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Retraditionalization as Socialization? The Making or the Myth of Croatia's 1990s Generation

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Summary

Although retraditionalization is often invoked to explain contemporary youth attitudes in Croatia, existing studies provide no firm evidence of its impact on those who came of age in the 1990s. This article treats the 1990s as a potential socialization setting and tests whether the retraditionalization project imprinted the cohort that reached adulthood amid war, state-building, and the Tudman regime. Using ten waves of the Croatian National Electoral Studies (1995–2024) and an age-cohort-period framework, we offer a systematic assessment of this hypothesis. Contrary to expectations, we find no durable traditionalist imprint among the 1990s cohort across religious, nativist, and gender-conservative domains. Instead, patterns point to gradual liberalization between cohorts and to long-term stability in identity-anchored attitudes tied to political cleavages. Robustness tests confirm that formative exposure to the Tudman era does not increase traditionalism and may reduce it. The findings challenge prevailing assumptions about youth socialization and the legacies of the 1990s.

Keywords: Retraditionalization, Political Attitudes, Political Socialization, Survey Research, Political Generations

1. Introduction

For Croatia, the twentieth century was indeed what Hobsbawm labelled an “age of extremes”, marked by a whiplash of competing political projects, each seeking to materialize its own vision of statehood and often contradicting its predecessors. This intense historical setting, shaped by revolutions, wars, and a succession of non-democratic and illiberal regimes, offers a tangible site for examining how political environments socialize individuals and shape their attitudes and values (Stoker, 2014). One particularly salient episode emerged with the collapse of Yugoslavia,

when new victors wiped the socialist plate clean and replaced it with ethnonationalist content, thereby creating a distinctive, war-inflected socialization ambience, often described as *retraditionalization* (Županov, 2002a, p. 13). In this light, numerous studies have examined how these developments affected people's orientations and views, especially among youth, under the assumption that those who come of age in turbulent times are the most susceptible (see Gvozdanović *et al.*, 2019, p. 33; Gvozdanović and Kovačić, 2020, pp. 210–211).

Yet, despite much spilled ink, the empirical foundation of these political socialization claims remains fragile. Much of the existing work has examined only one dimension of temporal effects – most often period effects – by asking whether youth at the time adjusted their attitudes to fit the retraditionalization context. However, if we take the impressionable-years hypothesis in earnest, its central claim is that the context in which individuals spend their formative years can produce lasting value imprints, apt to turn biological cohorts into political generations sharing distinctive viewpoints and understandings (Mannheim, 1952; Grasso, 2016).

Following this logic, we ought to test whether this was the case for the cohort that politically socialized in the 1990s under the Tuđman regime. Put differently, the key question is whether the values of young people formed in a retraditionalist milieu differ from those of older and younger cohorts who were socialized in markedly different political and ideological environments – i.e., to paraphrase an Arab proverb, whether they resemble their time more than their fathers.

To provide an answer, we employ an age–period–cohort framework (Neundorff and Niemi, 2014) that allows us to isolate cohort differences net of age and period effects. Drawing on three decades of repeated cross-sectional survey data from the Croatian National Electoral Studies, this design enables us to assess whether those who came of age in the 1990s display a distinct and durable traditionalist profile across the religious, nativist, and gender-conservative domains associated with retraditionalization. In doing so, the analysis expands the scope of retraditionalization research by bringing its theoretical premises – above all, their generational implications – into systematic empirical focus.

Considering the above, the paper proceeds as follows. It first sketches the 1990s context and introduces the notion of retraditionalization, then situates this concept within the existing literature, tracing its ebbs and flows and pinpointing the gap under examination. On that basis, an alternative set of hypotheses about value change is developed, followed by a methodological section detailing the data, identification strategy, and modelling approach. The subsequent section presents and interprets the results, complemented by robustness checks. The paper closes with a reflection on the main findings, the limitations of the analysis, and avenues for future research.

2. Retraditionalization: Context and Concept

The collapse of socialism in Croatia marked the advent of a democratic state-building period, during which transition unfolded simultaneously with war, post-war reconstruction, and the consolidation of an ethnonationalist political project. The newly founded Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and its leader Franjo Tuđman emerged as the dominant actors of this formative phase, securing victory in the first democratic elections and subsequently entrenching themselves as the dominant political force (Søberg, 2007; Kasapović, 1996a, p. 171). Their position rested on a broad nationalist upheaval forged in the context of state formation and war (Dolenec, 2013, pp. 140–141), which they not only drew upon but also actively cultivated through state institutions and public discourse (Kasapović, 1996b). In this setting, Tuđman(ism) and HDZ served as key symbolic (Fisher, 2006, ch. 3; see Đurašković, 2014) and institutional (Kulenović and Petković, 2016, pp. 109–113) reference points, with many of the values, interpretations, and norms they advanced, both formal and informal, shaping the social and political habitus of 1990s Croatia (Čular, 2000). By constructing a semi-authoritarian configuration of power (Mudde, 2007, p. 279; Gallagher, 2003, pp. 185–191), this project set the main interpretive and normative frame for public life during the transition (see Ilišin, 2007).

Effectively, this meant that, under the framework of constitutional nationalism (Hayden, 1996) – reinforced by the institutional setup of semi-presidentialism and Tuđman's charismatic authority – a traditionalist outlook became the prevailing normative horizon. The regime sought to secure ideational dominance, aligning key mechanisms and institutions with nationalist ideology. Accordingly, the education system, public discourse, and language codification were maneuvered in a top-down fashion, reflecting a broader effort to root Croatian national identity in ethnicized and de-Yugoslavized values, symbols, and memories (Bellamy, 2003, ch. 6). Thus, school curricula (Koren and Baranović, 2009, pp. 94–100) and textbooks (Najbar-Agičić and Agičić, 2007; Pavasović-Trošt, 2018, pp. 10–11), popular culture (Baker, 2010; Pettan, 1998), media (Cohen, 1997, pp. 88–89; Peruško, 2007, pp. 233–234), and other socializing sites (Gvozdanović and Kovačić, 2020) became part of a Croaticized meaning-making system. Importantly, religion figured centrally in this framework: Catholic identity was reaffirmed as a key marker of national belonging (Malešević, 2002, p. 264), accompanied by the elevated public and institutional role of the Catholic Church (Zrinščak *et al.*, 2014, pp. 138–144) and the promotion of Catholic morality. In the same vein, a gender-conservative outlook was articulated as part of this ideological project, manifesting both symbolically (Senjković, 2002, pp. 147–153, p. 156) and institutionally (Dobrotić, 2023), informing broader discourses on demographic renewal (Ćeriman and Vučković-Juroš, 2024).

Taken together, these developments are commonly captured under the concept of retraditionalization (Županov, 1995), broadly understood as the re-anchoring of traditionalist cultural norms, identity scripts, value hierarchies, and moral codes in the first post-socialist period (Kligman, 1994, p. 256). The scope of such changes prompted scholarly attention to value change in Croatia, particularly regarding whether and how such efforts shaped individual attitudes, with youth playing a central role in this scholarship. The following section reviews this body of research and identifies the gap motivating the analysis.

2.1. Retraditionalization Research and Gap: From Moment to Mechanism

As Croatia moved through the breakdown of socialism, the ethnonationalist transition of the 1990s, and the democratic consolidation of the 2000s, scholars examined whether individual values and predispositions shifted. In a rare long-horizon comparison, Sekulić (2014) demonstrates that nationalist exclusivity and religiosity increased during the 1990s and then stabilized, whereas gender conservatism declined steadily throughout the transition and post-transition periods. Rather than offering uniform support for the retraditionalization thesis, these findings suggest a differentiated pattern in which some traditionalist dimensions strengthened while others weakened. Complementarily, research on gender and modernization (e.g., Tomić-Koludrović, 2015; Tomić-Koludrović *et al.*, 2018) documents non-linear, domain-specific transformation among women, further indicating that transitional value change does not map neatly onto a singular retraditionalization trajectory. Overall, these studies indicate substantial attitudinal shifts, but not a coherent socio-cultural profile that aligns with a comprehensive retraditionalization scenario (Burić, 2024, p. 214; see Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007).


However, the bulk of retraditionalization scholarship has focused on youth attitudes and values. This emphasis reflects a longstanding premise in political socialization theory that adolescence and early adulthood constitute the most receptive life stages (Mannheim, 1952; Ryder, 1965), and thus the period in which macro-level transformations should be most clearly mirrored at the individual level. Therefore, in the Croatian context, youth became an especially salient analytical category because the first post-socialist cohort entered adulthood at the very height of the retraditionalization project. Accordingly, studies of youth were used to detect signals of value reorientation and to identify potential continuities or breaks in the moral and political order emerging from the Tuđman era (see Ilišin and Spajić Vrkaš, 2017).

The empirical record of this scholarly body puts up a consistent picture. Namely, studies show that Croatian youth of the 1990s adapted to the dominant value climate, expressing stronger national (Ilišin, 2011) and religious sentiment (Goja, 2000; Ilišin, 2002, p. 273) and, for part of the cohort, adopting more traditionalist

orientations than their late-socialist predecessors (Ilišin and Radin, 2007, p. 276). On this basis, several authors concluded that retraditionalization left a visible mark on the first post-socialist youth cohort (Ilišin, 2005; Radin *et al.*, 2002, p. 311), even though it did not stop broader modernization trends (Ilišin and Gvozdanović, 2016). At the same time, research shows that today's youngest generations remain less traditional overall (Labus, 2005; Brajdić-Vuković *et al.*, 2007; Radin, 2007; Ilišin, 2011), suggesting that value liberalization has continued and broadly conforms to the usual life-cycle pattern, in which older people are generally more conservative (see Petterson *et al.*, 2020; Geys *et al.*, 2022). Taken together, this picture reflects broader post-communist trends, where retraditionalization appears as a short-term slump on a longer modernization trajectory (Norris and Inglehart, 2004, pp. 119–124; see Inglehart and Baker, 2000).

