

NATO Disputes: U.S.-Denmark Tensions Over Greenland and the 1974 Cyprus Parallel

Toma Gruica ¹

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the escalating geopolitical crisis between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark over the status of Greenland during the 2025-2026 period. Driven by the “Golden Dome” missile defense initiative and a global race for critical minerals, the current U.S. administration has transitioned from traditional alliance-building to a posture of strategic assertiveness, including the implied necessity of annexing Greenland. The analysis highlights how this “intra-alliance predation” challenges the foundational premise of Article 5 and the rules-based international order. To assess the potential for resolution, the paper draws a historical parallel to the 1974 Cyprus crisis between Greece and Turkey, which demonstrated NATO’s institutional paralysis and inability to arbitrate territorial disputes between its own members. The paper contrasts the Danish “Everything stops” doctrine and Greenland’s independent Arctic strategy with the “hedging” response of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. Ultimately, the Greenland crisis is presented as a definitive test of NATO’s identity, whether the alliance remains a values-based community or has

¹ Assistant Professor at „Dr. Franjo Tuđman“ Defense and Security University, e-mail: toma.gruica@sois-ft.hr; the research for the article was funded within the PostDoc-Track Fellowship of the Austrian Academy of Science.

devolved into a pragmatic security arrangement where smaller states' sovereignty is secondary to the strategic interests of the lead power.

KEYWORDS: *Greenland, NATO, Cyprus, Article 5, EU-U.S. Relations*

Introduction

The analysis provided in this paper pertains to ongoing and highly volatile geopolitical developments within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), specifically regarding the diplomatic tensions between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark during the 2025-2026 period. The situation remains fluid, characterized by rapid shifts in executive policy in Washington, responding maneuvers in Copenhagen and Nuuk, and a broader restructuring of Arctic security architectures. While the paper utilizes historical parallels and contemporary intelligence to forecast potential trajectories, the inherent unpredictability of the current US administration's foreign policy and the evolving nature of Arctic climate change may alter these outcomes. The findings should be interpreted as an assessment of the present crisis and its existential implications for the transatlantic alliance as of January 2026. Regardless of these constant changes, the present case nonetheless serves as a valuable prism for developing understanding and analytical insight into how internal disputes between NATO member states may be addressed and potentially resolved within the alliance framework.

The traditional cohesion of NATO is currently facing its biggest internal challenge since the organization's inception in 1949. While NATO was designed to present a unified front against external aggression, primarily from the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia, as one of its successor states, the current (2025-2026) crisis over Greenland illustrates unseen intra-alliance predation. The United States, historically the guarantor of Danish sovereignty and the primary architect of the rules-based international order, has transitioned into a posture of strategic assertiveness that treats the territory of its own allies as a matter of American national security necessity (Bryant, 2026). This friction is not an isolated diplomatic incident but the culmination of a decade of shifting priorities. The Arctic has transitioned from a zone of "low tension" into a theatre of Great Power competition, driven by the dual catalysts of climate change and the global race for critical minerals (Spence and Hanlon, 2025). The US

administration's renewed interest in acquiring Greenland, articulated with increasing intensity throughout 2025 and early 2026, has forced a re-evaluation of the mutual defense guarantees contained within NATO. If an ally perceives the United States not as a protector but as a potential annexing power, the foundational premise of Article 5, that an attack on one is an attack on all, undergoes a potentially fatal reinterpretation (Thorsson, 2026).

The Geopolitical Significance of the Greenlandic Landmass

To comprehend the current US-Denmark dispute, we must analyze the strategic attributes of Greenland. Spanning over two million square kilometers, the island represents the “high ground” of the North Atlantic. Its utility to the United States is defined by its role in missile defense, its proximity to melting Arctic shipping lanes, and its vast, largely untapped mineral wealth. The 2025 US National Security Strategy emphasizes the completion of a comprehensive missile defense shield, often referred to in policy circles as the “Golden Dome.” Greenland's Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) is the northernmost installation of the US military and serves as a critical node for the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). As military technology evolves, particularly with the advent of hypersonic glide vehicles and advanced ICBM trajectories from both Russia and China, the US seeks to expand its radar and interceptor footprint on the island (Knight, 2026). The administration argues that the existing sporadic investment in Pituffik is insufficient for modern threats and that direct US jurisdiction would allow for a more rapid and robust expansion of these capabilities (Stone and Mason, 2025).

Beyond defense, Greenland is viewed as a solution to the West's dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains for rare earth elements (REEs), furthering a race for critical minerals (Thorsson, 2026). The island contains significant deposits of neodymium, praseodymium, uranium and zinc. The 2025 US administration has explicitly linked the acquisition of Greenland to the goal of mineral independence, viewing the territory's current regulatory environment under Danish and Greenlandic law as “red tape” that hinders the extraction of resources essential for the defense and technology sectors. The US argument, as articulated by officials such as Vice President JD Vance and special envoy Jeff Landry, is that Denmark, a nation of six million people with a limited mil-

itary budget, cannot provide the security architecture required to protect such a strategically vital asset from the encroaching influence of Russia and China (Little et al., 2025).

The 2025-2026 Crisis

Following the inauguration in January 2025, the new administration immediately signaled that the Arctic would be a priority, but with a transactional tone that shocked allies in Copenhagen. In March 2025, Vice President JD Vance conducted a highly publicized visit to Pituffik Space Base. During this trip, Vance took the unprecedented step of publicly criticizing the host nation while on its own soil (Brezar, 2026). He accused Denmark of “under-investing” in the security of Greenland and suggested that the Danish “one more dog sled” approach to Arctic defense was a liability to the entire alliance. This rhetoric served to delegitimize Danish sovereignty by framing it as a security deficit that the United States had a moral and strategic obligation to correct (Moulson, 2025).

A pivotal moment in the escalation occurred in late 2025 and early 2026, following a US military operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro. The bombardment of Venezuela and the swift decapitation of its leadership were viewed by the Trump administration as a demonstration of the effectiveness of unilateral force in securing the Western Hemisphere. Almost immediately following the Venezuela operation, the rhetoric regarding Greenland shifted from diplomatic inquiry to implied military necessity. Proponents of the administration, including figures like Stephen and Katie Miller, began using the Venezuela intervention as a precedent, suggesting that the US was now in a period of “real action” where the territorial integrity of other nations was secondary to American safety. The posting of a map of Greenland draped in the American flag with the caption “SOON” by Katie Miller, served as a clear signal that the administration viewed the Arctic island as the next target for consolidation (Cole, 2026).

