između naizgled različitih teorija ili objašnjenja, ona su zapravo istovrijedna i, u biti, prazna, te se zastupnici takvih, naizgled različitih mišljenja, u takvom slučaju uzaludno spore.

Kako se naše sveukupno iskustvo sastoji od mnoštva različitih dijelova i velikog mnoštva pojedinačnih događaja i doživljaja, da bismo to iskoristili na najučinkovitiji način, moramo nekako obraditi i međusobno povezati različite i pojedinačne dijelove tog cjelokupnog iskustva. Zbog toga uvodimo pojmove i *ideje* koje služe tome da dobro povezuju dijelove iskustva u koherentnu cjelinu. Prema Jamesu, koji se ovdje oslanja na Deweya i F. C. S. Schillera, *ideje*, a mi bi smo danas rekli sudovi ili teorije, upravo postaju *istinite* kada uspostavimo odgovarajuće odnose. Tako je ovdje razrađena *instrumentalistička* teorija istine. Također, korisno nam je uvidjeti i da li unutar mnoštva pojedinačnih događaja i doživljaja u iskustvu ima nekih zajedničkih karakteristika, te onda iz njih apstrahiramo i dolazimo do nekih općenitijih principa koji nam mogu na zadovoljavajući način objasniti to mnoštvo pojedinačnih stvari i događaja. Za razliku od krutog empirizma ili krutog pozitivizma, pragmatisti, a pogotovo James, otvoreni su za razmatranje svih filozofskih problema, pa tako i metafizičkih i teoloških, jer ukoliko pronađemo zadovoljavajuća objašnjenja, s potporom u iskustvenom dijelu, ali koja uključuju i neopažljive entitete kao što

su npr. supstancija, Bog itd., mi imamo »ontološku obavezu« prihvatiti ih jer su onda ti entiteti dijelovi naših najboljih objašnjenja koja za nas imaju instrumentalnu vrijednost. Na tim temeljima James i raspravlja o nekoliko značajnih pitanja filozofije – postojanje Boga, sloboda volje, jedinstvo i mnoštvo itd.

Filozofija Williama Jamesa, kao uostalom i pragmatizam u cjelini, nije samo povijesno značajna filozofija, već je ona izvršila i znatan utjecaj na suvremenu filozofiju; izravan utjecaj očigledan je kod jednog od najznačajnijih predstavnika anti-realizma u filozofiji znanosti, van Fraassena, dok Quine, Rorty i Putnam, da spomenem samo neke najznačajnije suvremene filozofe, grade dijelove svojih filozofskih teorija na temeljima i vrlinama pragmatizma.

Što se tiče prijevoda, on je napravljen znalački tako da se tekst i na hrvatskom čita tečno, a argumenti ništa ne gube na jasnoći.

želio bih također istaknuti i izuzetno koristan predgovor prevoditelja iz kojeg se može saznati još nešto više o Jamesu, pragmatizmu i njihovom utjecaju danas, a priložen je i popis glavnih Jamesovih djela te dvije adrese web stranica s daljnjim tekstovima i informacijama za one koji će se više zainteresirati ovom knjigom.

<div align="right">

Davor Pećnjak
Filozofski fakultet u Zadru – Sveučilište u Splitu, Obala kralja Petra Krešimira IV, 3, HR-23000 Zadar

</div>

Michael Williams, *Problems of Knowledge. A Critical Introduction to Epistemology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, ix + 276 pp.

Michael Williams' introduction to epistemology, entitled *Problems of Knowedge. A Critical Introduction to Episte-*

mology, is a good book in more than one sense of the word. Firstly, it is written with clarity and simplicity on rather con-

fusing problems. Secondly, in only 250 pages it covers almost all relevant topics of contemporary epistemology. Finally, it gives a critical introduction to debate on naturalized epistemology and normativity in knowledge. As the author himself says, the title of the book is an allusion to Ayer's *The Problem of Knowledge* (1956). What Ayer wrote in the preface of this book – »In this book I begin by taking the question of what is meant by knowledge as an example of a *philosophical* inquiry« – may very well stand for Williams' book as well. Williams believes, namely, that Ayer's book is the model of philosophical writing, so he follows this model, especially in his attempt to appeal to wide a range of readers (not only to young undergraduates but to non-specialists as well).

