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The Modern is Not Yet

Latour and the Concept of Modernity

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Summary

In 1991, French philosopher Bruno Latour published his work titled, We Have Never Been Modern, and in 1993 it was translated into English. Latour defined herein the concept of modernity and characterized it by dichotomy. According to Latour, the dichotomic narratives and divisions such as nature versus society, human versus non–human, and scientific versus non–scientific are not actual but rather illusory. By claiming such narratives to be illusory, Latour concludes that humanity as a collective has never achieved modernity. Regardless of whether Latour's claim is valid or not, it is very meaningful, not only because it is a bold statement, but also because a critical and thorough examination of his claim will yield further intellectual findings, while opening more possibilities for potential questions and investigation. By examining Latour's We Have Never Been Modern, the author argues that the origin of Latour's project is rooted in his perception of crises, and that such perception leads Latour to a positionality of neutrality.

Keywords: *history; Latour; neutrality; modernity; postmodernity*

Introduction

In his book titled, *We Have Never Been Modern* the author Bruno Latour has made a bold argument, as already indicated in the title, namely, that we have never been modern. If Latour's argument succeeds, then this would indeed be a very disruptive theory, not limited only to the fields of anthropology or philosophy, but its impact would also be extended to all fields of study, including natural science and even some aspects of our real lives. However, just like any potentially meaningful or disruptive theory, Latour's claim that we have never been modern shall be a subject for discussion and investigation. To better understand and interpret Latour's claim, while viewing it under a critical lens, the

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author shall argue that Latour asserts that "we have never been modern" because he perceives a number of crises rooted in modernity, and his perception of such crises leads him to the positionality of neutrality, which offers a broader and more up–to–date perspective of viewing the world, even though it may be questionable and it renders Latour's argument indecisive.

1. Latour's Insecurity

1.1. Latour's sense of crisis and the problem of modernity

Philosophical problems regarding modernity have been vehemently discussed, both inside and outside the academia. In the opening sentence of Jean Baudrillard's classic piece titled, *Modernity* the author claims that »Modernity is neither a sociological concept, nor a political concept, nor exactly a historical concept. It is a characteristic mode of civilization, which opposes itself to tradition, that is to say, to all other anterior or traditional cultures« (Baudrillard, 1987, 63). Latour, who shares a similar understanding of modernity with Baudrillard, wrote: »We cannot return to the past, to tradition, to repetition, because these great immobile domains are the inverted image of the earth that is no longer promised to us today: progress, permanent revolution, modernization, forward flight« (Latour, 1993, 76).

To better understand and critically examine Latour's project, it is important to discern why he has stated that we have never been modern. Throughout Latour's project, there is always a sense of insecurity which haunts and endures, and he was quite straightforward and clear about this, as the abovementioned quote indicates: the gateway of return to the past is no longer avaiblable. The opening chapter of *We Have Never Been Modern* is an enumeration of crises and even the title itself of this chapter is *Crisis*. Latour argued and listed a series of crises that range from the meltdown of Antarctica to the debate over contraception. For Latour, the rise of such crises can all be attributed to modernity, as Asdal, Brenna, and Moser conclude: »perhaps we have never been modern, as Latour asserts in his book of the same title. The boundaries between science and society, the technical and the social, have never been absolute« (Asdal et al., 2007, 8). For Latour, the definition of modernity arises from the dichotomy of present and past, and such a definition could be extended to other sets of dichotomies as well.

Despite the fact that the crises takes a multiple variety of shapes, all crises proposed by Latour actually have one origin, and that is the malfunction of the current theory. Latour believed that current theories are inadequate to explain the interconnectedness of different phenomena because their pursuit of modernity and "purification", as he put it, creates two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand and of non–humans on the other (Latour, 1993, 10). »The shaft is broken: on the left, they have put knowledge of things; on the right, power and human politics« (Latour, 1993, 3).

1.2. The logic of purification and its consequences

For Latour, the broken shaft symbolizes an isolated, static, and one–sided view which is prevalent in current theories but is also inadequate to explain the contemporary world. Such a view is indeed detrimental and insufficient, however, more importantly we must ask whether it is really rooted in the pursuit of modernity, as Latour claimed.

