

Memory and Imagery in Russell's *The Analysis of Mind**

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ABSTRACT: According to the theory Russell defends in *The Analysis of Mind*, ‘true memories’ (roughly, memories that are not remembering-hows) are recollections of past events accompanied by a feeling of familiarity. While memory images play a vital role in this account, Russell does not pay much attention to the fact that imagery plays different roles in different sorts of memory. In most cases that Russell considers, memory is based on an image that serves as a datum (image-based memories), but there are other cases in which memory judgment requires an image without being based on it (answer-memories). A good example for the former is when a person, asked what the colour of the sea was last afternoon, recalls an image and forms a judgment on this basis. In the second case she may recognize the sea and entertain a memory image of it without ‘reading off’ the memory judgment from this picture. That is, the image does not prompt but itself *is part of* the propositional content of answer memories. Since in this latter case the feeling of familiarity is constitutive of the recollection but cannot serve as its explanans, answer memories do not conform to Russell’s account. According to Lindsay Judson this is not a vice of the theory, since Russell never meant to extend it to answer memories. Despite having a certain appeal of benevolence, Judson’s interpretation is not supported by textual evidence. Taking side with David Pears, I will argue that Russell did not properly differentiate between image-based memory and answer memory, and illegitimately extended his theory to the latter.

KEYWORDS: answer memory, definite reference, image-based memory, Judson, memory, non-conceptual content, Pears, Russell, simple judgment memory, true memory

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0. Introduction

Throughout his philosophical career, Bertrand Russell defended numerous different theories of memory. In *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912) he presented a direct realist account, and in *The Analysis of Mind (AM)* (1921) he switched to a representational theory. Of course, his views underwent a number of changes so that he held various hybrid theories between these two dates.

On the direct realist account of memory, we are directly aware of the past. When we are remembering, the objects of memory are always the past occurrences themselves; nothing mediates between the past occurrence and the remembering person. This is why this view has come to be known as a *direct acquaintance* account. Russell's views gradually underwent considerable changes in the coming years. By 1919 he abandoned the doctrine of acquaintance, and in *The Analysis of Mind* he put forward a quite different theory of memory. This account – the representational theory of memory – has it that objects of memory cannot be the past occurrences themselves for the simple reason that we are in the present but past occurrences have already passed. So some third element is required to bridge the gap between past occurrence and present memory. According to the representational account what connects the past occurrence and the memory state is a memory image. Memory images are copies of the sensational 'prototypes' the subject had at the time of the original experience. They also have propositional content; so to say, memories *mean* the past occurrences they result from.¹

If a theory of memory is to get off the ground at all, it has to answer the question of how to tell apart memory and other mental states. In that respect, Russell's theory is often taken to be a clear advancement over most of his representationalist predecessors. For Hume, for example, what differentiates memory from other mental states like perception or dreaming is its lower vivacity and forcefulness. For Russell, by contrast, what makes an image a memory image depends not on its intrinsic qualitative properties but on its representational relations to the subject who remembers.²

What makes it the case that a certain mental state is a memory state? In Russell's view, what is special about memory is that it is always accompanied by a special feeling of familiarity, a sense that something qualita-

¹ My thanks to the anonymous referee who suggested that Russell's view be stated in a clearer way.

² This difference is nicely fleshed out by Sutton (2008).

tively similar has happened, and this prompts a memory belief.³ That the definitive mark of memory is the feeling of familiarity would also explain the fact that memory beliefs come by different degrees: the stronger the feeling of familiarity is, the more confident one will be in her memory belief.⁴

Russell's theory, and Russell-inspired representational theories in general, have been subject to vehement criticism in the second half of the 20th century. However, I will not be concerned with these usual objections. Instead of criticizing representational theories in general, I will try to show that there is a tension, if not incoherence, in Russell's concept of memory. In particular I shall discuss David Pears's charge that Russell's theory implies a narrowed conception of what memory is; some cases of memory that escape Russell's analysis make it untenable. On the other hand, Lindsay Judson argued that Russell's theory is not wrong but has a limited scope: it was never *meant* to explain all kinds of memory, only what Russell called 'true' memories.

