Logic, Words, and Representations*

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16Frege, G.
1:81
Original scientific paper /
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Primljeno / Received: 11. 11. 2025.
Prihvaćeno / Accepted: 24. 11. 2025.
https://doi.org/10.52685/pihfb.51.2(102).11

Summary

This paper accompanies and introduces the English translation of Franjo Marković's text "Of Words" – a section from his manuscript *Logic*. The paper has two principal aims. First, it draws attention to several themes that Marković discusses throughout the first part of *Logic* – the part immediately preceding the section "Of Words" – which I take to be important for a better appreciation of that section. I focus on Marković's understanding of logic itself, and how, according to him, it relates to psychology on the one hand, and to language and grammar on the other. I also consider Marković's account of concept and representations important to logic, and I compare his views with those of Gottlob Frege. Second, I draw attention to some of the issues that Marković addresses in the section "Of Words" and relate them to the themes discussed previously – such as negative names, absolute names, and Marković's criticism of Heymann Steinthal's view of logic. The paper opens with a brief biographical sketch of Marković and concludes with remarks concerning the English translation of the section that follows.

Keywords: Concepts, Frege Gottlob, logic, Marković Franjo, ordinary language, representations, words.

* This paper and the accompanying translation and notes were produced within the Zagreb Institute of Philosophy projects *Antipsychologistic Conceptions of Logic and their Reception in Croatian Philosophy* (APsiH, reviewed by the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Youth and financed through the National Recovery and Resilience Plan by the European Union – NextGenerationEU) and *Intentionality and Modes of Existence* (IP-2022-10-5915, financed by the Croatian Science Foundation).

> *For a mind not previously versed in the meaning and right use of the various kinds of words, to attempt the study of methods of philosophising, would be as if some one should attempt to become an astronomical observer, having never learned to adjust the focal distance of his optical instruments so as to see distinctly.*
>
> J. S. Mill[1]

The text "Of Words" ["O riečih"] forms the opening section of the second part of Franjo Marković's manuscript *Logic* [*Logika*], composed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and subsequently revised and expanded over the following years. In this introductory essay, I provide relevant biographical notes on Marković, describe the manuscript itself, and highlight several philosophically stimulating aspects of the manuscript, especially in relation to the translated section concerned with language. The essay concludes with remarks on the translation, accompanied by a list of key terms paired with Marković's original Croatian expressions – often perceptive and inventive neologisms. A bibliography of related works currently available (or forthcoming) in English and German is appended.

The author

Franjo Marković (1845–1914) is today regarded as one of the central figures of modern Croatian philosophy. He studied at the University of Vienna (1862–1865), where he also earned his doctorate in philosophy in 1872, under the supervision of the Herbartian Robert Zimmermann, a member of the so-called Bolzano Circle.[2] Following the re-establishment of the University

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[1] John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1919), p. 11.

[2] The most comprehensive biography of Marković to date is Ivan Peklić, *Život i djelo Franje Markovića* [*The Life and Work of Franjo Marković*] (Zagreb/Križevci: HAZU, 2014). Ana Grgić's "Franjo Marković and Srećko Kovač on the Identity and Continuity of Croatian Philosophy" provides a concise biographical outline of Marković, while Marotti, *Marković's Critique of Hegel's Logic*, pp. 21–27, describes the Viennese intellectual context in which he was educated. So far, no comprehensive English biography of Marković has been published. A German overview was written by his student and department colleague Albert Bazala, "Franjo Marković: ein philosophisches Porträt". (For the relevant bibliographical information on the works available in English and German, see the bibliography at the end of this essay.)

of Zagreb in 1874, Marković was appointed its first professor of philosophy, and he remained a prominent philosophical and public figure in Croatia until his retirement in 1909 – and indeed beyond. During his tenure, he developed a comprehensive philosophy curriculum covering all major philosophical disciplines (except metaphysics), drawing primarily on contemporary literature and approaches. His philosophical views were shaped chiefly by post-Kantian, anti-idealistic thinkers, often with empiricist and naturalistic inclinations, such as J. F. Herbart, H. Lotze, J. S. Mill, W. Wundt, and R. Zimmermann. He was consistently and decisively critical of Hegel and the later speculative idealist tradition.

In 1903, Marković published the first systematic exposition of aesthetics in the Croatian language, securing his reputation as a primarily *aesthetic* thinker – a reputation that, unjustly, accompanied him until quite recently.[3] In this exposition, he adopted a formalist conception of aesthetics influenced by R. Zimmermann, to whose memory the work was dedicated.[4] However, Marković's numerous preserved manuscripts and lecture notes – only partially researched and published to this day – reveal him to be a far more versatile and prolific philosopher than previously assumed, extending well beyond a Herbartian aesthetic formalism or even the aesthetic themes in the broader sense. The section from his *Logic* translated here, "Of Words", undoubtedly bears witness to this, as does the *Logic* manuscript as a whole – for instance, his criticism of the so-called absolute logic, that is, the Hegelian version of logic-as-metaphysics, or of algebraic logic (I return to these and other logical themes below).[5] Other examples include the posthumously published selection from his *Pedagogics* [*Pedagogika*] and the recently published fragment of his *Ethics*, both written along Herbartian lines.[6]

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[3] Franjo pl. Marković, *Razvoj i sustav općenite estetike* [*Development and System of General Aesthetics*] (Zagreb: Naklada Kr. Hrv.-Slav.-Dalm. Zemaljske vlade, 1903). The abbreviation "pl." befor Marković's surname is the Croatian equivalent of the German "*von*" or the English "*Sir*"; it denotes the noble origin of the person who bears it. Marković occasionally used it in his publications.

[4] A brief "glimpse" into Marković's aesthetics can be found in Kovač, "Franjo pl. Marković: On the 150th Anniversary of His Birth", pp. 186–187.

[5] For further details on this criticism, see Kovač "Franjo pl. Marković …", pp. 184–185 and Marotti, *Marković's Critique of Hegel's Logic*.

[6] Franjo Marković, *Pedagogika* (izbor) [*Pedagogics* (a Selection)], in Franjo Zenko (ed.), *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1995), pp. 115–128; and *Etika* [*Ethics*] (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2016). (The apograph of *Ethics*, which, alongside the already published part, also contains a previously unpublished section, apparently preserved only in this apograph, was recently discovered in the archives of the Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb.)

Even the philosophical works that Marković published during his lifetime challenge the perception of him as primarily an aesthetic thinker. He made significant contributions to the establishment of Croatian philosophical terminology, initiated the study of Croatia's philosophical heritage, and began developing the idea of a "national philosophy".[7] With regard to the latter, Marković's conception is aptly summarised in the opening section of *Logic*, when writing that

> nations are kept alive only by a *lively striving toward [logical, aesthetical, and ethical] ideals*; it is a hearth to millions of souls. The philosophical spirit is a unifier not only of thoughts, but of feelings and deeds. Such is the grand educational significance of philosophy; it is also the significance of the striving of our people, to claim philosophy for itself; this striving is not a mere intellectual task for our people, but also an ethical and national duty. <…> Even if it is no birthmother, philosophy is a breast feeder that rears a nation and liberates its spirit.[8]

Of course, Marković's idea here is not that one should strive towards an esoteric national philosophical system that would exclude others and divide nations; rather, as he remarks,

> if the philosophical spirit unifies the individuals of a nation, it likewise unifies various nations, it is a cosmopolitan force. <…> *Philosophy is the spiritual cosmos* ("world") *of all nations*. It spreads from nation to nation, and those that have been newcomers in its sanctum two or three centuries ago are now the forebears. [9]

A noteworthy idea, later elaborated by Marković's student and colleague Albert Bazala (1877–1947). Whether intentionally or not, Bazala embodied this idea for almost half a century through numerous public lectures, popular writings, and the first three-volume history of philosophy ever written in the Croatian language.

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[7] For the latter two, see Marković "Philosophische Schriftsteller kroatischer Abkunft" and "Logic, Chapter 1", pp. 880–882, as well as Kovač, "Franjo pl. Marković …", pp. 171–175. Marković also wrote a comprehensive study of the Croatian philosopher and scientist Rugjer Bošković (*Filosofijski rad Rugjera Josipa Boškovića* [*The Philosophical Work of Rugjer Josip Bošković*] (Zagreb, 1888)). Bojan Marotti discusses Marković's distinctive Croatian philosophical terminology in "Nazivlje u Markovićevoj *Etici*" ["Terminology in Marković's *Ethics*"], in Bojan Marotti, *Prema domovini misli: Ogledi o hrvatskoj filozofiji od Markovića do Cipre* (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 2019), pp. 309–348.

[8] Marković, "Logic, Chapter 1", pp. 881–882; see also Kovač, "Franjo pl. Marković …", pp. 171–175.

[9] Marković, "Logic, Chapter 1", p. 881.

Beyond philosophy and academia, and in keep with his philosophical interests and commitments, Marković was also a literary writer, a critic of literature and theatre, a politician, a philologist, and a translator. Unsurprisingly, his philological education and interests are especially evident in the section translated here, "Of Words". During the 1860s and 1870s in particular, he wrote a number of literary works, and in the following decades, he produced several in-depth critical-aesthetic studies, primarily concerned with the Croatian literary heritage.[10] In the 1880s, he served in the Croatian Parliament, where he advocated Croatian national interests (at the time, Croatia was under the Hungarian Crown within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy).

For all the contributions and influences outlined above, Marković is today regarded as a central figure in the development of modern Croatian philosophy from the late nineteenth century onwards. And I would add: In terms of his philosophical style, orientation, and the themes he elaborated in his published – and even more so, his unpublished – writings, Marković was the thinker who came closest to analytic philosophy within the Croatian philosophical tradition when compared to other prominent modern representatives of that tradition who wrote primarily in Croatian before the Second World War.[11] Given his philosophical background, this is not altogether surprising. (I return to this point in the next section.)

Marković's rich philosophical opus, both published and unpublished, still awaits full discovery as well as proper evaluation and re-evaluation. The latter – re-evaluation – began in the 1980s with Vladimir Filipović's insightful study of the type and extent of Marković's Herbartianism, and the former – proper

[10] For example: Franjo Marković, *Estetička ocjena Gundulićeva* Osmana [*The Aesthetic Evaluation of Gundulić's* Osman] (Zagreb 1880); "Etički sadržaj naših narodnih poslovica" ["The Ethical Content of Our Folk Proverbs"], *RAD JAZU* 96 (1889), pp. 167–227; "Prilog estetičkoj nauci o baladi i romance" ["A Contribution to the Aesthetic Study of the Ballad and the Romance"], in *RAD JAZU* 138 (1899), pp. 118–205. Marković's 1889 paper on folk proverbs was his only predominantly ethical work published during his lifetime.

[11] Another example that comes to mind from the late nineteenth century is the Dalmatian mathematician, logician, and philosopher Albino Nagy (1866–1901). Born in Trogir, he was educated in Zadar and later in Vienna, where one of his professors was Franz Brentano. In Vienna, in 1888, he also earned his doctorate in philosophy on the topic of mathematical logic and subsequently wrote extensively on the subject. Nagy died in Rome and was buried in Zadar. His influence on Croatian philosophers and logicians, however, remined negligible until quite recently, and none of his works were originally published in Croatian. For further details on Nagy, see Kovač and Žarnić, "An Outline of the History of Croatian Logic", sect. 3.1, and Ivan Macut's forthcoming book on Nagy (Zagreb: Institute of Philosophy).

evaluation – in the 1990s with the examination of his philosophical *Nachlass*.[12] Over the past decade, a century after his death, interest in his philosophical work has grown considerably.[13]

The manuscript

The early parts of Marković's *Logic* date back to the mid-1870s, when he began lecturing on the subject at the University of Zagreb, and the work was gradually expanded and revised in the years that followed.[14] The version of *Logic* on which the translation of the section "Of Words" is based – one of its preserved apographs – dates from the academic year 1902/1903 or later and is held in the archives of the Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb.[15]

This apograph of *Logic* consists of two parts – the "Introduction to Logic" and the "System of Logic" – amounting to approximately 1,000 handwritten pages distributed across nineteen medium-sized notebooks (one notebook from the second part is currently missing).

The first part of *Logic* consists of seven sections (or chapters):

I/i. (The untitled introductory section[16])

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[12] Vladimir Filipović, "Franjo Marković – rodoljubni pjesnik i učitelj filozofije. Koliko u filozofiji Herbartovac?" [Franjo Marković – A Patriotic Poet and Teacher of Philosophy. To What Extent Was He a Herbartian in Philosophy?], *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, 8(1-2) (1982), pp. 7–24. See also the notes 6 and 18 for the early publications of parts of his *Nachlass*, as well as Srećko Kovač, "Formalizam i realizam u logici: Franjo pl. Marković and Gjuro Arnold" ["Formalism and Realism in Logic: Franjo pl. Marković and Gjuro Arnold"], *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* 18(1-2) (1992), pp. 141–182 and Kovač, "Franjo pl. Marković …".

[13] See, for example, Stipe Kutleša (ed.), *Filozofijsko djelo Franje pl. Markovića* [*The Philosophical Work of Franjo pl. Marković*] (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2016).

[14] The most detailed presentation of Marković's *Logic* to date is Kovač, "Formalizam i realizam u logici". It deals not only with a critical overview of the content of the manuscript, but also with the various preserved autographs and apographs of *Logic*, as well as with the philosophical context of the second part of the nineteenth century from which it emerged. A shorter version of this exposition can be found in Kovač, "Franjo pl. Marković …", pp. 177–185.

[15] This estimation is based on the date found in the original text of the section "Of Inferences", which reads: "[The end of] II semester 18/III 903 yr.". Most of Marković's *Nachlass* is held in the archives of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb, while some of his manuscripts (apographs) are also preserved at the Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb and at the National and the University Library in Zagreb.

[16] In this introductory section, Marković outlines the idea of a "national philosophy" and explains how logic figures in it (§1), traces the conception of logic as the science that sets the laws and rules of human thought back to Socrates (§2), and provides a historical and taxonomical outline of four conceptions of logic, all of which stem from this earlier Socratic idea and are discussed in the following sections of the first part (§3).