However, existing research relies either on youth snapshots at specific moments or on comparisons between youth and the rest of the population at the same point in time. As age and cohort are confounded in such designs, they cannot identify whether the observed 1990s traditionalism reflects a lasting generational signature or merely a short-term adaptation to the era's dominant climate (Neundorf and Niemi, 2014). More precisely, period-to-period comparisons cannot distinguish whether these patterns stem from life-cycle effects (youth being especially receptive due to their impressionable years, i.e., *sensitivity*), from period effects (everyone becoming more traditional amid war and state-building, i.e., *exposure*), or from genuine cohort effects that persist as individuals age – i.e., *imprints*, which emerge when sensitivity and exposure coincide (Dinas, 2013). The distinction matters: life-cycle and period effects typically fade, whereas cohort imprints endure and define generations by their unique formative experiences. Research in other contexts illustrates this logic. For example, youth socialized under Thatcher, exposed to strong free market and authoritarian cues during their most impressionable years, tend to retain more right-wing and authoritative attitudes in adulthood (Grasso *et al.*, 2019). Likewise, women who came of age under state-socialist egalitarian policies continue to express more gender-egalitarian orientations later in life, reflecting the ideological climate of their formative period (Beloshitzkaya and Reilly, 2024). In the 1990s, for Croatian youth, developmental sensitivity and intense exposure to traditionalist cues coincided, making the *retraditionalization-as-socialization hypothesis* theoretically compelling. For this reason, the present study shifts the focus from retraditionalization as a *period* phenomenon to retraditionalization as a (potential) *socialization mechanism*.

Beyond this identification problem, a further issue concerns the way findings have been interpreted: even when designs cannot separate cohort effects, studies often treat observed youth patterns as if they reflected generational change. Notably,

Figure 1. Media Articles Mentioning Retraditionalization, Per Year

Note: data compiled using *TakeLab Retriever* (Dukić *et al.*, 2024).
 Details on the search engine setup are elaborated in the Appendix (Part A).

research treats findings as indicative of a generational imprint – or imply as much – despite relying solely on single-period youth data (Gvozdanović, 2017, p. 220) or straightforward period-to-period comparisons that cannot isolate cohort effects (Gvozdanović and Kovačić, 2020).¹ Consequently, the retraditionalization framework continues to function as the default conceptual lens for youth research, even when applied to cohorts who were born and socialized long after the Tuđman era (Gvozdanović *et al.*, 2019).

This imprecision, however, extends beyond academia. Media outlets, commentators, and expert reports (e.g., Ćulum Ilić and Androić, 2020) likewise invoke retraditionalization as an ever-present, ready-made explanation for youth attitudes. Illustratively, even as this section is being written, new media commentary continues to frame contemporary youth orientations within a retraditionalization narrative (Modrić, 2025). Figure 1 illustrates this dynamic by displaying the annual number of articles mentioning retraditionalization across Croatia’s most-read news portals.

¹ On that note, it is worth mentioning that the Pew Research Center (Parker, 2023), widely recognized as a leader in generational research, has recently cautioned against such methodological pitfalls in the increasingly popular field of generational studies.

As shown, media attention has increased notably over the past decade, peaking in 2022, when the term appeared, on average, almost once per week.²

At first glance, this surge could be interpreted in two ways. One possibility is that the 1990s left such a profound and lasting imprint that retraditionalization remains a central reference point for understanding contemporary values. Another is that retraditionalization itself continued well into the 2000s and 2010s, making sustained media focus a reflection of its presumed ongoing relevance. Yet to date, neither interpretation has been empirically verified. In fact, existing research has not been designed to conclusively demonstrate either a durable cohort imprint or the persistence of retraditionalization as a long-term societal process. This widening gap – between the concept's expanding public visibility and the lack of empirical evidence to substantiate the implied claims – underscores the need to test the scope of the retraditionalization thesis rigorously.

On that note, a further limitation of existing research is that youth have rarely been examined in relation to other cohorts. Yet, youth-only designs or simple youth-versus-all comparisons cannot establish whether the 1990s cohort is genuinely distinctive, because they lack an appropriate benchmark: without adjacent cohorts for comparison, one cannot determine whether observed traditionalism is specific to the 1990s cohort or reflects an age or period effect. Hence, any meaningful generational test requires systematic comparison with cohorts socialized both before and after the 1990s. Against this backdrop, this study examines whether the cohort that came of age in the 1990s displays a lasting attitudinal imprint relative to surrounding cohorts, while simultaneously modeling and disentangling age (life-cycle) and period influences. Since multiple outcomes are plausible, we first outline alternative expectations, contrasting the *retraditionalization-as-socialization* hypothesis with other models of generational value change.

2.2. *Competing Hypotheses*

From the perspective of generational trajectories, three main expectations can be derived, each pointing to different dynamics between cohorts: a *retraditionalization-as-socialization* hypothesis, a (*latent*) *continuity* hypothesis rooted in pre-1990s value patterns, and a *modernization* hypothesis predicting linear liberalization across successive cohorts.

The first expectation follows directly from the retraditionalization literature and mainly concerns the two youngest cohorts. If the 1990s exerted a lasting forma-

² Nevertheless, this does not mean that these treatments went on without criticism. A sustained critique is offered in the work and public appearances of Inga Tomić-Koludrović, concisely summarized in her award-winning 2020 lecture at the *Croatian Sociological Society*.

tive influence, then the so-called Tuđman children should display more traditional attitudes than the youngest cohort, which was socialized after the 2000 elections marking Croatia's democratic opening (Kasapović, 2011). Put differently, the youngest cohort reached adulthood during the phase of most substantial democratization and institutional Europeanization. Consequently, it is often described as democratic (Vuksan-Ćusa and Đurašković, 2024) or European (Raos, 2024) and displays the lowest authoritarian tendencies (Raos and Zakošek, 2024). Even if one accepts that some aspects of retraditionalization persisted into the 2000s – based on claims that national exclusivism and religiosity remained enduring socializing features (Gvozdanović, 2016) – the core expectation still holds. Namely, the socializing intensity of the 2000s differed fundamentally from that of the 1990s: whereas a dominant cluster of traditionalist cues characterized the 1990s, these signals diffused and diversified after 2000 with processes of liberalization, media pluralization, and Europeanization (Coppedge *et al.*, 2025), even if the traditionalist *durée* itself did not disappear.³

A second expectation incorporates older cohorts into the analysis and draws on a cleavage-based perspective that retraditionalization research often overlooks. In this view, retraditionalization is not unique to the 1990s but represents the overt political manifestation of value orientations that had long existed in latent form. The Tuđman era is thus seen as bringing to the surface dormant yet persistent identities rooted in the major historical-identitarian cleavage stemming from the World War II rupture. Although socialist hegemony suppressed open expression of these divisions, it did not erase them; instead, it froze the tension between official (socialist) and alternative, non-official (nationalist) interpretations of Croatian history and statehood (Henjak *et al.*, 2013). These orientations survived through channels such as family political biographies (Šiber, 1997) and competing memories of key historical episodes (Henjak, 2011), as well as through the long-standing mobilizational role of the Catholic Church, which had engaged in nationalist socialization well before the 1990s (Perica, 2002, ch. 6). From this perspective, the nationalist upsurge of the 1990s reflects the manifestation of an already forged political identity, later intensified by war and fully accommodated by the Tuđman regime. While the retraditionalization hypothesis emphasizes top-down socialization relying on official agencies, the cleavage-based view stresses bottom-up, intergenerational, and non-official transmission. Accordingly, if cohort trajectories are driven primarily by

³ We base this comparison on V-Dem data, drawing primarily on indicators such as *ideology* (the extent to which the government promotes a specific ideology to justify its rule), *liberal democracy* (the degree to which liberal-democratic standards are met), *media bias* (the level of media impartiality), and related measures. Across these indicators, the data consistently show a pronounced leap in democratization with the advent of the 2000s.

these cleavages and corresponding political identities, which have proven remarkably stable in Croatia, the expectation is that we should observe only slight systematic variation across cohorts.⁴

A third expectation holds that cohort differences need not stem from discrete formative shocks. Instead, attitudinal change may reflect slow-moving, long-term transformations (Ryder, 1965, p. 851). In this perspective, political socialization remains the core mechanism, but it operates through gradual shifts in the broader socializing environment rather than through acute, highly salient episodes. A classic illustration is Inglehart's *silent revolution*, which attributes value change to economic development and cohort change: older generations, whose impressionable years were marked by material scarcity and insecurity, tend to hold more traditional orientations, whereas younger generations – socialized under conditions of greater economic security – develop more socially liberal profiles (Norris and Inglehart, 2019, pp. 32–42). Put differently, the theory couples a socialization logic with the scarcity hypothesis, predicting slow-burning yet profound long-term change (Inglehart, 2008). As noted above, evidence for such a trajectory is strong in Croatia: younger cohorts consistently appear more liberal than older ones, a pattern consistent with findings of rising post-material values following the end of the war (Matić, 2007, pp. 116–117). In essence, this perspective would expect each successive cohort to be somewhat more liberal than the previous one, generating a linear decline in traditionalist orientations across generations.

To umpire between these competing expectations in the Croatian setting, we now turn to empirical analysis. The following section outlines the data and methodological framework that allow us to model age, period, and cohort dynamics and evaluate whether the 1990s cohort exhibits a distinct attitudinal profile.

3. Data and Methodology

The analysis utilizes data from the *Croatian National Electoral Studies* (CroNES, see Bovan *et al.*, 2024a), a longitudinal series of repeated cross-sectional surveys conducted between 1990 and 2024. The dataset comprises 12 nationally representative surveys and over 15,000 respondents. For this study, the analysis relies on a reduced interval, as the 1990 and 1992 waves lack information on respondents' year

⁴ Additional, non-cleavage explanations also reinforce this expectation. Firstly, some authors argue that retraditionalization was rooted in the structural features of Yugoslav socialism itself, emerging from the imbalances of its modernization project since the 1960s (Bougarel, 1999). Secondly, several studies suggest that Yugoslav socialism was, in some respects, compatible with a broader traditionalist outlook (Magnusson, 1987) or even helped reproduce neotraditional cultural patterns (Adam, 1989). Taken together, these perspectives view retraditionalization not as a phenomenon born in the 1990s, but as an expression of longstanding value orientations.

of birth as a key variable for modeling age, cohort, and period effects (elaborated below in more detail). The resulting sample includes 10,437 respondents, covering an entire century, with birth years ranging from 1903 to 2006. All surveys were administered face-to-face using multistage stratified random sampling of the adult population, ensuring robust national representativeness.⁵

Crucially, by pooling repeated cross-sectional observations across time, the data form a structured age-by-period matrix in which age groups, survey periods, and birth cohorts can be cross-classified (Yang and Land, 2013, pp. 15–19). This structure enables the systematic disentanglement of temporal (period), developmental (age), and socialization (cohort) effects on value orientations, providing precisely the analytical leverage required to revisit the retraditionalization-as-socialization mechanism. This framework is elaborated in detail later in the section, following the discussion of the operationalization of retraditionalization outcomes.

