

## **CROATIAN-BRITISH VIEWS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. THE CORRESPONDENCE OF WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE AND JOSIP JURAJ STROSSMAYER (1876-1882)<sup>1</sup>**

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The views of the Eastern Question held by the renowned British statesman W. E. Gladstone and the distinguished Croatian Catholic dignitary and politician J. J. Strossmayer are examined in this work, based on their correspondence from 1876 to 1882, which is maintained by the Archives of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Science in Zagreb. Given that Gladstone's letters to Strossmayer have thus far not been published in academic publications, the author attaches them hereto as an appendix, thereby creating the framework for engendering comprehensive insight into the Eastern Question, and particularly into the views of these two distinguished individuals of European political and clerical history in the latter half of the nineteenth century on the political fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkans after the removal of Ottoman suzerainty over this territory.

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## Introduction

Croatian historiography has still not dedicated sufficient attention to the Eastern Question,<sup>2</sup> particularly given the vast historical importance of this phenomenon. Most works by Croatian historians deal with the Bosnian-Herzegovinian component of the Eastern Question in the latter half of the nineteenth century, which is understandable, given Croatia's long border with Bosnia-Herzegovina and the correspondingly great interest of Croatian political exponents of the time in the political fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the centuries-long participation of the Croats in the development of that country's culture and statehood. Recently some significant progress in this direction has been made, particularly with reference to research into the attitudes of Croats toward the Eastern Question in the broader historical context. In this process,

<sup>2</sup> The Eastern Question is a term which denotes a complex of problems and events in international relations in Europe from the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries, caused by the struggle of the great powers (Great Britain, France, Tsarist Russia, the Habsburg Monarchy and Germany) for dominance in those countries of Southeast Europe and the Near East under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. On the most important "way-stations" along the European powers' way to taking over these Ottoman territories, see: Nicolae Jorga, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches* (Gotha, 1913); Adolf Hasenclever, *Die orientalische Frage in den Jahren 1838-1841. Ursprung des Meerengenvertrages vom 13. Juli 1841* (Leipzig, 1914), German Werth, *Der Krimkrieg* (Frankfurt/M., 1989), Florian Keisinger, *Unzivilisierte Kriege im zivilisierten Europa? Die Balkankriege und die öffentliche Meinung in England, Deutschland und Irland* (Paderborn, 2008); Alfred Franzis Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914* (Cambridge, vol. I 1920; vol. II, 1921); C. J. Bartlett-Thomas Lawrence, *The foreign policy of Castlereagh 1812-1815. Britain and the reconstruction of Europe* (London, 1931); William Norton Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After* (London, 1938); S. M. Goryainov, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles* (Paris, 1910); *Ibid.*, "The secret agreement of 1844 between Russia and England," *Russian Review* (Liverpool, I/1912), 3, 97-115; 4, 76-91; Eduard von Wertheimer, *Graf Julius Andrassy. Sein Leben und seine Zeit*, vols. I-III, (Stuttgart, 1913); Theodor von Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866*, vols. I-II, (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1913-1914); Philip Heinz, *Die Debatten des englischen Parlaments über die Orientalische Frage 1876* (Mainz: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, 2003); Friedrich Heyer, *Die Orientalische Frage im kirchlichen Lebenskreis: Das Einwirken der Kirchen des Auslands auf die Emanzipation der orthodoxen Nationen Südosteuropas 1804-1912, Schriften zur Geistgeschichte des östlichen Europa, Bd. 19*, (Wiesbaden, 1991); Gregor Schöllgen, *Imperialismus und Gleichgewicht. Deutschland, England und die orientalische Frage 1871-1914* (München, Oldenbourg, 1984); Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923. A Study of International Relations*, (London, 1966); M. Garcia-Pelayo, *El imperio británico* (Madrid, 1945); John Louis Jennings, *Mr. Gladstone: a study*, Edinburgh, 1887; Armando Potassio, "Problema slavo-meridionale e crisi d'Oriente (1853-1878) nella storiografia italiana», *Archivio Storico Italiano*, (Firenze, 1978), 165-194; *Ibid.*, "La Bulgaria fra rivoluzione e reazione (1918-1923)," in: *Rivoluzione e reazione in Europa: 1917-1924*, Edizioni Avanti, Milano, vol. I, 243-315; *Ibid.*, "Nascita di uno stato balcanico: le vicende politiche interne della Bulgaria di Alessandro di Battenberg" in: A. Pitassio - F. Guida - R. Tolomeo, *Nascita di uno stato balcanico. Il principato di Bulgaria di Alessandro di Battenberg nella corrispondenza diplomatica italiana (1879-1887)*, (Naples, 1988), 14-88.; *Ibid.*, "La perception de la Russie dans l'Europe balcanique" in: AA. VV., *Europe, its Borders and the others*, a cura di L. Tosi (Naples, 2001); Werner Zürer, *Die Nachostpolitik Frankreichs und Russlands 1891-1898* (Wiesbaden, 1970); Angelo Tamborra, *L'Europa centro-orientale nei secoli XIX-XX*, vols. I-II (Milan, 1973).

many important and new insights – neglected in previous research – have been generated.<sup>3</sup>

This work has been conceived as a contribution to the aforementioned research on the positions of the Croats on the Eastern Question in its late phase, in the 1870s and early 1880s, but also as an attempt to analyze the compatibility of Croatian interests in solutions to the Eastern Question with the interests of that era's great powers, specifically Great Britain.<sup>4</sup> In previous research into the Eastern Question during this period, the exceptionally relevant correspondence between two distinguished contemporaries, the Đakovo-Srijem and Bosnian Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer<sup>5</sup> and renowned British statesman of the nineteenth century, William Ewart Gladstone,<sup>6</sup> has been historiographically

<sup>3</sup> See the recent monograph by Dragutin Pavličević, *Hrvati i istočno pitanje*, (Zagreb, 2007). On pp. 569-577, the author cites the most important works on the Eastern Question in Croatian and foreign historiography, with particular emphasis on works dedicated to the 1875-1878 period.

<sup>4</sup> I partially touched upon this problem in my article "Velika Britanija i Habsburška Monarhija", *Hrvatska revija*, IV/2004, 4: 87-101.

<sup>5</sup> Josip Juraj Strossmayer (Osijek, 4 Feb. 1815 – Đakovo, 8 Apr. 1905) was one of the central figures of Croatian political, social, clerical and cultural history in the latter half of the nineteenth century. He earned a doctorate in philosophy at the High Seminary in Budapest in 1834. He completed his study of theology in Budapest (1833-1837). He was ordained in 1838, and then served as a chaplain in Petrovaradin, while in 1840-1842 he continued his studies at the University of Vienna, as a resident of the Augustineum foundation (Fritaneum), where he earned a doctorate in theology in 1842. At the proposal of Ban Josip Jelačić, he was appointed bishop of Đakovo-Srijem and Bosnia on Nov. 18, 1849, and formally inaugurated in Đakovo on Sept. 29, 1850. In 1851 he was appointed apostolic vicar for Serbia (until 1896). During the revolution of 1848/49 he supported the positions of Austro-Slavism, advocating the constitutional and federalist reorganization of the Monarchy. Within the framework of his Yugoslav concept, he called for ties between the politically divided Croatian lands. His significant political engagement included participation in the enlarged Reichsrat in Vienna in 1860, the Ban's Conferences in Zagreb in 1860-1861 and 1865, the *Sabor* (territorial assembly) of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia in 1861 and 1865-1867, and his service as grand prefect of Virovitica County in 1861-1862. He withdrew from politics in 1873, after attempts to revise the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise (its financial provisions in particular) failed. As a patron of culture and the arts, he deserves credit for the opening of the University in Zagreb in 1874, the establishment of the Croatian (originally Yugoslav) Academy of Arts and Science in 1866 and the Gallery of Old Masters in Zagreb in 1884. See the extensive encyclopedia entry on Strossmayer written by Jaroslav Šidak for the *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*, vol. 8, (Zagreb, 1961) 195-198.

<sup>6</sup> William Ewart Gladstone (Liverpool, 29 Nov. 1809 – Hawarden, 19 May 1898) was educated at Oxford. He began his political career as a Tory (Conservative), winning a seat in Parliament in 1833. From 1834 to 1845 he represented the city of Newark in Parliament. He became colonial secretary in Peel's ministry in 1839. During the so-called Oxford (Tractarian or "Puseyite") Movement, he called for separation of the Church and State. In 1847, he became the MP for the University in Oxford. In 1850 he traveled to Italy, whence he sent a letter to Lord Aberdeen about the political persecutions in Naples. With this letter, as in the declaration of his pro-Catholic orientation, Gladstone earned great popularity. After the fall of Disraeli's ministry in December 1852, he became chancellor of the exchequer. Due to Lord Palmerston's refusal to abolish the commission of inquiry into the conduct of the Crimean War, he resigned in 1855 and joined the Liberal opposition. In the ensuing years the influence of the Liberals was restored. Gladstone served as prime minister from 1868 to 1874, and then again from 1880 to 1885 and from 1892 to 1894. In 1893, he saw through the passage of the Home Rule Bill for Ireland in the House of

neglected. It is my intention to present the content of this correspondence, which reflects the standpoints of Gladstone and Strossmayer on the political status of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the revolt in that country (1875-1878) and the possibility of the political reconstruction of the Balkans after the end of the Great Eastern Crisis of 1878.<sup>7</sup> In the analysis of the historical context in which this correspondence emerged, I shall make use of the existing literature and published and unpublished archival materials. I shall first cover the relationship of the great powers to the Eastern Question and the circumstances surrounding its solution at the Congress of Berlin (1878), with reference to some important events that preceded it. Then I shall analyze the content of the correspondence between J. J. Strossmayer and W. E. Gladstone, which illustrates the complexity of the issues surrounding the Eastern Question and its far-reaching implications, not only for Europe, but also Eurasia and partially even Africa (the question of Egypt and Suez). In the end, I shall endeavor to provide a response to the question as to whether and to what extent Gladstone and Strossmayer's views were relevant when it comes to the formulation of the specific political decisions of the governments of the states in which they lived and worked.

Over time, a firm friendship and mutual esteem developed between the two correspondents, so their correspondence also contains much information on their other activities, particularly Gladstone's philosophical and religious

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Commons, but after its rejection by the House of Lords, he retired from political life in 1894. He introduced the secret ballot to parliamentary elections and public admissions to the civil service; he removed religious bars to university admissions and set the foundations for universal primary education. In his brochure *The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*, (1876), on the Ottoman massacres of Bulgarians, he turned the British public's attention to the misery in the Balkans during the Great Eastern Crisis (1875-1878). When he became prime minister the second time (1880-1885), he almost doubled the size of the electorate with a new election law. Although he personally opposed imperialist policies, he spearheaded the interventions in Egypt and Sudan, while in Asia he came into conflict with Russia over Afghanistan. He wrote studies on Homer and translated the works of Horatio. See the obituary in *Hrvatsko pravo*, Zagreb, 1898, no. 762 (20 May 1898), 2; *Hrvatska enciklopedija*, vol. 4, (Zagreb, 2002), 204.

Transcripts of Strossmayer's letters to Gladstone are held in the Isidor Kršnjavi collection (collection no: 804) in the Croatian National Archives (hereinafter: HDA), box 1, vol. IV, 67. These letters are also in the appendix to the book by R. W. Seton-Watson, *Die südslawische Frage im Habsburger Reiche* (hereinafter: *Die südslawische Frage*), (Berlin, 1913), 589-630, first published in 1911 under the title *The Southern Slav Question*. Due to the sensitivity of his position with regard to the Turcophile Hungarian government, Strossmayer refused Gladstone's request that their correspondence on this problem be published immediately. On this, see: R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question. A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics* (hereinafter: *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question*) (London, 1935.)

<sup>7</sup> I had already partially touched upon Strossmayer's letters to Gladstone as part of an analysis of the Eastern Crisis and the revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1875-1878) in the work mentioned earlier on relations between Great Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy (see note 3), and even before, much more extensively, in my dissertation, which was later supplemented and published as a book. See: Z. Grijak, *Politička djelatnost vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa Josipa Stadlera*, (Zagreb, 2001). At the time, I was not able to examine Gladstone's letters to Strossmayer. They are analyzed here for the first time, and they open the way for comprehensive insight into Gladstone's views on the political reorganization of the Balkans during and immediately after the Great Eastern Crisis.

studies and their common efforts to bring together the Christian churches of Southeastern Europe.

Since Gladstone's letters to Strossmayer have thus far been published selectively and fragmentarily, I appended them to this work.<sup>8</sup> They illuminate not only the political, but also intellectual and moral profile of this great British statesman of the Victorian era.

The great powers on the Eastern Question (1875-1878). Allowing the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina at the Congress of Berlin in 1878

When the Congress of Berlin was convened by the great powers of the time after the revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1875-1878) and the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), decisions were made which would greatly alter the balance of international relations and have a long-term impact on the political structure of Europe, and beyond. The Congress of Berlin was a gathering of the highest diplomatic representatives of the Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, France, Great Britain, Italy, Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire, held in Berlin from June 13 to July 13, 1878, and presided by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.<sup>9</sup> The Congress was preceded by the Treaty of San Stefano,

<sup>8</sup> The correspondence between Gladstone and Strossmayer encompasses the period from 1876 to 1892. On this see: Robert J. Rohrbacher, "Bishop J. J. Strossmayer's Yugoslavism in the Light of the Eastern Crisis 1875-1878," *East European Quarterly*, XXXV(2001), no. 3:356. The Archives of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Science (hereinafter: Arhiv HAZU) hold only the letters written during the period of the revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina and several years thereafter (1876-1882). These letters are appended to this work and they are here published in their entirety for the first time.