As Freek pointed out, in Latourean literature »modernist purification creates both human and non–human autonomy by separating the two into distinct ontological zones and increasing the distance between them« (Freed, 2005, 101). In Latour's entire project, he has associated modernity with purification, and purification is the ultimate demon that makes a human being's view more and more isolated, static, and one–sided. However, Latour's association between modernity and purification is highly questionable.

Considering his actor–network theory, which Latour further elaborated in his later work titled, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor–Network–Theory*, Latour presented the idea that purification is a manifestation of the pursuit of modernity, and he used his actor–network theory to criticize both purification and the pursuit of modernity at the same time. However, Latour's association between these two concepts is unclear, and even a little circular: he only associated them theoretically but did not provide a real basis from a practical perspective. In other words, Latour only explained why the shaft is broken in theory, but did not explain why it is actually broken.

In examining the breakage of the shaft from a historical perspective, one might conclude that the process of purification does not serve the purpose of pursuing modernity, but rather is primordial. When considering the anthropological perspective, we can say that humans started to artificially create distinctions between different things from the commencement of the division of labour, as pointed out by Phillipe Descola (2014). Or even more radically, such purification and the establishing of distinctions started with the emergence of consciousness of the self and intersubjectivity. Therefore, in this sense, purification is not solely attributed to modernity as it occurs in premodern societies as well. Latour is indeed right to claim that we have never been modern, but what he neglected to say is that »we have always been premodern« and »we have always been becoming modern«.

1.3. The critique of critical reason and Marxist residues

Latour argued that the crisis of the critical stance is rooted in the inner conflicts among these three divisions as he wrote that »each of these forms of criticism is powerful in itself but impossible to combine with the other two« (Latour, 1993, 6), and »the critique of each group is feeding on the weakness of the other two«. Also, the crisis rooted in these inner conflicts would make the critical stance less constructive.

Latour's view on the critical stance is significant not only because his critique is accurate in particular, but also because his critique serves his broader argument

of »we have never been modern« within the bigger picture. As mentioned above, Latour argued that the critical stance consists in a tripartite division; however, he did not give his readers a clear demonstration as to how this tripartite division is made. It almost seems that the distinctions among these three groups of the critical stance are determined by Latour arbitrarily and artificially. If this is the case, then his categorization and separation of the critical stance is a manifestation of modernity.

If Latour's criticism of the critical stance is valid, it would only prove that the critical stance is constructive and significant; furthermore, if this is the case, the constructiveness and significance of the critical stance would not be about the confirmation of the critical stance, but rather about the negation of it. Therefore, it is fair to say that Latour could not totally dismiss the critical stance, but rather built his theory on the negation or critique of the same. It seems as though Latour's critique of the critical stance is merely another variation of the critical stance.

Another school of philosophy that Latour explicitly criticized in *We Have Never Been Modern* is Marxism. In the section *1989: The Year of Miracles*, Latour began his criticism of Marxism from a historical and empirical approach. Marxism's influence is tremendous as it exerts an influence in both the fields of academia and actual political entities.

Because of Marxism's tremendous influence, and also because the troubles caused by its malfunction exploded in 1989, there is likely a sense of historical urgency caused by this drastic social and political change which is haunting the field of academia and challenging all existing social theories.

Meanwhile, more and more new and previously unsolvable problems began to emerge. Latour wrote that »the former socialist societies think they can solve both their problems by imitating the West; the West thinks it has escaped both problems and believes it has lessons for others even as it leaves the Earth and its people to die« (Latour, 1993, 9). For Latour, after the year 1989, the world appears to be entering a checkmate situation, in that both the former socialist societies and the West are losing, even though one confessed its failure while the other did not.

1.4. Latour's response to the collapse of dualism

Latour proposed his theory and statement most likely because of the situation in which, after 1989, the majority of Marxist nation–states had fallen. The decline and malfunction of Marxism is one of the most direct reasons that leads Latour to conclude that »we have never been modern«. In Latourean literature, modernity is characterized by the establishing of dichotomies, such as culture versus nature or the scientific versus the non–scientific etc., and it is also characterized by the pursuit of purification and separation. These dichotomies such as Latour described are really obvious in Marxism because of its dialectical foundation.

The entire project of Marxism is built upon such dichotomies as Latour observed: »Marxism made it possible to retain the portion of truth belonging to the natural and social sciences« (Latour, 1993, 36). It was due to dichotomies, or thesis versus antithesis in Marxist or Hegelian terminologies, that Marxism could

remain standing and continue to develop. From this perspective, Latour's claim that we have never been modern can be interpreted as meaning that we have never got past dialectics.