Finally, In December 2025, President Trump appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as a special envoy to Greenland. Landry, a staunch ally of the president, openly stated that his mission was to “make Greenland a part of the US“. This appointment was accompanied by a series of high-level statements that questioned the very basis of Danish control. White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller, in January 2026, went so far as to question the legitimacy

of Denmark's "colonial" claim to Greenland, asserting that the US required the island to "defend NATO interests", effectively arguing that the US must annex an ally's territory to save the alliance (Guldogan, 2026).

Danish and Greenlandic Counterstrategies

The response from the Kingdom of Denmark has been one of principled defiance. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has repeatedly stated that Greenland is not for sale and that the idea of the US annexing the territory is "absurd". However, the 2026 crisis has forced Denmark to go beyond rhetoric, adopting an "Everything stops" doctrine. Frederiksen's most significant contribution to the current dialogue is her warning that a US move against Greenland would represent the end of the post-World War II security order. By stating that "everything stops" if the US attacks another NATO country, she has highlighted the paradox of the current situation, the very power that provides the backbone of NATO's defense is now the primary threat to the territorial integrity of a member state. This has rallied other European leaders, including the leaders of the UK, France, and Germany, who have expressed solidarity with Denmark and emphasized that borders in the 21st century cannot be changed by force (Gronholt-Pedersen, 2026). Simultaneously, Greenland itself has asserted its own agency through its comprehensive foreign and security policy strategy titled *Greenland in the World - Nothing About Us Without Us*. Published in February 2024, this document outlines a ten-year plan for Greenland to act as an independent international actor, even while remaining part of the Danish Kingdom (Naalakkersuisut, 2024).

The 1974 Cyprus Crisis and NATO's Internal Paralysis

To understand why the 2025-2026 Greenland crisis is so dangerous for NATO, we must examine the supporting historical parallel of the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. This event remains the starkest example of a conflict between NATO members that the alliance's internal mechanisms were unable to prevent or resolve (Christou, 2014). At his annual press briefing on 5 January, the then Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán framed Greenland as an internal "in-house" NATO matter, arguing that since both Denmark and

the United States are members of the alliance, any potential change should be discussed exclusively within NATO structures (Konya, 2026). This characterization invites a critical comparison with the “in-house” deliberations once conducted within the Warsaw Pact over Hungary itself, underscoring why an understanding of NATO’s internal decision-making mechanisms is essential for assessing how such issues are managed within contemporary alliance politics (Békés, 2008).

Failure of NATO Mediation (1974-1975)

The primary objective for NATO during the crisis was twofold - preventing communist influence on the island, and avoiding a catastrophic war between two of its members, Greece and Turkey. The Cyprus conflict began not with an invasion, but with the failure of a power-sharing agreement. The 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was designed to balance the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority, but instead it created institutional gridlock (Lindley, 2007). The disproportionate representation and veto powers given to the Turkish Cypriots led to a complete breakdown of governance by 1963, triggering a decade of intercommunal violence and the formation of separate, armed enclaves (Dodd, 2010). This period illustrates the “security dilemma” in an internal NATO context, as Greek Cypriots armed for *Enosis* (union with Greece), Turkish Cypriots responded by arming for *Taksim* (partition) (O’Malley and Craig, 2001). Every defensive move by one side was perceived as an existential threat by the other, eventually leading to the 1974 coup sponsored by the Greek military junta. When Turkey launched its invasion in July 1974, citing its role as a guarantor power, NATO was paralyzed (Hart, 1990). Because the conflict involved two allies (Greece and Turkey), the alliance could not invoke Article 5. Instead, the North Atlantic Council became a forum for recrimination rather than resolution (Dodd, 2010).

Documents from the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library reveal the frustration of then-Secretary General Joseph Luns (Ford et al., 1975). Luns admitted that while the alliance maintained formal unity, the Greek-Turkish-U.S. dispute was having a “precarious effect” on alliance solidarity (Hitchens, 2012). Greece felt betrayed by NATO’s inability to stop the Turkish advance, leading to its withdrawal from NATO’s military command structure in 1974 (Dodd, 2010). Turkey, meanwhile, was “dismayed” by the US Congress’ decision to impose an arms embargo, which it viewed as an interference in its sovereign right to

protect its ethnic kin (Ford et al., 1975). The crisis set a precedent where NATO was willing to tolerate the occupation of an ally's (or associate state's) territory if it meant keeping both belligerents within the alliance. Henry Kissinger's pragmatic acceptance of the partition of Cyprus, "there's no American reason why Turkey should not have one third of Cyprus", is similar to the 2026 rhetoric that Denmark "is not going to be able to handle" the security of Greenland and thus should cede it to the US (Zierler, 1974a). By 1974, the strategic management of Cyprus fell largely to Kissinger due to the Watergate scandal in the United States. Declassified documents and telegrams suggest that the U.S. was aware of the impending coup against Archbishop Makarios by the Greek junta, led by Dimitrios Ioannides. Kissinger viewed a pro-NATO partition as a viable way to end the instability. When the coup occurred on July 15, NATO did little to restore the status quo. According to the Cyprus Files, there was an expectation that a controlled Turkish intervention would lead to a "double *Enosis*" outcome. While NATO did not orchestrate every tactical move, its strategic fingerprints were on every major shift that led to the permanent division of Cyprus (Dodd, 2010).

The parallel between Kissinger's Cyprus calculus and contemporary Greenland rhetoric is not coincidental but symptomatic of a structural "logic" in US hegemonic alliance management, what we might term "instrumental sovereignty" (Abegunde, 2021). This represents a type of framework wherein allied territorial integrity becomes contingent upon serving broader alliance (i.e. American) strategic objectives rather than representing an inviolable principle (Jolly, 2025).

Both instances employ identical discursive mechanisms that operate through distinct stages. First, the construction of a "security deficit" narrative that frames sovereign allied territory (or, in Cyprus's case, territory contested by allies) as a security problem requiring solution rather than as a matter of allied self-determination (Cyprus as ungovernable; Greenland as inadequately defended). Second, the repositioning of what is fundamentally a sovereignty violation as a security solution, thereby transmuted coercion into prudence, positioning a larger ally's territorial claim as the pragmatic resolution to this constructed problem ("Turkey should have" / "Denmark should cede") (Ackrén and Jakobsen, 2014). Finally, the implicit assertion of a hegemonic prerogative to adjudicate which allied territories are "properly" secured and which require "reorganization", subordinating alliance cohesion and international law to realpolitik assessments of capability ("no American reason why not" / "Denmark

not going to be able to handle”) (Adamides, 2020). Fourth, the naturalization of territorial partition or transfer as inevitable geopolitical common sense by obscuring its coercive dimension, presenting it as security governance rather than as a violation of NATO Article 4’s commitment to territorial integrity consultation.

