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The Black Sea Area between *Hinterland* and History: Past and Present*

The Extended Black Sea Area and the Three Seas Initiative have come to represent key geopolitical concepts particularly over the past decade. At the same time, the use of history for contemporary political purposes has increased, especially following the Russian invasion of the Crimean Peninsula (2014). The present paper surveys the potential connections between the aforementioned concepts and historical events used to legitimize present-day political actions. This survey also seeks to examine the relationship between crisis and a return to history (to the “glory days of old”), during the first two decades of the 21st century.

Prone to controversy and to an almost inherent politicization, the Three Seas[1] concept encompasses three seas of different characteristics, at least in recent decades: “calm waters” (the Adriatic Sea), “windy waters” (the Baltic Sea), and “stormy waters” (the Black Sea).[2] Largely motivated and justified by transports and the transfer of energy resources (most notably through the well-known pipelines), the focus has been concentrated on the waters/seas (as almost autonomous entities) and less on their surroundings.[3] On the one hand, these surrounding regions comprise the

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1 At present, the Three Seas concept largely resembles a Four Sea structure, as the “basis” of the original triangle is pushed onto the Aegean Sea. This expansion remains rather debateable, not only because of historical reasons, but also due to the fact that the Balkan “hinterlands” outside of the European Unity do not form a unity, unless they are viewed as remnants of past empires (most recently the Ottoman one). The topic itself would be worth a special study in relation to, in particular the Black and the Adriatic Seas.

2 Largely rooted in the Polish *Intermarium* concept (1920s – 1930s), the Three Seas Initiative was launched in 2015 by the Presidents of Poland and Croatia. The first three summits were held in Dubrovnik (2016), Warsaw (2017) and Bucharest (2018), a rather telling succession (see also Donald Trump’s 2019 Warsaw speech: FARBER 2017).

3 An otherwise well-known fact must be emphasized. The main companies operating in the field, OMV and MOL, are based in countries (Austria, respectively Hungary) with no direct access to the coast. This stands valid both in the case of the

so-called *Hinterland*(s), studied primarily in the case of the Eastern (i.e., the West Balkans) coastline of the Adriatic Sea.[4] The other surrounding context is provided by history, a fact that became most evident in the northern and north-western Black Sea region after 2014 (i.e., the Crimean expansion of the Russian Federation) and, in particular, after 2022 (i.e., the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation).[5] The past again came to be used to justify the present, in the South as well, since 2016 (after the failed coup d'état in Türkiye),[6] impacting not only the (wider) Black Sea area, but also the entire geopolitical Three Seas concept.[7]

Questions, Aims and Perspectives

The present study surveys the *Hinterland*(s)[8] of the Black Sea between 2004 (that is from the point at which the European Union (EU) reached the western Black Sea coast, following the acceptance/accession of Romania and Bulgaria as members of the Union) and 2014/2016 (that is the events that have caused so much havoc and tragedy in the long-run).[9] The survey foregrounds the role played (or not) by history in political decision-making.[10] By history we mean primarily the medieval and early modern periods because, however uncomfortable this may seem, neither the Armenian genocide[11] nor the *Holodomor*[12] belong to the (officially accepted) "glory days" of the Turkish and Russian state, respectively, with their own brands of soft power,[13] rooted in the days following Byzantium's fall.[14]

A series of questions must be addressed.[15] Only a few examples are listed here. How influential was history prior to the events of 2014 – 2016 (particularly given that memories of World War I were "kept alive" by the use of legitimizing

(Eastern) Adriatic (Croatia) and of the (Western) Black Sea (Bulgaria and Romania). Russian based and operated Lukoil constitutes no exception in relation to the said areas.

4 Considering also the author's later (north-) eastern studies (on Romania, chiefly, and more recently on Russia), see SCHMITT 2001.

5 Ukraine becomes partner of Europe's Three Seas Initiative.

6 E.g., ÇIÇEKOĞLU AND TURAN 2019.

7 YILMAZ AND SEVENCAN 2025. Türkiye too became a partner of the Three Seas Initiative in 2025, almost a decade after its launch.