One of the essential distinctions or sets of dichotomies that is unshakable and is the absolute foundation of Marxist social theory is the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie. This dichotomy is the core of Marxist social theory, but for Latour, it probably is a result of the pursuit after modernity because it artificially sets up the distinction and seeks purification and separation. If this is the case, then Latour's concerns and frustrations regarding the pursuit of modernity will also apply to Marxism.

Furthermore, the use of dialectics can be traced to the ancient period, even all the way back to the pre–Socratic period, and Heraclitus could be its representative. Therefore, there can be two possibilities, and either one would somehow shake the foundation of and undermine Latour's theory. The first possibility is that Latour's definition of modernity is incorrect, or at least revisable: whether or not modernity is defined by the pursuit of purification or separation shall be an inconclusive question, instead of a inferred definition. The second possibility derives from the premise of Latour's definition of modernity as being acceptable. If so, it is fair to conclude that people started to pursue modernity since ancient times, at least since as early as the age of Heraclitus.

However, this possibility seems quite counterintuitive. Even though the age of modernity cannot be defined by an exact year, people still have a vague and ambiguous sense of the time period, which means that people can roughly point out the age of modernity on the spectrum of time. Obviously, to say that the pursuit of modernity might have started from the pre–Socratic period would be much too early.

1.5. Another problem: The crisis of science

Another type of crisis is related to the validity of science. In an earlier work, *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society*, Latour's main argument is his conclusion that scientific facts and technological objects are not discovered or revealed but rather constructed through complex social processes. As Koch further elaborated: »The authority of the scientific report is identical to Hobbes's Leviathan; the emergence of scientific objectivity is not merely contemporaneous with that of the absolutist state, it is the absolutist state« (Koch, 1995, 320). Following this train of thought, Latour, in this project, brings up a crisis of science that is rooted in modernity and argues that science in a modern sense has never been achieved because there always exist some non–scientific elements that could influence science at least to a certain degree.

Meanwhile, Latour also criticized the pursuit of purification rooted in modernity which could ultimately abandon the non–scientific elements in the development of science as he attacked and presented the world of modernity as »a world in which the representation of things through the intermediary of the laboratory is forever dissociated from the representation of citizens through the intermediary of the social contract« (Latour, 1993, 27).

For Latour, the origin of the crises in science is clear: it is modernity. To prove that the crises rooted in modernity are truly crises, Latour dedicated an entire subchapter to demonstrate the invincibility of the moderns. For Latour, moderns are »unquestionable, they are, they have been, they have almost been, they have believed they were, invincible« (Latour, 1993, 39).

Latour is indeed correct in making the aforementioned statements, as non–scientific elements are indeed intertwined with science. However, a better question to ask is whether science, in the modern sense, can be achieved regardless of whether or not it is invincible. The answer is likely to be negative because purification is a never–ending process rather than being a solid and concrete goal.

1.6. The moral of the story

Latour's concerns and worries might be valid. Furthermore, Latour's advocating the holistic perspective is not only valid, but also valuable. Still, Latour is also clear in saying that purification is actually ultimately unattainable since, according to his actor–network theory, Latour argued that knowledge is only possible through networks. He wrote in *An Inquiry Into Modes Of Existence* as follows: »The notion of the network can now be made a little more specific: it designates a series of associations« (Latour, 2013, 33). Thus, for Latour, in the case of science, scientific knowledge would not exist independently without the effects of non–scientific elements.

So, it is fair to conclude that if Latour's actor–network theory stands, then he is presenting a concern (i.e., that purification associated with modernity in this case) which would never actually occur. Ultimately, Latour's concerns and frustrations with purification seem rather unnecessary.

Latour's presentation of his frustration and concern for purification in the matter of science cannot simply be reduced to a groundless worry. It is not that Latour wanted to be the God of the Old Testament and thus attempt to solidify his authority by making the general public fear the crises; rather, Latour's narration of the crises of science caused by the pursuit of purification is only the smaller crisis.

As Roland Barthes famously said: »The birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the author« (Barthes, 1967). The bigger crisis is Latour's book itself, or in other words, the fact that Latour is able to make comments on the field of science, specifically natural science, is already a manifestation of the fact that we have never been modern, for it is important to remember that Latour is not a scientist. Furthermore, this shows precisely that science is not only about science, but that it also exerts and absorbs influences from and to non–scientific elements, such as philosophers or anthropologists like Latour.