I will argue for the first interpretation: Russell did mean to extend his theory to some cases to which it does not in fact apply. In section 1, I will demarcate the sort of memory – true or paradigmatic memory – Russell's analysis was intended to explain. In section 2, I will distinguish two sorts of memory that conform to Russell's definition of true memory: image-based and answer memories. It will be shown that Russell's analysis cannot explain the latter. Sections 3 and 4 are mostly exegetical: evidence will be presented to the effect that – *pace* Judson, but in lines with Pears's claim – Russell did mean to extend his theory to answer memories, so it can be described more accurately as mistaken than as having a limited scope.

1. True and Habitual Memory

I shall begin this section by introducing the most important elements of the conceptual map relevant to the problems to be dealt with here. Russell distinguished between various kinds of memories, many of which will not be discussed here. The first distinction is to be drawn between

³ Sometimes Russell appears to have thought that the feeling of familiarity does not consist in a sense of "something like this happened" but rather in a sense of "this happened". Note, however, Russell's caveat that the word "this" is vague here. As he remarked, "the judgment that what is familiar has been experienced before is a product of reflection, and it is no part of the feeling of familiarity." (Russell 1921: 169). See section 4, where this interpretative question becomes crucial to my reasoning.

⁴ Russell (1921: 161–2)

immediate memory which stores representations for short periods of time (up to cca. 30 seconds according to Russell) and remote memory. Remote memories are to be further divided into true memories and habitual memories.

The term ‘true memory’ comes from Henri Bergson. In his use, ‘true memory’ means paradigmatic rather than veridical memory, and is always a memory of a particular event in the past experienced by the subject. Russell takes this concept of true memory over, although he is a bit more lenient: he also includes memory *judgments* which are based on true memories about particular events. For instance, the judgment ‘that picture was not on the wall before’ counts as a paradigmatic memory if it is based on a single perception of the wall.⁵

Habitual memories, on the other hand, are based on the acquisition of certain habits. The dividing line between habitual and true memories is notably difficult to pin down. First, ‘habitual’ is broader than what contemporary philosophers normally mean by ‘know-how’; so the habitual/true distinction ought not to be understood as the more familiar practical/propositional one. There is nothing in habitual memories that might preclude them from having propositional content. Second, the distinction is not to be confused with the duality of dispositional as opposed to manifest remembering either: a habitual memory can very well be as occurrent as any true memory.⁶

So what is the difference? The essential point here is that a person who habitually remembers is not in the most direct possible contact with the past occurrence. Habitual memory is mediated by some mechanism other than a memory image (Judson dubs this mechanism ‘story-telling habit’.)⁷ In such cases, words will play the role that images play in true memories. Suppose, for example, that someone remembers how she has learnt a certain poem by heart. By some later time she has completely lost all her memory images of that event, but she still remembers the poem. This is a case of habitual memory: it does not consist of calling an object to mind and, more importantly, it does not refer to any concrete event in the subject’s life. In order to remember the poem, one is not required to relive a picture representing the process of learning; the rememberer in this case ‘just remembers’. I would like to stress, however, that habitual memory need not be devoid of image. The point is that it does not

⁵ Judson (1987: 67–8).

⁶ Malcolm (1977: 60).

⁷ Judson (1987: 66–7).

necessarily involve image, and no corresponding belief about the past is prompted by it.⁸

An odd consequence of Russell's theory has probably not escaped the reader's attention: apparently, it is very easy for a true memory to become habitual, and this is often the case when we regularly and routinely invoke a past experience. So it is not an overstatement to say that on Russell's account, the overwhelming majority of our memories are not true but habitual. In that case, 'genuine' is a better synonym for 'true' than paradigmatic.

Having established the most important distinctions for Russell's theory, in the next section I turn to Pears's criticism of this account, and then to Judson's response.

2. Three Kinds of What Might be Considered True Memory

As indicated above, a memory in Russell's view has to satisfy two criteria in order to count as true: (1) a true memory is always a memory of a particular event or experience *or* is based on such a memory, and (2) the link between the original memory and the present recollection must not be established by a 'story-telling habit'. It should be emphasized that this twofold tenet is only a reconstruction which both Pears and Judson seem to subscribe to; Russell himself did not explicitly endorse these two criteria, nor did he make any attempt to provide anything like a definition of true memory. From now on, I shall assume that this understanding of Russell is correct.

