THE SOCIAL LEGACY OF COMMUNISM

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The paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, the author presents an immanent criticism of Berliner's definition of the social legacy of communism as a "social contract" of sorts between the Party/State and population, within which he substituted "the civil society" in communist countries. The author warns that in this case there was no exchange of individual rights and freedoms for social privileges, but the "exchange" of legitimacy (in favor of the elite) for social rights and privileges (in favor of the employees). This exchange also included a dual communication between the elite and masses. In the second part, the author indicates that in 1983 he himself described this mechanism of legitimizing the power of the elite, which Berliner too considered the basis of social stability, as the theory on "the coalition between politocracy and physical workers", setting it into a broader context of socialism's abortive economic reforms. In the third part, by means of an analysis of cross-cultural empirical findings, "the communist legacy" in Croatia is said to be much less preserved than in other postcommunist countries. The author suggests an interpretative hypothesis which attempts to explain this "Croatian deviation".

Man needs bread, not freedom.
F. M. Dostoyevsky

PROLOGUE

The anticommunist revolution, which swept away socialist regimes in Europe-Asian countries by the end of the 1980's and at the beginning of the 1990's, was accepted enthusiastically in the West, and euphorically in the East. However, it failed to meet the expectations of both. Instead of a triumphant arrival into the promised land flowing with milk and honey, ensuring a high standard of living, political democracy and respect of human rights, East-Europeans found themselves in the desert of Sinai, in the midst of an in-

definitely long and tedious transition period.[1] A rapid "transition to democracy" was expected in the West. From this perspective, Eastern Europe, according to Ken Jowitt, resembled "a historical blackboard written on with Leninist chalk for forty years, erased (largely) by Soviet actions in 1989, and waiting, tabula rasa, to be written on, now in liberal capitalist script." (Jowitt, 1992, 285-6). The 40-year cultural, political and economic legacy of Leninist rule was thus ignored and treated in the same way Leninists after 1948 treated their own Eastern European inheritance -as a collection of historically outmoded "survivals" bound to lose their cultural, social and psychological significance. According to Jowitt, this was a grave intellectual mistake because, inheritors have always been formed by their cultural and institutional legacies, for better or worse. The Leninist legacy has thus shaped the development and outcomes in Eastern Europe so far, and will continue to do so in the future.

It is not our aim here to analyse the ways in which transition processes and their outcomes have been shaped by the Leninist legacy or, even less, to predict final results which will not be the same in all postcommunist countries.[2] It is the aim of this paper to discuss an important part of the Leninist legacy which is referred to by American experts as the "social legacy of communism," (Millar and Wolchik, 1994) and which has been intensively explored on the empirical level. Special attention will be paid to this legacy in Croatia although empirical data on the subject are scarce.

I. THE "SOCIAL CONTRACT" THEORY

1) An Operational Definition of the "Social Legacy of Communism"

In the introductory chapter entitled "Social legacies and aftermath of communism", Millar and Wolchik discuss social consequences of communism under

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In the same way as ancient Israelites, clamouring against Moses and Aaron, wanted to return from Sinai to Egypt, 20 per cent of East Germans would like to restore the German Democratic Republic. The number of people who looked back to the previous system with nostalgia grew from 10% to 20% in 1995. More than a half have been dissatisfied with the newly created social situation. (The figures are based on a survey carried out by Suddeutsche Zeitung, that was reported about in Vjesnik, 5 January 1996)

2
Eastern socialism is often regarded as a historical aberration in the modernization process, while transition is seen as a return from a side-track of historical development to its main road. It would be more correct, however, to regard it as a stage in the process of social evolution than as a conversion to "true faith" and rectification of mistakes. The process of evolution is a complicated aleatory game with lots of blind alleys and failures. Only those who have managed to adapt can survive. There are no guarantees that all countries which are now in the process of transition will eventually reach the main road of development and continue to exist as modern societies. Some will definitely fall to the level of underdeveloped countries of sub-Saharian Africa, which have no historical chances.

three broad headings: (1) legacies that flow from the tacit social contract between population and the state; (2) legacies that represent values, attitudes and behavior that the state attempted to either instill or extirpate in the subject population, and (3) "the aftermath", that is, the unintended consequences of communist rule. (Millar and Wolchik, 1994, 4).

The book abounds in empirical data on phenomena belonging to the three groups which are related primarily to the former USSR and some of the East-European countries. The Socialist Yugoslavia and its successor states, including Slovenia, have not been included in the research. I shall limit my comments to the first two groups (i. e., social contract and values, attitudes and behavior), leaving out the aftermath-effects as a heterogeneous category in which it is often impossible to distinguish clearly specific consequences of communist rule from similar phenomena which are encountered in non-communist countries.

The "social contract" consisted mainly of social entitlements, such as free education, free health care, cheap housing, job security, the stability of wages and living standards (even though low), social security, old-age pensions, etc; in short, it consisted of social benefits and social rights.

Legacies representing values and collective attitudes comprise the attitudes and values instilled by communist rule, and those which had neither been explicitly proclaimed nor supported by the regime, but which evolved as a result of living in the communist system. Belonging to this group are fundamental norms of the Soviet regime, such as the state ownership of heavy industry, state procurement of medical aid, the dominant role of the state in the production and distribution of agricultural products and the legal supremacy of social rights over the rights of the individual who is charged with criminal offence. Economic attitudes, such as preferences regarding the type of economic systems, attitudes to market economy, private ownership and economic reform should also be listed here, as well as political attitudes to one-party and multiparty system, democratic perspectives and the role of the individual in politics.

We shall not review here a large number of empirical data concerning these issues. However, we would expect a book dealing with the "social dimension" of transition to provide a theoretical sociological elaboration of the social legacy of communism. Such elaboration, however, is completely missing from the introductory chapter, and is provided as late as the final chapter, entitled "Conclusion : Reflections on the Social Legacy of Communism" written by Joseph S. Berliner. This may be due to the authors' agreement concerning the organization of the book. (Millar and Wolchik, 1994, 379-385). We believe that these considerations deserve a special comment here.

2) Theoretical Reflections of Joseph Berliner

Berliner points out correctly that the concept of "legacy" should convey the social world of Soviet communism at the time of its departure from the historical scene. It was due to the "social contract" that the Soviet society managed to maintain a relative stability prior to 1985, before the advent of Gorbachev and glasnost. The "social contract" provided the "social cement" which was crumbling away slowly. It replaced a societal void ("societal-void theory") which had been created by the supression or destruction of traditional institutions of social control, such as the family, the church, the ethnic group and other elements of civil society. These institutions were replaced by a system of controls, imposed by the state and the party, which were based on the social contract between the party and the people." The terms of that contract are familiar. The people surrendered their rights to individual freedom, but they received in return such benefits as job security, free medical care and education for their children, and a spare but adequate level of consumption. It made for a drab way of life, but streets were free of crimes." (Millar and Wolchik, 1994, 380-1) Regardless of the extent to which the "social contract" acted as an adequate substitute for civil society, it suffered from a serious drawback from the viewpoint of party interests. The suppression of organized opposition enabled the party to realize its aims without the fear of protest on the part of interest groups. As a result, however, circumstances deteriorated so much that this finally precipitated the breakdown of the system. Berliner concludes his sociological analysis of the "social contract" with these observations. I would like to continue the analysis along the lines of his globalistic approach. I believe that the "social contract" should be viewed in terms of the global social world of communism, and I shall first analyze it in the former USSR and then in the former Yugoslavia.

3) An Attempt at (Re)interpretation of the "Social Contract"

We shall start from the highly simplified definition of "social contract" given by Berliner. Its key word is "surrender." We must point out, however, that people can surrender only something they have or aspire to have. It is therefore appropriate to ask whether Russian citizens were actually in a position to surrender their right to individual freedom.