3.1. *Dependent Variables*

To capture the outcomes of retraditionalization, we rely on a range of variables drawn from the CroNES questionnaire. Given that retraditionalization is a multidimensional construct, the dependent concept is divided into three facets: religious, nativist, and gender-conservative (Sekulić, 2014, p. 134). Together, these cover the principal domains through which retraditionalization manifests at the individual level.

The *religious* cluster rests on the richest set of indicators, as religiosity represents the most entrenched dimension of Croatia's retraditionalization project (Županov, 2002b, p. 296). First, it includes measures of self-declared religiosity and church attendance, capturing both confessional identification and practical (behavioral) religiosity (Nikodem and Zrinščak, 2019). In addition, it covers 2 items toward the public role of the Church and the importance of Catholic moral teachings, reflecting the 1990s discourse of "moral renewal" and the broader traditionalist moral outlook.

The *nativist* cluster captures attitudes related to ethnic exclusivity and corresponding notions of national belonging. It comprises two items assessing the desirability of an ethnically homogeneous society, alongside a third item measuring agreement with the idea that society should preserve the traditions and values of the (ethnically conceived) national community. Collectively, these indicators reflect what Betz (2019, p. 13) terms symbolic nativism – a worldview "centered on the

⁵ A detailed description of the dataset is provided in Bovan *et al.* (2024b). However, as their account of CroNES could not include the most recent 2024 survey wave, supplementary information on this edition is provided in the Appendix, Part B.

defense of the fundamental traditions, values, and historically evolved institutional arrangements that define a particular community, its culture, and identity”.

The *gender-conservative* cluster represents a traditionalist outlook on gender roles and women's rights (Sekulić, 2011). It includes two items focusing on gender equality and the role of women within the family, following comparative operationalizations of the GAL–TAN cultural dimension (Kurella and Rapp, 2025). Additionally, this cluster includes attitudes toward abortion, a key issue through which the retraditionalist discourse articulated restrictive moral and national frames (Tomić-Koludrović and Lončarić, 2007), and a variable used as an indicator of modernization processes (Bovan *et al.*, 2024b). This completes the nucleus of the retraditionalization domain, in which women's roles were conceptualized as primary caregivers within a pro-natalist framework.

Additionally, retraditionalization outcomes are assessed through single items rather than composite indices for several reasons. Namely, although the examined concepts broadly fall under the traditionalist umbrella, as elaborated in Sekulić (2014), their trajectories in post-socialist Croatia have not evolved uniformly. To capture these internal divergences, each item is therefore analyzed separately. In addition, analyzing each item independently enables a more nuanced interpretation of cohort patterns, revealing which specific dimensions of traditionalism represent generational continuities or transformations. As such, this item-level approach also provides one of the first detailed insights into value change across generations in Croatia, moving beyond the prevalent focus on youth-only samples or broad age-based comparisons (i.e., youth vs. others). Ultimately, not all of the variables outlined above are available across the entire temporal span covered by the dataset, as detailed in the Appendix, Part C. Consequently, constructing composite indices or latent profiles would substantially reduce the number of valid observations and risk obscuring meaningful variation across items and time.

Lastly, although the majority of these variables have demonstrated empirical utility and align with disciplinary standards, their inclusion in this analysis is determined by data availability rather than by a systematic process of scale construction specifically designed to operationalize retraditionalization outcomes. To partially address this limitation and provide evidence of external validity, we correlated the dependent variables with respondents' self-placement on the left–right scale. In the Croatian context, this scale functions as a reliable indicator that captures general ideological orientations (Raos, 2024). Accordingly, most of the variables included here are expected to display a moderate positive association with rightward self-positioning, consistent with them being the main facets of a traditionalist value outlook. Indeed, as shown and elaborated in Part D of the Appendix, main retraditionalization domains correlate substantively with rightist ideological placement.

3.2. The Identification Problem and Model Specification

Disentangling the relationship between age, period, and cohort effects presents the well-known identification problem, which arises from the perfect linear dependency among these three dimensions (Kritzer, 1983). In other words, age, period, and cohort are algebraically linked (e.g., $age = period - cohort$), making it impossible to estimate all three simultaneously without introducing additional assumptions. To address this issue, and following recent advances in generational research on political attitudes and behavior (Jocker *et al.*, 2024; Mitteregger, 2024), we employ the *Constrained Variable Method* (Thijs *et al.*, 2020). This approach rests on a theoretically guided specification of age and cohort. Conceptually, age is understood as a proxy for the life-cycle stage that captures predictable, life-course developmental changes in value expression, while cohort represents formative socialization contexts that differentiate generations. Operationally, both dimensions are modeled as categorical variables reflecting these theoretical distinctions, whereas period is introduced as a set of freely estimated year dummies to capture time-specific effects. This design constrains the functional form of age and cohort while allowing period effects to vary freely, thus breaking the linear dependence among the three elements. However, in this approach, the robustness of the findings depends directly on the quality of the underlying theoretical constraints (Delli Carpini, 1989). Accordingly, particular attention has been paid to the conceptual and empirical justification of the generational and life-cycle classifications used in the analysis.

Starting from the central assumption of the generational thesis, namely that the context of socialization during the formative age factors one's values and attitudes, we derive the generational scheme from the historical period where political learning of an individual peaked (Grasso, 2016, pp. 40–44). In practical terms, this means that respondents are classified according to the political trajectory of the historical era in which they turned 18 (Rekker *et al.*, 2018; Schuman and Rodgers, 2004), to align with the well-established finding that socialization imprint is most plausible to occur during the interval between childhood and early adolescence (Bartels and Jackman, 2014).

Along these lines, we draw on the typology of political generations proposed by Vuksan-Ćusa and Đurašković (2024), who link each cohort to the socio-political environment that is argued to have shaped its formative political learning. Specifically, this scheme distinguishes generations formed under the *reformist progressivism* and subsequent *stagnation* of socialism; those maturing amid the *disintegration of late socialism*; the cohort socialized during the 1990s period of war, state-building, and *retraditionalization*; and those reaching adulthood in the era of *democratic consolidation and European integration*. While the present analysis does not assume that these contexts necessarily produced lasting generational imprints, this

historically anchored framework provides a coherent basis for testing whether the retraditionalization of the 1990s corresponded with durable cohort differences or merely reflected transient period dynamics or life-cycle effects. The generational classification is summarized in Table 1, which outlines each cohort's birth years, formative periods, and defining historical conditions.

Table 1. Political Generations in Croatia

Generations	<i>Socialist progression generation</i>	<i>Socialist stagnation generation</i>	<i>Late socialist generation</i>	<i>Tuđman's generation</i>	<i>Democratic generation</i>
Formative period	1941–1971	1972–1980	1981–1989	1990–1999	2000–2020
Birth year	1923–1953	1954–1962	1963–1971	1972–1981	1982–2006
Key features	WWII revolution, socialist advent, modernization, decentralization, ends with suppression of Croatian Spring	Political centralization, late Titoism, reassertion of party control, economic slowdown	Political and economic crisis, loss of legitimacy, opening of public sphere	Homeland War, transition, state-building, authoritarian democracy, ethnonationalism, retraditionalization	Democratic consolidation, EU integration, political apathy, populist currents
N	3,079	1,891	1,652	1,781	2,034

Note: adapted from Vuksan-Ćusa and Đurašković (2024). As the youngest and oldest respondent groups had low frequencies, they were merged with the first and last generation, respectively.

Additionally, life-cycle effects are operationalized across four major life stages: late adolescence (18–21 years), early adulthood (22–29 years), middle adulthood (30–64 years), and late adulthood (65+ years). These stages are grounded in developmental psychology and follow the dynamics of attitude and value formation that tend to unfold in broadly identifiable patterns (Braungart and Braungart, 1986, pp. 208–212; Jocker *et al.*, 2025). In brief, attitudes change most rapidly and display the highest plasticity during late adolescence and early adulthood (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989), tend to stabilize as individuals develop greater social and political identity in middle adulthood (Fadjuhoff, Pulkkinen and Kokko, 2016), and become less stable again in later life (Dassonneville, 2017; Hobbs, 2019).

This classification also fits well within the Croatian context, as it mirrors empirically observed trajectories of political participation (Vuksan-Ćusa and Jannewein, 2024) and broader social-life-course benchmarks. The distinction between

emerging and middle adulthood effectively captures the extended dependence and delayed transition to social adulthood that characterize contemporary youth (Smets, 2016). This is particularly relevant in Croatia, where emerging adults leave the parental home the latest in Europe (Eurostat, 2023), and where transitions such as entering the labor market (Gvozdanović *et al.*, 2024), forming families (DZS, 2024, p. 25), and settling geographically (see Čipin *et al.*, 2016) typically coincide with the onset of middle adulthood. Consequently, the early adulthood stage captures a prolonged formative phase in which individuals remain socially dependent yet increasingly politically aware, whereas middle adulthood marks the consolidation of these social and attitudinal transitions.

Alongside the APC nexus described above, the models also include controls for gender, education, and region. Gender is accounted for, given that younger women in Croatia tend to lean somewhat more to the left (Vuksan-Ćusa, 2024), while education controls for compositional differences between cohorts, as younger generations are generally more educated. Regional controls are included due to Croatia's distinct spatial structuring of ideological orientations, which follow a relatively robust geographical pattern (Grdešić, 2013; 2021). Descriptive statistics wordings and computing details of all variables are presented in the Appendix, Parts E and F.


