

## The Post-Modern Society: Which are the Basic Value-Orientations?

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Political behaviour like voting or allegiance to political parties is today less a function of the social structure and more an expression of the value orientations that the electorate harbours. The new research into political culture has resulted in numerous findings concerning the role of dominant value orientations like post-materialism, trust and gender or egalitarianism as well as individualism. In this article, we examine a question never resolved in the political culture research, namely if the dominant value orientations are *independent* of each other or not. We show that this is really the case meaning that ordinary people have multiple value orientations, which increases the complexity of politics in the post-modern society. One really cannot speak of *one* set of values that would constitute *the* set of values for the post-modern society.

**Key words:** values, indicators, value orientation, social capital, egalitarianism, WVS, the independence hypothesis, post-materialism, gender and trust.

### 1. Introduction

The micro research into political behaviour offers a wealth of information about the attitudes of citizens and other persons. The methodology of micro analysis deals with how to access and handle large data sources about these attitudes. In order to meet the standard criteria of scientific research, such as the *principle of inter-subjectivity*, theories about value orientations must be testable in relation to empirical data, accessible to the entire scientific community. How to meet this requirement? That is the subject of the so-called Converse's rule. It links a theoretical construct in value research with the constraint in the responses of people to batteries of questions. We will exemplify Converse's rule when examining the main theories of value orientations, such as trust theory, post-materialism and New Culture Theory.

The crux of the matter in micro analysis of values is the evidential base of any concept of value orientation, be it social capital, social or civic permissiveness and egalitarianism. It is much easier to theorize these values than to pinpoint them in existing social reality by means of survey data. This fundamental problem of verifiability or falsifiability of value theories and their constructs must be resolved before one embarks upon macro analysis, which is all derived from micro analysis.

The literature on attitudes among ordinary men and women in a variety of societies suggests that a few major value orientations would have social and political import. These fundamental value orientations have been researched separately at length in order to probe how relevant they are and how their strength varies over time. Yet, there is hardly any research on how these value orientations relate to each

other. Any list of value orientations would have to be finite, as one may discover new value orientations tomorrow.

The study of political culture would gain from knowing more precisely how basic value orientations coexist among mass attitudes. To be more specific, one would wish to know:

- (1) How strong is the allegiance to the main value orientations?
- (2) Do some value orientations overlap among citizens? If so, how much?

Ideally, one would arrive at the geometry of value orientations, picturing the attitudes of mass publics as choices among a few basic values, allowing for the possibility of people adhering to more than one value. In practical terms, one would be able to analyse value orientations in the form of contingency tables, showing, for instance, how many people are at the same time so-called egalitarians and post-materialists, i.e. how strong is the relationship between egalitarianism and post-materialism. Similarly, one may wish to find out whether the trust attitude is more prevalent among so-called "egalitarians" than among "marketers".

The aim of this paper is to show the diversity of values, i.e. to demonstrate that the main theories of value orientations target alternative values among citizens. In fact, the overlap among these value orientations is not big, unless one employs a host of the same indicators to tap various values. First we examine the question of existence of value orientations and then we look at the amount of overlap between them in the attitudes of mass publics. Following the literature on values, we will cover post-materialism, social capital and New Culture theory. These theories all cover several value orientations, meaning they need to be unpacked. Here we will show that the key value orientations in the literature occur independent of each other in peoples' minds.

## 2. Values = Value orientations

In order to analyse how different values relate to each other, one needs to pay much attention to methodological questions. The key difficulties concern how the variety of value orientations is to be identified and measured by means of a set of valid and reliable indicators. One must avoid the use of the same indicator to tap the existence of two different value orientations. And

one must be cautious to tap one value orientation by means of a set of multiple indicators. At the same time, one should employ one and the same data source, such as e.g. the numerous World Value Surveys.

In sociological value analysis, it holds that

Values = Value Orientations.

Thus, in empirical value enquiry it is not a question of defining some abstract value, as within philosophy or moral theory, or trying to argue for a set of ethical values. Similarly, one does not estimate economic value, or benefits, costs or utility. By "value" is merely meant a value orientation that occurs in the minds of people. Thus, values in this approach exist only as attitudes in the minds of ordinary men and women.