According to Soviet historian and dissident Andrey Amalrik, (Amalrik, 1970) individual rights in the Western sense of the word have never existed in the whole history of Russia. All "individual rights" were in the hands of the tsarist or Leninist absolutist state, which could grant them as a privilege or withold them at will. They were not the "natural rights" of the individual. Aspirations to individual rights and freedoms, which are self-evident in American culture, have been completely lacking in Russian culture. To quote Amalrik: "Whether because of its historical traditions or for some other reason, the idea of self-government, of equality before the law and of personal freedom – and the re-

sponsibility that goes with these – are almost completely incomprehensible to the Russian people...To the majority of people the very word 'freedom' is synonymous with 'disorder' or the opportunity to indulge in some kind of antisocial or dangerous activity. As for respecting the rights of an individual as such, the idea simply arises bewilderment. On can respect strength, authority, even intellect or education but it is preposterous to the popular mind that the human person should represent any kind of value. – As a people, we have not benefited from Europe's humanist tradition. In Russian history, man has always been a means and never in any sense an end." (Amalrik, 1970, 33-34)

What could the Russian masses give in return for social benefits? Not the individual rights to freedom, but the social legitimacy to authoritarian rule. That rule could not found its legitimacy upon the traditional authority of the tzar: he was done away with not only as a person, but as the institution as well. According to communist ideology, the authorities and the party could be given legitimacy only by the working class, which in return got what it had asked for, i.e. social entitlements.

Although Berliner fails to see the legitimation function of the contract, he is aware of its consequence, i.e. social stability. The legitimacy of rule as a prerequisite of social stability presupposes some kind of value consensus.[3] This implies that the ruling elite should endorse (or at least tolerate) certain values and attitudes of the masses, and that the masses, for their part, should endorse certain values and attitudes of the elite, even though passively. Consequently, the content of the contract "package" cannot be reduced to social entitlements, but should include mutual communication between the "contracting parties". As opposed to Berliner's general methodological instruction, a reductionist view distinguishes the legacy proceeding from the "contract" from ideas and attitudes which the elite tried to instill in the population. In other words, the communication system, as an integral part of the "social contract," is set apart from the content of the "contract" and is, furthermore, reduced to the top-bottom communication between the elite and the masses, neglecting the bottom-top communication between the masses and the elite.

The authors of the book were not the only ones who ignored the bottom-top communication simply because they could not understand its content, which is that of "radical egalitarianism". This orientation was excellently described by Amalrik who nevertheless failed to provide its adequate interpretation.

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The idea of a value consensus in totalitarian countries might seem morally unacceptable to those who have undergone the process of socialization in democratic societies. No totalitarian regime, however, could persist long without a consensus of a kind. Thus Liah Greenfelf is right when she points out, referring to Max Weber, that the Nazi regime in Germany would not have lasted for a week without the popular collaboration and support. For, "no system of authority, no society, exists for any length of time if it is not legitimate and cannot claim voluntary obedience from the mass of its subjects. The Nazis understood this as well as any. Perhaps they understood it better than most..." L. Greenfeld (1993), Nationalism, Harvard University Press, p. 384. Ervin Staub convincingly explained the idea of consensus on the socio-psychological level in terms of the relationship between the Leader and his followers. Ervin Staub (1994) The Roots of Evil, Cambridge University Press, p. 23-24.

"The Russian people, as can be seen from both their past and present history, have at any rate one idea that appears positive: the idea of justice. The government that thinks and acts in everything for us must be not only strong but also just. All must live justly and act justly.

It is worth being burnt at the stake for that idea, but not for the right to 'do as you wish'... In practice, 'justice' involves the desire that 'nobody should live better than I do' (but not the desire for the much-vaunted notion of equalizing wages, since the fact that many people live worse is willingly accepted).

This idea of justice is motivated by hatred of everything that is outstanding, which we make no effort to imitate but, on the contrary, try to bring down to our level, by hatred of any sense of initiative, of any higher or more dynamic way of life than the life we live ourselves. This psychology is, of course, most typical of peasantry, and least typical of the 'middle class'. However, peasants and those of peasant origin constitute the overwhelming majority in our country.

As I have observed myself, many peasants find someone else's success more painful than their own failure. In general, when the average Russian sees that he is living less well than his neighbor, he will concentrate not on trying to do better for himself but rather on trying to bring his neighbor down to his own level. My reasoning may seem naive to some people, but I have been able to observe scores of examples in both village and town, and I see in this one of the typical traits of the Russian psyche." (Amalrik, 1970, 34-35)

In this passage, Amalrik described excellently the radical – egalitarian value orientation, but he misinterpreted it as a characteristic typical of the Russian soul. Leaving aside the fact that the "Russian" or the "Slavic soul" is an intellectual construct forged by intellectuals in the course of the historical development of Russian nationalism, (Greenfeld, 1993, 256-258) the same feature could easily be ascribed to the "Croatian soul" or, more or less precisely, to the "Croatian envy" (in Croatian "jal"). That envy, however, is characteristic of other republics in the former Yugoslavia as well, as I showed with a number of illustrative examples in my study on egalitarianism. (Županov, 1969) Amalrik's observation regarding the peasant roots of egalitarianism is correct. The phenomenon had been described earlier by Barrington Moore. (14, 497-8) It does not follow, however, that egalitarian orientation is a characteristic of the "peasant soul"; it actually arises from a given social situation.

The closed traditional peasant community could be taken as an example. According to G.M.Foster, the worldview of this community is dominated by the image of limited good. (Foster, 1963) All material and non-material goods are limited in quantity and cannot be enlarged by human effort.[4] In cases where

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Economic goods cannot be expanded by greater effort in a situation where the available land is limited and technology is stagnant.

the quantity of goods is fixed, the distribution is that of the "zero-sum-game" type: what is gained by A is lost to B.[5] The requirement of justice can be met only by egalitarian distribution, i.e., if A and B get equal shares.

To be sure, the closed traditional community is a borderline (historical) case today. However, egalitarian value orientation is functional in any situation of absolute deprivation, i.e. of serious scarcity of essential goods, from which the individual cannot extricate himself by his own effort, relying on a competitive mechanism. A group of shipwrecked persons on a boat can be taken as a paradigmatic example, although this is also a borderline case. Such deprivation is possible in other cases,[6] especially in the "economy of scarcity." A case in point is socialist economy which was marked by low salaries and the lack of competitive mechanisms that an individual could rely upon. This was due to the fact that the labor market did not exist, and private enterprise was not allowed institutionally. In this situation it is certainly not just that anyone should live "better than I do"; and if someone does, this is certainly at my expense, so that he should by all means be "called to order".[7] In short, if someone lives better than I do, it is unjust and immoral. It is much easier to get over one's loss, being merely a sad fact, than another's gain (success). In the distribution of the "zero-sum-game type", the moral code of the community is broken by individual success. To quote Pareto, people are more willing to tolerate poverty than moral disorder.

The hatred of personal affirmation and initiative should also be understood in the light of the "limited good", which refers to non-material goods as well. Thus

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The idea is expressed in the popular proverb: One man's loss is another man's gain.

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The situation was like that at the time of protracted reductions of electricity, which were frequent in Croatia in the 1980's. I shall evoke here a personal experience. In my neighbourhood, the electricity was switched off in all buildings except for a skyscraper connected to a transformer station which supplied a medical centre with electricity. The lighted windows on the skyscraper at the time when all the other buildings were in darkness caused strong resentment, which grew even stronger because people living in the privileged skyscraper put electric lamps and reflectors on their windows and balconies. It was technically possible to cut the supply to the skyscraper without leaving the medical center without electricity. One day, this was actually done: when the lights on the skyscraper went off, we all felt relief. We did not gain anything, but 'they' were finally called to order!