8 For the shifting meanings and usages of the concept: NEEL 2018.

9 This is also the topic of our PhD thesis: ANASTASE 2026a.

10 From a Romanian perspective, in relation to the Three Seas, see SIMON 2021: 27–46.

11 MÜGE GÖÇEK 2015: 173–202.

12 SNYDER 2010: 21–58.

13 A telling title and subject: NYE JR. 2023.

14 For an overview of these complex issues: STEWART, PARNELL, WHATELY 2022.

15 We have attempted to limit the influence of post-2014 developments on the wording of the questions.

medieval narratives)?[16] When did pragmatic coeval (i.e., recent, and modern) interests discover the usefulness of past events in order to achieve their goals (because it is self-evident that oil and gas are not, in themselves, century-old issues)?[17] Approached from the East (from the Black Sea), such questions are also relevant to the other "components" of the Three Seas structure, as well as for its viability.[18]

Considering the evident complexity of the topics, the structure of the present paper was tailored along the simple, and perhaps simplistic, division represented by the states with (direct) access to the Black Sea.[19] For reasons of clarity, the order of the presentation was adjusted to present-day political circumstances: (1) the Russian Federation and the former republics of the Soviet Union, (2) Türkiye, and (3) the member states of the European Union (Bulgaria and Romania).[20] Given, however, the manifest diversity of the political actors, each state is treated individually, in this listing, in relation to the three "categories", a scholarly rather than a (geo)political choice.[21] This is made particularly clear by the existence of a "fourth category", either voluntarily neglected or deliberately overstated: NATO member states (Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye),[22] which are also found along the shores of the Baltic and the Adriatic Seas.[23]

The Russian Federation

Pre-2014 Russian politics present a puzzle, primarily because of Moscow's actions in the subsequent decade.[24] In particular, the period from 2008 to 2012 and the "diarchy" (i.e., with Vladimir Putin as former president turned prime minister, and Dmitry Medvedev as a nominal president), which poses major

16 E.g., LYNCH 2016.

17 E.g., WILLIAMS 2016: 1–8. The dates of publication have also to be taken into consideration.

18 The main counterexample remains the "Huntington line", drawn through Eastern Europe in the 1990s.

19 For a Romanian perspective see CRENGANIȘ.

20 For instance: SABANADZE AND DALAY 2025.

21 A thorough overview: KING 2005.

22 This in fact returns us to the abovementioned question of the southern side of the Three Seas triangle, for the belongings of the two other sides (in particular of the western one) are/should be rather evident.

23 From our perspective, and with reference to the timespan under scrutiny, the undisputed influence of NATO in the shaping of the Three Seas concept should be revisited following the paths of the unifying global crisis of 2008 (that basically cuts/divides our timespan, 2004 – 2014, into two almost equal halves).

24 The main scholarly challenge is not to employ/to restrain the usage of the vantage point(s) created by post-2014 and especially post-2022 dramatic events and subsequent pertinent analysis. For an "updated perspective", see ANASTASE 2006b.

questions.[25] Reducing the policies of the Russian Federation into a "one- or two-man show", as appealing as it may have been prior to 2014 (it is seemingly more attractive nowadays, after 2014, and after 2022),[26] hindered an understanding of the frequently resolute resistance mounted against the unmistakably revisionist[27] designs promoted by power figures in Moscow.[28] Such policies would have been inconceivable without access to vital resources whose potential long-term value was greater outside of the Russian Federation than within it.[29] Moscow's post-2014 revival of (historical) unifying narratives centred on Kievan Rus', thus looks rather astonishing, given the state's pragmatic and ruthless policies.[30]

Although Moscow had, since the mid-1980s,[31] established one of the leading schools in medieval Black Sea studies, recognized as such internationally,[32] these studies were not "weaponized", unlike research on the Golden Horde,[33] Muscovite Russia's principal imperial inheritance and as its former "yoke", alongside the remnants of the Byzantine Empire.[34] Apparently, more attention was paid to the (extended) *Hinterland*(s) of the Black Sea than to the sea and its coastline (which, in light of the offensive of 2014, might now be interpreted as a diversion).[35] The curious and highly controversial case of the competition between Istanbul and Belgrade (the decisive vote was held in Sofia in August 2011)[36] for the hosting

25 Medvedev–Putin tandemocracy. The "alternative name" is noteworthy.

26 The same applies in fact for Türkiye's reception over the past decades, though, historically speaking, this was not the case, not even under Mehmed II, the conqueror of Constantinople (STAVRIDES 2001: 175–178, 181–183).

27 Alternative wordings would be *Reconquista* or "Build Back Better", from a post-Soviet perspective. Alas, even though the two concepts have little in common with the endeavours of the Russian Federation and of its officials, they must be mentioned in order to facilitate the understanding of the past decades. Their perception became increasingly dependent on social media conveyed data and disinformation.