I/ii. Reasons against Pure, or Mere Formal, Logic
I/iii. The Defence of Pure Formal Logic is Inadequate
I/iv. Bringing Pure Formal Logic Closer to Real, or Objective, Logic
I/v. The Task of Logic according to its Proper Conception
I/vi. Reasons against Absolute Logic
I/vii. The Psychological Ground of Logic.

The second part of *Logic* consists of eleven sections (or chapters):

II/i. Of Words
II/ii. Of Concepts
II/iii. ⟨Of Judgements⟩[17]
  a. The Kinds of Judgements according to their Form [in the Old Logic]
  b. Lotze's Different Definition and Classification of Judgements
  c. A Historical Overview of the Doctrine of Fundamental Logical Principles [after Ueberweg's Logic]
II/iv. Of Immediate Inferences
II/v. Of Inferences
II/vi. Of Systematic Inferences
II/vii. Abridged Syllogisms, Enthymemes, and Epiheremes
II/viii. Of Erroneous Inferences (Paralogisms and Sophisms)
II/ix. Of the Systematic Forms of Thought
II/x. Analogical and Probabilistic Inferences
II/xi. Boole's and Jevons' Attempt at a Reform of Logic.

The introductory section of *Logic* (I/i) was translated into English in the previous volume of this journal (2024) (for details, see the bibliography). The translation of the section "Of Words" is presented after this essay. Most of *Logic* remains unpublished, even in Croatian, and is therefore available only in manuscript form. So far, five (out of eighteen) sections have been edited and published, namely, I/i, I/vi, I/vii, II/i, and the first subsection of II/iii.[18] Judged by their philosophical content, the most interesting sections of *Logic* are probably those of the first part (which mainly deal with the matter of the nature

[17] This section bears no title in the manuscript, but since it deals with the topic of judgement, I have added a title in the style of the others in this part of *Logic*. (I mark such insertions in the original text with angle brackets.) The section is composed of three subsections, all of which originally bear titles. For my use of square brackets, see pp. 511 and 530.

[18] "Logika. 1. odsjek" (= I/i), *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* 18(1-2) (1992), pp. 247–258; "Vrsti sudova po njihovih oblicih" (= II/iii/a), *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* 19(1-2) (1993), pp. 251–265; "[Uvod.] VI. odsjek. Razlozi proti absolutnoj logici" (= I/vi), "[Uvod.] VII. odsjek. Psihologijska podloga logici" (= I/vii), and "[Sustav logike.] I. odsjek. O riečih" (= II/i), all three collected in Bojan Marotti, *Tročlani sklop. Ogledi o filozofiji jezika* (Zagreb: ArTresor, 2021), pp. 313–380.



Sadržaj logike
Potanje razvijanje izabranih čestica
logike

Logika

napisao

Dr Franjo pl. Marković.

I. Odsjek.

§. 1. Obilježje i zamašaj filozofijske težnje.

Logika je reć bi termilo na onoj putnoj lađi, što no ju ljudski um otiskuje po beskrajnoj pučini mi„sli, događaja i pojava, put uvijek željno izgledane is„tine, dobrote i ljepote. I naš se je narod dao za tim u„zorima, za kojima čudstvo kao za svrhom svojom teži; otkad je čovjek saznao za se, poznoja mu nema van u onom trudu, što mu ga zadaje ovo njegovo pregnuće za duhovnim uzorima. Poslije 2-3 x godina, otkad se može brojiti svjesno ovo nastojanje, još se ne

The first page of an apograph of Franjo Marković's *Logic*.
This apograph is preserved at the Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb and dates from the academic year 1902/1903, or perhaps slightly later. Several similar apographs of *Logic* survive today, in addition to Marković's autograph manuscript(s).

of logic – that is, with the competing conceptions of logic and its relation to psychology) and several sections of the second part (in which Marković also expands upon some points touched on in the first part).

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Aside from the introductory and closing sections, in the remainder of the first part of *Logic* (I/ii–I/vi) Marković compares and contrasts four competing conceptions of logic – the pure formal, the real, the formal-real, and the absolute. In the light of the reasons considered for and against these conceptions, he settles on a blend of formal and real logic – the "formal-real" logic.

According to Marković, pure formal logic recognises only deduction and is strictly rationalistic (aprioristic), offering no substantive knowledge about the world, whereas real (objective) logic recognises only induction and is strictly empiricist, thus providing knowledge about the world. Pure formal logic, he contends,

> cares not about the real world, but is concerned solely with thinking itself, seeks its internal lawfulness and regularity, and therein finds the mark and criterion of truth. <…> logic ought to observe bare, or pure, forms of thought, devoid of any real content that concerns the external world: <…> by not paying any mind to external objects of thought, logic discovers the laws of thinking.[19]

The opposite, real logic, according to Marković, takes the following view:

> When one then seeks rules and laws of thinking, and the very forms of thought suited to truthful thinking, then one ought to also mind the external objective world, the things that stir in the thinking subject some specific contents and some specific forms of thought, and not separate and utterly disentangle the form of thought from the objective or real content of thought <…>.[20]

In contrast to previous two conceptions, the formal-real logic

> endeavors to reconcile formalism with realism, and, more generally in philosophy, rationalism with empiricism, by alleviating the adversity between opposing principles – formalism and realism, rationalism and empiricism.[21]

This in particular means that,

> together with the forms of thought, it regards also to the actual contents of those forms. It is, therefore, a logic that takes account of actual reality, <…> yet it does so in such wise that its regard for objects is required only for the greater

[19] Marković, "Logic, Chapter 1", pp. 885–886.
[20] Marković, "Logic, Chapter 1", p. 886.
[21] Marković, "Logic, Chapter 1", p. 887.

> clearness [i.e. well-foundedness] of the forms of thought, and it does not itself enter into the apprehension of the objects as such.[22]

Marković's adopted position in logic may also be described as the "inductive-deductive" conception, since it acknowledges that we form general representations – concepts – by means of induction.[23] Once we construct judgements from *such* concepts, we can infer further judgements – conclusions – by means of deduction. Thus, neither induction alone nor deduction alone will suffice; accordingly, neither pure formal logic nor real logic will do so.[24]

Despite all the differences between the two opposing conceptions of logic mentioned above, together with Marković's reconcilatory conception, one nevertheless has the sense that they all address the same fundamental matters. The fourth conception of logic that Marković considers – absolute logic – distinguishes itself sharply from the other three. It is not concerned with the basic principles of logic and their nature, nor does it study judgements and inferences in the traditional way. Instead, it develops a distinctive *metaphysical* system – best represented in Hegel's speculative philosophy. Marković was firmly opposed to it. According to Marković, the idea is that everything can be derived from a single fundamental concept – that of *Being*. Marković summarises this position as follows:

> An external thing <…> does not otherwise even obtain, does not exist, except in the conceptual thought of the thinking spirit, which thinks the essential property or essence of the external thing; the thinking spirit and external reality are, thus, completely identical, and in such a way that all external reality is nothing but the thought-up creation of the spirit. Being, existence is possessed either by that which thinks – the spirit – or by that which is thought – external reality. The spirit possesses being because it thinks, and the external material world possesses being, existence, only by the fact that it is thought and how it is thought by the spirit. This is asserted by the view known as absolute logic, most fully developed by Hegel, which pushes idealism to the extreme in that it eradicates

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[22] Marković, *Logika*, I/v/4.

[23] The term "representation" ["pomisao"] is one of Marković's fundamental and most frequently used terms in *Logic*. For him, representations are mental entities grounded in sense perception, and they differ from sensations in being, to some extent, always general – even when particular representations are at issue. The closest German equivalent to "pomisao" is probably "Vorstellung". In translating Marković's "pomisao" as "representation", I follow Kovač's suggestion (in "Formalizam i realizam u logici" and "Franjo pl. Marković …"), as well as Ivanković's later translation of Marković. Nevertheless, the English terms "notion" or "conception" may also be considered suitable alternatives. In the *System*, Mill uses all three terms interchangeably. In Marotti's *Marković's Critique of Hegel's Logic*, "pomisao" is sometimes rendered as "conception" and sometimes as "thought".

[24] Marković, "Logic, Chapter 1", pp. 886–887.

> being from anything apart from the thinking spirit: being is possessed by nothing other than the thinking spirit.[25]

Marković then singles out its central idea, which he subjects to criticism:

> The basic general claim of this logic is this: the most abstract concept, as the starting point of all other concepts, develops out of itself, without any assistance from perceptual representations that arise through actual sensations, the totality of concepts, that is, the totality of beings of the entire world.[26]

And he develops two lines of criticism of the outlined Hegelian conception:

> α) that absolute logic cannot carry out this development otherwise than by, contrary to its own fundamental assertion, surreptitiously employing, at the decisive stages of its progression, representations which have arisen from the sensory perception of particular things; β) that the entire procedure of absolute logic is itself illogical, being in contradiction with the incontrovertible laws of logic.[27]

When carefully considered, however, it turns out that the latter objection to absolute logic – at least in the form in which Marković applies it to Hegel's case – is not valid. This is particularly evident when Marković's argument is expressed in a language that, unlike Croatian, contains definite and indefinite articles, and when, moreover, modern logical insights into the functioning of descriptive noun phrases are taken into account.[28]

Thus, according to Marković, Hegel assents to inferences such as:

Pure Being is the emptiest concept;
Nothing is the emptiest concept;
Thus, Nothing is Pure Being.

or

Pure Being is the most abstract concept;
Nothing is the most abstract concept;
Thus, Nothing is Pure Being.

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[25] Marković, "Logic, Chapter 1", p. 888.

[26] Marković, "[Uvod.] VI. odsjek. Razlozi proti absolutnoj logici" ["[Introduction.] VI. Section. Reasons against Absolute Logic"], p. 315.

[27] Marković, "[Uvod.] VI. odsjek. Razlozi proti absolutnoj logici", p. 315. For further discussion, see §§2–3 of the same section, as well as Marotti, *Marković's Critique of Hegel's Logic*, pp. 39ff.

[28] I will return to this point in the next section, but it should already be note here that Marković completely disregarded in *Logic* any kind of singular names other than proper names. One of the consequences of this can be seen in his failure to notice that the superlative phrases occurring in his argumentation are, in fact, singular names, unlike the other words or phrases with which he compares them by analogy. In fact, superlative singular phrases are definite descriptions most easily recognised in languages that lack articles, such as Croatian. For Marković's position, see §§3 and 5 in the section translated below.

The problem with such inferences, Marković maintains, lies in their violation of Aristotle's syllogistic laws, acknowledged by all philosophers (other than Hegel(ians), of course). The inferences above, according to Marković, substantially resemble the following:

C is a letter.
D is a letter.
Thus, C is D.[29]

Leaving aside Aristotle's syllogistic laws, no reasonable person would assent to this inference; thus, by analogy, all the inferences above must be fundamentally flawed.

Unfortunately – intuition about the analogy aside – at this point Marković does not justify his claim concerning the fundamental logical principles, but merely appeals to authority and tradition, stating:

> Such erroneous inferences (paralogisms) run like a faulty thread through the whole of absolute logic. Hegel, of course, clearly recognised this contradiction of his with the logical laws of inference. Indeed, he sought to justify himself by asserting that *those laws* were antiquated and of *no value*. Yet that does not help him, for all others – from Aristotle down to Mill – maintain that those (old) logical laws are valid because the natural reason of every man testifies to their validity. Who would ever attempt to derive that C = D in the above manner? Hegel would. But Herbart was the first to have thoroughly demonstrated the logical errors of Hegel; many Hegelians refused to heed him, thereby hindering the further perfection of their own doctrine.[30]

The lack of support for the claim concerning the validity of the fundamental logical principles is not, however, the only problem in Marković's argumentation.

It should be noted that Marković could draw the analogy between the inferences above – those involving the emptiest (the most abstract) concept and the one involving the letters – only because Croatian lacks articles and because he disregarded certain kinds of singular names. Once the arguments are translated into English and different types of singular names are taken into account, the analogy breaks down. In the first two cases there are definite noun phrases in the predicate position ("the emptiest (the most abstract) concept"), while in the third there is an indefinite one ("a letter").[31] Accordingly, the first two inferences do make some sense (as far as logic is concerned), whereas the

[29] Marković, "[Uvod.] VI. odsjek. Razlozi proti absolutnoj logici", pp. 326–328.

[30] Marković, "[Uvod.] VI. odsjek. Razlozi proti absolutnoj logici", pp. 327–328.

[31] Marković does not mention this, but Mill's *System* suggests that indefinite noun phrases, such as "a letter", do not, from a logical point of view, differ from adjectives; see Mill, *A System of Logic*, p. 15.

third does not. In the third case, the transition from the first premise – which contains an indefinite noun phrase in the predicate position – and the second premise – which contains that very phrase in the predicate position – to the conclusion that C is identical to D, is inconclusive. That both C and D are letters does not entail that they are identical letters, just as the fact that Plato is a philosopher, and that Aristotle is a philosopher, does not entail that they are identical philosophers. Thus, if Hegel's argument is to be undermined, it should be on other grounds, not by analogy with the inference that Marković proposes.

* * *

The closing section of the first part of *Logic* – the physical as well as the thematic continuation of the criticism of absolute logic – contains Marković's detailed epistemological and, at the same time, metaphysical elaboration of his view of concepts (a view further developed in several sections of the second part of the manuscript, most notably, II/i, II/ii, and II/xi). Naturally, such a combination of the epistemology and metaphysics of concepts is to be expected from someone working within the empiricist tradition, as Marković for the most part did. The task of the closing section is to determine the *proper* relation between psychology and logic – that is, between the psychological laws regarded as significant to logic and the basic logical principles.

Marković does not reject the relevance of psychology for logic; indeed, he insists that psychology is a mandatory introductory consideration for logical investigation, just as in the next section ("Of Words") he insists that the critical examination of words is essential for the same purpose. – Without a critical analysis of grammatical distinctions and characterisations, grammar remains a descriptive enterprise grounded in psychology, just as the description of a person's actual thought does. What Marković rejects, then, is the proposal that psychological laws (or, for that matter, grammatical distinctions and principles) directly enter the logical domain. Rather, such laws *describe* the psychological processes essential to the formation of general representations – the only kind of logical concepts attainable to logicians. Anything beyond that – the fixed logical concept, an independent being – is nothing but an unattainable logical ideal. (In I/vii Marković introduces for the first time within *Logic* the idea of real, pure, or fixed logical concepts as *ideals*.) Once the general representations are acquired and sufficiently refined, and once the logician begins to form logical judgments and inferences from them, these are governed by a different kind of law. Such logical laws do not merely state – or describe – how the elements are mutually and actually connected; rather, they state how the elements *are to be* treated and connected in order to be logical and true. Thus, unlike psychologi-

cal laws, which are descriptive, logical laws are normative. As such, logical laws cannot be reduced to psychological ones, as some authors have suggested along crudely psychologistic lines.