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The market mechanism was replaced by a mechanism of political loyalty, which enabled some people to gain certain privileges. Thus, for instance, one did not have to queue in front of shops because he could get everything he needed in special shops. Of course, these were not available to anyone. The mechanism of primary social relationships such as the family, ethnic and local ties on the one hand, and professional connections on the other, enabled some people to get preferential treatment in obtaining goods and services. Thus, for instance, a doctor did not have to waste his time in waiting rooms if he needed medical help as a patient. These mechanisms were not available to everyone. When an ordinary line crasher wanted to get something without waiting for his turn, this could provoke a true outrage which stopped short of physical force to get him back to the place where he belonged. Those who could neither use political loyalty nor primary social relationships and professional connections had only bribery to resort to.

an individual, who builds up a good reputation due to his superior intellectual qualities, breaks the moral code of the community, and must exonerate himself by sacrificing some of the material goods.[8] Personal initiative and inventiveness, as deviations from traditional routines, are also liable to disrupt the balance of community and are therefore regarded as undesirable.

The breakthrough of market and monetary economy has disrupted traditional peasant communities, while industrialization brought the process to the close. Communities have disappeared as social structure but, contrary to Tomasevich's view, have persisted as a "state of mind" (Tomasevich, 1955). Market economy (even without intensive industrialization) and industrialization (even though socialist) have opened up new possibilities to individuals who could thus get a larger share of the "cake" than it would be possible according to the egalitarian codex of distribution. Furthermore, the post-traditional economy has entailed or strenghtened individualist and utilitarian values. As a result, while remaining egalitarian on the societal level, an individual cannot tolerate the fact that someone else lives better than he does. As a utilitarian (on the individual level), he wishes to live better than someone else, and finds it morally acceptable. As an egalitarian, he is well-aware that others will turn against him. Therefore he will not attempt to improve his position within the institutionally allowed business activities – which was not possible in socialism anyway – but rather within the framework of "invisible" activities, such as "grey" or even "black economy", including corruption and crime. The combination of two social codes in a situation of greater economic opportunities has been an important parameter of the socio-cultural dynamics in the former USSR and some other socialist countries.

The egalitarianism which does not only tend to equalize opportunities, but also final outcomes in the distributive process, along with a whole battery of collective attitudes which I referred to as "egalitarian syndrome" in 1969, (Županov, 1969) and which could also be termed egalitarian ideology, provides the content of the bottom-top communication in the "social contract" system. The political elite has accepted this ideology as part of its programme, as the fundamental premise of the institutional system of business operation and political decision-making. However, rulers have not accepted it as a "blueprint" of their own lives.[9] The elitist endorsement of egalitarianism for others, but not for

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This was the function of "potlatch" in the Kwakiutl tribe, where ceremonial burning of one's own property increased the social standing of an individual. Similar behaviour could be found in former Yugoslavia: extravagant feasts, lighting cigarettes with banknotes in taverns, sticking banknotes to the forhead of a Gipsy singer etc. "Potlatch", however, had other functions in the distribution within the community. Marcel Mauss (1960) Essai sur le don, Sociologie et anthropologie, Paris, P.U.F

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The exclusion of the elite's personal consumption and way of life from the egalitarian scheme was partly institutional or semi-institutional (e.g. special shops, dachas and summer resorts, special sanatoriums etc.), and partly non-institutional (e.g., "gifts" of various companies to political leaders and state functionaries, or even criminal activities, such as corruption and the like).

themselves, is the essential factor of social dynamics.[10] This will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this study.

On the other hand, the endorsement of the egalitarian codex has a considerable impact on the content of top-bottom communication. Ideological postulates of state ownership and administration, along with the derived political system, are in the function of "realization" of egalitarian ideology. Egalitarian distribution is a complicated process of constant redistributions. The process of redistribution always requires a redistributive mechanism. In traditional communities, where the redistribution is limited in its extent, customs, such as the exchange of equivalent gifts, provide a sufficient mechanism. (Mauss, 1960) In a larger and more complex society, this role can only be carried out by the state.[11] To be sure, the redistributive function is carried out by the state both in capitalism and socialism. Without making detailed comparisons here, I shall just say that the capitalist state performs the redistributive function mainly outside the economic sector, ceding the (re)allocative economic function to the autonomous market mechanism. In socialism, the economic sector is included in redistribution processes, which ensures the range and permanence of social entitlements which could not be ensured by the state-operated redistribution outside the economic sector. In other words, the "social contract" cannot be realized without state ownership and administration. Therefore, the ideology of state ownership and state running of economy was not merely imposed; it was accepted because it was functionally indispensable.

The state redistribution had its economic, but also its social and political price, which left no room to special interest groups and the pluralist political system. The absence of political pluralism dangerously increased the strains in the system as a whole, arising from the combination of diverse value codes and the exemption of the elite from the egalitarian distribution.

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The communist political elite was more prone to accumulating wealth illegally than the American elite, since in the U.S.A. the individual accumulation of wealth is institutionally allowed and actually possible. On the other hand, the "red" elite risked much less being caught in illegal activities, since it had a complete control of the media, the police and the judiciary. It could not, however, control indiscretion and rumours of malpractices. The fact that these offences usually went unpunished, both legally and politically, intensified moral revolt. In the first period the revolt was mainly in the form of "criticism from within" which consisted of accusations that the system did not act in keeping with its own fundamental ideology. In the stage of decline, the elite became the target of "criticism from without" which required the change of the system. An individual citizen felt helpless, since any autonomous group action was forbidden. Consequently, he became "alienated" and tried to "lay his hands on something" illegally himself. This resulted in the flourishing of petty crime on a large scale, which was either partly tolerated (Millar and Wolchik, 1944, pp. 21-24) or simply considered "delit chevaleresque", such as stealing a book from a library or avoiding taxes.

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Of course, voluntary non-profit organizations ("the third sector") are also a redistributive mechanism in democratic countries.

The majority of authors dealing with transition and communist social legacy have not been aware of the egalitarian ideology and its importance for the "social contract"; they have ignored the fact that official ideology was not (merely) imposed on the population. Consequently, they could not perceive the "communist legacy" from the viewpoint of a dynamic system (the "communist world") which has broken down.

A question apart is why Western[12] (especially American) social scientists have failed to understand radical – egalitarian ideology. Even a perceptive analyst, such as Ken Jowitt, who saw clearly that the "limited good" perspective was embedded in the Leninist culture, was not fully aware that it was a constituent part of egalitarian ideology. (Jowitt, 1992, 67-8) It cannot be said that the few existing studies dealing with radical egalitariansism were not available because of the language barrier.[13] They were, rather, "culturally unavailable"; someone who experienced his primary socialization in the American culture could not understand radical egalitarianism any better than an average Russian could understand individual rights and freedoms. This idea has never existed in the American culture. However, there is a a variant of egalitarian ideology which belongs to the American cultural legacy. (Lipset, 1967) Some elements of the "egalitarian syndrome" could be found in the past, such as anti-intellectualism (Merton, 1957) and antiprofessionalism (de-professionalization of medicine in Jackson's America was similar in many respects to de-professionalization of medicine during the Cultural Revolution in China). (Rus and Arzenšek, 1984, 259). These elements, however, have been cast into deep oblivion today. Therefore, American social scientists were unable to cross the boundaries of their own culture, unlike social anthropologists on the Pacific islands where they acted as participant observers. This method was pratically inapplicable in socialist countries.

The reader is bound to ask the following question: "Your explanation might be applicable to the former USSR and former Yugoslavia, i.e. to countries with peasant majority where 'the authentic revolution,' to use Marxist jargon, had taken place. Can it be applied also to countries where the revolution was imported on tanks and where the majority of population was not peasant?" The question is appropriate indeed, but I cannot answer it here, because a reliable answer can be provided only by specialized research. Studies which have appeared so far do not offer an answer, since this question was not the subject of their research.

