

**Prilog br. 1: Pismo Bernarda O'Sullivan
veleposlaniku Tvrtku Andriji Mursalu**

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Bernard Francis O'Sullivan

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FAX 611008

29 January 1992

Mr T A Mursalo

Office of the Republic

REGISTERED A/R CARD

of Croatia

P.O. BOX 30

CRESTA

2118

Dear Mr Mursalo,

In accordance with our conversation I am enclosing the following:

1. A complete photostat copy of the Cowgill Report.
2. A copy of my affidavit dated 16 April 1987.
3. A copy of my affidavit dated 21 May 1990.
4. An extract from The Observer dated 21 October 1990.
5. A copy of a Regimental Order signed by me.

The more I study the documents in the report the more I become convinced that Lieut-General McCreery stands as the person responsible for the debacle over the repatriation of my 900 Croats. This has at all times been my attitude. I was there that day and I know precisely what I am talking about. What is more Lieut-General McCreery was also in Carinthia that very day. I know for a fact that the final decision to send me to the border was made by 8 Army Advance Headquarters at 5pm on 24 May 1945.

2/...

2.

8 Army Advance Headquarters was at a point South of the road between Spital and Villach whilst I was en route to Rosenbach with 900 Croats and two generals. As the evidence unfolds it transpires that the repatriation of these 900 Croats is the most serious of all the repatriations. They were the last batch to go because they were found to be deep into Austria and the furthest away from the border.

At page 194 (x) of the report it is stated that 5 Corps kept 8 Army informed through daily sitreps. While this is correct 8 Army could also see for itself what was going on. Of this I am certain because the officer who reprimanded me knew exactly what my orders were.

At page 192 of the report at (vii) the report agrees with me that on 23 May 1945 A.F.H.Q definitely forbade the repatriation of the Yugoslavs. Yet on 24 May 1945 at about 5pm I arrived at Advance 8 Army Headquarters with two generals and 900 Croats and for some unknown reason was severely reprimanded for bringing them there. I was then ordered to the border.

At page 194 of the report at (xi) the report states that "from a British point of view the entire operation had gone smoothly, without any direct need for direct use of force by British troops".

3/...

3.

I deny this. The Croats were ordered very forcibly by the Welsh Guards to lay down their arms in my presence. This they did and it is incorrect to say that this was not done by force.

The prisoners were then handed over to Tito's men who all the time were outside the ring of headlights of the trucks.

As late as August 1990 Brigadier Cowgill believed that there had never been an Eighth Army Headquarters detachment north of Udine between 19 May 1945 and 24 May 1945.

A short while later he was surprised to find out that I had been right all the time and actually telephoned me from London to give me the news. He then faxed me a map and an order showing 8 Army Tactical Headquarters as having been located immediately west of Klagenfurt. This may have been so but I know for a fact that there was yet another and as yet undisclosed 8 Army detachment south of the road between Spittal and Villach. Why has this presence never been revealed? What are the names of all the 8 Army officers in Austria on 24 May 1945? I think there must be a lot of information still to be obtained if the War Diaries of 8 Army (Main, Forward and Rear) and of 78 Division and 6 Armoured Division were to be examined. It is also imperative that Brigade and Regimental War Diaries be examined and I think this should be done as soon as possible.

The handing over of these 900 Croatian prisoners of war on 24 May 1945 was one of the great tragedies of World War 2 and should never have taken place.

4/...

It could be maintained that the handing over of Croats following the order of 17 May 1945 is in a different category. This could be so because it is just possible that there was a misunderstanding. But there can be no misunderstanding whatsoever by Lieut-General McCreery of the order issued by A.F.H.Q on 23 May 1945. (Key Paper 228). It must be noted that there is no record, official or otherwise, of Lieut General McCreery querying the order.

It will no doubt be argued in defence of Lieut General McCreery that notwithstanding the commencement of the withdrawal of Tito's forces from Carinthia on 21 May 1945 (Key Paper 212), that there was still danger of military conflict with Tito. The answer to that theory is that as far as clearing the decks for action against Tito was concerned it was just as easy for me to have taken the 900 Croats south to Udine as it was for me to take them to Rosenbach. I was used to taking prisoners south to Udine. I was taking prisoners south to Udine on a daily basis anyway. The road through Tarvisio was not all that congested. This was the one and only occasion that I did NOT take prisoners of war to Udine. Thus there was no excuse for Lieut General McCreery to disobey the order because he wanted to clear the decks for action against Marshal Tito's forces.

A nation which produced Magna Carta and which stood out alone against the Nazis in 1940 does not deserve to be associated with Lieut General McCreery's error vis a vis the 900 Croats. It was not a political decision. It was an ad hoc military decision and it was a wrong decision and completely unwarranted. What is worse it was a clear cut disobeyal of an order issued on 23 May 1945 emanating from A.F.H.Q and in turn from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington.

5.

A.F.H.Q must have had very good reason for not wanting the prisoners to be returned if force was to be used. I refer to Key Paper 155 when Field Marshal Alexander on 17 May 1945 advised the Combined Chiefs of Staff not to return the 25 000 German Troops to Tito "because it might be fatal to their health".

In my view the handing over of the Croats was not a British decision and that the real culprit was at 8 Army Headquarters and that this culprit deliberately disobeyed orders. The evidence points directly at Lieut General McCreery. I have maintained this stance throughout. He made a very wrong appreciation of the situation.

As early as 1987 I made it clear in my affidavit that Advance 8 Army sent me to the border. I deliberately avoided 5 Corps. (I remember a section of 5 Corps as having been billeted in the centre of Villach at a Hotel. (It could have been the Post Hotel which I have since visited). I was startled when these generals expressed a fear of execution.

I therefore chose 8 Army in preference to 5 Corps as I needed an immediate decision at the highest level. I had taken hundreds of prisoners by this time. These were the only prisoners to express fear of execution without trial.

I note from page 224 of the report that Lieut General McCreery made an extensive visit to the 5 Corps area on 24th and 25th May 1945.

6/...

6.

Could a check not be made to prove that I am right and that he did in fact set up a temporary Advance Headquarters for those two days south of the road between Spittal and Villach? It was a small sign at the side of the road but I had spotted it. It must surely be possible to ascertain who it was who ordered me to the border in contravention of the order contained in Key Paper 228. A list of the names of the officers who accompanied Lieut General McCreery must surely appear in 8 Army War Diary.

I had been an Assistant adjutant and an Intelligence Officer in 13 Corps in the 105 Anti Tank Regiment. I annex a copy of a Regimental Order signed by me to prove it. I had also been a Troop Commander in the Italian Campaign. I was not without experience in intelligence in the field. My associates at 13 Corps were Major Le Grice and Lieut Peter Mason.

History will want to know why Lieut General McCreery ignored Field Marshal Alexander's order of 23rd May 1945.

The reason why I picked on 19 May 1945 in my second affidavit was simply because it came out in the libel trial that the Croats were the very first of the Yugoslav prisoners of war to be repatriated. I conformed to this new information. It was only on receiving a copy of the Cowgill report at a later stage and reading about the 900 Croats that it became obvious to me that my first affidavit putting the date of my involvement as "towards the end of May" was in the final analysis the correct version of the date after all.

7/...

7.


It seems that the 900 Croats are very important indeed. Brigadier Cowgill mentions them a few times in his report. I must state that I picked up these 900 Croats deep into Austria and a very long way from the border. Sending them back had nothing to do with "clearing the decks" for action. They were already completely out of the area anyway. I picked them up on the northern side of the mountain range in the region of Radstad north of Spittal. They were peaceful and making no trouble and were completely out of the way. This was the one and only time that I had to go out of our own area, as we knew it, in order to pick up prisoners.

I note in the Sunday Times on 12 January 1991 that Count Tolstoy is about to publish a revised Croatian version of his book. This coupled with the independence of Croatia makes it imperative and as a matter of urgency that the blame be put here and now where it correctly belongs. It certainly does not belong to Mr Churchill or Field Marshal Alexander.

Thank you very much for the photostats of newspaper items. I have not had a chance to read them as yet and will give you my comments at an early date.

With all best wishes.

Yours sincerely



BERNARD O'SULLIVAN

**Prilog br. 2: Preslika izvornog dokumenta, Affidavit
(Izjava dana pod prisegom) od 15. travnja 1987**

TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN


I, JACOBUS CASPARUS ^{HENDRICKUS} ~~HENDRICKES~~ MULLER

Registrar of the Supreme Court of South Africa (Cape of
Good Hope Provincial Division) hereby certify that

IAN ALEXANDER DICHMONT

whose signature is affixed to the Affidavit signed by
BERNARD FRANCIS O'SULLIVAN and dated 15th April 1987,
and marked "A", is a Notary Public by lawful authority
duly admitted and sworn, residing and practising at Cape
Town in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope, and that
to all Acts, Instruments, Documents and Writings, subscribed
by him in that capacity full faith and credence are given
in Court and thereout, within the said Province.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE, at CAPE TOWN
aforesaid, this 16th day of APRIL in the year of Our
Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty Seven (1987)..


Registrar of the
Supreme Court of South Africa
(Cape of Good Hope Provincial
Division)

A F F I D A V I T

I, BERNARD FRANCIS O'SULLIVAN do hereby make
oath and say :

1. THAT I reside at "Valentia", Victoria Road,
Bantry Bay, Cape Town, South Africa.
2. THAT I was born on the 18th day of DECEMBER
1918.
3. THAT I am an attorney of the Cape Provincial
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa
practising under the name of O'Sullivan &
Company at United Buildings, Main Road, Claremont,
Cape Town.
4. THAT in May 1945 I was a Lieutenant in the 64th
Anti Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery, forming part
of the 78th Infantry Division of the Eighth Army.
That I seconded to the British Army in 1943 having
previously served in the South African Army since
1940.

That I annex hereto a photostat of myself showing
the 78th Divisional flash together with a copy of
a letter from the War Office. (Annexure A & B)

That at the time I was billeted at Pattendorf
west of Spittal in Carinthia. (vide Annexure C
which is a photostat of part of a map issued to
me at the time.)

THAT I/...

para 4/...

THAT I cannot remember the exact date that I arrived in Austria, but I was in Austria about a fortnight when the following event took place. I would estimate it as having taken place towards the end of May 1945.

5. THAT I was given a map reference and told to transport a number of Croatian soldiers who had surrendered.

6. THAT the map reference referred to a place the name of which I have forgotten. It turned out to be an open field the other side of a mountain which is to the north of Spittal. It took me about two hours to get there.

7. THAT my orders were typewritten and that I threw them away when the mission was accomplished. I cannot remember who signed them. My orders were to escort the Croatians forthwith into the custody of the Welsh Guards who were to be found at a place called Rosenbach south east of Villach. That was all that was on the message pad. The fact that Rosenbach was near the Yugo-Slav border held no implications for me whatsoever. I was completely new to the country. We were extremely busy rounding up prisoners and putting them into enclosures and trying to feed them.

CONDITIONS WERE7

para 7/
page 3/

Conditions were chaotic with thousands of displaced persons trying to make their way home along the congested roads.

Among them were prisoners from the concentration camps still in their blue and white striped prison uniforms. There was much confusion with little time to think and there was also a tremendous language problem. We simply carried out orders as quickly as we could and without question in all this confusion. I had no idea that there was anything out of the ordinary about these particular orders.

8. THAT with about 40 NCO'S and men I proceeded over the mountain to the appointed place. I arrived at about 10 am and found three generals and about 800 armed men in an open field.

9. THAT the three generals were seated at a table at the side of the field drinking wine and smoking whilst a priest was saying Mass in the middle of the field,

10. THAT the generals appeared very pleased to see me and offered me wine and Turkish cigarettes all of which I accepted. They asked permission for the Mass to be concluded and this I readily agreed to.

THEY HAD/...

para 10/
page 4 /

They had obviously been waiting for me. The conversation was conducted through a thin faced clean shaven man of sallow complexion who was slightly above average height and who spoke very good English. He advised me that before the war he had held some fairly high position at the Lloyd-Triestino Shipping Line offices in Trieste. When the generals spoke to me I distinctly remember that I chose to talk almost exclusively through the interpreter. My usual tactics in these situations was to resort to French of which I have a working knowledge. When I did speak to the generals I probably spoke to them in French. I cannot remember if any of them spoke English. We seemed to get along well enough without English. The generals were thick set and of average height but beyond that I cannot describe them. However my whole rapport was through the interpreter who actively engaged me in conversation and it was through him alone that I actually communicated. The interpreter was about ten years younger than the generals.

11. The interpreter asked me where I was taking them to and I replied I was to take them south and that I was to hand them over to a British Regiment in accordance with my orders. My relationship with them was cordial. This answer appeared to satisfy the generals.

AS MASS/...

para 13/...
page 5 /...

As Mass was finished by this time I requested that the troops get mounted. The men were all armed. I had no orders to disarm them.

12. I was driving a captured Mercedes Benz sedan and requested two of the generals and the interpreter to come into my vehicle. The third general drove behind me. I think he was driving a Tetra. They had an odd assortment of motor cars with them. One of them was a Studebaker. The convoy moved off with my vehicle in the lead. The men were mounted in open trucks.

13. THAT a long discussion took place in my vehicle. The upshot of it was that the interpreter advised me that whereas the Croats had been fighting for the Germans it was a case of "the lesser of the two evils for them." Those were the actual words. They said it had been absolutely impossible to remain neutral and that they had been in a difficult situation and that they had therefore fought for the Germans rather than fight for the Russians. They were anti communistic. They were obviously out to impress me but I listened attentively nevertheless. I was not in a position to discuss the matter with them as I knew very little about the conflicts between the peoples of their country.

HOWEVER THE/...


para 13/...
page 6 /...

