

A MODEL OF PEACEFUL REINTEGRATION AND THE POSSIBILITY TO LIVE TOGETHER

Antun Šundalić

Faculty of Economics, Osijek

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When differences in the language, religion, tradition and culture in general grow into an obstacle to the communication between nations, the possibility of living together becomes doubtful. The burden of historic heritage in the Croato-Serbian relationship has become intolerable due to Serbian rejection to recognise Croatian independence. Through violence, plunder, banishment and devastation of the Croatian villages and towns, the Serbs have declared against co-existence with the Croats. Can the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration convince the expelled Croats and other non-Serbs that living together is possible? The Plan offered administrative solutions that neglect essential characteristics of the area (historical prerogatives, migrations, wars, cultural differences). The displaced persons do not see the Plan as a humane, material and moral satisfaction, but rather as additional protection for the Serbs. They have formed their returnees' consciousness mainly from the point of view of their everyday living needs and expectations, which so far have not approved or accepted all details of the Plan.

1. INTRODUCTION: LIFE AS LIVING TOGETHER

To live means to live with other people. Living together is a an inevitable condition of each living being. There is no choice – existence is always co-existence. Awareness of this is characteristic of a rational nature of human being. However, most essential in human rationality is to find a modus of living next to someone else and, by all means, a reason for it.

Pre-industrial societies interpreted living together as a mutual effort with the aim of common survival; collective interest completely eliminated individual interest. Industrial societies arrange living together by a contract, that is, the dif-

ferent interests of individuals are not denied but are brought into co-existence through a contract which limits them.¹

The terms of contract-defined relations are today the backbone of institutionalised reality. To obey the law is an obligation of every good citizen which is accepted without analytically evaluating the restrictions on individual freedom. Individuals accept certain roles (the role of voters, for instance) and participate in certain procedures as a part of the social system (election for instance) by which they give legitimacy to existing reality (Luhmann: 1992:44-55). Such an institutionalised socialisation is today understood as a result of the historical development of civilisation which has offered most "bread and freedom" in democratic capitalism.² The example of institutionalised socialisation in the USA made living as the co-existence of different nations, religions and cultures into a reality. The starting point is a liberal approach to personal freedom in order to realise individual potentialities.³

Naturally, such development of civilisation is not present in all climates, in all nations and cultures. There have always been those who wanted more and better, and those who wanted what others had. Weber took this difference in attitudes as playing an essential role in the development of a rational capitalistic economy. The mentality of trading, speculating, swindling and robbing belongs to the past (late Rome, China). Mentality characteristic for the West is rational gaining of profit (Weber: 1976:130-1). Both mentalities cannot exist for long in the same region and at the same time. We shall take this as a basis for the analysis of the situation in Croatia.

The co-existence of Croats and Serbs has not been fruitful for both nations from the very beginning. Dinko Tomašić finds the reason for the divergent mentalities of these two nations in the difference of "autochthonous cultures". For the Croats a tradition of co-operative agriculture and cattle-breeding has been characteristic; for the Serbs a tribal culture of cattle-breeding and theft (Tomašić:1993;890). The co-existence of these two mentalities is hard to achieve and short-lived. Its final result is war, meaning freedom for one nation, and defeat for the other. Each war, regardless of its result, changes the con-

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There should be mentioned Durkheim's distinction between mechanistic and organic solidarity, as well as the importance of social contract in the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau and others.

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Supporting arguments can be found in the following books: M. Novak, *Duh demokratskog kapitalizma* (Zagreb:Globus-Školska knjiga, 1993), F. Fukuyama, *Kraj povijesti i posljednji čovjek* (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 1994), P. Berger, *Kapitalistička revolucija* (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1995).

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M. Friedman highlights that liberalism has as its basic concern belief in the dignity of an individual, in individual's opportunity to realize full potentialities by own choice, but on the sole condition that the freedom of one person does not infringe on the rights of others. M. Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Zagreb: Globus-Školska knjiga, 1992: 201).

ditions of co-existence, and thus creates different assumptions about sharing a way of life in future.

2. HISTORICAL HERITAGE AS A BURDEN OF CO-EXISTENCE

The problem of co-existence was seemingly actualised with the first multiparty elections in 1990. The term seemingly is stressed, because this problem has persisted for several centuries and refers to the multinational co-existence of Croats and Serbs.