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An exception is Nicole Janigro (1989) Elite politica e classe operaia: una coalizione 'elastica'. in Stefano Bianchini (ed.), L'enigma jugoslavo – le ragioni della crisi, Milano, Franco Angeli Libri s.r.l.

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J. Županov's study "Egalitarianism and Industrialism" was published in America in 1978. Besides, basic information on the egalitarian value orientation in Yugoslavia could be found by American readers in the book by Sharon Zukin (1975) Beyond Marx and Tito, Cambridge University Press, passim.

II. REFORM AND THE "COALITION" – THE YUGOSLAV CASE

In current discussions it has been completely forgotten that contemporary transition was preceded by another "transition", i.e. by efforts to switch from the centrally planned to "market-planned" economy, which was referred to as the "economic reform". The attempted reform ended in complete failure. It was followed by the "anticommunist revolution" which triggered the process of transition to capitalist market economy and multiparty democracy.

The reform of socialism first started in socialist Yugoslavia, where the reform process reached its peak,[14] so that I shall limit my discussion to that reform. First, I have to answer the question of why we should return to the past now, no matter how recent it was. The reform tried to unravel the Gordian knot of socialism in communist countries; having failed to do so, the "anticommunist revolution" tried to cut it with a sword. The attempt, however, did not unravel the knot completely; if it had succeeded, we would not be dealing with the "communist legacy" now.

Why did the reform fail? I shall try to explain this by analyzing the case of Yugoslavia. My explanation, however, will have wider implications. In my 40-year research on reforms, I have come to the conclusion that neither the ruling elite nor manual workers had any real interest in the success of the reform.

The ruling elite lacked this interest because:

1) the success of the reform would bring about considerable changes in the structure of the elite, resulting in the redistribution of power. It is highly probable that the managerial elite, whom the political elite wanted to keep permanently in the position of 'junior partner' although its members were originally recruited from the ruling elite, would attain leading positions. With the growing professionalization of top managers (directors), the political elite was less and less willing to accept such a change; (Županov, 1995)

(2) the ruling elite would have to accept technical and scientific establishment as a partner participating in political power on an equal footing, which it had always resolutely refused, so that the very word partnership was proscribed. The ruling elite did not allow partnersips for the following reasons: first, they would entail a change in the social and ideological basis of its legitimacy, which was extremely risky. Secondly, a new coalition would establish and legalize the pluralism of elites, undermining the one-party political system. The ruling elite and

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Economically, it was on the brink of success with Marković's "new socialism", but politically it had no chance of success with Milošević as the strongman. On the concept of "new socialism", see Dragomir Vojnić, (1989) Ekonomska kriza i reforma socijalizma, (Economic Crisis and Reform of Socialism), Zagreb, Globus, (p. 225-241)

the party would thus lose their political monopoly in society. In their view, that would be "the end of the world," i.e., the end of their idea of socialism. The elite could perhaps accept changes within its own structure. It could even go so far as to accept changes in the social (ideological) basis of its legitimacy, but it was absolutely unwilling to accept the loss of its political monopoly in society. To sum up, the reform had no chance of success.

Manual workers were not really interested in the success of the reform for two reasons:

(1) the success of the reform would entail the (re-)establishment of the competitive labor market, where the working class would be exposed to a great deal of uncertainty and insecurity. Socialist economy acted as a "protective cover" which could be compared in its effects to the Spenhamland system in England in the first third of the nineteenth century. (Polanyi, 1968) The Spenhamland system brought about the separation of workers' survival from their productivity, which occurred in socialist systems as well. In this way, local paternalism in England hindered any rise in wages and even reduced them. Likewise, the socialist state paternalism impeded any considerable rise in the wages and standard of living. (Županov, 1995, 63) In short, workers preferred the umbrella of total state protection to the partial and conditional protection offered by trade unions;

(2) manual workers in Yugoslavia, and in most other socialist countries, saw no intrinsic value in work as vocation, or Beruf in Puritan ethics. They were even less prepared to consider work as the "prime need" according to the Marxist ideology. In order to attribute some social value to work, it was necessary to resort to other value codes, such as "revolutionary heroism", "sacrifice", "self-denial", "dedication to work," etc. Revolutionary enthusiasm and self-denial did not last long. Voluntary work drives on Saturdays (Communist subotnici) soon disappeared in Soviet Russia. The movement to increase productivity (Stakhanovism) persisted longer, but without the initial zeal. The enthusiasm for storming work in Yugoslavia was short-lived. Hard work, i.e. systematical and methodical everyday work required by modern economy, cannot be based on these codes. As in traditional society, work remained an external necessity which anyone 'in his right mind' tried to avoid.

That attitude to work was most significantly determined by socialist economy itself. "The socialist industrialization" in general and the fetishism of heavy industry and huge organizations in particular soaked up a large portion of the gross national product. Furthermore, state economy made highly inefficient use of assets, which resulted in heavy losses. Since socialist economy relied mainly on its own resources,[15] the national "fund" of wages and salaries was

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The Socialist Yugoslavia was an exception in this respect: non-repayable loans from 1950 to 1959 were considerable. Thus the US economic assistance from 1950 to 1959 amounted to 1,153.4 million dollars, not to mention the counterpart withdrawals for Yugoslav use, as of June 1959 totaling

limited and kept at a rather low level. In this situation, it was reasonable from the workers' point of view "not to overwork themselves," and to minimize their work contribution to the lowest acceptable level. The socialist state protected the worker not only from the labour market, but from work itself! Lafargue's (Lafargue, 1978) "right to laziness"[16] was thus apparently attained in a trivialized form.

It is obvious that interests of the political elite and workers converged regarding the preservation of the economic and social status quo. Workers saw their narrow socio-economic interests as more important than their actual participation in political power, while political elite was more concerned with the retention of political monopoly as the highest priority, than with economic efficiency. A deal, or a "social contract" was possible on the basis of this congruence of interests. To use my terms, it was the basis of the "coalition between political elite and manual workers".

It took me years of work and research to understand that which seems self-evident today. In the text that follows, I shall recapitulate briefly the results of many years of my study and research.

1) First Insights into the Problem

When the first economic reform was introduced in 1965, I carried out an empirical research in 10 industrial firms in Osijek to determine basic attitudes of employees to market economy. The question about the attitude to state price control was used as a test to determine the attitude to market economy. The survey showed that employees in general and skilled workers and office staff in particular favoured price control. The senior staff was divided: one half was in favour of price control, while the other half was against it. As many as 37.8% managers favoured price control. (Županov, 1985, 52) These data confirmed my hypothesis concerning the existence of a "mass basis of etatism." Having paid verbal tribute to free market pricing in the period of "administrative socialism" which preceded the economic reform, politics could always appeal to the protection of the living standard of working people, especially of those with low incomes. Invoking the living standard and workers'solidarity could strike a

60,956 million dinars. Aid received from other Western countries (primarily from Great Britain and France) totalled roughly 219 million dollars in the same period. – George W. Hoffman and Fred W. Neal (1962), Yugoslavia and the New Communism, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, pp 351, 353 and 354. Although the loans covered losses and enabled a higher level of pay than in other socialist countries, this was not sufficient for Yugoslavia to join developed European countries in this respect.