This view of the relation between psychology and logic places Marković in opposition to the psychologists of his time, who were promoting the direct reduction of logic to psychology and treating logic as nothing more than an advanced formal description of actual mental processes in a person's mind. Marković's rejection of this view, however, does not mean that he was not, in an important respect, a psychologist. Indeed, he was a psychologist in the worst possible way – at least by Frege's standards – namely, one who grants that there *is* a psychological ground of logic but fails, at the same time, to see or acknowledge how allowing the psychological element into logic undermines the appeal to objectivity and normativity nominally adopted in the same account. As soon as a psychological element creeps into logic, Frege insists, one is on the path of "inescapable singing into idealism", which "as an unavoidable consequence [leads] into solipsism".[32] Frege sees in this "nothing but psychological corruption of logic", because of which, as he puts it, thick books on logic are "bloated with unhealthy psychological lard".[33]

Section I/vii opens with a detailed exposition of Alexander Bain's analysis of the psychological laws closely connected with logic. According to Bain – and to Marković, insofar as he agrees with Bain – these laws govern the transition from particular (concrete) representations to general representations, beginning with sense perception. Bain's insights, however, need to be corrected in light of Hermann Lotze's views, especially regarding the role of sensations. Marković argues that Bain's materialist claim that the intellect (reason) is nothing more than a "plurality of brain atoms" is untenable; a "simple and unique immaterial soul" must be posited instead. Accordingly, Marković summarises his own position as follows:

> For the formation of representations, *comparison and differentiation* of sensory qualities are necessary: this task can be performed neither by the brain atoms nor by sensations themselves, but only by a unique, *independent*, and *self-creative* force as a being – the soul. Its self-creative power is required already for the emergence of individual sensations, and still more for the differentiation of dissimilar sensations, the assimilation of similar ones, and the identification of

[32] Gottlob Frege, *Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Derived Using Concept-Script I/II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. xix.

[33] Frege, *Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, p. xxv. For Frege's clearest and most detailed expression of this criticism, see his *Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, pp. xiv–xxvi, as well as "Thoughts", in Gottlob Frege, *Logical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977), pp. 1–30.

> identical ones, through which first arise individual representations, and then, from many similar individual representations, general or abstract representations, which, when sufficiently refined or fully developed, are called *concepts*. Indeed, we cannot think, with a single thought, an entirely pure general representation, such that it would contain no admixture of individual representations. The pure concept <…> is, for our actual thought, an *ideal* to which it strives to approximate, but which it never fully attains.[34]

Another author whose view Marković combines with Bain's is Wilhelm Wundt, who developed his logic under Herbart's influence, although he placed far greater emphasis on the relation of words to concepts, since without (written) words there would be no general representations.[35] The problem with Wundt's logic, however, Marković finds in his excessively subjective view of concept, which stands in sharp contrast to the realist view. The only tenable view of concepts, according to Marković, is the moderate one, whereby concepts are mental but not imaginary entities – they are partly the product of the mind and partly of real (objective) things possessing real (objective) properties.

The issue of concepts and general representations thus inevitably leads to the question of competing views of concepts, two of which Marković identifies and rejects in I/vii. The first is *realism*, according to which concepts are independently and objectively existing beings, as exemplified in Plato's theory of ideas. Any such view was alien to Marković's thought, and throughout *Logic* he repeatedly criticises various aspects and manifestations of this tendency, which he detects in otherwise very different authors such as Plato, certain scholastic philosophers, and Hegel, and, in a way, some algebraic logicians (George Boole and William Stanley Jevons). The second is *conceptualism*, whose proponents he explicitly locates among some philosophers (such as Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch) and linguists (Heymann Steinthal).

Conceptualism is, as Marković remarks, the view "[m]uch closer to truth, but still wrong"; it holds that

> our reason can, *with a single* thought, completely think a certain concept in such a way that the concept is thought of by itself and entirely pure, without any admixture of particular individual representations.[36]

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[34] Marković, "[Uvod.] VII. odsjek. Psihologijska podloga logici" ["[Introduction.] VII. Section. The Psychological Ground of Logic"], p. 339.

[35] This conception is further discussed in Bojan Marotti, "O pojmu znaka u Markovićevoj *Logici*" ["On the Concept of Sign in Marković's *Logic*"], in Bojan Marotti, *Tročlani sklop. Ogledi o filozofiji jezika* (Zagreb: ArTresor, 2021), pp. 71–86.

[36] Marković, "[Uvod.] VII. odsjek. Psihologijska podloga logici", pp. 333–334; see also p. 553 in the translated section below, where Marković attributes the conceptualist view to Steinthal.

What is true in conceptualism, according to Marković, is the claim that concepts are not objective beings but general representations within a person's mind; what is false in it is the claim that these concepts are entirely independent of particular representations that are grounded in sense perception.

The conceptualist view that Marković has in mind here – and calls it "conceptualism" – should not be confused for another, more general doctrine, also labelled "conceptualism" in the literature. In this latter sense, conceptualism is typically an empiricist doctrine – a middle ground between realism and nominalism – according to which concepts, properties, attributes, and the like exist in the mind rather than as objective beings. Indeed, given Marković's own account of representations and the concepts founded upon (or identified with) them, he would properly be regarded as a conceptualist in this latter sense.[37] His insistence that what he calls "conceptualism" is nevertheless a mistaken view thus amounts, in effect, to a domestic quarrel among conceptualists themselves about whether concepts conceived as entities within the mind are dependent on, or independent of, particular representations.[38]

But there is also a realist addendum in Marković's conception, as is evident from his earlier remarks on Wundt. While concepts are mental entities that represent objects in the world, these objects exist independently of the mind and possess objective properties that stand in fitting correspondence with the concepts. These properties therefore exist independently of the mind and are precisely what one would typically regard as (Platonist or Aristotelian) universals. Thus Marković writes:

> To be sure, a properly formed concept and its characteristics are indeed creations of our own *thought*; yet they are not *imagined* phantoms but have their occasion and ground not only in the nature of our consciousness, of our thinking mind, but equally in the nature of real things and their real properties, in so far as things and their properties are apprehended by our consciousness.[39]

Interestingly, Marković does not discuss nominalism here, in this context, as a third competing view of concepts. He does, however, mention it briefly – once in the previous section on absolute logic, and once again later in this section – and, I would argue, in an unusual and somewhat inconclusive manner.[40] From

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[37] Marotti suggests the same in *Marković's Critique of Hegel's Logic*, p. 32.

[38] For a discussion, see Marotti, *Marković's Critique of Hegel's Logic*, pp. 31–32.

[39] Marković, "[Uvod.] VII. odsjek. Psihologijska podloga logici", p. 349.

[40] See Marković "[Uvod.] VI. odsjek. Razlozi proti absolutnoj logici", p. 314 and "[Uvod.] VII. odsjek. Psihologijska podloga logici", p. 347. For a brief reflection on this, see Marotti, *Marković's Critique of Hegel's Logic*, pp. 31–33.

the way he characterises nominalism, it is difficult to see how it differs from conceptualism. He writes that, according to the nominalists, "concepts are not being, but our mere thoughts expressed in words", and that a concept "exists only in the word that expresses it". In the same passage, Marković also notes that for the nominalists "a concept is a mere word, '*nomen*'", and concludes that concepts are "mere thoughts, mere words", rather than beings, "*res*". On the basis of this characterisation, one does not gain the impression that Marković truly grasped the view or recognised how it differs from conceptualism – a view sometimes described as "moderate nominalism". Yet it does not seem that Marković had this moderate sense in mind when he spoke of nominalism.[41]

The larger, second part of *Logic* includes, at times, extensive sections on "technical" matters of judgement and inference – perhaps less appealing to the broader philosophical public – extending from II/iii to II/x. The remaining three sections of this part – the introductory sections II/i and II/ii, and the closing section II/xi – however, address several philosophically intriguing issues of more general interest. As was customary in similar logical treatises of the period, in addition to the discussion of typical "technical" and traditional logical themes (such as concepts, judgements, inferences, and fallacies), based on scholastic Aristotelian syllogistics, its later modifications, and the addition of the doctrine of induction, the three sections of the second part also include considerations that today would more typically fall under the headings of metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, and the philosophy of language. The section "Of Words" is a clear example of the latter – philosophically stimulating on its own right, yet also readily connected with the discussions initiated by Frege and later continued by Russell, roughly in the same period.[42]

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[41] The only other remark Marković makes about nominalism ("[Uvod.] VII. odsjek. Psihologijska podloga logici", p. 347) is that the scholastic nominalists introduced the distinction between concrete and abstract *concepts* (e.g., *white* versus *whiteness*). Marković, however, immediately applies this distinction to concrete and abstract *words* (e.g., "white" versus "whiteness") and contrasts this traditional usage of the terms "concrete" and "abstract" with that of modern logicians, who distinguish between concrete and abstract *entities* – the former being particular objects (such as particular men, e.g. Socrates or Plato) and the latter what is general (namely, concepts, properties, or characteristics). Marković returns to these two usages of "concrete" and "abstract" in the translated section below, "Of Words", where he introduces the Mill-influenced distinction between names of objects and names of properties (cf. §4, pp. 540–541).

[42] Although both Frege and Russell adopted an anti-idealist orientation, they developed rather different logical and linguistic doctrines along that line, well illustrated in their correspondence from the period 1902–1904 (cf. Gottlob Frege, *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 130ff).

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Franjo Marković (1845–1914) was a contemporary of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925). The two adopted entirely different approaches to logic and, accordingly, developed their conceptions along distinct lines. Frege would, no doubt, have accused Marković of advancing a plain psychologism in logic, since the latter grounded it in abstraction and mental representation rather than in the timeless concepts and objects of the *drittes Reich*. Indeed, as already noted, Marković regarded fixed, timeless concepts as mere ideals towards which the logician strives but can never attain, given the limits of human epistemic faculties:

> Herbart observes that such collective images, owing to their indeterminacy, do not satisfy the logical requirements that a *concept* must fulfil, and that therefore our actual thought never thinks *genuine* concepts; rather, these remain as *models* or *ideals* toward which actual thought merely *strives* to approximate. Our actual thought, instead of thinking with a single representation the pure and mere *content* of the concept, that is, the complete combination of its essential characteristics, by psychological necessity strays into the *extension* of the concept, that is, into the thought of those particular representations of objects which are encompassed within the concept's extension.[43]

Marković makes a similar point in the closing section of *Logic*:

> [T]hus, the second law of Jevons and Boole [the law of singularity and identity of any concept] truly holds only if we conceive *absolute being* as the thinker of some concept; or if we conceive the concept, with Plato, *as the idea that possesses being, as an ens reale*; furthermore, if in both of these alternatives we also suppose that the very *object* to which the concept applies remains forever unchangeable in name, that the species likewise remain eternally unchangeable, and never alter through development <…> From a psychological point of view, that is, in the development of our human cognition, concepts, as human *subjective* psychological *formations*, are perfected and *do not remain always the same*; <…> the *timelessness* of concepts, and hence the absolute identity of each concept with itself, is a claim that inclines toward Platonism.[44]

Frege, on the other hand, introduced the cognitive faculty of grasping [*Erfassen*], by which he sought to resolve precisely the epistemological problem of timeless concepts identified by Marković.[45] Concepts of whatever kind, according to Frege, are discovered; the mind reaches out for them in reality – one grasps them (or, better, their extension) as one might grasps a stone upon stumbling over it – and in that process neither the stone nor the concept is in any

[43] Marković, "[Uvod.] VII. odsjek. Psihologijska podloga logici", p. 341.
[44] Marković, *Logika*, II/xi (this section of *Logic* is not divided into paragraphs).
[45] Cf. Frege, *Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, p. xxiv and "Thoughts", pp. 5ff.

sense created. Nevertheless, both Frege and Marković were partly influenced or inspired by the same nineteenth-century philosophers and logicians, and often consulted the same works. Prominent among these were F. A. Trendelenburg, J. S. Mill, W. Wundt, H. Lotze, J. F. Herbart, and W. Windelband.[46] This shared background surely instilled a common trait in their respective work – if not a shared standpoint, then at least a similar approach to philosophical problems and to the very practice of philosophy.

Accordingly, throughout Marković's manuscript one finds many points that relate to Frege's considerations and are closely aligned with them in style and the theme even though the two were often not on the same path. For illustration, a couple of examples may serve to indicate the suggested similarity or point of connection.

Marković criticised the algebraic logicians Jevons and Boole, who, as he noted, had recently "endeavoured, indeed, in a rather ingenious manner, to transform logic into an algebra of thoughts", and he insisted that "their attempt did not succeed, owing to the <…> difference between the connection of quantities in mathematical operations and the connections of characteristics in the composition of a concept".[47] In contrast to such logicians, Marković adopted Lotze's view:

> [I]t is questionable whether the characteristics in the content of a concept are all at the same level, that is, whether they are all equally significant, or whether *some are more significant than others*? If it is said <…> that the characteristics within the content of a concept are *all at the same level* [i.e. all are coordinated], this gives rise to the mistaken belief that all the components of a concept are of equal value, that is, that each [characteristic] is connected with the whole content in the same way as the other [and the third etc.]; that the first characteristic is joined with the second just as the second with the third, and the third with the fourth, so that the formula would be: $tc = a + b + c + d$ [were *tc* is the total content of a concept]. <…> the characteristics within the content of a concept are not, therefore, arranged [i.e. coordinated] as if they were [all] of equal significance; rather, some are primary, as causes, while others are secondary, as consequences of [the] first. In general, the characteristics [which make up the content of a concept] are determined in diverse ways; that is, some take precedence, and others

[46] For example, Trendelenburg is the only philosopher – and one of only two authors – to whose work Frege refers in the *Begriffsschrift* (cf. Gottlob Frege, *Conceptual Notation and Related Articles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 105).