This is the bigger crisis as Latour, in his book, was trying to point out; however, the act of pointing out the crisis *per se* is a manifestation of the crisis itself. In conclusion, the crisis would not be resolved or mitigated if the action of pointing out the crisis in itself is part of the crisis. Because of this, Latour could not, as probably no one else could, escape the problem of modernity, and in this sense, he has been indecisive.

2. The Origin of Latourean Insecurity

2.1. The inner conflict in Latour's diagnosis of the crisis

It is significant to note that Latour traces the underlying tension to a fundamental difficulty in classification. He wrote: »My friends and I have been studying these strange situations that the intellectual culture in which we live does not know how to categorize« (Latour, 1993, 3). Alongside the difficulty of categorization, the lack of terminology is also an accomplice to the crises, according to Latour.

Moreover, Latour also believes that the authority and validity of science is being challenged because the distinctions between the scientific and the non–scientific are set up artificially. On the surface level, it is possible that both of these two claims are true and coherent. There seems nothing contradictory in claiming that the difficulty of categorization and the lack of terminology prevail, while claiming that the distinctions between the scientific and the non–scientific are set up artificially. Just as in everyday language, for example, it is coherent to artificially and arbitrarily set up distinctions between physics, which is scientific, and witchcraft, which is non–scientific, while claiming at the same time that such distinctions are imperfect because of the difficulty of categorization and the lack of better terminology.

However, between these two claims made by Latour, there is an unsolvable inner conflict that might eventually lead to the indecisiveness of Latour's project, and the crux of this inner conflict lies in the word *artificiality*. Thus, claiming something is artificial must entail knowledge of what is not artificial. What is artificial and what is not artificial is a dichotomy: if one could categorize and coin the term for one item in the pair, one would have knowledge of the other item in the pair. In this case, Latour is able to categorize and has a term to describe what artificiality is. Therefore, by claiming the distinction to be artificial, there is no actual difficulty of categorization nor a lack of terminology for Latour.

One might counter–argue that claiming the distinction as being artificial is not contrary to the difficulty of categorization and the lack of terminology since the categorization and terms used might not be perfect and accurate, even though they exist. However, in describing the distinction, the categorization and the term used must be accurate and perfect.

Otherwise, there will be a short circuit in semantics that would further invalidate Latour's claim. Latour posed the problem of the difficulty of categorization. However, it is important to note that this difficulty will never be a problem in describing distinctions because the words "categorization" and "distinction" are synonymous. Latour, on the one hand, claims that moderns are experiencing the difficulty of categorization, while, on the other hand, claiming that moderns are moderns just because of these distinctions. If Latour's claim stands, then categorization would just function as well as or as badly as the distinctions.

2.2. The pragmatic value of Latour's project

By proposing such a statement, Latour offered two approaches to solving the problem. One way of solving the issue of the difficulty of categorization and lack of terminology is Latour's project. Latour proposed that when facing such issues, we shall be seeking the interconnections between various phenomena.

Another way is to invent more and more categories and new terms. This solution seems more naturalistic than Latour's solution; however, this solution is also much more detrimental than Latour's solution. By inventing more and more categories and new terms, more and more chaos will be created in the realm of semiotics, and thus intersubjectivity will be undermined. As a consequence, mutual communications will be harder and harder, less and less agreement will be achieved, thus further destroying the unity of humanity. In comparing these two options of facing the problems of categorization and lack of terminology, Latour's proposal is the less detrimental.

The meaningfulness of Latour's solution does not rest upon its accuracy in the reflection of reality, but rather on the elimination of the worse possibility, even though Latour's solution might only be meaningful on the theoretical level. In conclusion, Latour's project shall be credited for protecting intersubjectivity, even though the dichotomy of subject versus object might be criticized by him as it is rooted in the pursuit of modernity.