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"The requests of the right to work and to remuneration according to needs do not express so much the desire to work as the wish for concealed loafing and pay without work". A. Hlavek (1969) "Projekt socijalizma i njegovo ostvarivanje" (The Project of Socialism and its Realization), Gledišta, 5, p. 742.

responsive chord in deeper attitudes based on the cognitive perspective of "limited good" and redistributive orientation. I shall quote here the observation of V. Bakarić regarding "Our bureaucracy" ("Our bureaucracy" referred to revolutionaries turned bureaucrats who were still dedicated to the Communist cause, as distinguished from "other bureaucrats" who were an unwanted by-product of the "deformation of Socialism"), where he claimed that modern etatism had developed from the "revolutionary etatism" which had mass support, especially among workers. (Županov, 1985, 74-75)

At the time, however, I could not fully determine which social stratum was actually the exponent of statist policy. Who were "Our bureaucrats?" Who was right: Milovan Djilas when he claimed that the top political leadership belonged to this category, (Djilas, 1966) or Trotsky who maintained that the political establishment was exempt from the category of "bureaucrats who had betrayed the revolution"? (Trotski, 1973) I could not imagine that the political elite could sabotage their own project of workers' self-management and "socialist commodity production" because, in spite of the Ranković scandal, I believed the political elite to be monolithic. Most analyses presenting the division within the political elite into reformist and anti-reformist streams in other socialist countries did not even exist at the time. Moreover, I could not understand how "some other bureaucrats" in state administration could sabotage projects of the political leadership. True enough, a similar case was reported by S.M. Lipset in the Canadian state of Saskatchewan (Lipset, 1950) after the Socialist victory at the elections, but it seemed impossible that an experience of this kind could be repeated in the Yugoslav one-party system. Therefore, in my analysis at the time, I could not proceed beyond the current slogan of "etatism" which is, sociologically, a mere abstraction.

2) The Elaboration of the Problem

I was inclined to explain the existence of pro-statist attitudes on such a massive scale by the fact that the working class was in its early formative period, so that the tradition of "revolutionary etatism" was still strong. Soon after my research in Osijek, however, I came to the conclusion that workers' attitudes had deeper roots reaching back into traditional society. Therefore I placed my further considerations within the context of social modernization. The result was a controversial paper entitled "Egalitarianism and Industrialism" which I submitted at the sociological symposium in Split in 1969.

In my paper, I tried to present theoretically the concept of egalitarianism, with its specific variant which I later referred to as 'radical egalitarianism'. Since I did not want to limit my discussion to conceptual analysis, I illustrated this variant with available empirical data and non-systematic observations from daily press. An important component of my future theory of 'coalition' was thus explained.

That is not all. Having borrowed from Gunnar Myrdal (1968, I, 19, 26) the concept of the 'social matrix' as a potential inhibitor of industrial development, I redefined the 'mass basis of etatism' as the 'social matrix' whose essential components are the egalitarian value complex, low standard of living and a way of life interwoven with traditional cultural patterns. Since I was dissatisfied with the concept of 'etatism' as an ideological chimery, I wanted to find the actual group interests underlying this label. I defined the ruling group as the 'political substructure of social stratification'. This group was constantly exposed to demands of the working population to abolish social privileges and inequalities and thus adapt the actual social-economic situation to the central social value. Trapped between the social ideal of radical egalitarism (Sollen) and the fact of the social and economic differentiation (Sein), the ruling group performed remarkable maneuvers. They launched from time to time large-scale campaigns against 'social differences,' finding the scapegoat usually among members of the middle classes, such as abstract painters, intellectuals with additional incomes earned on the market of intellectual services, private owners, technocracy etc. Campaigns were usually launched from the top. They were followed by ideological tumult and threats of repressive and restrictive measures. After a while, they reached lower levels of the system, and some administrative measures were taken, with poor practical results. Finally, everything slowly subsided.[17] An average campaign lasted for about six months.

It would be a mistake to reduce these campaigns to cheap political trickery: they were a very serious matter both for the masses and the elite.

"The campaign is an attempt to revert the whole social situation, and go back to the stage of the revolutionary movement which preceded its institutionalization and formalization. The existing situation which caused discontent was 'deleted from the magnetic tape', and the development started anew with great promises given by the political bureaucracy that things would develop differently in the future. To be sure, existing trends could not be abolished and soon everything returned to the usual. The political bureaucracy, however, played for time, gaining perhaps as many as several years. In the 1970's, for instance, strikes ceased temporarily in response to the anti-technocracy campaign, constitutional changes and the SIZ (SIZ – "Selfmanagement Community of Interest" was a parastatal institution for financing public services (health, education, science, social work etc.). They were instituted by the Associated Labour Act), to be continued at the end of the 1970's. After that, new campaigns were in prospect." (Županov, 1983, 39)

3) Formulating the Theory

It took me years to formulate the theory completely. Its completion was due to the grave recession at the beginning of the 1980's, when I asked the key ques-

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For instance, well-known campaigns which were triggered off by the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1958 or by Tito's speech in Split in 1962. In the case of the students' movement in 1968, the campaign was launched from "below".

tion: What is the main actual (not declarative) aim of the Yugoslav social-economic system? The answer was facilitated by frequent economic restrictions, which revealed the scale of priorities of the system. The main aim could be found in the elements which the system was absolutely unwilling to sacrifice or which were the last to be sacrificed. "Sacrifices" (restrictions) were made in the following order: (1) personal consumption and standard, where the system was willing to reach the poverty line, (2) "collective consumption", or social payments, where the system was prepared to abolish some privileges and institutions, (3) "general consumption", i.e. government expenses, where the system was willing to make some "sacrifice". On the basis of this, I concluded that the system was least ready to sacrifice investments. Why were investments such an important, untouchable priority? To answer this question, one should have in mind that throughout the socialist period the economic development was "extensive" rather than "intensive" which, to use Kindleberger's terms, meant "growth" rather than "development" (Kindleberger, 1965). Despite formal declarations that the reform would enable the transition from extensive growth to intensive development, this had never happened. Quantitative development relied on classical technology and mass employment of unskilled workers, while scientific knowledge and human resources were completely neglected.

What was the purpose of this quantitative growth? An analysis done by the Fabbian Group of the British Labour Party entitled "The New Left – An Economic Analysis" helped me to answer that question. The new left consisted of employees of local authorities and voluntary agencies belonging to welfare professions: teachers, social workers, social care and housing advisors, "researchers" etc. Members of that social group made their living on "poverty management", thus ensuring themselves their middle-class position and standard of living. Therefore their essential class interest was to perpetuate poverty, keeping the number of social cases – their clients – on the same permanent level in town centers from which the middle classes had moved out. In this way they actively perpetuated poverty.

Then I asked the following question: which social group in Yugoslavia provided the social basis for the power and the high living standard of political bureaucracy? Whose interest was not to reduce, but to increase that social group? The answer was: "manual workers, who were relatively poorly educated, poorly paid, who lived in poor flats, who lacked trade union awareness and experience of struggle on the labour market, forming a group which was constantly enlarged by newcomers from the country. This group was identified with the 'historical working class,' and it provided the source of the historical legitimacy of political bureaucracy. At the same time they provided pliable material which could be manipulated in the game against other social strata that had certain aspirations to participate in the power (intellectuals, technocrats).

There is an essential difference between the relationship between the political bureaucracy and manual workers on the one hand and that between leftist

Labourists and slum proletariat on the other. Welfare proponents did not create a mass political basis in the apathetic city poor which did not accept their attitudes. On the other hand, political bureaucracy found its political and social basis in manual workers. Mutual communication was established in which manual workers accepted the ideology of political bureaucrocy, and political bureaucracy endorsed egalitarian values and attitudes of manual workers.

Thus it was the vital interest of bureaucracy to perpetuate the working class social stratum. Extensive economic growth was the best source for the reproduction of this group. Qualitative development would intellectualize the working population and put at the forefront technical intelligentsia and science, which political bureaucracy would have to integrate on the western technocratic model. Thus it would have to change the basis of its historical legitimacy. These changes would be extremely risky, and bureaucracy did not accept risks. It wanted to preserve the status quo, where there was no room for scientific knowledge. (Županov, 1983, 1052-54)

Thus, the theory of coalition was formulated as early as 1983, only the term "coalition" was not used at the time. It was used for the first time in the discussion at the round table organized by the Belgrade periodical Ekonomika in the same year.