In short, Kissinger’s statement can be used as an example of the U.S. position that allied sovereignty is a derivative of U.S. strategic calculation, not foundational to it. What emerges across both cases, of Cyprus and Greenland, is an alliance architecture where the hegemon preserves systemic stability by selectively suspending the very sovereignty norms that constitute NATO’s *raison d’être*. Additionally, in both cases, NATO’s Article 4 commitments to territorial consultation were overridden by U.S. strategic calculations, weakening the alliance’s foundational commitment to collective defense based on sovereign equality.

Collapse of the Southern Flank During the 1974 Cyprus Crisis

The summer of 1974 was the first time in the history of the alliance, where two member states, Greece and Turkey, engaged in a direct and sustained military conflict over the sovereign territory of Cyprus, a non-aligned but geopolitically critical island nation (Erickson and Uyar, 2020). This conflict, colloquially known as the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and referred to by the Turkish military as Operation Star Drop-4 (often erroneously labeled Operation Attila in Western historiography), fundamentally shattered the operational cohesion of NATO’s Southern Flank and exposed the alliance’s lack of robust internal conflict resolution mechanisms (Danopoulos, 1988). Operation Star Drop-4 represented the fourth revision of Turkish invasion plans originally drawn up in 1970 or earlier, reflecting Turkey’s longstanding contingency planning following the 1964 intercommunal clashes and the 1967 Kofinou incident, both occasions when Turkey threatened invasion but was restrained by U.S. pressure (Hart, 1990; Richter, 2010). The strategic significance of the Mediterranean region to the North Atlantic Alliance cannot be overstated. Since the formal establishment of the Southern Flank in 1951-52, comprising Italy, Greece, and Turkey, the alliance sought to integrate these powers into a unified defensive system aimed at deterring Soviet expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa (Kotoulas, 2020). Greece and Turkey were seen as

the indispensable anchors of this flank, securing the Dardanelles and providing the necessary land and sea approaches to protect vital oil supply routes. However, the inclusion of these two states was initially met with reluctance by some founding members who feared their historical rivalry would undermine alliance unity, a fear that was realized in 1974 (Kotoulas, 2020).

As early as 1964, the United States viewed Cyprus through the lens of Cold War stability. After intercommunal violence broke out, President Lyndon Johnson intervened to stop a Turkish invasion and tasked Dean Acheson with creating a solution. Dean Acheson proposed two versions of what became known as the “double *Enosis*” plan. These plans aimed to divide the island between Greece and Turkey, either through land swaps or military bases, to satisfy both NATO allies (Dodd, 2010). However, Archbishop Makarios rejected these proposals, viewing them as a violation of Cypriot sovereignty. Makarios was viewed with deep suspicion by NATO leadership, who dubbed him the “Castro of the Mediterranean” due to his non-aligned stance. Cyprus had been a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, the only European state besides Yugoslavia, and Makarios was perceived as open to Soviet influence. This prompted Western powers and the Greek government under George Papandreou to consider his removal (Dodd, 2010).

By 1967, a military junta took power in Greece. Though the United States would have preferred a return to democracy, Cold War imperatives and the need to maintain NATO’s southern flank compelled Washington to cooperate with the junta. The junta, led by Georgios Papadopoulos, was seen as a more reliable NATO partner that would be willing to force a solution on Cyprus. After the Kofinou incident, a November 1967 clash between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriot forces that resulted in casualties and nearly triggered a Turkish invasion, led to renewed Turkish invasion threats, the United States pressured the Greek junta to withdraw the Greek Division that had been secretly deployed to Cyprus in 1964 (Richter, 2010). The U.S. priority was keeping Turkey within the NATO fold at all costs, even if it meant weakening the Greek military presence in Cyprus. This withdrawal of Greek forces, combined with Athens’ covert support, created conditions that enabled the emergence of EOKA B in 1971, a Cypriot paramilitary organization dedicated to overthrowing Archbishop Makarios and achieving *Enosis* with Greece (Dodd, 2010).

Cyprus, while not a member of NATO, occupied a position of paramount strategic value. The island’s 1960 independence from British colonial rule was predicated on a complex web of constitutional protections for the Turkish

Cypriot minority and the granting of guarantor status to Britain, Greece, and Turkey (Erickson and Uyar, 2020). From NATO's perspective, however, the primary concern was the "Mediterranean Cuba" phenomenon, the fear that the non-aligned government would provide Moscow a permanent foothold in the region (Balci, 2012).

During that period, intercommunal violence had pushed Turkey to the brink of intervention, only to be deterred by a stark and controversial letter from U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson. Johnson's warning that NATO might not assist Turkey if a Cyprus intervention provoked a Soviet response, and his prohibition on using U.S.-supplied arms for non-NATO purposes, successfully halted the 1964 incursion but sowed deep-seated resentment in Ankara (Balci, 2012). This historical precedent created a cognitive bias within NATO and U.S. intelligence circles leading up to 1974. Planners underestimated Turkish resolve, assuming that alliance disapproval or U.S. pressure would deter intervention. Simultaneously, there was a chronic overestimation of Greek Cypriot military strength and the defensive capabilities of the National Guard. This intelligence failure left the alliance fundamentally unprepared when the Greek military junta, led by Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis, orchestrated the July 15, 1974 coup against President Makarios (Erickson and Uyar, 2020).

The Coup, Turkish Intervention, and Operation Attila Phase II

The July 15 coup installed the pro-*Enosis* militant Nikos Sampson as president (Morelli, 2011). This act directly threatened the Turkish Cypriot minority and provided Ankara with the legal pretext to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee to restore constitutional order. On July 20, 1974, Turkey launched a complex amphibious and airborne operation that caught the alliance off guard (Erickson and Uyar, 2020). The initial Turkish landings captured approximately 3% of the island before a ceasefire was declared on July 22 (Morelli, 2011). During this period, NATO's internal dialogue was characterized by a desperate attempt to avoid a wider war between Greece and Turkey. While the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 353 calling for an immediate end to foreign military intervention, the United States and Britain blocked efforts to name Turkey as the aggressor, fearing that such a move would permanently alienate Ankara from the alliance (Bowers, 1995). The subsequent collapse of the Greek military junta on July 24 and the return of Constantine Karamanlis

to Athens briefly shifted the focus toward a negotiated settlement. However, the Tripartite talks in Geneva between Britain, Greece, and Turkey in late July and early August proved fruitlessly contentious (Morelli, 2011). Turkey, having established a beachhead, demanded a bizonality or cantonal system to ensure Turkish Cypriot safety, while Greece and the newly restored civilian government in Nicosia insisted on a return to the 1960 status quo (Zierler, 1974a).