Ultimately, because the outcomes are continuous, all models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The only exception is the final indicator – abortion support – which is binary and therefore estimated using logistic regression. The OLS model specification follows as:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Generation} + \beta_2 \text{LifeCycle} + \beta_3 \text{Period} + X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where Y_{it} denotes the outcome for individual i observed in period t ; β_1 , β_2 , and β_3 gauge generation, life-cycle and period effects, respectively, while X_{it} denotes the vector of control variables (gender, education, and region), and ε_{it} is the error term. With generations specified categorically, cohort contrasts are additionally assessed through post-estimation Wald tests.

4. Findings and Discussion


To ease interpretation and maintain focus on generational differences, we present results as panels of marginal effects (Williams, 2012), depicting predicted values for each generation and item within a given cluster. As life-cycle and period terms serve only to account for developmental and temporal influences necessary for identifying cohort effects, we do not discuss them in detail. Accordingly, full regression estimates are provided in the Appendix, Part H. Note that all items are coded so that higher values reflect a traditionalist stance.

Figure 2. Religious Cluster (Marginal Effects of Generations)

Note: full results are presented in the Appendix, Table H1. Whiskers denote 95% confidence intervals.

We begin with the religious dimension of retraditionalization (Figure 2). The upper-left panel, showing self-declared religiosity, reveals minimal variation across generations: all cohorts fall between 3.9 and 4.0 on the scale, clustered at the religious end. By contrast, the upper-right panel, depicting church attendance, shows a clear linear decline from socialist-raised cohorts to post-socialist ones. This divergence highlights an important distinction: while identity-level religiosity – often linked to historical and identitarian cleavages (Jou, 2010; Henjak and Čular, 2024) – remains stable (Vuksan-Ćusa and Raos, 2021), concrete religious practice exhibits a classic modernization pattern.

The lower panels show a similar configuration for attitudes toward the Catholic Church and the desirability of its moral code. The right panel again displays a marked modernization trend: each successive cohort expresses weaker support for Catholic morality as a desirable societal value (with most differences between cohorts being significant). The left panel shows a related but milder pattern: the two youngest cohorts attribute less moral authority to the Church than socialist-era cohorts, net of age and period effects. Here, as in two previous instances, the most

Figure 3. Nativist Cluster (Marginal Effects of Generations)

Note: full results are presented in the Appendix, Table H2. Whiskers denote 95% confidence intervals.

pronounced difference appears between the socialist stagnation generation and the Tuđman generation.⁶

Taken together, these results provide little support for a *retraditionalization-as-socialization* imprint among the 1990s cohort. The only finding that might align with such a mechanism is the higher endorsement of Catholic morality among the Tuđman generation relative to the democratic cohort ($p = 0.006$), but this difference sits within an otherwise consistent modernization slope. Similarly, behavioral religiosity and moral traditionalism decline across cohorts, aligning with a silent-revolution trajectory. Only identity-level religiosity remains stable, mirroring its cleavage-based and national-identitarian character. Overall, the religious cluster reflects slow-moving generational change rather than a distinguishing imprint of the 1990s. This aligns with broader findings showing that, although religiosity remains high in Croatia, it has begun to show signs of a downward slope in some of its dimensions (Nikodem and Zrinščak, 2019).

Next, we turn to the nativist dimension, shown in Figure 3. The left panel, which captures support for the idea that society should turn back to traditional values, mirrors a classic modernization pattern: each successive cohort is less inclined to endorse a return to tradition. As with the religious cluster, the higher traditionalism of the Tuđman generation – relative to the democratic generation – fits a gradual modernization angle rather than a discrete formative shock.

The centre and right panels, however, exhibit striking stability across cohorts. The beliefs that ethnically and religiously homogeneous countries are more stable

⁶ Still, when interpreting these results, it is important to note that this indicator was included only in the 2000-2012 survey period (Part C of the Appendix), resulting in low case counts for the youngest generation. This is reflected in the wide confidence interval for that cohort's estimate.


and that nations should live in their own country do not vary across generations. The Wald tests (Table G1 of Appendix) formally corroborate this, as none of the comparisons reach significance. Put differently, whether individuals came of age within a socialist, multiethnic federation or during the ethnonationalist state-building of the 1990s appears to make little difference for attitudes concerning the relationship between ethnic exclusivity and state arrangement. Therefore, while (nostalgic) traditionalism declines across generations, preferences for in-state ethnic homogeneity remain essentially constant. The only partial deviation from this pattern is the democratic generation's slightly higher endorsement of the nation's exclusivity statement compared to the oldest cohort (left panel), though this difference only lies at the margin of significance ($p = 0.06$).

Taken together, the results provide no evidence of a retraditionalization-based nativist imprint among the 1990s cohort. Rather, they reinforce a dual pattern: a clear modernization trajectory within nostalgic traditionalism alongside long-term continuity in attitudes toward ethnic exclusivity. Such persistence aligns with prior findings showing no age-based differences in cultural exclusivism in Croatia (Mesić and Bagić, 2011), as well as with evidence from other contexts indicating that exposure to a traditionalist political climate during youth does not translate into stronger anti-immigrant attitudes later in life (Jeannet and Dražanová, 2024).

Importantly, stability holds despite meaningful differences in baseline levels across items. Agreement with the claim that homogeneous countries are more stable remains moderate to high across cohorts, whereas support for the idea that a nation should live alone in its own country is consistently lower, about one whole point lower on the 1–5 scale. Put differently, all generations tend to accept the ethnic/religious homogeneity underlying stability argument, yet they are far less inclined to endorse a strict equivalence between the nation and the state territory. This distinction reflects the difference between a broadly held belief about how societies should function and a more hard-edged nationalist prescription demanding stringent ethnic separation. Overall, this cross-cohort pattern supports the continuity hypothesis: key ethnic identity-related orientations appear deeply entrenched and remain largely untouched by both modernization and the specific formative shocks of the 1990s.

Finally, we turn to the gender-conservative dimension of retraditionalization. Figure 4 presents generational marginal effects for three indicators: scepticism toward gender equality, support for a traditional gendered division of labour, and restrictive attitudes toward abortion.

The first item – agreement with the assertion that women who demand equality are actually seeking privileges – shows near-complete stability across cohorts. Although there is a slight downward shift from the oldest to the youngest generation, the difference falls short of statistical significance. Substantively, all cohorts cluster

Figure 4. Gender-conservative Cluster (Marginal Effects of Generations)

Note: full results are presented in the Appendix, Tables H3 and H4. Whiskers denote 95% confidence intervals.

around the mid-point of the scale, suggesting a generally ambivalent stance toward gender equality rather than a clear polarization between conservative and egalitarian orientations. The second item, however, reveals a more evident modernization pattern. Each successive cohort is less likely to endorse the view that women's primary role lies in the household and child-rearing. Nevertheless, this pattern is not entirely linear: the democratic generation appears to plateau or slightly reverse the decline, suggesting that Croatia does not reproduce the uninterrupted modernization slope observed in several Western European countries (Shorrocks, 2018). Importantly, these results also run counter to expectations derived from political socialization under socialism, which often posit that cohorts raised during socialist gender-equality campaigns should hold the most progressive gender attitudes (Beloshitzkaya and Reilly, 2024). At the same time, unlike Heller *et al.* (2024), who demonstrate du-

rable retraditionalization imprints among cohorts socialized under post-unification conditions in Germany, our analysis finds no analogous cohort effect in Croatia.

The final indicator – abortion – also exhibits the pattern of generational continuity. Across all cohorts, restrictive abortion stance is low. Wald tests (Table G1 of Appendix) confirm that no generational comparison reaches statistical significance, even under lenient thresholds ($p < 0.10$). The youngest cohort shows somewhat higher restrictiveness (just above 30% disapproval), yet this difference is muted and statistically indistinguishable from other generations. This stands in contrast to comparative findings that typically show younger cohorts as the most permissive (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, pp. 59–63).⁷

In sum, the gender-conservative domain produces a pattern very similar to that observed in the religious and nativist clusters. Generational attitudes are largely stable, with only limited modernization evident in views about women's household roles. Crucially for our purpose, none of the indicators displays a distinctive 1990s imprint: the Tuđman generation does not diverge systematically from adjacent cohorts. If anything, Croatian cohorts appear resistant to both progressive and traditionalist political imprinting, reinforcing the broader conclusion that gender-related attitudes exhibit either stability or gradual modernization – but not the kind of cohort differentiation expected under the *retraditionalization-as-socialization* hypothesis.

Ultimately, the overarching finding is that there is no evidence of a distinct formative imprint among those who came of age in the 1990s. Instead, two broader patterns emerge. Firstly, several outcomes – such as church attendance, religious moral code, nostalgic traditionalism, and gender-role attitudes – follow a gradual modernization trajectory, with younger cohorts showing a decline in traditionalism. Secondly, items that remain stable across cohorts – self-declared religiosity, ethnic exclusivity, and abortion attitudes – should be interpreted in light of their anchoring in Croatia's dominant and long-established political identity. In the Croatian context, identity-level religiosity is a core component of national belonging, given the Catholic Church's symbolic, historical, and political centrality. Ethnic exclusivity, likewise, relates to enduring notions of how statehood should be organized with respect to ethnic homogeneity – an issue deeply embedded in Croatian mass politics


⁷ When zooming in on the youngest, democratic generation, the results present mixed signals: on the one hand, they evaluate women's pursuit of equality somewhat less negatively, while on the other, they show a slight uptick in restrictive abortion attitudes. One possible explanation is that gendered trajectories among younger cohorts tend to be less stable than among older ones, as they have come of age during a period when men's and women's life courses are far more similar than in previous generations (Perales *et al.*, 2019). Still, these patterns should not be overstated, as none of the differences between the democratic generation and the others reach statistical significance.

throughout the 20th century and closely tied to the country's most durable political cleavage. Given the prevalence of this cleavage structure, cross-cohort continuity in these attitudes is unsurprising. Abortion attitudes follow a similar logic: while socialist Yugoslavia adopted a liberal stance, the Tuđman regime advanced a more conservative framing, and these opposing interpretations became embedded within distinct historical-identitarian camps. As these identities formed the basis of political competition in democratic Croatia, the issue crystallized as a site of identity-based polarization. Consequently, contemporary abortion attitudes remain tied to these enduring historical alignments rather than to generational positioning.

Taken together, stable identity-anchored attitudes and gradual modernization elsewhere point to a pattern of slow-moving value change. In the end, the evidence aligns squarely with Županov's (1993, p. 6) claim: values take time to build, and even more time to disappear. To ensure that this interpretation is not an artefact of our modelling choices, the next section introduces an alternative measurement setup that allows us to reassess the robustness of the findings.