<sup>9</sup> Major sources and general literature on the Congress of Berlin: Imanuel Geiss (Hrsg.): *Der Berliner Kongreß 1878. Protokolle und Materialien*. (Schriften des Bundesarchivs 27), (Boppard am Rhein:1978) (German sources). *Affaires d'Orient. Congrès de Berlin 1878. Documents diplomatiques*, hrsg. v.: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France (Paris, 1878) (French sources). *Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin, with the Protocols of the Congress*. (Accounts and Papers 1878, Bd. 83), (London, 1878) (British sources). *Österreich und der Congress. Von einem Deutsch-Österreicher* (Leipzig, 1878); Benoit Brunswick, *Le traité de Berlin annoté e commenté* (Paris, 1878); Adolphe d'AVRIL, *Négociations relatives au traité de Berlin et aux arrangements qui ont suivi 1875-1886*, (Paris, 1886); Edouard Driault, *La Question d'Orient. Depuis ses origines jusqu'à la paix de Sèvres*, 8e éd. (Paris, 1921), Antonin Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe. Depuis l'ouverture du Congrès de Vienne jusqu'à la fermeture du Congrès de Berlin* (1814-1878), vol. II. (Paris, 1931); Ralph Melville in: Hans-Jürgen Schröder (Hrsg.), *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878* (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte, Mainz. Beiheft 7), (Wiesbaden, 1982); William Norton Medlicot, *The Congress of Berlin and After. A diplomatic history of the Near Eastern settlement 1878-1880*, 2nd Edition (London, 1963); F.A.K. Yasamee, *The Ottoman Empire and the European Great Powers 1884-1887* (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1984), *Ibid.*, *Ottoman Diplomacy. Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888* (Istanbul, 1996); Alexander Novotny, *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Berliner Kongresses 1878* (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs 44) (Graz & Cologne, 1957); Serge Maiwald, *Der Berliner Kongress 1878 und das Völkerrecht* (Stuttgart, 1948); Bruce Waller, *Bismarck at the Crossroads. The Reorientation of German Foreign Policy After the Congress of Berlin, 1878-1880* (London, 1974); Walther Hubatsch, "Der Berliner Kongreß 1878. Ursachen, Folgen und Beurteilungen hundert Jahre danach". In: *Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte. Gedächtnisschr. f. Hermann Conrad*, (Hrsg. v. Gerd Kleinheyer u.a.) (Paderborn, 1979), 307-328.

signed on March 3, 1878 in San Stefano, not far from Istanbul, which ended the Russo-Turkish War. According to the conditions of this Treaty, which reflected Russian interests almost exclusively, the Ottoman Empire was supposed to forfeit most of its territories in the Balkans, in which a large Bulgarian state was to be established, encompassing most of today's Macedonia, parts of Serbia up to Niš, parts of Albania and Greek Macedonia, Chalkidiki (Chalcidice) and Thessaloniki (Salonica). Bosnia-Herzegovina, although under Ottoman sovereignty, would receive considerable autonomy, while the gains for Serbia were negligible, for Russia assessed that Serbia was moving increasingly into the orbit of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This sudden rise in Russian influence in the region was opposed primarily by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Great Britain, both seeing in the enfeebled Ottoman Empire an obstacle to the expansion of Russian influence. Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy feared, not without justification, that Russia, bolstered by the Treaty of San Stefano, and exploiting Panslav propaganda, could quickly become the dominant state in the Balkans. France and Great Britain found the Treaty entirely unacceptable, for it would help Russia extend its influence not only in the west, which they also found intolerable, but also in the south and east, which would threaten their interests in Egypt and Palestine and especially routes leading to the East (Bosphorus, Dardanelles, Suez). Great Britain and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy took the initiative and jointly sought an international congress. Confronted with international pressure, Russia had to concede. The Treaty of San Stefano was voided, and talks on the territorial organization of the Balkans were once more launched. Only the negotiators of the great powers participated in these talks, while the representatives of interested smaller countries could participate only in those sessions at which matters directly concerning them were deliberated. The Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 13, 1878, thoroughly revised or annulled the decisions of the Treaty of San Stefano. Under it, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro were formally recognized as sovereign states, while Bulgaria was divided into a southern territory which remained under Ottoman suzerainty, Eastern Rumelia as an autonomous province, and independent Bulgaria in the remaining territory. A series of other Ottoman provinces were separated from the Ottoman Empire and granted to other states for administration, such as Cyprus, which was ceded to Great Britain, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was left to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Serbia was considerably expanded, receiving four districts at the expense of the Ottoman Empire: Niš, Pirot, Toplica and Vranje. Romania received Dobruja, and Montenegro received Nikšić, Podgorica and Bar. The Ottoman Empire had to guarantee the civil rights of its non-Muslim citizens, thereby implementing the provisions of the Organic Law of 1868. The countries which attained independence in these talks also had to assume a portion of the Ottoman national debt, but this never came about, for an agreement was never reached as to how the sum would be distributed. The decisions of the Berlin Congress did not comply with the interests of some states which participated in its work. The strength of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia was drastically

curtailed. Russia's influence was also reduced to the benefit of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which increased tensions between the two empires.

The great success of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy at the Congress of Berlin, reflected in the mandate granted to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina, could be attributed to the fact that having the Balkans placed within the Austro-Hungarian sphere of interest suited the two great powers vitally interested in this region: Great Britain and Germany. However, one should not overlook the great diplomatic acumen of the leading Austro-Hungarian delegate at the Congress, the foreign minister, Count Gyula Andrásy.<sup>10</sup> At the first session of the Congress of Berlin held on June 13, 1878, Andrásy called Russia to account for its arbitrary actions at San Stefano, which had resulted in something unacceptable to the remaining great powers: the creation of Greater Bulgaria. Prior to this address at the Congress of Berlin, Andrásy had secured the support of Great Britain and Germany. Great Britain's support primarily hinged on the shared hostility toward Russia's expansion into the Balkans and the Orient. German support for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy rested on the desire to acquire a reliable ally at a time when close German-Russian relations had to cool, and to make the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy resistant to "French courtship" (*französische Liebeswerbungen*).<sup>11</sup> German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, presiding over the session of June 13, 1878, backed Andrásy, opening the question of revising the Treaty of San Stefano. At the eighth session of the Congress of Berlin held on June 28, 1878, Count Andrásy read aloud a

<sup>10</sup> Gyula Andrásy (Košice in Slovakia, 3 Mar. 1823 – Voloska in Istria, Volosko-Opatija [*Volosko is not in Istria, rather in the Littoral or Kvarner*], 18 Feb. 1890) participated in the revolutionary events in Hungary in 1848/49. After the bulk of the Hungarian army surrendered to the Russians at Világos on Aug. 13, 1849, he spent several years in exile, mostly in Paris. The Austrian authorities sentenced him to death in absentia in September 1851. He was granted amnesty in 1857 and returned to Hungary. When talks between the Viennese Court and the Hungarian nobility were resumed in 1859, he backed Ferenc Deák in his demand for resumption of the legal status of 1848, and he interceded between Deák and the Court. Francis Joseph I appointed him Hungarian prime minister on Feb. 17, 1867, and as the highest Hungarian representative he participated in negotiations on the Austro-Hungarian Compromise and the coronation of Francis Joseph as Hungarian king in 1867. As Hungarian prime minister, he opposed von Hohenwart's scheme to reorganize Austria along federal lines, as well as Beust's plan for renewed war against Prussia, for this, besides the uncertainty of such a war, would lead to ties between the Monarchy and France, which he opposed. On Nov. 14, 1871, he succeeded Beust as foreign minister. Working to reinforce the Monarchy's international status, he strenuously insisted on consolidation of the dualist system. To curtail the "Slavic threat" on the foreign stage, he blocked Russian ambitions in the Balkans, while domestically he advocated German domination in Slav-populated Austria. He deserves much of the credit for having the occupation mandate entrusted to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Confronted with the fierce criticism of anti-annexation deputies in the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments, he resigned on Oct. 8, 1879. A day earlier he had secured the conclusion of the Dual Alliance with Germany against Russia, which held until the Monarchy's collapse in 1918. See: *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. 1 (Chicago, 1963), 906; Engelbert Deutsch, *Andrásy und die Okkupation in Bosnien und der Herzegowina*, in: ÖOH 1 (1974), 18-36.

<sup>11</sup> Theodor von Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866*, vol. I. (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1913), 180.

memorandum in which he claimed that the solution to the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a pre-eminent European matter which directly concerns the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He firmly opposed the solution to the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina stipulated in Article XIV of the Treaty of San Stefano, whereby Bosnia-Herzegovina is granted autonomy, for this would not, in his view, secure lasting pacification nor prevent a reoccurrence of events perilous to Europe's peace, and it would also inflict great damage on the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as the state on its border.<sup>12</sup> The proposal to grant Bosnia-Herzegovina autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman Empire was characterized by Andrassy as lacking any prospects whatsoever given its deep religious and ethnic rifts. He warned that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy could only consent to a solution which would inject thorough change into Bosnia's untenable situation.<sup>13</sup> Endorsing Andrassy's memorandum, the British delegate at the Congress, Lord Salisbury,<sup>14</sup> read a memorandum in which he asserted that the Porte lacked the power and ability to bring order to its two provinces, and that the work of pacification and introduction of the necessary order could only be accomplished by a state with adequate military and financial resources. As evidence of the Ottoman Empire's inability to implement modernizing policies and administrative reform, Salisbury cited the unsuccessful attempts at reform of the Ottoman Empire prompted by the European powers after the Crimean War (1853-1856).<sup>15</sup> Pursuant to an agreement reached earlier with Andrassy, he submitted a formal proposal to the Congress to entrust the occupation and administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Hans Schneller, *Državno-pravni položaj Bosne i Hercegovine* (Belgrade, 1893), 7.-13. Schneller's work *Die staatrechtliche Stellung von Bosnien un der Herzogovina*, was first published in Leipzig in 1892. There is no Croatian translation, but it was translated to Serbian by legal historian Milan Vesnić

<sup>13</sup> Theodor von Sosnosky, *op. cit.* 182.

<sup>14</sup> Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil Salisbury (Hatfield, 3 Feb. 1830 – London (?) 22 Aug. 1903) became an MP for the Conservative Party in the House of Commons in 1853. He moved to the House of Lords in 1868, while in 1866/67 he served as Secretary of State for India, while from 1874 to 1880 he served as minister in the governments of Benjamin Disraeli. As foreign minister he participated in the Congress of Berlin in 1878, at which he resolutely opposed the Russian plans to create an enlarged Bulgaria based on the San Stefano Treaty. This was preceded by a secret deal between Salisbury and Russia, whereby Great Britain granted Tsarist Russia the right to its Asian provinces, while Cyprus was ceded to Britain in return. With Bismarck's support, he saw through the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's occupation mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the Congress of Berlin. After Disraeli's death in 1881, Salisbury became the leader of the Conservative Party. He was prime minister in 1885, and again from 1886 to 1892, and from 1895 to 1902. Up to 1900, he was also foreign minister. He advocated British isolationism in international affairs, although engaged in an active colonial policy: the conquest of Burma, Sudan and East. At home, he firmly opposed Home Rule for Ireland and the extension of suffrage to workers. See: *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. 19 (Chicago, 1963), 880-883; *Opća enciklopedija JLZ*, vol. 7 (Zagreb, 1981), 252.

<sup>15</sup> R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question*, 153.

<sup>16</sup> Theodor von Sosnosky, *op. cit.*, 182.



Andrássy's biographer Eduard von Wertheimer noted that the Russian delegates at the Congress of Berlin were dismayed by Salisbury's proposal, but they conceded after Bismarck's robust backing, which was followed by consent from France and Italy.<sup>17</sup> Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin of July 13, 1878 entrusted the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with the European mandate to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina and to institute administration that would facilitate its complete and permanent pacification, establish order and secure the future of its populace. The Ottoman Empire was forced to accept this decision, but insisted that it remain interim in nature, which was conceded. Endeavoring not to jeopardize its gains at the Congress of Berlin, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy consented to the signing of a confidential declaration on July 13, 1878 stipulating the transitory nature of the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which it proffered to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>18</sup> However, it never saw the occupation as temporary for even a moment, convinced that the Ottoman Empire would no longer be able to back the formal legal demands for its provinces with evidence of any genuine ability to organize effective administration.<sup>19</sup> The possibility of Bosnia-Herzegovina's autonomy under the Ottoman Empire was most adamantly opposed at the Congress of Berlin by Lord Salisbury, asserting that the potential incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to one of the neighboring principalities, i.e. Serbia or Montenegro, would lay the foundation for the creation of a series of Slavic states that would extend over the entire Balkan Peninsula. This would threaten the survival of the Ottoman Empire, which was no longer able to control the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>20</sup>

The principal aim of British politics was to prevent the restoration of an alliance between the three empires: the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian, which would diminish Great Britain's political influence in continental Europe and the possibility of furthering its interests in the East. However, by rejecting a pact with Austria-Hungary, Great Britain actually contributed to the renewal of the Three Emperor's League (*Dreikaiserbund*) in June 1881. The League functioned with great difficulty due to the antagonism between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (backed by Germany) and Russia over the Balkans. The implementation of British Eastern policies specifically hinged upon on the frustration of Russia's political ambitions, and the associated support for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's dominance in the East. This British position explains Great Britain's firm support to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy at the Congress of Berlin with reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was clearly defined by Benjamin Disraeli, who declared: "(...) the occupation (of Bosnia-Herzegovina – *author's note*) allows us to reign in, forever I hope, the Panslavic confederation and conspiracy, which has already

<sup>17</sup> Eduard von Wertheimer, *Graf Julius Andrássy. Sein Leben und seine Zeit*, vol. III. (Stuttgart, 1913), 129-130.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 133.