It has already been mentioned that imagery and the feeling of familiarity play a crucial role in Russell's representational account. Besides being necessary ingredients of memory, they are also explanatory of it. That is, it is the feeling of familiarity that *makes* a mental state an instance of memory. Let us take, for example, a case discussed in *AM*. A person remembers how a certain wall looked like on a previous occasion. On Russell's account, it goes like this: Our protagonist sees a wall; some time elapses. At a later time, she entertains a picture of the occasion. The picture feels familiar, so our protagonist judges: "I have experienced something like this before." Following Judson's terminology, let us call these imagery-based recollections image-based memories.⁹ Image-based memories like the one just mentioned give rise to correct memory-beliefs and conform to the two criteria attributed to Russell.

⁸ For more on the possibility of habitual memories accompanied by imagery, see section 3 and its references.

⁹ Judson used the term MI-based memory, which I take the liberty to simplify here.

Pears's trouble is that apparently there are cases of memory which satisfy conditions (1) and (2), thereby counting as true memories, but which nonetheless resist this kind of analysis. Judson distinguishes two such cases, simple judgment memories and answer memories.¹⁰

While telling apart simple judgment memories and image-based memories is an easy task – simple judgment memories are not accompanied by imagery –, the difference between answer memories and image-based memories is a subtler one. Answer memories do involve a pictorial element, yet they cannot be explained by the feeling of familiarity. In order to see the difference between image-based and answer memories, compare the following two cases. In Case 1, someone is asked whether the colour of the sea yesterday was marble blue. The person interrogated starts wondering what happened the previous day, and after going through the various different recollections of yesterday's events, she recalls the colour of the sea and forms a conceptual answer – something like 'the sea looked marble blue yesterday.' In Case 2, our protagonist is not asked *whether* the sea was marble but, say, *what sort of* blue it was. In that case, she may first have a very vivid recollection of a marble sea scene and then form the judgment: '*That* was the colour of the sea yesterday!' (If shown a picture, she would also probably point to it, saying that *that* is exactly what she had in mind.)¹¹

What the above example shows is that image is involved in both kinds of memory but it plays different roles. In Case 1, the memory and the corresponding propositional answer to the query are based on an image. The process of remembering starts by recalling yesterday's scenes, then forming a conceptual answer, and finally coming up with the right answer (image-based memory). In Case 2, however, one does not have to start by visualizing the reminiscences and then form a (purely) conceptual answer. There are certain questions to which the imagery itself is the answer or, at least, part of the answer. It is entirely correct to point to some constituent

¹⁰ Judson (1987: 69). Simple judgment memories are supposed to be cases of memory which are neither based on imagery nor mediated by 'learnt-by-heart' processes (for that would make them habitual). Sometimes, it is said, we just 'know immediately' what happened in the past without experiencing anything like 'reliving' or 'seeing the event again'. Pears does not mention simple judgment memories at all, but Judson argues that it is "in the spirit of Pears's interpretation" to include them. However, it could be argued that Russell's definition can be easily amended by a third criterion that makes explicit reference to images so as to exclude simple judgment memories from the problematic cases. In this paper I remain agnostic about this option and omit the discussion of simple judgment memories.

¹¹ Thanks to Guo Peng for pinpointing numerous flaws in my earlier presentation of these two cases.

of the original scene, or a picture thereof, and say that *this* is what one's memory represents. It is no more peculiar than answering the question which song one is currently listening to by simply humming the tune (and, perhaps, adding that it is *that* song). In Judson's words:

The judgment in this case requires the image [...], but it is not *based* on it: the recollection is neither prompted nor explained by the image's feeling right, for that (the recognition that *this* was the colour of the sea) is just what constitutes the recollection.¹²

By now it should be clear that memory image plays different roles in these two sorts of memory. In image-based memories the image occurs as a *datum*. It is not part of the memory state but the latter is based on it. By contrast, in answer memories the image plays the role of a *symbol*.¹³ Take, for instance, the answer memory and its content '*this* is how the sea looked yesterday', where the demonstrative '*this*' stands for an image. This image plays just the same role as the string of words '*is how the sea looked yesterday*' in the propositional content of this memory. In short, the image does not prompt but itself *is part of* the propositional content of answer memories. However, memory cannot be explained by the imagery if it is, in turn, part of the propositional content; once imagery is a constitutive element of the memory state, it is part of what is to be explained. It cannot be an explanans and an explanandum at the same time; so answer memories pose a problem for Russell's account.

Two questions naturally press themselves upon us. First, how are we to understand the claim that in answer memories the image is *part of* the propositional answer? How can an image be part of a proposition? Second, why is this claim supposed to imply that the feeling of familiarity cannot explain answer memories?