Two problems are crucial in the micro analysis of these value orientations:

(P1) *Occurrence*: How to know whether a value exists? This is the same as enquiring into whether the corresponding value orientation *occurs* in a group of ordinary men and women.

(P2) *Content*: Which attitudes are involved in a particular value orientation? The only way to find out is to somehow ask the persons concerned by means of a battery of survey questions. The content is the indicator(s) employed to tap the relevant attitudes, or the correlation among alternative indicators or questions employed.

Let us exemplify what handling these two problems – occurrence and content – entail by examining some of the main value orientations discussed in the political science or sociological literature on values. Making an enquiry into how various value-orientations are related to each other is here an empirical project, as what matters is how ordinary people perceive the connections between values, whether logical or not.

## 3. Variety of Value Theories

The most discussed theories of value orientations or attitudes include post-materialism, social capital or trust, egalitarianism, individualism and gender or feminism; one would be inclined to say. Some scholars may wish perhaps to add one or two more theories. However,

in this paper we focus upon these. There is no reason for saying that this list is exhaustive. New value orientations may be identified in the future, reflecting either new insights when interpreting the data or a changing space of values in post-modern society.

One should not speak of post-modernism as *one* definitive coherent set of values. It is a philosophical theory about the post-modern society that harbours several different values. Instead, the basic aim when theorizing values orientations is to understand value conflicts in the post-modern society, as different groups cling to various values.

Actually, the question of how to validate the existence of a value among people's attitudes and behaviour involves serious considerations about how to resolve methodological problems concerning the match between indicator and concept. The enquiry into values is founded upon survey data, which entails having access to a myriad of response items. The question naturally arises as to which response item(s) one should pick in order to tap the existence of a value.

One may employ two strategies in order to tap the occurrence of a value. Either one searches for one indicator that would score high on validity and reliability. Or one attempts to use a number of indicators in order to measure the occurrence of a value orientation. Both research strategies have their pros and cons. Let us mention some of the methodological problems that arise in relation to the main theories of values, as we go along examining them one by one.

#### (a) Trust

The hypothesis that trust is an important element in political culture was already suggest-

ed in Almond and Verba (1963). It was further developed during the 1980s and 1990 in theories in social capital theory. It has been argued that a high level of trust is positive for politics, economics and society in general. We will test some of these claims when we in another paper move to macro analysis, studying whether differences between countries in terms of democracy or economic growth may be related to the occurrence of trust. Here, we deal only with the micro analysis of this value orientation.

Although theoretically plausible, various trust theories face the difficulty of specifying the proper indicator(s). One may employ three kinds of indicators on trust: (i) civic engagement, or membership in associations, (ii) general trust attitude; and (iii) permissiveness attitudes.

However, one must ask whether these three types of indicators do correlate strongly. It may be problematic to say that the same entity is tapped by three different indicators. The existence problem (P1) is critical in relation to trust as a value: How to know how much trust there is in a society? If one and the same concept is tapped by several indicators, then one would wish that these measures are related to each. Yet, one must recognize the possibility that there may exist alternative sources of social capital, i.e. substitutes.

Table 1. shows the correlations between indicators of civic engagement in terms of associational membership and a general index of civic engagement on the one hand and generalized trust on the other hand, based on World Values Surveys data from 33 countries, covering the period 1999-2002.



*Table 1.* Correlations between civic engagement and generalized trust  
(N=23,567)

INDICATORS CIVIC ENGAGEMENT	GENERALIZED TRUST
Social service for elderly	.02 (p<.000)
Church organization	-.01 (p=.192)
Cultural activities	.04 (p<.000)
Labour unions	.03 (p<.000)
Political parties	.03 (p<.000)
Local politics	-.01 (p=.087)
Human rights group	.01 (p=.153)
Ecological/ conservation movement	.003 (p=.653)
Professional association	.05 (p<.000)
Youth work	.01 (p=.136)
Sports or recreation	.03 (p<.000)
Women's group	.01 (p=.330)
Peace movement	-.04 (p<.000)
Association concerned with health	.002 (p<.758)
Scale of civic engagement (raw score)	.03 (p<.000)
Civic engagement (two groups)	.07 (Pearson and Spearman's rho, p<.000); .05 (Kendall's tau-b, p<.000)

One observes the low measures of associations in Table 1., meaning that people with strong trust attitudes are not especially involved in free associations, or vice versa. When there is an association of a determinate size, then it is mostly positive. Yet, one cannot claim that social capital is generated by one compact group of people, displaying much trust *and* participating in free associations. Thus, one may wish to distinguish clearly between two sources of social capital, civic engagement on the one hand and the trust attitude on the other hand.