However the following point was made very clear to me. The terms of the surrender laid down that they were to be taken prisoner only by the army against which they had been fighting at the time of actual surrender and no other and that was why they were so pleased to be in my temporary custody until such time as I handed them over to a British regiment. As yet they had not laid down their arms. As long as they were going to be handed over for disarming by a British regiment they were satisfied. I too was satisfied that this was the correct legal position and was in line with the terms of surrender.

14. After travelling for about an hour we started to ascend the mountain. I distinctly remember the angle of ascent on a sign post. It was 29%. The road was not tarred and it started to rain. The Croats had to get off the open trucks and push as the tyres were slipping on the road. A 25 pounder Field Artillery Regiment met us coming from the opposite direction and we were forced off the road. When we started up again the general following behind me shouted that his engine was "KAPUT". I shouted to him I would wait for him at Spittal. I pointed to the other side of the mountain. It was raining heavily. I never saw him again.

ON ARRIVAL AT/...

para 15/..
page 7 /.



15. On arrival at Spittal I waited for a few minutes for the general but he did not appear. I went on without him. At this stage we turned east. The generals now asked me why we were going east. Quite innocently I told them we were going to Rosenbach. I had not tried to conceal this from them. Had they asked me earlier I would have told them. When they heard this they became very excited and told me that Rosenbach was on the Yugo-Slav border and that I was in fact taking them to Yugo Slavia and that they would all be shot. This was the first inkling that I had that something was wrong. The generals said they had a right to be taken to a British general to state their case and that they would surrender only to British troops. They said that the lives of the men behind us were at stake and that it was my duty to accede to their request.

16. THAT I was aware that an advance party of Eighth Army Headquarters had arrived in the area. I had seen the sign south of the main road between Spittal and Villach which by this time we were now approaching. Thinking there could be some mistake I immediately decided to take the generals to Advance Eighth Army Headquarters.

THAT I LEFT/...


para 17/..
page 8 /..

17. THAT I left the convoy parked alongside the road and took the two generals and the interpreter up to the Headquarters which was on the side of a hill. That I requested the generals to stay seated whilst I went inside the house.

18. THAT I was taken to a staff officer. I think he was a major. He was a man of medium height and aged about forty. I told him I had two Croatian generals outside and that they did not want to go to Rosenbach as they would all be shot by Tito's forces. The major was immediately hostile to me. He asked me what right I had to come there and what were my orders. He appeared to know my orders perfectly. I said my orders were to hand over the prisoners to the Welsh Guards at Rosenbach. The major then reprimanded me severely. He was furious with me. He told me to obey orders or face the consequences and to get moving. I went outside and he followed me. To my complete surprise the interpreter had changed into civilian dress whilst I was inside. This made the major even more furious and he reprimanded the interpreter severely and asked him what right he had to take off his uniform. The major again told me to get moving. I returned to the convoy and proceeded eastward.

THE ATMOSPHERE/...


para 19/..
page 9 /..



19. The atmosphere in my vehicle now became tense. The generals refused to talk to me and muttered amongst themselves. I could only assume that they considered that I had not presented their case properly or worse still that I had been deceiving them right from the start. They had not seen the major dressing me down inside the building.
20. It was getting dark by this time and I took a wrong turning. We were now well on our way to Rosenbach and were east of Villach. We heard shooting ahead and we had to turn the convoy back on a narrow country road. This took some time. Some armed Yugo-Slav partisans arrived and started to interfere with us. When they saw that we were all armed and that we outnumbered them they left us alone and we went back down the road. I cannot say why the Yugo-Slav prisoners did not attempt to escape at this stage. They were all armed and could easily have jumped from the open trucks into the darkness. Possibly it was due to fear of meeting more partisans.

THAT AT ABOUT/...

para 21/..
page 10/..

A handwritten signature or set of initials, possibly 'M. M.', with a horizontal line above it.

21. THAT at about 10pm we arrived at Rosenbach where I was met by a detachment of Welsh Guards. A circle of light was made from the headlights of the vehicles. The Welsh Guards ordered the Croats to put their arms onto the ground. This they did. The pile was very big and about six feet high. Nothing else was taken from the Croats. Tito's men were some yards away but clearly visible with the red star on their uniforms just outside the circle of light. The men were then marched towards Tito's men. I could not see what happened after that but there was a lot of shouting in the darkness. By this time it was about 11 pm and I left taking one of the Croat's motor cars with me. I left about twenty three motor cars with the Welsh Guards.

22. THE incident disturbed me deeply and the next day I reported the matter to my commanding officer. He knew as much as I did. We all had a lot of work on our hands. I do not think that anybody had much idea of what was going on in all the chaos. In any case we went immediately onto our next job of rounding up more prisoners and sorting out the SS troops from the Wehrmacht.

THAT I LEFT/...


para 23/..
page 11/..

 H..

23. THAT I left Austria a day after the atom bomb was dropped at Hiroshima. That I was demobilised in September 1945 in Cape Town. That in 1946 I was shocked to read in Life magazine that all these prisoners had been shot within hours of their being handed over.
24. THAT the incident has worried me over the past 42 years and I have often spoken to my children about it. That two years ago I tried in vain to find the relative copy of Life magazine. I asked the Librarians in the South African Library to find it. They spent many hours looking for it. I also wrote to the New York offices of Time/Life. I received a note in return to the effect that the September 1946 issue might be what I was looking for. The issue was not in the South African Public Library. I intended to take the matter further at some stage but due to pressure of work I have delayed doing so. It was only after reading the book "The Minister and the Massacres" by Nikolai Tolstoy that I found out what really was going on behind the scenes in Austria in May 1945.
25. THAT I make this affidavit in the interests of truth and history and with complete impartiality.

I CERTIFY/...

page 12/..



A handwritten signature, possibly 'M. Međimorec', is written over the printed text 'I CERTIFY/...'. Below the signature, the initials 'M.M.' are written.

[Handwritten signature]


I certify that the Deponent has signed this affidavit at
CAPE TOWN in the Republic of South Africa before me on
the *15th* day of *April* 1987 and that he has acknowledged
that he knows and understands the contents of this affidavit,
and that he has no objection to taking the oath and that he
considers it binding on his conscience and, that he uttered
the following words :

"I swear that the contents of this declaration are true, so
help me God."

IAN ALEXANDER DICHMONT
55 St. George's-Street
CAPE TOWN
Republic of South Africa

IA Dichmont

NOTARY PUBLIC



Prilog br. 3: Preslika izvornog dokumenta , Affidavit od 21. svibnja 1990.

TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN


I, JACOBUS CASPARUS HENDRICKUS RULLER


Registrar of the Supreme Court of South Africa (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division) hereby certify that

IAN ALEXANDER DICHEMONT

whose signature is affixed to the Affidavit signed by BERNARD FRANCIS O'SULLIVAN and dated May, 1990, and marked "A", is a Notary Public by lawful authority duly admitted and sworn, residing and practising at Cape Town in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope, and that to all Acts, Instruments, Documents and Writings, subscribed by him in that capacity full faith and credence are given in Court and thereout, within the said Province.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE, at CAPE TOWN
aforesaid, this 21st day of MAY in the year of Our Lord
One Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety (1990).




Registrar of the
Supreme Court of South Africa
(Cape of Good Hope Provincial
Division)

A F F I D A V I T

I, the undersigned

BERNARD FRANCIS O'SULLIVAN

do hereby make oath and say:

1. That I am an attorney of the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa practising under the name of O'Sullivan and Company at United Building, Claremont, Cape Town and resident at "Waterville" Ravine Road, Bantry Bay, Cape Town.
2. That the purpose of this affidavit is to request the Gowgill Commission to make the following specific separate findings quite apart from other findings it may make in respect of Cossack prisoners of war who in 1941 had been Soviet citizens and soldiers and who had deserted the Russian Army to join the German Army;
 - (a) That certain 900 Croatian prisoners of war and two generals handed over by me to the Welsh Guards at Rosenbach on or about 19 May 1945, which prisoners were immediately handed over to Tito's forces in my presence, were not Soviet citizens;
 - (b) That in view of the fact that these Croatian prisoners of war had never been Soviet citizens they were therefore not subject to the Agreement at Yalta in February 1945 and thus should not have been handed over,

- (c) That the identity of the person who ordered Lord Aldington to sign the order in retrospect some two days later, on 21 May 1945, by which time all the prisoners had already been handed over and probably shot, should in the interest of history and justice be made public;
 - (d) That it was incumbent on any officer having received such an order to study the moral imperative which confronted him so far as these Croatian prisoners of war were concerned and to have gone on official record in the War Diary as having queried such an order and that Clause 2(c) in Annexure "A" hereto should never have been included.
3. That I refer to my affidavit dated 15 April 1987 and confirm its contents subject to certain amendments and additional information contained in this affidavit.
4. That evidence emerged at the trial of Lord Aldington versus Count Tolstoy and Nigel Watts and this evidence was not contested:
- (a) That the Croatian prisoners of war were the very first of the Yugo-Slav prisoners of war to be handed over to Tito's forces.
 - (b) That such handing over commenced on the 19 May 1945 and continued for a few days thereafter.
 - (c) That the said handing over commenced some two days prior to Brigadier Toby Low (Lord Aldington) signing the order

in retrospect on the 21st May 1945.

(Annexure A)

5. That I erred in my affidavit dated 15 April 1987 when I stated that I handed over the two generals and the 900 Croatian prisoners of war "towards the end of May 1945". That the date was in fact on or about the 19th May 1945.
6. That this mistake of a matter of a few days in an affidavit made forty two years later is understandable.
7. That a copy of my affidavit was in the hands of the solicitors of both Plaintiff and Defendant prior to the trial of Lord Aldington versus Count Tolstoy and Mr Nigel Watts.
8. That I was on the point of leaving Cape Town for London to give evidence when I was advised that the evidence was being pruned as this was not a war crimes trial but only a libel action and that my evidence was not relevant in a libel action.
9. That with regard to the question as to whether Intelligence Staff Officers of 8 Army Headquarters had any idea as to whether there was a high probability factor that the aforesaid Croatian prisoners of war faced summary execution without trial, I verily believe that they did have good reason to believe that there was such a high probability factor,
10. That in support of this contention I aver that I have discussed this point with a personal friend who was a Lieutenant Colonel in the British Army and who operated with Tito's forces. The

said Lieutenant Colonel is still alive and will corroborate what follows.

11. I am advised by this ex-officer that in September 1944 he was operating on the island of Vis off the West Coast of Yugo-Slavia. That he was working in collaboration with Tito's forces who were wearing British uniforms. That with their combined efforts 180 Wehrmacht soldiers were taken prisoner.
12. That it was the practice to halve the prisoners taken and that this Lieut-Colonel sent 90 of the prisoners by boat to Bari in South East Italy.
13. That about two days later the Lieut-Colonel asked the Yugo-Slav officer what had happened to his 90 prisoners whereupon he was shown a ditch where the 90 prisoners had been shot. That one prisoner was still breathing. That he ordered this living prisoner to be pulled out of the ditch. He thereafter sent him to Bari for hospitalisation.
14. That the said Lieutenant Colonel was deeply shocked and immediately reported the matter to Allied Forces Headquarters at Caserta in Italy. That shortly afterwards Marshall Tito left for Caserta but it is not known whether this incident was the actual reason for the visit.
15. That quite apart from this incident I verily believe that the attitude of Marshall Stalin and Marshall Tito on the question of treatment of prisoners of war must have been well known to Staff Intelligence Officers at Allied Forces Headquarters and

also at 8 Army Headquarters, if not at Corps level. In this connection I refer to Annexure "B" hereto (Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943. United States Government Printing Office Washington 1961) and in particular at page 554 when it is shown that Prime Minister Mr Winston Churchill took strong exception to Marshall Stalin's attitude regarding the summary execution of ordinary prisoners of war.


16. That I verily believe that there was no justification for 8 Army to have given an order to 5 Corps to include Croatian prisoners of war amongst those to be handed over to Tito's forces and to have been included in Clause 2(c) of Annexure "A". That I base this belief on the fact that the Croatsians have never been Soviet citizens and were definitely not within the contemplation of the United States, Britian and the Soviet Union as being Soviet citizens. In this connection I refer specifically to Annexure "C" hereto. (Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945. United States Government Printing Office Washington 1955). I refer in particular to page 985. It will be noted that this was a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union and did not include Great Britian. It will be noted also from page 866 (note 4) that there is no record of any meeting having taken place whereby Britian signed a tri-lateral agreement concerning the matter.
17. That I annex hereto an extract from the Independent State of Croatia published in Toronto on May 1989 in which my evidence

is detailed and where it will be seen that my attitude is supported by the Independent State of Croatia. (Annexure "D")


.....


I certify that the Deponent has signed this affidavit at CAPE TOWN in the Republic of South Africa before me on the 20th day of May 1990 and that he has acknowledged that he knows and understands the contents of this affidavit, and that he has no objection to taking the oath and that he considers it binding on his conscience and that he uttered the following words :

" I swear that the contents of this declaration are true, so help me God."


.....

IAN ALEXANDER DICHMONT
55 St George's Street,
CAPE TOWN.
Republic of South Africa.

NOTARY PUBLIC



Handwritten mark

Prilog br. 4: Laurence Marks propituje Cowgillovo izvjješće, Observer



Chelsea Bridge House, Queenstown Road, London SW8 4NN 01-427 0700

It's time for her to go

THE Liberal Democrats' victory in the Eastbourne by-election is a clear sign that time is running out for this deeply unpopular Government. Wishful talk about an election next June has evaporated almost as fast as that equally foolish notion of a 'golden scenario' in which the voters go to the polls jingling large tax cuts and sharp reductions in interest rates. Anxious Tory backbenchers are now voicing their concern that even next autumn may be too early to invite the judgment of the electorate. They are right to be worried.

The Chancellor, Mr John Major, held out no hope in his Mansion House speech last week that good times are just around the corner. The economic road ahead is pot-holed. Inflation will not start coming down sharply until the middle of next year. Public spending is once again under acute pressure. Interest rates will remain high. Tax cuts are not on the immediate agenda. All this is not the stuff of electoral success. Yet if the Government is forced to soldier on until the final constitutional whistle in the summer of 1992, it will not just be a huge gamble but an open admission of desperation.