This introduction however is opinionated in the first place by Williams' own epistemological position from his earlier works. By this, I have in mind his *Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology* (1977) with explicit Sellarsian impact, and an *Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism* (1991) with explicit contextualist theory of justification. The book is divided into 20 chapters with introduction and conclusion. In the introduction he raises fundamental, let us say metaepistemological, questions or question concerning the very nature of epistemological inquiry itself. »[W]hat is implied by saying that epistemology is a branch of *philosophy*? What is special about philosophical investigations of knowledge?« […] »Many philosophers today deny that philosophical questions about knowledge have any special character. They argue that epistemology needs to be 'naturalized': that is, made continuous with one or more of the sciences, cognitive psychology perhaps. Other philosophers assert that epistemology is dead« (p. 1).

After introducing the problem, Williams makes a distinction between five central epistemological problems. (1) The analytic problem (What is knowledge?); (2) the problem of demarcation, which is divided into two sub-problems: (2.1) external problem (if some definition of knowledge is given, can we determine, in principle, what things we can know?); (2.2) internal problem (are in the province of knowledge some significant boundaries [such as *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge?]); (3) the problem of method (how the knowledge is to be obtained?). This problem is divided into two sub-problems: (3.1) the problems of unity or the question is there just one way of acquiring the knowledge, or are there several ways?; (3.2) the ameliorative problem (or the question can we improve our ways of seeking the knowledge?); (4) the problem of scepticism, or the question is it possible to obtain knowledge at all? (this problem is closely linked with the problem of justification); (5) The problem of value or the question why is knowledge worth having, or are there beside knowledge some other goals of inquiry? (p. 1–2). However, some sections of introduction are very interesting – like the one on the knowledge as contemplation and as power and the one on the descriptive and normative dimensions of knowledge – and they are crucial for his goal in the book (p. 7–12).

Twenty chapters of the book are: the standard analysis, knowledge without evidence, two ideals, unstable knowledge, Agrippa's trilemma, experience and reality, foundations, the problem of basis, reduction and inference, coherence, the myth of the system, realism and truth, evidence and entitlement, knowledge in context, seeing and knowing, scepticism and epistemic priority, induction, projection and conjecture, relativism and objectivity and progress.

The crucial point of the book is the idea of »Prior Grounding Requirement« (PGR), which places justification mainly in the sphere of personal relation and responsibility. PGR stands on simple distinction between: (1) *persons*

believing that p and (2) *p that person believes*. Williams follows James (and some contemporary epistemologists) in making this distinction and it is really a distinction between the idea of »grounds« and the idea of »responsibility«. James used the distinction in his famous essay »The Will to Believe« where he defended a pragmatic (truth-independent) argument in favour of a religious belief.

Williams shows several reasons why we have to answer epistemological questions. Firstly, because there is no short way of refuting the sceptic's challenge. Secondly, because epistemology cannot be »completely« naturalized. Thirdly, because it is impossible to completely eliminate normative dimensions of knowledge (especially in H. Putnam).

After this, in the conclusion, five fundamental epistemological questions are answered. First, he answers to the question of the end of epistemology (which Williams himself, but also Rorty raised). Williams makes a crucial distinction, namely between the idea of reformation of epistemology (Quine), and avoidance of epistemology (Rorty). In Williams' terminology, Quine is a naturalist, and Rorty is an obituarist »announcing the death of epistemology« (p. 241).

Williams gives an explanation why his own pragmatism is not the same as that of Quine or Rorty, because pragmatism leads them to the elimination of epistemology. On the other hand, he tries to show that *it isn't necessarily so* (e.g. leading him to be naturalist or obituarist). Here is the story. Quine and Rorty are assuming that (traditional) epistemology must satisfy three requirements: (1) unity (theory must be single one), (2) autonomy of epistemology (autonomy from metaphysics and sciences), (3) *a priori* status of epistemology (p. 242). The gap between these requirements and foundations of knowledge is filled with methodological scepticism. That is why a traditional epistemologist is led to choose between scepticism and foundationalism. However, this picture of epis-

temology is rather strange for Williams, because of his »elastic account of epistemology« (p. 243) or, should we say, non-reductive account. In addition, Williams shows that this model was not followed by main figures of epistemological tradition, such as Plato or Locke (p. 243–244).

In answering the five fundamental questions Williams is constrained. He is sceptical about finding explicit necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge, but he defends standard analysis. This puts him in opposition to contemporary epistemologists since they are purely: reliabilist, externalist and non-justificational. It is not just about »clash of intuitions« because: »[t]he possession of propositional knowledge, while often importantly dependent on tacit know-how, is thus essentially involved with practices of justifying what one says« (p. 245).