Let me start with the first question. Russell clearly held the view that pictures can be parts of propositions. In *AM*, he is pretty explicit about this:

We may extend the term "proposition" so as to cover the image-contents of beliefs consisting of images. Thus, in the case of remembering a room in which the window is to the left of the door, when we believe the image-content the proposition will consist of the image of the window on the left together with the image of the door on the right. We will distinguish propositions of this kind as "image-propositions" and propositions in words as "word-propositions." (241)

¹² Judson (1988: 68). Emphasis in the original.

¹³ I borrow this distinction from Pears.

Not much later he adds:

Our more elementary beliefs, notably those that are added to sensation to make perception, often remain at the level of images. [...] It would seem that image-propositions are more primitive than word-propositions, and may well ante-date language. (242)

In light of these quotations, it is entirely faithful to Russell's spirit to hold that nothing precludes a memory from having an image as part of its propositional content.

Now to the second question: why is the claim that imagery is part of the propositional content of answer memories supposed to imply that the feeling of familiarity cannot explain answer memories? I believe that once it is accepted that the propositional content of answer memories has a pictorial element, the conclusion that answer memories escape Russell's analysis becomes unavoidable. In order to see this, let us recall how the feeling of familiarity is supposed to explain true memories. Someone relives a picture, then forms a conceptual judgment, and finally finds herself with a memory belief. The reason we attribute memory and not some other sort of mental state to her is that she has a peculiar attitude to the content of this mental state. This is what Russell calls the feeling of familiarity. The image feels familiar to the subject and on *this* ground she forms a judgment.

There is a sharp contrast between cases in which the content is caused by the image and those in which the image is part of the content. In the latter case, the image is the product of an attempt at recollection and as such it cannot be the *result* of the picture feeling familiar. And, recall, the feeling of familiarity is a relational element in Russell's theory: it tells us that what makes a mental state an instance of memory is that the subject is appropriately related to it. Now it appears that this explanation is inapplicable to answer memories. The subject does not *first* entertain a picture and *then* contemplates whether it is familiar; the picture is 'given' in the mental state, so the question of familiarity does not even arise. There is no image separate from the propositional content, thus it just makes no sense to say that there is any resemblance between them. So Judson is right in stating that the feeling of familiarity is "out of place" in this kind of memory.¹⁴ While the feeling of familiarity might be illuminating for image-based memories, it cannot explain answer memories.

The distinction between image-based memories and answer memories is a subtle but real one. Russell probably recognized this distinction but re-

¹⁴ Judson (1987: 70).

garded it as unimportant. If image-based memories and answer memories both satisfy Russell's proposed definition but answer memories cannot be analyzed in Russellian terms, then the theory is highly problematic. The next obvious question is whether Russell actually meant to extend his theory to answer memories. In what follows I turn to this issue.

3. Concerns about Definite Reference

Pears put forward three arguments to the effect that Russell did in fact mean to include answer memories in his account. The first is based on an interpretation according to which Russell takes imagery to be sufficient for true memory; the second exploits Russell's 'picture on the wall' example; and the third is concerned with the relation between definite reference and imagery. I will only very briefly expose the first, since I believe Judson successfully rebutted it, and I shall entirely omit the second, because it resists brief analysis. My main point will be that Judson's answer to the third argument is unsatisfactory, so Pears is right, after all, in attributing to Russell a seriously incomplete theory of memory.

Pears's first argument is based on a quotation from *AM*, where Russell classifies all memories in which words replace images as habitual (*AM*, 175–6). Pears takes Russell to hold the view that all memories involving images are true memories, and (correctly) points out that images can also get between the original experience and its representation. That is, images can have the same representational role that normally words have in habitual memories. Judson is right in replying that Russell should be read as thinking that involving an image is sufficient but not necessary for being a true memory. So the theory is compatible with the correct observation that images can also be due to habit. But according to Russell, what makes a memory true is not the mere occurrence of an image but the way in which the memory belief depends on it; so Pears's first objection is not based on a charitable interpretation of Russell.

Let me turn to the more important third objection, which argues that definite reference to the past is possible only in the case of answer memories. If this were true, it would undermine Russell's first criterion of true memory, namely that true memory is always a memory of a particular event or experience *or* at least is based on such a memory.