4.1. Robustness Checks

As a means of corroborating our findings, we revisit the way generations were constructed. The aim is to address the inherent artificiality in typology-based cohort delineation (Delli Carpini, 1989). To rewind, our baseline approach defined cohorts by the year individuals turned 18, treating this as the peak of political socialization. While dominant in studying political generations, this operationalization may be imprecise on its own, as formative experiences span both mid-adolescence and early adulthood. Thus, alongside our baseline approach, most other accounts conceptualize impressionable years as a broader window – typically ages 15–25 (Grasso, 2014; 2016; Grasso and Shorrocks, 2025). This amends the arbitrariness of cut-offs in defining socialization periods, allowing for a more real-world setting. Since our primary interest lies in the potential effects of the 1990s, we construct a continuous exposure measure capturing the number of formative years each respondent spent under the Tuđman regime. This mirrors approaches used in the literature on communist legacies (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017; Zagórski, 2021). At the same time, this literature also highlights the importance of childhood socialization, often operationalized as ages 6–17 (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2013). Accordingly, we implement both strategies, only replacing generations with the exposure variables. Figure 5 displays the estimated effects of exposure on continuous retraditionalization outcomes (listed on the y-axis). The two panels show alternative exposure windows – ages 15–25 (left) and ages 6–17 (right) – with dots indicating regression coefficients and horizontal lines their 95% confidence intervals. Because the abortion outcome is measured with a binary indicator, estimates from logistic models (log-odds) using the same specification are shown separately in Figure 6.


Figure 5. Exposure Effects on the Continuous Outcomes, by Exposure Window

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Full results are presented in the Appendix, Tables I1, I2, I3 and I5, I6, I7.

Whiskers denote 95% confidence intervals.

For readability, we show only the main exposure coefficients here, while the full OLS models are provided in the Appendix (Part I). Estimates shown in the left panel suggest that individuals who spent their impressionable years during the re-traditionalization era are not more traditional: none of the coefficients are positive and significant. Notably, two estimates are significant and negative, indicating that spending one's formative years under the Tuđman regime is associated with lower gender-role conservatism and nostalgic traditionalism. The right panel, which applies an earlier childhood-exposure window, reinforces this conclusion. Again, no positive significant effects emerge; instead, childhood exposure to the ethnonationalist 1990s is again linked to less traditionalism and a weaker endorsement of Catholic morality as a desirable social glue. Additionally, as shown in Figure 6, spending one's childhood and youth in the 1990s does not seem to have shaped abortion attitudes in any systematic way.

Figure 6. Exposure Effects on the Abortion Outcome, by Exposure Window

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.
 Full results are presented in the Appendix, Tables I4 and I8.
 Whiskers denote 95% confidence intervals.

Taken together, these patterns offer additional evidence that the *retraditionalization-as-socialization* mechanism did not operate as often implied. Contrary to the dominant narrative, exposure to the 1990s values' climate correlates with less, not more, traditionalism – especially regarding traditionalist values' restoration. Therefore, across the board, rather than imprinting a conservative generational profile, the retraditionalization period appears to have produced a slight backlash among those who were children or young adults at the time. Consequently, it seems that spending formative years in an ideologically saturated environment can lead individuals to reject certain aspects of the dominant worldview of their youth, resulting in an ideological counter-slant later on (Dinas, 2017; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2019).

These results, therefore, consolidate the broader empirical picture: rather than carving out a distinct 1990s cohort, the patterns align with long-term modernization and stable identity cleavages – and, if anything, move counter to what a retraditionalization imprint would predict. The concluding section considers how these findings reshape our understanding of retraditionalization and what they imply for future research on political socialization in Croatia.

5. Conclusion

In a period of ethnonationalist mobilization marked by war and state-building, the consolidating regime redirected the ideological legacy of socialism and advanced a retraditionalization project. This study aimed to assess whether this *mise-en-scène* imprinted the attitudes and values of those with the highest socialization potency – youth.

By highlighting the identification pitfalls of previous studies and the gap between empirical evidence and widespread explanatory claims, we introduced an

age-cohort-period framework to reassess the retraditionalization hypothesis. In doing so, we sought to make a threefold contribution. *Conceptually*, if retraditionalization is to operate as a fully fledged analytical framework, its main implications must be subjected to systematic scrutiny (Toshkov, 2016, p. 63), socialization being a central one. Accordingly, we recast retraditionalization as a testable socialization hypothesis rather than a period-specific phenomenon, thereby expanding its scope. *Methodologically*, we provide the first APC-based assessment of retraditionalization in Croatia, overcoming the age-period confounding that characterizes existing designs. *Empirically*, using three decades of nationally representative data, we offer the first-cut evidence on whether the 1990s produced a durable cohort imprint. Additionally, given the widespread use of retraditionalization as a ready-made explanation for youth attitudes, we contribute evidence suggesting that such accounts should be treated with caution.

If we are to draw a line under the findings, the panoptic conclusion is clear: retraditionalization did little to socialize youth in the long term. In several domains, its effects did not disrupt ongoing modernization trajectories; in others, especially those tied to political identity, it did not alter their stability. Yet, contrary to how retraditionalization effects are commonly portrayed in public discourse, this period has reinforced a reservoir of ideological counter-slant among those who politically matured in that environment.

Still, these results should not be interpreted as conclusive evidence, nor as a dismissal of retraditionalization scholarship or its potential effects. Instead, they point to the need for renewed analytical engagement with the 1990s, a period whose legacy remains only partially understood. One promising direction is to disaggregate the decade itself and examine whether its early phase – marked by ethnonationalist escalation and war – produced different socialization effects from its later phase, when regime legitimacy waned and the statehood narrative began to exhaust itself. Another is to examine key socialization agents in greater detail, particularly the family. For instance, future research might explore whether young people with war veterans in their households display systematically different attitudes, given the evidence that veterans' experiences and political behaviors differ (Lesschaeve, 2019).

Naturally, this study has several limitations. Most importantly, it lacks pre-1990 survey data. Although the present design allows us to model cross-cohort differences, a more fine-grained analysis would require survey waves from the 1980s to trace cohort trajectories across time. Such data would also enable a more stringent test of the APC framework. Cohort effects rest on the imprinting assumption, where sensitivity and exposure meet, but this mechanism itself warrants additional empirical scrutiny (see Luo and Hodges, 2020), particularly in new settings. With pre-1990 surveys, researchers could interact cohort and period directly, evaluating

whether young people respond differently to specific regimes or events than older individuals – thereby strengthening identification. However, as far as we know, no pre-1990 dataset with the necessary structure exists, making CroNES the best available resource.

Regardless of data availability, these considerations point to a clear path forward: to study the 1990s not as a settled storyline but as an open empirical question, and to move from assuming retraditionalization effects to demonstrating them. Only then can the decade's shadows and echoes be understood with clarity rather than through the stories we have grown accustomed to telling about it.

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APPENDIX


Part A. TakeLab Incept

To compile articles mentioning retraditionalization, we used TakeLab Retriever, a platform that applies machine learning and natural language processing to Croatian news content (Dukić *et al.*, 2024). The search engine was configured to detect occurrences of **retraditionalization* or **re-traditionalization*, with a constraint requiring them to appear as phrases rather than partial matches. We excluded low-quality content and restricted the corpus to twelve mainstream, high-traffic Croatian news portals (24sata.hr, dnevnik.hr, hr.n1info.com, hrt.hr, index.hr, jutarnji.hr, net.hr, rtl.hr, slobodnadalmacija.hr, telegram.hr, tportal.hr, vecernji.hr). To ensure thematic relevance, we further filtered articles by four topic categories most closely associated with retraditionalization – education, politics, religion, and society. This procedure yielded 239 articles on retraditionalization between 2010 and 2024, averaging roughly 16 per year.

As a benchmark on how frequently social-science concepts enter public discourse, we repeated the procedure for another influential concept by Županov, *the egalitarian syndrome*, which is also used to explain long-enduring values and orientations of Croatian society. However, unlike retraditionalization, this term appears only 19 times in the sampled period, with a maximum of six mentions in 2016 (see Figure below). Taken together, these patterns show that retraditionalization has

achieved far greater media traction and discursive visibility than comparable sociological constructs, underscoring its prominence as an interpretive frame in Croatian public debate.

Figure A1. Articles per Year (Egalitarian Syndrome Comparison)



Part B. CroNES 2024 Sample


The 2024 CroNES wave was fielded in November–December 2024 by Henda, one of Croatia’s leading public-opinion agencies. Data were collected face-to-face using CAPI, and sampling relied on a multistratified design combining random selection and the birthday-key method to ensure national representativeness. The average interview lasted 37 minutes, and the final sample comprised 1,020 respondents. More than 1,700 individuals declined participation, resulting in a refusal rate of roughly 60%. To ensure data quality, the polling firm carried out respondent callbacks and conducted internal verification of key items in at least 25% of each interviewer’s workload. All procedures adhered to ISO 20252:2012 standards for social research.

Part C. CroNES Temporal Coverage

Item	1995	1999	2003	2007	2012	2015	2016	2018	2020	2024	N
Religiosity	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	10,406
Church attendance			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	8,226
Church as authority		✓	✓	✓	✓						4,319
Catholic morale		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	8,222
Homogenous countries						✓	✓		✓	✓	3,843
Nation living alone		✓	✓	✓	✓						4,296
Traditionalism		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	8,240
Role of women		✓	✓	✓	✓						4,335
Gender equality						✓	✓		✓	✓	3,903
Abortion	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	10,211

Part D. Correlations (External Validity via L–R)

Results of external validity tests (correlations between outcomes and ideological positioning) are shown in the Figure below. All results are significant at the $p < 0.001$ level, with a mean coefficient size of .26. Religious cluster shows the strongest association ($\bar{r} = .31$), while nativist and gender-conservative items display slightly weaker correlations ($\bar{r} = .24$ and $\bar{r} = .21$, respectively). Using the field standard as a benchmark, with $\bar{r} = .14$ and only 25% of effects exceeding 0.29 (Gahner Larsen, 2022), we consider this a substantive correlation for external validity, increasing confidence in our selection of the outcome variables.