[47] Marković, *Logika*, I/ii/2. I have adopted the convention of citing unpublished parts of Marković's *Logic* in the style of citing Mill's *System of Logic*; that is, book/chapter/paragraph. In Marković's case, "I/ii/2" means: the first part, second section, second paragraph. If a section has subsections, I propose marking them with letters; thus, for example, the second paragraph of the first subsection of II/iii I would write as "II/iii/a/3".

> follow after them, and they are not all equal and at the same level. Hence, the content of a concept is neither a *sum* nor a *product* of *equally valuable* factors. Therefore, to the content of a concept it cannot properly suit the formula $tc = a + b + c + d$, nor the formula $tc = a \cdot b \cdot c \cdot d$ [a multiplication]; rather, it suit it the formula $tc = F(a, b, c, d)$, where *tc* notes the total unified content, *a*, *b*, *c* note the individual characteristics of that content, and *F* notes the function, the form, or the mode of their connection. Thus, the manner of the connection of characteristics is not the same in every content.[48]

A similar general negative idea concerning the content of concepts can be found in Frege's *Begriffsschrift*, where he remarks:

> The modelling upon the formula language of arithmetic to which I have alluded in the title refers more to the fundamental ideas than to the detailed structure. The farthest thing from my mind was any effort to establish an artificial similarity through *the interpretation of a concept as the sum of its characteristic marks* [*Merkmale*]. The most immediate point of contact between my formula language and that of arithmetic is in the way letters are used.[49]

No doubt Frege, in this passage, has in mind the algebraists, whose logical novelties and formalism provided no suitable tool for his purposes. This becomes especially evident in the subsequent period, when Frege explicitly criticised logicians such as George Boole or Ernst Schröder, comparing their logical systems with his own conceptual notation.

Frege does not explicitly credit Hermann Lotze for his view of concepts, expressed in the quote. Yet the claim that it was precisely Lotze who may have influenced his view is supported by Gottfried Gabriel's report of a note found in the *Nachlass* of Bruno Bauch (1877–1942), a colleague of Frege, in which Bauch wrote:

> I have heard it from our great mathematician Frege himself, that for his mathematical – and I may add what Frege in his modesty didn't say, epoch-making – investigations, the impulses he got from Lotze were of decisive significance.[50]

It would certainly be worthwhile to undertake a detailed study and compare Marković's and Frege's views on concepts and to set out all their mutual dif-

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[48] Marković, *Logika*, II/ii/5; for Marković's adaptation of Lotze's view of concepts, see Kovač, "Formalizam i realizam u logici", pp. 147 and 153, and Kovač, "Franjo pl. Marković …", pp. 179–180 and 184–185.

[49] Frege, *Conceptual Notation*, p. 104 (emphasis added).

[50] Gottfried Gabriel, "Frege and the German Background to Analytic Philosophy", u Michael Beaney (ed.), *The History of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 280–297, here on p. 287.

ferences, despite their shared general conviction that concepts are not merely the sums of characteristics in their content.

Another point of connection between Marković and Frege concerns their respective remarks on identity and scientific discoveries. Marković, for his part, writes:

> The awareness of the *identity* of two sensations, or of two perceptions, or, in general, of two representations, is, for logic, an *equally* significant mental act as the awareness of the *difference* between two sensations or, in general, between two representations. The many significant scientific discoveries were nothing other than the awareness of the *identity* of two facts, or of two representations; for example, Newton's significant discovery of the law of universal gravitation consists precisely in his having recognised the *identity* of the force by which an apple falls from the tree with the force that keeps the Moon bound in its orbit around the Earth.[51]

Frege, for his part, similarly writes:

> There is no doubt that the first and most important discoveries in a science are often a matter of recognizing something as the same again. However self-evident it may seen to us that it is the same sun which went down yesterday and rose today, and however insignificant therefore this discovery may seem to us, it has certainly been one of the most important in astronomy and perhaps the one that really laid the foundations of the science. It was also important to recognize that the morning star is the same as the evening star, that three times five is the same as five times three.[52]

There are numerous passages in *Logic* in which Marković discusses various aspects and applications of identity, both in logic and in psychology (insofar as it is relevant to logic). Once his remarks on identity are connected with his observations on particular and general representations, on the one hand, and on connotative and non-connotative names, on the other, the issue immediately becomes the point of connection with Frege's views on identity and on the *Sinn*/*Bedeutung* distinction.[53]

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[51] Marković, "[Uvod.] VII. odsjek. Psihologijska podloga logici", pp. 331–332.

[52] Gottlob Frege, "Logic" (1897), in Gottlob Frege, *Posthumous Writings* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 126–151, here on p. 142. For a similar point, see also Frege's letter to Wittgenstein of 3. IV. 1920, in Enzo De Pellegrin (ed.), *Interactive Wittgenstein: Essays in Memory of Georg Henrik von Wright* (Dordrecht and New York: Springer, 2011), pp. 65 and 67.

[53] See Marotti, "O pojmu znaka ...", pp. 75–76, for a different connection between Marković's view in *Logic* and Frege's distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*.

Yet another point of connection between the two lies in Marković's and Frege's remarks on what can be true and, consequently, what can be judged. In *Logic*, Marković writes (§1, p. 538):

> Truth resides not in any single representation, but only in a combination of several. If I say "sun", I cannot follow up that single word and the bare representation it evokes with the question: Is "sun" true, or is it not true? But when I say, "The sun warms", or "The sun does not revolve around the earth", others understand me, and can judge whether they hold to be true what I think and manifest in one of the foregoing propositions. / Truth or falsehood pertains only to a combination of representations; and a combination of representations – that is, a judgement – must be expressed in the form of a proposition.

In the *Begriffsschrift*, Frege introduces the symbol for judgement (⊢) and understands judgements as acknowledgements of the truth of a content of a sentence conceived as a combination of ideas [*Verstellungsverbindung*]. He then adds:

> Not every content can become a judgement by placing ⊢ before its symbol; for example, the idea [*Vorstellung*] "house" cannot. We therefore distinguish assertible and unassertible contents. [54]

The point that both Marković and Frege are making here is fairly general and not particularly striking. Yet their apparent convergence soon break once one realises that, as far as the truth in logic is concerned, Marković advances a conception opposed to Frege's. In connection with truth, Marković also writes about *self-evidence*, and observes, regarding this epistemological concept, something similar to what he says about truth, namely:

> Self-evidence does not belong to individual thoughts taken each by itself, but only to the combinations and compounds of thoughts. For example, the logical law of identity ($A = A$) does not certify the truth of the concept A, but asserts the identity of that concept with itself; and this assertion is self-evidently true, self-evidently certain.[55]

Indeed, it takes Marković barely a passage to move from speaking of *truth* to speaking of the *self-evidently true* and then *self-evidently certain*. The latter concepts are epistemological rather than semantic, and in the discussion that follows in this section they completely sideline the concept of truth. For Frege, this would be a clear – and, indeed, preposterous – case of conflating logic with psychology, the objective with the subjective; in a word, of adopting psychologism.

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[54] Frege, *Conceptual Notation*, p. 104 (emphasis added).

[55] Marković, "[Uvod.] VII. odsjek. Psihologijska podloga logici", p. 350.

In his well-known criticism of psychologism, in connection with Benno Erdmann's conception of truth as *objective certainty*, Frege complains that Erdmann

> equates truth with general validity, grounding the latter on general certainty regarding the object judged, and this in turn on general consensus amongst those judging. And so, in the end, truth is reduced to being taken to be true by individuals. In opposition to this, I can only say: being true is different from being taken to be true, be it by one, be it by many, be it by all, and is in no way reducible to it. It is no contradiction that something is true that is universally held to be false. By logical laws I do not understand psychological laws of taking to be true, but laws of being true.[56]

The same appears to hold for Marković's concept of self-evidence when it is so closely tied to logical truth. Indeed, in this context Marković attributes to proper logical thought not only self-evidence but also general validity (i.e. the uniformity of logical thought in all thinkers), and further equates self-evident *truth* with self-evident *certainty*, thereby providing yet another epistemologisation of what is originally a semantic concept. Once again, we find here a point of connection between Marković and Frege – but above all, a point of profound disagreement, one that deserves further attention.

A final point of connection to be mentioned is this: despite their deeply opposing conceptions of logic, Marković and Frege agree on the normative character of logical laws (when contrasted with descriptive psychological laws) and even illustrate their points about normativity with the same analogy between the logical laws (i.e. the laws of thought) and the laws of nature. Thus, Marković, for his part, writes:

> The logical laws are the rules by which everyone *ought* to think if their thoughts are to be true and universally valid; the psychological laws, on the other hand, merely state how people actually think. They are, like the laws of nature, simply expressions of the *actual* modes and forms of thinking, whether these lead to true or to false thoughts. Only certain combinations of thoughts possess self-evident truth and universal validity – namely, those that conform to the logical rules; only such thinking is logical.[57]

Whereas Frege, for his part, writes:

> It is commonly granted that the logical laws are guidelines which thought should follow to arrive at the truth; but it is too easily forgotten. The ambiguity of the word "law" here is fatal. In one sense it says what is, in the other it prescribes what ought to be. Only in the latter sense can the logical laws be called laws of

[56] Frege, *Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, pp. xv–xvi.

[57] Marković, "[Uvod.] VII. odsjek. Psihologijska podloga logici", p. 353.

> thought, in so far as they legislate how one ought to think. <…> But the phrase "laws of thought" seduces one to form the opinion that these laws govern thinking in the same way that the laws of nature govern events in the external world. In that case they can be nothing other than psychological laws; for thinking is a mental process. And if logic had to do with psychological laws, it would be a part of psychology. And thus it is in fact conceived. These laws of thought may then be conceived as guidelines merely in the manner of stating a mean, similar to the way one can say how healthy digestion proceeds in humans, or how grammatically correct speech goes, or how one dresses fashionably.[58]

Frege makes the same point again in later years, now, in relation to logic, additionally distinguishing explicitly between the descriptive laws of truth (that describe the abstract logical reality) and the normative laws of thought:

> The word "law" is used in two senses. When we speak of moral or civil laws we mean prescriptions, which ought to be obeyed but with which actual occurrences are not always in conformity. Laws of nature are general features of what happens in nature, and occurrences in nature are always in accordance with them. It is rather in this sense that I speak of laws of truth. Here of course it is not a matter of what happens but of what is. From the laws of truth there follow prescriptions about asserting, thinking, judging, inferring. And we may very well speak of laws of thought in this way too. But there is at once a danger here of confusing different things. People may very well interpret the expression "law of thought" by analogy with "law of nature" and then have in mind general features of thinking as a mental occurrence. A law of thought in this sense would be a psychological law. And so they might come to believe that logic deals with the mental process of thinking and with the psychological laws in accordance with which this takes place. That would be misunderstanding the task of logic, for truth has not here been given its proper place.[59]

However, the agreement between Marković and Frege is much weaker here than it may at first appear. Marković recognises only two cases – the normative logical laws and the descriptive psychological laws – whereas Frege, in the *Grundgesetze*, recognises an additional case: rules derived from facts, that is, normativity arising from a true description. Marković's logical laws would, it seems, fall precisely into this category.

There are other points of connection between Marković and Frege. For example, this includes their understanding of how logic relates to philosophy and to the other sciences. Another example is their shared opposition to *crude* psychologism grounded in a materialist doctrine – an opposition that derives

[58] Frege, *Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, p. xv.
[59] Frege, "Thoughts", p. 1.

from Lotze's views. Yet there are also significant differences; I discuss one of these in connection with Marković's criticism of Steinthal, but those mentioned here should already suffice to demonstrate that there is a non-trivial and not too superficial connection between the two, and perhaps to motivate further investigation of their relation. (I discuss several further points of contact between Marković and Frege in the next section of this essay.)

* * *

Of course, it is one thing *what* Marković and Frege were proposing and defending in their logical considerations; it is another *how* they were doing so – or, more generally, *how* they conceived and practised philosophy, and *how* they understood the relation between philosophy, logic, and the other sciences. With regard to the *what* question, they were more often on different paths than on the same page. The *how* question, however – at least from my perspective – reveals them as, in a sense, allies. Given this, the present sketchy comparison of the two, together with the earlier thesis that Marković was, in certain respects, close to the analytic tradition, is a matter worth further investigation.

The proposed thesis about Marković's relation to analytic philosophy gains further support from recent investigations into the "continental" philosophical influences on Frege and, more generally, into the continental roots of analytic philosophy.[60] Indeed, an additional line of argument could be suggested – merely to prompt further exploration of the issue – and it would run as follows:

> J. F. Herbart exerted a strong influence on Marković's conception and practice of philosophy.
>
> > Filipović, for example, cites Herbart as saying: "The clarity and distinctness of concepts, together with the non-contradictoriness of their combinations, is the fundamental postulate of critical thinking, and this is the foundation of systematic scientific knowledge within which, or rather upon which, philosophical thought must develop. The critical and systematic elaboration of empirically given concepts stands in opposition to the architectonic and constructive manipulation of concepts, the method employed by idealism". Filipović then remarks: "These are the theses of both Herbart and Marković". Afterwards, Filipović follows up on Bazala's observation, writing: "Herbart's criti-

[60] See for example Gabriel, "Frege and the German Background to Analytic Philosophy"; for a more general discussion, see Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

> cal–empirical philosophy 'appeared suitable [to Marković], under such circumstances, to serve as a propaedeutic to the philosophical spirit among us', in accordance with the postulate that scientific thought must above all be characterised by 'clarity and exactness'. And the task in both cases was the same: to introduce philosophical reflection through the analysis of the meanings of concepts – a procedure that somewhat later became the source of phenomenology, and subsequently of modern philosophy of language".[61]

Judged by Herbart's own way of conceiving and practising philosophy, he might even be regarded as the "grandfather of analytic philosophy".