In theories of trust, one often encounters the value orientation of permissiveness, meaning acceptance of others or tolerance. One

must distinguish between two kinds of permissiveness, *social permissiveness* linked with the acceptance of deviant behaviour among people that is not strictly speaking illegal, as well as *civic permissiveness* linked with the acceptance of behaviour that could be illegal. Let us here focus upon the first kind of permissiveness and enquire into whether it could be related to trust as attitude or civic engagement. Perhaps social permissiveness is a vital source of social capital in society, offering moderation and tolerance?

Table 2. shows the connection between membership in associations and attitudes indicating social permissiveness in the WVS data.

Table 2. Correlations between civic engagement and social permissiveness (N=23,567)

INDICATORS CIVIC ENGAGEMENT	CORRELATION WITH SOCIAL PERMISSIVENESS (raw score, 0-54)	CORRELATION WITH SOCIAL PERMISSIVENESS (two groups, <= median and >= median)
Social service for elderly	-.074 (rho, p<.000)	-.067 (Kendall's tau-b, p<.000)
Church organization	-.219 (rho, p<.000)	-.186 (tau-b, p<.000)
Cultural activities	.002 (rho, p=.755)	-.002 (tau-b, p=.713)
Labour unions	.039 (rho, p<.000)	.031 (tau-b, p<.000)
Political parties	-.078 (rho, p<.000)	-.070 (tau-b, p<.000)
Local politics	-.102 (rho, p<.000)	-.090 (tau-b, p<.000)
Human rights group	-.046 (rho, p<.000)	-.043 (tau-b, p<.000)
Ecological / conservation movement	-.023 (rho, p<.000)	-.021 (tau-b, p=.001)
Professional association	-.001 (rho, p=.823)	-.003 (tau-b, p=.630)
Youth work	-.037 (rho, p<.000)	-.043 (tau-b, p<.000)
Sports or recreation	.047 (rho, p<.000)	.042 (tau-b, p<.000)
Women's group	-.098 (rho, p<.000)	-.090 (tau-b, p<.000)
Peace movement	-.101 (rho, p<.000)	-.085 (tau-b, p<.000)
Association concerned with health	-.065 (rho, p<.000)	-.058 (tau-b, p<.000)
Scale of civic engagement (raw score)	-.084 (Spearman's rho, p<.000)	-.079 Spearman's rho, p<.000)
Civic engagement (two groups)	-.020 (rho, p<.002)	-.025 (tau-b, p<.000)

The findings from Table 2. indicate a weak negative association between civic engagement and social permissiveness. One cannot, thus, say that people who tend to participate in free associations also tend to be favourable towards the acceptance of deviant behaviour. On the contrary, these people are if anything slightly less favourable to social permissiveness than people with no or little civic engagement.

In Table 3., we examine the relationship between the trust attitude and social permissiveness.

Interestingly, Table 3. indicates a fairly strong and positive association between trust and social permissiveness. Thus, one may conclude that among people who display trust in others there is a tendency towards the tolerance of deviant behaviour.

Table 3. Correlations between generalized trust and social permissiveness (N=23,567)

	CORRELATION WITH SOCIAL PERMISSIVENESS (raw score, 0-54)	CORRELATION WITH SOCIAL PERMISSIVENESS (two groups, <= median and >= median)
GENERALIZED TRUST	.112 (Spearman's rho, p<.000)	.096 (Kendall's tau-b, p<.000)

#### 4. Summing-Up

We would be inclined to argue that trust is best measured by the general trust attitude, which indicates that on an average roughly 25% in society harbours this value. It varies from one society to another, rising from a low 7% and 8% in Tanzania and Uganda to 58% and 48% in Finland and Japan, respectively, to be discussed in the macro analysis. The generalized trust attitude may be considered as one source of social capital in society, but social capital may have other sources as well, like civic engagement. Only between the groups of people with high trust and with strong social permissiveness is there a considerable overlap. One should, however, not consider permissiveness as a key dimension of social capital but rather look upon it as a value orientation of its own with two modes: social and civic permissiveness.