Figure D1. Correlations of Outcomes on L–R Scale

Part E. Descriptive Statistics

Table E1. Descriptives of Variables Used in Analysis

	Min	Max	\bar{x}	SD
Birthyear	1903	2006	1964	18.71
Gender	0	1	0.53	0.50
Education	1	3	2.08	0.60
Religiosity	1	5	3.92	1.03
Church attendance	1	6	2.89	1.69
Church as authority	1	5	2.98	1.43
Catholic morale	1	5	3.40	1.30
Homogenous countries	1	5	3.24	1.25
Nation living alone	1	5	2.20	1.35
Traditionalism	1	5	3.80	1.13
Role of women	1	5	2.19	1.47
Gender equality	1	5	2.43	1.30
Abortion	0	1	0.28	0.45

Table E2. Period Distribution

Survey	N
1995	1,144
1999	1,126
2003	1,153
2007	1,083
2011	1,002
2015	1,001
2016	1,000
2018	1,014
2020	979
2024	1,020

Table E3. Life-cycle Distribution

Life cycle	N
18–21	735
22–29	1,542
30–64	6,452
65+	1,768

Table E4. Region Distribution

Regions	Percent
Zagreb	25.44
Northern Croatia	13.07
Slavonia	18.77
Lika and Banovina	11.42
Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar	11.40
Dalmacija	19.90

Part F. Wordings and Computing

Demographics

Gender is measured as sex, with 2 answer categories (0–male, 1–female).

Birth year is calculated by subtracting the respondent's age from the survey year.

Education is measured as the highest level of education obtained, with eight categories provided as answers (1–no completed school, 2–primary school, 3–secondary vocational school (up to 3 years), 4–secondary vocational school (up to 4 years), 5–high school, 6–college, university bachelor's degree, 7–completed university, master's degree, 8–master of science, PhD). This was recorded in three categories: low, middle, and high levels of education.

Region is measured by asking people what geographical region they live in. The answer categories were as follows: 1–Zagreb and the surrounding area, 2–Northern Croatia, 3–Slavonia, 4–Lika and Banovina, 5–Istria, Primorje, and Gorski Kotar, 6–Dalmatia.

Religious Cluster

Religiosity is measured with the following indicator: *How would you describe your relationship with religion?*, with five answer categories provided (1–I am a strong believer and I accept everything my religion teaches, 2–I am a believer, but I don't really accept everything my religion teaches, 3–When I think about it, I'm not sure whether I believe or not, 4–I am not religious, but I don't mind others believing, 5–I am not religious and I am against religion). For analysis, the answers were reverse coded.

Church attendance was measured using the *How often do you go to church?* indicator, with six answer categories (1–Never or rarely, 2–Two or three times a year, during major religious holidays, 3–Once every two months, 4–Once a month, 5–Several times a month, 6–Once a week or more often).

Church as authority was measured via *The Catholic Church is a moral authority whose views should bind all citizens* item (on a 1–5 scale).

Catholic morale was measured as *Croatia would be better off if all citizens followed Christian moral values*, on a 1–5 scale.

Nativist Cluster

Homogeneous countries were measured with the following item: *States in which the vast majority of the population belongs to a single nation and religion are more stable than countries with more nations and religions*, on a 1–5 scale.

Nation living alone was operationalized as: *It is best for members of a particular nation to live alone in their own country*, on a 1–5 scale.

Traditionalism was assessed via *We should return to the traditions and original values of our people*, with a 1–5 scale.

Gender-conservative Cluster

Role of women was measured using the item stating that *Women, first of all, should stay at home, where they should take care of the household and raise children*, on a 1–5 scale.

Gender equality was measured as follows, on a 1–5 scale: *Under the pretext of seeking equality, women actually seek special privileges*.

Abortion stance was measured with an indicator asking *What do you think about women's right to abortion?*, with three categories provided for answers (1–Women have the right to decide on abortion freely and this should be guaranteed by law, 2–Abortion should be prohibited, except in medically justified cases, 3–Abortion is unacceptable and should not be allowed under any circumstances). The indicator was recoded as a binary variable, with original values 2 and 3 denoting a restrictive stance and value 1 (now 0) denoting permission.

Part G. Wald Tests

Table G1. Wald Tests Results (Main Analysis)

Gen vs. Gen	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
Stagnation vs. progression	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Late socialist vs. progression	ns	ns	ns	*	***	ns	ns	*	ns
Tuđman vs. progression	ns	ns	ns	**	***	ns	ns	*	ns
Democratic vs. progression	ns	ns	ns	***	***	ns	ns	ns	ns
Late socialist vs. stagnation	ns	ns	ns	*	***	ns	ns	ns	ns
Tuđman vs. stagnation	ns	**	*	**	***	ns	ns	ns	ns
Democratic vs. stagnation	ns	**	ns	***	***	ns	ns	ns	ns
Tuđman vs. late socialist	ns	ns	*	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Democratic vs. late socialist	ns	ns	ns	**	**	ns	ns	ns	ns
Democratic vs. Tuđman	ns	ns	ns	**	*	ns	ns	ns	ns

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Part H. Results, Regression Models, Shown per Cluster**Table H1.** Religious Cluster

	(A) Religiosity	(B) Church attendance	(C) Church as authority	(D) Christian morale
Generations (ref. Socialist progression)				
Socialist stagnation	0.0173 (0.0356)	0.0443 (0.0731)	0.0801 (0.0734)	-0.0189 (0.0517)
Late socialist	0.0730 (0.0380)	-0.0335 (0.0786)	0.0776 (0.0740)	-0.117* (0.0559)
Tuđman's generation	0.0605 (0.0407)	-0.124 (0.0786)	-0.109 (0.0938)	-0.161** (0.0596)
Democratic generation	0.00477 (0.0513)	-0.154 (0.0928)	-0.108 (0.136)	-0.303*** (0.0717)
Period (1995) Ref.				
1999	-0.0468 (0.0433)		Ref.	Ref.
2003	0.00150 (0.0417)	Ref.	-0.0587 (0.0637)	0.0775 (0.0575)
2007	-0.0714 (0.0431)	-0.205** (0.0750)	-0.369*** (0.0701)	-0.136* (0.0607)
2012	-0.0275 (0.0439)	-0.0198 (0.0796)	-0.123 (0.0738)	0.207*** (0.0612)
2015	-0.248*** (0.0473)	-0.162* (0.0776)		-0.0215 (0.0616)
2016	-0.0881 (0.0462)	-0.0529 (0.0784)		0.0228 (0.0611)
2018	-0.160*** (0.0452)	-0.0588 (0.0773)		
2020	-0.158** (0.0499)	-0.267** (0.0821)		-0.118 (0.0664)
2024	-0.0667 (0.0519)	0.0723 (0.0870)		-0.0951 (0.0666)

Life cycle				
(ref. Late adolescence)				
Early adulthood	0.0351 (0.0481)	-0.158 (0.0898)	-0.0279 (0.0989)	0.0664 (0.0687)
Middle adulthood	0.0817 (0.0510)	-0.111 (0.0980)	-0.0618 (0.130)	0.0951 (0.0744)
Late adulthood	0.102 (0.0670)	-0.0529 (0.127)	0.257 (0.152)	0.188* (0.0945)
Gender (ref. Male)	0.276*** (0.0199)	0.666*** (0.0360)	-0.0204 (0.0438)	0.0655* (0.0285)
Education (ref. Low)				
Middle	-0.275*** (0.0297)	-0.189** (0.0623)	-0.328*** (0.0614)	-0.247*** (0.0432)
High	-0.521*** (0.0358)	-0.296*** (0.0713)	-0.591*** (0.0717)	-0.465*** (0.0509)
Region (ref. Zagreb)				
Northern Croatia	-0.0105 (0.0335)	0.122* (0.0564)	0.202* (0.0834)	0.0118 (0.0493)
Slavonia	0.237*** (0.0292)	0.582*** (0.0574)	0.224*** (0.0654)	0.341*** (0.0431)
Lika and Banovina	0.0380 (0.0380)	-0.122 (0.0669)	0.0716 (0.0762)	0.102 (0.0535)
Istria, Primorje and GK	-0.300*** (0.0378)	-0.366*** (0.0602)	-0.291*** (0.0810)	-0.232*** (0.0526)
Dalmatia	0.243*** (0.0300)	0.617*** (0.0550)	0.307*** (0.0651)	0.358*** (0.0427)
Constant	3.990*** (0.0675)	2.768*** (0.136)	3.356*** (0.149)	3.522*** (0.0986)
Observations	10175	8140	4191	8035
R ²	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.07

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Table H2. Nativist Cluster

	(D) Traditionalism	(E) Nation living alone	(F) Homogenous countries
Generations (ref. Socialist progression)			
Socialist stagnation	-0.0330 (0.0427)	0.103 (0.0689)	-0.0878 (0.0889)
Late socialist	-0.190*** (0.0465)	0.103 (0.0703)	-0.0910 (0.102)
Tuđman's generation	-0.257*** (0.0498)	0.117 (0.0873)	-0.0995 (0.103)
Democratic generation	-0.372*** (0.0611)	0.247 (0.131)	-0.148 (0.108)
Period (1999)			
	Ref	Ref	
2003	0.330*** (0.0492)	-0.203** (0.0616)	
2007	0.278*** (0.0526)	-0.222*** (0.0660)	
2012	0.473*** (0.0525)	-0.308*** (0.0703)	
2015	0.220*** (0.0537)		Ref.
2016	0.285*** (0.0539)		-0.0586 (0.0538)
2020	0.337*** (0.0577)		-0.368*** (0.0596)
2024	0.118* (0.0588)		-0.0197 (0.0556)
Life cycle (ref. Late adolescence)			
Early adulthood	0.0450 (0.0643)	0.132 (0.0980)	-0.0642 (0.109)