> There is a compelling case for this characterisation; see Frederick C. Beiser, *Johann Friedrich Herbart: Grandfather of Analytic Philosophy*. Beiser for example writes: "It was Herbart who first outlined – if only roughly and generally – our modern conception of the purpose and method of philosophy. The idea that philosophy is primarily an analysis of concepts, that it is a second-order logical enterprise that *examines* concepts rather than a first-order empirical discipline (physics, biology) that *uses* them were Herbartian innovations of the early 19th century. These conceptions were appropriated by neo-Kantians, positivists, and phenomenologists, who handed them down to analytical philosophy itself. If Russell and Frege are the fathers of analytical philosophy, Herbart is its grandfather." <…> Herbart summarized his new conception of the method of philosophy in the slogan: 'Bearbeitung der Begriffe,' the laboring or investigation of concepts. It was a slogan later adopted by Frege."[62]

In the light of these sketchy observations, it should come as no surprise that Marković was, in certain important respects, close to the analytic tradition.

Let us leave aside for now the general question of where Marković is to be placed in terms of his philosophical orientation. As far as Frege is concerned, the section "Of Words" (as already hinted) offers a good starting point for comparison – especially the two appendices. In the appendices, Marković criticises Heymann Steinthal's conception of logic, and his later criticism of algebraic logic serves as a continuation of the discussion found there. Marković's treatment of singular names, discussed primarily in §§3 and 5 of the section, is another case in point; I return to it in the closing part of this essay. As for the

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[61] Filipović, "Franjo Marković – rodoljubni pjesnik i učitelj filozofije", pp. 17–18.

[62] Frederick C. Beiser, *Johann Friedrich Herbart: Grandfather of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. 2–3.

two appendices, much of what he objects to in Steinthal and the algebraists he would readily extend to Frege's view, although on certain points expressed there he would be in agreement with Frege. Frege's *Begriffsschrift* and his early critical writings on logic, where he addressed algebraic logicians, would provide the best starting point for a more in-depth assessment.

Thus, from today's perspective, Marković's *Logic* should, in many respects, appear close and appealing to those working within the analytic tradition – and that is no mere coincidence. Unfortunately, its direct influence on Croatian philosophers, both in style and in content, especially during the period in which Marković was writing and lecturing, is doubtful. Today, it is scarcely possible to find any direct and evident traces of such influences in pre-Second World War Croatian philosophical literature – that is, in the period when Marković must still have been vividly present to Croatian philosophers. Indeed, his successor in the Zagreb philosophy department, Albert Bazala, regarded Marković's philosophy as outdated and apparently sought a different orientation.[63] That applies even more to two other prominent Croatian pre-war philosophers, Gjuro Arnold (1853–1941) and Pavao Vuk-Pavlović (1894–1976): the latter adopted a phenomenological conception, while the former embraced an antinaturalistic one.[64] Concerning Arnold: Probably the most direct influence of Marković's *Logic* (or his lectures on logic) can be found in the first modern Croatian logic textbook, *Logic for High Schools*, published in 1888 and written by him (he was Marković's student and colleague). Although considerably shorter than Marković's *Logic*, this book clearly reflects its themes, exposition, and orientation – namely, the formal-real conception of logic. Unlike Marković's *Logic*, however, it lacks deeper engagement with the subject matter (as would be expected for a textbook of this kind). It was widely used before the Second World War.[65] Beyond that, there appears to be no evident influence of Marković's *Logic*.

As for the earlier post-Second World War period – the socialist era in Croatia as part of Yugoslavia – the situation was, expectedly, worse. The Marxist paradigm began to dominate the philosophical scene, and few philosophers remained from the period of Marković's active presence. His manuscripts were safely archived and forgotten, while his published works were typically ignored or misrepresented. There is an illustrative report from 1966 on the development

[63] For Bazala's understanding of Marković as a philosopher, see his "Franjo Marković: ein philosophisches Porträt".

[64] For more details, see the chapters on Gjuro Arnold and Pavao Vuk-Pavlović in Zenko (ed.), *Novija hrvatska filozofija*.

[65] For more details about Arnold as a logician, see Kovač, "Formalizam i realizam u logici", pp. 162–170.

of philosophy within the Academy in Zagreb in which Marković, one of its first philosopher-members, is portrayed rather negatively, together with Herbart:

> However, it was precisely in German philosophy that, after Kant's epistemological-critical philosophy, after Fichte's system of transcendental idealism, and Schelling's system of transcendental philosophy, a certain crisis arose – one that, within this line of development, was filled by the philosophy of J. F. Herbart. With its epigonal and eclectic character, however, that philosophy was nothing more than a dead end in the current of German philosophy. And it was precisely Herbart's philosophy that Marković took as his starting point and as the foundation for the development of philosophy and philosophical thought in our country. <…> and his poetic and literary work, not without objective reason, [Marković] valued more highly than his philosophical work; the poet of *Dom i svijet* [*Home and the World*] seemed, indeed, to have had no real desire to delve more deeply into purely philosophical problems.[66]

Vladimir Filipović later criticised this portrayal of Marković as a philosopher, in the early 1980s.[67]

* * *

Most of preserved copies of Marković's *Logic* were handwritten – or, more precisely, hand-copied – as was customary for such study material in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when it was not printed as a book. Thus, there are today two preserved autographs and eight apographs. The two autographs differ from each other in their composition and completeness, as do the apographs.[68] The copy archived at the Zagreb Institute is, without doubt, an instance of the final version of *Logic*. Its various parts were written by different transcribers, and, as far as I can tell (based on comparison with another preserved copy considered to be the most complete one), it does not contain any less substantial material.

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[66] *Spomenica: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti 1866–1966* (Zagreb: Izdavački zavod Jugoslavenske akademije), p. 53. The mentioned work, *Dom i svijet*, was Marković's politically engaged idyllic poem written in 1865 and published in 1883.

[67] Filipović, "Franjo Marković – rodoljubni pjesnik i učitelj filozofije", pp. 12ff. For further discussion, see also Bojan Marotti, "O Markovićevim filozofskim rukopisima u arhivima HAZU" ["On Marković's Philosophical Manuscripts in the HAZU Archives"], in Bojan Marotti, *Prema domovini misli. Ogledi o hrvatskoj filozofiji od Markovića do Cipre* (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 2019), pp. 27–62, here pp. 27–36.

[68] I draw most of the relevant information from Kovač, "Formalizam i realizam u logici"; see also Marotti, *Marković's Critique of Hegel's Logic*, p. 7, who mentions only one autograph. More recently, Ana Grgić has also examined Marković's manuscripts archived at the Academy, and in her unpublished overview she suggests there may be two autographs of *Logic* after all.

For illustration, here are six randomly selected pages exemplifying the different handwritings found in the Institute apograph:











Random samples of different handwritings found in various parts of the apograph of Franjo Marković's *Logic*, preserved at the Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb.

Nevertheless, at times it differs from other copies in the terminological choices and spellings adopted by the transcribers.

Some of the preserved apographs of the manuscript contain subsequently inserted brief pencil-written notes – additions, alternations, or corrections to the existing text. It may be assumed that these were made either by Franjo Marković himself or by one of his designated and trusted students, acting according to his instructions. As for the Zagreb Institute apograph, the likely writer (though not the author) of such pencil notes was the Croatian philosopher Blaž Madjer (1883–1964).[69] I draw this conclusion from a pencil note on the very last page of Marković's manuscript, which reads: "Thank God! Zagreb, 9. III. 1909. B. Madjer". The handwriting here (as far as I can tell) is the same as that found in the pencil notes inserted throughout the manuscript.

Such notes were probably inserted in accordance with Marković's own instructions, or perhaps copied from another apograph in which he had personally inserted them. It is also possible that they were, to some extent, recorded

[69] In 1911, Madjer published a brief booklet, *Sofizmi i paralogizmi* [*Sophisms and Paralogisms*].

on the basis of Marković's comments or clarifications during his lectures, when he most likely read from a copy of the manuscript. My conjecture is supported by several inserted pencil notes in the apograph, such as: "I (Marković) think", "I would say", and "I believe". It would make little sense to assume that a reader of this particular copy would have adopted Marković's claims – to which these notes are prefixed – to such an extent that he would add them on his own behalf. Nor does it seem likely that Marković himself would have write "I (Marković) think".

In the translation that follows, I have incorporated most of the pencil notes found in the section "Of Words", on the assumption that they originated with Marković himself, but I have consistently marked them with square brackets "[ ]" to indicate insertion.

The section and its translation

The section "Of Words" consists of nine parts – seven paragraphs and two appendices. Not all paragraphs bear a title in the manuscript, but for the sake of uniformity and clarity, in the translation that follows I have added appropriate titles and marked all such additions with angle brackets "⟨ ⟩".

The content of the section is as follows:

II/i. Of Words
- §1. The Significance of Words for Logic.
- §2. The Kinds of Words Required for Logic.
- §3. ⟨General and Singular Names.⟩
- §4. ⟨Names of Objects and of Properties.⟩
- §5. ⟨Connotative and Non-Connotative Names.⟩
- §6. ⟨Affirmative and Negative Names.⟩
- §7. ⟨Relational and Absolute Names.⟩
- Appendix 1.
- Appendix 2.[70]

[70] In both appendices Marković discusses Heymann Steinthal's conception of logic. He outlines Steinthal's view and provides its criticism (I return to this below). Heymann Steinthal (1823–1899) was a German-Jewish linguist and philosopher, significantly influenced by Wilhelm von Humboldt's understanding of language. Likewise influenced by J. F. Herbart's psychological studies, he argued that linguistics should be grounded in psychology rather than in logic. Steinthal's work on the relations between language, mind, and society influenced early empirical psychologists such as Wilhelm Wundt, as well as early psychoanalysts such as Sigmund Freud. For further details, see Sabine Sander, "From the Soul to the Social Self: Heymann Steinthal's Contributions to Psychology in His Linguistic and Mythological Writings", in Carlos Cornejo and Cristián Hernández Maturana (eds.), *Forgotten Streams in the History of 19th-Century German Psychology* (Cham: Springer, 2025), pp. 79–99.



Drugi dio.

Sustav logike.

I. odsjek.

O riečih.

§1. Znamenitost rieči za logiku.

U Engleskih logikah, npr. Millovoj i Bainovoj raspravlja se prije o riečih, a onda tek o pojmovih. Starije školske logike francezke i njemačke počimale su odmah s najtežim, naime s pojmom; tako n. pr. Zimmermannova, Lindnerova logika za gimnazije. No sad se i u Njemačkoj prihvaća engleski način, kako se vidi n. pr. Lotzeovoj, Sigwartovoj i Wundtovoj logici, pak u austr. vladnih naputcih za gimnazije od god. 1884 (s log. naukom o rieči). I doista je probitačno i potrebno, da se razjasni vrijednost rieči za logič. mišljenje.

Pomišljaj, kojim su vrstne i životinje,

The first page of the section “Of Words” in the Institute apograph of Franjo Marković’s *Logic*.

Marković's section translated below is clearly written and, for the most part, speaks for itself. Nevertheless, I would like to draw attention to few interesting points that warrant closer consideration.

The section opens with a pedagogical remark by Marković. It is grounded in his view that, from a methodological perspective, the logician must be clear about the language he uses and about the starting point of his inquiry. For Marković, this clearly is a prerequisite for a logician to engage adequately with the matters of concepts, judgments, and inferences. Accordingly, "Of Words" forms the opening section of Marković's "System of Logic" – the second part of *Logic* – in which most of the general considerations of the first part are set aside. However, since Marković held that both psychological and linguistic considerations form part of the preparatory study of logic, the section "Of Words" could just as well have been placed as the closing section of the first part, so that the second part of *Logic* would open with the section "Of Concepts". Indeed, the concluding remarks of I/vii support the proposal that Marković might have placed "Of Words" at the end of the first part. He apparently found justification for his preferred organisation in other logic books of the period (as indicated in II/i/1).

Thus, the very organisation of *Logic* enables us to see how Marković conceived the project of approaching the subject-matter of logic – what belongs to the logical investigation proper, namely the System of Logic, and what falls within a preparatory, or "meta-logical" inquiry. Today one would typically subsume the latter under the heading of "philosophy of logic". This certainly applies to the sections dealing with the psychological ground of logic and with words relevant to logic. Marković apparently ascribes different weight to these two types of considerations, placing the former in the introductory part (I/vii) and the latter (II/i) within the System itself. In this too Marković follows Mill, who omitted explicit psychological considerations in his *System*, although he embraced and promoted psychologism both there and in his other writings, even claiming that "[Logic] is a part, or branch, of Psychology; <…> Its theoretical grounds are wholly borrowed from Psychology, and include as much of that science as is required to justify its rules of art".[71]

Returning to the opening of the section: The language about which the logician must be clear is a refined form of ordinary language, not its formalised substitute. It is *refined* in that all unnecessary distinctions among words are

[71] Cited in Martin Kusch, "Psychologism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/psychologism/>. See sect. 2 of this entry for details about Mill's psychologism.

eliminated, and words of the relevant kinds have fixed meaning – or, rather, connotation. Only such language can serve as an appropriate scientific tool and a reliable guide in the investigation of concepts, judgements, and their mutual relations – whether in logic proper or in its applied forms in philosophy or the sciences. Unrefined ordinary language will not suffice for logical, philosophical, or scientific purposes.

This idea bears some similarity with Frege's, but with an essential difference: for Frege, no version of ordinary language – however refined – can serve the scientific purposes. That purpose, primarily logical and arithmetical, requires a newly structured language of logic, one that strictly follows neither ordinary nor arithmetical language. It is not based on grammatical systematisation, nor does it imitate arithmetical operations. For Marković, however, the idea of logic completely liberated from ordinary language and the categories it imposes is equally untenable, as is evident from his criticism of Steinthal in the section on words and of algebraic logic in the closing section of *Logic*.

On the question of ordinary language – how it relates to logic, and when and in what way a logician should engage with it – Marković is, as already suggested, in complete agreement with Mill. In the *System of Logic,* Mill, for example, writes:

> Logic is a portion of the Art of Thinking: Language is evidently, and by the admission of all philosophers, one of the principal instruments or helps of thought; and any imperfection in the instrument, or in the mode of employing it, is confessedly liable, still more than in almost any other art, to confuse and impede the process, and destroy all ground of confidence in the result.[72]

A bit later Mill adds:

> We must begin by recognising the distinctions made by ordinary language. If some of these appear, on a close examination, not to be fundamental, the enumeration of the different kinds of realities may be abridged accordingly. But to impose upon the facts in the first instance the yoke of a theory, while the grounds of the theory are reserved for discussion in a subsequent stage, is not a course which a logician can reasonably adopt.[73]

Mill's influence on Marković, however, extends far beyond this general standpoint on the relation between language and logic. Throughout the section, Marković primarily follows Mill's exposition and his taxonomy of words (or names), while occasionally criticising authors such as W. Wundt, A. Bain, and

[72] Mill, *A System of Logic*, p. 11.
[73] Mill, *A System of Logic*, p. 14.

especially H. Steinthal – typically when their views are not in accordance with Mill's. Let me briefly reflect on these three in turn.