<sup>19</sup> Hans Sshneller, *op. cit.*, 20-21.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

proven itself so deleterious to the world's happiness."<sup>21</sup> Speaking on the text of the Treaty of Berlin, Lord Salisbury asserted that placing the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy between two Slavic states offered security to the sultan against the renewed aggression of these states against parts of his Empire. In his address to the House of Lords, he highlighted the most important reason for Britain's support for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's domination in the East, by observing that Russia had made every attempt to become the successor to the Ottoman Empire, but after the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's entry in the Balkans, it became quite certain that insofar as the Ottoman Empire falls, Russia would not take control of the Bosphorus. According to a contemporary statement by Lord Selborne, fear of Panslavism spurred Great Britain to make Austria a candidate for Istanbul's successor.<sup>22</sup>

### **The views of Bishop Strossmayer and Gladstone on the Eastern Question and possibilities for its solution**

Croatia's politicians could not participate in the diplomatic deliberations in which decisions were made on the fate of the Ottoman Empire's European possessions, including the fate of its westernmost territory, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Exclusion from the diplomatic scene of the European great powers nonetheless did not keep the most distinguished personalities of the Croatian political and clerical scene of the time from attempting to influence the course of decision-making on this matter with their own suggestions. Any analysis of the international aspect of the Eastern Crisis, at least when dealing with its Croatian component, cannot avoid Đakovo-Srijem and Bosnian Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, whose participation in the First Vatican Council in 1869/70 secured him renown not only in European clerical circles but also in some influential political circles. In five extended speeches delivered at the Vatican Council, Strossmayer advocated the rights of the Council and the episcopate in relation to the pope, condemned as historically inaccurate the claim that Protestantism was to blame for modern rationalism and liberalism and refused to accept the dogma of papal infallibility which, he believed, was impeding the achievement of church unity, particularly with Eastern Orthodoxy. He also deemed it necessary for the Roman Curia to reflect by its composition the universal character of the Catholic Church, which meant it should cease being a focal point of "the noxious encroachment of Romanism." It was only in 1872 that he published the contested, in his view, constitution *De ecclesia Christi* in the bulletin of his diocese, *Glasnik*, which he launched at the time.<sup>23</sup> Strossmayer's addresses at the Vatican Council earned

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<sup>21</sup> R. W. SETON-WATSON, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question* (London, 1935), 532.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 532.-533.

<sup>23</sup> See: Janko Oberški, *Strossmayerovi govori na Vatikanskom koncilu* (Zagreb, 1929).

him a great deal of sympathy in European Protestant circles. His speeches were printed in the capitals of Protestant countries, although often cited from forged texts, so that Strossmayer sometimes felt compelled to personally deny the claims made in some of these forgeries.<sup>24</sup>

With reference to Strossmayer's stance on the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it should be pointed out that his views on this problem were rather contradictory. Only a slightly more than two years separated his fierce opposition to Austro-Hungarian plans to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina in the latter half of 1876, when he advocated entrusting Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia for administration, from his statement, published only a few months after the occupation in 1878, according to which it was "an event of providential import to our people."<sup>25</sup>

Strossmayer's opposition to the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina particularly comes to the fore in his letters to Gladstone. Transcripts of Strossmayer's letters to Gladstone are held in the Croatian National Archives (*Hrvatski državni arhiv*) in Zagreb.<sup>26</sup> Robert William Seton-Watson<sup>27</sup> included

<sup>24</sup> With reference to the inauthentic editions of Strossmayer's speeches at the First Vatican Council, see: *Henry Matthews – J. J. Strossmayer*, Arhiv HAZU (Zagreb), XI A/Matth. H. 1. The letter had attached to it a brochure with portions of a forged speech by Strossmayer at the First Vatican Council and comments by the editor. The brochure was published under the tendentious title *The Papal Pretensions Exposed: or, An Appeal to Scripture, History and Facts, by a Roman Catholic Bishop*, Fourth Edition, (Leeds: no year cited). The text on the back cover reads: "The following is the translation of an Italian Version of the celebrated speech of Bishop STROSSMAYER, in the Vatican Council, which has been published in Florence, under the title *The Pope and the Gospel*. It may be truly said that nothing equal to this has appeared from such a source [the Catholic Church – *author's note*] during the past three hundred years." Strossmayer, because he promoted open insubordination to church authority, is directly associated with the Catholic bishops who opted for Protestantism and risked burning at the stake in the sixteenth century: "This discourse, which in the sixteenth century would have procured for the courageous Bishop the glory of dying at the stake, in this present century provoked the contempt of Pius IX and all of those who desire to abuse the ignorance of the peoples." (p. 12). In the upper section of Matthews's letter the bishop's secretary wrote: "Bishop himself responded on 8/Dec. [18]78 from Rome and protested."

<sup>25</sup> *Glasnik Biskupie Đakovačko Srijemske*, VII(1879), no. 1:4.

<sup>26</sup> See: HDA (Zagreb), Isidor Kršnjavi Collection (collection no.: 804) box 1, vol. IV, 67.

<sup>27</sup> R. W. Seton-Watson (1879-1951) was a respected British historian and diplomat of Scottish origin. He researched the history of the Habsburg Monarchy, and besides German and Hungarian, he also learned several Slavic languages. In studying the history of Hungary, he learned of the disenfranchisement of the non-Hungarian peoples in Hungary, and in 1909 he published *Racial Problems in Hungary*. Until World War I, he called for the maintenance and restructuring of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, while supporting a solution to the South Slav question within the framework of a reorganized Habsburg Monarchy. This idea was particularly promoted in his best known work *Die südslawische Frage im Habsburger Reiche*, (Berlin, 1913) (It was originally published in English, *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy*, (London, 1911). Later, adhering to contemporary historical trends and the official policies of Great Britain, one of the most influential creators of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, he opposed the conclusion of a separate peace with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and called for the recog-

them as an appendix to his book *Die südslawische Frage im Habsburger Reiche* (Berlin, 1913, pp. 589-630; hereinafter: *Die südslawische Frage*), first published in 1911 as *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy*. Gladstone's letters to Strossmayer, from the period of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian revolt and immediately thereafter (1876-1882), have only been published fragmentarily. They were written in the French language, and they are held in the Strossmayer Papers in the Archives of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Science. They are appended to this work. They reveal that Gladstone agreed with Strossmayer on many points, particularly in the belief that the Ottoman Empire had to be removed from Europe, although they also held divergent views on some issues, especially when considering them within the context of British national interests.

The Gladstone-Strossmayer correspondence was partially published in periodicals as well, both during the Austro-Hungarian era and in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), which testifies to the broadest interest of the scholarly public in its content, and to the efforts to promote Strossmayer's political ideas in public in a different historical context with the help of Yugoslav-oriented publications.<sup>28</sup> The efforts of Strossmayer and Gladstone to bring the churches together also inspired works concerning their correspondence.<sup>29</sup>

Respected Protestant church officials largely contributed to the establishment of contacts between Bishop Strossmayer and Gladstone during the Great Eastern Crisis (1875-1878). Prominent among them was the renowned Anglican canon of the Puseyite tradition,<sup>30</sup> Henry Liddon, who visited the Balkans in 1876 to

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nition of the Yugoslav Committee in London as an ally and the interim wartime government. He promoted his pro-Yugoslav ideas from 1916 to 1918 in the journal *The New Europe*, which at the time waged a campaign to resolve the Czech, Romanian and Yugoslav questions, i.e. he supported the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. See: *Opća enciklopedija JLZ* vol. 7, (Zagreb, 1981), 387. Other important works by R.W. Seton-Watson: *Racial Problems in Hungary* (1908); *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans* (1917); *Europe in the Melting-Pot* (1919); *The New Slovakia* (1924); *Sarajevo: A Study In The Origin Of The Great War* (1926); *The Role of Bosnia in International Politics 1875-1919* (1932); *A History Of the Roumanians* (1934); *Disraeli, Gladstone and The Eastern Question* (1935); *Britain In Europe (1789-1914): A Survey Of Foreign Policy* (1937); *Britain and The Dictators: A Survey Of Post-war British Policy* (1938); *From Munich to Danzig* (1939); *Masaryk In England* (1943); *A History Of the Czechs And Slovaks* (1943).

<sup>28</sup> See: "Strossmayerova korespondencija s Gladstoneom," *Obzor*, 53/1912, 19, 3-6; *Jedinstvo* (Novi Sad), 3/1921, 504, 1-2 (*Obzor* carried 11 letters by Strossmayer dated between 1877 and 1886 and a letter by Gladstone of 12 Oct. 1882 – *Jedinstvo* carried excerpts of letters dated 28 Oct. 1877, 13 Feb. 1878 and 25 Jul. 1892 and the text of two letters by Gladstone of 13 Mar. 1879 and 12 Oct. 1882 – *Trgovinski glasnik*, 22/1912, 215, 2; 216, 2 carried [Strossmayer's] letter of 13 Feb. 1878.

<sup>29</sup> See: "Iz dokumenata o odnošajima između V. Gledstona i biskupa J. J. Štrosmajera" [Reported by] R[astko] Drljić, *Franjevački vijesnik* 48(1941), no. 1, 47-48 (contains text of letter from Aleksandar Bresztyenszki to Strossmayer of 19 Oct. 1896 on the problem of church unity among the South Slavs; particularly Gladstone's statement on this problem).

<sup>30</sup> On this see: George W. E. Russel, *Dr. Pusey* (London: The English Churchman's Library, 1912).

establish personal contacts with Eastern Christians.<sup>31</sup> He was accompanied by Malcolm MacColl, a Scottish Episcopalian priest who had been closely associated with Gladstone for almost two decades. Both clergymen arrived in Belgrade in early September 1876. During their meeting with Jovan Ristić,<sup>32</sup> they expressed Great Britain's sympathies for the Balkan Christians and the conviction that they were called upon to usher in the future of that region. On their way home, Liddon and MacColl visited Bishop Strossmayer in Đakovo. Liddon informed Gladstone of Strossmayer's stance that the idea of reforming the Ottoman Empire was illusory, that Bosnia-Herzegovina should belong to Serbia and Montenegro, and that this more than anything else would create a barrier to Russia's aspirations and bring England closer to the South Slavs.<sup>33</sup>

The correspondence between Strossmayer and Gladstone commenced in October of the same year. In his first letter to Gladstone, sent from Đakovo on October 1, 1876, Strossmayer expressed his gratitude for Gladstone's advocacy of independence for the Balkan states, and expressed his conviction that European diplomacy, insisting on reform of the Ottoman Empire, would not solve the Eastern Question satisfactorily. In Strossmayer's opinion, the Ottoman authorities were incapable of guaranteeing the security and intellectual betterment of the Christian population, nor create the conditions for the introduction of virtuous

<sup>31</sup> On contacts between Bishop Strossmayer and Canon Liddon, see: R.W. Seton-Watson, "Canon Liddon and Bishop Strossmayer," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 14 (1935-36):43; 44.

<sup>32</sup> J. Ristić (Kragujevac, 4 Jan. 1831 - Belgrade, 23 Aug. 1899) participated in the Serbian movement in Hungary in 1848 as a lycée pupil. In 1852 he earned a doctorate in philosophy in Heidelberg. Afterward he worked in the ministries of education and foreign and internal affairs of the Principality (and after 1877 Kingdom) of Serbia. In 1858 he became the head of the police department under the Internal Affairs Minister Ilija Garašanin. He belonged to a circle of conservative politicians gathered around the heir to the throne, Prince Mihailo Obrenović, and criticized the liberals in the newspaper *Srpske novine*. After Prince Mihailo ascended to the throne, he promoted the latter's domestic policies in *Srpske novine*. In 1861, he became secretary of the so-called Preobraženska Assembly. In late 1867 he succeeded Garašanin as foreign minister, but he immediately withdrew, as Prince Mihailo did not want to accept his proposed liberal reforms. After Prince Mihailo's assassination in 1868, he was appointed to the Regency, established because Prince Milan Obrenović was still a minor. As a regent, he prevented Andrassy's plan to incorporate Serbia into the Austro-Hungarian sphere of interest. Once Prince Milan reached adulthood (1872), he became foreign minister. During the revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he endeavored to secure maximum gains for Serbia with Russia's help. As Serbia's delegate, he participated in the Congress of Berlin in 1878. As the prime minister he pushed the railroad convention with Austria through parliament, but in the same year he resigned due to his disagreement with the provisions of a trade agreement with the Monarchy. After King Milan stepped down from the throne (1889), he once more served as a member of the Regency, which was a counterweight to the Radical government, while in foreign policy he was committed to observing the secret convention with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of 1881. He withdrew from politics in 1893 when the underage King Aleksandar seized authority in a coup d'état. He wrote two studies on Serbian history in the period from 1848 to 1878. See: *Narodna enciklopedija SHS*, vol. III, (Zagreb, 1928), 948-949.