Though the Conservatives are in serious trouble, any premature dancing on Mrs Thatcher's political grave would be ill-advised. Mid-term blues are no new political phenomenon. Every government since the mid-1950s has suffered dramatic declines in its popularity during its period of office; even so, almost half have gone on to win subsequent elections. Not as stunning by-election disasters a rare event. In Mrs Thatcher's first two terms the Tories suffered eight by-election defeats, yet only one — Brecon and Radnor — has escaped recapture. Any list of disappearing Alliance battle honours — Croydon, Crosby, Hillhead, Portsmouth South, and Ryedale — is a reminder that mid-term protest votes often switch again at a general election.

Ominous factor

A new and ominous factor for the Conservatives in the

Eastbourne result, however, is that it comes not as a surprise but towards the end of a parliament. The depth of dissatisfaction with the Government's policies on education, health and the poll tax, revealed in the BBC's exit poll at the constituency, will not quickly or easily be cured. Remarkably, only 2 per cent of Eastbourne voters canvassed by National Opinion Polls as they came out of the polling booths said they were satisfied with the way the Government was dealing with education. A huge majority — 61 per cent — said they were dissatisfied.

The 21 per cent swing to the Liberal Democrats in Eastbourne, squeezing Labour to within three votes of losing its deposit, also carries a particular warning for the Tories. Tactical voting is nothing new in mid-term by-elections but there are signs that the tendency is gaining in strength. As policy differences between Labour and the Liberal Democrats narrow, so it becomes more tempting for voters to

concern their votes behind whichever opposition party



Man in the middle of a tragic muddle

Laurence Marks examines the Cowgill report on the repatriation of the Cossacks in 1945 and in particular the role of the British General at the heart of the affair.

OKAY, it was not a conspiracy, it was a tragic muddle. But whose tragic muddle? The Cowgill committee's report on the forcible repatriation of anti-Communist Russians and Yugoslavs who surrendered to the British Eighth Army in Austria in May 1945 studiously avoids blaming individuals.

The repatriations were a calamity. Thousands of people, not all of whom had borne arms against the Allies, they

included women, children and priests, were massacred or subjected to long, often lethal imprisonment. Government policy was to repatriate Soviet citizens, but not pro-war Russian emigrants or anti-Titoist Yugoslavs, who were to be treated as refugees. Yet many of those in the exempted categories were handed over. To discover why, the committee conducted a dispassionate analysis of the signals traffic.

Its shining virtue is that it last presents the key decisions in clear sequence, introducing important new disclosures. It is a model of objective what

to the British. Showing seemed about to start. On 11 May, McCreery asked Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, for authority to use arms against the Titoists.

On the 14th, 5th Corps warned McCreery that the food and guard animals could become critical unless prisoners were moved out of the area. They requested permission to open negotiations with the Red Army for the repatriation of the Cossacks — a mixed batch of 70,000 anti-Communist Russians. McCreery signalled his superiors recommending this course of action.

That evening General Brian Robertson, Alexander's chief administrative officer, ordered Eighth Army to hand over 'all Russians' to the Red Army and all Yugoslavs to the Allied Governments. Tito had relinquished his claim to Austrian territory. 'Military necessity' no longer pressed so urgently. Yet unscrupled repatriations continued until 7 June.

Three days after the Robertson order, Alexander was appealing to Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in northern Europe, to take the prisoners off 5 Corps's hands, and Robertson was asking the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington for an early decision on how to dispose of them because 'to return them to their country

The term 'White Russian' tends to be used as a general label for anti-Communist Russians rather than as a specific one for emigrants who had never owed allegiance to the Soviet State. 'Cossacks' is used in the same sense. Robertson fails to make it clear whether his order applies only to the 200,000 Croats (had they surrendered) or to all Yugoslavs. The practicalities of screening — essential if government policy was to be carried out

are outlined. McCreery tried hard to untangle the confusion. On the 21st he signalled Alexander's HQ querying the contradiction between Robertson's order to repatriate the prisoners and a message from Eisenhower five days later saying he was willing to accept the 'Cossacks'. On the 23rd he queried another contradiction between AFHQ's order to evacuate the Yugoslavs to Italy and its apparent assent to their repatriation.


'Consider policy should be for all nationals, ie persons born within the pre-1939

why, the committee conducted a dispassionate analysis of the signals traffic. Its shining virtue is that it at last presents the key decisions in clear sequence, introducing important new disclosures. It is a model of objective scholarship on an episode clouded by anger and shame.

The central facts can be summarised. In 1943 General Richard McCreery, commander of Eighth Army, was 47. He had had a brilliant career. As Alexander's chief of staff in the Middle East in 1942-43, he had exercised a decisive influence at Alamain. In the subsequent Italian campaign he had been one of Alex's most successful generals, commanding 10 Corps in bloody fighting at Salerno and on the Garigliano. 'McCreery did not shrink from the harsher actions of command,' wrote the military historian W. G. F. Jackson.

When World War Two ended amid civilian and military chaos across much of Europe, Tito's forces were disrupting control of southern Austria with 25,000 troops of Eighth Army's 5 Corps. There was already an unmanageable concentration of refugees and prisoners-of-war in the area, and another 500,000 German and Croat troops were trying to escape from Yugoslavia and cross the border to surrender

course of action. That evening General Robertson, Alexander's chief administrative officer, ordered Eighth Army to 'return all Russians' to 6th Red Army and all Yugoslav who had served with the Germans to Tito's troops. What the repatriations began on 18 May, 5 Corps reluctantly decided that they needed to use deception, and in some cases force of arms, to carry out their instructions. They also decided, in response to an earlier order from Alexander's HQ that Russian prisoners should not be encouraged to claim exemption, not to screen them individually to ascertain whether they were Soviet citizens (though they retrieved two Russian formations *en bloc*).



McCreery: Tried to untangle confusion

the prisoners of 5 Corps's hands, and Robertson was asking the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington for an early decision on how to dispose of them because 'to return them to their country of origin immediately might be fatal to their health'. As the report observes: 'AFHQ policy towards the prisoners was no longer coherent.' The tragedy is located in this bureaucratic muddle, at last made explicit, not in some hoked-up conspiracy theory. Many signals were exchanged. It is impossible to read them without recognising that the officers who drafted them were conscientiously trying to ascertain and apply government policy in innumeral circumstances.

When Robertson remarks that he is 'faced with a grave administrative problem with hundreds of thousands of German POWs on his hands and could not bother at this time about who might or might not be turned over to the Russians and Partisans to be shot, one hears an honest soldier under stress, not a brutalised one. The signals contain ambiguities. That's no surprise. They were drafted by officers responding to what they thought was an emergency of not by lawyers. Categories of citizenship are fuzzily defined.

was busily trying to bring about talks involving all the parties, including the government in Dublin. Optimistic paragraphs began to appear in the papers. Recently, however, the paragraphs have grown less optimistic, and during the last month or so the prospect of any kind of get-together appears to have receded.

Last week, Mr Brooke delivered a speech to a group of businessmen in East Belfast which consisted of a series of weary platitudes attacking the IRA and insisting that the British Government would continue to hold sway in Northern Ireland for so long as the majority wished it. The speech, utterly negative in tone, offered no hope whatsoever to anyone. It looks now as if our original assessment of Mr Brooke and his appointment was the right one.

I MAY be accused of perversity when I say that those people demanding impartiality from the big television companies have a point. The fact is that, particularly since the arrival of Channel 4, it has

spool article by Paul Lunnouy Garton Ash featuring a Dr Jonathan Scruton and imagining a situation in 2003 when academics have come round to the view that Stalin was not such a bad chap after all.

The three (all of whom are well known for their trenchant opinions, not to say robust attacks on fellow academics) instructed their solicitor, Mr Richard Sykes, to write to the *Independent* demanding an apology with the accompanying threat of a libel action.

Instead of kowtowing or opting for a quiet life (the normal response by newspapers on these occasions), the *Independent* reprinted part of their original article and the correspondence between the two lawyers, together with photographs of the three dons. The *Independent* reprinted part of their original article and the correspondence between the two lawyers, together with photographs of the three dons. The result has been to make Professor Scruton and Co look exceedingly foolish. Whatever damage they may have suffered from the original article — minimal in my view — has been far outweighed by their hasty resort to law. They are revealed to the world as a trio of puffed-up, self-important, humourless prigs.

Prilog br. 5: Preslika pukovnijske zapovijedi od 1. prosinca 1944. koju je potpisao ađutant poručnik Bernard O'Sullivan-izvornik i hrvatski prijevod

REGIMENTAL ORDERS.

by
Lt. Col. S.L. MacGarratt, D.S.O., M.C., R.A.
Commanding 105 Anti Tank Regiment, P.A.

1 Dec 44.

147. AWARDS.

R.H. THE KING has been graciously pleased to approve the award of the Distinguished Conduct Medal to 1117663 7/Sgt Lucas, D.L.

" At 0400 hrs on the morning of 9 July at "BENJILL" R.093256, the enemy launched a strong infantry counter attack and forced our infantry back past the M.10 commanded by Sgt Lucas, leaving Sgt Lucas with his M.10 and 2 Canadian tanks to face the thrust. Sgt Lucas noticed a German Machine Gun spraying our troops and promptly engaged it with HE putting it out of action. He then engaged the enemy infantry with his Tommy gun and Browning. As there appeared danger of being cut off he dismounted under heavy rifle and machine gun fire and cleared the M.10 tracks of the splinter cover. He then returned to his post, rallied the infantry, and continued engaging the enemy with tommy gun and Browning. He noticed a German firing a Bazooka 50 yds off, this Bazooka put out one of the tanks. Sgt Lucas fired HE at it and killed the operator. Meanwhile the surviving Canadians from the tank had "beled out". Sgt Lucas again left his M.10 under heavy fire and carried one of the wounded Canadians over to his M.10 and put him inside. Undoubtedly Sgt Lucas' coolness and handling of his M.10 saved a break through and possible occupation of a very important post from which the Germans would have overlooked the axis road. Sgt Lucas' M.10 was on its own, the other M.10 having been hit slight previously. He has been continually under mortar, 88 SP gun fire and 'Stouks' for 14 days. The "positions" of the M.10s were overlooked by an enemy OP and the approach under direct observation. The M.10 is very vulnerable to infantry attack. Throughout he has shown coolness and by his bearing has set a very good example to his crew."

148. LEAVE TO GO TO N.Y.

Leave to the B.M. will in future be run on a Regimental basis and NOT on a Battery basis.

The vacancies will be allotted in the first instant on the time factor as there there is more than one set of the same date of embarkation lots will be drawn Regimentally to fill vacancies in order to avoid any unfairness.


The B.M. will be asked to send representatives to attend at the draw whenever a draw is necessary.

149. ORDERS.

Capt. J. F. Mann, P.A. returns to hospital and assumes command of 316 4/7k Battery, R.A. W. .F. 25 Nov 44.


150. 1st DAILY TASK.

1st. Daily Task for 2 Dec 44 - No.9 - Charging System.



Adjutant, 105 Anti Tank Regiment, P.A.

Prilog br. 6: Preslika novina „Nezavisna država Hrvatska“, Toronto svibanj 1989. uvodnik pod naslovom „Pred 44. godina“ u kojem je pretiskan dio ispovijesti Bernarda O'Sullivanana



NEZAVISNA DRŽAVA
HRVATSKA

INDEPENDENT STATE OF CRO

"DRAVO, SAVO, DRINO TEČI, NIT TI DUNAV SILU GUBI, SINJE MORE SVIETU RECI, DA SVOJ NAROD HRV. HRVATSKI NACIONALNI DEMOKRATSKI LIST U KANADI - CROATIAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC NEWSPAPER

GOVINA (YEAR) XXVIII.

TORONTO, Ont., CANADA - SVIBANJ (MAY) 1989.

Br

RED 44. GODINA

USTAV NASILJA

POVODOM PROMJENE USTAVA S. R. SRBIJE



Velikome stupnjeva...
...da se ne može zaboraviti. Mora se
...svaki akustiv, poziv i opomena.
...moru nas poticati da svi djelatno sudjelujemo u
...svakoj oslobodilačkoj borbi, kako njihove žrtve ne bi
...uzaludne.

Nazlost, ime i danas ljudi, čak i onih koji se smatraju
...hrvatskim rodoljubima, ali koji ne vide veličinu
...velikog političkog susreta na tom tužnom polju. Sto vi-
...kažu, da tamo i nema više hrvatskih grobova, jer
...svijet "Oni Križ", dobrotvorna ustanova koja se bri-
...kaštili vojnika na druge, uređena vojnička groblja.
...Bleiburg je početak, polazna točka Velike Tregodije.
...započelo partizansko, srpsko i komunističko klanje
...ni hrvatskih žrtava, koje su Englezi protuzakonito,
...čime predali, Bleiburg jest i ostaje simbol jednog pora-
...zima ujedinijeni neprijatelji hrvatskog naroda, na
...našu podršku svojih ondašnjih ratnih saveznika, na
...našu dobili stotine tisuća hrvatskih vojnika i građan-
...jaka, koji se s punim pravom polupao svoje duše u
...nepravde zakone o ratnim zarobljenicima.

Događilo se međutim ono, neočekivano: izručenje,
...stavno u pojednostino, jer su se o tom događaju već
...e naplatio. Jedan od tamo prisutnih britanskih zapo-
...nika, Brigadier Toby je, vjerojatno, uz političkog
...inika britanske vojske na tom području, Harold Mac-
...ne, nepodgovorniji za izručenje, interpretirajući na
...način zaključke i određuje svoj predstavnički zapo-
...ništvo, koje se onom kakvu događaju nisu bile ni
...naveo ni riječi.

Str. 1 i 2. prof.