2.3. Symmetrical anthropology: A reckless innovation?

Bloor concluded that »in Latour's eyes the sociology of knowledge has been a failure, and it will continue to fail unless it adopts an entirely new approach which will qualitatively change its character« (Bloor, 1999, 81). In Latour's dicussion on the sociology of knowledge, he briefly mentioned the Edinburgh School or the sociology of scientific knowledge, and he pointed out the limitation of the Edinburgh School as follows: »If all questions of epistemology are questions of social order, that is because, when all is said and done, the social context contains as one of its subsets the definition of what counts as good science« (Latour, 1993, 25). Despite Latour's pointing out the limitation of the Edinburgh School, his project and the Edinburgh School share quite a few similarities. The Edinburgh School aims to point out the social nature of science itself by setting up the dichotomy of the social and the scientific. In the Edinburgh School narration, sociology and science are almost in competition with each other and would fight for the right to define what knowledge is.

To solve this dichotomy or competition, the Edinburgh School took the side of sociology and would make sociology "engulf" and "devour" science.

The aim of Latour's project is inherently different from that of the Edinburgh School, as »Latour defends a non–objectivist sociology which refrains from defining a domain called 'the social' and which describes the associations through which various outcomes are assembled« (Kale–Lostuvali, 2016, 274). However, Latour accepted the dichotomy of the social and the scientific and built a majo-

rity part of his project based on this dichotomy, even though he held a critical position on the dichotomy.

Unlike the Edinburgh School which took the side of sociology, Latour held a compromising position on this issue. Latour intended to mediate the social and the scientific, and his possible solution is symmetrical anthropology. However, whether symmetrical anthropology is a viable solution or not is another question.

Latour's symmetrical anthropology advocates for equal treatment of humans and non–human actors. He borrowed Michael Callon's idea in citing that »the anthropologist has to position himself at the median point where he can follow the attribution of both non–human and human properties« (Latour, 1993, 95). From this summary of symmetrical anthropology, one could conclude that symmetrical anthropology lacks a potential third party which can capture and mediate current dichotomies; it is more like a shift in point of view, instead of a truly theoretical innovation.

In other words, symmetrical anthropology solves the conflicts of dichotomies by denying the conflicts. And this, probably, is one of the most innovative and adventurous features of Latour's project. Just because this feature is innovative and adventurous, even somehow reckless, its validity is a subject worthy of investigation.

2.4. The dialectical consequences and Latour's political reluctance

In addition, because Latour's symmetrical anthropology advocates the equal treatment of human and non–human actors, it is bound to have some concerns in regard to humanism. Latour describes humanism as follows: »Such a superiority, such an originality, made the moderns think they were free from the ultimate restrictions that might limit their expansion« (Latour, 1993, 38). Latour took a critical stance towards humanism, and for Latour, humanism is a component of modernity, therefore it would lead to purification and separation. Thus, in the opinion of Latour, humanism will ultimately fail.

Latour's view on humanism is fixed; however, if one regards Latour's view on humanism from the other side, Latour will be in a Euthyphro dilemma. Is it because there is a humanism crisis that Latour proposed his symmetrical anthropology, or is it because Latour proposed his symmetrical anthropology that there is a crisis of humanism? Even though the former is not completely invalid, the latter is likely to be the case because the advocacy of abandoning human vs non–human dichotomy requires human actors.

Among all of the network actors, humans are the only ones that could reflect and question their own legitimacy, and then express their doubts and concerns. Therefore, the fact that there exists an advocacy for abandoning the human versus the non–human dichotomy is a manifestation of human exceptionalism. If the latter is the case, then it shows that the humanism crisis can be an example of Latour's project not only trying to solve the existing crisis but also of initiating further crises.

If one takes a progressive stance, having more crises might not necessarily be a bad thing because, as Marx described in the Afterword to the second German edition of *Das Kapital*, dialectics »includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up« (Marx, 1996). If Marx's quote makes a point, then the multiple crises initiated by Latour's project would not only be reasonable and meaningful but also constructive because, according to dialectics, such forthcoming crises are inevitable. From certain perspectives, it is fair to say that Latour somehow predicted such crises.

Furthermore according to dialectics, and philosophically speaking, opportunities and crises could be viewed as a pair of thesis and antithesis: they contain each other and will eventually and necessarily turn into each other. In his project, Latour has no explicit attachment to dialectics, but using dialectics to interpret Latour would yield some fruitful results. Also, in regard to dialectics, it is fair to say that the significance of Latour's project also lies in what he did not explicitly write, and this would make the interpretation of his project equally meaningful.