Middle adulthood	0.0858 (0.0682)	0.0190 (0.126)	-0.107 (0.111)
Late adulthood	0.121 (0.0826)	0.0896 (0.147)	-0.155 (0.145)
Gender (ref. Male)	-0.0309 (0.0245)	-0.0423 (0.0420)	-0.0570 (0.0397)
Education (ref. Low)			
Middle	-0.137*** (0.0355)	-0.383*** (0.0631)	-0.363*** (0.0749)
High	-0.428*** (0.0436)	-0.599*** (0.0702)	-0.498*** (0.0858)
Region (ref. Zagreb)			
Northern Croatia	-0.0416 (0.0438)	0.119 (0.0818)	-0.0229 (0.0641)
Slavonia	0.254*** (0.0372)	0.0918 (0.0644)	0.558*** (0.0617)
Lika and Banovina	0.156*** (0.0448)	0.105 (0.0744)	0.0222 (0.0779)
Istra, Primorje and GK	-0.0626 (0.0453)	-0.296*** (0.0701)	-0.246*** (0.0711)
Dalmatia	0.187*** (0.0363)	0.188** (0.0625)	0.267*** (0.0596)
Constant	3.734*** (0.0864)	2.583*** (0.148)	3.824*** (0.160)
Observations	8057	4172	3779
R ²	0.07	0.04	0.07

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Table H3. Gender-conservative Cluster

	(G) Role of women (traditional)	(H) Gender equality (negative)
Generations (ref. Socialist progression)		
Socialist stagnation	-0.0670 (0.0644)	-0.0113 (0.0919)
Late socialist	-0.145* (0.0635)	-0.0693 (0.106)
Tuđman's generation	-0.208* (0.0820)	-0.0434 (0.107)
Democratic generations	-0.186 (0.117)	-0.147 (0.111)
Period (1999) Ref.		
2003	0.0271 (0.0556)	
2007	-0.158** (0.0590)	
2012	1.326*** (0.0660)	
2015		Ref.
2016		-0.407*** (0.0552)
2020		-0.426*** (0.0605)
2024		-0.217*** (0.0590)
Life-cycle (ref. Late adolescence)		
Early adulthood	0.125 (0.0815)	-0.168 (0.117)
Middle adulthood	0.140 (0.109)	-0.149 (0.119)

Late adulthood	0.497*** (0.132)	-0.197 (0.154)
Gender (ref. Male)	-0.395*** (0.0382)	-0.396*** (0.0408)
Education (ref. Low)		
Middle	-0.654*** (0.0616)	-0.180* (0.0865)
High	-1.048*** (0.0658)	-0.429*** (0.0938)
Region (ref. Zagreb)		
Northern Croatia	0.166* (0.0774)	-0.184** (0.0623)
Slavonia	0.180** (0.0575)	0.366*** (0.0663)
Lika and Banovina	0.113 (0.0670)	0.203* (0.0809)
Istria, Primorje and GK	-0.0700 (0.0713)	0.0688 (0.0692)
Dalmatia	0.331*** (0.0566)	0.316*** (0.0602)
Constant	2.507*** (0.130)	3.223*** (0.170)
Observations	4211	3839
R ²	0.28	0.08

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Table H4. Abortion (Logit Model)

	(I) Abortion (restrictive)
Generations (ref. Socialist progression)	
Socialist stagnation	0.0548 (0.0824)
Late socialist	0.00989 (0.0905)
Tuđman's generation	0.0449 (0.0976)
Democratic generation	0.168 (0.120)
Period (1995) Ref.	
1999	-0.230* (0.107)
2003	0.194 (0.100)
2007	-0.0286 (0.104)
2012	-0.245* (0.113)
2015	0.750*** (0.106)
2016	0.162 (0.110)
2018	-0.178 (0.113)
2020	-0.109 (0.117)
2024	0.290* (0.118)

Life-cycle	
(ref. Late adolescence)	
Early adulthood	-0.0549 (0.115)
Middle adulthood	-0.0608 (0.121)
Late adulthood	0.378* (0.155)
Gender (ref. Male)	
	-0.336*** (0.0470)
Education (ref. Low)	
Middle	-0.722*** (0.0691)
High	-1.022*** (0.0827)
Region (ref. Zagreb)	
Northern Croatia	-0.136 (0.0818)
Slavonia	0.588*** (0.0685)
Lika and Banovina	-0.322*** (0.0884)
Istria, Primorje and GK	-0.774*** (0.0996)
Dalmatia	0.403*** (0.0684)
Constant	-0.319* (0.161)
Observations	9978
(ps)R ²	0.07

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Part I. Robustness Checks (15–25 and 6–17 Exposure Windows)**Table II.** Religious Cluster (15–25)

	(A) Religiosity	(B) Church attendance	(C) Church as authority	(D) Christian morale
Exposure (15–25)	0.0693 (0.0361)	-0.104 (0.0683)	-0.0554 (0.0862)	-0.0347 (0.0549)
Period (1995)	Ref.			
1999	-0.0459 (0.0431)		Ref.	Ref.
2003	0.00319 (0.0411)	Ref.	-0.0668 (0.0625)	0.0454 (0.0572)
2007	-0.0713 (0.0419)	-0.213** (0.0747)	-0.387*** (0.0661)	-0.184** (0.0597)
2012	-0.0253 (0.0412)	-0.0412 (0.0785)	-0.149* (0.0657)	0.131* (0.0591)
2015	-0.246*** (0.0441)	-0.186* (0.0754)		-0.107 (0.0585)
2016	-0.0855* (0.0428)	-0.0779 (0.0762)		-0.0658 (0.0577)
2018	-0.157*** (0.0411)	-0.0888 (0.0742)		
2020	-0.157*** (0.0448)	-0.304*** (0.0778)		-0.228*** (0.0615)
2024	-0.0523 (0.0442)	0.0305 (0.0790)		-0.217*** (0.0580)
Life cycle (ref. Late adolescence)				
Early adulthood	0.0236 (0.0459)	-0.153 (0.0849)	-0.00527 (0.0954)	0.0769 (0.0652)
Middle adulthood	0.0788* (0.0401)	0.00732 (0.0767)	0.0736 (0.0813)	0.265*** (0.0569)
Late adulthood	0.0807 (0.0476)	0.0859 (0.0865)	0.359*** (0.0954)	0.443*** (0.0643)

Gender (ref. Male)	0.274*** (0.0199)	0.663*** (0.0358)	-0.0194 (0.0438)	0.0668* (0.0284)
Education (ref. Low)				
Middle	-0.274*** (0.0294)	-0.202** (0.0620)	-0.325*** (0.0611)	-0.254*** (0.0429)
High	-0.521*** (0.0355)	-0.318*** (0.0707)	-0.589*** (0.0714)	-0.483*** (0.0505)
Region (ref. Zagreb)				
Northern Croatia	-0.0117 (0.0334)	0.115* (0.0562)	0.208* (0.0832)	0.00347 (0.0491)
Slavonia	0.238*** (0.0291)	0.583*** (0.0571)	0.225*** (0.0654)	0.336*** (0.0429)
Lika and Banovina	0.0370 (0.0379)	-0.123 (0.0667)	0.0730 (0.0760)	0.100 (0.0535)
Istria, Primorje and GK	-0.301*** (0.0377)	-0.368*** (0.0599)	-0.288*** (0.0810)	-0.235*** (0.0525)
Dalmatia	0.244*** (0.0298)	0.620*** (0.0548)	0.310*** (0.0650)	0.353*** (0.0424)
Constant	4.011*** (0.0584)	2.668*** (0.112)	3.264*** (0.114)	3.344*** (0.0821)
Observations	10235	8200	4191	8095
R ²	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.06

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Table 12. Nativist Cluster (15–25)

	(D) Traditionalism	(E) Nation living alone	(F) Homogenous countries
Exposure (15–25)	-0.125** (0.0475)	-0.0349 (0.0821)	0.0290 (0.0787)
Period (1999)	Ref	Ref	
2003	0.291*** (0.0491)	-0.183** (0.0603)	
2007	0.220*** (0.0520)	-0.185** (0.0626)	
2012	0.380*** (0.0512)	-0.251*** (0.0622)	
2015	0.114* (0.0513)		Ref.
2016	0.176*** (0.0517)		-0.0593 (0.0537)
2020	0.201*** (0.0533)		-0.381*** (0.0589)
2024	-0.0426 (0.0520)		-0.0622 (0.0520)
Life-cycle (ref. Late adolescence)			
Early adulthood	0.0766 (0.0614)	0.0990 (0.0947)	0.0137 (0.0960)
Middle adulthood	0.305*** (0.0536)	-0.119 (0.0808)	0.0130 (0.0850)
Late adulthood	0.454*** (0.0587)	-0.121 (0.0939)	0.0551 (0.0948)
Gender (ref. Male)	-0.0274 (0.0245)	-0.0420 (0.0420)	-0.0579 (0.0393)
Education (ref. Low)			
Middle	-0.142*** (0.0352)	-0.370*** (0.0630)	-0.351*** (0.0738)

High	-0.447*** (0.0433)	-0.586*** (0.0703)	-0.492*** (0.0842)
Region (ref. Zagreb)			
Northern Croatia	-0.0510 (0.0437)	0.123 (0.0818)	-0.0346 (0.0636)
Slavonia	0.245*** (0.0372)	0.0980 (0.0644)	0.548*** (0.0609)
Lika and Banovina	0.153*** (0.0448)	0.111 (0.0744)	0.0167 (0.0774)
Istria, Primorje and GK	-0.0672 (0.0453)	-0.294*** (0.0702)	-0.250*** (0.0705)
Dalmatia	0.185*** (0.0362)	0.193** (0.0624)	0.257*** (0.0589)
Constant	3.492*** (0.0736)	2.752*** (0.114)	3.609*** (0.118)
Observations	8116	4172	3839
R ²	0.07	0.04	0.07

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Table 13. Gender-conservative Cluster (15–25)

	(G) Role of women (traditional)	(H) Gender equality (negative)
Exposure (15–25)	-0.181* (0.0738)	0.00329 (0.0833)
Period (1999)	Ref.	
2003	0.0131 (0.0545)	
2007	-0.184*** (0.0551)	
2012	1.284*** (0.0593)	
2015		Ref.
2016		-0.407*** (0.0551)
2020		-0.437*** (0.0596)
2024		-0.256*** (0.0548)
Life-cycle (ref. Late adolescence)		
Early adulthood	0.165* (0.0791)	-0.0981 (0.100)
Middle adulthood	0.248*** (0.0684)	0.00591 (0.0907)
Late adulthood	0.657*** (0.0855)	0.0221 (0.0993)
Gender (ref. Male)	-0.397*** (0.0382)	-0.396*** (0.0404)
Education (ref. Low)		
Middle	-0.663*** (0.0614)	-0.163 (0.0851)
High	-1.056*** (0.0656)	-0.425*** (0.0922)