Slavonija, and in particular its eastern part, encountered this problem in the period of the conquest of Turks (1526-1687). From the so called "little paradise of Catholicism" (Čuljak: 1994;195), this region became exposed to islamization, influences of the reformation, and as time passed, to the most persuasive penetration by the Orthodox creed.⁴ By organised colonisation, the Serbian population inhabited depopulated regions of Croatia. Under the leadership of the Patriarch Arsenie III Crnojević about 30 thousand Serbs immigrated to Eastern Slavonija in 1690. Immigration was also taking place in the 18th century, during the Patriarch Arsenie IV (Kolarić: 1985;134). The relationship towards Serbian immigrants and the consequences of their immigration were described by a Jesuit Antun Kanižlić, a respectable Slavonian of that time. He described that Vlasi arrived along the Danube looking for a better living, found in Slavonija the "celebrated Slavonic language", and brought with them customs of cursing and the abuse of father, mother, religion, soul and grave. By this, he says, they produced a "Turkization of the language" (Kanižlić: 1760:XI-XII, nonpag).⁵

Religion, language and customs are the most distinctive differences between nations. They do not have to be, necessarily, the sources of hostility, but they become so from the moment when they are imposed on another religion, language and customs. In the period of domination by the Austria-Hungary dual monarchy in Croatia the threat to the Croatian language, tradition and religion came mainly through attempts at Germanization and Hungarization. Some Croatian intellectuals and politicians tried to resist this danger, even through

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Writing that may be consulted: Butorac, J. *Katolička crkva u Slavoniji za turskog vladanja* (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost 1970), Bösendorfer, J. *Crčice iz slavonske povijesti* (Osijek 1910), Mažuran, I. *Popis naselja i stanovništva u Slavoniji 1698. godine* (Osijek: JAZU 1988), Šuljak, A. *Vjerske organizacije u sjeveroistočnoj Hrvatskoj, Proceedings Hrvatska – povijest sjeveroistočnog područja* (Osijek 1994: 188-207).

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The writing of the same author indicated religious intolerance between Slavonians - Roman Catholics, and immigrated Serbs who were more willing to accept islamization than Roman Catholicism. (Kanižlić: 1760.XIII, nonpag).

forming an alliance with the Serbs and other South Slavs, which seemed to them less threatening.⁶ However, since 1918, and in particular after the death of Stjepan Radić in 1928, awareness of the problems of co-existence with the Serbs in the same state has been increasingly present. During the Second World War, the Communist Party revived the idea of a single state as a means of struggle against fascism and Stalinist pressure later on (Županov: 1995;36-7). Giving priority to classes instead of nationality, in accordance with the spirit of its ideology, communist authority tried to develop a sub-nationalist sense of Yugoslavism as a substitute for national consciousness. This was achieved mostly through the systematic atheisation of society. How unsuccessful it was, can be best documented by the 1953 and 1991 population census (Table 1). Not only had the population not turned atheistic, but, the number of Roman Catholics had even increased and the number of those who did not belong to any faith, had decreased. The first multiparty elections also showed that national consciousness had not deteriorated either.

Table 1
Distribution of Croatian population by confession

Confession	Year	
	1953	1991
Roman Catholics	73.9%	76.6%
Orthodox	11.3%	11.1%
Other religions	1.3%	6.6%
Not religious	12.5%	3.9%
Unknown	1.0%	1.8%

3. WAR – A NEW BURDEN OF CO-EXISTENCE

In the summer of 1991, in Eastern Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srijem, a new era began with regard to the relationship between Serbs and Croats, Hungarians, Slovaks, Ruthenians and other non-Serbian nationalities. In summary, this relationship can be described as genocide. Confirmation of this de-

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In the time of Strossmayer, Croatia was endangered by Germanization from one side and Hungarization from the other. The idea of unification of South Slavs was a kind of reaction to that threat. That aspect of national threat has to be kept in mind when the development of the idea of Yugoslavism is discussed. (Županov: 1995.37)

Corresponding was the opinion of the French historian P. Garde stating that Yugoslavia is a term invented by the Croats; a project developed by Strossmayer which was a good concept and the best solution, but was very hard to achieve. A lot of good will that was needed had not existed in the monarchic Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs. (From the interview published in *Nedjeljni Vjesnik*, 13 October 1996)

