

Introduction

The first issue of this year of the Croatian Journal of Philosophy opens with a special section devoted to The Behavioral and Ethical Consequences of Large Language Models. This was also the theme of the 3rd Kathy Wilkes Memorial Conference, held in Turin, Italy, on 26–27 April 2024. I am grateful to the conference organisers, and in particular to Ms Nada Bruer of the Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik, for their assistance in preparing this section. The conference opened with welcome remarks by Monica Bucciarelli, Anita Avramides, Nada Bruer, and Riccardo Viale, and included presentations by Edoardo Datteri, Lukas J. Meier, Mario Rasetti, David Papineau, and Tvrtko Tadić. The present section brings together papers by Edoardo Datteri, Lukas J. Meier, and Riccardo Viale and Shaun Gallagher. In “Enactive Problem Solving and Chatbot Architectures,” Riccardo Viale and Shaun Gallagher examine competing conceptions of rationality in decision-making and problem solving, and develop the notion of enactive problem solving (EPS). They argue that problem solving is best understood as an action-oriented and embodied process grounded in agent–environment interaction. Applied to therapeutic chatbots, this approach suggests that less rigid systems may, in certain respects, better support users’ relational autonomy than more highly structured architectures. In “The Attribution of Rationality to Robots,” Edoardo Datteri critically assesses current experimental approaches to the study of the intentional stance towards robots. He argues that the existing focus on the attribution of mental states neglects the attribution of rationality, thereby limiting our understanding of how users form expectations about robotic behaviour. In “Large Language Models versus Fuzzy Cognitive Maps for Solving Moral Dilemmas,” Lukas J. Meier compares the performance of large language model–based systems with an alternative approach based on fuzzy cognitive maps (the METHAD algorithm) in the domain of medical ethics. He identifies systematic differences in interpretability, structure, and types of error, and suggests that an optimal advisory system would combine features of both approaches.

Continuing from the special section, the issue proceeds with a set of articles addressing a range of topics in contemporary philosophy. Walter Veit and Heather Browning, in “Two Kinds of Conceptual Engineering,” develop a pluralist account of conceptual engineering by distinguishing between its naturalist and moral variants. Rather than differing in method, these approaches are shown to diverge in their roles and purposes. Through the examples of health and animal welfare, the authors

illustrate how tensions between them can both generate conflict and contribute to conceptual improvement. A defence of libertarian free will is advanced by Davor Pećnjak in “Deliberation, Action and Freedom.” Drawing on phenomenological considerations, Anselmian insights, and recent empirical findings concerning the inhibition of action, the paper presents a cumulative argument for the existence of genuine alternatives in both deliberation and action. Timothy J. Nulty’s “Temporal Integration and the Basis of Moral Equality” offers a critical challenge to the widely accepted view that all persons possess equal moral status. On the basis of an account of temporal integration, Nulty argues that differences in individuals’ connections to their future selves bear directly on morally relevant properties such as autonomy and agency, thereby complicating standard defences of moral equality. The issue concludes with Jinghua Chen’s “Theoretical Sources of Rawls’s Justice as Fairness: Kant, Hegel and Mill,” which situates Rawls’s theory within its broader philosophical context. The paper identifies important parallels between Rawls’s central ideas—the original position, the primacy of the basic structure, and the two principles of justice—and corresponding elements in the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Mill.

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