Milošević i njegova velikosrb-
...ska klica nastojali su politički
...kim ratom prisiliti ostale repu-
...blike višenarodne Jugoslavije, da
...jednostavno kapituliraju, pred
...stolkom najjednostavnijem, političkom
...lizatione širokih slojeva srba, koji
...koji su - treba to priznati - pokazali
...zeli apsolutnu kompaktnost u
...podpori svome političkom vod-
...stvu. Na tim masovnim demon-
...stracijama, našle su se zajedno
...crvene zvijezde, pravoslavni križ-
...ovi, stike Tita i sv. Save, pa čak i
...Karađorđa, i - dakako - uz obilje
...stika svog majmika Štobe Miloševića.

Iako su - u prvom naletu - us-
...pjeli odvrati pri korak prema
...centralizmu i pesantizmu vlasti -
...jer su zadržali podršku za pro-
...mjenu ustava, zahvaljujući u pr-
...vom redu kuljevičkom držanju
...komunističkih vlastodržaca u
...Zagrebu, njihov se je borbeni
...nalet zasustavio pred opozicijom
..."zapadnih republika", koje su
...konacima vratile srba na najnere-
...- povratak na stari centralizam.

Mošla je pod utjecajem nar-
...danog natezaja "željeznog zas-
...ta" prema Austriji i njenoj poli-
...tičkoj otvaranju prema Zapadu
...dolo do promjena i u Vojvodini,
...gdje je izlaskom jednog novog pre-
...stavnik vojvodanske autonomije

"Zelazkorica" - koji je pred par
...dana u promjenjivoj skupštini u
...Novom Sadu dobio podršku od
...131 protiv 2 glasa!


Isto se tako saznaje, da su
...promjene na putu i u Crnoj Gori
...gdje je partijsko vodstvo, pod
...pritiškom Miloševićevih rukova-
...ca, pristalo ostaviti a da nije bilo
...sklapano putem glasanja, jer mila-
...da komunistička gnanje su
...zeli biti srba.

Ako se napući afirmirati ove
...dne "autonomije" struje (pro-
...tivne srbskom centralizmu) na
...vodstvu svojih pokrajina, srbska
...imperijalistička politika bi mogla
...biti Činovito zmasovljena "lega-
...tim" i masovnom njeznom. Ne
...vjerujemo da je to isporučeno. Ne
...dusti rok, jer će Srbi, na svojom
..."istorijskom" putu koristiti
...kugano izmisliti kakvog strojaka
...za "generala Simovića", jer se
...oni, po svojoj prirodi - ukoliko se
...će poniziti s klijem ratvojn-
...stima u državi koju oni nastupa
...svojim "prigovor".


S druge strane, srbsko klanje
...nje na Kosovu, oranje otvoreno,
...bez obzira na ustavne promjene
...ili na promatranje shiljaka i
...kinavog partijskog vodstva,
...domaćih izdajaca.

Glav.
...Tuzam,
...je, nije
...ustavne
...kucijom
...stavu
...vali: "N
...događaja
...je mojom
...nastala,
...svoja, što
...svoj pri
...Ustavu S
...U nas
...da "mo
...slobodni
...stavima,
...podstojati
...stavova,
...sto žele i
...staviti u
...biti sa sv
...događaja
...na.


S drug
...stavu u
...bica srba
...su je da
...staviti u
...hrvatski s
...ljuje osno
...podstoj i



Prilog br. 7: Vojna karta juga Austrije – Koruške - u posjedu Bernarda O'Sullivan



Prilog br. 8: Fotografija poručnika južnoafričkog topništva Bernarda O'Sullivan



Prilog br. 9: Zahvalnica Ministarstva obrane od 30. rujna 1945. poručniku Bernard O'Sullivanu na kraju službe u Britanskoj vojsci- izvorni dokument i prijevod na hrvatski jezik



30 Sep 45.

Sir,

On the termination of your service with the British Army during a period of grave emergency, I am commanded by the Army Council to convey to you their thanks for the valuable services you have rendered, and to express to you their good wishes for the future.

The Council hope that you will carry with you pleasant recollections of your service with the British Army, and that you may find it possible to keep in touch with the regiment or corps with which you served.

I am, Sir,


Your obedient Servant

Lieutenant B.P. O'Sullivan (WDF/114441)

South African Artillery.

M. Medimorec: Izvršio sam zapovijed: odveo sam u smrt 900 Hrvata

Prilog br. 10: Naslovnica „Life magazina“ iz rujna 1946. u kojem je Bernard O'Sullivan pročitao što se dogodilo s Hrvatima koje je predao Titovim partizanima



Life Magazine September 2, 1946 : Cover - Vacation's end, Michael Foster and Marcia Perry at Cape Cod at Cotuit. Nice full page color General Electric radio ad with Marjorie Reynolds, so pretty. Oak Ridge has Atomic hoe-down, AFL CIO dance. T-man Elmer Irey retires, he tracked down income tax evaders. Man goes out on a limb, very funny photo of John Kopsnyder of Greensburg, Pennsylvania. Photo of the men of the 88th division carrying Walter Kujawa's coffin, shot in Trieste. More conflicts in the Balkans and the Middle East, Palestine - at this point the partition is still proposed, includes photos of overloaded ships of Jews trying to run the blockade into Palestine, just like today's Cuban refugees. Fun group of summer sports pictures, including (among many others) Mary McMillin golfing, Ben Hogan golfing, Soapbox Derby at Akron, Ohio with Gilbert Klecan, Ranch horse Assault, Swimmer Ann Curtis, Baseball Trickster Johnny Price, Baseball player Jackie Robinson, Tennis players such as Gardner Mulloy, and the Pig swimming race in Kirkland, Washington. Nice full page color Nash ad with blue car. The strange case of the resurrected prince. The state of the armed forces. Photo essay - Mountain glaciers. Hay fever drugs. Reading tests. The Killers - movie and story by Ernest Hemmingway. Harp festival in Camden, Maine. French swim suit. Life visits cape cod. Living paintings are a hit at the Laguna Beach Festival of Arts, California. Great full page color National Confectioners' Association ad for Candy, art by Grant. Nice full page color Pabst Blue Ribbon beer ad with tennis theme.

G - \$24 [Buy Now](#)

F (all VG, with VG framable cover, but cover partly loose) - \$10 [Buy Now](#)

F (all G, but minimal edge stain at back) - \$8 [Buy Now](#)

.....

Prilog br. 12: Željko Krušelj intervju s britanskim časnikom Bernardom O'Sullivanom, „Ne želim više šutjeti: Britansko izručenje Hrvata Titovim partizanima neoprostiv je zločin“, Večernji list, 26. veljače 1998.

»VEČERNJAKOV« NOVINAR U JUŽNOAFRIČKOJ REPUBLICI PRONAŠAO BIVŠEG BRITANSKOG ČASNIKA BERNARDA O'SULLIVANA, KOJI ŽELI RASVJETLITI POSLJEDNJU TAJNU DRUGOGA SVJETSKOG RATA

**EKSKLUZIVNO
IZ CAPE TOWNA**

NE ŽELIM VIŠE ŠUTJETI: BRITANSKO IZRUČENJE HRVATA TITOVIM PARTIZANIMA NEOPROSTIV JE ZLOČIN

Piše Željko KRUŠELJ

● Bernard O'Sullivan bio je 1945. časnik britanske vojske koji je izvršio zapovijed da kod austrijskog Radstadta izruči hrvatske vojnike Titovim partizanima

Južnoafrički »The Sunday Independent« nedavno je objavio tekst o Bernardu O'Sullivanu, umirovljenom odvjetniku iz Cape Towna, koji je izjavio da je nesvjesni sukrivac ratnog zločina koji se dogodio prije pedesetak godina na tadašnjoj austrijsko-jugoslavenskoj granici. To dramatično svjedočanstvo o okolnostima koje su ga, kao mladog časnika britanske vojske, prisilile da odvede u smrt poveću skupinu hrvatskih vojnika, uglavnom domobrana, bilo je razlog da ga ovih dana potražimo u Južnoafričkoj Republici. U tome nam je pomogao i Turko Mursalo, hrvatski veleposlanik u Pretoriji, koji je s njim već duže vrijeme u telefonskom kontaktu. Ispostavilo se, štoviše, da O'Sullivanu poznaje i dio Hrvata iz Cape Towna, jer ponekad prisustvuje nedjeljnoj misi u njihovoj crkvi.

O'Sullivanov ratni put

Bernard O'Sullivan stanuje u Bantry Bayku, jednom od najljepših obalnih dijelova Cape Towna, gdje je i rođen prije punih 80 godina. Drugi svjetski rat dočekaio je kao student, svjestan nakaradnosti nacističke ideologije. To ga je navelo da se pridruži netom stvorenoj Južnoafričkoj vojsci, no nakon što je 1940. veći dio njegove regimente pao u njemačko zarobljeništvo, uključio se u britanske postrojbe. Prošao je nekoliko bojeva, a potkrnj rana dospio je u Italiju. Otuda je početkom svibnja 1945. kao obavještajni poručnik u 64. antitankovskoj regimenti 78. pješake divizije 8me armije, dospio u Austriju, gdje su se sljevale beskrayne kolone izbjeglica, među njima i mnoštvo Hrvata.

Dana 24. svibnja dobio je zapovijed da na celu jedne postrojbe, kojoj je bilo priključeno i 40 britanskih kamiona, na



Nas novinar Željko Krušelj s gosp. Bernardom O'Sullivanom

Nas novinar Željko Krušelj s gosp. Bernardom O'Sullivanom

Iz časopisa saznao za likvidaciju

Godinu dana kasnije iz američkog časopisa »Life« saznao je da je većina ih

Priljavi 'rat nakon rata'

Gospodin O'Sullivan ja, prema vlastitim riječima, već dvadeset godina rastavljen, a sin i kći odavno su se preseleli u Australiju i na Novi Zeland. »Večernjakove se novinara dva puta susreo s njim u hotelu »Präsident«, kojem prilikom je dobio nu uvid i dijelove njegove pozamašne korespondencije, kao i kopije nekih hrvatskih javnosti manje poznatih britanskih knjiga i dokumenata o bleiburškom masakru.

Zdravstveno stanje toga ključnog, možda i posljednjega svjedočka onoga što je među Tolstojevim istomišljenicima nazvano »britanskim izdajom« danas nije zadovoljavajuće. Na njega je prosudan trag ostavila teška operacija srca, nakon koje je, kaže, prelijen živjeti suza baču sedmice dnevno i uz rigoroznu dijetnu hranu, bez pomisli na ikakvo piće«. Lako se umara, tako da veći dio dana provodi spavajući, a na trenutke se i teško prisjeća pojedinih detalja svoje priče. Ipak, njegov je iskaz uvjerljiv i činjenično dokazan, pa uporno traži da ga ispitaju i neka neutralna međunarodna komisija, po mogućnosti i iz Međunarodnog suda pravde u Strasburgu, koja bi napokon okončala polemike oko toga priljagov rata nakon rata.

takodur bez ikakva uspjeha. Smisao njegova života danas se ogleda upravo u toj pomalo sifilozovoj borbi s britanskim establishmentom, koji mu ne želi vratiti nepravedno oduzetu čast.

»Osvješćenja sam radio kao tužitelj ili odvjetnik«, zaključuje O'Sullivan, stako da mi je jasno da je odvođenje hrvatskih vojnika u smrt bez ikakva suđenja neoprostiv zločin, suprotan svim onim idealima koji su proklamirani u borbi protiv nacizma. Upravo zato ne želim šutjeti, iako sam svjestan da mi vrijeme sve više izmiče.

SUTRA: opširniji razgovor s Bernardom O'Sullivanom

5
Večernji list ČETVRTAK, 26. II. 1998.

ŠTO SE DOGAĐALO NA ZATVORNOJ STANICI TIH...

Prilog br. 13: Željko Krušelj, intervju s Bernardom O' Sullivanom „Izvršio sam zapovijed: Odveo sam u smrt 900 Hrvata“, Večernji list 27. veljače 1998.

EKSKLUZIVNO
BERNARD O'SULLIVAN, SVJEDOK BRUTALNOGA
IZVRŠIO SAM
900 HRVATA

Razgovarao
ŽELJKO KRUŠELJ

Punih jedanaest godina traju očajnički pokušaji Bernarda O'Sullivanova, umirovljenog odvjetnika iz južnoafričkog Cape Towna, da istinu o žestokim i tragediji predoči najširoj međunarodnoj javnosti. Kao da kao mladi britanski časnik početkom svibnja 1945. upućen u Austriju, nije ni mogao pretpostaviti da će, kao idealist koji se još 1940. samovoljno priključio zapadnim saveznicima, nesvjesno sudjelovati u ratnom zločinu koji će trajno obilježiti njegov život. Dugi je niz godina bio, doduše, svjestan da će se ta »krvava tajna« prikrivati na sve moguće načine, jer seže i u same vrhove britanske vojske i politike.

Kad se, međutim, pojavila prekretnička knjiga grofa Nikolaja Tolstojca »Ministar i masakre, O'Sullivan je odlučio progovoriti o svim njemu poznatim detaljima. Budući da je u razdoblju u kojem govori imao samo 26 godina i kao poručnik-obavještajac - dakle, terenski časnik - sa svojom jedinicom bio priključen britanskoj Osmoj armiji, razumljivo je da on ne može svjedočiti o mehanizmu donošenja odluka o prisilnoj predaji hrvatskih vojnika partizanskim jedinicama. Tako, primjeru radi, feldmarsala Harolda Alexandra ne smatra osobno odgovornim za austrijska zbivanja, iako neka istraživanja hrvatskog povjesničara dr. Darka Bekića jasno kažu da je u Stozheru saveznički snaga, kojim je rukovodio, odobrena nasilna repatrijacija. Mnogo je bitnije da je nesporno ono što je O'Sullivan osobno doživio, a povjesničari će iz te priče kad-tad izvući adekvatne zaključke o hijerarhiji odgovornosti za masakre koji su se dogodili nekoliko tjedana nakon sluzbenog završetka Drugoga svjetskog rata.