On political attitudes of J. J. Strossmayer the following book can be consulted: Pavić M, Cepelić M. *Biskup Josip Juraj Strossmayer*, Đakovo 1994..

scription are the numerous devastated villages and cities (from Čelije to Vukovar), a lot of people killed and taken away, as well as about one hundred thousand displaced persons. It was accompanied by destruction and devastation of anything that represented the 13-century long period of the presence of Croats and Christianity in this region. It should be stressed that 65 catholic churches and chapels, 13 monasteries, 19 prior houses, and 21 crosses were destroyed or severely damaged, and church possessions were mostly robbed and devastated (Srakić:1994;343-400).

Five years later, taking into account all that Serbs have done to Croats⁷ and other non-Serbian nationalities, the question of another possibility of living together is extremely actual for the process of "peaceful reintegration".

What tone can be ascribed now to the quotation "We shall return!" which echoed in the thoughts of displaced persons leaving their homes, and which was repeated many times at local and national levels? This thought was buried deep in the consciousness of the displaced, more as a reminder to "settle debts" with their persecutors, and less as a confirmation of peace, forgiveness and forgetting. "Anyone who was listening to the confessions of the displaced could learn a number of facts about what the Serbs did to other non-Serbian neighbours. These doings do not have to be that heavy that one could add them to the war-crime lists. But they do not have to be more cruel, either. Abolition of crime in neighbouring community is, thus, the hardest to attain. Since many of the escaped Serbs reasonably consider that this will be hard to achieve, they preferred to leave. Their number should not be surprising. The crimes they have made were also numberless." (Rogić:1995;184.).

The war has brought new, by now the greatest burden in the relationship of Croats towards Serbs. The time that passed was too short to speak of the effects of forgetting. Besides, all crimes were recorded: genocide, culturocide and ecocide in the east of Croatia were the central theme of numerous journalists and writers.⁸ The discovery of mass graves in the presence of media (in Vukovar, Tordinci) even more revives the fear of the days not so long gone. Besides, the continuous recurrence of new misunderstandings about the beginning of the return to Baranja, Eastern Slavonija and Western Srijem makes displaced persons less and less patient. Their readiness to accept demands put forward during the slow development of "peaceful reintegration" becomes more doubtful knowing that a new co-existence with their persecutors has been planned in advance.

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The exiled population consisted of 93.8% of Croats and of 95.2% Roman Catholics by confession (Rogić: 1995.74-76).

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Following are several titles that trustworthy recorded the events in the east of Croatia during the years 1991/1992: Topić D, Špišić D (1992) Rat prije rata, Vinkovci, Runtić D (1992) Rat, Vinkovci, Runtić D (1993) Rat poslije rata, Vinkovci, Nazdar V (1993) Sjene rata, Osijek, Rem G (1994) Čitati Hrvatsku, Osijek-Zagreb, Otvoreno sveučilište Osijek-Dureiux.

4. AND NOW, CO-EXISTENCE AFTER ALL?

After the spring ("Bljesak") and summer ("Oluja") 1995, "peaceful reintegration" meant a stretched hand of forgiveness to the remaining devastators of Eastern Croatia. But what did the stretched hand imply? The meaning of "peaceful reintegration" could be understood in three ways:

- for the Croatian state it was a way to reach its eastern, internationally acknowledged borders, but also a demonstration of good will to show the co-operative and peaceful politics of Croatia;
- for the Serbian rebels it was a way to achieve as good a position as possible in the negotiations and to avoid sanctions for what had been done, appearing as peaceful seekers of national rights;
- for the displaced persons from Eastern Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srijem, it was a way to return to their century-old hearths.

In this last instance, "peaceful reintegration" was understood as a necessity for displaced persons to live with those who expelled them. In other words, "peaceful reintegration" as a political substitute for co-existence, is a term which is expected to be more readily accepted by the public. But its final outcome should be not only the physical reintegration of the Croatian occupied territory, but also the recroatisation of this region. A revitalization of the Croatian spirit involves the return of the expelled Croatian inhabitants. Their return, according to the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration, does not involve the departure of those who declared themselves against co-existence, five years ago.⁹ Here we come to the point of questionable "digestivity" of the Plan, that is, co-existence.