28 A recent unavoidable reference: DA EMPOLI 2022.

29 ORTTUNG AND OVERLAND 2011.

30 Prior to the 2000s: TOLZ 1998. Post 2022: KLIMENKO 2026.

31 KARPOV 1986.

32 See also the resources and analysis available at Akkerman Fortress Project (AFP). The Ottoman centre at Akkerman is modern-day Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi, formerly known as Romanian Cetatea Albă.

33 See the Kazan based journal, *Golden Horde Review* (still indexed by Clarivate or Scopus) and its attempts to maintain a scientific balance.

34 Still influential MEYENDORFF 1989.

35 The (curious) issue is worth a closer inspection starting with a recent statement (15 June 2026) by Suleiman Mamutov: "The Kremlin's claim that Crimea is Russian rests on a 240-year project to erase the peninsula's indigenous Crimean Tatar population" (the full article published by the Centre for European Policy Analysis, based in Washington DC, is available: MAMUTOV 2026).

36 Istanbul had previously organized the 10th congress in fall 1955 ("Being a Byzantinist in Turkey" Oral History Project: The Past, Present and Future of Byzantine Studies in Turkey). In 2011, Sofia hosted the 22nd congress (the website, http://22byzantinecongress.org/bg/, is currently unavailable).

of the 23rd International Congress for Byzantine Studies (August 2016)[37] should be reviewed from this perspective too. Belgrade narrowly won over Istanbul,[38] which aimed at legitimizing the transfer of the Byzantine legacy (a red line not only for Tsarist Russia, but also for Bismarck's Berlin).[39]

Azerbaijan

Besides Türkiye, Azerbaijan is the only Muslim power in (the greater) Black Sea region, although it does not have direct access to the Black Sea.[40] Its strategic location and its natural resources pushed issues of human rights and democracy into the background, in spite of repeatedly voiced concerns.[41] It is perhaps the clearest example of a state with no access to the Black Sea, but a key component of the extended Black Sea area.[42]

Aware of its "peculiarities" and in control of its resources, Azerbaijan pursued an increasingly determined policy of cultural diplomacy.[43] The fact that most of modern-day Azerbaijan was not part of "historical Russia", but consisted of territories ceded by Iran to Tsarist Russia in the first decades of the 19th century,[44] may have eased this (Muslim) soft power approach, underpinned by firm ties to Moscow.[45] Previously, Azerbaijan had belonged to Safavid Iran, a traditional ally of the West against the Ottoman Porte.[46]

Armenia

Repeatedly faced with a choice between an "international Armenia" and a "national Armenia",[47] Armenia struggled with a historically predominantly hostile

37 23rd International Congress of Byzantine Studies.

38 If organized in Istanbul, the congress would have been held (in late August) in the immediate aftermath of the Turkish coup d'état (mid-July 2016). Alternative histories are both tempting and avoidable.

39 With direct reference to modern Bulgaria and Romania as well, see the studies collected in YAVUZ AND SLUGLETT 2011. The neglected Byzantine Reinsurance Treaty of 1887, concocted by Otto von Bismarck, was not renewed after Wilhelm II forced him out of office (1890).

40 See also STAALESEN 2004.

41 PUDDINGTON 2014: 58–62.

42 E.g. (under the circumstances), see: Azerbaijan is strategically important for Croatia; we continue with energy and economic cooperation.

43 GANBAROVA 2025.

44 ALTSTADT 1992: 15–21.

45 BAIG 2020.

46 MATTHEE 2013.

47 From a historic perspective (and with focus on a key-part of modern-day Romania): OSIPIAN 2012.

neighbourhood and with the challenges posed by the damaging effects of corruption.[48] To add to the complexity (and confusion),[49] like its rival Azerbaijan, Armenia is not a proper Black Sea state, but forms part of its *Hinterland*, drawn into the muddy geopolitical waters of the Black Sea through the pipelines and the resources connecting it with its Christian neighbour, Georgia, and its Muslim neighbours, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye, as well as Iran, which should not be forgotten.[50]

Christianity was and remains Armenia's defining characteristic, due equally to regional history and geography.[51] The exaltation of the glorious pre-Ottoman Middle Ages therefore came almost naturally.[52] Historically speaking, given Western (primarily Roman Papal) anti-Ottoman policies, both Armenia and Georgia would have been eligible for "participating partner" status in the Three Seas Initiative, based on 21st century rather than 15th century needs.[53]