<sup>33</sup> R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and Eastern Question* (London, 1935), 85.

administration: “The Christian in Turkey remains ever a slave, whose freedom, property, life and death depend on the caprice of Turkish authority.”<sup>34</sup> Strossmayer did not see reforms as a way out for Christians in the Ottoman Empire, rather this could only be accomplished with the expulsion of the Ottomans from Europe. He rejected the possibility of the Ottoman Empire’s transformation, for he was convinced that Christianity and Islam had created entirely divergent systems of cultural, social, economic and other values, whose coexistence was possible only with the use of force which ensures the dominance of one side. Speaking of Islam, Strossmayer asserted that the *Koran*, upon which the Ottoman Empire was based in its legislation, governance and customary practices, had proven absolutely incapable of ruling over Christian populations: “The Koran has demonstrated its absolute inability to govern Christian peoples before God and the people, for it has made itself the foundation and wellspring not only of religious, but also civic and social life. Its portentous task is to either compel the Christian populace to accept Islam or to permanently deny them all rights in public life and subject them to humiliating and unbearable captivity. This inherent mission of the Koran cannot even be altered by all the power in the world, for, according to the belief of the Muslims, it ensues from God himself.”<sup>35</sup>

Reforms in the military and administration, which were leading to a more equal position in the Ottoman Empire were characterized by Strossmayer as sacrilegious absurdities due to their fundamental clash with the basic Islamic principles which accord divine sanction to Muslim privilege.<sup>36</sup> Strossmayer saw the intercession of Providence in the decay of Ottoman authority in the Balkans, linking this process with the fulfillment of his idea of South Slav unity: “Here among us, the Slavic peoples, a process of unification is under way by which, despite many difficulties and many lapses, it would appear that God has taken us into his hands.”<sup>37</sup> In this vein, Strossmayer expressed the desire for Providence to continue working on behalf of those states, to which he also belonged, which were entrusted with the task of preventing a conflict between the great powers

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<sup>34</sup> “Der Christ bleibt in Türkei ewig Sklawe, dessen Freiheit, dessen Hab und Gut, dessen Leben und Tod in der Willkür des türkischen Herren liegt.” R. W. Seton-Watson, *Die südslavische Frage* (Berlin, 1913), 592.

<sup>35</sup> “Der Koran hat seine absolute Unfähigkeit, christliche Völker zu regieren, vor Gott und der ganzen Welt dadurch konstatiert, daß er sich zum Fundamente und zur Quelle nicht nur der religiösen, sondern auch des bürgerlichen und sozialen Lebens gemacht hat. Seine fatalistische Aufgabe ist es, die christlichen Völker entweder gewaltsam zum Islam zu zwingen, oder aber jeder Berechtigung im staatlichen Leben für immer zu entkleiden und in eine schmachvolle und unerträgliche Knechtschaft zu stürzen. Diese inhärente Mission des Korans kann keine Macht der Welt ändern, denn sie stammt, nach dem Glauben der Muselmänner, von Gott selber ab.” *Ibid.*, 591.

<sup>36</sup> “Sie betrachten die erzwungenen Reformen als gotteslästerliche Torheiten, die geeignet sind, sie in ihrem göttlichen Rechte und in ihrem gottverbürgten Gemüte zu stören.” *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> “Es erfüllt sich hier bei uns innerhalb des slawischen Volkes ein Prozeß der Einigkeit den trotz mancher Schwierigkeiten und mancher Verirrungen Got selber in die Hand genommen zu haben scheint.” *Ibid.*, 594.

and finding a solution that would secure the happiness and blessings of Europe. The leading role in the cultural integration of the South Slavs and their elevation to the level of European culture was intended by Strossmayer to fall to the Croats, as the Tuscan element among the South Slavs, i.e. the South Slav people which had in a very short time managed to create institutions<sup>38</sup> which preordained it to the leading role on their way to spiritual progress.<sup>39</sup>

Speaking of the future status of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Strossmayer, in a letter to Gladstone dated October 24, 1876, expressed the view that it would be best left to Serbia, for that would have been a fair price for Serbia's sacrifice in the struggle for the "holy cause," meaning the struggle against the Ottoman Empire.<sup>40</sup> Strossmayer intended Great Britain to play a special role in the creation of a new European political system, which would emerge after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, stressing that it had been destined for this thanks to its geographic position, for it was bound to Europe by a thousand threads, while its insular status simultaneously separated it from the "frivolous passions and petty squabbles" and made it the most suitable and most qualified to deal with peaceful arbitration. Assessing its role in Europe as honorable, delicate and accountable, he hoped England would wholeheartedly accept and fulfill it.<sup>41</sup> Strossmayer particularly endeavored to convince Gladstone that the idea reforming the Ottoman Empire was illusory, that Bosnia-Herzegovina had to belong to Serbia and Montenegro, and that this more than anything else would create a curb Russian aspirations and bring England closer to the South Slavs.<sup>42</sup> In his subsequent letters as well, he attempted to convince Gladstone of the correctness of his understanding of a solution to the Eastern Question. He singled out for particular reproof the English-Russian disputes over influence in the East, which prompted the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli<sup>43</sup> to adopt a rigid stance

<sup>38</sup> Strossmayer was here thinking of the Yugoslav (today Croatian) Academy of Arts and Science (1861) and the University of Zagreb (1874), the first academic institutions in the territory of Southeast Europe.

<sup>39</sup> "Wir Kroaten, ohne Selbstüberhebung sei es gesagt, repräsentieren in diesem kleinen Bunde slawischer Brüder das toskanische Element. Wir haben trotz großer Schwierigkeiten während kurzer Zeit solche Anstalten ins Leben gerufen, die uns einigermaßen berechtigen, die Führerrolle auf dem Wege des geistigen Fortschrittes und der idealen Zwecke zu beanspruchen." R.W. Seton-Watson, *Die südslavische Frage* (Berlin, 1913), 592.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 594-595.

<sup>41</sup> "Gott hat England in Europa so gestellt, daß es mit demselben mit tausend Fäden verbunden ist, während es zugleich durch seine insulare Stellung von allen kleinlichen Leidenschaften und Zänkereien von Europa geschieden, am geeignetsten und berufensten ist, in allen schwierigen Fragen die herrliche Rolle des Schiedsgerichtes zu üben." *Ibid.*, 600-601.

<sup>42</sup> R.W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and Eastern Question* (London, 1935), 85.

<sup>43</sup> Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield (London, 21 Dec. 1804 – London, 19 Apr. 1881) was the descendent of a Sephardic Jewish family which moved from Ferrara, Italy to London in 1748. His father Isaac arranged for the baptism of his children into the Christian faith. Disraeli's political career began in 1835 as a candidate for the Conservatives (Tories) in Taunton. In 1837 he was elected a Conservative MP representing Maidstone in Kent. In 1852, he became Chancel-

in relations with Tsarist Russia. Great Britain's fear that Russia would occupy Istanbul and the Straits were deemed puerile by Strossmayer, who stressed that British primacy on the seas was unquestionable, but that it should be aligned by universal interests. He assured Gladstone that England and Russia must fulfill a great providential task in Asia, and that they therefore must live in peace and mutual esteem in Europe.<sup>44</sup> Strossmayer's insistence on a British-Russian alliance included tolerance for the achievement of Russian designs in the Balkans and stood in opposition to Austro-Hungarian Eastern policies, which were aimed at the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy's dominance in the Balkans.

Since Strossmayer's views of the role of the great powers in the reorganization of the Balkans from 1875 to 1878 were quite controversial, an attempt to interpret them by the Croatian politician and art historian (and one-time chief education and religious affairs official in Croatia) Isidor Kršnjavi is noteworthy. In his "Conversations with Bishop Strossmayer,"<sup>45</sup> Kršnjavi noted that with reference to the Balkans Strossmayer had a grand plan for the Habsburg dynasty at the head of a Balkan federation. From Strossmayer's statements to Kršnjavi, it may be concluded that he saw Tsarist Russia as the principal threat to the Monarchy's existence, and that he believed that unification of the South Slavs inside the Monarchy would be a guarantor against Russian incursions into the Balkans. Later he altered his view and proposed that Bosnia-Herzegovina

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lor of the Exchequer in Lord Derby's ministry. In 1874, he managed to lead the Conservatives to victory, using skilled rhetoric to oppose Gladstone and the Liberals, who he accused of impinging the reputation of the Monarchy, the House of Lords and the Church. When implementing social programs in 1873, he came into conflict with the Anglican Church, which mounted stiff resistance to his Eastern policy in 1875. In implementing British imperial policies, he managed to secure control of the Suez Canal by purchasing the necessary number of shares, but this would later lead to conflict with Egypt and military occupation. In early 1876 he pushed through the enactment of a law whereby Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India. He was conferred the title of Earl of Beaconsfield for his diplomatic achievements. During the conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, he threatened military intervention to protect the Straits from Russian seizure, resolutely opposing Gladstone's pro-Russian orientation. At the Congress of Berlin, he worked jointly with Bismarck to repeal the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano and secure the mandate to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He also succeeded in his efforts to win Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire. He was also a notable prose writer. The first edition of his novel *Vivian Grey* (1826) garnered considerable attention with its portrayal of high society life. Together with friends in political and literary circles, he established the Young England group, whose views were reflected in his novels *Coningsby or the New Generation* (1844), *Sybil or the Two Nations* (1845), and *Tancred or the New Crusade* (1847). He was convinced that the Whig aristocracy could not suitably represent the nation. Rejuvenation had to be ushered in by the Tories, once it became firmly committed to the problems of the people and joined forces with the "popular" rule of the sovereign. See: *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. V, Berlin-Leipzig, 1930, 1156-1158; *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. 3, Chicago, 1963, 316-320.

<sup>44</sup> R. W. Seton-Watson, *Die südslavische Frage* (Berlin, 1913), 600.

<sup>45</sup> See: I. Kršnjavi, *Razgovori s biskupom Strossmayerom* (1920), HDA (Zagreb), Isidor Kršnjavi Collection (collection no.: 804).



be entrusted to Serbia and Montenegro for administration, realizing that the leadership of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was not prepared to accept a federal model that would facilitate the national and political affirmation of the South Slavs inside its borders. Asserting that the Monarchy did not want to bring about the unification of the South Slavs inside its borders, he warned that this would lead to its downfall, for realization of the need to change such a wrongful policy would come to late, once the Russians are already in Galicia. To Kršnjavi's query on the intentions of Gladstone and the British Liberals, who were in the opposition during the Great Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, with limited influence, Strossmayer responded ambiguously to the effect that Gladstone wanted to liberate the Balkan Peninsula and establish autonomy. Actually, this was a reference to a plan to establish a system of autonomous principalities under a British protectorate. When, in the first half of 1878, he realized that the incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Serbia could not be achieved, Strossmayer began to advocate the creation of autonomous principalities within the Ottoman Empire, which would be under Great Britain's protection. His expectations in this regard were completely dashed, for Disraeli's cabinet ordered Lord Salisbury, the British delegate at the Congress of Berlin, to fully endorse the conferral of the occupation mandate to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. According to the "Conversations with Bishop Strossmayer" by Kršnjavi, the reason behind Strossmayer's abandonment of the idea of gathering the South Slavs around the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the anti-Slav mood of that era's most influential politician in the Monarchy, Count Gyula Andr ssy, who saw the incorporation of new Slav-populated territories into the Monarchy as a danger to the maintenance of the political power of the Hungarians and the dualist system. After the failure to revise the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise in 1873, Strossmayer truly became convinced that the Croats could expect nothing positive from the Monarchy. This also provides some explanation of his contacts with Gladstone, one of the most distinguished exponents of British politics at the time. Strossmayer's expectations were entirely frustrated, for they contradicted the basic postulates of Britain's Eastern policy, wherein the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy served as a barrier to two expansionist threats: Germany and Russia.

### **The views of Gladstone and Strossmayer on the Eastern Question in the context of the national policies of Great Britain and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy**

Strossmayer's advocacy of British-Russian rapprochement in Europe, in which he attempted to persuade Gladstone in a letter dated October 24, 1876, even though it assumed Great Britain's tolerance of Russian gains in the Balkans, not only contradicted vital Austro-Hungarian and British interests in Europe, it also stood in stark opposition to the existing secret pact concluded in Reichstadt

in July 1876 and in Budapest in 1877. Tsarist Russia opted for the Reichstadt agreement after a failed attempt to create an alliance with France, which was blocked by Germany. Under this agreement, Russia pledged that it would not benefit from an Ottoman victory. In case of victory over the Ottoman Empire, Russia would recover Bessarabia, which was taken from it after the Crimean War (1853-1856), while the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would acquire some or all of Bosnia. Istanbul (Constantinople) would become a free city, while Bulgaria, Rumelia and perhaps Albania would become autonomous or independent. This treaty did not allow for Russia's involvement in Balkan conflicts, nor to wage war against the Ottoman Empire.<sup>46</sup> Under the Budapest conventions, Russia pledged not to attempt to establish its dominance in the Balkans, which could have been accomplished by the territorial expansion of Serbia and Montenegro into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their unification into an alliance of Balkan Orthodox states under Russian influence.<sup>47</sup> These conventions between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Tsarist Russia were quashed when Russia created Greater Bulgaria under the Treaty of San Stefano, imposed upon the Ottoman Empire on March 3, 1878, as the basis for its domination in the Balkans.<sup>48</sup>

The Treaty of San Stefano brought the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Great Britain closer together, as the enhancement of Russian influence in the Balkans was unacceptable to both. Strossmayer considered the possibility of an Austro-British alliance against Russian policies in the Balkans quite dangerous, so in a letter dated April 11, 1878, he appealed to Gladstone to exert his influence to keep his country from making a wrong-headed political judgment and going to war with Russia, for England could still peacefully deliberate with Russia and protect its interests in Europe just as Russia could. In complaining that Great Britain, by heeding the inducements of the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Count Gyula Andrassy, was leaving Russia to Hungary, Strossmayer clearly expressed his opposition to the Monarchy's Eastern policy at a moment when its diplomats were doing everything to nullify the Treaty of San Stefano.