Why think that image-based memories cannot refer to particular events? On Russell's analysis of image-based memories, it is the feeling of familiarity that explains the forming of a memory judgment. However, so the argument proceeds, the feeling of familiarity is not suitable to ensure any definite reference because it always consists in a sense of "I have

experienced *something like this* before”. However, this ‘something like this’ never stands for a definite, particular past event. There is nothing in the feeling of familiarity itself that would make something an image *of* a particular thing. As Wittgenstein put it aptly in his *Philosophical Investigations*: “What makes my picture of him an image of him? Not its looking like him.”¹⁵

In answer memories, of course, there *is* definite reference: the proposition “*this* is how the sea looked yesterday afternoon” makes reference to a particular event in the past. But in those cases, as it was indicated above, the feeling of familiarity plays no role at all. Those images do not seem familiar but are the result of some *attempt* at recollection. In short, there is no such memory that satisfies both conditions Russell appears to prescribe for true memories, that is, that they make definite reference to the past and that the feeling of familiarity is important in their explanation. In consequence, Russell’s account is not coherent.

Judson acknowledges this argument but finds it only superficially plausible. He concedes the correctness of the first step: when someone has an image very similar to *A*, no amount of resemblance to *A* will make it the case that the image is *of A*; no phenomenological property can fix reference all by itself. However, Judson contends, definite reference may still be secured in another way, namely by the content of the images. This is not so incredible taken into consideration that for Russell *all* definite reference (except for demonstrative reference to the mind’s present content) is ‘by description’. Bearing in mind his image theory of propositions, there is nothing absurd in the idea that reference is secured by images.

Judson then asks whether there are ways other than descriptive identification in which images could secure reference to past occurrences. His answer is ‘yes’. Although an image’s mere resemblance to an object never makes that image refer to the object, it may nevertheless be part of the content of the image that it is *of* a certain thing:

If *A* can recognise *B*, he is thereby in a position to have perceptions whose content represents to him that *B* is *F* – it is part of that content that it is *B* who is *F* (contrast the case in which *A*’s perception merely represents it to him that that man is *F*, and he infers on the basis of other beliefs that that man must be *B*). It is obviously plausible that memory images which replicate the non-conceptual features of perception of this sort [...] can also reproduce this feature of the original content if *A* has retained his recognitional ability, and hence can represent to *A* that *B* was *F*. (Judson 1987: 76)

¹⁵ *Philosophical Investigations*, II, iii. See also Malcolm (1977: 159–60).

So goes Judson's rejoinder. Let us now turn to the issue whether this understanding of Russell is plausible. In my view, it does not have much to recommend it.

4. Definite Reference and Non-Conceptual Content¹⁶

I closed the previous section by asking whether Russell can bring his views on definite reference in line with his account of image-based memories. In brief, there appears to be a tension between the claim that the definitive mark of image-based memories is the feeling of familiarity and the other desideratum that such memories make definite reference to past occurrences. How is this possible, given that familiarity as such does not suffice for definite reference? Judson's answer is that since for Russell all instances of definite reference are secured via descriptions, it is all right for him to assume that the feeling of familiarity in image-based memories works in a similar way.

Now of course it is true that for Russell, all definite reference (save demonstrative reference to the mind's present content) can be achieved purely by description. (Note that I do not thereby subscribe to the contentious interpretation of Russell, according to which proper names are abbreviated descriptions.) However, Judson forgets to add that the description must be *definite*. Judson may be right that the content of the images could provide material for certain descriptions, but he does not even attempt to show that content is also sufficient for descriptive identification. That the content of the images can be made available by some *definite* description is precisely the question at issue; this is what must be shown in order to establish the possibility of definite reference secured by the feeling of familiarity.

What about Judson's other answer, according to which memories may have definite reference in ways other than descriptive identification? Perhaps, as he says, there is something in the non-conceptual features of the memory image that could fill the bill. I proceed on the assumption that by non-conceptual features Judson means non-conceptual content. Otherwise it would be difficult to see how a memory image could fix reference; if difference in non-conceptual features does not affect the contents, then there can be no difference in content and *a fortiori* no difference in reference.

If this understanding of Judson is correct, his appeal to non-conceptual content is questionable, to say the least. Even granted that there is such a thing as non-conceptual content (an assumption which is anything

¹⁶Thanks to Miklós Márton for drawing my attention to the relevance of non-conceptual content to the question of definite reference.

but uncontroversial), it is going to be of no use in securing definite reference. Consider two qualitatively indistinguishable memory states M1 and M2. What makes it the case that they refer to different past occurrences? (Bear in mind that in order to remain faithful to the Russellian agenda, definite reference must be secured by their qualitative properties; so causation cannot be allowed to play any role here.) Obviously, we need something “over and above” their phenomenal properties.