The failure of the Geneva talks led directly to the second phase of the Turkish operation on August 14, 1974. In a swift military campaign that lasted only two days, Turkish forces expanded their control to approximately 36% of the island, establishing the “Attila Line” (now known as the Green Line). This second push was perceived by Greece and many NATO allies as a clear violation of the ceasefire and a transition from a “peace operation” to an “illegal occupation” (Boyatt and Erdman, 1974). The repercussions for NATO were immediate, frustrated by what he perceived as NATO’s inability to protect a member’s interests against an ally, Prime Minister Karamanlis announced Greece’s withdrawal from the integrated military command structure of the alliance on August 14, 1974. Karamanlis’ decision was a calculated move to satisfy a domestic public that felt betrayed by the West, while also attempting to shock NATO into pressuring Turkey for a withdrawal (Danopoulos, 1988).

Institutional Paralysis and Aegean Disputes

The Secretary General of NATO during this period, Joseph Luns, a staunch advocate for Atlantic unity, was deeply concerned that the Cyprus crisis would erode the NATO partnership and invite Soviet opportunism (Erickson and Uyar, 2020). On July 4, 1974, days before the coup, Luns had already expressed fear of a conflict and proposed a “step-by-step” approach to defuse Aegean tensions, suggesting that Greece and Turkey focus on joint exploitation of oil and mineral wealth rather than territorial disputes (Zierler, 1974b). Following the invasion, Luns’ mediation efforts were hampered by the lack of a formal conflict resolution framework within the North Atlantic Council (NAC). While he attempted to use his “Good Offices”, a mediation mechanism established by NATO’s 1956 “Three Wise Men” report that empowered the Secretary General to intervene in disputes between member states, the real diplomatic power resided in Washington and London (Zierler, 1980).

The Greek withdrawal from the military wing created a massive operational hole in NATO’s Southern Region. For years, Greece had held operational re-

sponsibility for the Aegean Sea within the NATO framework, including control over air defense and naval surveillance boundaries. Upon Greece's exit, these responsibilities were largely assumed by Turkish forces, a shift that Turkey sought to make permanent (Damiras, 2011). However, Greece may have overestimated the strategic impact of its withdrawal on NATO operations (Congressional Research Service, 1975). The resulting command-and-control (C2) dispute became a surrogate for the broader territorial and maritime conflicts in the Aegean (Mann, 2001). Turkey challenged the pre-1974 boundaries, arguing they were established at a time when the Turkish Navy was small and the Soviet threat less complex, similar to the situation in the Arctic today. These technical disagreements regarding Flight Information Regions (FIR) and naval search-and-rescue (SAR) zones led to decades of dangerous "dogfights" between Greek and Turkish jets in disputed airspace (Mann, 2001). The crisis reached a new level of complexity in 1975 when the United States Congress, under intense pressure from the Greek-American lobby and reacting to the illegal use of U.S. weapons in Cyprus, imposed a total arms embargo on Turkey. This move created a significant rift between the Executive branch, led by Kissinger (who viewed the embargo as a strategic disaster), and the Legislative branch, which insisted on the rule of law regarding foreign aid (Rossides, 1991). The impact on Turkey was significant, facing a critical shortage of spare parts and modern weaponry, the Turkish military readiness plummeted (Association of the United States Army, 1978). In retaliation, the Turkish government of Süleyman Demirel declared the 1969 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) invalid and suspended operations at several critical U.S. and NATO facilities on Turkish soil. Ultimately, the embargo served as a catalyst for Turkey to develop its own indigenous defense industry (Durmaz, 2014). Realizing that total reliance on a single ally was a strategic vulnerability, Ankara launched a massive industrialization program that, while decades in the making, eventually transformed Turkey into a significant regional arms producer and reduced its future dependence on Western supplies (Durmaz, 2014).

Reintegration Effort

When the Carter administration took office in 1977, it inherited a Southern Flank that was "weaker than ever". President Carter initially sought to link the lifting of the Turkish arms embargo to progress on the Cyprus issue, but this strategy proved ineffective. By 1978, the administration concluded that the deterioration of Turkey's defense posture was too great a risk to the alliance as a

whole, and Congress was finally persuaded to lift the embargo (Zierler, 1980). The next challenge was the reintegration of Greece into the military structure. Prime Minister Karamanlis, facing domestic elections and military pressure, sought to return to the alliance to alleviate the fear of Turkish expansionism. However, Turkey used NATO's consensus procedure to block several reintegration plans, including the 1978 "Haig/Davos Arrangements", which would have restored the pre-1974 Aegean boundaries. Ankara argued that any return to the old boundaries would allow Greece to use NATO's consensus rules to permanently block changes to Aegean C2 (Zierler, 1980). The eventual return of Greece to the integrated military command in October 1980 was made possible by the "Rogers Plan", developed by General Bernard Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Following the September 1980 military coup in Turkey, the new military government in Ankara was more amenable to a strategic compromise. The Rogers Plan was frequently described as a "monument of obscurity" because it allowed for Greek reintegration while leaving the final resolution of command boundaries for future technical discussions that were never fully resolved (Smith-Windsor, 2013).

Long-term Consequences

We can conclude that the 1974 Cyprus crisis exposed some structural flaws in the NATO framework that continue to reverberate: (1) Failure of Internal Norms - while NATO was successful at promoting liberal democratic norms externally after the Cold War, it has historically failed to enforce these norms within its own ranks. The alliance's "hands-off" approach to the 1974 invasion suggested that strategic value would always outweigh moral or legal concerns in the eyes of the major powers; (2) NATO became a "pacifist pleaser" - it attempted to manage both Greece and Turkey without addressing the core issues of territory and ethnic identity. This has led to a situation where the Alliance can contain conflict but cannot resolve it, resulting in a permanent state of high-readiness tension in the Eastern Mediterranean; (3) The PfP and EU Deadlock - the most significant modern failure is the "Participation Problem" stemming from the 1974 division. Since the Republic of Cyprus (which Turkey does not recognize) joined the EU in 2004, full NATO-EU cooperation has been effectively frozen. Turkey blocks Cyprus' accession to the Partnership for Peace (PfP), while Cyprus uses its EU membership to veto NATO-EU intelligence sharing and joint operations.