An examination of the content of the Gladstone-Strossmayer correspondence reveals that Gladstone's positions contrasted significantly from the contemporary British policies implemented by Disraeli's government. This particularly applies to Gladstone's tendency to accept Strossmayer's ideas of removing the Ottoman Empire from Europe, even though this would open the way for Russia's advance into the Balkans. Unable to entirely neglect the main postulates of Britain's Eastern policy, Gladstone adopted contradictory positions, fearing the negative repercussions that would ensue from wholly relinquishing the Balkans to the Russian sphere of influence. Furthermore, there is a considerable gap between Gladstone's views of British imperial policy which he expressed in his letters to Strossmayer during his time in the opposition and the actions he took when

<sup>46</sup> Alan John Percival Taylor, *Borba za prevlast u Evropi 1848.-1918.* (Sarajevo, 1968), 234.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 238.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 242.

he once more took control of the government. During the Great Eastern Crisis (1875-1878), when he was in the opposition, he opposed British imperialism and he denounced as folly the Disraeli cabinet's (1874-1880) initiative calling for the possible conquest of Egypt. Later, when prime minister for the second time (1880-1885), he proclaimed a British protectorate in Egypt (1882), and then British title to the entire Suez Canal zone (1883). Nonetheless, this does not mean that he was inconsistent or insincere in his letters to Strossmayer when speaking of British foreign policy. Perhaps he never even privately abandoned these views. However, as British prime minister, he had to implement British imperial policy which rested on maintenance of vast colonial possessions and control of the major routes leading to them, which often implied the military occupation of the principal strategic points.

On the other hand, Strossmayer's Yugoslav ideas not only ran counter to contemporary Austro-Hungarian policies, particularly the idea of entrusting Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbian administration, they also threatened the Monarchy's fundamental state interests, and they could even have been deemed treasonous. Even before the revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Strossmayer corresponded with the Serbian Prince Mihailo Obrenović (1823-1868), and encouraged him to take action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even pledging monetary assistance. When Prince Mihailo was assassinated, Jovan Ristić, the regent to the underage Prince Milan, formally handed over these letters to Emperor Francis Joseph I. When later asked by Isidor Kršnjavi if these papers were treasonous, Strossmayer responded that they were not, for in this case he would have been indicted. He conceded, however, that they did compromise his position.<sup>49</sup> Strossmayer's attempts to convince the Serbian government to intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the precariousness of his position in relation to the Turcophile Hungarian government, dictated his refusal to agree to Gladstone's request that their correspondence on this matter be immediately published.<sup>50</sup> We can only speculate as to the reasons why Gladstone did not later encourage Strossmayer to publish it. After the Congress of Berlin, this correspondence was no longer topical, if it ever really was given the realistic potential of any of the major ideas contained therein ever being implemented. Additionally, once Gladstone once more assumed the reigns of government (1880-1885) he

<sup>49</sup> Isidor Kršnjavi, Strossmayer's friend and protégé until he joined the pro-regime People's Party of Ban Khuen Héderváry in 1884, later learned that Francis Joseph showed Strossmayer's letters to Prince Mihailo Obrenović to Count Andrassy, asking the latter what to do with him: "Was sollen wir mit diesem Menschen anfangen?" Andrassy responded that he should be left alone, to refrain from making a martyr of him, for this would be perilous, and that he would in any case make it impossible for himself: "Laufen lassen – wir sollen keinen Märtyrer aus ihm machen. Das wäre gefährlich. Er wird sich selbst unmöglich machen." Based on this information, Kršnjavi concluded that Andrassy had saved Strossmayer from political persecution at the time. I. Kršnjavi, *Razgovori s biskupom Strossmayerom*, 23.-24.

<sup>50</sup> On this, see: R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question* (London, 1935).

largely discarded the opposition standpoints expressed in his correspondence with Strossmayer. They otherwise contravened some of the central postulates of Britain's European and Eastern (colonial) policies, so their publication would have been rather inopportune in this regard as well.

The assessment of the relevance of the Gladstone-Strossmayer correspondence from the historiographic point of view is entirely different. The fact that Strossmayer and Gladstone formulated their positions on the Eastern Question and the possibilities for its solution in contradistinction to the current policies of the states in which they functioned, even rendering them unrealistic in some segments, does not reduce the historiographic importance of their correspondence, for it contains many vital – and when speaking of Gladstone's letters, some hitherto unknown – facts which allow for more comprehensive insight into one of the vital periods of recent European history.

Since Gladstone's letters are attached hereto, I believe there is no need to review their content in great detail. Nevertheless, I believe it is important to point out that besides Gladstone's opinions on the Eastern Question and the British policy objectives in this regard, these letters also offer a fascinating view into his convictions on the influence of the British mentality on the formulation of British policy. Furthermore, it testifies to the turmoil in the British government over Disraeli's "aggressive" Eastern policy and the British public's enormous interest in the Eastern Question and the popular assemblies held on this matter throughout the country. They familiarize the reader with Gladstone's commitment to the unification of Christian churches and his erudition in religious philosophy and comparative religions. They reveal the robust humanistic strain in Gladstone's personality, which came to the fore in his advocacy of civil rights, the inviolability of property and the dignity of women in Bosnia-Herzegovina swept up in revolt, and his conviction that in the exercise of its domestic and foreign policies, the British Empire is not entitled to violate any individual's freedom – an ideal which, unfortunately, he did not uphold once he regained the post of prime minister, particularly with reference to Britain's Eastern policies.

## APPENDIX: Correspondence between William Ewart Gladstone and Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1876-1882)<sup>51</sup>

1. W. E. Gladstone to J. J. Strossmayer, Hawarden près de Chester, 5 November 1876

The Turcophile press in London is disseminating lies on the “crimes” which the Russians perpetrated in Turkestan in order to equate Russia with Turkey. While the English government shirks its duty (to intervene), the Russians are the only ones left fighting the good fight in the bewailed (bereaved) provinces, Gladstone therefore wrote a work on this in R. C., for he believes that this could benefit the English public (as a counterweight to the writing of the other media). For Gladstone, the issue of the suffering provinces in Turkey is a first-class matter, so he is sacrificing his rest (retirement) after 44 years of continual struggle in English political life to acquiesce to a “stormy sea.” But he gladly makes this sacrifice, for it is all in God’s hands and so forth. He believes that this matter would take a turn for the better, because, first, the English government had given way to the other great powers on the project for administrative autonomy, no matter how deficient (for any project of this type is based on the principle of outside interference in Turkey’s internal affairs). However, since these powers are engaged in this ceremonial act, it was now a matter of their honor as the protectors of peace and maintenance of the European order. Gladstone believes that there are too many “Anglo-Turks” counting on lassitude, but that they are wrong, for his party had made much progress on this issue, which constituted a matter of nobility. What has to be feared is the mutual jealousy of the great powers. Something contradictory among the English is that they constantly complain of any Russian aggression, whether real or perceived, while on the other hand nurturing concealed thoughts of having England occupy Egypt, and perhaps Crete, to safeguard the route to Western India which, in Gladstone’s opinion, is criminal and fallacious. The task of the English fleet is to safeguard the route to India, while the British Empire is entitled to violate anybody’s freedom. He seeks from Strossmayer the most possible information in order to enable the advancement of local autonomy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria.

Hawarden près de Chester

Novembre 5. 1876

Illustre et très Révérend Monseigneur,

Il y a plus que trois semaines depuis que j’ai reçu la lettre que Votre

<sup>51</sup> Arhiv HAZU. Josip Juraj Strossmayer Papers, XI A/Glad. 1.-7. All letters are written in French. They were transcribed and annotated by Florence Sabine Fabijanec, Ph.D. The notations were compiled by Fabijanec (orthographic component) and Zoran Grijak, Ph.D. (historical component). In compliance with the rules of transcription, corrections were not made to the text, rather all archaic forms and grammatical and spelling errors, and certain today incomprehensible words (with attempts to decipher their meaning) are specified in the notes.

Grandeur s'est complue m'adresser<sup>52</sup>. Ni l'indifférence ni la paresse n'a<sup>53</sup> été la cause de mon silence. A l'époque de l'arrivée de cette lettre, la presse turque (comme on l'a très justement appelée) de Londres s'efforçoit<sup>54</sup> d'empoisonner l'esprit public marquant une quantité de mensonges (rien de moins) au sujet des "atrocités" Russes dans le Turkistan<sup>55</sup>. Ce n'étoit pas une question d'humanité: c'étoit un essai très habile d'amortir le sentiment public /si vivement touché/<sup>56</sup> en suggérant Russe et Turquie<sup>57</sup>, ce sont deux pendants<sup>58</sup>; n'ôtez pas de l'un pour donner à l'autre. A l'époque actuelle, quand le Gouvernement anglois s'éloignoit déplorablement de son devoir, et les Russes presque seuls propageaient<sup>59</sup> la cause des provinces affligées, cela m'a paru une chose assez grave. Conséquemment, bien que malgré moi, je me suis adonné à l'annoncé<sup>60</sup> de la question, et le résultat de mon travail se trouve publié depuis peu de jours dans la Revue Contemporaine. J'en envoie une copie à l'V. G., mais c'est en vérité une brochure d'occasion, et ne vaut pas la peine de la lecture de votre part; quoique je crois qu'elle doit avoir quelque utilité pour le public Anglais.

Ma première idée, après l'arrivée de la lettre de V. G., était celle-ci. Je souhaitois vivement la permission de donner au public une pièce si intéressante: même modiquement, pour le cas que<sup>61</sup> la publication avec le nom, qui auroit<sup>62</sup> tant de poids parmi mes compatriotes, ne soit pas possible.

Je ne pense pas vous dire comme je m'associe au sentiment /intime/ de cette lettre. La question des provinces souffrantes de la Turquie est pour moi question de premier ordre. Elle m'a arraché de la retraite, dont en partie je commençai à me réjouir, après quarante quatre ans de lutttes continuelles de la vie politique Anglaise, et après avoir touché à peu près le terme de 67 ans complets. Je peux bien assurer V. G. que sous beaucoup d'égards c'est pour moi un sacrifice de changer ainsi le cours de mes idées et mes travaux journaliers, et me fier encore une foi<sup>63</sup> à une mer orageuse.

<sup>52</sup> Missing is "de", "de m'adresser."

<sup>53</sup> Instead of "n'ont."

<sup>54</sup> From the thirteenth until the end of the nineteenth centuries, the old imperfect form "-ois" was used. Here the "cédille" on the "c" is missing, so in the present form it would be "s'efforçait"; the same applies to the future conditional. Henceforth these forms, whether used in verbs or nouns, will not be corrected.

<sup>55</sup> Instead of "Turkestan."

<sup>56</sup> \* // Designates subsequently inserted portions of the text.

<sup>57</sup> Instead of "Turc."

<sup>58</sup> Instead of "pendants."

<sup>59</sup> Instead of "propageaient"?

<sup>60</sup> Instead of "énoncé."

<sup>61</sup> Instead of "où."

<sup>62</sup> Old form of the future conditional, instead of "aurait" – not corrected henceforward.

<sup>63</sup> Instead of "fois."

*Nunc agilis fic, et mersor civilibus mundis.* C'est un sacrifice que je fais volontiers, et qu'on ne doit pas faire à moitié. Je dois donc suivre la question à travers tous<sup>64</sup> ses ambages jusqu'au point où par la grâce de Dieu elle sera arrivée à son port, sa solution suffisante.

Et j'espère, je peux presque dire je le crois, que dorénavant cette grande question va faire bon voyage. Ce n'est pas que le gouvernement anglais se soit nettement converti mais il me paroît que, bien que peut-être avec /beaucoup d'/ insouciance, ce gouvernement a pris une démarche définitive et très importante à l'heure quand il soumettoit aux autres Puissances un projet pour l'autonomie administrative des Provinces; quelque 'insuffisant qu' il soit. Car tout projet de cette espèce est basé essentiellement sur le principe de l'ingérence étrangère dans les affaires intérieures de la Turquie. Il ne peut être douteux selon moi que, une fois que les dites Puissances se soient engagées à cette ingérence par un acte solennel, il tient à leur honneur, et à l'idée élémentaire de leur officie de Conservatrices de la paix et de l'ordre Européen, de poursuivre leur chemin jusqu'à la fin; et de trouver les marques efficaces pour /en/ assurer le succès. L'espérance donc l'emporte sur la crainte dans mon âme, et je rends grâce au bon Dieu, sur ce que jusqu'au point d'aujourd'hui Il a fait, parmi une foule de dangers et de difficultés, de sottises et de lâchesses<sup>65</sup>.