The source of data on the attitudes prevailing among the displaced was a survey carried out on the sample of 1499 displaced persons from Baranja, Eastern Slavonija and Western Srijem. The methods, subjects and instrument are described by Kaliterna and Rimac (1997) and Šakić et al. (1997).

Whether the displaced persons accept life with the Serbs presently living in Baranja, Eastern Slavonija and Western Srijem? (Table 2)

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According to the Erdut Agreement the Transitional Administration was accepted in the interest of all the persons resident in/or returning to the Region (Article 2). "All persons who have left the Region or who have come to the Region with previous permanent residence in Croatia, shall enjoy the same rights as all other residents of the Region." (Article 4). "All persons have the right to return freely to their place of residence in the Region and to live there in conditions of security. All persons who have left the Region or who have come to the Region with previous permanent residence in Croatia, will have the right to live in the Region." (Article 7). (The text of the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium)

Table 2
Can the Serbs stay?

Do you agree that Serbs presently inhabiting Eastern Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srijem, should continue to live there?	%
1. All who wish have the right to stay (except war criminals)	24.7
2. Only some members of the Serbian nationality can stay	39.3
3. Not any of the Serbs can stay	30.6
4. Something else	1.3
5. Don't know, cannot estimate	4.2

It seems that the possibility of co-existence is not an utopia. For 24.7% of those interviewed all the Serbs presently living in eastern Croatian may stay there, except war criminals. As many as 39.3% of the interviewed were ready to make a compromise (only some Serbs could stay), while 30.6% rejected any possibility of living with the Serbs. The question is whether these answers resulted from an inclination of the displaced persons to forgive, or from their wish to return home at any cost, or, perhaps, from being insufficiently informed of the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration and what it offers. The level of acquaintance with the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration, and how the displaced persons evaluated it is shown in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3
Displaced persons and acquaintance with the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration

Degree of familiarity	%
1. Good	31.9
2. Medium	46.2
3. Poor	21.8

Table 4
Attitude toward the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration

Attitude toward the Plan	%
1. Completely agree	11.9
2. Mostly agree	38.2
3. Mostly disagree	19.9
4. Completely disagree	14.1
5. Not well informed	15.9

The preceding tables show that majority of those interviewed (46.2%) are moderately familiar with the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration and almost one third of them (31.9%) are well informed. Slightly more than one fifth are not satisfactorily informed (21.8%). But, when the attitude toward the Plan was in question, as many as 50.1% of the interviewed displaced persons support it (completely or mostly) and much fewer disagree (34% do not agree with the Plan "mostly" or "completely").

The greatest importance of the Plan lies in the possibility of a peaceful solution to the conflict (for 39.1% of the interviewed). Among the drawbacks of the Plan, in the first place is living with the Serbs again (31.9%), which is most emphasized among the displaced persons from Vukovar (Table 5). This can be explained as a consequence of most manifested hostility toward non-Serbs that culminated in 1991. Vivid memories of the status of the non-Serbs in this region over the period of two preceding Yugoslavian states also contributed to the lack of readiness of the displaced persons from Vukovar to accept co-existence.

Table 5
Chief drawbacks of the Plan by municipalities

Drawbacks	% of interviewed by municipality				Whole sample %
	Beli Manastir	Osijek	Vinkovci	Vukovar	
Living with Serbs	27.3	22.4	13.2	41.8	31.9
Slow implementation of the Plan	17.5	21.0	7.9	10.2	13.0
Plan is completely unacceptable	3.5	3.7	1.2	3.9	3.4
Possibility of stay for war criminals	2.0	1.5	0.8	4.4	3.0
Plan supports interests of the Serbs more than of Croats	3.5	3.1	1.8	2.1	2.5
Local authorities and police mixed of the Serbs and Croats	0.4	1.5	1.8	2.1	1.6
Insecurity upon return	1.6	0.6	0.5	1.5	1.3
Slowing down of establishing completely Croatian authority	0.4	1.5	1.0	1.5	1.2
Possibility of stay for Serbian newcomers	0.7	0.2	0.1	1.7	1.1
Insufficiently protected interests of the displaced persons	1.9	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.0
Threatened living security	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8
Insufficient means for reconstruction	0.3	0.2	0.3	-0.1	0.2
Possibility that Serbs stay in Croatian houses	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0
No major drawbacks	7.1	8.7	19.3	3.1	7.1
Don't know, cannot estimate	32.1	33.5	50.4	25.9	31.8

The question whether the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration supports the interests of the Serbs more than of Croats was positively answered by as many as 68.5% of the displaced persons interviewed. Only 14.7% did not share the same opinion (Table 6).