* * *

In §6, Marković discusses the distinction between affirmative and negative names. Following Mill's proposal, he acknowledges that there are pairs of names which share the same *form* – N/not-N – although the negation "not" does not carry the same *logical sense* in every case.[74] It is the task of logicians to investigate and systematise the various senses of negation and thereby determine which names are truly negative. Wilhelm Wundt, however, disagrees with such an approach to negation and to the affirmative/negative distinction itself. According to Marković's report, Wundt maintains two theses: (1) negative names are formed by prefixing the negation "not" to an affirmative name; and (2) negative names do not express concepts opposite to those expressed by the corresponding affirmative names, but rather express indefinite concepts merely different from the affirmative ones.

Marković's strategy for refuting Wundt's position is highly insightful and deserves more detailed elaboration, particularly in connection with his later criticism of Steinthal (in Appendix 2 of "Of Words" below). For the time being, however, I will confine myself to a brief reconstruction of Marković's view.

Although Marković does not state this explicitly, in §6 he distinguishes, with regard to negative names, between: (a) the *strict logical* analysis of negation and (b) the *use*-based analysis of negation.

According to (a), the analysis adopted by Wundt, a negative name "not-N" refers to every object that is not N, i.e., one that lacks every characteristic contained in the content of the concept *N*. Yet, as Marković observes, this is not the sense in which speakers *use* many (if not all) negative names in language – at least not in the case of the Croatian language. Instead, when using a negative name such as "not-human" (Cro. "nečovjek", where "ne" = "not" and "čovjek" = "human"), speakers refer to things that lack a particular characteristic contained in the content of the concept *not-human*, rather than all of its characteristics. Thus, they still refer to a human, but one who lacks

[74] It should be noted that in the Croatia language there is far greater uniformity in the form among negative names than in English, as is evident from a comparison between the literal and the more idiomatic English renderings of Marković's Croatian examples (cf. §6 in the translated section below). This formal uniformity – especially in expressions of the type "not-N" – enables Marković to compare logical examples with those from ordinary language more easily and to make his point about negative names more effectively.

that particular characteristic. This observation leads to the alternative analysis (b). According to it, a negative name "not-N" refers only to objects that lack a *salient* characteristic contained in the content of the concept *N*. The salient characteristic is presumably determined by context – that is, by the way in which speakers actually use the name in accordance with accepted linguistic norms, which typically transcend principles of logical or syntactic formalism.

Given the choice between analyses (a) or (b), Marković's position is that the almost mechanical conception of negative names – according to which the mere negative *form* of a name "not-N" *guarantees* that it expresses a concept contrary to the affirmative one expressed by "N" and refers to every thing that is not N – is unjustified. The analysis (a) should be discarded.

The (a)/(b) distinction suggested in Marković's criticism of Wundt points not only to more recent considerations of the nature of negation – especially when it is embedded within words rather than sentences of ordinary language – but, more importantly, to the broader semantics–pragmatics distinction and the question of whether, and to what extent, the way speakers use and understand particular types of words in communication affects the manner in which such words should be analysed within logic. The subsequent development of logic and semantics in the works of Frege, Russell, and their successors, as well as the later criticism of the strict logical approach to linguistic phenomena (for example, in the writings of the later L. Wittgenstein, P. F. Strawson, P. Grice, and others), makes Marković's brief consideration of negative names in §6 all the more interesting and suggestive – indeed, worthy of further investigation.

In §7, Marković begins with Mill's distinction between absolute and relational names and further subdivides the latter into shared and correlative names. The issue at stake, according to Marković, is whether absolute names exist at all. Alexander Bain argues that they do not: according to him, all names are relational because every characteristic in the content of a concept expressed by an allegedly absolute name is relative to its contrary characteristic – without which one could not even conceive of the original. Or, as Marković puts it (§7, p. 548):

> We represent no property merely by itself, but always in relation to some different or opposite property. Every property is relational – or, better, *relative* – since it is clearly representable only with reference to some different property.

Bain therefore proposes an alternative distinction – a division of relativity into universal and special – and further subdivides special relativity into shared and correlative. All cases of relativity that are neither shared nor correlative fall under universal relativity. Put universally relative names aside, together with shared or correlative names, and none remain that may be regarded as absolute.

The problem that Marković identifies in Bain's conception of unrestricted relativity is that the view according to which *all* names should be treated as *relational* imposes an undue epistemic burden on speakers. As Marković puts it, "such a language would grievously hinder thought" (p. 548). This consequence, he argues, follows from Bain's implicit assumption that all names, being relative, in fact occur in pairs with their contraries, each pair defined with respect to a particular characteristic contained (or opposed) in the content of the concept they express. However, as Marković observs, there is no *single* opposing characteristic for every name, and therefore no single name that is contrary to the one with which it would be paired. Rather, each name expressing a concept would be correlative to innumerable other names expressing a concept that includes in its content a property contrary to that of the original. For instance, "bright" would not be correlated only with "dark", but also with "hard", "bitter", "scent", and many other similar names. To avoid this untenable epistemic burden on speakers, absolute names must be admitted – just as Mill maintained.

Bain's specific understanding of relativity – particularly of *universal* relativity – and his consequent conclusion that the idea of absolute names must therefore be abandoned, rests on his view of the relation between psychological and logical laws. However, as already noted in the previous section of this essay, this aspect of Bain's approach to logic was subjected to criticism by Marković in the closing section of the first part of *Logic*. Marković, who, under the influence of Lotze and Wundt, adopted a refined version of Bain's position, with the two kinds of laws now more carefully distinguished. What appears to underlie this separation is a combination of two theses. First, contrary to Bain's materialism, there is a dualist acknowledgment of a unique "soul", governed by principles different from those of the "brain atoms". Second, contrary to Wundt, there is an acknowledgment of the objective world, which prevents logic from becoming over-subjective through an excessively subjective view of concepts.

* * *

In the section "Of Words", as already noted, Marković is particularly critical of Heymann Steinthal – and that is hardly surprising. Unlike the other authors mentioned in the section, Steinthal is the only one who directly challenges Marković's underlying assumption that ordinary language is essential for logical thought. In the opening paragraph of the section, continuing the discussion of the psychological grounds of logic (i.e. I/vii), Marković, for instance, writes (§1, p. 537):

> Only in the form of words do representations attain clear generality so that they may become the elements of logical thought. Lotze has well pointed out how

> greatly words aid the development of general representations [or concepts], without which no science could arise, not even logic. <…> The value of words for logic is shown also by the fact that logic is concerned in the first place with the form [or the mode of connection] in which representations are combined; and that form is the form of a proposition. <…> Since propositions are the natural form of logical judgements [or combinations of representations], the words required for forming propositions are likewise required for logic.

By contrast, Steinthal maintains that language deals with representations grounded in sense perception, whereas logic concerns concepts as completely independent representations – thus not grounded in, or bounded to, sensations and particular representations. Hence, language and logic should, in principle, be kept separated, since the two kinds of representations are distinct. To some extent, Marković agrees with Steinthal in this respect, as both were influenced by Herbart's conception:

> *That those are mistaken who wish to turn grammar into logic* is proven by the fact that *there is no general grammar valid for all languages*; that is, there is no set of lexical and propositional forms that would hold equally for *all* languages; for example, the same logical laws can be manifested through very different grammatical forms. *The ground of grammar is not logic but psychology; grammar stands in relation to logic as the psychological laws of thought stand in relation to the logical rules of thought*.[75]

The assumption that grammar and logic are not the same, or that grammar is not grounded in logic, does not entail that the two should be entirely separated or that one is substantially irrelevant to the other. On the contrary, it is the task of the logician, as a preparatory step in logical investigation, to examine language critically – most notably the kinds of words – and to determine which of the grammatical categories and distinctions are significant for logic, for logic cannot proceed without language. That was the view Mill advanced in his *System* (see the previous quotation from Mill), and which Marković readily adopted. Steinthal, however, contests the importance of such an approach to logic.

Despite all the criticism, Marković also shows considerable appreciation for Steinthal. This is evident not only from the fact that he devoted two carefully developed appendices to his views – which together comprise almost half of the entire section "Of Words" – but also from his subsequently inserted remark about Steinthal's *Grammatik, Logik, Psychologie* (1855), reading: "the work eminently necessary for anyone who wish to enter more deeply into logic" (App. 2, p. 555). Nowhere else in the whole of *Logic* does Marković mention Steinthal. This, combined with the fact that he addresses Steinthal's views in

[75] Marković, "[Uvod.] VII. odsjek. Psihologijska podloga logici", p. 354.

the two appendices rather than in the main text, suggests that Steinthal's ideas came to Marković's attention only later, after he had already written the main body of the manuscript – at least those parts in which Steinthal would have been relevant to mention.

Steinthal's views, which Marković criticises, recall those of the algebraic logicians – such as Boole and Jevons – whom Marković attacks in the closing section of *Logic*. Indeed, he concludes the first appendix of "Of Words" with the remark that "Steinthal acts similarly to the English logicians Boole and Jevons", and then refers to the closing section of the manuscript in which he examines their conceptions. Yet nowhere in that closing section does Marković mention Steinthal. From this asymmetry, a natural conclusion is that Marković became aware of Steinthal's views – or at least paid them a more serious attention – only after he had written the section on algebraic logic.

This assumption appears to be supported by the fact that the same issue of the journal containing Alois Riehl's "Die englische Logik der Gegenwart", which Marković consulted extensively in the closing section of *Logic*, also includes Johann Ludwig Tabler's review of Steinthal's *Der Ursprung der Sprache*. Although Marković does not mention Steinthal's book on the origin of language in the section, the review may well have caught his attention and aroused his interest sufficiently to prompt a closer study of Steinthal's doctrines – an engagement that ultimately gave rise to the two appendices. For example, a passage from Tablere's review, reporting Steinthal's position, reads:

> The individual stages [of the evolution of language] are to be understood as successive acts of apperception, whereby, above the world of sensory impressions, a new spiritual creation arises. Not every single perception could be raised to representation by a distinct means, so that there would have had to be as many reflex sounds as perceptions, but new representations developed from already existing ones, the entire world of them from a few fundamental representations, which indeed had to be products of onomatopoeia.[76]

This passage thematically closely resembles much of Marković's discussion of the psychological ground of logic, as well as the opening discussion in "Of Words", where he contrasted the representational abilities of animals and humans and their relation to language, for example (§1, pp. 535–536):

> Representations, in which animals also are skilled, require no language. Animals perceive surrounding objects through their senses. <…> A man likewise senses and represents various things without the aid of words. <…> But when a man

[76] Johann Ludwig Tabler, "Steinthal, H. *Der Ursprung der Sprache im Zusammenhang mit den letzten Fragen alles Wissens*", *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* I (1877), pp. 450–455, here on p. 453.

> wishes to impart to another his insights into equalities, similarities, and differences concerning things – into relations among things in general – then words are required to express these insights. For example, if one sought to instruct another without words about the relation one has detected among many objects scattered across the world – all of which evoke a sensation of heat – he would have to bring the other to each such object. In this way the other could receive from every such object the impression of heat for himself, so that by comparing all the sensations he receives he might conceive the representation of their similarity. But how much more reliably, easily, and quickly one evokes in another the representation of that similarity when the former expresses his representations by means of words such as heat, sun, flame, friction, etc., combining them into propositions apt for expressing thoughts.

The passage cited from Tabler's review of Steinthal's position also clearly reveals his appreciation of Herbart's theory of apperception, which Steinthal applied in his psychological theory of language.[77] This must have been particularly appealing to Marković, if he read it, given his own inclination towards Herbart. The review also, as one might expect, directly connects with Marković's presentation of Steinthal's position in Appendix 1 – for example, when he writes (App. 1, p. 549):

> Plain sense perception takes place without words and requires none. Higher cognitive activity, however, which transforms sense perceptions into non-sensory representations, at the same time produces words as the expressions of those representations. The memorising and recollecting of representations occur by means of words. *Sensations are particular*, whereas representations are, probably, already in some measure general; and words do not note sensations, but representations.

Marković's previously cited passage was probably also written before the appendices, that is, before Steinthal's work had attracted his attention.

An alternative explanation might be that Marković came to appreciate Steinthal's work through the writings and lectures on philology of Franc Miklošič, one of his teachers in Vienna. Miklošič in particular promoted the idea of subjectless sentences (or propositions) – the thesis that the subject is not an essential component of a sentence – against the judgment model adopted, among others, by Steinthal.[78] This is precisely the issue that Marković addresses

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[77] For more details, see Sander, "From the Soul to the Social Self".

[78] For details about Franc Miklošič, see §6, p. 543 and note 10 in the translated section "Of Words" below. Marković also mentions Miklošič in the omitted part of the same paragraph (cf. p. 546, note 11 below). For a detailed comparative analysis of the relation between Steinthal's and Miklošič's views, see Giorgio Graffi, "Theories of the Sentence in the Psychologistic Epoche (and Shortly After)", *Histoire Épistémologie Langage* 32(2) (2010), pp. 57–73.

in "Of Words", where he appears to defend the judgement model: *every* sentence (proposition) consists of at least a subject and a verb (§2, p. 539):

> There are propositions consisting of only two words: a subject and a verb. In such propositions the verb performs a double function: it notes an action or a state, and predicates it to the subject. Indeed, there are propositions consisting of only one word, such as *grmi* ⟨= thunders⟩ or *bliešti* ⟨= flashes⟩. The older a language is, the more frequently it employs such seemingly subjectless propositions. Yet these are not truly subjectless propositions; rather, the subject is represented in them by a demonstrative pronoun. <…> True, the subject is not indicated by a name, but it is at least pointed to by a [demonstrative] pronoun.