Ne croyez pas, Monseigneur, que le peuple Anglois se soit repenti, en tout ou en partie, de ce qu'il a dit et fait pendant les deux derniers mois. Si à l'heure qu'il est, il y a moins de bruit, en voici les deux causes principales : d'abord, presque toutes les communautés du pays ont exprimé leur vœu, et on ne veut pas dire deux fois la même chose : en second lieu, on croit que le Gouvernement *volens volens* ait senti l'impulsion de dehors, et n'ose pas /maintenant/, s'il le veut /encore/ persévérer dans la fausse route qu'il faisait si longtemps. Cependant la besogne est encore loin d'être achevée. Sans doute, nos Anglo-Turcs (et il n'y en a que trop) comptent, pas tout à fait sans raison, sur la lassitude, plus que sur les changements possibles, de l'esprit populaire. Mais en partie je crois qu'ils se trompent : en partie aussi, que nous avons gagné énormément de terrain, de la façon que j'ai expliquée auparavant. Non, ce mouvement national, si frais, si simple, j'oserais dire si noble, n'a pas été infructueux.

Ce que nous avons toujours à craindre, ce sont les jalousies réciproques des Puissances. C'est la plus étrange de toutes les bizarreries, mais, parmi nous autres les Anglois, ceux qui se plaignent incessamment des menées agressives, ou réelles ou supposées, de la Russie, ceux mêmes ont toujours l'arrière pensée, et quelque fois /ils/ la tiennent sur leurs langues, que l'Angleterre devra<sup>66</sup> se

<sup>64</sup> Instead of "toutes."

<sup>65</sup> Instead of "lâchetés."

<sup>66</sup> Instead of "devra."

saisir de l'Égypte,<sup>67</sup> peut-être aussi de la Crête, pour sauvegarder la route des Indes Occidentales. Ce seroit, selon moi, dans les circonstances actuelles, un crime et une folie. C'est la marine Anglaise, qui doit, et qui pourra longtemps, sauvegarder la route des Indes; et l'Empire Britannique n'a ni le droit ni le besoin de blesser la liberté de personne.

J'ai écrit trop tard, et trop longuement. C'est dans la bienveillance et les sympathies de V. G. que je vais trouver mon excuse. Je ne veux pas en finir sans vous prier de m'aider à la recherche des meilleurs renseignements sur la suffisance de capacité et de marques de faire marcher l'autonomie locale dans les Provinces de Bosnie, d'Herzégovine et de Bulgarie.

En vieillissant, je me sens plus paresseux, ou moins capable de voyager. Aussi je crois que V. G. est plus jeune que moi, et j'espère que vous alliez faire une visite à l'Angleterre; où Votre Grandeur trouvera toutes les sympathies, tout le respect, dont nous vous sommes redevables. Néanmoins, je ne peux pas renoncer à l'espérance de venir vous voir dans votre propre demeure. Je me suis entretenu là-dessus avec notre ami Lord Acton. Nous avons /même/ l'idée de voyager ensemble /en temps opportun/. Peut-être c'est un rêve, mais c'est un rêve charmant, que je ne chasserais pas volontiers : en rêvant à jamais, avec tous les sentiments de respect et d'affection, de V. G.

le serviteur dévoué

Walter Gladstone

Encore une petite prière à V. G. c'est décrire les noms Allemands, s'il vous plaît, en caractère Italien: je ne lis pas trop bien le caractère allemand.

2. W. E. Gladstone to J. J. Strossmayer, 15 December 1876

Since October, when the public meetings throughout the country were concluded, the core of an association had been created which grew into an organization of 2,500 people who met in St. James Hall, Westminster. Among them there were many individuals who were dissatisfied with the actions of the authorities who committed many "positive evils," terrifying certain ministers, primarily Disraeli, and heightening the weakness of their colleagues who were not as enthusiastic about their ideas, while

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<sup>67</sup> Gladstone's opinion of the Disraeli's government's designs for conquering Egypt was not without justification, although Disraeli did not succeed in carrying them forward. Despite Gladstone's earlier personal misgivings about British imperial policy, it would be precisely his government (1880-1885) that would conduct the British intervention in Egypt in 1882 (see appendix no. 7) and Sudan, while in Asia it would clash with Russia over Afghanistan.



the “negative evils” were another matter entirely. Furthermore, there is mention of the consent between Lord Salisbury and Count Ignatieff, although it is uncertain as to whether their collaboration is genuine or they are simply “bargaining,” so that there is some confusion in public opinion and among the English movement. As to the objective that has to be achieved, Gladstone deems essential the substitution of the Ottoman regime and public authority, for without such a change, any reform, even the most radical, would be worthless and simply create problems, while, if the aforementioned substitution is implemented, even through the most imperfect plans, it would ensure that once ejected, the Turk would never be able to return. Gladstone predicted that after the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans, autonomy would ensue, or an interim situation under the aegis of a foreign regime. He sees great peril in this outcome, asserting that, for example, Russia could be feared, for it would then obtain its opportunity. However, he nonetheless deems it realistic to hope that almost everyone in Europe would take this to heart and intervene to prevent such a complex situation and that almost perfect autonomy would be established as the foundation for a new future.

Harwarden Castle, Chester, Dec. 15. 1876

Illustre Monseigneur et cher Ami,

Depuis l'arrivée de votre lettre, chaudement appréciée de ma part, nous ne sommes<sup>68</sup> pas endormis sur notre oeuvre. Au mois d'octobre, quand les réunions populaires avoient à peu près achevé leur course dans toutes les parties du pays, il s'est formé le *nucleus* d'une association; et ce corps étant arrivé au point d' /une/ organisation suffisante, nous nous sommes réunis, jusqu'au chiffre de 2 500 personnes, à St James' Hall, Westminster, le vendredi passé. Quant à l'idée d'une réaction supposée, je crois que nous en avons fini. Sous tous les rapports, cette Assemblée a été très satisfaisante. Nous ne sommes plus tout à fait à même de gouverner le gouvernement. Il nous reste à craindre de jour en jour quelque mauvaise démarche. C'est plus que difficile que de faire agir les mal-disposés<sup>69</sup> comme s'ils étaient bienveillants : et jusqu'à l'heure qu'il est, nous sommes incertains si les Ministres se dirigent par leur meilleure ou par leur pire inspiration. C'est la plus étrange, la plus incroyable de toutes les situations politiques que j'ai connues de toute ma vie. Des individus, nombreux il est vrai mais toujours des individus /seulement/<sup>70\*</sup>, mécontents des procédés du gouvernement actuel, se sont efforcés de parcourir *ab introi* la politique du pays à l'étranger, dans la plus difficile de toutes les questions. Plût-il à Dieu que nous ne voyions dorénavant ni un pareil mal ni un pareil suicide! Ils ont réussi jusqu'à un certain point : beaucoup de mal positif, ils l'ont empêché en faisant peur aux Ministres, avant tous à Disraeli, et en fortifiant un peu la faiblesse de

<sup>68</sup> Instead of “nous ne nous sommes.”

<sup>69</sup> Instead of “mal disposés” or “indisposés.”

<sup>70</sup> \* // Designates subsequently inserted portions of the text.

ses collègues qui ne partageaient pas de bon coeur ses idées. Mais quant au mal négatif, c'est autre chose. On dit que Lord Salisbury et le Général Ignatieff sont d'accord, mais on ne sait pas s'ils coopèrent franchement, ou s'ils marchandent entr'eux<sup>71</sup> de part et d'autre, ni s'ils sont arrivés aux points essentiels. Nous avons donc toujours l'incertitude au lieu de la lumière; et dans de pareilles circonstances il faut parler et agir, et ne se fier pas<sup>72</sup> aux accidens<sup>73</sup>. Voilà /en esquisse/ la position actuelle de l'opinion et du mouvement Anglais.

Quant au bût<sup>74</sup> à atteindre, l'essentiel selon moi est toujours la succession d'un nouveau régime, /d'une/ nouvelle source de l'autorité publique, au régime et à la source ottomane. Sans une substitution de cette espèce, toutes les réformes, même les plus radicales, sont des nullités et des problèmes : mais de l'autre côté, quand elle aura à accomplir, on pourra espérer beaucoup même des plans imparfaits en eux-mêmes: une fois expulsé, le Turc ne pourra revenir jamais. Après l'expulsion, il y aura ou l'autonomie, ou l'état intermédiaire et prévision d'un régime étranger. J'y vois beaucoup de mal et beaucoup de danger. Si la Russie est à craindre, ce sera alors qu'elle aura son opportunité. Cependant, on peut espérer que tout le monde, ou presque tout le monde Européen, tiendra à coeur de se sauver d'une situation si fâcheuse, et d'expédier autant qu'il sera possible l'autonomie éventuelle et parfaite, à laquelle il appartiendra de jeter les fondements d'un avenir meilleur.

Je ne sais pas si V. S. maîtresse de tant de langues, y conte<sup>75</sup> aussi l'anglaise; et je ne veux pas charger votre bibliothèque de ce qui pourrait être tout à fait inutile. C'est seulement pour cette cause que je n'envoie pas une brochure sur l'Hellénisme et sa fonction dans la question d'Orient, que j'ai écrite au dernier numéro de la Revue Contemporaine.

Encore un mot sur ce que V. S. a dit à l'égard de mon âge et mes emplois. Ce n'étoit pas le dégoût, ni la paresse qui m'a fait vivement décider la faculté de changer un peu mon métier à une époque quand en vérité c'est à peine que je pourrais supporter les travaux de la vie politique, pure et simple, à la Chambre des Communes. Je voudrais jusqu'à ma mort servir à mon pays et à l'humanité. Mais ce service-là peut se vendre d'une façon ou d'une autre. Si je demande à moi-même où est-ce qu'il agit principalement, de nos jours, au bonheur de l'humanité, je me répons que ce n'est pas dans la sphère de la politique ordinaire : ces luttes peuvent être sérieuses, mais il y a une autre lutte beaucoup plus grave, la lutte du *credo* et de mon *credo*, qui dans mon pays sonne toujours comme le tonnerre à mes oreilles. La question de la foi chrétienne, et de ses rapports à la raison, à la liberté, aux sciences, à la vie humaine, et la question,

<sup>71</sup> Instead of "entre eux."

<sup>72</sup> Instead of "ne pas se fier."

<sup>73</sup> Instead of "accidents."

<sup>74</sup> Instead of "but."

<sup>75</sup> Instead of "compte."

également menaçante et fructueuse, et du jour et de l'avenir. Quelle joie et quelle harmonie ne serait-il pas prévenir, si en revenant à des études que j'ai toujours aimées et jamais tout à fait abandonnées, Dieu m'aidât à dire, ne fût-ce que peu de mots, qui pourraient avancer même la moindre de ces questions vers sa solution nécessaire et dérivée. Voilà mon dernier espoir. Je prends néanmoins pour le moment, et pour autant de moments qu'il en faut, la question d'Orient comme un mot d'ordre impérieux.

Permettez que je reste avec un respect profond de V. S. le bien affectionné  
W. Gladstone

### 3. W. E. Gladstone to J. J. Strossmayer, London, 26 September 1877

On the books he sent, which are unfortunately personal copies and therefore difficult to attain, among them the German translation of his Homeric study, a family prayer-book according to the Anglican rite and a Latin transcription of a Serbian hymn, which was supposedly written by St. Sava.

Londres

Le 26<sup>ème</sup>76 septembre 1877

Right Rev. Bishop & Cardinal<sup>77</sup>

Ci-joint je vous envoie une partie de mes livres et brochures. La plupart malheureusement est<sup>78</sup> ce que nous appelons "out of print" et ne se trouve pas ni chez les libraires ni chez l'Editeur. Parmi eux vous trouverez une traduction en Allemand de mon dernier ouvrage sur l'Homéologie,<sup>79</sup> un petit recueil de prières pour les familles, remaniement sans changement d'une partie des formulaires Anglicans, et une tradition latine d'un hymne admirable en lui-même et originairement serbe : au moins on dit que c'est de S[t]. Etienne de Saba.

<sup>76</sup> Instead of "le 26."

<sup>77</sup> Incorrectly addressed; Strossmayer was never elevated to cardinal.

<sup>78</sup> Instead of "sont."

<sup>79</sup> Gladstone sent him the German translation of his book, *Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age* (1858), since Strossmayer did not understand English. In this work, Gladstone attempted to ascertain a correlation between Homer's works and Christian teachings. Later, in this same vein, he wrote another book, *Juventus Mundi and Homeric Synchronism* (1876). On the importance of these works to Gladstone's system of religious and political philosophical thought, see: David Bebbington, *The Mind of Gladstone: Religion, Homer, and Politics* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Mon coeur palpite aux événements de la guerre, mais je n'en veux parler. Le bras du Seigneur se déploie; il faut que devant Lui un homme faible comme moi se taise. Mille remerciements de la part de l'ami de V. S. très fidèle et très respectueux.