##### (b) Post-materialism

The theme of post-materialism has attracted as much attention as trust theory, coming out of the many publications by R. Inglehart and associates. It definitely seemed to capture something new in politics and society that went beyond the traditional ideologies of the industrial society, when it was launched in the 1970s. It should not be confused with the theme of post-modernism as a philosophical theory, especially strong in France, about the nature of the society that has replaced the industrial society.

The occurrence of post-materialist values has been tapped by first a four battery response items and later on a twelve battery response items. The theory of post-materialism has itself developed, from an emphasis first upon especially "green" values to later a general endorsement of self-expression values. One now employs an even larger set of response items on the basis of the claim that a variety of diverse

post-modern attitudes tend to correlate highly with post-materialism (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). We find this questionable. This expansion of the theme is perhaps unfortunate, as one really cannot claim scientifically that one set of values is more modern or post-modern than another set.

As environmentalism in particular is not the same as self-expression in general, one must look into the coherence of the content of the post-materialist value orientation – the problem (P2) above. Do post-materialist values exist or occur together in a transparently coherent manner in the sample of citizens? And how strong would post-materialism be, if it exists, meaning how many people adhere to those values? And one must ask: How to measure self-expression, given the importance given to this value by Inglehart? Here we will focus upon the classical definition of post-materialism from Inglehart's earlier work.

The question of identification of post-materialism and the ensuing problem of coherence among the attitudes mentioned in these various survey batteries – 4 questions or 12 questions – are decisive for any empirical application of this theory. One do not ask people whether they are post-materialist or not – how could they tell or define such an abstract concept? The post-materialist value orientation is a *construct* based upon replies to survey batteries of simple questions. The survey technique employed consists basically of offering respondents four options, where they are to rank two as first priority and two as second priority. A materialist rank certain items first and other items second. The same is true of a post-materialist, although he/she would have the reversed priorities.

Yet, Table 4. shows that most people reply mixed on the classical four-item battery tapping post-materialism. And the group that endorses its values fully is not very big, as a matter of fact.

Table 4. Frequency table for post-materialism (4-item index, N=49,546)

Category	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Materialist	15436	31.2	31.2
Mixed	28428	57.4	88.5
Post-materialist	5682	11.5	100.0
Total	49546	100.0	

The fact that so many people are neither clear materialists nor clear post-materialists seems to indicate that the existence of this value orientation is more problematic than recognized in the literature. The association between ecology and self-expression is not as strong as Inglehart has posited.

We suggest that one separates environmentalism from self-expression, the former focussing upon "green" values and the latter targeting personal integrity, free choice and self-autonomy. One should not include trust in self-expression, forming a general post-modernist value orientation, as Welzel and Inglehart (2005) does, but remain open to the possibility that various value orientations may overlap only to some extent. This should be researched by means of the analysis of associations among values. Moreover, we suggest in another paper that self-expression be best tapped by permissiveness.

### (c) Egalitarianism

A most ambitious attempt at capturing the various key and conflicting value orientations in the post-modern society has been made by a group of scholars, launching the so-called *New Culture Theory* (Ellis, Thompson and Wildavsky, 1990). In *New Culture Theory*, the basic confrontation between values would be that between egalitarianism and individualism, as it seems most relevant for understanding electoral choice and public policy. The other two values advanced in *New Culture Theory* – hierarchy and fatalism – are more difficult to apply, at least in relation to survey research. *New Culture Theory* employs all kinds of evidence, and thus not only survey data, engaging also in historical interpretation of behaviour as expressing various value orientations (see e.g. Thomson, Michael, G. Grendstad, and P. Selle (1999) and Wildavsky (2006)).