Marković briefly reflects on the issue in *Logic*, I/vi/2, where he argues that such sentences are single-worded in respect of their form – the propositional form – although they are somewhat more complex in respect of their sense, resembling existential judgements. Single-worded propositions (sentences) express the existence of a sensation without there being any particular subject, as in typical existential propositions (see also *Logic*, II/iii/a/7 and II/iii/b/5).

Be that as it may, Marković eventually decided to engage critically with Steinthal's views in greater detail, which resulted in the two appendices. In these appendices, he primarily focuses on the following theses that Steinthal advanced in several of his writings: (I) Logic should be entirely separated from ordinary language and set in the realm of pure intellect, which directly thinks concepts. (II) One relies on ordinary language merely out of habit, not because it is essential to thought. (III) The grammatical kinds of words do not correspond to the kinds of concepts (grammar identifies more distinctions between words than there are between concepts, and conceals logically significant differences between them, etc.). (IV) The proper instrument of logic is algebra, not ordinary language; only through the former can one express genuine logical thought. (V) The progress of a science coincides with its emancipation from the words of ordinary language. In sum, Steinthal's position is that "the consideration of words according to their kinds has no value for logic" (App. 2, p. 556).

To this principal separation of logic from ordinary language, Marković raises several objections. For one thing, he contends, *every* algebraic formula must be explained in words in order to be understood; formulas do not possess clarity or precision by themselves. One cannot express, let alone attain, a logical thought through an algebraic formula if one does not know what each of its constituent signs – and their arrangement – means. Thus, algebraic signs and formulas remain at bottom, *linguistic* items; indeed, they are linguistic abbreviations rather than something wordless or soundless. Not even the best of logicians can, at a single glance and without any words, apprehend a formula

and thereby grasp a logical concept. In this respect, Marković notes a tension between Steinthal's theses (I) and (IV): pure logical thought cannot be at one graphic – it cannot rely on any signs, not even geometrical or algebraic ones.

At this point, it is instructive to bring Frege into the discussion, for one of the opening remarks in his *Begriffsschrift* may help in clarifying a potential misunderstanding in Marković's criticism of Steinthal.[79] Marković writes (App. 1, p. 554):

> But [we claim that] pure thought cannot at once be graphic, for pure thought is so called precisely because it is abstracted from every sensibility or graphic sign. When Steinthal says that even at its highest stage of development the human mind requires certain graphic signs – geometrical or algebraic – for the thinking of concepts, he thereby acknowledges that a purely non-sensory representation of concepts is impossible, and that the furnishing of graphic signs for concepts serves only as a necessary substitute for pure thinking of them [– for thought entirely abstracted from sensibility].

However, there is another way of understanding what Steinthal is claiming – one grounded in the distinction that Frege draws between *justification* and *explanation*; that is, between "the most perfect method of proof" of a proposition's truth and "the psychological mode of origin" of the apprehension of a true proposition. Frege writes:

> Accordingly, we divide all truths which require a proof into two kinds: the proof of the first kind can proceed purely logically, while that of the second kind must be supported by empirical facts. It is quite possible, however, for a proposition *to be of the first sort and still be one that could never come to the consciousness of a human mind without activity of the senses**. [* Since *without sense perception no mental development is possible* for beings known to us, the latter point *holds for all judgements*.][80]

A little further on, in connection to his conceptual notation, Frege continues:

> Certainly, [the conceptual notation] also *does not reproduce ideas in pure form* either, and this is probably *inevitable for a means of thought expression outside of the mind*; but on the one hand, we can limit these discrepancies to the unavoidable and harmless; and on the other hand, merely because they are of a completely different kind from those [discrepancies] peculiar to [ordinary]

[79] I follow here in part a brief analysis in Dušan Dožudić, "Bojan Marotti, *Tročlani sklop: Ogledi o filozofiji jezika* (Zagreb: ArTresor, 2021), 432 pp.", *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* 49(1) (2023), pp. 141–157, here on pp. 148–149.

[80] Frege, *Conceptual Notation*, p. 103 (emphasis added).

> language, they provide a protection against a onesided influence of one such means of expression.[81]

Frege returns to this topic in his later writings as well – for example, when reflecting on the relation between logic and psychology, he remarks:

> In human beings it is natural for thinking to be intermingled with having images and feeling. Logic has the task of isolating what is logical, not, to be sure, so that we should think without having images, which is no doubt impossible, but so that we should consciously distinguish the logical from what is attached to it in the way of ideas and feelings. There is a difficulty here in that we think in some language or other and that grammar, which has a significance for language analogous to that which logic has for judgement, is a mixture of the logical and the psychological. If this were not so, all languages would necessarily have the same grammar. It is true that we can express the same thought in different languages; but the psychological trappings, the clothing of the thought, will often be different.[82]

Accordingly, one might attempt to defend Steinthal's position by arguing that the very fact that logical thought requires graphic, sensory signs in order to become a thought at all does not entail that it cannot be pure – at least not as far as the justification of the thought is concerned. Graphic signs are required merely as a tool, a means of access to logical thought, not as something that constitutes it in terms of its proof. Yet granting this line of defence of Steinthal does not mean he is justified in insisting on algebraic rather than linguistic signs of ordinary language. An additional argument would still be required to demonstrate that the former are indeed more suitable for logical purposes than the latter – just as Frege demonstrates the same point with respect to *his* conceptual notation in comparison with existing alternatives. Once again, this is a matter that deserves further attention.

As for Steinthal's thesis (III), Marković rightly observes that it would be unjustified to expect language itself to manifest logical distinctions at the grammatical level or in its formal structure. Negative names, discussed in §6, are a good example. The mere fact that a name has, or does not have, the negative form "not-N" does not by itself entail that it is, or is not, a genuinely negative name. Rather, logical distinctions manifest themselves at the level of *sense*: they are embedded in the sense of words, not in their external form. The sense of a word, in turn, derives from the *content* of the concept it expresses.

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[81] Frege, *Conceptual Notation*, p. 106 (emphasis added).
[82] Frege, "Logic" (1897), p. 142.

To support his claim that logical distinctions are grounded in word's sense rather than its form, Marković briefly appeals to a case related to his earlier idea of "national philosophy". His argument runs as follows: numerous folk proverbs are funded upon logical distinctions. Yet it is not a formal logical theory that enables this grounding; rather, the relevant words – such as the contraries "black"/"white" in the proverb "even black hens lay whit eggs" – "possess [logical characteristics] already, by the natural and reasonable consciousness of a people" (App. 2, p. 556).

Concerning the affirmative/negative distinction, Marković undermines Steinthal's position by drawing upon his earlier criticism of Wundt (in §6). Now he extends that criticism in a predictable direction – away from pure (formal) logic and towards the empirical fact of how words are actually used in language, regardless of their form. In other words, his analysis turns toward how speakers in practice use and understand the relevant terms. (Recall the earlier discussion – the distinction between the (a) and the (b) analyses of negation.) As Marković writes (App. 2, p. 557):

> logical consideration also reveals, by comparing affirmative and negative concepts, that affirmativity and negativity are only relative, not absolute, with respect to all conceivable and actually conceived concepts.

Marković does not address Steinthal's final thesis (v) concerning the advancement of science, since its refutation follows from his previous objections. Still, it is worth noting that this thesis is likely the most direct point of connection with Frege's ambitious project, hinted at in the *Begriffsschrift* and extending well beyond logic and arithmetic. Just as Steinthal, Frege suggests – along Leibniz's lines – that the diminution of ordinary language and the expansion of the formal one, of "the adequate method of notation", would greatly advance *any* science that values the demonstrative validity of proofs.[83] Indeed, Frege expresses this most clearly with respect to philosophy itself:

> If it is a task of philosophy to break the power of the word over the human mind, uncovering illusions which through the use of language often almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations of concepts, freeing thought from that which only the nature of the linguistic means of expression attaches to it, then my "conceptual notation", further developed for these purposes, can become a useful tool for philosophers.[84]

In the section "Of Words" and throughout *Logic*, when discussing the relation between ordinary and formal language, Marković primarily has in mind

[83] Frege, *Conceptual Notation*, pp. 105–106.
[84] Frege, *Conceptual Notation*, p. 106.

algebraic logicians and Heymann Steinthal. There is no doubt, however, that he would have extend his criticism of eliminating ordinary language as irrelevant for logical investigations to Frege and his alternative project of freeing logic from ordinary language through the adoption of a conceptual notation with all its novelties (e.g. the abandoning of the grammatical subject/predicate distinction). Unlike the algebraic alternatives, Frege's approach soon became the standard among logicians, as evident from the subsequent development of logic beginning with Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica* (1910–1913). By that time, Marković could hardly have maintained any vivid interest in logical developments beyond his lectures, which were largely defined decades earlier in his manuscript and remained restricted mostly to traditional logic. Nevertheless, had he become acquainted with the new advances in logic and reflected upon their merit, he might have been inclined to reconsider his position – especially regarding the relation between ordinary and formal language, and particularly in light of the fact that the new Frege – Russell logic was far superior to its nineteenth-century predecessors.

Marković died in 1914. Already in 1912, however, Franjo Mihletić (1876–1922) has published in a Croatian journal an overview of the foundations of mathematics that also paid attention to Russell and *Principia Mathematica*.[85] Yet this overview appears to have done little to stimulate interest in the vigorous debates on logic and the foundations of mathematics then taking place across Europe. Until well into the second half of the twentieth century, to the extent that there was any interest in logic at all, the Croatian philosophical tradition remained dominated by traditional logic.[86]

Marković concludes his reflections in the appendices by asserting that, in light his criticism of Steinthal, all the distinctions among names that he adopted and discussed in §§3–7 of "Of Words" are justified. On this ground, one might conclude that Marković successfully defended *Mill's* conception of names against Steinthal's objections. In one sense, this conclusion would be justified; in another, not – and not because Marković's arguments are inconclusive or beside the point. Rather, the more accurate conclusion is that, although Marković adopted Mill's *distinctions* as logically relevant, he did not thereby endorse Mill's specific *characterisations* of the kinds of names involved in these distinctions. This departure from Mill's characterisations is precisely one of the features that make Marković's contribution distinctive, original,

[85] Franjo Mihletić, "Pincipi matematike" ["The Principles of Mathematics"], *Nastavni vjesnik* 20(7) (1912), pp. 510–523.

[86] For further details about that period in Croatia, see Kovač and Žarnić, "An Outline of the History of Croatian Logic", sect. 3.

and consequently, worthy of further study. In the remainder of this section, I will briefly consider one case of departure – Marković's treatment of Mill's connotative/non-connotative distinction – and indicate how it has influenced my translation of the section "Of Words" that follows.[87]

* * *

For today's well-versed Croatian philosopher, the terms "značiti" and "označiti" (and their cognates) typically convey different meanings and, accordingly, require different renderings: the former pertaining to *sense* or *meaning*, while the latter pertains to *reference*, *designation*, or *denotation*. This has been the standard understanding within the analytic tradition for the last century or so. Hence, one might be tempted to interpret Marković's use of the terms "značiti" and "označiti" along these lines – translating the former as "mean" and the latter as "designate" or "denote". Yet this would undoubtedly be mistaken. A more attentive reading of Marković's section "Of Words", together with the literature he consulted there, reveals a more intricate picture.

For Marković, the terms "značiti" and "označiti" are sometimes interchangeable and sometimes not. When they are not, the term "označiti" carries a fairly specific sense. It concerns the circumstance in which a speaker names an object by one of its properties. Marković's own example is the circumstance in which one uses the name "human" to refer to objects possessing a certain property – namely, humanity – and thereby names them *as humans*. Such cases, following Mill's distinction, stand in sharp contrast to *proper* names, which are used to name objects without implying or connoting any of their properties – that is, when they function as mere marks. Thus, Marković's intended meaning of the term "označiti" aligns closely with Mill's term "connote", but it is not synonymous with it.

As can be seen from later corrections and modifications in one preserved apograph of *Logic*, Marković strove to maintain a consistent distinction between the terms "značiti" and "označiti", replacing the earlier pair "označiti/suoznačiti" with "značiti/suznačiti" and reserving the term "označiti" for the distinct sense outlined above.[88] Accordingly, I would conclude that in the final version of *Logic*, the term "označiti" was (or should have been) intended to be

[87] In what follows, I draw on Dožudić, "Names and Connotation in Marković's Logic".

[88] See the published Croatian version of the section "Of Words" and the accompanying footnotes listing the terminological corrections in Marotti, *Tročlani sklop*, pp. 360ff. The Institute apograph does not include these corrections – or at least they are not implemented consistently throughout the text. Nevertheless, even without the corrections, it is evident that Marković did not use "označiti" with the same meaning in every instance in the section.

analysed in terms of the pair "značiti/suznačiti" as follows (I have translated "označiti" as "characterise", and the pair "značiti/suznačiti" as "note/connote"): To say that the name "human" *characterises* certain objects is to say that it *notes* those objects and at the same time *connotes* a certain property of them – namely, humanity. And the fact that the name that connotes a certain property applies to those objects implies that they indeed possess that property, that they are *humans*. Thus, Marković did not understand the terms "značiti" and "označiti" as mere stylistic variations of the same term. Rather, the term "označiti" ("characterise") derives from the term "oznaka" ("characteristic"), rather than "označivanje" ("designation" or "denotation"). In the logical tradition to which Marković belongs, *oznaka* (characteristic) is not a linguistic item but a property, quality, or attribute.

In the section "Of Words", Marković principal aim was to present Mill's taxonomy of names, and there is no indication that he *intended* to depart from it in any substantial respect. He merely supplemented Mill's account with examples drawn from the Croatian language and with criticisms of Wound, Bain, and Steinthal – precisely at points where those authors diverged from Mill. Thus, in translating the section, the most appropriate strategy would seem to be to integrate Mill's terminology. To some extent, I have followed that approach (for instance, in using "proposition" or "mark" as Mill did). However, I have deliberately departed from Mill's terminology concerning the connotative/non-connotative distinction. In places in the translated Marković's text where one would expect the verb "denote", I have instead used the verb "note", resulting in the pair "note/connote" rather than "denote/connote".[89] The difference may appear slight – or even awkward or unsuitable – but it marks what I take to be a substantive divergence between Mill's and Marković's conceptions, as outlined above.[90] The reader of the following translation should bear this in mind. The broader context supporting this interpretive decision may be outlined as follows.[91]

If one carefully reads, in particular §§3 and 5 of "Of Words", one may notice several departures by Marković from Mill. First, unlike Mill, for Marković the

[89] Mill considers the term "note" only once, in a footnote in which he discusses a predecessor of the denote/connote distinction – another distinction found in his father's work. However, according to Mill junior, James Mill used the term "note" to indicate a name's relation to an attribute, and the term "connote" to indicate a name's relation to objects possessing that attribute (cf. Mill, *A System of Logic*, p. 25).