W. Gladstone

Right Rev. Bishop of Sirmium & Bosnia Diachovo

4. W. E. Gladstone to J. J. Strossmayer, 4 March 1878

On his continued work on the Eastern Question among his countrymen. When the government convened parliament on January 16, it was generally perceived that preparations for war were afoot. On one hand, the government gave in (to such a mood), while on the other internal rifts were present, so it did not adopt a clear stance either for or against war. The government is divided, with Prime Minister Disraeli leaning toward war, while Lord Derby supports peace, and the remaining ministers are unsure of where to turn, although they are most inclined to follow the "chief," so many inconsistencies ensued. A part of the public changed its view in favor of war, while Gladstone, on the part of his political grouping (the Liberal opposition to Disraeli's Conservative cabinet), is attempting to influence the government from the outside. He feels that in all of these tensions war is not possible, for there are no legitimate grounds and because public opinion could be directed toward the Congress and all that it entailed. The root of all evil rested in the Tory leadership, while good could be found in the Catholic clergy and the Protestant nation, i.e. the Nonconformists. He intended to write about his hopes and fears concerning the election of the new pope, but did not manage to do so.

London March 4. 1878

Illustre Evêque et cher Ami

Quoique dans les deux lettres, que vous vous êtes complu dernièrement de m'écrire, vous me dispensez du devoir d'une réponse, je ne peux pas me refuser la satisfaction de vous assurer que nos sentiments sont à l'heure qu'il est, comme auparavant, d'une concorde, je pourrais dire d'une identité parfaite. Parmi mes compatriotes je travaille toujours dans la grande question de l'Orient, selon mes forces, malheureusement petites, mais jusqu'au dernier limite<sup>80</sup> de ces forces. Dans le mois de Décembre le Gouvernement donnait l'idée, en convoquant le Parlement pour le 16<sup>ème</sup><sup>81</sup> de Janvier, qu'il méditait la guerre. A cette époque le peuple s'est prononcé fortement dans le sens de la paix. Le gouvernement, cédant à ces déclarations, et distrait par des dissensions intérieures, n'a pas agi

<sup>80</sup> Instead of "jusqu'aux dernières limites."

<sup>81</sup> Instead of "le 16."

d'une manière prononcée ni pour la paix ni pour la guerre. Aussi il a commis beaucoup de sottises, et se trouve forcé de parler un peu haut pour se sauver du ridicule dans lequel il est tombé. Cependant c'est un solécisme que de parler du Gouvernement comme un ensemble. Le Premier Ministre penche vers la guerre; au moins, toujours avec une volonté ferme et persistante, il travaille à porter un coup /quelconque/<sup>82</sup> soit militaire soit diplomatique, qui pourrait avoir les résultats d'une guerre fortunée pour sa personnalité. Lord Derby<sup>83</sup> penche vers la paix; et pendant les dernières six semaines, il a déployé une virilité beaucoup au-delà de ses antécédents. Les autres /ministres/ n'ont aucune direction certaine, mais ils penchent, au moins la majorité, vers leur chef.<sup>84</sup> Il s'ensuit que nous voyons beaucoup d'inconséquences. Je dois avouer que le sentiment d'un parti<sup>85</sup> du peuple a changé, à<sup>86</sup> faveur d'une politique de guerre ou de rhodomontade<sup>87</sup>. Nous autres essayons toujours d'influer sur le gouvernement du dehors : et quant à moi et le soutien que j'ai trouvé n'est pas venu même de la partie libérale comme partie<sup>88</sup> politique, mais du peuple, dont la droiture et le sentiment humain chrétien et libéral a été fort remarquable<sup>89</sup> parmi les doutes, les hésitations, les *audirivieni* de ceux qui auraient dû leur servir de guides. Malheureusement ce sont (comme à Paris dans la première révolution) le sentiment et la presse métropolitaine dont l'action est la plus vive et immédiate, et ils sont, l'un et l'autre, pires de beaucoup que ceux de la presse et du public national. La situation donc est tendue, la condition des esprits fiévreuse. Je crois néanmoins que la guerre est peu probable, parce qu'il n'y en a aucune cause légitime, et parce que c'est à espérer que nous pourrions déjouer la mauvaise politique en faisant notre appel à l'amour de la liberté, et en dirigeant le sentiment public vers la Conférence et ce qu'il y a à faire là dedans.

Le siège du mal c'est dans la classe soi-disant supérieure dans le parti Torry, la classe militaire, et dans ce qu'il y a de plus égoïste, de plus étroit, de plus passionné du peuple. De l'autre côté, on trouve la force /principale/ du bon sentiment dans la partie la plus catholique du clergé, et la partie la plus protestante de la nation, c'est-à-dire les Non conformistes.<sup>90</sup> Il y a aussi

<sup>82</sup> \* // designates subsequently inserted portions of the text.

<sup>83</sup> Edward Smith Stanley (1826-1893), the 15<sup>th</sup> Earl of Derby. He served as foreign minister in Disraeli's government. In 1880, he joined Gladstone's Liberal Party and served as colonial secretary in the latter's government (1880-1885).

<sup>84</sup> In connection with the Treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878 which prompted British Prime Minister Disraeli to consider war and provoked discord in his government.

<sup>85</sup> Instead of "d'une partie."

<sup>86</sup> Instead of "à la."

<sup>87</sup> Instead of "rodomontade."

<sup>88</sup> Instead of "parti."

<sup>89</sup> Instead of "remarquable."

<sup>90</sup> The Nonconformists, English Protestants who did not agree with the doctrines of the official (Anglican) Church of England and thus withdrew from it.

bon nombre des incrédules qui sont (selon moi) plus chrétiens ! cette fois que la majorité des dévôts<sup>91</sup> ne le sont. J'ai appris, chez Evêque<sup>92</sup>, de leçons assez pénibles pendant la controverse actuelle: comme les croyances et la morale, comme l'orthodoxie et l'amour de la justice, ne marchent pas toujours ensemble; comme l'état de privilège et le sens du monopole entraînent de l'obscurcissement et de la faiblesse au sens moral. Mais, parmi ces secousses, il y a abondamment du soulagement pour le coeur et de l'appui pour la foi, quand on voit, comme on a vu pendant l'année passée, les bras de l'Eternel s'étalant au ciel et réduisant au néant les machinations des hommes.

Comme j'ai écrit longuement, et comme j'ai dit peu ! Mais il faut en finir. J'aurais voulu aussi parler des affaires de Rome, des espérances et des craintes de la nouvelle Papauté.<sup>93</sup> Impossible. Me croyez donc votre bien obéissant, respectueux et affectionné.

W. Gladstone

A monseigneur l'Evêque Strossmayer

5. W. E. Gladstone to J. J. Strossmayer, London, 17 February 1879

He sincerely declares that the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina with reference to equal rights among the faiths and races depended upon Strossmayer's influence. He says much good can be expected from the new pope, but that a good pope should fight against the immovable spirit and well-organized forces of that "mysterious power" called the Roman Curia. He deems it desirable that the Austrian government should effect a "conversion" toward the laws of freedom and justice upon which it had heretofore trampled, for even though it introduced a constitutional system for its own subjects no change could be observed with reference to its foreign and Eastern policies. It appears to him that her Slavic subjects are half foreigners, and that the sole reason for this is egoism, although it must be acknowledged that England defended such political egoism, so that, insofar as Austria is at fault, then England is second in line for blame. He hopes that the next elections at the end of the year will bring fundamental change in the spirit and character of English politics. Thereafter, perhaps it would no longer proceed to the benefit of either Russia or the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, or any other conquering or aggressive power, but rather in line with the interests of the people of the provinces under the Ottoman yoke for centuries. This change in England may crucially influence changes in European diplomacy, but Gladstone

<sup>91</sup> Instead of "dévôts."

<sup>92</sup> Instead of "l'Evêque."

<sup>93</sup> Pope Pius IX died on February 7, 1878. His lay name was Giovanni Maria Mastai Feretti (b. 13 May 1792, Sinigaglia). He was succeeded on February 20, 1878 by Pope Leo XIII (Carpineto, 2 Mar. 1810 – Rome, 20 Jul. 1903), lay name Joachim Pecci.

stresses that he is not a prophet and that ultimately God intercedes. He is awaiting the resolution of the Eastern Rumelia affair, deeming that for the present at least aspirations for independence and national affirmation must be reconciled. He deems crucial the establishment of all civil rights, guaranteed security of property and the dignity of women. As to the Orthodox population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he expresses the view that they should submit to Strossmayer's liberal and Catholic spirit. He asserts that Great Britain has become entangled in two exhausting wars in Afghanistan and Africa, the former absurd and wrong-headed, the latter, although its causes known, also absurd, giving the English much to ponder.

En route à 73 Harley st. London

Februar 17. 1879

Illustre Evêque et cher ami

Après plusieurs mois de silence de ma part, je vous écris ces quelques lignes en partant de la campagne pour Londres. C'est leur bût<sup>94</sup> presque unique d'avouer franchement que dans la situation actuelle de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine tout mon espoir se repose sur Votre Grandeur, quant à l'égalité de droits entre les Confessions et aussi (autre point essentiel) entre les races. Du Pape actuel on pourrait attendre de bonnes choses : mais un bon pape doit lutter contre l'esprit immuable et les forces si bien organisées de ce pouvoir mystérieux qu'on appelle la Cour de Rome, et *qua se brutta, et la soma*.

Du côté du gouvernement autrichien, ce qu'on doit désirer c'est la conversion aux lois de la liberté et de la justice, qu'elle foula sous ses pieds si longtemps, et à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur. Car, quoiqu'elle doit entrée dans la voie constitutionnelle pour ses propres sujets, je ne vois /encore/ aucun changement considérable de sa politique extérieure et orientale. Il me semble que ses sujets Slaves soient censés d'être à moitié étrangers, et que l'égoïsme politique soit la loi principale de ses procédés jusqu'à présent. Anglais /moi-même/, je ne parle pas à l'Autriche-Hongrie du haut en bas, mais plutôt du bas en haut. La vérité exige de ma part la confession que, pendant les trois dernières années, c'est mon propre pays qui s'est fait le coryphée de l'égoïsme politique et que si l'Autriche a péché, ce n'est que dans le second rang qu'elle s'est fait coupable. L'Election générale prochaine, à arriver probablement avant la fin de l'année courante fera, comme j'espère, un changement /paisible mais/ fondamental à l'esprit et au fond de nôtre<sup>95</sup> politique. Après cet événement, nous agirons peut-être non pas dans le sens des Russes ni des Autrichiens-Hongrois ni d'aucune Puissance conquérante et agressive, mais pour les intérêts bien entendus des populations des provinces, qui ont gémi pendant tant de siècles sous le joug Ottoman.

<sup>94</sup> Instead of "but."

<sup>95</sup> Instead of "notre."

Ce changement de la part de l'Angleterre sera sans doute un événement considérable, qui devra influencer puissamment sur le bilan /de la diplomatie/ Européenne. Mais je ne suis pas prophète. Je ne prédis pas sur *l'arbitrium popularis arriva* – j'espère seulement, et j'ai l'idée que l'espérance soit assez raisonnable. S'il n'arrive pas, rien ne me restera que de me taire et de pleurer en me résignant toujours à la volonté de Dieu.

J'attends avec beaucoup de sollicitude du dénouement de l'affaire de la "*Roumalies Orientale*"<sup>96</sup> comme on s'est plu de l'appeler. Le mieux qui pourra arriver, selon moi, dans les circonstances actuelles, ce sera qu'on apaise la soif de l'indépendance et de la nationalité, au moins pour le moment, en lui assurant tous les droits civils de la vie, de la propriété, de la liberté, de l'honneur des femmes, dans la mesure la plus large et satisfaisante.

Quant aux Slaves orthodoxes de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, ils doivent se fier à l'esprit libéral et catholique de V. G.

Nous sommes tombés dans deux guerres entièrement pénibles : la guerre afghane<sup>97</sup> et la guerre africaine.<sup>98</sup> La première des deux est également sottise et coupable; l'une est l'autre dans un degré presque incroyable<sup>99</sup>. La seconde, nous ne comprenons pas, à l'heure qu'il est, dans son origine trop bien: nonobstant elle a l'apparence d'une autre sottise assez grossière.

A nous autres les Anglais tout cela donne beaucoup à penser. De Votre Grandeur.

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<sup>96</sup> Under the Treaty of San Stefano concluded on March 3, 1878, a so-called Greater Bulgaria was created from the Danube to Edirne (Adrianople), approaching Thessaloniki, and from Burgas to Varna on the Black Sea and Skopje and Ohrid in the west. The creation of Greater Bulgaria was unacceptable to Great Britain, as repelling Russia from the Mediterranean and Istanbul constituted the cornerstone of its policies. Therefore, at the Congress of Berlin (June/July 1878), it was mostly due to Great Britain, but with the wholehearted support of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, that the San Stefano provisions were revoked, and the enlarged Bulgaria was divided into two: the northern part was the Bulgarian Principality under the sultan's sovereignty, while the south, Eastern Rumelia, was organized as a province with limited autonomy and a Christian administrator appointed by the Porte. Russia exploited its influence in Bulgaria and enthroned the German noble Alexander of Battenberg as prince in 1879. In Eastern Rumelia, Alexander Vogorides, called Aleko Pasha, was appointed administrator. By mentioning the Eastern Rumelia crisis in his letter, Gladstone is probably referring to the crisis in British-Russian relations caused by these Russian actions aimed at establishing Russian dominance over the divided territory of Greater Bulgaria. For more on this, and the further course of related events, see: D Pavličević, *Hrvati i istočno pitanje*, 133-139.

<sup>97</sup> In 1878, the British attacked Afghanistan and penetrated as far as Kandahar and Jalalabad. The war ended with the Treaty of Gandamak on May 26, 1879. However, this was only the prologue to the second Anglo-Afghan War of 1879/1880.