In the decades following the 1974 crisis, both Greece and Turkey have undergone significant domestic and military transitions. Greece transitioned from a military dictatorship to a stable parliamentary democracy, legalizing the communist party and eventually seeking security through deeper integration into the European Community (EC/EU) rather than purely through NATO. Turkey, meanwhile, moved toward a more independent foreign policy, bolstered by its growing defense industry and its pivotal role in regional conflicts in the Middle East (Güney, 2004). The creation of a “military de-confliction mechanism” by NATO in October 2020 is a recent attempt to modernize the alliance’s response to Greek-Turkish tensions. However, this mechanism focuses on preventing accidental military clashes rather than resolving the fundamental dispute over Cyprus and the Aegean. The persistent ethnic conflict in Cyprus remains “immune to all attempts of peacemaking”, having survived over fifty years of UN and NATO mediation (Güney, 2004). The 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus remains the “longest-running United Nations peace-keeping operation” and NATO’s most enduring internal scar. The alliance’s response, characterized by a prioritization of Cold War deterrence over internal justice, successfully prevented a Soviet breakthrough but at the cost of the Southern Flank’s permanent fragmentation (Balci, 2012).

NATO’s internal dialogue during the crisis revealed an organization that was strategically brilliant but institutionally fragile. The failure to prevent the 1974 coup and the subsequent invasion demonstrated that the “shield of the Treaty” did not extend to protecting members from one another. The resulting de facto partition of Cyprus, the erosion of Greek trust in Western guarantees, and the Turkish pivot toward defense autonomy have created a Mediterranean security environment where the two littoral powers are often “adversaries rather than NATO allies”.

Article 5 in an Internal War

The 2025-2026 crisis has exposed the legal ambiguity of NATO when the aggressor is a member state. Article 5 was drafted during the Cold War with the specific intent of deterring a Soviet attack (NATO, 2025). It assumes an external enemy. There is no protocol for a situation where a member state uses its military or economic power to coerce another member into surrendering territory (Grady, 2002). While NATO’s Article 5 is theoretically grounded in Article 51 of

the UN Charter (the inherent right to individual or collective self-defense), its application in an intra-alliance dispute is procedurally impossible (Smiljanić, 2025). If Denmark were to invoke Article 5 against the United States, the North Atlantic Council would be unable to act, as the U.S. holds a veto over all major decisions (Lilly, 2026). This leaves Denmark and Greenland reliant on a “coalition of the willing” within Europe rather than the institutional weight of NATO itself (Gronholt-Pedersen, 2026). Similarly, the U.S. administration’s use of “economic coercion” to pressure Denmark, including threats to pull out of defense agreements or disrupt trade, further complicates the legal landscape. Danish intelligence has explicitly labeled the U.S. a “security risk” due to these tactics. This marks the emergence of “intra-alliance hybrid warfare”, where an ally uses non-military means to undermine the sovereignty of another member to achieve territorial goals (Bryant, 2026).

The strategic miscalculation of withdrawal demonstrates a parallel between the 1974 Greek response and potential Danish actions in 2026. Greece’s August 1974 withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command structure was intended to shock the alliance into pressuring Turkey for a territorial withdrawal from Cyprus. Prime Minister Karamanlis believed that removing Greek forces from NATO’s Southern Flank would expose the alliance’s vulnerability to Soviet opportunism, thereby compelling the United States and other allies to intervene decisively on Greece’s behalf (Congressional Research Service, 1975). However, this calculation fundamentally overestimated the strategic impact of Greece’s absence. While the withdrawal created operational complications in the Aegean command structure, NATO adapted by reassigning responsibilities to Turkish and Italian forces, effectively demonstrating that no single member, excepting the United States, possessed sufficient leverage to compel alliance-wide action through withdrawal (Danopoulos, 1988). By 1980, facing continued Turkish control of northern Cyprus and increasing domestic security concerns, Greece was forced to return to the military structure under the deliberately ambiguous Rogers Plan, having achieved none of its stated objectives through its six-year absence (Smith-Windsor, 2013).

The contemporary rhetoric from Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen that a U.S. move against Greenland would represent the end of NATO and that “everything stops” suggests a similar overestimation of Denmark’s strategic weight within the alliance (Banka, 2026). Should Denmark withdraw from NATO’s military structure or suspend its membership in response to U.S. pressure, the precedent of 1974 suggests that such a move would produce limited

coercive effect. The alliance's dependency on American nuclear deterrence, intelligence infrastructure and military logistics renders any European member's withdrawal strategically manageable from Washington's perspective. Furthermore, Denmark's withdrawal would not precipitate a broader European exodus from NATO, as no other member state currently faces a comparable territorial threat from the United States. The more probable outcome, following the Greek precedent, is that Denmark would find itself isolated, forced to negotiate a return to the Alliance under less favorable conditions once the initial crisis subsided, having demonstrated its vulnerability rather than its indispensability. This parallel underscores a structural asymmetry within NATO where withdrawal functions as a credible threat only when wielded by the hegemon, not by smaller members seeking to constrain hegemonic behavior (Iwanami, 2024).

Chinese and Russian Presence in Greenlandic Waters

The tensions over Greenland are occurring against the backdrop of a complete breakdown in Arctic governance. The Arctic Council, once the primary forum for regional cooperation, has been sidelined by the exclusion of Russia and the increasing assertiveness of China. The U.S. administration has justified its aggressive stance by citing the presence of "Chinese and Russian ships everywhere" along the Greenlandic coast. While Danish officials contest the scale of this presence, the reality is that the melting ice has made Greenland's vast coastline more accessible and harder to patrol. The U.S. argues that only the American Navy and Coast Guard have the "ice-breaking" and surveillance capabilities necessary to maintain the Arctic as a Western-dominated zone.

In parallel, the Eastern Mediterranean remains entrenched in the zero-sum "*Mavi Vatan*" (Blue Homeland) doctrine, where Turkey's rejection of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in favor of continental shelf primacy directly challenges Greek and Cypriot maritime entitlements. While the Greenland dispute is primarily transactional and resource-focused, targeting molybdenum and rare earth elements for defense industries, the Mediterranean conflict is an existential struggle over energy security and historical sovereignty that effectively neutralizes Article 5 cohesion (Grady, 2002).