[90] For further details, see Dožudić, "Names and Connotation in Marković's Logic", especially sect. 4–8.

[91] In what follows, I rely on Dožudić, "Names and Connotation in Marković's Logic", and summarise some of its points; for details and additional arguments, see that forthcoming paper.

singular/general and the connotative/non-connotative distinctions fully overlap. For Marković, every singular name is non-connotative, and every general name is connotative. Second, because of this overlap, Marković does not consider singular names other than proper names and treats all abstract names as proper abstract names, thereby rendering all abstract names non-connotative. Nowhere in Marković's section could one read that singular names, such as definite descriptions, complex demonstratives, or certain abstract names, could be connotative, as Mill contended in the *System*.[92] Third, proper names, such as personal and place names, are, in a nontrivial way, connotative.

How did Marković arrive at the view that proper names – personal and place names – are, in a way, connotative? Marković did not read Mill's *System* in English, but in its German translation, which proves decisive in this respect. I believe that one of the main reasons for Marković's view of proper names was the imprecise German translation of Mill's *System*, which blurred the distinction between singular and proper names. Moreover, it is difficult to obtain from the German edition an accurate picture of the relation between *denoting* and *connoting* as Mill intended, because the translation does not employ a systematic use of the German terms "bezeichnen" and "bedeuten" (and their cognates) that would consistently and clearly reflect the denote/connote distinction as presented in the English original. The term "bezeichnen" appears in places where Mill would use the terms "mark", "designate", "denote", "signify", or (Lat.) "notare"; the term "bedeuten" also occurs where Mill would say "denote" or "signify", whereas the term "mitbezeichnen" typically translates Mill's "connote". Given these translations, the distinction between "note", "denote", and "connote", unlike in Mill's English *System*, becomes obscured, as is then examplified, for instance, in Marković's remark (§5, p. 541):

> Yet the name human directly notes ⟨upravo znači⟩ nothing but beings, and only indirectly notes ⟨uzgredice znači⟩ also a property. It thus notes ⟨znači⟩ objects and connotes ⟨suoznačuje⟩ a property (*notat rem, connotat atributum*). On the other hand, the names whiteness, length, virtue, and humanity note ⟨znače⟩ a property alone, without at the same time noting ⟨znače⟩ objects. These are non-connotative names.

In addition, from the German edition the reader encounters the following inconsistent tirade:

1. singular names are proper names,
2. proper names are always non-connotative,
3. some singular names are connotative.

[92] See Mill, *A System of Logic*, pp. 16–21.

Regarding this triad presented to the German reader, as Dožudić insightfully observes,

> such a reader has two options for eliminating the tension (better, the inconsistency): Either to abandon the conflation of the two name classes or disregard the types of singular names that do not figure into the class of Mill's proper names. Marković sided with the latter option – a bad choice if Mill's intent is to be respected.[93]

Marković, interestingly, resolved the further issue with the inconsistent triad by proposing that proper names undergo a *semantic* transformation from connotative to non-connotative terms (§5, p. 542):

> By their origin, place and personal names are connotative [– these are κατ' ἐξοχήν singular names]. For example, a village is called Drumlin ⟨= *Brdovac*⟩, which must once have been named after a drumlin. At one time the village lay upon that drumlin, but today it lies in the valley. Hence a place-name, though connotative at first, may in the course of time lose all connotation and become a mere mark. The village Underhill ⟨= *Podsusjed*⟩ will retain its name even though the fortress Hill ⟨= *Susjed*⟩ be brought utterly to ruin, and the hill at which the fortress stood be entirely levelled. The village will retain the name Underhill, even though it is no longer under Hill. The same holds of surnames.

This solution not only distances him from Mill but also aligns him with some more recent debates in the philosophy of language; I will not pursue this matter further here.[94]

Accordingly, I have decided to translate Marković's term "značiti" with the English verb "note". As far as "označiti" is concerned, I have varied the translation depending on the context: where appropriate, I have rendered "označiti" as "characterise", for reasons set out above, and in several instances as "note". Any other translational choice, I believe, would amount to an excessive interference with the philosophical content of Marković's text and a substantial alteration of what he actually thought. It would undoubtedly give a misleading impression to an English reader of the text, particularly one familiar with Mill and the subsequent analytic tradition.

Accordingly, the translation of "Of Words" that follows this introductory essay should be understood as an opinionated translation governed by the interpretation I have outlined. The matter certainly deserves further attention, especially if Marković's related texts are to be translated in the future.

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[93] Dožudić, "Names and Connotation in Marković's Logic", sect. 7.

[94] For further details, see Dožudić, "Names and Connotation in Marković's Logic", sect. 7 and 8.

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Here are several remarks about the translation and a list of the terms from the translated section.

Some of the passages in the section are unusually long by today's standards. I have divided some of these into several shorter passages at thematically appropriate points. Marković also tends to write extraordinarily long sentences by contemporary standards, which become even more cumbersome when translated into English. I have therefore divided many such sentences into several shorter ones.

As already noted, there are many pencil notes inserted subsequently in the text of *Logic*. Some of these pencil notes are merely terminological, while others are more explanatory or clarificatory. I have included all pencil notes that, in my judgment, made sense when translated into English, and I have consistently marked them with square brackets.

Thus, I have adopted the following convention in the translation:

[ ] – Square brackets indicate (presumably) Marković's subsequent brief additions to the manuscript, written in pencil by Marković himself or at his instruction.

⟨ ⟩ – Angle brackets indicate my insertions into the text.

All footnotes in Marković's text have been added by the translator.

To avoid lengthy explanations and descriptions, I have provided approximate English versions of Marković's Croatian examples that cannot be directly or literally translated into English. Such cases typically involve names that wear their "connotation" on their sleeve or idiomatic Croatian phrases.

It should be borne in mind that, throughout the manuscript – as was customary for the period – Marković does not use quotation marks systematically or consistently, namely, to mark the mentioning of linguistic items, as is typically done today. Indeed, when referring to linguistic items (to words and sentences), he often omits quotation marks altogether. On other occasions in the text, he uses quotation marks when discussing concepts rather than words. In some such cases, it is not entirely clear whether he truly means *concepts* or whether he in fact has *words* in mind. I considered that the systematic insertion of quotation marks where they were originally omitted would be inappropriate. Nevertheless, I have occasionally inserted the phrases "the word …" or "the name …" to improve the flow of the sentence.

Even for a native Croatian speaker today, Marković's language is at times difficult to penetrate, especially when his neologisms are concerned. An attentive reader of Marković's text must at times gain the impression that he was relying on the subtle internal structure of his neologism and of certain other

adopted terms – a structure typically lost, together with its subtle connotations, in translation when approximate English terms are supplied.

At the time when Marković began lecturing on philosophy and writing philosophical texts in Croatian, Croatian philosophical terminology was only beginning to develop. Marković contributed significantly to this project, primarily by educating and inspiring the next generation of philosophers to engage in philosophy in Croatian rather than in German, Italian, or Latin. Consequently, he is regarded today not only as the founder of modern Croatian philosophy – practised in the Croatian language from the 1870s onward – but also as a leading creator of Croatian philosophical terminology and as the initiator of the study of Croatian philosophical heritage.[95] Many of the terminological solutions he proposed did not find their way into subsequent strands of the tradition, which at times makes him both more demanding and more intriguing to read. Nevertheless, once mastered, Marković is revealed to be a remarkably clear, insightful, and stimulating philosophical writer.

What follows is a list of Marković's terms from the section "Of Words", together with their adopted English renderings.[96]

absolute *samosebično*
abstract *apstraktno; odlučeno*
adjectival *pridavačno; pridavničko*
adjective *adjektiv; pridavak; pridavnik*
affirmative *ječno; pozitivno*
anticipation *predćuće*
apprehend *razabrati; razumjeti; shvatiti; urazumljeti*
attribute *atribut; pridjevak*
being *biće*
characterise *označiti*
characteristic *oznaka; obilježje*
characteristic property *označno svojstvo*
classification *razvrstba*
classify *razvrstiti*
cognitive *duševno; misaono*
collection *skup*
collective *skupno*
comparison *isporetba; izporedba*
conceive *misliti; zamisliti*
conceptualist doctrine *nauka čistopojamstva*
connectedness *suveznost*
connection *spoj; spojevina; spojina; spojtba; sveza; vez*
connotation *suoznačenje; suoznačje*
connotative *konotativno; suoznačno*

[95] For further details, see the opening section of this essay and the references provided there.

[96] Kovač, "Formalizam i realizam u logici", pp. 172–182, offers a detailed comparative list of the established Latin logical terms and Marković's Croatian equivalents, some of which also appear in the section translated below. Marotti, "Nazivlje u Markovićevoj *Etici*", discussess Marković's philosophical terminology. Marotti, *Marković's Critique of Hegel's Logic*, includes a number of English translational solutions for Marković's distinctive terminology, as does Viktor Ivanković's English translation of the first section of *Logic* (see the bibliography for details).

connote *suoznačiti*
consideration *domišljanje; razmatranje*
construct *kovanica*
contradiction *porjeka*
contradictory *porječno*
contrariety *kontrarnik; kontrarnost; suprotak; suprotnost*
correlated words *sudružnice riječi*
correlative name *sudružno ime*
declarative judgement *izričeni sud*
dependent *nesamostalno*
dichotomy *razdvojstvo*
different *različno*
differentiation *različenje*
disjunctive *rastavno*
doctrine *nauka*
domain *područje*
dual noting *dvoznačje*
exist *biti; bitkovati; obstojati*
existence *bitak*
expert *vještak*
express *izjaviti; izjavljati; izricati*
expression *izjav; izjavilica; izjavljaj; izjavljalo; izjavnica; izrijek; izrieka*
extension *obseg*
formula *oblikovina*
generalisation *poobćitba*
gestural sign *pokretajni znak*
graphic *zorno*
grasp *shvaćati*
ground *podloga*
ideographic *ideografično; mislopisno*
independent *osamostaljeno; samostalno*
indicate *natucati; naznačiti; obilježiti; označiti*
indicator *obilježba*
insight *spoznaja*
intellect *mišljenje; razum*
intellectual *umstveno*
linguistic *jezično*
mark *kazalica; kazaljka*
memorise *upametiti*
mind *duh*; *pamet*
narrower concept *uži pojam*
negation *nijek; nijekalica; njekalica*
negative *niječno*
non-sensory *bezosjetno*
note *označiti; značiti*
observation *pogledanje; zor*
opposite *suprotan*
opposition *suprotak; suprotnost; suprotica; suprotnica*
perceive *zamjećivati*
perception *zor; zamjećivanje; zamjetba*
predicate *predikat; prirek*
(to) predicate *priricati*
prefixing *predmetanje*
present *prikazati*
presentation *prikazivalo*
privative *odrječno*
privative particle *odrjekalica*
pronoun *zaimenica; zamjenica*
proposition *izreka*
propositional sign *znak izrjeke*
quality *kakvoća; kvalitet*
realm *okružje; prostor*
reasonably *razložno*
reasoning *umovanje*
reciprocal name *uzajmično ime*
recollection *ponovno usvještavanje*
reflection *premišljanje*
relation *medjusobica; uzajmica*
relational *medjusobično*
relative *obzirično*
relativity *obziričnost*
represent *pomišljati*
representation *pomisao; pomišljaj*
rival *suparno*
sentient *ćutljivo*
sensation *osjet; osjetilni zor; osjećaj; zor*

sensibility *zornost*
sensory *osjetilno*
shared name *zajednično ime*
simultaneous name *sasobično ime*
singular *osebito*
sphere of reflection *umovište*
structureless *bezredno*
subject *samoriek; subjekt*
subordinate *podredjeno*
subordination *podredjenost*
substance *samostalica; substancija*
substantival *samostavničko*
substantive *samostavnik; substantiv*
superordinate *nadredjeno*
superordination *nadredjenost*
think *misliti; pomišljati*
thought *misao; mišljenje*
tied to things *sastvarno*
twin words *dvojnice riječi; blizanice riječi*
unrelated *bezsavezno*
utter *izreći*
verbal *izriečno; riečno*
verbal explanation *izriečna porazumitba*
verbal presentation *izriečni prikaz*
(the) whole *sveukupje*
wider concept *opsežniji pojam*

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Logika, riječi i pomisli

Sažetak

Ovaj rad pratnja je i uvod engleskom prijevodu odsjeka "O riečih" Franje Markovića – odsjeka iz njegova rukopisa *Logika*. Rad ima dva glavna cilja. Prvo, skrenuti pozornost na nekoliko tema koje Marković razmatra u prvome dijelu *Logike* – dijelu koji neposredno prethodi odsjeku "O riečih" – a koje smatram važnima za bolje razumijevanje toga odsjeka. Usredotočujem se na Markovićevo shvaćanje same logike i na to kako se ona, prema njegovu mišljenju, odnosi prema psihologiji s jedne strane te jeziku i gramatici s druge. Također razmatram Markovićevo objašnjenje pojmova i 'pomisli' (reprezentacija) važnih za logiku te uspoređujem njegova stajališta s onima Gottloba Fregea. Drugo, skrećem pozornost na neka pitanja koja Marković obrađuje u odsjeku "O riečih" i povezujem ih s prethodno razmotrenim temama – poput niječnih imena, 'samosebičnih' ('absolutnih') imena i Markovićeve kritike gledišta Heymanna Steinthala o logici. Rad započinje kratkim biografskim prikazom Markovića, a završava osvrtom na engleski prijevod odsjeka koji slijedi.

Ključne riječi: Frege Gottlob, logika, Marković Franjo, obični jezik, pojmovi, pomisli, riječi.