Egalitarianism would favour equality in a general sense. But the concept of equality is a complex one with many nuances or aspects to it, such as the distinction between equality of opportunities and equality of results. Thus, one would wish to separate economic equality from gender equality, as socialism or communism did not always harbour the values of feminism. In any case, feminism may promote values other

than economic equality between men and women, such as nursing values for instance. It may be pointed out that Wildavsky (1991) interpreted radical egalitarianism in a most general manner, covering also environmentalism for instance. Thus, the concept of egalitarianism to Wildavsky covers all forms of priorities given to real equality as opposed to equality of opportunity. He considered the interpretation of equality to be the main value issue with egalitarianism and individualism. Thus, Wildavsky included the movement for animal rights into egalitarianism besides the groups who target economic equality and redistribution somehow.

Very controversial is the hypothesis of a *bias* linked with all forms of value orientations, also egalitarianism. Douglas and Wildavsky suggested that risk is a basic dimension of values, as the attitude towards risk would play a major role in behaviour and influence future expectations.

One may regard this hypothesis about risk as an additional one that is not really necessary for the analysis of egalitarianism. It involves a clear rejection of one alternative concept of risk, namely the precautionary approach to risk. People who adhere to a very restrictive conception of risk, being risk-averse, are said to do so because they may *blame* the existing system for all the misdeeds that it produces. Thus, we arrive at a *bias – blame* theory that is really outside of the more precise and narrow attitude of egalitarianism. Actually, this hypothesis about politics, blame and blame avoidance stimulated a whole literature within public policy with for example Christopher Hood and associates (Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 2001). Here, we focus only upon egalitarianism strictly as a set of attitudes towards mainly economic outcomes.

We would emphasize that one captures more of values diversity if one employs more specific indicators and then enquires into their possible interrelationships. The four categories of values or value orientations in NCT – egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchy and fatalism – may actually be too broad for the purpose of empirical analysis. They should be unpacked into several value orientations. Table 5. reports on one indicator on attitudes towards economic egalitarianism.

*Table 5.* Frequency table for economic egalitarianism (preference for more equal income distribution, N=49,546)

Category	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Least egalitarian	7541	15.2	15.2
1	2628	5.3	20.5
2	3232	6.5	27.0
3	2855	5.8	32.8
4	5985	12.1	44.9
5	3799	7.7	52.6
6	4863	9.8	62.4
7	6069	12.2	74.6
8	3384	6.8	81.5
Most egalitarian	9190	18.5	100.0
Total	49546	100.0	

The evidence presented in Table 5. suggests that the ordinary opinion with men and women is fairly equally divided in relation to the relevance of economic equality. Rather sizeable minorities at the two extremes either completely reject or fully endorse equality of income and wealth. Clearly, this attitude towards equality must have some political implications, when voters evaluate candidates and policies. Here, we would like to know whether this form of egalitarianism – for or against economic equality – is linked in the minds of ordinary citizens with other values, such as environmentalism and feminism. The opposite value orientation to egalitarianism is sometimes called “individualism” and sometimes “achievement orientation”. Here, we look at individualism as a value orientation.

#### **(d) Individualism**

It must be underlined that there is no neat concept of individualism to draw upon when linking it with response items in surveys. What

is vital is to distinguish it from self-expression. In New Culture Theory, individualists are considered competitors, which is actually the opposite to one of the key values in self-expression, namely self-fulfilment and leisure. Whether individualists score high also on trust but low on environmentalism, feminism and self-expression is, in our view, an open question to be settled by empirical enquiry. Thus, one must take care to develop indicators on individualism that do not anticipate any findings about how this value relates to other values, like self-expression. Whether competition is the best indicator to use to tap the occurrence of individualism is debatable, as one may wish to separate between competition as a social norm - market competition and competition as an individual ideal - the achievement orientation.

Table 6. indicates the occurrence of individualism as competition in the sample, where aggregated scores for society may vary considerably.



Table 6. Frequency table for individualism (assessment of competition, N=89,379)

Category	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Least favourable toward competition	5805	6.5	6.5
1	6624	7.4	13.9
2	18633	20.8	34.8
3	21850	24.4	59.2
Most favourable toward competition	36467	40.8	100.0
Total	89379	100.0	

Note: As these variables were added subsequently to the already cleaned dataset, N=89,379 for this variable is higher than the usual N = 49,546.

Not unexpectedly, the embracement of market competition is strong among ordinary people, a large minority believing that competition is favourable to the consumer, bringing down prices and increasing quantities. Only a small minority is little favourable to market competition. Yet, it is an open question whether the attitude towards market competition goes together with an individual achievement orientation. People could, of course, support the principle of competition in the economy, being sceptical about government intervention and large public spending, while at the same abstaining from trying themselves to become a successful achiever. Individualism is thus not easy to operationalise.