Georgia

The BTC pipeline and the failed Nabucco pipeline projects largely shaped the fate of the country, whose ties to Moscow had never been fully severed, hardly an advantage in an increasingly global and business-oriented world.[54] The developments throughout the past decade make further assessments difficult or, at least, liable to revision.[55]

Russia's invasion of Georgia in support of Russian separatists (August 2008), Moscow's first major foreign military action after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was seen as marking "the official return of history".[56] It certainly hindered Georgia's westward orientation, which, unlike Russia, had seemingly neglected its past in pursuit of its future.[57] The Rose Revolution (2003) had faltered whilst

48 PUDDINGTON 2014: 47–51.

49 Unlike the Ukraine and the Republic of Moldavia (see also below), neither Armenia, nor Georgia were granted status of participating partner states of the Three Seas Initiative.

50 The current geopolitical context compels us to pause comments in the wake of numerous uncertainties.

51 With focus on the place and date of publication: SANJIAN 1969.

52 E.g., STOPKA 2017: 291–317.

53 Yet this does not mean that the 1400s have lost their relevance (see above, first in relation to Russia, the case of the modern legacy on the Byzantine Empire in the early and mid-2010s).

54 GURBANOV 2007. Emphasis should also be placed on the year and on the language of the publication.

55 In this context, we draw attention to the, unverifiable at present, parallel drawn by Viktor Orbán between the Russian invasion of Georgia (2008) and the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956) (reference can be found at Russo-Georgian War).

56 KAGAN 2008.

57 A search using the keywords "history of Georgia" and "pdf" provides some rather interesting results.

attempting to find modern models for a society burdened by corruption, a trademark of the (not too remote) past.[58] After Russia's invasion of Crimea, an event that some had anticipated, turning to identities rooted in the past also became a defensive mechanism in Georgia as well, which had in fact been available since the late 1990s.[59]

Ukraine

The estimates of Ukraine's Black Sea coastline range between approximately 1,600 km to roughly 2,800 km,[60] exceeding of Türkiye's Black Sea coastline of nearly 1,600 km and therefore making the Ukrainian battlefield state the largest Black Sea entity.[61] The prized possession of the coastline is conditional however on the control of its *Hinterland*, undoubtedly diverse and therefore subject to inherent tensions.[62] These tensions were visible, irrespective of (geo)political and cultural options, on the eve of the invasion of Crimea.[63]

In spite of efforts made by historians under the influence of World War I and the fall of Tsarist Russia,[64] Kiev's historical position on the Black Sea is rather difficult to defend, a fact of which Moscow was and is fully aware.[65] As part of the (Baltic) Lithuanian half of the Polish-Lithuanian medieval and early modern political union, future Ukraine – via the dukes in Vilnius – rarely secured and maintained a Black Sea presence, even if a limited one.[66] Weaponizing the past does not always contribute to one's modern (rightful) defence.[67]

Republic of Moldova

Technically, the Republic of Moldova should not be counted among the Black Sea states (after World War II, the southern parts of what had once been medieval

58 WHEATLEY 2005: 1–2, 9–10.

59 EASTMOND 1998.

60 These are the commonly used figures. For potentially more accurate data: STANCHEV, PALAZOV, STANCHEVA, APOSTOLOV 2011. The costal length of the Ukraine would stand at 1,756 km and that of *olim* Turkey would reach precisely 1,700 km.

61 The omission of the Black Sea from among the Ukrainian (-Russian) major issues in the below cited report is conspicuous, considering the overall quality of the report and its "forecasts".

62 LINS DE ALBUQUERQUE AND HEDENSKOG 2015: 18 (an ignored warning).

63 PUDDINGTON 2014: 726–731.

64 In its last edition: HRUSHEVSKY 2017. See additionally PLOKHY 2005.

65 We must emphasize that this fact exceeds the limits of Crimea and covers the entire Ukrainian coastline (from a neutral, pre-2004, perspective, see HOPE 2003).