Region (ref. Zagreb)		

Northern Croatia	0.163*	-0.184**
	(0.0772)	(0.0617)
Slavonia	0.177**	0.358***
	(0.0574)	(0.0655)
Lika and Banovina	0.109	0.203*
	(0.0670)	(0.0805)
Istria, Primorje and GK	-0.0720	0.0681
	(0.0714)	(0.0686)
Dalmatia	0.329***	0.309***
	(0.0565)	(0.0594)

Constant	2.375***	3.008***
	(0.102)	(0.127)

Observations	4211	3899
R ²	0.28	0.08

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Table 14. Abortion (15–25)

	(I) Abortion (restrictive)
Exposure (15–25)	-0.0588 (0.0900)
Period (1995)	
1999	-0.225* (0.106)
2003	0.213* (0.0987)
2007	0.00102 (0.102)
2012	-0.202 (0.108)
2015	0.800*** (0.0986)
2016	0.214* (0.102)
2018	-0.121 (0.105)
2020	-0.0458 (0.107)
2024	0.340*** (0.101)
Life-cycle (ref. Late adolescence)	
Early adulthood	-0.0356 (0.110)
Middle adulthood	-0.121 (0.0957)

Late adulthood	0.271*
	(0.108)

Gender (ref. Male)	-0.344***
	(0.0468)

Education (ref. Low)	

Middle	-0.720***
	(0.0686)
High	-1.012***
	(0.0820)

Region (ref. Zagreb)	

Northern Croatia	-0.143
	(0.0816)
Slavonia	0.575***
	(0.0682)
Lika and Banovina	-0.330***
	(0.0882)
Istria, Primorje and GK	-0.778***
	(0.0992)
Dalmatia	0.393***
	(0.0680)

Constant	-0.234
	(0.138)

Observations	10037
(ps)R ²	0.06

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Table 15. Religious Cluster (6–17)

	(A) Religiosity	(B) Church attendance	(C) Church as authority	(D) Christian morale
Exposure (6–17)	-0.0291 (0.0399)	-0.125 (0.0646)	-0.157 (0.120)	-0.227*** (0.0540)
Period (1995)	Ref.			
1999	-0.0416 (0.0432)		Ref.	Ref.
2003	0.00848 (0.0415)	Ref.	-0.0545 (0.0632)	0.0614 (0.0573)
2007	-0.0665 (0.0424)	-0.208** (0.0748)	-0.367*** (0.0677)	-0.161** (0.0600)
2012	-0.0190 (0.0419)	-0.0362 (0.0785)	-0.128 (0.0673)	0.157** (0.0592)
2015	-0.242*** (0.0446)	-0.180* (0.0754)		-0.0832 (0.0586)
2016	-0.0811 (0.0433)	-0.0758 (0.0762)		-0.0479 (0.0578)
2018	-0.151*** (0.0416)	-0.0881 (0.0742)		
2020	-0.152*** (0.0454)	-0.301*** (0.0779)		-0.209*** (0.0616)
2024	-0.0472 (0.0447)	0.0353 (0.0789)		-0.194*** (0.0582)
Life cycle (ref. Late adolescence)				
Early adulthood	0.0266 (0.0459)	-0.147 (0.0854)	-0.0284 (0.0933)	0.0768 (0.0649)
Middle adulthood	0.0732 (0.0408)	-0.0218 (0.0751)	-0.00770 (0.104)	0.217*** (0.0575)
Late adulthood	0.0604 (0.0486)	0.0609 (0.0872)	0.279* (0.117)	0.373*** (0.0662)
Gender (ref. Male)	0.273*** (0.0199)	0.662*** (0.0359)	-0.0191 (0.0438)	0.0646* (0.0284)

Education (ref. Low)				
Middle	-0.269***	-0.201**	-0.323***	-0.244***
	(0.0294)	(0.0620)	(0.0611)	(0.0428)
High	-0.516***	-0.312***	-0.586***	-0.468***
	(0.0356)	(0.0710)	(0.0715)	(0.0505)
Region (ref. Zagreb)				
Northern Croatia	-0.0105	0.115*	0.204*	0.00730
	(0.0334)	(0.0562)	(0.0833)	(0.0491)
Slavonia	0.239***	0.581***	0.223***	0.335***
	(0.0291)	(0.0571)	(0.0654)	(0.0429)
Lika and Banovina	0.0385	-0.129	0.0712	0.0982
	(0.0379)	(0.0667)	(0.0760)	(0.0534)
Istria, Primorje and GK	-0.301***	-0.367***	-0.286***	-0.232***
	(0.0376)	(0.0599)	(0.0810)	(0.0525)
Dalmatia	0.244***	0.619***	0.307***	0.353***
	(0.0298)	(0.0547)	(0.0650)	(0.0423)
Constant	4.023***	2.690***	3.330***	3.389***
	(0.0585)	(0.112)	(0.127)	(0.0828)
Observations	10235	8200	4191	8095
R ²	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.07

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Table 16. Nativist Cluster (6–17)

	(D) Traditionalism	(E) Nation living alone	(F) Homogenous countries
Exposure (6–17)	-0.271*** (0.0486)	0.0293 (0.116)	-0.129 (0.0734)
Period (1999)	Ref.	Ref.	
2003	0.311*** (0.0491)	-0.185** (0.0609)	
2007	0.250*** (0.0522)	-0.188** (0.0639)	
2012	0.412*** (0.0513)	-0.254*** (0.0641)	
2015	0.147** (0.0515)		Ref.
2016	0.200*** (0.0517)		-0.0609 (0.0537)
2020	0.227*** (0.0536)		-0.381*** (0.0589)
2024	-0.0120 (0.0522)		-0.0616 (0.0519)
Life-cycle (ref. Late adolescence)			
Early adulthood	0.0680 (0.0611)	0.0932 (0.0932)	0.0331 (0.0966)
Middle adulthood	0.241*** (0.0539)	-0.102 (0.103)	0.0465 (0.0844)
Late adulthood	0.379*** (0.0601)	-0.0983 (0.115)	0.0550 (0.0948)
Gender (ref. Male)	-0.0294 (0.0245)	-0.0420 (0.0420)	-0.0599 (0.0393)
Education (ref. Low)			
Middle	-0.135*** (0.0352)	-0.372*** (0.0630)	-0.345*** (0.0738)

High	-0.433*** (0.0433)	-0.589*** (0.0702)	-0.478*** (0.0844)
Region (ref. Zagreb)			
Northern Croatia	-0.0476 (0.0437)	0.123 (0.0818)	-0.0299 (0.0636)
Slavonia	0.242*** (0.0371)	0.0976 (0.0644)	0.548*** (0.0608)
Lika and Banovina	0.148*** (0.0448)	0.110 (0.0744)	0.0152 (0.0774)
Istria, Primorje and GK	-0.0638 (0.0452)	-0.294*** (0.0702)	-0.249*** (0.0704)
Dalmatia	0.185*** (0.0362)	0.193** (0.0624)	0.257*** (0.0588)
Constant	3.538*** (0.0741)	2.733*** (0.127)	3.603*** (0.118)
Observations	8116	4172	3839
R ²			

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Table 17. Gender-conservative Cluster (6–17)

	(G) Role of women (traditional)	(H) Gender equality (negative)
Exposure (6–17)	-0.0834 (0.108)	-0.103 (0.0718)
Period (1999)		
2003	0.0212 (0.0551)	
2007	-0.169** (0.0565)	
2012	1.297*** (0.0610)	
2015		0
2016		-0.409*** (0.0550)
2020		-0.438** (0.0595)
2024		-0.256*** (0.0548)
Life-cycle (ref. Late adolescence)		
Early adulthood	0.119 (0.0782)	-0.0821 (0.101)
Middle adulthood	0.212* (0.0925)	0.0281 (0.0901)
Late adulthood	0.641*** (0.107)	0.0220 (0.0993)
Gender (ref. Male)		
	-0.396*** (0.0382)	-0.397*** (0.0404)
Education (ref. Low)		
Middle	-0.667*** (0.0615)	-0.159 (0.0851)

High	-1.060*** (0.0656)	-0.415*** (0.0925)
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Region (ref. Zagreb)		
Northern Croatia	0.159* (0.0773)	-0.180** (0.0617)
Slavonia	0.174** (0.0575)	0.358*** (0.0655)
Lika and Banovina	0.105 (0.0671)	0.201* (0.0802)
Istria, Primorje and GK	-0.0702 (0.0714)	0.0690 (0.0686)
Dalmatia	0.325*** (0.0565)	0.310*** (0.0593)
<hr/>		
Constant	2.386*** (0.115)	3.005*** (0.127)
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Observations	4211	3899
R ²	0.28	0.08

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

Table 18. Abortion (6–17)

	(I) Abortion (restrictive)
Exposure (6–17)	0.122 (0.0935)
Period (1995)	
1999	-0.235* (0.106)
2003	0.195* (0.0995)
2007	-0.0183 (0.103)
2012	-0.224* (0.109)
2015	0.781*** (0.100)
2016	0.197 (0.103)
2018	-0.140 (0.106)
2020	-0.0625 (0.108)
2024	0.322** (0.102)
Life-cycle (ref. Late adolescence)	
Early adulthood	-0.0388 (0.110)
Middle adulthood	-0.102 (0.0966)
Late adulthood	0.315** (0.110)

Gender (ref. Male)	-0.343***
	(0.0468)
Education (ref. Low)	
Middle	-0.729***
	(0.0686)
High	-1.023***
	(0.0823)
Region (ref. Zagreb)	
Northern Croatia	-0.146
	(0.0816)
Slavonia	0.575***
	(0.0683)
Lika and Banovina	-0.330***
	(0.0882)
Istria, Primorje and GK	-0.779***
	(0.0993)
Dalmatia	0.393***
	(0.0680)
Constant	-0.256
	(0.138)
Observations	10037
(ps)R ²	0.07

Note: significance levels denoted as .05*, .01**, .001***.

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