If there were some kind of a qualitative but somehow indescribable difference between M1 and M2, then something like the argument from fine-grainedness could be appealed to in defence of non-conceptual differences.¹⁷ However, the argument from fine-grainedness has no application to memory. First, memory is arguably *less* fine-grained than perception, at least on Russell’s account. Recall that memory images are copies of the prototype sensations. Since no copy is more fine-grained than its prototype, it is doubtful that a memory’s level of grain could ever reach that of a perception or, more accurately, the non-conceptual, raw part of it. (I do not thereby mean to say that the idea of a perfectly copied prototype is incoherent, only that it is extremely unlikely to occur.) So it is quite doubtful that there could be indescribable differences between two memory states.

But there is a more important and quite simple reason why the argument from fine-grainedness for non-conceptual perceptual content does not help here. *Per definitionem*, there are no qualitative differences between M1 and M2. In general, there cannot be qualitative differences between any two exactly similar memory images – otherwise they would not be qualitatively exactly similar. The two images are qualitatively *indistinguishable*, and non-conceptual content is supposed to explain qualitative *differences* that cannot be expressed in terms of propositions. Hence, if there is any difference between two memories accompanied by qualitatively exactly similar images, it will not lie in the images themselves. But then, we are back with the insufficiency of the feeling of familiarity to explain true memory.

Judson could reply that the qualitative features of memory are not exhausted by its non-conceptual content. Memories have definite reference because of a demonstrative element in them, in a way similar to perception. Indeed, according to some philosophers, definite reference could not be secured without such demonstrative properties. This thought can be

¹⁷ The argument would be an analogue of the argument from fine-grainedness for non-conceptual *perceptual* content. Some proponents of non-conceptual perceptual content urge that perception is more fine-grained than the content of our propositional attitudes, hence there are some differences in perception only non-conceptual content can account for. See Bermúdez and Cahen (2009).

traced back to P. F. Strawson's famous reduplication argument.¹⁸ Take any object in an arbitrarily rich background scene. Whatever rich the scene is, it is in principle always possible that the world involves an exact duplicate of the object in question, along with the background you have imagined in all its richness. That is, massive reduplication – a qualitatively identical object with the corresponding scene, fitting the same description as the intended object – is always at least an epistemic possibility.

It is sometimes argued that non-conceptual content is indispensable for precisely this reason.¹⁹ Non-conceptual content is required because nothing else could ensure that we can make definite reference, given the possibility of massive reduplication. If there is anything in memory that can secure definite reference, it should be its non-conceptual demonstrative content; nothing else will do.

Regardless of whether the reduplication argument forces us to acknowledge this demonstrative element as part of the non-conceptual content of memories, this approach surely fails as a piece of Russell exegesis. For the point is not whether definite reference could be secured by images but whether it is actually secured in image-based memories. The way Russell describes the content of such memories – 'something like this happened' – suggests that definite reference is in fact not secured by the content of image-based memories. The image in question just does not contain such demonstrative elements. It is not ruled out in principle that images can secure reference, but the way Russell sets out his examples suggests that as a fact of the matter, they do not.

I conclude that Judson fails to rebut Pears's argument that Russell obliterated the important difference between image-based memory and answer memory, thereby illegitimately including the latter in his theory.

5. Conclusion

I started this paper by making distinctions among the kinds of memories Russell acknowledges. Of these the most important one is the distinction between true memory and habitual memory, since Russell's official 1921 theory of memory is advanced to explain the former. However, closer examination reveals that – sticking to Russell's own understanding of true memory – his appeal to the feeling of familiarity cannot handle (but is meant to handle, *pace* Judson) an important sort of memory, namely, answer memory. The reason for this is that although Russell recognizes the subtle difference between image as datum and image as symbol, he does

¹⁸ Strawson (1959: 19–22).

¹⁹ Brewer (1999: 26–48).

not pay due heed to this difference. Evidence for this is the tension between the feeling of familiarity and definite reference. All this suggests that the theory Russell laid down in *The Analysis of Mind* is not only limited in scope but also internally incoherent.

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