Nisam mogao znati posljedice

● Gospodine O'Sullivan, jeste li prilikom dolaska u Austriju znali što se protihodnih ratnih godina zbivalo na jugoslavenskim prostorima? Jeste li uopće razlikovali partizane, ustaše, domobrane, četnike i bjelogarde, odnosno tko se s kim i protiv koga borio?

— Odgovor je gotovo u potpunosti negativan, iako sam kao student dobro bio upućen u nužnost suprotstavljanja naci-

● U naredbi nije stajalo da hrvatske vojnike moram razoružati, tako da to prije ukrcavanja nisam ni činio. Štoviše, generali me uoči polaska uopće nisu pitali za odredište, zacijelo ni ne pretpostavljajući što bi se moglo dogoditi. Glavni uvjet njihove pre-daje bilo je nečije obećanje da će ih preuzeti zapadni saveznici

zmu i fašizmu. Kako sam do odlaska u britansku vojsku živio u desetak tisuća kilometara udaljenom Cape Townu, za mene su zbivanja u jugoistočnoj Europi bila velika nepoznanica. Dakako, u tisku sam ponešto pročitao o Titu i partizanima, naravno samo o četnicima, makar mi baš i nije bilo jasno na čijoj su strani, a nakon dolaska u Korušku bilo mi je rečeno kako su ustaše kvislinzi koji su do posljednjeg trenutka ostali odani Hitleru. Sve je ostalo bilo odviše komplicirano.

Uostalom, u Austriji je moj glavni zadatak kao obavještajni časnik bilo traženje za odbjeglih SS-ovcima, njihovo razdvajanje od ostalih vojnika Wehrmachta i dovodenje u talijanske logore. Tu su se i potvrdile moje predočbe o tim zadržim nacistima, jer se oni nisu željeli družiti sa svojom regularnom vojskom. Jednom su čak pristali da cijelu noć kisnu na otvorenom polju, samo da ne budu u istoj prostoriji s ostalim zarobljenicima.

● Što se, zapravo, dogodilo tog za hrvatske vojnike fatalnoga 24. svibnja 1945? Jeste li bili svjesni da oko 900 ljudi, od kojih većina uopće nisu ustaše, vodite u sigurnu smrt?

— Kategorički tvrdim da nisam mogao znati koja je krajnja posljedica mojeg izvršavanja zapovijedi Toga jutra dobio sam vojni zamjovnik s uputama o privođenju poveće grupe Hrvata, koji su se tih dana predali našim postrojbama. Naredba je bila otipkana na pisačkoj mašini, a ja sam je, kako je to bio običaj, nakon obavljanja posla bacio. Potpisnika te naredbe, kakve

London ne bira sredstva u prikrivanju odgovornosti svojih dužnosnika

● Smatrate li se žrtvom britanske beskrupuloznosti? Što ste sve poduzeli da istina napokon izađe na vidjelo?

— Zasigurno sam iskoristen na jedan ružan način, jer sam kao uvjereni protivnik hitlerizma i krenuo u rat da se takvi zločini ne bi više događali. Što sam učinio? Pokušao sam mnogo toga, ali rezultatima nisam zadovoljan. Naime, reći da su moja svjedočanstva bila svjesno prešućivana ili marginalizirana. Svaki sam iskaz poslova na razne adrese, nudeći se i za eventualnu sudsku istragu, no službeni London ne bira sredstva za istraživanje i kreruo u rat protiv odgovornost svojih visokih dužnosnika. Zar nije dovoljno poučan sudski proces koji je lord Aldington, pravim imenom Toby Low, pokrenuo protiv Tolstojca, s ciljem da se potonji financijski upropasti? Srećom, to naposljetku nije uspjelo, a u novoj Tolstojevoj knjizi bit će, saznajem, uključeno i moje svjedočanstvo.

— Ja sam, inače, u više navrata pisao i bivšem britanskom premijeru Johnu



Bernard O'Sullivan kao mladi britanski obavještajac

Majoru, a i sadašnjem Tonyju Blairu. Rezultat je ravnan null, a prijavljena se i dalje mete pod tepih.

Obojica su se formalno zahvaljivala na mojim pismima i prosjedivala ih u nadležna ministarstva, da bi otuda stizali odgovori koji su se između redova mogli shvatiti kao preporuka da se okanim toga posla. Za konzervativce, čiji su ugledni članovi, poput nekadašnjeg premijera Harolda Macmillana i lorda Aldingtona, bili izravno upleteni u te događaje, to je čak i pomalo razumljivo, ali na isti se način ponašaju i današnji laburisti. Britanci, čini se, ne shvaćaju da bi istjerivanje istine potvrdilo njihovu pravdoljubivost. Usporredbe radi, nisu li još u 13. stoljeću u slavnoj engleskoj »Magna Charti Libertatum« postavljeni temelji ljudskih prava? Cemu onda to današnje licemjerje?

ITANSKOG »ČIŠĆENJA PALUBE« U SVIBNJU 1945. NA AUSTRIDSKO-JUGOSLAVENSKOJ GRANICI

PROTIV NEKOG OD NEKO SAM

Je li Walleška garda prevarila Eisenhowera

● Kako je u svemu tome bila uloga Amerikanaca?
 - To je vrlo složakovo pitanje, o kojem ni najbolja literatura ne daje precizan odgovor. Uvjerem sam da general Eisenhower tako našto ni, kad je govoreći ne bi učinio ipak, činjenica je da se Radstadl, gdje je obavljao predstava zarobljenika, našao u Hrvatskoj operativnoj zoni. Za Wallešku gardu možda nije dovoljno bilo u pomoć, jer je to bio najlakša obaviti primopredaju s partizanima do daljnjeg ostaje bezazleno.

● Walleška je garda potjerala sve hrvatske vojnike prema Titovim partizanima. Dalje nisam mogao vidjeti što se događa, ali sam iz daljine čuo mnogo vike i jauka

● Uvjerem sam da će cjelovita istina o zbivanjima na austrijsko-jugoslavenskoj granici ipak biti obznanjena. Jako bi me radovao da doživim takvu moralnu satisfakciju

čovjek, ako je ostao živ, doista je mogao govoriti da je veći sretnik.
 Nakon tog neuspješnog čekanja, iz Splita smo zakrenuli prema Istoku. Tek u tom trenutku dvojica generala su me začudno upitali: »Kuda to idemo?« Pitajući me sam im odgovorio da je određeno Rosenbach. Tu informaciju nisam ni pokušao prikriti. Generali su se istoga trenutka jako uznemirili i pokušali objasniti da je Rosenbach na jugoslavenskoj granici i da ih zapravo predajem u partizanske ruke, nakon čega će svi biti strijelani. Pokušali su me nagovoriti da ih vratim natrag, nakon čega će oni razgovarati s nekim visim britanskim česnikom. Meni je to bilo prvo ozbiljno upozorenje da nešto nije u redu. Nije mi, međutim, jasno zašto Hrvati u tom trenutku nisu izveli svoje oružje i pobjegli na suprotnu stranu. Moja pratnja im se u tome zasigurno ne bi uspjela oduprijeti.

Nisu ni pokušali pobjeći

● Što ste u tom dramatičnom trenutku učinili? Zar još niste mogli pomisliti da su hrvatski generali u pravu?
 - Prije svega, meni je i dalje bilo nepojmljivo da bi britanska vojska bez dokazivanja krivnje nekoga postala u sigurnu smrt. Nie bi li sebe samog uvjerto da je riječ o nekoj slučajnoj pogrešci, odlučio sam potražiti prethodnicu stožera Osmo armije, stacioniranog pokraj Splita. Kad sam ga našao u podnožju obilježje brda, konvici sam ostavio parkiran uz cestu, a generale i prevoditelja poveo sa sobom. Njih sam ostavio pred ulazom. Dežurni me odveo do



čovjeka četrdesetih godina, sretnije vjeline. Inače, koliko se sjećam, čin bojnika. Rekao sam mu koga dovodim i da oni ne žele čiti u Rosenbach, tvrdeći da će ih strijelati Titove snage.
 Na moje iznenađenje, bojni je s njima, trena postao neprijateljski raspoložen. Povišenim je glasom napomenuo da dobro zna koje su moje namjere, odnosno da Hrvats bezpogovorno moram u Rosenbachu predati Wallešku gardu. Zatim me je nastavio žestoko kriti, prijetidit zasučavanjem s posljednjakom, što je značilo moje slavljenje pred vojni sud. Kad sam pomalo ošamućen izišao, bojni je iskalio svoj bijes i na prevoditelja koji se prevukao u civilno odijelo. Zatim nas je potjerao u vozila, pa smo u sumrak našli prema Istoku.
 Atmosfera je postala vrlo napeta, a generali su odbili sa mnom razgovarati, već su nešto međusobno murmurali. Kako nisam mogao vidjeti što se događalo u zgrad, vjerojatno im nije bilo jasno jama li pretstavljamo tako loše predstavio njihov slučaj, ili sam im od pobješka lažao. Tek mi je bilo jasno zašto nisu nikad suočavanja s grubom letinom nisu pokušali pobjeći. Možda su se bojali da se sami ne saoo s partizanima, koji su se već molje u ruke masice i rasplivali se koga vozimo.
 Napokon, oko 22 sata stigli smo u Rosenbach. Tu je već čekala Walleška garda, čiji su članici također bili vrlo neljubavi

Čišćenje palube - pogodba za Titovo povlačenje

● Kome ste pričali o tom nemilom događaju? Jesu li Vadi pretpostavili imati informacije o surbiti bit Hrvata?
 - Ekstradicija me duboko uznemirila, pa sam idućeg jutra cijeli slučaj prijavio narednom česniku, imao sam doljam da mi ruke masice nije jasno. Nije mi pozvalo što je poduzeo. Međutim, kao što biu u takvim kaotičnim prijkama, imao sam toliku česničkih odvaja da se nisam mogao ozbiljno baviti tom enigmom. Demobiliziran sam u rujnu 1945. i odmah sam se vratio u Cape Town, gdje sam studirao pravo. Godinu dana kasnije došao mi je u ruke magacin »Life«, u kojem je pisao da su gotovo svi izručeni hrvatskih vojnika bili lividirani.

Moram priznati da sam sve do pojave Tolstoyjeve knjige bio uvjerto da je ratni zločin čijim sam nevjerasnim sudionikom bio i ja osobno, proizaio iz nesretnog spleta okolnosti, kao i nelizvravanja situzeren stava da se hrvatski, slovenski, kozarski i ostali vojnici ne mogu izručivati protivno njihovoj volji. Drugim riječima, mislio sam da je to samo jedan izolirani incident. Tek sam iz Ministira i pokoljao čitalo da je »za vrijeme rata riječ o prijavi političkoj igri koju je životima platilo tisucje nevinih ljudi. Za sam desetljeće bio i luđeti i odvjetnik, tako da mi je jasno što znači postati nekoga bez sudenja i smrt.

● Vi, dakle, sve to godine niste znali da je komendant britanske Osmo armije, general McCreery, još 14. svibnja 1945. predložio savjetničkom združenom stožeru da »Hrvati postanu Titova predstava«, i da je rad Titova pokušaja osvajanja Koruška planirana soperacija Pčinjica, kojom su partizani potpunoj svobnja trebali biti slom i terani iz Austrije?

- Točno je, o svemu tome nisam ništa znao. Apolutno ništa. Tek sam naknadno saznao i to da je britansko »čišćenje palube« od Hrvata bilo dio pogodbe za Titovo povlačenje iz Austrije. To je plaćeno ogromnom količinom protivne krvi.

u svakodnevno prizivala, ne mogu se ješiti, možda i zato što mi to line tada nije išta govorilo. Sigurno je tek to da je u nadi pisalo da hrvatske vojnike treba prešti Walleški gardi kod gradača Rosenbacha, jugoistočno od Vitešca. Naziv lokalje, zapravo nekog polja, na kojoj sam reuzeo zarobljenike također nisam zamnio, jer je ona za mene bila potpuno ova.

Uvjeti su, radi boljeg razumijevanja poličkih okolnosti, ih dana bili doista kaotični, stotine tisuca bijegunaca, uglavnom iz uposleni i Svijskog Saveza, zaključili u sve važnije prometnice, tražedi hranu i koništia. Među njima su bile čak i povode rupe bivših logoraša, odjeveni i plavo-bijele prozaste uniforme, koji su se vraćali vojim kućama. Nije bilo puno vremena za smišljanje, to više što su na austrijski teritorij ušli i Stajinove i Titove jedinice, što i uvidavio mogućnost izbijanja novih ožih sukoba. Mnogo kasnije em tek me nisam saznati koliko je to opasnost bila realna.

Krenuli smo sa 40 kamiona

● Vratimo se, ipak, sudbini zarobljenika. Inače, u Visokim svjedočanstvu, koje ste iz Cape Towna objavili kod javnog bilježnika, li bi mogli poslužiti za eventualnu istragu, piše da ste po njih krenuli s četrdesetak kamiona. Što se dalje značilo?
 - Krenuo sam preko jedne planine i u njeslo označeno na karti stigao oko 10 sati ujutro. Tamo sam zatekao trojicu svjetskih generala i oko 500 njihovih vojnika. Točan broj zapravo i nije mogaoš izdrijeti, jer ih nismo pojedinačno identifikali, ali se to moglo zaključiti prema broju soderanih kamiona. Na tom otvorenom polju u generali su me čekali za jednim improviziranim stolom, pijuci vino i pušeći, dok je većenik nešto podalje za vojnik držao svoju Budući da generali nisu znali engleski, ali ni francuski, razgovarali smo predostrom mrisavog, svježe obrljanog čovjeka, svježe puti i nešto višeg rasta. Rekao mi je da je engleski našao prije rata, kad je još zaposlen na nekome visokom položaju i uredu pomorskom osiguranju Lloyd u rfu.

