined to exchange their national political positions for, perhaps, the much more comfortable ones of Brussels or Strasbourg.

In any case, to be fair to the oikophobes behind the Kosinj case, one has to acknowledge that nothing in their motives that might be reasonably predictable betrays any trace of either resentment towards what is being destroyed in the wake of their project, or a guilt complex with regards to privileges in any shape or form. In place of resentment, there is mere neglect and quiet repudiation of the *oikos* (phenomenological component). In place of a guilt complex, there is an inferiority complex (cultural component). The latter is particularly pernicious, as it can drive the bearer of the complex to do otherwise unimaginable things in order to be able to cope with it, thus further exacerbating the former. Since the difference is so significant in both of the fundamental components of oikophobia, the particular kind of oikophobia in the example examined above can reasonably be referred to as “soft” oikophobia. The “softness” here signifies the implicit character of harm to the *oikos*, as well as fondness towards the *xenos*, as opposed to the explicit character of the two in the case of “hard” oikophobia.

Likewise, xenophilia, as the flipside of oikophobia, has its “hard” and “soft” variations. Again, xenophilia broadly implies yielding the privileged position of the *oikos* as the object of the person’s deepest affection and responsibility, to a certain *xenos*, to that which is “not-ours”. In this case, however, what varies is not the motivational aspect, but the nature of *xenos*. Interestingly, in addition to the scope of meanings mentioned above, the same Greek word was also used to de-

signate a »guest–friend, applied to persons and states bound by a treaty or tie of hospitality« (Liddell et al., 1968, s. v. *xenos*). This provides even the etymological grounds to interpret the *xenos* of “soft” xenophilia as the other, the foreigner, and the “not–ours”, in front of whom we are willing to present ourselves in the best light, not because we are simply well–meaning, but because we are bound by a treaty of some sort, and so driven by a particular interest. Couple this with sufficient neglect towards the *oikos*, and enough of an inferiority complex, and as soon as the opportunity arises, “soft” oikophobia becomes all but inevitable. Not only does this insight make sense of the matter in terms of international politics, but it also hints at an important irony of a possible solution to “soft” oikophobia.

As a genuine conservative thinker, in all his writing on the subject Scruton has been uncompromisingly in favour of the primacy of the bottom–up approach. This approach includes, among other things: enabling those who have the most at stake in a given situation to come up with a solution on their own; making it impossible to externalize the costs of one’s actions onto others or onto future generations; favouring free trade solutions against the solutions of the state. Particularly regarding the latter in his essay on *Conserving Nature*, Scruton writes that »what has gone wrong [...] is not the attachment of conservatives to the market, but the failure to see what a real market solution requires: namely, the retreat of the state and its projects from every decision in which local aims and loyalties are at stake« (Scruton, 2021, 162).

From this, it is clear that even at the prescriptive level, there are some aspects of the problem which unequivocally pertain to both suggested types of oikophobia. However, what if the capacity for a bottom–up approach has been completely depleted, and there nevertheless remains the need to limit the state because the *oikos* is at stake? It can be argued that in such cases a somewhat ironic top–down solution should perhaps be considered. One such instance is the so–called Precautionary Principle. As an instrument of international law, it states that »if it is possible that a given policy or action might cause harm to the public or the environment, and if there is still no scientific agreement on the issue, the policy or action in question should not be carried out«.³ Notwithstanding the vagueness of some of the key concepts in this definition — such as »harm«, »action«, »scientific agreement«, etc. — the underlying concerns that gave rise to the principle in the first place are something which should not be simply neglected, as Scruton notes in his detailed review of the principle, particularly in terms of »the non–negotiable nature of certain human goods, which we wish to rescue entirely from the process of deliberation« (Scruton, 2012, 104–136). As exemplified in the case of the Kosinj Valley, this particularly holds true for instances of “soft” oikophobia. The irony of this possible solution, if it could be successfully applied, is in the fact that by valuing the global political and legal order more highly than the most fundamental needs of its own citizens, or its own natural resources, or its own cultural heritage, the state indirectly lends itself to becoming limited “from

3 For details on the Precautionary Principle, see: European Union, s. a.

above”, thus being denied the capacity for oikophobia by virtue of the very object of its xenophilia.

Conclusion

Both the phenomenological and cultural levels of analysis of oikophobia, as well as xenophilia, show that there are significant differences in how these two function and how they can manifest themselves. This insight provides a useful differentiation between “hard” and “soft” oikophobia. In the case of “hard” oikophobia, the underlying phenomenological component is resentment towards the *oikos*, while the underlying cultural component is a guilt complex. In the case of “soft” oikophobia, the underlying phenomenological component is neglect of the *oikos*, while the underlying cultural component is an inferiority complex. As the case of the Kosinj Valley illustrates, this marked difference between the two types of oikophobia invites an openness to possible solutions which do not necessarily need to be applicable in the case of “hard” oikophobia. An example of this is the Precautionary Principle, which could be applied to limit the power of the state “from above”, in favour of the *oikos*. Further research into this matter should focus on a phenomenological analysis of neglect, combining it with a cultural analysis of the inferiority complex, following the succinct outlines given in the paper. This would provide a clearer insight into the nature of “soft” oikophobia than it was possible to accomplish within the limits of this paper, while this in turn would benefit further research of other instances of this as yet unexplored phenomenon.

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Uvid u narav “meke” oikofobije

Valentino Findrik*

Sažetak

U ovom radu autor obrađuje koncept oikofobije kako ga je definirao engleski filozof Roger Scruton. Primarni je cilj rada pokazati da je moguće opravdano razlikovati dvije vrste oikofobije, o kojima se u radu govori kao “tvrdoj” i “mekoj” oikofobiji. Pritom je cilj bio dokazati da je potonja valjan konstrukt. Distinkcija je predložena kao rezultat istraživanja Scrutonovih izvornih pojmova oikofobije i oikofilije kroz prizmu fenomenologije ljubavi i mržnje Maxa Schelera. Pored toga, u radu je komparativno razmatran niz autora koji su pisali o pojavama značenjski povezanima s oikofobijom na Zapadu, kako bi bila pružena potpora za preciznije nijansiranje primarnoga koncepta oikofobije. Konačno, autor u radu raspravlja o aktualnom slučaju Kosinjske doline u Hrvatskoj kao primjeru “meke” oikofobije.

Ključne riječi: Roger Scruton; Max Scheler; oikofobija; oikofilija; ksenofobija; ksenofilija; Kosinj; Kosinjska dolina

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