66 E.g., BARONAS 2024.

67 This might also partially explain the omission of the Black Sea question from the above-cited report.

Moldavia belonged to Ukraine, within and outside of the Soviet Union).[68] Geopolitically, it is impossible to exclude the Republic of Moldova from among the Black Sea states[69] (the republic, as a whole, is in fact pushing down, as some sort of *Hinterland*, on the western corner of Ukraine's Black Sea coastline).[70] The balance between these two extremes was, and remains difficult to maintain, because the urgent problems of the Republic of Moldova were of a much more mundane nature: extreme poverty, widespread corruption and conflicting identities (and loyalties), all in an environment marked by abuse and diversity.[71] It is therefore understandable that, both before and after 2014, the NATO- and EU-supported efforts made by Romania to draw the Republic of Moldova closer to the West did not meet with widespread approval either within or outside the republic.[72]

Coining a Moldavian historical (and ethnic, and even national) identity different from the Romanian one represents a cornerstone of the recent history of the Republic of Moldova, drawing its strength from 18th – 19th century Tsarist projects and imperial rule.[73] In this context, the medieval figure of Stephen III the Great of Moldavia is fundamental and control of Moldavia's Black Sea harbours was of paramount importance to his power.[74] Consequently, contrary to modern appearances, the Republic of Moldova is much more dependent on history and on the Black Sea than first meets the (geo)politician's eye.[75]

Türkiye

Capitalizing on Washington's need for stability, or tranquillity, in the Black Sea region,[76] Türkiye increased its regional influence after 2001.[77] The protracted negotiations (initiated in 2005) for Türkiye's (still Turkey at that time) full mem-

68 HAYNES 2022, in particular chapters 7 to 11.

69 Still, the coastline in question remained underdeveloped, irrespective of modern political authority.

70 We pay more attention to the case of the Republic of Moldova, because, in compassion to the other states in the extended Black Sea area, it less known, despite its geopolitical and, one could add, historical value.

71 PUDDINGTON 2014: 468–471.

72 This echoed "in and on the past" (e.g., CUSCO 2017).

73 E.g., SUVEICĂ 2019.

74 RĂDVAN 2020.

75 In August 2023, Greece became an member of the Three Seas Initiative and the Republic of Moldova was granted participating partner status, identical in fact to the one given to the Ukraine a year earlier (MIHAI 2024).

76 UNGUREANU 2008: 21. For other views of Romania's ministers for foreign affairs (after 2004), see below.

77 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan echoed, rather naturally in effect, in the (extended) Black Sea area.

bership of the European Union eventually worked against its fuller integration into the Black Sea region and encouraged radicalizations, at all ends.[78] Contrary to the course that events would take in the following decade, common interests, despite increasingly divergent values, nevertheless held the Black Sea together as a modern *mare nostrum*, with Türkiye, a member of NATO, in a more dominant position.[79]

In recent years, the concept has been interpreted as an expression of "Ottoman (Turkish) neo-imperialism",[80] the concept of the Black Sea as an "Ottoman Lake" should be understood in relation to the successive adaptations of Atatürk's republic, in "survival mode" since World War II (i.e., throughout the Cold War).[81] Türkiye's present-day post 2016 cultural and historical approach to its former imperial borderlands draws not only on recent political agendas[82] but also on earlier scholarship, including Western scholarship.[83] Unlike Ukraine, the medieval and other history tends to work in Türkiye's favour,[84] given the historically well-documented periods of Ottoman political and military successes.

Bulgaria

Although it was listed among the defeated states at the end of both World Wars,[85] Bulgaria can be viewed as a "success story", both internationally and domestically.[86] Careful not to sever its beneficial ties with the EU and NATO, as well as its long-standing special relations with Germany and Russia,[87] Bulgaria overcame the 2008 crisis that had brought an abrupt end to nearly a decade of sustained economic growth.[88] This resilience was at least partially rooted in the "management of the (glorious) past".[89]

78 BARAN 2025. Or, in more official manner: Türkiye 2025.

79 For some insightful facts and figures: WEZEMAN AND KUIMOVA 2018: 9–11.

80 In spite of some of its rather obvious biases, see YAVUZ 2020.

81 INALCIK 1979.

82 The case of Vladimir Putin's "historical writings" and doctrine is particularly relevant in comparison.

83 E.g., Gilles Veinstein's disputed election to the Collège de France in 1998 (for references see: Gilles Veinstein).

84 Due to the importance of this difference, an extended framework for comparison could prove most useful: BILIARSKY, CRISTEA, OROVEANU 2012.

85 Still useful (though not always "bipartisan") SETON-WATSON 1945.

86 Also from a different perspective: DINEV 2026.

87 The explanations for this ability seemingly run can be connected to the development and the survival of nationalism (e.g., WENSHUANG 2014).