4) The Elaboration of the Theory

The term "coalition" was used for the first time in the above mentioned discussion in the following way:

"The basic coalition is that between the political elite and manual workers. It is not a coalition of equals, since it consists of the 'protector' and the 'protégé'. This ideology found expression in the slogan about the protection of self-management by the state...To consolidate the deal, the working classes had to be provided for. They were therefore granted job security and a pay which was not very high, but which was stable. This explains the fantastic job security in all the socialist countries. It was a part of the deal. The social background of the working class also played an important part in the deal, since the majority of its members, especially those coming from mountainous areas, had led an existence of utter depravity and poverty. Thus, their present situation fared very well compared to their previous circumstances. That was another important element of the coalition." (Županov, 1987,93)

Along with the term "coalition", I used the term "deal" which is semantically very close to that of the "social contract". I also hinted at the idea that this could be applied to other socialist countries. I pointed out that an important function of the radical egalitarianism, and a constituent part of the coalition, was to diminish differentiation in the social system, and thus facilitate the management of the system by the elite. (Županov, 1987, 92)

5) The Completing the Theory and Empirical Testing of the Strength of the Coalition

My theory was completed in 1986, when I wrote the chapter entitled "The Working Class and Social Stability" (1987) for the second edition of my book Sociologija i samoupravljanje (Sociology and Self-Management). (Županov, 1987) The chapter was based on a survey of the culture of young workers, (Ilišin et al., 1986) which enabled me to formulate more precisely the theory on the coalition between the ruling elite and the working class.

"It is an unequal coalition in which the elite acts as a patron that 'protects' workers by ensuring them minimal pay and extensive social rights, while the protégé, disguised as the historical working class ('the historical interest') secures the elite its social legitimacy. Such a coalition implies the establishment of a two-way communication in the social 'software',[18] workers accepting the official ideology, and the elite endorsing the values of radical egalitarianism. These values are not endorsed by the elite out of sincere egalitarian convictions, but because the levelling of differences among people simplifies the social system and facilitates its management." (Županov, 1987, 140-1)

Furthermore, I pointed to another important function of the coalition as the basis of social stability. Until the time of Milošević's putsch in Serbia in 1987, Yugoslavia could boast an amazing social stability, with the only exception of Kosovo. "The collapse of living standard, which endangered the physical existence of a large part of the population, did not provoke public protest; there was no strike movement, no public manifestations of discontent. Despite everything, the indispensable minimum of social participation was ensured." (Županov, 1985, 139)

A great deal of strain in the coalition was brought about by the recession, since it called into question the ability of the elite to carry out its part of the deal, which consisted in the stability of employment and income, as well as in extensive social rights. Otherwise, workers could refuse to carry out their part. Therefore, I wanted to test the strength of the coalition and see how much strain it could withstand. The figures indicating the endorsement of official ideology by young workers were taken as indicators of the strength of the coalition. The figures were obtained in a survey which was carried out in Croatia in 1982. The results, which show a strong endorsement of the official ideology, including official institutions, politics and definitions of social reality, are presented in the following order:

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In the discussion at the round table organized by the journal Economics, the author compared society to the computer, with certain social codes and value orientations representing the software, and class interest providing the hardware. (Županov, 1987, 86)

(1) The Endorsement of the Institutions of the System

(a) Attitudes to the Communist Party (in %)

– positive attitude to the Communist Party in general	73.0	
– negative attitude	9.9	
– neutral attitude	11.8	

(aa) Recent Social Influence and Reputation of the Communist Party (in %)

– on considerable increase	44.0	
– has not changed	15.3	59.3
– in decline	14.0	
– does not know, has no opinion	22.0	
– without answer	4.7	

(b) Definitions of the Socialist State (in %)

– positive (official) definition	77.6
– negative definitions	11.2
– does not know/has no answer	11.4

(c) The Official Trade Union (opinions in %)

– an independent workers' organization of interest (the official definition)	43.0	
– acting on behalf of the management	38.0	
– transmission belt of the party in a firm	18.1	56.1

Bearing in mind their actual role as transmission of the ruling party on the top level and a sort of company union on the level of firm, trade unions fared well. It is evident that the official ideological definition of the role of trade unions had a decisive influence on the perception of a significant number of respondents, although not on the absolute majority.

(d) The Perception of the Delegation System (in %)

– positive (official) definition	28.6
– negative definitions	18.3
– without opinion	47.1
– no answer	8.9

To be sure, the delegation system was such a monstruous creation that most respondents failed to understand it. However, the number of opponents, who saw the delegation system as a disguise for the one-party system or, in the best case, as a system of economic democracy without political democracy, was below 20 per cent.

In order to examine the accuracy of answers about the delegation system, a direct question was asked concerning the attitude to one-party system.

The answers were highly instructive (in %)

– unconditional support of one-party system	39.0
– conditional support of one-party system as a temporary and short-term solution	8.7
– unconditional opposition to one-party system	6.7
– without opinion	39.5
– no answer	6.1

In short, respondents were divided into two approximately equal groups: staunch supporters of the authoritarian system and the uncommitted. The opposition to the one-party system "because it is a totalitarian regime" was very weak (6.7).

(2) Endorsement of the Official Politics

(a) Rating of the State Economic Policy (in %)

– positive	50.5
– negative	11.9
– without opinion	32.1
– other answers/no answer	5.4

(b) Attitudes to the Reform of Secondary Education (in%)

– positive	72.0
– negative	21.0
– other answers/no answer	7.0

Although "Šuvar's reform" (That was an ambitious and far-reaching reform project of secondary education inspired by the Party and executed with utmost zeal in Croatia by the Commissioner for Education Stipe Šuvar. This reform aimed at levelling the system of secondary education (by bringing elitist gymnasiums and vocational schools for skilled workers to the same level), and at installing the narrow program specialization along the lines of factory, was met with hostility in Croatia, especially in intellectual circles, it was fully endorsed by respondents.

(c) The Employment Policy for Young People

Answers (in %) to the question of who should be concerned with the employment of young people were very interesting.

– the state	60.9
– the associated labour, i.e. self-management firms	28.7
– individuals	8.1
– no answer	2.3

The ideologically correct answer was that self-management firms should be concerned with employment. This was not, however, endorsed by respondents

since it would imply the breach of the 'contract'. Therefore, respondents insisted that it should be the concern of the state government, as it was in all the other socialist countries.

(d) The Financing of Public Services (in %)

While the respondents departed from official ideology in answering the question on employment, they endorsed it again in the question on financing the public services:

– return to the state (budget) financing	9.7
– development of the "system of free exchange of labor" (self-managing communities of interest)	50.6
– without opinion	36.3
– no answer	3.4

Although this was a sensitive question from the viewpoint of the "deal", most respondents were in favour of parastatal self-managing communities of interest. However, more than one third of respondents were reserved in their attitudes to these parasitic organizations. Self-managing communities of interest did not call into question the realization of the "deal".

(3) The Endorsement of Official Definitions of Social Situation

(a) The Perception of the Social Class Structure

The question about the existence of class differences in Yugoslav society was answered in the following way (in %):

– class differences do not exist any more	24.3	
– there are no significant class differences	17.4	
– there are certain differences, but they are not class differences	40.1	81.8
– class differences exist, and they are getting more pronounced	10.7	
– no answer	7.5	

In short, the socialist Yugoslavia was seen as a classless society.

(b) The Perception of Exploitation (in%)

– it exists only in the private sector	21.4
– it exists both in the private and social sector	40.9
– there is no exploitation in Yugoslav society	29.9
– no answer	7.8

A large number of respondents believed that exploitation existed in the social sector. Did they consider the exploitation in the social sector to be "class exploitation", as opposed to that in the private sector? We should bear in mind here the government manipulated "business conditions" due to which some firms and branches were favoured, while others were treated with disfavour.

(c) Can Workers Protect Themselves from Exploitation?