What will be the reaction of members of the Serbian nationality to peaceful reintegration and co-existence? Can they forget what they have done to their yesterday's neighbours and meet them with the arguments that they were misled and forced to act as they did, or that all that has been done was carried out by other, non-domestic Serbs? Most displaced persons believe that their return would mean emigration of the Serbs (58.8%); only 12.1% maintain that Serbs would adjust to Croatian authority. Distrust toward the Serbs showed 13.3% of the exiled; they think that Serbs will continue with the efforts to cre-

ate "their state" (Table 7). These attitudes suggest that displaced persons accept co-existence as a real option, because the majority of "sinners" will leave.

Table 6
Whom the Plan protects?

Plan protects interests of the Serbs more than of Croats	%
1. Completely agree	41.6
2. Mostly agree	26.9
3. Mostly disagree	8.3
4. Don't agree	6.4
5. Don't know	16.7

Table 7
Will the Serbs leave?

What will members of Serbian nationality do after the Croatian authority will be established?	%
1. Majority will emigrate	58.8
2. Majority will stay and conform to Croatian authority	12.1
3. Majority will stay and proceed with efforts to realise "their state"	13.3
4. Something else	2.3
5. Don't know, cannot estimate	13.4

The members of Serbian nationality who remain in eastern Croatia will be one real but not the greatest difficulty for the returning displaced persons, considering the organisation of their everyday life. Evaluating the difficulties that the displaced persons expect to encounter upon their return, it can be seen that relations with the Serbs are not perceived as the most dominant. Table 8 shows that "Problems with Serbian neighbours" came in fifth place, and "Possibility that Serbs participate in local authorities" in eighth place out of ten difficulties listed.

Table 8
Expected difficulties in the life of displaced persons upon their return

Difficulties to be encountered by the displaced persons upon their return	%
1. Threatened personal safety (danger from mines, weapons, planted bombs etc.)	73.8
2. Lack of money	71.6
3. Bad living conditions for children and adolescents (lack of schools, kindergartens, playgrounds, etc)	54.5
4. Difficulties in adaptation to living conditions in general	52.9
5. Problems with Serbian neighbours	48.7
6. Lack of population capable of working	46.1
7. Unemployment, poor economic prospects	44.0
8. Possibility that Serbs participate in local authorities	41.2
9. Bad organisation and functioning of local authorities	19.5
10. Poor traffic communication with other parts of Croatia	13.4

A breakdown of the sample by municipalities shows that the population expelled from Vukovar is considerably more cautious about "Serbian neighbours" as well as "the Serbs in local authorities" (difficulties 5 and 8). A majority of displaced persons from Vukovar, 63%, saw Serbian neighbours as problems and 54.6% participation of the Serbs in local authorities (Table 9). In relation to the whole sample these difficulties are 13 to 15% more often expressed by the population from Vukovar.

Table 9
Difficulties by municipalities

Difficulties	Beli Manastir	Osijek	Vinkovci	Vukovar
1.	59.0	69.8	65.2	83.9
2.	60.5	68.7	71.7	77.1
3.	32.3	39.0	51.7	69.2
4.	34.6	42.8	46.7	65.5
5.	37.7	35.7	28.1	63.0
6.	31.9	33.2	43.6	56.6
7.	28.7	35.9	42.7	53.2
8.	30.6	34.1	17.1	54.6
9.	9.7	8.9	14.7	28.1
10.	6.9	6.0	10.2	19.3

From the data given in Table 10 it can be seen that in making decisions about their return, members of Serbian nationality are not the crucial difficulty for the majority of displaced persons. The banished population maintains that complete implementation of the Croatian authority (97.1%) and living security (97%) are "very important". Repair of objects essential for normal life was the third factor influencing their decision about the return (92.7%). The possibility of living without Serbs was listed in sixth place (58.8%).

Table 10
What conditions are important in making decision to return?