Greece's perception of Turkey as its primary security threat has fragmented NATO's southern command, leading to bilateral defense pacts outside the al-

liance's formal structure. These internal fractures provide a strategic opening for the Sino-Russian "Polar Silk Road" and Mediterranean Squadron to exploit alliance vulnerabilities. In the Arctic, Russian militarization and Chinese investment in dual-use infrastructure challenge NATO's situational awareness, while in the Mediterranean, the diplomatic paralysis between Greece and Turkey allows Moscow to project power into the Levant and North Africa (Lampas and Filis, 2023). Both theatres are increasingly vulnerable to hybrid warfare targeting critical undersea infrastructure, as evidenced by incidents like the Balticconnector, where adversaries leverage "shadow fleet" activity to bypass collective defense triggers. Ultimately, the value of these seas to NATO, as gateways for global trade and energy, is being degraded by the inability of unified command structures to arbitrate sovereignty disputes between member states (Ibid.).

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who took the helm during a period of intense U.S. skepticism toward the alliance, has consistently sought to avoid a direct confrontation with Washington (Brezar, 2026). During his March 2025 visit to the White House, Rutte was seen "hedging" on the Greenland issue. When Trump stated that the annexation "will happen" and that Rutte could be "very instrumental" in the process, Rutte responded by focusing on the "high north" and Arctic security generally, while pointedly stating he did not want to "drag NATO" into the specific discussion of Greenland joining the U.S. This refusal to take a firm stand in defense of Danish territorial integrity has been criticized in Copenhagen as a sign of institutional weakness, mirroring the perceived "superpower's contempt" that some believe characterizes NATO's treatment of its smaller members.

Conclusion

The 2025-2026 Greenland crisis represents a terminal point in the evolution of NATO's identity. Since its founding, the alliance has been defined by two competing concepts, NATO as a Values-Based Community, and NATO as a Strategic Security Arrangement. In the traditionalist view, held by Denmark and most European allies, NATO is a community of democratic nations bound by a shared commitment to the rule of law and the sanctity of sovereign borders. In this model, the protection of Greenland's status is not just a matter of Danish interest, but a test of the alliance's moral and legal foundations. If the

most powerful member can use force or coercion against a smaller ally, the “community” ceases to exist, replaced by a hierarchy of power.

In the revisionist view, championed by the 2025-2026 U.S. administration, NATO is a pragmatic tool for the projection of Western (and specifically American) power. In this model, the strategic utility of a territory like Greenland outweighs the “legalistic” claims of a small ally. This view argues that for NATO to “survive” and “defend its interests”, the most capable power must have the right to organize and secure the alliance’s most vital assets, even if it means violating the sovereignty of another member. The 2026 crisis has brought these two identities into a collision that the Alliance may not survive. If NATO remains silent while the U.S. applies pressure on Denmark, it confirms that it has transitioned into a “strategic arrangement” where small states are mere buffer zones or asset pools for the great powers. This would likely lead to a permanent fracturing of the alliance, with European states seeking a separate strategic autonomy outside of the U.S.-dominated structure. Conversely, if the alliance’s European members successfully resist U.S. pressure and reinforce the “Nothing About Us Without Us” paradigm, NATO may emerge as a more decentralized but more resilient organization. This would require a new “constitutional” understanding within the alliance that explicitly prohibits the use of coercion, military or economic, between its members, moving beyond the failed mediation model of the 1974 Cyprus crisis.

While this analysis has drawn extensive parallels between the 1974 Cyprus crisis and the 2025-2026 Greenland dispute, a rigorous comparative framework requires explicit acknowledgment of both structural similarities and critical differences. The similarities lie in the alliance’s institutional mechanisms and normative failures. In both cases, NATO Article 4 consultation procedures proved (or are proving) inadequate to prevent unilateral action or credible threats thereof by a larger ally against the sovereign interests of smaller member states. The alliance’s consensus-based decision-making, designed to protect against external threats, became (or risks becoming) an instrument of paralysis when the threat originates internally (Grady, 2002). Both crises revealed (or are revealing) NATO’s inability to enforce its foundational commitment to territorial integrity when doing so would alienate a strategically valuable member. The discursive mechanisms of instrumental sovereignty, constructing security deficit narratives and repositioning coercion as prudent security governance, operate identically across both cases, though in the Greenland dispute these

mechanisms remain primarily at the rhetorical level rather than having materialized into concrete action (Abegunde, 2021; Adamides, 2020).

However, the differences are equally significant and fundamentally alter the stakes of the contemporary crisis. The 1974 dispute involved two regional powers, Greece and Turkey, whose combined military and economic weight remained subordinate to the alliance's core guarantee structure provided by the United States. NATO could tolerate their conflict because neither possessed the capability to fundamentally reshape the alliance architecture unilaterally. The Greenland crisis, by contrast, involves the hegemon itself. The United States provides approximately 70% of NATO's total defense spending, maintains the sole credible nuclear umbrella for European members, and controls the intelligence infrastructure that underpins collective situational awareness (Spence and Hanlon, 2025). This creates an asymmetry of dependence that did not exist in the Greek-Turkish context. While Greece could withdraw from the military command structure without collapsing NATO's deterrence posture against the Soviet Union, a comparable withdrawal or reduction of U.S. commitment would render the alliance strategically inoperable against peer competitors like Russia and China.

This hegemonic differential transforms the nature of coercion. Turkey's 1974 occupation of northern Cyprus was a violation of Cypriot sovereignty and Greek strategic interests, but it did not challenge the existential premise of NATO as a defensive alliance. The United States could mediate, however inadequately, because it was not a direct party to the territorial dispute. In 2026, the United States is both the coercing power and the ultimate guarantor of the alliance. There is no external mediator. European members face a paradox where resisting U.S. pressure on Greenland risks undermining the very security guarantee that makes their own territorial integrity credible. This explains the divergent responses. In 1974, NATO members could express moral condemnation of Turkey while maintaining alliance cohesion because the stakes were regional. In 2026, European leaders' solidarity with Denmark must be carefully calibrated to avoid provoking a broader U.S. reassessment of its transatlantic commitments, as evidenced by Secretary General Mark Rutte's deliberate hedging during his March 2025 White House visit (Brezar, 2026).

The material stakes also differ significantly. Cyprus in 1974 was strategically valuable as a surveillance outpost and a denial space for Soviet influence, but it was not economically transformative. Greenland in 2026 represents a type of convergence between military necessity, specifically the expansion of mis-

sile defense architecture against hypersonic threats, and economic imperative, access to rare earth elements critical for defense and technology supply chains (Knight, 2026). The U.S. justification for Greenland is therefore not merely strategic convenience but framed as existential to maintaining Western technological and military superiority against China. This elevates the crisis beyond a territorial dispute into a question of alliance purpose. If NATO's *raison d'être* is collective defense against peer competitors, and if Greenland is genuinely indispensable to that defense, does the Alliance have the right to reorganize sovereign control over its most critical assets? This is a question that simply did not arise in the Cyprus context, where no comparable existential framing was credible.