We can summarize the answers in the following way (in %):

– there is no exploitation in Yugoslav society	30.9	
– YES, by individual action inside the system	30.9	61.8
– YES, by collective action outside the system	6.7	
– YES, by individual action outside the system	3.8	10.5
– NO, by no means (they feel helpless)	19.9	

According to most answers, exploitation did not exist, and if it did, a worker could protect himself by individual action inside the system. According to respondents, action outside or against the system did not "pay off". This view was ideologically correct, but it did not correspond to reality, since strikes actually paid off quite often. The management gave in to strikers' demands for reasons which need not be explained here. Individual action paid off even better. It was exemplified in the questionnaire by feigned sick leaves and workers' stealing from their firms' supplies. Respondents, however, did not approve of action outside, or against the system.

(d) The Perception of Workers' Social Position

Workers' perception of their own social position is perhaps the most telling indicator of the intensity of their endorsement of the official ideology (in %):

A. The Official Definition (Ideology)

– workers are creators who produce material goods using their knowledge and abilities	36.4	
– workers are self-managers, who decide about all important issues in their firms	28.1	64.5

B. Unofficial Definition (Fact)

– hired labourer	9.7	
– poor man who lives in privation and whose circumstances do not improve	11.5	
– caught in a trap: cannot extricate himself from his position as a worker	1.8	
– robot who performs fragmented operations at a monotonous pace	3.3	
– no answer	5.8	26.3

It is understandable why workers did not think they were hired labourers: in self-management socialism labour relations were defined as status or membership relations rather than as market relations. It is also understandable why they did not feel they were human robots – only a minority actually worked on the asembly line, although the exact figures are lacking. We can also understand why the modality of "being caught in a trap" got negligibly few answers,

since a peasant who became worker rose on the social status scale in traditional society. Moreover, new members of the elite were recruited from among skilled and highly skilled workers. The process was actually completed by mid-1960's, (Zukin, 1978,399) but memories were still alive; besides, Šuvar's reform of education nourished aspirations to mobility. Thus, for instance, graffiti with slogans such as "Workers to the University!" could be found on many facades. However, the fact that only one tenth of respondents chose the modality of "poor man living in privation whose circumstances do not improve" was very far from the actual situation.

On the other hand, the view of industrial work as a creative activity was far from reality in a situation where self-management was centered on the firm rather than on the working group, as opposed to workers' participation in Sweden. Actually, negligibly few rationalizations and useful suggestions were submitted by workers. The view of workers as self-managers deciding about all important issues was likewise far from truth, since all important decisions were made by directors, top executives and political functionaries from inside and outside the company. The function of workers' councils consisted mainly in giving the whole affair a semblance of legality.

Why did respondents ignore their practical experience and give "politically correct" answers? They were induced to do so by the way in which the questions were formulated. If they had answered from their experience they would have discredited the ideology, which they did not want to. If the questionnaire had consisted of open-ended questions, few respondents would have mentioned the fictitious creativity involved in their job or significant decision-making in their firms.[19]

In short, answers to these questions were highly indicative: they showed that respondents saw institutions and politics, as well as their own personal position, through ideological glasses. Although respondents did not give unambiguous answers to all questions, it was more than evident that most of them favoured the official ideology. Admittedly, we did not ask highly 'theoretical' questions, with the exception of the following: "Does the dictatorship of the proletariat exist in Yugoslav society?"

The answers revealed utter confusion, with only 10.1 per cent giving the ideologically correct answer: that the dictatorship of proletariat becomes stronger with the growing importance of associated laboUr in the distribution of income. Great dispersion and confusion in answers to this question shows the cognitive level at which the official ideology was received.

Finally, a methodological caveat is appropriate. Our sample was made up of young workers, most of whom lived in urban centres, which was certainly an

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On the influence of the formulation of survey questions on answers, see John R. Zaller (1993), The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Cambridge University Press (pp. 32-34).

advantage. They were the best educated workers and were not among those who had recently arrived from the country and had deep ties with their peasant background. On the other hand, this was also a serious shortcoming: it appears that at the time young people in general, including workers and high-school and university students, were more exposed to ideological influence than older generations. (Ilišin et al., 1990) Therefore, without doubting the validity of the thesis about the intense top-bottom communication, we should take the figures on the strength of this communication cum grano salis.

III. THE CROATIAN DEVIATION: THE AFTERMATH-EFFECT?

Naturally, Croatian readers are interested in the "social legacy of communism" in their own country, but Millar-Wolchik's book does not say a word about the subject. All the successor countries of the former Yugoslavia, including Slovenia, were left out in the American research. A few indications of this legacy can be found in the journal published by Glasgow University which was formerly entitled Soviet Studies, and has now changed its title to Europe-Asia Studies (Rose and Haerpfer, 1994). The survey entitled "The National Democratic Barometer", which was carried out in 1992, covered 10 postcommunist countries, including Slovenia and Croatia. Figures on the communist legacy are scarcer than those in the American research. Besides, they are not comparable because of differences in the wording of questions. We shall nevertheless try to see what these figures reveal.

First, it is possible to draw indirect inferences about the communist legacy from the figures which reveal the positive evaluation of the economic and political system before the collapse of communism in ten countries. Respondents were asked to evaluate the functioning of these systems on a scale ranging from minus 100 to plus 100. It is reasonable to assume that the "social contract" was an important parameter for this evaluation.

Table 1
The Positive Evaluation of the Economic and Political System in the Socialist Period

Country	Economic system (scores)	Political system (scores)
Ukraine	76	55
Belarus	75	60
Hungary	74	68
Slovakia	64	48
Bulgaria	59	42
Poland	57	42
Romania	57	35
Slovenia	46	46
The Czech Republic	44	29
Croatia	28	13

Source: Rose and Haerpfer, (1994)

It is evident that Croatia radically departs from other countries included in the survey, with the lowest number of positive scores.

The other group of figures regards collectivistic, as opposed to individualistic values, in survey questions. Thus, in the question on wages, respondents were asked to choose between equal pay for all and the dependence of pay on individual achievement. In the question on welfare, respondents could choose between the state vs. individual concern for the welfare of the individual. In the question on ownership, respondents were asked to choose between state ownership and private enterprise. In the question on employment, respondents chose between a poorly paid but secure job and a job which was well-paid but insecure.

Table 2
Collectivistic values (in %)

Country	Income	Welfare	Ownership	Employment
Bulgaria	41	63	47	65
Hungary	31	60	24	73
Slovenia	30	55	20	85
Croatia	29	40	15	47
Ukraine	28	57	52	39
Poland	23	85	31	67
Belorus	22	52	46	65
Romania	22	52	46	65
Slovakia	13	57	27	37
The Czech Republic	10	46	17	48

Source: Rose and Haerpfer (1994)

It could be concluded at first that the value orientation is not coherent. With respect to income, the orientation to individualist values prevailed in all the countries. This is at variance with answers to the other three questions, where the collectivist orientation was much more pronounced. The mixed individualist and collectivist orientation should not be taken as anomalous. Different values can actually "cohabitate" in the mind of the same individual on different levels, which Baier and Rescher refer to as "levels of centeredness" (Baier and Rescher, 1969, 92-5). Thus, individualist utilitarianism can dominate on the individual level, and radical egalitarianism on the societal level. The answer depended on the level which the respondent had 'switched on' in answering the question. Thus the majority of respondents, with the exception of those from Ukraine, did not favour state ownership, probably because it had been politically compromised. Therefore the questions on pay and ownership cannot be taken as good indicators of the collectivistic orientation. The concern of the state for the welfare of the individual and job security are probably better indicators of the "social legacy of communism" in the countries covered by the sur-

vey. As to the state concern for the welfare of the individual, Croatia was the last on the list, while it was the last but one regarding job security.