Sva trojica generala su bili jače građani i roješnje visine. Moji odnos s njima bio je vrlo srdcaan, jer mi nisu ostavili dojam opasnih ljudi, kakve sam ih ratnih godina upoznao. Pokušali su mi objasniti da Hrvati i ratu nisu mogli ostati neutralni, odnosno ta su se borili na strani Nijemaca, odobrujući s od dva iz ona manje. Tvrdili su da bi pristajanje uz ruski komunizam za Hrvats bilo još pogubnije. Željeli su se, dakle, prikazati uvjerenim antikomunistima, što ja nisam želio komentirati.

Ni slutili nisu

Sada dolaz ono najinteresantnije. U mojoj naredbi nije stajalo da hrvatske vojnike moram razoružati, tako da ja prije izjavljanja nisam ni činio. Stotinu, generali ne uoči poljsku upotrebu nisu upitali koje je krajnje određite, zacišlo ni ne pretpostavljaju što bi se moglo dogoditi. Iz razgovora s mi je bilo jasno da je glavni uvjet njihove predstava bilo nečije običavanje da ih prevezati zapadni savjesnici. Zato ih je zadovoljio napisati da krećemo prema jugu i da će uskoro biti predani drugoj britanskoj jedinici. Sve što sam rekao bio je točno!

Ja sam vozio zarobljenike »Mercedes Benz«, a u mene su bila dva generala i prevoditelj. Treći je ina nas vozio »Fiat« dok su vojnici bili smješteni u otvorenim kamionima. Nakon jednog sata putovanja pošlo je uspon na planinu. Dobra se sjećam prometnog znaka od 29 stupnjeva nagiba po neasfaltiranoj cesti. Počela je i jaka kiša, pa su vojnici gurali kamione čiji su kotači stalno proklizavali. Nako vrijeme smo se i morali maknuti s ceste, jer je prozeta jedna britanska artiljerijska regimenta. Uskoro se vozilo onoga trećega generala poklovalo. Kako smo obilježili kamion, doživio sam mu da ćemo ga prečkati iz Splita, pokušajući mu na drugu stranu planine. Njega više nikad nisam vidio. Taj

Izručenje je pripremao stožer Osmo armije, a volio bih doznati koji me bojniik na nj prisilio

● Prijetili ste oči sa de Saše i ne nalazi na popisu osoba čiji su iskazi navodno izjavljeni u sastavljanju kontroverzno izjavljaju Cowgillove komisija, čija je očita svrha bila da ospori Tolstoyevu knjigu. Jeste li doista suradivali s brigadirom Cowgillom?

- Uvjerem sam da je Cowgillov izvještaj napravljen radi obmanjivanja međunarodne javnosti, tako je i komisija imala na raspolaganju relevantnu dokumentaciju u njemu su svjesno prikrivene sve bitnije informacije, pa i ona koja mene najviše zatekaju: tko je bio bojniik koji me je u stožeru Osmo armije prijetiljama prisilio za nastavak puta u Radstadl? Začijko je on kasnije bilo neka velika zvjerk.

Kad kažete da se moje ime nalazi na popisu Cowgillovih svjedoka, onda je prava letina te da je komisija imala moji iskaz, ali ga u završnom tekstu ni na koji način nije koristila ili citirala. Moje je ime, dakle, zloporabljeno za nametanje stava u kojima se upoće ne slažem. Zato sam s Cowgillom imao podeljivo konspicijozni, no opet bez konkretnih rezultata. Štošve, saznao sam da je u

Cape Townu bio i predstavnik njegove komisije, čak znam i u kojem hotelu. On je imao moju adresu i telefon, ali mi se upoće nije pokušao javiti. Što li u pokušao saći nekog drugog svjedoka, ili je možda tražio informacije u svrhu moje kompromitacije? Nikad to nisam uspio saznati.

Ipak, autorima izvještaja omanuko se jedan bitni detalj, koji zapravo potvrđuje moje svjedočanstvo. U izvještaju Osmo armije navedeno je da je 24. svibnja 1945. Hrvats prećeno zagešavanima. Netoliko je, pak, navedeno da se to dogodilo u 16:55 sati, jer sam zbog problema na putovanju u Radstadl stigao sa spomenutim zakoljenjem od pet sati.

Za indikativna zabuna u terminu sam potvrđuje da je ekstradicija bila unaprijed pripremana u stožeru Osmo armije.
 Na koncu konca, onako svih tih mojih teškoća i neuspjeha, uvjerem sam da će cjelovita istina o zbivanjima na austrijsko-jugoslavenskoj granici ipak biti obznanjena. Tako bi me radovao da doživim takvu moralnu satisfakciju.

Prilog br. 14: Dokument KP 39 od 27./28. travnja 1945. telegram veleposlanika VB Haroldu Macmillanu u Casertu kojim ga obaviještava o približavanju južnoj Austriji velike skupine protivničkih snaga i sugestijama kako postupati s njima

KP 39 [PRO FO 371/48812]

27.ec

THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST AND SHOULD BE EXAMINED BY THE AUTHORIZED RECIPIENT AND NOT PRESSED ON.

(TOP SECRET).

DELOVATNO (SECRET).

FROM BELGRADE TO RESERVE MINISTER'S OFFICE, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

CASERTA.

Mr. Stevenson.
D. 8.43 a.m. SAT April 28th, 1945.
R. 12.45 p.m. SUN April 28th, 1945.

Repeated to FOREIGN OFFICE No. 549.

Washington
Rome.

YTTTTT

URGENT.

My telegram No. 506 to you.

It is clear that very shortly troops of 15th Army Group may make contact with considerable anti-partisan Yugoslav Forces whose total strength is believed to be over 20,000 men.

The Germans have deliberately assisted the passage of these troops northwards in the hope of creating political confusion in an area of conflicting international interests, and of disrupting our relations with Yugoslav and Russian.

These anti-partisan units are without exception completely commanded by open collaborationists with the Germans and have accepted the German line. It is therefore our intention to attempt to rehabilitate them where they can make the final effort to re-establish themselves in the eyes of the British and American commanders.

An urgent decision is therefore required on the attitude to be adopted by ourselves when the commanders of these troops offer their services to the Allied commanders in North Western Italy.

5. Three courses are possible:-

- (a) They should be used as auxiliary troops;
 - (b) They should be handed over to the Yugoslav Army;
 - (c) They should be disarmed and placed in refugee camps;
- Course (a) is out of the question in view both of our relations with Yugoslav Government and proven collaboration of these forces.

Course (b) as a general policy is inconsistent with traditional claim to asylum of political refugees at the close of a civil war.

Course (c) seems to me to be most reasonable solution of this thorny matter.

2.

6. I would suggest an unambiguous instruction to the effect decided by common agreement between British and American authorities on the following lines:-

All anti-partisan elements contacting Allied commanders in Italy should be told that no collaboration with Allies whatsoever will be even discussed. Those who wish to surrender will be discussed on their merits. Those who wish to return to Yugoslavia as individuals can do so. Those who wish to return to Yugoslavia as units must wait until there is evidence classifying them as war criminals which will later be handed under this category.

7. I feel it to be of considerable importance that if such a decision is accepted and myself should be instructed to inform the Yugoslav Government of this intention on our part before such incidents arise.

8. In the dangerous general situation which is developing in the area in question there is no doubt that a disturbing element is the heavy suspicion here connected with collaborationist elements and that we are still quite unready to undertake course (a) mentioned in paragraph 5 above. It is for this reason therefore that I would suggest such a decision as being the atmosphere should go at least part of the way to clearing the atmosphere.

9. I am publishing a summary of the present evidence of the activities of these anti-partisan elements which will follow by fast post.

Foreign Office pass to Washington and Rome as per telegram Nos. 25 and 24.

(Repeated to Washington and Rome under Nos. 4285 and 1156).

O.T.P.

Miroslav Medimorec: Izvršio sam zapovijed: odveo sam u smrt 900 Hrvata

Prilog br. 16: Dokument KP 212 (osobni dokument general-majora de Fonblanquea od 21. svibnja 1945. koji potvrđuje njegovo stupanje na dužnost zapovjednika 5. korpusa i odlazak Tobyja Lowa) i KP 213 od 21. svibnja 1945. o izručenju svih Rusa Crvenoj armij

KP 213 [USNA (Kirk Papers)]

SECRET
AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
TOD : 212315Z
OFFICE UNITED STATES
MAY 22 1945
AFHQ/CPA/OPS/SEC

4CI ROUTE UNIT
Aid: [initials]
CD [initials]
CIC [initials]
IC [initials]
21 May 1945

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: MAIN EIGHTH ARMY
TO : AFHQ, INFO MAIN V CORPS
REF NR THIS MESSAGE: A 4073

444

Cite FIGAB.

Reference your FY-75383 dated 18 stating all Russians to be returned to Soviet Forces and SBRAF 399 Fwd 21870 stating Comaacka accepted by 12 Army Group.

Request earliest information whether approved policy is to detach to Soviet Forces and SBRAF to secure direct return to Russians by Eight Army negotiations.

FA-75383 is MC OUT MAY 18/5/45 CIG
FD-21870 is MC IN 13090 19/5/45 0-1 (B)

ACTION : 0-1 (B)

INFORMATION : SACB
CAO 0-2 MTJ
0-1 0 3
RESKIN 0-1
0-5
0-7
C (MAINT)
ACOS (B)

MC IN 15741 22 May 45 0943B Ref N.: A-4073 Jjs/H/GB

Spent the evening with the Field Marshal, and slept at the Hunting Lodge.

Wednesday, 23 May 1945

A very heavy day, making all sorts of preparations for my return. I am to go back on Saturday, but as the appointments are not yet out, I can only take F.M. into my confidence. There is a lot to do; I must make dignified and appropriate farewells after nearly two-and-a-half years at A.F.H.Q.

A long meeting on Venezia Giulia in the afternoon, and appropriate telegrams to C.C.S. were drafted, in accord with the Americans.

My staff are playing up well, and are arranging various entertainments. I have really been most fortunate in having such good chaps.

Thursday, 24 May 1945

10.30 a.m. Political Meeting - mostly Venezia Giulia, and the French behaviour in the Val d'Aosta.¹⁵

1 p.m. Kirk gave a farewell luncheon to me at the Americans Camp. Office really organised it. Everyone was there - F.M., C-in-C, Med. and Air Marshal Garrod on the British side; General McNamey, Admiral Glasford, General Cannon on the American. That is, all the Commanders-in-Chief of the three services and their deputies. General Morgan, C. of S., and General Lemnitzer (Deputy C. of S.), Broad, Office, etc. They drank my health (after a speech by Kirk) and I replied. My speech, which tried to be both light and serious in due proportions, seemed to please them.

5.30 p.m. Cocktail party to all my staff, including cypherers, typists, clerks, etc., in our rooms in the palace. Sergeant-Major Brown proposed my health in a very good speech.

6.8 p.m. Cocktail party to all in A.F.H.Q., Navy, MEDBO, P.W.B., Consulate, Kirk's office, etc. About 530 came. The Field Marshal came early and stayed to the end, giving thereby great pleasure to all. I slept the night with the Russells at the Villa Vittoria in Caserta.

KP 212 [Maj-Gen de Fonblanque's Private Papers]

Toby Low departed on leave not to return and I became P.O. I was sworn to execute Committee

Prilog br. 18: Dokument PRO FO 1020/42. od 24. svibnja 1945. (o suglasnosti da se svi Jugoslaveni iz područja 8. armije izruče u Jugoslaviju osim ako to ne uključuje uporabu sile)

229

KP 229 [PRO FO 1020/42]

[PRO FO 1020/42]

23 May 1945

OTHER MESSAGE SOURCE 4116

From: MAIN 5 CORPS 239120

To: MAIN EIGHTH ARMY 135

Serial 135

23rd

OTHER. TOP SEC.

ATTN: EA IN EIGHTH ARMY.

INFO: 15 MAIN 5 CORPS. DISTORE.

FROM: AFHQ c/o HQ AB FK 80836 23rd.

0920. SUBJECT: PERSONAL HAS FOR O OF S.

REF AFHQ CDR 760497 DATED 22 FEBRUARY FOR CDR BOSTON AND 0908

OUT TO 5 CORPS. AS A RESULT OF VERBAL INTERVIEW FROM MATTELAN TO CDRS

OOCD AT BOSTON BOSTON IS HAVE UNDERSTAND TO INTERVIEW ALL BOSTON MATTEALS

IN OTHER AREA TROUBLE FINISH. MATTELAN REQUESTED TO PROVIDED ABOVE USE OF

FORCE AND WE HAVE ISSUED INVESTIGATION THAT FORCE MAY BE USED IF NECESSARY

NECESSARY. CONSIDER QUITE RESPONSIBLE TO GUARANTEE TO INTERVIEW CONTACTS AND SO IN

REGARD OUR VERBAL AGREEMENT WITH BOSTON FORCES UNLESS WE ARE ALLOWED FROM

HAND IN THIS MATTER. CONTACTS WILL VIEW ANY NOTE WITH SUSPICION AS TO

INTERVIEW. CONSIDER THEREFORE MAY BE NECESSARY USE FORCE TO MOVE CONTACTS

AS ACT FROM PRESENT AREA. LOWER THAT REMAIN PRESENT AREA MUST INTERVIEW

FORCES HAVE TO BE USED. REQUESTED YOU COMPLETE OUR PRESENT OF ACTION IN THIS

Ref EA IN EIGHTH ARMY & ALLS of 23 MAY. 139

agree that all JUGOSLAV nationals in EIGHTH ARMY area

should be returned by you to JUGOSLAVS unless this

involves use of force in which case they should be

dealt with in accordance with AFHQ 77268 of 17 116

200 23/1087.

THI

FOR 23/1085.

SIG 23/1110.

action: MA JTR 000. C of S. B.A/V. 010). GJ.L.L.