88 For instance, Bulgaria's adoption of the Euro seemed virtually impossible at the beginning of the 2010s.

89 Cf. (since the early 1980s) CHARY 1981.

Bulgaria's (extended) Black Sea façade has long been an object of national pride and international controversy.[90] With Romania to the north and Türkiye to the south, the issue was not only medieval (the Second Bulgarian Tsarate between Wallachia and, then, the Ottoman Empire) but also rather modern (because of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877 – 1878 that led to the creation of the autonomous Principality of Bulgaria and to the independence of the Principality of Romania).[91] Between these periods, however, lay the long era of Ottoman rule over Bulgaria, a lasting source of controversy extending well beyond scholarship.[92]

Romania

The global crisis of 2008 was a major setback in Romania's evolution from a country plagued by shortages and corruption to a functioning member state of the EU and of NATO, memberships in both organizations, which had been facilitated by Romania's access to the Black Sea.[93] Notwithstanding the numerous shortages and challenges of the period, Romania held on to the advantages it had previously acquired, owing also to its strategic location.[94]

From a historical perspective, the relationship between the Romanian polities and the Black Sea was interrupted during the 15th century as the Ottoman Empire conquered the harbours of Wallachia and Moldavia.[95] It was not until the Treaty of Berlin (1878) that a Romanian state regained proper access to the Black Sea.[96] As a result, Romania's relationship with the Black Sea is closer to modern necessities than to medieval nostalgia.[97]

Past and present necessities

Viewed from the vantage point created by the intersection of (geo)politics and history, the extended Black Sea area has a long way to go before becoming a Braude-

[90] E.g., BRĂTIANU 1925. The author, acclaimed history (author of a posthumously published, in 1988, synthesis on the Black Sea) and unsuccessful politician, was favourably inclined towards the Bulgarian point of view.

[91] GLENNY 2001: 138–139.

[92] E.g., BOYKOV 2024.

[93] It could go without saying that the same stands true in case of Bulgaria.

[94] See in this respect, for instance, 2008 Bucharest NATO summit. Because of my time in office as President of the Chamber of Deputies of Romania (19 December 2008 – 3 July 2012), I refrain from other references that might be interpreted as politically biased.

[95] On the impact of this conquests: MAXIM 1999.

[96] IORDACHI 2002.

[97] Its misuses are evident in the case of the (medieval) Black Sea based so-called Moldav(i)an identity.

lian (Mediterranean) masterpiece.[98] Considering its evident diversity, conflictual more often than not, the extended Black Sea area appears to be a rather unstable cornerstone for a Three Seas structure, resembling more a frontier[99], a frontier bridge, within the context of a civilizational *limes*.[100] This, however, does not mean that the Three Seas concept is "invalid" or that the Black Sea is "an independent area". It is a matter of emphasis, either on water, on land, or, preferably, on both, as history too has proven possible, in relation to Church Union,[101] a well-known and highly controversial subject in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.[102] At that time, the stakes were rather similar: common values and willingness to compromise.

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98 For the classic synthesis: BRAUDEL 1949. A modern match: ABULAFIA 2011.

99 A Romanian take on the matter: CHIFU AND TUTUIANU 2017.

100 We follow-up on the words of former Romanian ministers for foreign affairs Cristian Diaconescu and Bogdan Aurescu, with whom we conducted interviews during the researches for our PhD thesis (these and other opinions can be found in ANASTASE 2026a: 190–261).

101 CAMPANA 2019.

102 A classic reference GILL 1959.

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Crnomorsko područje između zaleđa i historije u prošlosti i sadašnjosti

Prošireno crnomorsko područje i Inicijativa triju mora tijekom posljednjeg desetljeća postali su osobito važni geopolitički koncepti. Istodobno je porasla uporaba povijesti u suvremene političke svrhe, naročito nakon ruske invazije na Krimski poluotok 2014. godine. U radu se razmatraju moguće poveznice između navedenih koncepata i povijesnih događaja kojima se nastoje legitimirati suvremeni politički potezi. Također se nastoji ispitati odnos između krize i okretanja povijesti, odnosno „slavnim vremenima prošlosti", tijekom prva dva desetljeća 21. stoljeća.

Ključne riječi: crnomorsko područje, Inicijativa triju mora, geopolitika, povijest, sjećanje, diplomacija, resursi

Key words: Black Sea Area, Three Seas Initiative, geopolitics, history, memory, diplomacy, resources

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
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