To what extent are the following circumstances an influence on your decision to return?	%
1. Completely established Croatian government	97.1
2. Personal and family safety	97.0
3. Reconstruction of objects necessary for normalisation of life in a village (medical service, schools, etc.)	92.7
4. Obtaining adequate help for restitution of lost properties	89.8
5. Possibility of employment or other means of obtaining the means to live	75.6
6. Possibility of living without Serbs	58.8
7. Departure of UNTAES and other UN military forces	47.5
8. Something else	1.5

It seems that minds of the displaced are not oppressed by a feeling of the impossibility of living next to the Serbs to the degree which would make it crucial in bringing their decision about return. But the question should be put in another way if one would like to know whether there is a certain degree of confidence in the Serbs who will meet the displaced persons. As already indicated by Table 7, the displaced persons suspect that the Serbs will still try to create their state. And if they would have the control in some village or city, would there be a place for non-Serbian nationalities? The majority of displaced persons answered negatively: 89.7% would not return to their villages if run by the Serbs (Table 11). This is a good indication that confidence as a crucial requirement of living together does not exist.

Table 11
Trust in Serbian authority

Would you return to your village reintegrated in Croatia but with Serbian local authorities	%
1. I would return because it would still be part of Croatia	1.2
2. I would return only if the Croatian authority could guarantee safety and a peaceful life	2.8
3. I would return if all conditions set by the Croatian authority would be respected and personal safety guaranteed	1.4
4. If the village would be controlled by the Serbs I should not return under any condition	89.7
5. I do not intend to return regardless of local authority	2.5
6. Don't know, cannot estimate	2.5

Distrust toward Serbian authority is so great that it almost wipes out native consciousness and patriotism. This could be illustrated by Table 12 in which two variables are crossed: one dealing with the patriotic feeling of the displaced persons and the other showing the trust of exiled non-Serbs toward the rule of the Serbs. From this contingency table it is obvious that even 91.1% of displaced persons who consider their original place of residence their only homeland, would not return there if the Serbs would be included in the authorities (row 1, column 4). Thus distrust in Serbian authority is so strong that displaced persons are more ready to discard their home-ties than accept Serbian rule.

Table 12
Perception of the native place and attitude toward Serbian local authorities

Perception of the place (1)	Attitude toward Serbian local authorities (2)					
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1.	1.1	2.8	1.5	91.1	1.3	2.2
2.	0.8	3.2	0.3	86.1	8.6	1.0
3.	0.0	0.0	0.0	82.9	4.6	12.5
4.	14.1	1.5	0.0	23.8	40.4	20.2
5.	0.0	0.0	0.0	89.4	0.0	10.6
6.	2.3	0.0	0.0	78.7	10.5	8.5
Total	1.2	2.8	1.4	89.7	2.5	2.5

Question 1:

Whether you think that the place of your exile is your home-village (that is, the place you are attached to by particularly strong emotions)?

1. It is my only home.
2. There are several places where I feel as in my home-village (to which I am strongly attached).
3. My home-village is somewhere else, I was only a newcomer in this place or "passer-by".
4. There is no place which I feel my home-village.
5. Something else.
6. I have no definite opinion.

Question 2:

Would you return in the situation where, after the peace is completely restored, your village would be returned to Croatia but local authorities would be run by the Serbs living there?

1. I would return because this would be a part of Croatia, however.
2. I would return only if Croatian rule could guarantee a safe and peaceful life.
3. I would return under some other conditions.
4. If the village would be controlled by the Serbs I should never return.
5. I do not intend to return, regardless of the local authority.
6. Don't know, cannot estimate.

The great majority of exiled, regardless of nationality do not accept return if Serbs would participate in local authorities. Column 4 in Table 13 shows that there is no significant departure from that attitude among exiled Croats, Hungarians and other non-Serbian nationalities, as well as among exiled Serbs. In column 1 it can be noted that only 1.2% of the displaced persons would accept return to their home-village because it is a part of Croatia, regardless of local authorities. This attitude is particularly significant for the Croats (88.1% in the interviewed sample) who maintain that Croatia without authorities run by the Croats is not their optimal living territory.