### (e) Gender or feminism

Finally, one of the major themes in the debate on values change has been the rise of gender or feminism. Although it holds true that feminism harbours a set of value orientations, from less radical ones to extremely radical ones, we make here only a minor effort to tap the strength of feminism in general. One may enlarge feminism to cover also environmentalism, as in deep ecology, as well as attitudes towards homosexuality. However, we underline again a restrained employment of indicators. Yet, the overall status of gender rights may be tapped by a few indicators on attitudes towards the roles of men and women.

Table 7. shows that gender values are widespread yet not universal in the sample, as measured with respondents' attitude toward the notion that women need to have children in order to be fulfilled.

Table 7. Frequency table for gender egalitarianism (need for woman to have children in order to be fulfilled, N = 49,546)

Category	Frequency	Percent
Not necessary	19867	40.1
Needs children	29679	59.9
Total	49546	100.0

The image of the post-modern society as favouring the formal equality between men and women as human beings is strongly supported by the evidence in Table 7. Almost a majority accepts that women may defend their place in society without falling back upon their reproductive capacity. One may in a deeper enquiry wish to tap the gender values by examining other indicators upon this value orientation, such as equal pay and affirmative action.

### 5. Overlapping value orientations?

In our view, any enquiry into how value orientations tend to cluster in groups of human beings must be based on a micro methodology. One must especially take care to avoid any and all forms of ecological fallacy, where one would claim that since for example post-materialism

and feminism receive much support in the same societies, these two value orientations tend to be linked at the individual level. It is probably true that for instance egalitarianism and environmentalism are both strong in advanced societies, but one certainly cannot conclude that one group with egalitarian attitude overlaps with the other group with environmental attitude, at the micro level. One must start from the micro analysis of each single value orientation and then proceed to enquire into how various groups of human beings endorse different values.

By using indicators on a variety of values in a restricted manner, one opens for an interesting empirical research into group formation in society, where some values occur predominantly with one group whereas others occur in a mixed manner. How, then, do the main values identified in Tables 1.-7. mix in the sample?

Table 8. Correlations between key variables

	Civic engagement (two groups)	Generalized Trust	Post materialism	Economic egalitarianism	Individualism (attitude toward competition)	Gender egalitarianism (need for woman to have children)
Civic engagement (two groups)	---	.085 (p<.000)	.097 (p<.000)	.030 (p<.000)	-.005 (p=.330)	-.108 (p<.000)
Generalized Trust	.085 (p<.000)	---	.077 (p<.000)	-.024 (p<.000)	.018 (p<.000)	-.076 (p<.000)
Post-materialism	.097 (p<.000)	.077 (p<.000)	---	.016 (p=.001)	.003 (p=.524)	-.176 (p<.000)
Economic egalitarianism	.030 (p<.000)	-.024 (p<.000)	.016 (p=.001)	---	-.016 (p=.001)	.014 (p=.002)
Individualism (attitude toward competition)	-.005 (p=.330)	.018 (p<.000)	.003 (p=.524)	-.016 (p=.001)	---	-.003 (p=.569)
Gender egalitarianism (need for woman to have children)	-.108 (p<.000)	-.076 (p<.000)	-.176 (p<.000)	.014 (p=.002)	-.003 (p=.569)	---

Two major findings stand out in Table 8. Firstly, it holds that these value orientations – post-materialism, trust, egalitarianism, feminism and individualism – are truly independent of each other to a high degree. Thus, there is no measure of association that indicates a strong overlap between the various groups who cherish these values. This constitutes strong evidence for the *heterogeneity of values* among ordinary people. One can not assume that values tend to co-vary, as the groups with these value orientations do not tend to have the same members.

Secondly, one may observe a few weak associations among some of these value orientations, although they are not strong ones. Thus, one notes that post-materialism weakly co-varies positively with feminism as well as that individualism and egalitarianism tend to co-vary weakly and negatively. Trust tends to be associated weakly with civic engagement and post-materialism. Based upon the findings in Table 8., one may question the claim that there is ONE coherent post-modern set of values (Inglehart and Welzel and Klingemann, 2003). We argue in favour of the diversity of values in the post-modern society, as the major value orientations do not covary considerably.