Williams here accepts certain kind of contextualist theory of justification and explicitly defends normativity. About the question of demarcation Williams is a kind of a coherentist but without ending with radical holism. Important fact is that »moral judgements (or normative elements in epistemology in general) are not beyond criticism simply in virtue of being normative« (p. 247).

On the question of method Williams endorses combination of contextualism and fallibilism and fallibilistic conception of rationality (e.g., Popper's critical rationalism). On the question of scepticism, he distinguishes between strong (Descartes) and broad methodological scepticism or we can call it »diagnostic scepticism« (which has its roots in Wittgenstein's position from *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty*). On the question of value Williams takes instrumentalist position of truth (James: »true beliefs are beliefs that work«). In a way, knowledge is always embedded in socially transmitted practices of inquiry (and apart from Baconian view of knowledge as power), so Williams defends a position that knowledge is always a

»practical« affair (p. 250). Against Quine and Rorty, Williams thinks that knowledge and, consequently, epistemology is and should be normatively significant. In that light, we should accept his arguments for general thesis (p. 254): »Contextualism gives us a picture of knowledge and justification that stays close to the phenomenology of everyday epistemic practices, that articulates a fallibilist conception of rationality, that is friendly to the socially distributed and historically situated character of knowledge, and that offers a principled escape from traditional sceptical conundrums. This is why we should adopt it.«

Kristijan Krkač
Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus, Jordanovac 110, HR-10000 Zagreb
kristijan_krkac@yahoo.com

Hilary Rose and Steven Rose (eds.), *Alas, Poor Darwin. Arguments Againts Evolutionary Psychology*, Vintage, London 2001, 292 pp.

Zbornik radova *Alas, Poor Darwin. Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology*, prema riječima njegovih urednika, feminističke sociologinje Hilary Rose i neuroznanstvenika Stevena Rosea, idejno je začet početkom 1998. kao sintetičko djelo »mnogih glasova« iz različitih znanstvenih disciplina i intelektualnih područja okupljenih u zajedničkoj kritici evolucijske psihologije (EP). Djelo je prvi put objavljeno u Velikoj Britaniji 2000., a sadrži petnaest izvornih znanstvenih radova u kojima se iz različitih misaonih kutova kritizira »loša teorija« EP. Prema urednicima, EP je dosad najutjecajnija znanstvena disciplina koja se napaja na najprodornijem od suvremenih »intelektualnih mitova« izraslom iz darvinističke evolucijske teorije. Roseovi definiraju EP kao najvećim dijelom anglo-američki fenomen, kao disciplinu koja »tvrdi da može objasniti sve aspekte ljudskog ponašanja«, kulture i društva na temelju univerzalnih osobina uma koje su se evolucijski oblikovale za djetinjstva naše vrste prije, otprilike, 100–600 tisuća godina. Spomenute univerzalne osobine uma zastupnici EP objašnjavaju i prepoznaju kao biološke adaptacije, kao ponašanja koja su »odabrana« tijekom evolucije čovjeka.

Kao »glavne igrače« tog pristupa urednici navode Ledu Cosmides, Johna Toobyja, Margo Wilson, Martina Dalyja, Stevena Pinkera, Randy Thornhill, Craiga Palmera, njihove popularizatore, znanstvene novinare Roberta Wrighta, Matta Ridleya i Helenu Cronin, te svima njima zajedničke prethodnike i »intelektualne heroje« E. O. Wilsona, Richarda Dawkinsa, Roberta Triversa i Davida Bussa. Nakon što su jasno označili znanstvenike koji su predmet kritike radova u zborniku, Roseovi u tri točke definiraju svoje opće vrijednosno stajalište iz kojega se kritika izvodi. Prvo, tvrdnje EP u poljima biologije, psihologije, antropologije, sociologije, kulturnih studija i filozofije ne samo da su »pogrešne, već su i kulturalno pogubne«. Drugo, EP posjeduje negativnu političku dimenziju. I, treće, stavovi EP zadobivaju snagu u posebnom suvremenom društvenom i povijesnom kontekstu čija su posljednja desetljeća obilježila veliki društveni, ekonomski i kulturni preokreti, pad komunizma, završetak Hladnog rata, krvavi nacionalistički i regionalni sukobi, slabljenje države blagostanja i povećani strahovi zbog ekoloških katastrofa. Paralelno su se zbila ve-