Table 13
Nationality and relationship toward Serbian authorities

Nationality	Attitude toward Serbian local authorities (2)					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Croat	1.2	2.4	1.3	89.9	2.8	2.3
Serb	3.5	13.5	0.0	73.4	0.0	9.5
Hungarian	0.9	0.4	0.6	94.4	0.0	3.7
Other	0.0	4.7	4.7	90.3	0.3	0.0
Total	1.2	2.8	1.4	89.7	2.5	2.5

Strong distrust toward life in which the local authority would be run by the Serbs does not leave room for a bright vision of future co-existence. But the fact is that displaced persons create their picture of the return on the assumption that in the reintegrated area Croatian rule will be completely revived. There will be no Serbs participating in the rule in their vision.

In a number of displaced persons a disbelief that they would return home soon is caused by the slow process of peaceful reintegration. Table 14 shows that 28.9% of displaced persons had a pessimistic vision of the future, and almost the same per cent of the displaced persons are uncertain about this (27.7%). Among the displaced persons 43.5% hold that the future will be better than the present situation. The Croatian authority should bear in mind the present attitudes of the displaced persons and do everything possible to turn their pessimistic view into optimistic impatience as the only feeling that can stimulate re-croatisation and development of still occupied territory.

Table 14
Feelings prevailing among the exiled

In your opinion what feelings prevail today among the displaced persons?	%
1. Pessimistic view and fear that the future cannot result with good	28.9
2. Optimism, belief that things will be better soon	43.5
3. Cannot estimate	27.7

5. CONCLUSION

The failed option of co-existence experienced by non-Serbian inhabitants in the Croatian east in 1991 made them displaced persons and war-affected people. Their wish to return home after the summer of 1995 has become a realistic prospect to be fulfilled soon. On the other hand, the military actions the "Flash" ("Bljesak") and "Storm" ("Oluja") make any further delay even harder. From month to month, impatience about the return became a growing burden to actual policy. A politically formulated model of peaceful reintegration has not paid attention to pre-defined terms in all its stages, and has become one of the central topics among the displaced persons. More and more frequent demonstrations of refugee-representatives and mass meetings are a warning that displaced persons are again put in the situation of "refugee as a victim" as it was in 1991, and this position is far from the desired status of "displaced person as an independent and self-organised factor" (Rogić:1995.125-7).

Such a course of events, very slow for the exiled, brings into question the optimistic perception of tomorrow among the displaced persons. Their belief that the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration primarily protects the interests of the Serbs, supports a dominant attitude that the Croatian authority could have done more for the displaced persons. Discord between the expectations of the displaced

persons and the effectiveness of the Croatian authority can be interpreted by the distinction between "objective facts" and "subjective meaning" as well as through the existence of "separated sub-universes of meanings" (Berger-Luckmann:1992.33-4, 106). The present reality for the displaced persons, and their return are uncertain, and not definitely understood in the institutionalised scheme. The right to return, with adequate human, moral and material satisfaction define the meaning of the return in the minds of the displaced persons.

Institutionalised reality, that is a Croatian authority and international presence, do not negate such an approach to the return, but modify it. The "now" suggesting immediate return, is transformed into a process which has as its final goal a universal, i.e. general and not particular, meaning. For every authority, Croatian as well, the legitimacy of its concept, that is its objective realisation and subjective acceptance are essential (Berger-Luckmann:1992.115). But difficulties arise in both segments; in acceptance as well as in the realisation of some stages of the Plan. It is known that difficulties primarily result from the disagreement of the "other side", and it is also hard to expect that a concept of living together and circumstances that could make it acceptable to both sides would occur overnight.

The very concept of co-existence, offered by the model of peaceful reintegration is an outcome of the administrative approach of diplomacy at the world level. Historical details of the territory to which it should be applied are neglected (from historical supremacy, migrations and wars, to cultural differences). Certain achievements of formerly created concepts of co-existence are also omitted, such as, a catholic understanding of co-existence. The concept in question develops trust among people at three levels: the level of simple personal relationships, the level of seeking the truth and the level of co-operation in practical achievements (Dijalog:168.9). The degree of applicability in this region, dominated by Roman Catholics, should be by all means investigated (Šundalić:1996).

* * *

In conclusion, can it be said that among the displaced persons from the Croatian east, a returnee-formed consciousness prevailed as a confirmation that the model of peaceful reintegration is accepted? The answer lies with the fundamental characteristics of how displaced persons see their return.