## 6. Conclusion

In the research into values in the post-modern society, one finds a few major themes:

- (i) Trust or social capital
- (ii) Post-materialism
- (iii) Egalitarianism
- (iv) Individualism or the achievement orientation
- (v) Gender or feminism.

Perhaps the list could be made longer, as it results not from a strict theoretical derivation but from the literature review comprising the observation of facts about attitudes with men and women. In any case, what the above analysis shows is that value orientations may be documented using one common source of data, the World Value Surveys. And the findings include both estimate of the size of the groups of people adhering to these values and the important point that these value orientations do not overlap to any great extent. Thus, the findings have established both the *variety and independence* of values in post-modern society.

Research into value-orientations is currently enjoying an impressive renaissance. Attempts to survey people's values have proliferated since the 1990s with the arrival of the WVS data framework. The concept of social or societal values has acquired great relevance in the social sciences. Yet, difficult theoretical problems remain to be resolved. Broadening the analysis of empirical values that ordinary people adhere to somehow from value-orientations to all kinds of societal values, one must refrain from any reductionist ambition to find one basic (modern, democratic) cluster of values. Rejecting the results of such monist ambitions (as with C. Welzel), we underline value complexity or heterogeneity as well as value conflict in today's society (see early research by M. Rokeach, Suhonen, 1985). One may employ Habermas's opposing concepts - system and life-world - as a starting point for systematising societal values, but it is a question of opposing values, where none can be singled out as the post-modern ones. In any democracy there is value conflict, as Max Weber always emphasized.

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**APPENDIX. DATA AND INDICATORS**

*Appendix 1.* Sample (source: World Values Surveys, Integrated Data File, 1999-2002, Release, ICPSR 3975)

Country / Region	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Albania	820	1.7	1.7
Argentina	1044	2.1	3.8
Bangladesh	1315	2.7	6.4
Belgium	1563	3.2	9.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1068	2.2	11.7
Bulgaria	762	1.5	13.3
Belarus	761	1.5	14.8
Canada	1709	3.4	18.2
Chile	1080	2.2	20.4
China	728	1.5	21.9
Croatia	857	1.7	23.6
Czech Republic	1661	3.4	27.0
Estonia	749	1.5	28.5
Finland	857	1.7	30.2
France	1389	2.8	33.0
Iceland	779	1.6	34.6
India	1389	2.8	37.4
Italy	1661	3.4	40.8
Japan	534	1.1	41.8
Korea	1002	2.0	43.9
Lithuania	689	1.4	45.2
Luxembourg	821	1.7	46.9
Mexico	1218	2.5	49.4
Moldova	757	1.5	50.9
Morocco	1005	2.0	52.9
Netherlands	965	1.9	54.9
Peru	1374	2.8	57.6
Philippines	1153	2.3	60.0
Poland	888	1.8	61.8
Puerto Rico	651	1.3	63.1
Romania	891	1.8	64.9
Russia	2022	4.1	69.0
Singapore	1439	2.9	71.9
Vietnam	811	1.6	73.5
Slovenia	871	1.8	75.2
South Africa	2655	5.4	80.6
Zimbabwe	920	1.9	82.5
Spain	1010	2.0	84.5
Uganda	969	2.0	86.5
Ukraine	896	1.8	88.3
Macedonia	888	1.8	90.1
Tanzania	898	1.8	91.9
United States of America	1076	2.2	94.0
Venezuela	1142	2.3	96.3
Serbia	971	2.0	98.3
Montenegro	838	1.7	100.0
Total	49546	100.0	

*Appendix 2. Social capital, post-materialism and egalitarianism: concepts, variables and indicators*  
(based on World and European Values Surveys, 1999-2002)