If we try to obtain average values for each country regarding these four aspects, we shall get the following list:

Bulgaria	53.7
Poland	51.5
Hungary	47.7
Slovenia	47.5
Belarus	46.2
Romania	46.2
Ukraine	44.0
Slovakia	33.5
Croatia	32.7
The Czech Republic	30.2

We can see that Croatia is the last but one – considerably behind Slovenia. This is interesting, since both countries used to form a part of the same system and of the same federal state. It is easy to understand why the Czech Republic is the "most resistent" to the communist legacy: before World War II, it was a highly developed industrial country with developed political democracy. But how to explain such "resistence" in Croatia which could not be compared to the Czech Republic either in economic development or democracy?

Besides these survey data, which do not warrant safe conclusions, a notorious fact lending considerable support to such conclusions should be mentioned. Namely, workers' self-management, which used to be the central organizing concept in the official ideology of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, has become a political taboo in present-day Croatia which has been proscribed to a degree that can be compared to the stigmatization of the syntagms "communist" and "communism" in the U.S.A. at the height of the cold war.[20] Even the word "worker" is not "politically correct", although it is now tolerated better than two or three years ago. (Županov, 1995, 136-9) There have been no surveys of the endorsement/rejection of self-management today, but deeper attitudes could hardly be tapped by this kind of research. (Zaller, 1993, 24-25)

If Croatia is really a deviant case regarding the "communist legacy", which collapsed so abruptly, the question is how and why this happened. The social ex-

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The proscription of "self-management" has gone so far as to reject even the concept of workers' participation, which is an essential component of the social doctrine of the Catholic church. An individual who endorses this idea publicly can easily get labelled as a "communist", which actually happened to a religious provincial in Zagreb. It is interesting to note that the official church, especially the local clergy, and official politics increasingly emphasize more conservative views on family planning, abortion etc. than those more progressive ones on workers' participation, though both form a part of the Catholic social doctrine. It is not within the scope of this essay to explain the differences in the reception of the Catholic social doctrine in present-day Croatia.

perience of the Croatian working population cannot answer the question. If we took as our starting point the social experience which had been examined in various previous surveys, we would expect the communist legacy in Croatia to be stronger, or at least not weaker than in most other communist countries. However, the reverse has happened.

A hypothetical explanation could start from the social mechanism of "ethnic cleansing", which I outlined in my book Poslije potopa (After the Deluge) (1995, 39-40). On the individual level, one should take into account the situation in which a Serb suddenly appeared on his Croatian neighbour's doorstep with a gun in his hand and ordered him to move out, carrying all that was left of his/her possessions in a small plastic bag. After the first shock, the Croat had to redefine socially his former neighbour. The exiled Croat found it utterly impossible that his Serb neighbour could turn into the worst of enemies after so many years of living together and being bound by close social ties. A logical "explanation" was that the neighbour had been an enemy in disguise who now revealed his true face.

It seems that something similar happened on the level of collective attitudes. When the communist indoctrinated Yugoslav Army under the communist insignia (the red star) launched its destructive military onslaught against Vukovar, Dubrovnik and other Croatian towns, an average Croat was forced to redefine abruptly the whole of his social experience of the past forty years. He suddenly saw it as a period of the "Serbian-communist conspiracy" and naked repression, in which the Vukovar holocaust had been prepared and planned in advance. That definition, which had been alive in political emigration all the time, came to be accepted as a ready-made formula by the majority of the population. Individuals felt anger and shame for having taken part in the 'trickery'. They tried to reconstruct the past 40 years of their life in an attempt to prove to themselves and to others that they were victims, rather than accomplices of the former regime, claiming that they had become members of the Communist Party only in order to prevent greater evil. To be sure, this Orwellian self-reformation towards dissent and victimization has been politically profitable, but this is not important for our present discussion.

The process of abrupt erosion of the "communist legacy" could be interpreted as a specific aftermath-effect of the bloody dissolution of the multinational socialist state. As opposed to the results of American studies which showed that the "aftermath-effect" existed alongside the other elements of the "communist legacy", it seems that in Croatia all memories of the "social contract" (i.e., the coalition) and the official ideology have been thrown into the "black hole" of collective amnesia.

A POSTSCRIPT INSTEAD OF THE EPILOGUE

If it is true that Croatia has deviated from other postcommunist countries, this could have (and probably has) important political implications. These hypo-

thetical or real implications, however, are not the subject of this essay. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that there is no "social regime" in Croatia anymore and that there will not be one in the future. In the December Constitution (1990), Croatia was defined as a "social state". It must be admitted that, during the war, practical politics tended to relativize this constitutional provision, to say the least. Such politics, however, has no future. There will certainly be a true "social regime" in Croatia, but it will be based on the experience of Western welfare states, such as Germany in the first place. It will deny any continuity or even analogy with the "social contract" from the socialist period. Other nations have had spheres of collective amnesia. Why should the Croats be an exception?

Translated by Lidija Sočanac

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DRUŠTVENO NASLIJEĐE KOMUNIZMA

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Studija je podijeljena u tri dijela. U prvom autor iznosi imanentnu kritiku Berlinerove definicije društvenog naslijeđa komunizma kao svojevrsnog "društvenog ugovora" između Partije/Države i stanovništva, u koji je supstituirao "civilno društvo" u komunističkim zemljama. Autor upozorava da se tu nije radilo o razmjeni individualnih prava i sloboda za socijalne povlastice, već o "razmjeni" legitimiteta (u korist elite) za socijalna prava i povlastice (u korist zaposlenika). A ta je razmjena uključivala i dvostruku komunikaciju između elite i mase. U drugom dijelu autor ukazuje da je taj mehanizam legitimiziranja vlasti elite, koji je i po Berlineru bio temelj društvene stabilnosti, on sam opisao još 1983. (teorija o "koaliciji između politokracije i fizikalnog radništva"), stavivši ga u širi kontekst abortivnih privrednih reformi socijalizma. U trećem dijelu analizom kroskulturnih empirijskih nalaza dokazuje da je "komunističko naslijeđe" u Hrvatskoj znatno slabije očuvano negoli u drugim postkomunističkim zemljama te sugerira jednu interpretativnu hipotezu koja tu "hrvatsku devijaciju" objašnjava.

DAS GESELLSCHAFTLICHE ERBE DES KOMMUNISMUS

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Vorliegende Studie ist in drei Abschnitte unterteilt. Im ersten Teil präsentiert der Autor seine immanente Kritik der Berlinerschen Definition vom gesellschaftlichen Erbe des Kommunismus als einer Art "Gesellschaftsvertrag" zwischen Partei/Staat und Bevölkerung, durch den die "Zivilgesellschaft" in den kommunistischen Ländern substituiert wurde. Der Autor betont, daß es sich hier nicht um einen Tauschhandel von individuellen Rechten und Freiheiten gegen soziale Privilegien handelte, sondern um den "Eintausch" von Legitimität (zugunsten der Elite) gegen soziale Rechte und Privilegien (zugunsten der Erwerbstätigen). Dieser Tausch schloß außerdem eine zweigleisige Kommunikation zwischen Elite und Masse ein. Im zweiten Teil verweist der Autor darauf, daß er selbst diesen Mechanismus elitärer Machtlegitimierung, der laut Berliner die Grundlage gesellschaftlicher Stabilität darstellt, bereits 1983 beschrieben (Theorie der "Koalition von Politokratie und physischer Arbeiterschaft") und im breiteren Kontext der abortiven Wirtschaftsreformen des Sozialismus untergebracht habe. Im dritten Teil wird anhand einer Analyse transkultureller empirischer Befunde der Beweis erbracht, daß das "kommunistische Erbe" in Kroatien wesentlich schwächer ausgeprägt ist als in anderen postkommunistischen Ländern, sowie eine interpretative Hypothese suggeriert, welche diese "kroatische Deviation" erklärt.