Finally, the international legal context has evolved. In 1974, decolonization was recent, and the norms around territorial integrity were still being contested, particularly in cases involving ethnic minorities and guarantor powers. The 1960 Cyprus constitution explicitly granted Greece and Turkey guarantor status, providing a legal pretext, however contested, for Turkish intervention (Erickson and Uyar, 2020). Greenland in 2026 operates under a fundamentally different legal regime. The island is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, with its own foreign and security policy strategy explicitly affirming its right to self-determination (Naalakkersuisut, 2024). There is no treaty granting the United States guarantor status, and any annexation would constitute a clear violation of the UN Charter and the foundational norms of the post-1945 order. The international community's reaction reflects this difference. In 1974, the UN Security Council condemned the violence in Cyprus but did not impose meaningful consequences on Turkey. In 2026, European leaders have framed a potential U.S. move on Greenland as a civilizational crisis for the rules-based order, with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stating that borders cannot be changed by force in the 21st century (Gronholt-Pedersen, 2026).

The Cyprus precedent therefore serves as both warning and inadequate guide. It demonstrates NATO's institutional incapacity to resolve intra-alliance territorial disputes and its willingness to subordinate sovereignty norms to strategic pragmatism. However, the Greenland crisis operates at a higher order of magnitude. It is not a conflict between two regional allies that can be contained through strategic ambiguity and eventual reintegration. It is a confrontation between the alliance hegemon and the normative foundations of the post-war international system. If NATO accommodates U.S. pressure on Greenland, it confirms the transition from a values-based community to a hier-

archical security arrangement where sovereignty is a privilege granted by capability rather than an inviolable right. This would represent a more fundamental rupture than the Cyprus partition, which, while damaging, left the alliance's core identity intact. The question is not whether NATO can survive another Cyprus-style failure, but whether it can survive the redefinition of its purpose from collective defense among sovereign equals to the management of spheres of influence under hegemonic primacy.

References

- Abegunde, B. (2021). Regional cooperation and state sovereignty. *Athens Journal of Law*, 7(2), 169–188. <https://doi.org/10.30958/ajl.7-2-3>
- Ackrén, M., and Jakobsen, U. (2015). Greenland as a self-governing sub-national territory in international relations: Past, current and future perspectives. *Polar Record*, 51(4), 404–412. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S003224741400028X>
- Adamides, C. (2020). The Cyprus conflict through the lens of securitization processes. In *Securitization and desecuritization processes in protracted conflicts*. Palgrave Pivot. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33200-6_5
- Association of the United States Army. (1978). *Congress lifts the Turkish arms embargo - NATO and U.S. security are the real winners (Defence Report AUSA DR-139)*. Association of the United States Army.
- Balci, T. (2012). The Cyprus crisis and the southern flank of NATO (1960–1975). *International Review of Turkish Studies*, 2(3), 30–55.
- Banka, A. (2026). The promise of aligning with the hegemon. In *America, the Baltic States and the making of an unlikely security alliance*. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-12815-7_1
- Békés, C. (2008). Why was there no “Second Cold War” in Europe? Hungary and the East-West crisis following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In M. A. Heiss & S. V. Papacosma (Eds.), *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc conflicts* (pp. 219–232). Kent State University Press.
- Bowers, P. (1995). *Cyprus and the United Nations* (Research Paper 95/31). House of Commons Library, International Affairs and Defence Section.
- Boyatt, T., and Erdman, R. (1974). *NSC contingency plans: Cyprus*. S/S–I Files, Lot 83 D 411, Box 3418, National Archives, Washington, DC.
- Brezar, A. (2026). *Greenland prime minister says “enough” after latest Trump threat*. Yahoo News. https://consent.yahoo.com/v2/collectConsent?sessionId=3_cc-session_b790cb80-247e-4940-b1df-4d34a59051f1

- Bryant, M. (2026). *Trump must give up fantasies about annexation, says Greenland's PM*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/05/trump-must-give-up-fantasies-about-annexation-says-greenland-pm>
- Christou, J. (2014). *Joint Declaration: final version as agreed between the two leaders*. Cyprus Mail. <https://archive.cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/11/joint-declaration-final-version-as-agreed-between-the-two-leaders/>
- Cole, D. (2026). *US 'has no right' to take over Greenland, Danish PM says after renewed Trump threats*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/04/greenland-denmark-us-venezuela-nicolas-maduro-donald-trump>
- Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress. (1975). *Greece and Turkey, some military implications related to NATO and the Middle East: prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off..
- Damiras, V. (2011). *Greece defence policy 1974-1981: An era of great dilemmas*. Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS). <https://rieas.gr/researchareas/editorial/1459-greece-defense-policy-1974-1981-an-era-of-great-dilemmas>
- Danopoulos, C. P. (1988). *Regional security organizations and national interests: Analyzing the NATO-Greek relationship*. San Jose State University. https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/pols_pub/11/
- Dodd, C. (2010). *The history and politics of the Cyprus conflict*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Durmaz, M. (2014). *The U.S. arms embargo of 1975-1978 and its effects on the development of the Turkish defence industry* (Master's thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
- Erickson, E. J., and Uyar, M. (2020). *Phase Line Attila: The amphibious campaign for Cyprus, 1974*. Marine Corps University Press.
- Ford, G. R., Kissinger, H. A., Luns, J. and NATO Ambassadors. (1975). *Memoranda of conversation*. U.S. National Archives.
- Grady, B. C. (2002). Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: Past, present, and uncertain future. *Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law*, 31(1), 167-198.
- Gronholt-Pedersen, J. (2026). *European leaders rally behind Greenland in face of renewed US threat*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/only-greenland-denmark-can-decide-their-future-european-leaders-say-joint-2026-01-06/>
- Guldogan, D. (2026). *Senior Trump aide says no country would fight US over Greenland's future*. Anadolu Agency. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/senior-trump-aide-says-no-country-would-fight-us-over-greenland-s-future/3790832>
- Güney, A. N. (2004). The USA's role in mediating the Cyprus conflict: A story of success or failure? *Security Dialogue*, 35(1), 27-42. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010604042534>
- Hart, P. T. (1990). *Two NATO allies at the threshold of war: Cyprus, a firsthand account of crisis management, 1965-1968*. Duke University Press.