Info: GSI "B". 0120). 012). SIG.

REFR. 018.

INTERVIEW OPERATIONS FOR 2341153

Datum: 0 of 3 (PERSONAL)
01 (Ops) (Personal)

Prilog br. 20: Robertsonova zapovijed od 14. svibnja 1945. o izručenju svih jugoslavenskih državljana koji su služili u njemačkim oružanim snagama)

THE ROBERTSON ORDER - AFHQ COPY

SECRET
AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

URGENT

TO FOR ACTION: 15TH ARMY GROUP, MAIN EIGHTH ARMY
FOR INFO : DISTONE
REF NO : FX 75383
SIGNED : SACMED CITE: FECAO

Ref Eighth Army AC/189 of 14 May.

1. All Russians should be handed over to Soviet Forces at agreed point of contact established by you under local arrangement with Marshal TOLBUKHIN'S Hq. Steps should be taken to ensure that Allied PW held in Russian Area are transferred to us in exchange at same time.

2. Movement to ITALY of all Germans is not acceptable because it would cause serious blockage on our L of C. SS and other arrestable categories under AFHQ Directive AG/371.2/173 GBI-0 of 2 May will be disarmed and evacuated to DISTONE. We are approaching 12th Army Gp immediately with request that they accept concentration under conditions of FREEBORN memorandum No. 7 phase II.

3. All surrendered personnel of established Yugoslav nationality who were serving in German Forces should be disarmed and handed over to local Yugoslav forces.

ORIGINATOR : CAO AUTH: B. H. ROBERTSON, LT GEN
INFORMATION : SACS CONCURRED: BR RESMIN
G-1 (B) G-1 (B)
G-4 G-2
G-1
G-5
G-4 (B)
RESMIN
G-2
**

MC OUT 4407 14 May 45 1836B Ref. No. FX 75383 R/L/G

SECRET

COPY NO.

Prilog br. 21: Sastanak zapovjednika stožera od 29. svibnja 1945.

8th 3rd Lt. J. F. W. *Headlist*
24/1/45
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.S.F.1.

26th May, 1945. 22A
Handwritten initials and scribbles
28/5
hey dear Alice,

The Chiefs of Staff have invited the Foreign Office in consultation with the War Office to examine MAP 975 as a matter of urgency to advise on the reply to be sent to Field Marshal Alexander. (Cats. 1, 45) 132nd Meeting of 13th May Minute 13). We have seen the text of DON 754 of 13th May which gives the preliminary views of the Joint Staff Mission.

Our views on the three categories whose presence in Southern Austria is an embarrassment to Field Marshal Alexander are as follows:-

- (a) Cossacks. We agree with the C.S.M. that the Cossacks are covered by the Yalta agreement on the reciprocal repatriation of Soviet citizens and accordingly consider it essential that all of them who are Soviet citizens should be handed over to the Soviet authorities in pursuance of our general policy. If we did not do so in the case of these particular people it would be a breach of the agreement and might look like a change of policy. In this matter to which the Soviet Government attach great importance and would be assumed by the Russians to indicate hostile intentions towards them. It might also have very unfortunate repercussions upon the Russian treatment of our prisoners of war detained by them. We suggest that Field Marshal Alexander should make arrangements with Marshal Tolbuzhin for the handing over of the Cossacks across the temporary occupational demarcation line.

(b)/

-Lieutenant-Colonel
C. A. Price,
War Cabinet Offices.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

Extract from the Minutes of the COS(45) 138th Meeting

held on 29th May, 1945.

14. DISPOSAL OF ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

COS(45) 138(0) *15A.*
Previous Reference: COS(45) 132nd Meeting, Min. 13)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a letter from the Foreign Office commenting on the problem raised by Field Marshal Alexander in MAP 975 regarding the disposal of Cossacks, Cotniks and Croats in Southern Austria.

SIR ALAN BROCKE handed round copies of a draft telegram to the Joint Staff Mission prepared in this light of the Foreign Office suggestion, and with reference to telegram DON 754, recommending the line which should now be taken for the disposal of these three classes of liberated persons. The Americans might possibly object to a policy of handing over all Croats to the British, in spite of the fact that some 900 had already been released. In this case we might also consider whether Croats should not be treated in the same way as the Cotniks, pending final decision on their disposal.

It was agreed that a paragraph in this sense should be inserted in the telegram, in view of the last sentence of the Foreign Office letter.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Approved the terms of the draft telegram, as amended above, and instructed the Secretary to despatch it;
- (b) Informed the Foreign Office to take parallel action with Washington and Moscow.

† Sent as COS(45) 917 - 24A

Copied to:-
MO 1 (b)
MO 5
PW 4 2

Prilog br. 23: Cowgillovo izvješće, 12. poglavlje koje razmatra pitanje zarobljavanja od strane britanske vojske 200.000 hrvatskih vojnika i njihovu predaju Titovim partizanima

- (iii) that *'immediate steps'* should be taken to deal with the *'large numbers of surrendered personnel from Army Group SE not foreseen in original plans'*.

Robertson's signal provided responses to each of these requests.

- (i) He gave Gen McCreery the authorization he required to negotiate with Tolbukhin for the hand-over of the Cossacks (although he referred to these, somewhat imprecisely, as *'all Russians'*). This authorization made provision for the removal of one large, identifiable group of surrendered personnel from 5 Corps responsibility, although at the same time Robertson instructed that *'steps should be taken to ensure that Allied PW held in Russian area are transferred to us in exchange'*. This was a reference to the principle of reciprocity embodied in the Yalta Repatriation agreements which will be discussed in Chapter Five.
- (ii) In his response to McCreery's suggestion that *'remainder of surrendered personnel and refugees'* in 5 Corps area should be evacuated either to Italy or to the US Zone of Austria under SHAEF/12th Army Group, Robertson dealt only with surrendered personnel. The largest such group in the Corps area were Germans. Their removal would therefore make a major contribution to alleviating the Corps' administrative problems. Robertson confirmed in the second paragraph of his signal that *'movement to Italy of all Germans is not acceptable because it would cause serious blockage on our L of C'*. He therefore informed McCreery that AFHQ would be *'approaching 12th Army Group immediately'* to ask them to accept all German surrendered personnel from 5 Corps, with the exception of *'arrestable categories'*, such as SS.

This request from AFHQ to SHAEF was sent off at 1917 hrs, only forty minutes after the despatch of the Robertson signal. It ran :

'Refugee and PW situation in 5 Corps area becoming unmanageable and prejudicing operational efficiency of Corps. Essential to clear it immediately in view of political situation. Earnestly request your assistance by accepting concentration in RADSTADT area or elsewhere more convenient to you. Information regarding numbers is not definite but total may be about 500,000.'

We may note here the estimated number mentioned as *'about 500,000'*. This is considerably larger than any figure previously reported for surrendered personnel in the 5 Corps area (although Macmillan had spoken in his diary

of '400,000 Germans', nothing approaching this figure had been formally reported). On this evidence therefore it seems possible that, on the evening of 14 May, AFHQ was working on the assumption that Loehr's forces, including hundreds of thousands of Germans, had already surrendered to 5 Corps or were about to do so, and therefore that the German element in those forces might be included in the '500,000' Germans whom AFHQ was asking SHAEF/12th Army Group to take over.

- (iii) The third paragraph of Robertson's signal directed that *'all surrendered personnel of established Yugoslav nationality who were serving in German forces should be disarmed and handed over to local Yugoslav forces'*. What has to be determined here is - to whom did this order refer? The significance of this to our enquiry is that, when Robertson's order was passed on by Eighth Army to 5 Corps, it was to be taken by 5 Corps - as we shall see later - to authorise the handing over of various groups of Yugoslav surrendered personnel, including the 15,000-odd Slovene, Serb and Montenegrin troops who had surrendered two days earlier and been placed in Viktring camp. The question we therefore have to address initially is - was Robertson's order on 14 May intended to cover the handing-over of the sort of Yugoslavs who were in Viktring?

* * * * *

As we know, by the time Gen Robertson came to draft his order Gen Keightley had reported to Gen McCreery that large component of Loehr's forces approaching Austria was 200,000 Croat troops. McCreery had already signalled to Gen Clark at 15th Army Group in his AC/190 his request that AFHQ should *'ask Tito how many enemy he wishes to retain. Suggest Croats become Tito's show'*. But these signals did not reach AFHQ until the morning of the next day, 15 May, long after Robertson had sent his response to McCreery's AC/189 which had only asked for 'immediate steps' to be taken over the approach of Army Group E, and which had made no specific reference to Croats.

Did Gen Robertson therefore have the Croats specifically in mind when he drafted his order?

It is a possibility that AFHQ could have learned of the huge body of Croat troops approaching Austria on 14 May from some source other than the main signals already referred to. McCreery had already by the afternoon of that day recognised that the question of what

On the morning of the following day, 23 May, before Eighth Army could be informed of the conclusions of this meeting, a further signal arrived at AFHQ for Gen MacLeod DAG from the Assistant AG Eighth Army, Lt-Col Tilley [KP 226]. This for the first time drew explicit attention to the contradiction between the order FX 77268 of 17 May, the 'Distone order', that 'Chetniks and dissident Yugoslavs' should be evacuated to Italy, and the agreement reached by 5 Corps that they should be handed over :

'Ref F 77268 of 17 [the Distone order]. Negotiations by 5 Corps with 3 and 4 Yugoslav armies provide for all military personnel to be handed over to Yugoslavs and considerable numbers have already been handed back ... This considered in accordance with AFHQ FX 75383 dated 14 [Robertson's order of 14 May -this confirms that Low's order of 17 May was issued in response to the Robertson order]. Consider essential this arrangement continues and that all Yugoslav military personnel handed over to Yugoslavs. Dep Cmd 3 Yugoslav Army has now raised question of return all Yugoslav nationals incl ex-PW internees slave workers and other displaced persons including Chetniks. Request immediate authority for all these categories to be returned as decision required this evening. Consider policy should be for all nationals, ie persons born within pre-1939 frontier of an Allied country, to be handed over to Ally concerned ...'

This final sentence underlined how keen Eighth Army was by this time to 'clear the decks' in its area. Here was McCreery's HQ giving the widest possible interpretation to the term 'allied national' to include anyone 'born within pre-1939' frontier of an 'Allied country', which of course would also have covered all Russian emigres regardless of when they had left Russia. As far as Yugoslavs were concerned, not only was Eighth Army fully in support of 5 Corps' agreement with Ivanovitch, and asking for the terms of the 'Distone order', FX 77268 to be set aside. It was going even further, in asking for authority to accede to Ivanovitch's demand that Yugoslavs 'NOT in Austria' (ie in Italy), 'including Chetniks' (such as the 11,000 under Damjanovitch who had surrendered on 3 May) should also be handed over.

AFHQ's response came at 1857 hrs that afternoon [KP 228] :

'Agree all Yugoslav nationals in Eighth Army Area to be returned unless involves use of force, otherwise evacuation to Distone (Italy) in accordance with FX 77268 of 17 May.'

This marked a significant change from the conclusions of the previous day. Now AFHQ was supporting Eighth Army's request in very wide terms. **All** Yugoslav nationals in Eighth Army area were to be returned so long as this did not involve the 'use of force'. This marked a striking change from the initial view recorded by G-5 the previous day that 'No Yugoslavs ... should be returned to Yugoslavia' later amended to allow volunteers to return. But at 2002 hrs that evening

Prilog br. 24: Cowgillovo izvješće 13. poglavlje: „Počinje post-mortem“, koje obrađuje što se događalo sa zarobljenicima izručenim Titovim partizanima.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE POST-MORTEMS BEGIN

JUNE-AUGUST 1945

"We have today been informed ... that decision to turn over to Tito Yugo nationals ... was made on grounds of military necessity in view of conditions existing at that time ...

Alexander this morning ... stated to us that he ... could not deal with anti-Tito Yugos as he would have liked."

[Alexander Kirk to US State Department, 14 August 1945]

By the time the main repatriation operations from 5 Corps area came to an end on 7 June, the immediate political and military crisis which had precipitated the original orders to 'clear the decks' in southern Austria had already receded into the past. Nevertheless it was not until 9 June that the international crisis over Tito's claims to Carinthia and Venezia Giulia came formally to an end, with the signing of an agreement between the Yugoslav, British and US Governments that Yugoslav forces should withdraw completely from north-east Italy [KP 294]. And only four days after that, on 13 June, did the US Chiefs of Staff in Washington finally propose that a stand-down signal be sent to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, urging that :

'the development of events now makes unnecessary the continuance of the special arrangements which were initiated in order to show a preponderance of force in those areas under dispute with Yugoslavs.' [KP 299]

As the repatriations came to an end, many British soldiers who had been directly responsible for carrying out the operations felt considerable unease about the drama in which they had been involved.

Todorovic's account has the ring of truth. Its general tenor is confirmed by other reports. There is no doubt that there was an extensive and indiscriminate slaughter ...'

A few days later copies of the statement were sent to the British Embassy in Belgrade and to the office of the British Resident Minister at AFHQ in Caserta.*

On 21 September, before a reply had been sent to Maj Lloyd, J M Addis was due to move from his post and left a minute for his successor John Colville :

'I had hoped to be able to write out before my departure a documentary account of the expulsion of the Croatian Ustasa and the Slovenian Domobranci from Carinthia to Slovenia during May. Unfortunately certain key documents have not yet arrived from the War Office.'

He then summarised *'the information at present available'*. This made reference to a signal from the Chiefs of Staff [COS (W) 917 of 2 May], indicating that, *'while the question of principle was still under discussion between AFHQ, the Chiefs of Staff and ourselves, V Corps, the British formation, had "agreed to hand over Croats to Yugoslavia and 900 Croats were transferred on the 24th May".'*

'Major James of PW2 in the War Office is going through the contemporary files and will send over copies of any relevant documents.'