<sup>98</sup> Pertains to the British intervention in Egypt. However, Great Britain only occupied Egypt in the summer of 1882, with the objective of taking control of the Suez Canal, exploiting the nationalist and xenophobic movement of the Egyptians in the process (see letter no. 7).

<sup>99</sup> Instead of "presque incroyable."



L'ami très respectueux et bien affectionné

Monseigneur Evêque de Sirmium et de la Bosnie

W. Gladstone

6. W. E. Gladstone to J. J. Strossmayer, The Coppice Henley on Thames, 10 September 1879

He is embarking a trip with his family, and upon his return is planning to travel to Edinburgh, important to his election campaign, because the term in office lasts six years, and currently parliament is experiencing its most severe crisis in the fifty years of his political career. He wants Strossmayer to travel to Italy or Germany, where he plans to travel with his family, so they can meet, for he would find it difficult to travel to Đakovo in his seventies. He intends to travel through Munich, to meet the respected German theologian Josef Ignaz von Döllinger together with Lord Action, and then on to Innsbruck and Venice.

The Coppice Henley on Thames

Septembre 10. 1879

Illustre et bien aimé Evêque

La semaine prochaine, s'il plaît à Dieu, j'arriverai avec ma femme, une fille, et un fils cadet, à Munich (le 16<sup>ème</sup><sup>100</sup>) et après /avec milord Acton/<sup>101\*</sup> à Trgusci (?) pour rencontrer Dr. Döllinger; <sup>102</sup> en route à Innsbruck<sup>103</sup>, au pays des Montagnes Dolomites, et à Venise. Nôtre<sup>104</sup> voyage, selon les idées que nous avons, sera probablement de cinq semaines. Peu de temps après nôtre<sup>105</sup> retour, je me suis engagé d'aller à Edimbourg, pour commencer une lutte électorale assez grave, comme partie un peu marquante de la lutte de l'élection générale, qui peut arriver même avant Noël, et qui au plus loin devra avoir lieu l'année

<sup>100</sup> Instead of "le 16."

<sup>101</sup> \* Designates subsequently inserted portions of the text.

<sup>102</sup> Johann Josef Ignaz von Döllinger (Bamberg, 28 Feb. 1799 – Munich, 10 Jan. 1890), professor of canon law and church history in Munich, a liberal in politics and theology. After the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary (1854), he launched the German liberal Catholic opposition to the papal policy of Church renewal based on neo-scholastic tenets. Most of the ideas expounded in the book *Kirche und Kirchen* (1861) were condemned in the *Syllabus* (1864). On the eve of the First Vatican Council he published the discourse *Der Papst und das Konzil* (1869), which was immediately placed on the Index of proscribed books. After his refusal to accept the Council's decisions and excommunication from the Catholic Church in 1871, he was one of the initiators of the Old Catholic Church. See: *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. 7 (Chicago, 1963), 559-560.

<sup>103</sup> Instead of "Innsbruck."

<sup>104</sup> Instead of "notre."

<sup>105</sup> Instead of "notre."

prochaine. Cette élection arrive à disposer au bien-être et de la renommée de ma patrie pendant un nouveau terme probablement de six ans. C'est la plus sérieuse des crises parlementaires que j'ai connues, quoique mes expériences s'étendent à peu près sur un demi-siècle.

Ce serait un bonheur tout à fait extraordinaire si par hasard Votre Grandeur penserait de voyager ou en Italie, ou dans les parties de l'Allemagne où nous allons. Quoique je désirerais beaucoup de profiter de l'invitation si amicale que V. G. m'a donnée plusieurs fois, à mon âge qui est de 70 ans presque complets, et avec une foule de lieux qui me tiennent comme si c'étoit dans une prison, je ne me trouve pas à même de voyager au moment actuel jusqu'à Diakovo. Il y auroit tant à dire et à entendre ! Même les démarches de l'Autriche elle-même nous feroient un sujet assez large et difficile. En attendant, vivent la liberté, la vérité, la justice.

De Votre Grandeur l'ami bien obligé et toujours affectionné  
W. Gladstone

A Sa grandeur Monseigneur l'Evêque de Sirmium et Bosnie

7. W. E. Gladstone to J. J. Strossmayer, Harwarden Castle, Chester, 12 Oct. 1882

Declares that the English operations in Egypt succeed only thanks to God. The Convention of Constantinople is the only matter he deems vital. He claims the Muslims are incapable of autonomous administration, so that they must be aided by the "civilized Christian world." As to the South Slavs, he hopes for their advancement and emancipation, which have been largely accomplished. He praises the appearance of the Đakovo cathedral, and would gladly accept Strossmayer's invitation, but is unable to do so.

Harwarden Castle, Chester

Octobre 12. 1882

Vénérable Evêque et cher Ami

Je remercie Votre Grandeur, de tout mon coeur, pour votre lettre si bienveillante; et je regrette, aussi vivement qu'il est possible, que le fardeau / journalier<sup>106\*</sup> des affaires publiques, toujours excédant et ne cessant d'accabler nos pauvres forces, m'empêche d'y répondre de la manière que je voudrais.

En peu de mots, je ne dis pas que je m'acquitterai de ma dette, mais au moins je la reconnaitrai.

C'est par la bonté inexprimable de Dieu que les opérations Anglaises en Egypte ont réussi d'une manière plus que satisfaisante sous tous les

<sup>106</sup> \* // Designates subsequently inserted portions of the text.

rapports.<sup>107</sup> Reste à voir, si nous sommes fidèles non seulement au Protocole de désintéressement, formulé à Constantinople, mais à tous nos aveux et déclarations y correspondantes<sup>108</sup>. Ce que nous désirons en Egypte, c'est la sécurité au-dehors, la liberté et la prospérité au-dedans. Peuple<sup>109</sup> Mahométan, il est peu avancé, mais il n'est pas mauvais à gouverner, ni incapable d'apprendre la pratique d'une autonomie raisonnable et croissante. Faisons donc notre mieux : le monde civilisé et chrétien nous donnera des encouragements et de l'appui.

Quant aux Slaves du Sud, nous pouvons espérer beaucoup de progrès à l'avenir, et de nous féliciter du grand oeuvre d'émancipation, qu'on a en grande partie accompli.

Et la Cathédrale,<sup>110</sup> magnifique selon tous qui l'ont vue, que V. G. a bâtie et sacrée, pour l'honneur de Dieu /et/ le salut des âmes, et pour inspirer à autrui, peut-être une noble émulation, en faisant voir que l'esprit élevé des siècles antérieurs n'est pas encore tout à fait éteint.

Comme j'aurais souhaité de profiter de la gracieuse invitation de V. G. ! mais c'étoit impossible. D'une manière ou d'une autre, et dans je ne sais quel endroit, j'espère toujours de rencontrer V. G. avant que je mourrai, en restant toujours Votre ami et serviteur très dévoué.

W. Gladstone

A S. G. Monseigneur l'Evêque de Bosnie et de Sirmium

Summary:

The views held by the renowned British statesman W. E. Gladstone and the distinguished Croatian Catholic dignitary and politician J. J. Strossmayer are examined in this work, based on their correspondence from 1876 to 1882,

<sup>107</sup> The English occupation of Egypt influenced Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian relations. Although Gladstone indicated that the Egyptian occupation was temporary, his declaration did not satisfy the French government, which traditionally considered Egypt a French sphere of interest. On the stance of the French government (foreign affairs department) on these events, see: *Affaires d'Égypte. 1882-1883. Exposé de la situation présenté aux chambres le 15 janvier 1883 avec un recueil de documents diplomatiques (...). Ministère des affaires étrangères, Imprimerie nationale, (Paris, 1883).*

<sup>108</sup> Instead of "correspondant."

<sup>109</sup> Instead of "Le peuple."

<sup>110</sup> In 1866, Bishop Strossmayer initiated the construction of the monumental cathedral in Đakovo, which was completed at great cost in 1882 and dedicated to the "glory of God, the unity of the Church, concord and love of one's people." Architect Karl Rösner designed it in a rather eclectic (a combined Romanesque-Gothic-Renaissance) style, and his work was continued by architect Friedrich Schmidt (who also designed the Academy Palace in Zagreb). The interior was painted in frescoes by painters of the so-called Roman-Nazarene group, Johann Friedrich Overbeck, Alexander Maximilian Seitz and his son Ludwig and Lodovico Ansiglioni. It was formally dedicated on Oct. 1, 1882.

maintained in the Archives of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Science in Zagreb. Given that Gladstone's letters to Strossmayer have thus far not been published in academic publications, the author attaches them hereto as an appendix, thereby creating the framework for engendering comprehensive insight into the Eastern Question, and particularly into the views of these two distinguished individuals of European political and clerical history of the latter half of the nineteenth century on the political fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkans after the removal of Ottoman suzerainty over this territory. This correspondence reflects the views of Gladstone and Strossmayer on the possibility of the political reconstruction of the Balkans after the close of the Great Eastern Crisis of 1878. In the analysis of the historical context in which this correspondence emerged, the author made use of the existing literature and published and unpublished archival materials. First the relationship of the great powers to the Eastern Question and the circumstances surrounding its solution at the Congress of Berlin (1878) are examined with reference to some major events that preceded it. This is followed by an examination of the content of the correspondence between Strossmayer and Gladstone, which illustrates the complexity of the issues surrounding the Eastern Question and its far-reaching implications, not only for Europe, but also Eurasia and partially even Africa (the question of Egypt and Suez). The author endeavors to provide a response to the question as to whether and to what extent Gladstone and Strossmayer's views were relevant when it comes to the formulation of the specific political decisions of the governments of the states in which they lived and worked. He concludes that their views on the Eastern Question not only failed to comply with the current policy options of the British and Habsburg governments, they also largely contravened them. However, this does not diminish the relevance of their correspondence from the historiographic standpoint, for it contains many vital, and in the case of Gladstone's letters, hitherto entirely unknown facts which provide comprehensive insight into the views of one of the most momentous periods in recent European history by this great British statesman of the Victorian era.

Kroatisch-britischen Ansichten über die Südslawische Frage.  
Korrespondenz William Ewart Gladstone – Josip Juraj Strossmayer  
(1876-1882)

Zusammenfassung

In dieser Arbeit wurden die Ansichten über die Südslawische Frage des berühmten britischen Staatsmannes W. E. Gladstone und des hervorragenden kroatischen katholischen Großwürdenträgers und Politikers J. J. Strossmayer erforscht und zwar aufgrund ihrer im Archiv der Kroatischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste bewahrten Korrespondenz aus der Zeit von 1876 bis 1882. Hinsichtlich der Tatsache, dass Gladstones Briefe zu Strossmayer bis jetzt in wissenschaftlichen Publikationen noch nicht veröffentlicht waren, werden sie als Beitrag zu diesem Artikel gedruckt und bilden auf diese Weise einen Rahmen für Bildung von etwas vollständigeren Erkenntnissen der Südslawischen Frage und besonders der Ansichten dieser zwei hervorragenden Persönlichkeiten der europäischen politischen und kirchlichen Geschichte der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts über politisches Schicksal von Bosnien und Herzegowina sowie Balkan nach der Beseitigung osmanischer Macht von diesem Raum. Die erwähnte Korrespondenz zeigt Gladstones und Strossmayers Gesichtspunkte zu Möglichkeiten einer politischen Rekonstruktion des Balkans nach der Beendigung der großen Ostkrise im Jahre 1878. In der Analyse des geschichtlichen Kontextes, in dem sie ihre Wurzel hatte, bediente sich der Autor der relevanten Literatur und der veröffentlichten sowie nicht veröffentlichten Archivalien. Zuerst zeigte er das Verhältnis der Großmächte zur Ostfrage sowie zu Umständen ihrer Lösung auf dem Berliner Kongress (1878), indem er auch einige wichtige Geschehnisse berücksichtigte, die dem Kongress vorausgegangen waren. Dann beschrieb er den inhaltlichen Aspekt der Korrespondenz J. J. Strossmayer – W. E. Gladstone, die die ganze Komplexität der mit der Ostfrage verbundenen Problematik und ihre weit reichenden Implikationen illustriert und zwar nicht nur auf dem europäischen, sondern auch auf dem eurasischen und teilweise auch auf dem afrikanischen Gebiet. Endlich versuchte der Autor die Frage zu beantworten, ob die Standpunkte von Gladstone und Strossmayer überhaupt aktuell waren, beziehungsweise in welcher Maße sie aktuell waren hinsichtlich der Bildung von konkreten politischen Entscheidungen seitens der Regierungen der Staaten, in denen sie lebten und wirkten. Er stellte fest, dass die Ansichten dieser Zwei über die Ostfrage mit den damals aktuellen politischen Optionen der Regierungen Großbritanniens und der Habsburgermonarchie nicht nur nicht korrespondierten, sondern auch ihnen größtenteils widersprachen. Dessen ungeachtet, verliert ihre Korrespondenz vom historiographischen Standpunkt aus nicht

zum mindesten ihre Relevanz, weil in ihr viele wichtige und in Gladstones Briefen auch ganz unbekannte Angaben zu finden sind, die uns die Bildung von vollständigeren Erkenntnissen der Ansichten dieses großen britischen Staatsmannes der viktorianischen Epoche über eine der wichtigsten Periode der europäischen neuzeitlichen Geschichte ermöglichen.