- Hitchens, C. (2012). *The trial of Henry Kissinger*. Twelve.
- Iwanami, Y. (2024). Asymmetric burden-sharing and the restraining and deterrence effects of alliances. *Journal of Peace Research*, 61(5), 711–725. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231158146>
- Jacobsen, M., Wæver, O. & Gad, U. P. (Eds.). (2024). *Greenland in Arctic security: (De) securitization dynamics under climatic thaw and geopolitical freeze*. University of Michigan Press. <https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12958623>
- Jolly, S. (2025). *Alliances, aggression, and regional cooperation: An Arctic case study on small state alliance formation* (Master's thesis), Harvard University Division of Continuing Education.
- Knight, C. (2026). *Why does Donald Trump want Greenland? Here's what to know*. National Post. <https://nationalpost.com/news/world/why-does-donald-trump-want-greenland-heres-what-to-know>
- Konya, R. (2026). *Hungary will not leave the EU, it will fall apart on its own, Orbán says*. Euronews. <https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/06/hungary-will-not-leave-the-eu-it-will-fall-apart-on-its-own-orban-said>
- Kotoulas, I. E. (2020). Greece as a NATO member in the historical *longue durée*. *Bezpieczeństwo i Obroność - The Bellona Quarterly*, 2020(4), 83–98. <https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6173>
- Lampas, N. & Filis, C. (2023). NATO's strategic concept: Implications for Greece and Türkiye. *Security and Defence Quarterly*, 44(4), 38–54. <https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/174813>
- Lilly, L. (2026). *Strengthening NATO Article Five: Mutual security assurances* (ODUMUNC 2026 Issue Brief). Old Dominion University Model United Nations Society.
- Lindley, D. (2007). Historical, tactical, and strategic lessons from the partition of Cyprus. *International Studies Perspectives*, 8(3), 224–241. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3577.2007.00269.x>
- Little, T., Foeger, L. & Bose, N. (2025, March 30). *Vance accuses Denmark of not keeping Greenland safe from Russia, China*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-vice-president-vance-visit-greenland-island-trump-wants-control-2025-03-28/>
- Mann, S. (2001). *The Greek-Turkish dispute in the Aegean Sea: Its ramifications for NATO and the prospects for resolution* (Master's thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
- Moulson, G. (2025). *Trump's envoy appointment sparks new tension with leaders of Greenland and Denmark*. PBS NewsHour. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/trumps-envoy-appointment-sparks-new-tension-with-leaders-of-greenland-and-denmark>
- Naalakkersuisut / Government of Greenland. (2024). *Greenland in the world: Nothing about us without us - Greenland's foreign, security and defence policy 2024-2033: An Arctic strategy* (P. Cohen, Trans.). Ministry for Statehood and Foreign Affairs.

- NATO. (2025). *Collective defence and Article 5*. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. <https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/collective-defence-and-article-5>
- O'Malley, B. & Craig, I. (2001). *The Cyprus conspiracy: America, espionage and the Turkish invasion*. I.B. Tauris.
- Richter, H. A. (2010). *A concise history of modern Cyprus: 1878-2009*. Harrassowitz Verlag.
- Rossides, E. T. (1991). Cyprus and the rule of law. *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce*, 17(1), Article 3. <https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol17/iss1/3/>
- Smiljanić, D. (2025). The Evolution of NATO: Strategic Adaptation in a Changing Security Landscape. *Strategos*, 9(1), 55-82.
- Smith-Windsor, B. A. (2013). *NATO's maritime strategy and the Libya crisis as seen from the sea*. *Research Paper*, 90(1), NATO Defence College, 1-12.
- Spence, J. & Hanlon, E. (2025). *The geopolitical significance of Greenland*. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. <https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/explainer-geopolitical-significance-greenland>
- Stone, M. & Mason, J. (2025). *Trump selects \$175 billion Golden Dome defence shield design, appoints leader*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-make-golden-dome-announcement-tuesday-us-official-says-2025-05-20/>
- Thorsson, E. (2026). *Danish PM says U.S. attack on Greenland would be end of NATO*. ArcticToday. <https://www.arctictoday.com/danish-pm-says-u-s-attack-on-greenland-would-be-end-of-nato/>
- Zierler, D., Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. (1974a). *Memorandum of conversation, President Ford; Dr. Henry A. Kissinger; Major General Brent Scowcroft* (Document 129). In *Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXX: Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976*. U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Zierler, D., Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. (1974b). *Telegram from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State* (Document 16). In *Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXX: Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976*. U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Zierler, D., Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. (1980). *Discussion paper prepared for a Policy Review Committee meeting on Greek reintegration* (Document 199). In *Foreign relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XXI: Cyprus; Turkey; Greece*. U.S. Government Printing Office.

Sporovi unutar NATO-a: Američko-danske tenzije oko Grenlanda i paralela s ciparskim slučajem iz 1974.

SAŽETAK

Ovaj rad istražuje eskalirajuću geopolitičku krizu između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Kraljevine Danske oko statusa Grenlanda tijekom razdoblja 2025.-2026. Potaknuta inicijativom proturaketne obrane „Golden Dome“ i globalnom utrkom za kritičnim mineralima, trenutna američka administracija prešla je s tradicionalne izgradnje savezništva na stav strateške asertivnosti, uključujući impliciranu nužnost aneksije Grenlanda. Analiza naglašava kako ovo unutar-savezničko predatorstvo izaziva temeljnu pretpostavku NATO-vog Članka 5 i međunarodnog poretka utemeljenog na pravilima. Kako bi se procijenio potencijal za rješenje, rad povlači povijesnu paralelu s ciparskom krizom iz 1974. između Grčke i Turske, koja je pokazala institucionalnu paralizu NATO-a i nesposobnost posredovanja u teritorijalnim sporovima između vlastitih članica. Izvješće suprotstavlja dansku doktrinu “Everything stops” i grenlandsku neovisnu arktičku strategiju s “hedging” odgovorom glavnog tajnika NATO-a Marka Ruttea. U konačnici, grenlandska kriza predstavljena je kao definitivan test identiteta NATO-a, hoće li savez ostati zajednica temeljena na vrijednostima ili se pretvorio u pragmatični sigurnosni aranžman u kojem je suverenitet manjih država sporedan u odnosu na strateške interese vodeće sile.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: Grenland, NATO, Cipar, Članak 5, Odnosi EU-SAD