The first point to be stressed is that the majority of displaced persons intend to return to their native areas. The fact that not all of them want to return, should not be surprising taking into account the length of period of their status and the awareness of what awaits them upon their return. It is known from worldly experience that "about one third of an emigrated population never returns to their native place, regardless of the modality of migration." (Wertheimer-Baletić:1993.209).

Secondly, return is understood among displaced persons as return to their homes. It could attain the dimensions of "the debt toward the homeland", "return to their home-village" etc., but not the dimension of "readiness for reconciliation, forgiveness and forgetting". This is confirmed by the attitude of the displaced persons that among all the handicaps of the Plan, the greatest is the insistence on living again next to the Serbs.

Third, the belief that the majority of the Serbs would leave before their return is very strong. This would mean that prerequisite for a tolerable life with the rest of the Serbs who have not committed any crimes against the exiled neighbours, would have to be fulfilled.

Fourth, distrust toward Serbs, in local authorities in particular, is so strong that displaced persons do not accept co-existence conditioned by local authorities run by members of Serbian nationality.

Fifth, displaced persons do not base their returnee-awareness primarily on the difficulties of daily life with the Serbs, but on the guarantees for their personal safety and material aspects of their lives. The guarantees they see in complete revival of the Croatian authority in the whole region.

Translated by Vesna Hajnić

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MODEL MIRNE REINTEGRACIJE I MOGUĆNOST SUŽIVOTA

Antun Šundalić

Ekonomski fakultet, Osijek

Kada razlika u jeziku, vjeri, tradiciji ili kulturi postane zapreka u komunikaciji među narodima, tada je među njima suživot upitan. Ovakav teret povijesnog naslijeđa u odnosima Hrvata i Srba dobio je dimenziju neizdrživosti zbog srpskog neprihvatanja državne samostalnosti. Nasiljem, pljačkom, progonima i pustošenjem hrvatskih sela i gradova Srbi su se izjasnili protiv suživota. Mogu li se planom mirne reintegracije uvjeriti prognani Hrvati i drugi ne-srbi da je suživot moguć? Plan je ponudio administrativna rješenja koja zaobilaze bitne specifičnosti ovoga kraja (povijesno prvenstvo, migracije, ratovi, kulturne razlike). Prognanici u njemu ne nalaze humanu, moralnu i materijalnu satisfakciju, već prije svega zaštitu Srba. Oni su stoga svoju povratničku svijest više oblikovali iz obzora svojih potreba i očekivanja koja uvjetuje život, a koja nisu do sada u cijelosti potvrđivala prihvaćenost svih potankosti plana.

DAS MODELL DER FRIEDLICHEN REINTEGRIERUNG UND MÖGLICHKEITEN DES ZUSAMMENLEBENS

Antun Šundalić

Ökonomische Fakultät, Osijek

Wenn Unterschiede in Sprache, Religion, Tradition oder Kultur zu Hindernissen in der Kommunikation zwischen den Völkern werden, ist es fraglich, ob ein Zusammenleben noch möglich ist. Die Bürde des geschichtlichen Erbes in den Beziehungen zwischen Kroaten und Serben wuchs bis zur Unerträglichkeit an, als die Serben es ablehnten, Kroatien als selbständigen Staat anzuerkennen. Durch Gewalt, Plünderung, Vertreibung und Verwüstung kroatischer Dörfer und Städte ließen die Serben keinen Zweifel daran, dass sie gegen ein Zusammenleben mit den Kroaten waren. Kann der Plan der friedlichen Reintegration die vertriebenen Kroaten sowie andere Nichtserben von der Möglichkeit eines Zusammenlebens überzeugen? Der Plan bietet administrative Lösungen an, in denen wesentliche Spezifika dieses Raums (geschichtlicher Vorrang, Migrationen, Kriege, kulturelle Unterschiede) umgangen werden. Die Vertriebenen erblicken darin keinerlei humane, moralische und materielle Befriedigung, sondern in erster Linie eine Inschutznahme der Serben. Die Einstellung der Vertriebenen im Hinblick auf die ersehnte Rückkehr ist daher eher von Bedürfnissen und Erwartungen geprägt, die durch das Leben selbst bedingt sind, die sich jedoch nicht in alle Einzelheiten des Reintegrationsplans finden können.