Concept	Variable	Indicator description
Civic Engagement	Civic Engagement (raw score)	<i>Summated rating scale</i> measuring the raw score on 14 indicators (see below) of associational membership (Cronbach's alpha = .7) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
	Civic Engagement (two groups)	<i>Two-group (dichotomic) summated rating scale</i> assigning the value 0 to respondents with scores ≤ median standardized mean score and the value 1 to respondents scoring > median on the standardized scale – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
	Membership in social welfare service for elderly	Dummy variable indicating whether respondents belong to a social welfare service for elderly people (0 = not mentioned; 1 = belongs) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
	Membership in church organisation	Analogous to the above
	Membership in cultural organisation	Analogous to the above
	Membership in labour union	Analogous to the above
	Membership in political parties	Analogous to the above
	Membership in local political party	Analogous to the above
	Membership in human rights group	Analogous to the above
	Membership in conservation, ecological or animal rights group	Analogous to the above
	Membership in professional association	Analogous to the above
	Membership in youth work organization	Analogous to the above
	Membership in sports or recreational group	Analogous to the above
	Membership in women's group	Analogous to the above
	Membership in peace movement	Analogous to the above
Membership in association concerned with health	Analogous to the above	
Generalized Trust	Generalized trust	Dichotomic variable indicating whether the respondent is generally trusting (0 = „you need to be very careful“; 1 = „most people can be trusted“) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
Post-materialism	Post-materialism index	Index based on responses to four items measuring the degree to which individuals have a materialist or post materialist value orientation (0 = materialist; 1 = mixed; 2 = post materialist) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
Economic egalitarianism	Preference for income inequality	Scale indicating the extent to which respondents favour a more equal income distribution (0-9) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
	Preference for income inequality (four groups)	Simplified scale measuring the degree to which respondents favour a more equal income distribution (0-4) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
Gender egalitarianism	Priority of scarce jobs for men	Indicator measuring whether respondents give priority for scarce jobs to men rather than to women (0 = disagrees; 1 = neither disagrees nor agrees; 2 = agrees) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
	Obligation for women to have children	Dichotomic variable measuring whether respondents think a woman has to have children (0 = not necessary; 1 = necessary) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
	Duty to contribute to household for husband and wife	Indicator measuring respondent's (dis)agreement with the notion that husband and wife should contribute equally to the household income – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
Individualism	Assessment of competition	Respondents' attitude toward competition on a scale from 0 (“competition is good”) to 9 (“competition is harmful”) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
	Assessment of competition (five groups)	Respondents' attitude toward competition on a scale from 0 (“competition is harmful”) to 4 (“competition is good”) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
	Assessment of possible social change toward more emphasis on individual	Respondents' attitude regarding social change toward greater emphasis on individuals (0 = “good”, 1 = “don't mind”, 2 = “bad”) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
Social Permissiveness	Social Permissiveness (raw scores)	<i>Summated rating scale</i> measuring the aggregated score on six ordinal-level indicators (see below) measuring the justifiability of behaviour related to the social-cultural dimension of permissiveness (Cronbach's alpha = 0.83) – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>
	Social Permissiveness (two groups)	<i>Two-group (dichotomic) standardized average summated rating scale</i> assigning the value 0 to respondents with scores ≤ median standardized mean score and the value 1 to respondents scoring > median on the standardized scale – <i>ordinal level of measurement</i>

## Postmoderno društvo: Koje su temeljne vrijednosne orijentacije?

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### Sažetak

Političko ponašanje poput glasovanja ili lojalnosti političkim strankama danas je manje funkcija društvene strukture, a više izraz vrijednosne orijentacije koju izborni tijelo gaji. Nova istraživanja političke kulture rezultirala su mnogobrojnim nalazima koji se dotiču uloge dominantnih vrijednosnih orijentacija, poput postmaterijalizma, povjerenja, kao i roda, egalitarizma i individualizma. U ovom članku bavimo se pitanjem koje još nije razriješeno u istraživanju političke kulture, naime pitanjem jesu li dominantne vrijednosne orijentacije *neovisne* jedne o drugima. Pokazujemo kako je to doista slučaj, što znači da obični ljudi imaju višestruke vrijednosne orijentacije koje povećavaju kompleksnost politike u postmodernom društvu. Uistinu nije moguće govoriti o *jednom* sklopu vrijednosti koji bi konstituirao vrijednosni sklop *samog* postmodernog društva.

**Ključne riječi:** vrijednosti, indikatori, vrijednosna orijentacija, socijalni kapital, egalitarizam, WVS, hipoteza neovisnosti, postmaterijalizam, rod i povjerenje