3. Latour's Outlet: Neutrality

3.1. Neutrality as a methodological principle and a political stance

One of the intrinsic and defining characteristics of Latour's project is that Latour, in *We Have Never Been Modern*, is constantly insinuating with a sense of neutrality, that a methodological principle thus can be further extended to a political stance. As concluded by Laurent, Latour »by 'following the actors' and refusing to involve broad categories such as 'power' or 'capitalism', would deny himself the ability to ever identify the major determinants that are the hallmark of politics« (Laurent, 2024, 23).

In this book, Latour does not associate himself with any specific school of philosophy but rather examines or criticizes them in an analytic fashion. Even in his analysis of the issue of modernity, Latour refused to adopt any positionality: he does not describe himself either as a modernist, postmodernist, or antimodernist in the Latourean sense. For example, when Latour describes modernity, he states: »When the word 'modern', 'modernization', or 'modernity' appears, we are defining, by contrast, an archaic and stable past« (Latour, 1993, 10).

He only describes modernity as an archaic and stable past but does not explicitly say whether we shall embrace or reject it. This is also the case for premodernity and postmodernity according to Latour: »I shall have to sort out the premoderns, the moderns, and even the postmoderns in order to distinguish between their durable characteristics and their lethal ones« (Latour, 1993, 12). From this phrase, Latour showed his analytic, instead of judgmental or partisan, positionality once again. Latour pointed out that some of the characteristics are durable while some others are lethal, but again, he did not advocate embracing or rejecting them but rather hid his stance behind the curtain once again.

3.2. Strengths and limitations of Latour's neutral position

The neutrality of this project is rooted in the catchphrase »we have never been modern«. By means of this claim, Latour presented modernity as something that is potential and forthcoming instead of something concrete and factual. By boldly and arguably claiming that we have never been modern, Latour made it harder to take a side or to judge the issue of modernity because, as mentioned above, modernity is something potential rather than factual for Latour, and it is always more difficult to make a judgment about something that is potential. Thus, it leads to the question of Latour's attitude and intention in this project.

Latour's neutral positionality might always be a good subject to criticize, even though this criticism is not valid and would not function in Latour's system of philosophy since, for Latour, this would also be a manifestation of modernity which would place Latour in an undefeatable or unfalsifiable position. The neutrality of Latour's project might be attributed to factors outside of the text. Latour published this book in 1993, which is right after the end of the Cold War and at a time when the West was in its heyday.

Conclusion

By means of a critical examination of Latour's project and claim, one could trace the foundation of Latour's project to his worries and concerns about the crises caused by modernity. With such a mindset, Latour claims »we have never been modern«, meanwhile offering a calm reflection or detachment in academia. Besides, the significance of Latour's project also lies in its endeavor to go beyond dichotomous or modernistic thinking and to present a more indecisive stand when facing crises, which makes Latour's project safe but less engaging in facing reality. In addition, considering its date of composition and publication, Latour's project was quite novel. However, more than thirty years later, some good questions to think about could be the following: is Latour's project still relevant and have we still never been modern?

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Moderna još nije nastala: Latour i pojam moderniteta

*Hexiong Yang**

Sažetak

Godine 1991. francuski filozof Bruno Latour objavio je djelo *We Have Never Been Modern* (“Nikada nismo bili moderni”), koje je prevedeno na engleski jezik 1993. godine. U tom djelu Latour je definirao pojam moderniteta te ga je opisao dihotomijom. Prema Latouru dihotomijski narativi i podjele poput priroda–društvo, ljudsko–neljudsko i znanstveno–neznanstveno nisu stvarne, nego iluzorne. Tvrdeći da su takvi narativi iluzorni, Latour zaključuje da čovječanstvo kao kolektiv nikada nije postignulo modernitet. Bez obzira na to je li Latourova tvrdnja valjana ili nije, ona je bitna ne samo zato što je smiona, nego zato što je kritičko i temeljito ispitivanje te tvrdnje donijelo daljnja intelektualna otkrića, a istovremeno su se otvarale mogućnosti za potencijalna pitanja i istraživanja. Proučavanjem Latourove knjige *We Have Never Been Modern*, autor ovoga rada je ustvrdio da je podrijetlo Latourova projekta utemeljeno u percepciji krize i da takva percepcija dovodi Latoura u poziciju neutralnosti.

Ključne riječi: *povijest; Latour; neutralnost; moderna; postmoderna*

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