* Our recent researches in the archives of Alexander Kirk's office at Caserta have shown that during the summer of 1945 quite extensive reports were reaching AFHQ from inside Yugoslavia to indicate the horrific scale of the massacres of Croats, Slovenes, Serbs and others opposed to Tito which had been going on in that country since the end of the war. It is not known whether any of this hearsay information was communicated back to the Foreign Office in London, or indeed how much significance was attached to it at AFHQ. But one document in particular, datelined from 'Slovenia, the middle of July', includes specific references to a number of mass-killings, at least two of which involved victims who had been handed over by the British in May. One of these was a description of the 'hole of death' in the Kocjevie Forest, south of Ljubljana, in which many thousands of victims were reported to have been put to death with great cruelty. A later report dated 23 August gave further details of what has since become notorious as 'The Pit of Kocevje'. Although this was not reported in 1945, it later became clear that among the victims at Kocevje were members of the Slovene Domobranci repatriated from Viktring. Only in 1990 did this and other massacre sites in Slovenia finally become the subject of a full, officially backed investigation by a Slovene Historical Commission. Its findings were not yet available at the time of our going to press, but visits were made to Kocevje and other sites in Slovenia with members of the Commission during the course of our own investigation.

It was not until some time later that we learned that the unfortunate Croats and Slovenians who had been expelled from Carinthia had been extensively slaughtered by Tito's troops after crossing the Yugoslav frontier. The best account of this massacres is given in R 16674 ...' [R 16674 is a reference to the statement by Todorovic.]

By 5 November, Major Lloyd still had not received a reply to his letter of 25 August, and Addis's successor John Colville noted :

'I am afraid there has been no progress in securing further information of this unpleasant subject, and all the people in the War Office who were dealing with the matter have been demobilised and succeeded by officers who were not familiar with the past history. However ... since the incident was a disgraceful one the War Office should be asked to have enquiries made into the immediate responsibility for handing over to a certain and unpleasant death these unfortunate Croats, while the question of their disposal was still under consideration at a high level ...

I think we can do no more than admit that a serious blunder did take place and that the story does not reflect well on the officers immediately concerned. It is no use trying to hush up an incident which is indefensible ...'.

Colville submitted the draft of a reply to be sent by the Minister of State Philip Noel-Baker to Maj Lloyd. This included the passage :

'I am afraid there is no doubt that during the last few days of May a serious blunder was made by some of the military authorities, and 900 Croats were in fact handed over to Tito's troops, by whom they were subsequently butchered, while the question of their disposal was under discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff ... I agree with you in thinking that this was a terrible incident which does not reflect well on the officers immediately responsible. needless to say, as soon as the story reached the ears of AFHQ and the authorities concerned in London, immediate enquiries were made and steps were taken to prevent the recurrence of such an atrocious event, but of course we could not undo the harm that had already been done ...'

Colville concluded by explaining that the reason why Richard Law had not replied to Dr Krek's original letter in June was that Dr Krek was 'now the leader of the anti-Tito Yugoslavs' and 'one of the leading anti-Tito propagandists'.

Philip Noel-Baker noted that he was 'reluctant to send such a letter to Major Lloyd, and certainly will not do so unless the War Office are in agreement'.

Here it appears the matter was left to rest.

4. Dr Kenneth Pickthorn MP

On 12 November 1945 another Conservative MP, Kenneth Pickthorn, tried to raise the handing over of the Yugoslavs with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, John Hynd, but merely received the reply that *'it has never been HM Government's policy to employ forcible repatriation.'*

5. Mr Francis Scott and the Foreign Office

On 13 May 1946, a Unionist MP, Prof Douglas Savory, again attempted to raise the repatriation of the Yugoslavs in the House. He was told by the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Hector McNeill, that :

'British authorities in Austria have handed over one person to Yugoslavia and he has been proven to be a genuine collaborator.'

Savory had asked his question at the instance of a constituent, Dr Harold Buxton, Bishop of Gibraltar, who had written to him enclosing a long letter about the events in Austria from his nephew Francis Scott. Scott had been an officer in a unit on the Austro-Yugoslav border charged with handing back 'Chetniks' to Tito's troops, and forcibly recalled the general unhappiness of his men at the :

'action taken by this country in handing over simple people who had acted as they felt was right during the war, some of them as our allies, to a sticky fate when we had the chance to save them.'

As a result of his letter to Savory, Dr Buxton was invited to the Foreign Office to discuss the matter, and on 30 May John Colville noted :

'The Bishop of Gibraltar came to see Mr Hayter and myself bringing with him this letter from his nephew ... we explained to him quite clearly that the incident to which his nephew referred must have been the surrender in May 1945 of 900 Croats by the British military authorities which ended in their massacre. In spite of this the Bishop went straight home and wrote his letter to the Times on the strength of which Professor Savory asked his question in Parliament.

I do not for a moment believe that there is any truth in Mr Francis Scott's allegations ...'

Considering Colville's own disquiet over the 'incident' of the Croats only a few months earlier, it seems that, as the war receded into the past, the trail was now becoming colder rather than warmer.

6. Maj Tufton Beamish MP and Mr Warbey MP

On 21 May 1946 two more MPs, one Conservative, one Labour, Maj Tufton Beamish and William Warbey, made further fruitless attempts

It is again a fundamental misunderstanding of what happened to suggest that, when arrangements were put in train for the hand-over of the Cossacks, there was a 'conspiratorial' contradiction between written and oral orders given by 5 Corps in respect of screening. The only serious attempt to distinguish which 'Cossacks' might not be eligible for repatriation had taken place by the time 5 Corps drew up 21 May definition order. Of the original six '*formed bodies*' originating from territories controlled by the Soviet Union, two had by this time been ruled as not eligible for repatriation, the Schutzkorps and the Ukrainian Division, because they comprised a majority of non-Soviet nationals. The other four were ruled as eligible to be repatriated because, as '*formed bodies*', they included a vast majority of Soviet citizens. The most obvious group of '*non-Soviet citizens*' in these groups were the 900-odd German officers and men in the 15 Cossack Cavalry Corps, not the emigres whose presence has in hindsight come to seem of such overwhelming importance. Nevertheless, for reasons of operational expedience, it was considered that the only screening which should take place should be that implicit in the terms of the 21 May definition order, ie that all members of the formations deemed eligible for repatriation, including Germans, should be handed over. Because the possibility of isolated individuals being found not to be Soviet nationals had been raised, a clause was properly put in to the effect that these would be considered if '*particularly pressed*'; but otherwise 5 Corps was acting strictly in accordance with the AFHQ letter of 7 March in not going out of its way to seek out '*non-Soviet citizens*' (in the event, of course, when this clause was put to the test by 6th Armoured Division on 29 May 60 individual cases were '*found not to be Soviet citizens*' and were not repatriated). The overriding intention of the 21 May definition order was that all the members of the named formations should be handed over with as little complication as possible. All subsequent orders, either from 5 Corps or from relevant subordinate commands, were in accordance with this, and the orders that special care should be taken to ensure that no officers escaped were given to avoid the possibility of officers alerting the remainder of the Cossacks in such a way that subsequent transfers became more difficult to carry out.

Similarly 5 Corps maintained its deliberate deception of higher authority that no Yugoslavs other than Croats were being handed back against their will;

The charge that 5 Corps deceived higher commands over the repatriations of the dissident Yugoslavs can only be based on a wilful misreading of the evidence and a lack of understanding of how the Army Staff system operates. On 20 May Eighth Army received full notification of the Low-Ivanovitch agreement the previous day, naming the categories of Yugoslavs to be handed over, and on 23 May sent a signal to AFHQ in full support

citizens must be returned to Russia, whether they are willing to go or not' and that 'there is no limit to the amount of force which may be used' [KPs 318 and 319]. FM Alexander, on the other hand, reported to Alexander Kirk at the end of July that, on his visit to the Potsdam conference, Churchill had told him to be particularly careful to ensure that 'no force' was used 'to persuade anyone to return to his native country' [KP 313]. This seems to have been in accordance with the general policy urged by Alexander's own HQ during the repatriations from Austria two months earlier.

Eighth Army

It was Gen McCreery commanding Eighth Army who was immediately responsible for direction of the situation in which 5 Corps found itself after its occupation of southern Austria. If force had to be used to expel Tito's Yugoslavs from Austria and north-east Italy, McCreery would have been in charge of all the military operations required. The initial fighting would have been the responsibility of 5 Corps and 13 Corps under his command. He wished 5 Corps to be operationally ready and he agreed with Alexander's policy of 'clearing the decks'.

It was Gen McCreery who initially suggested, at the time of the threat of Army Group E entering Austria, that 'Croats become Tito's show' and who made the suggestions to AFHQ which resulted in the Robertson order. From that time on McCreery and HQ Eighth Army gave the fullest possible support to all the steps which HQ 5 Corps was taking to implement that order. It was HQ Eighth Army which, on 23 May, objected to the application of the 'Distone order' to Austria (having observed a possible conflict between this and the steps being taken by 5 Corps to implement the Robertson order). And in the course of this signal to AFHQ, HQ Eighth Army commented '*Consider policy should be for all nationals, ie persons born within the pre-1939 frontier of an Allied country to be handed over to Ally concerned*'. This would have justified handing over not only the Viktring Yugoslavs, but also most of the emigres among the Cossacks, and was the most sweeping recommendation for repatriation put forward by anyone during the period.

In preparation for the discussion of repatriation policy with the AFHQ representatives on 26-27 May, Gen McCreery made an extensive visit to the 5 Corps area on 24-25 May, and the outcome of the discussions at his HQ was full support for what 5 Corps was doing. Only later, when the operational phase of the repatriations was concluded, did Gen McCreery respond to the representations made to him by the Red Cross and Allied Military Government by prohibiting further forcible repatriation.

Throughout the repatriation episode it was Gen McCreery and HQ Eighth Army who enabled 5 Corps to maintain a steady course, despite the contradictions in orders emanating from AFHQ. It was they who finally persuaded AFHQ to agree with 5 Corps practice. It would

Prilog br. 25: Cowgillovo izvješće, dokumenti svibanj do kolovoza 1945. koji se odnose na pitanje repatrijacije zarobljenika sila Osovine

No May 1945

99 14th T.923/5 *President to Prime Minister*

Your number 47. I have today informed the American Ambassador in Belgrade that the communication made by your Ambassador on the subject of Carinthia has the approval of the United States Government and that he may so inform Tito.

See KP 82

100 1205 1638 *Prime Minister to Macmillan*

Your 879 - I quite understand your embarrassment, but course is now clear. President Truman points the way. We certainly shall follow.

See KPs 74 and 91

101 1342 F 75163 *FM Alexander to Gen Clark, 15 Army Group*

1. *Reference your SGS 397 which covers report submitted by Gen Keightley to Gen McCreery on 13 May.*

See KP 86

2. *It should be made quite clear to all Yugoslav Commanders that the presence of Yugoslav forces in Styria and Carinthia contravenes the agreement between the Allied Governments, including Russia, that these two Austrian provinces will be occupied and administered for the present by British forces. Also that Marshal Tito has been requested by FM Alexander and formally by HM Ambassador at Belgrade to withdraw his forces south of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier. Their continued presence north of this frontier is therefore unwelcome.*

Concern Over Mass Movement of Croats

102 1450 AC/190 *Eighth Army to 15 Army Group, Copy AFHQ, 5 Corps*

Approx 300,000 Germans and 200,000 Croats moving towards area Villach-Klagenfurt.

See KPs 95, 97, 112 and 118

Have authorised Keightley to take over formed bodies as they cross border.

Received
AFHQ 0005
15 May marked
for action
G-1(B) Info
SACS, USPOLAD,
RESMIN, G-5,
G-3

Ask AFHQ to ask Tito how many enemy he eventually wishes to retain. Suggest Croats become Tito's show. This problem is additional to the subject referred to in my signal AC/189.

See KPs 135, 143 and 167

Troops under Army Group E have food for two days only.

No May 1945

127 16th 0225 0.442 5 Corps to Eighth Army, Copy AFHQ, TAC Eighth Army 6 Armd, 78 and 46 Divs [AFHQ copy arrived 1145 Action G-3 Info SACS, Resmin, USPOLAD, G-1(B), CAO etc]

Includes report on meeting with Lt Col Hocevar 4th Yugoslav Army [See KP 115]. See KPs 196 and 205

Surrender of '200,000' Croats Under Guarantee of Full Rights to Surrendered Personnel

128 0250 0.441 5 Corps to AFHQ, Eighth Army, Divs etc

Comd 38 Irish Inf Bde achieved agreement of Croat Corps Comd to surrender to Yugoslav forces all Croat forces amounting to 200,000 under his comd. Croat force will be assembled and disarmed within Yugoslav border in area East of Bleiburg. Yugoslavs have guaranteed full rights of surrendered personnel and agreed to trial of nominated war criminals by Allied court. Large train of camp followers to be sent back to Croatia. See KPs 89, 95, 122a and 225

129 0415r M 1007 Military Government Staff Austria at Eighth Army to G-5 AFHQ

Probability we shall shortly find in British occupied zone in Austria large numbers Yugoslav civilians who are anti-Tito. They being driven out by Yugoslav forces. See KP 168

If met, what is their position and should they be returned to Yugoslavia if such is demanded by Yugoslavs. If not demanded, what is their status?

130 0525 578-583 Marshal Tolbukhin (HQ Third Ukrainian Front) to Commanders First Bulgarian Army, Third Yugoslav Army, 57th Soviet Army, GSKA (General Antonov), Copy Marshal Tito

On the basis of the directive of the High Main Command number 11090 of 15 May 1945, the First Bulgarian Army is withdrawing to the rear, and in its place is being positioned the Third Yugoslav Army which comes under my command with regard to operations ...

1. ... The eleventh infantry division (marksmen) to be deployed only after the liquidation of bandit groups in the region of Gajlic, Rac. All captured Ustachi/Croats, members of Yugoslavia/are to be handed over to the Third Yugoslav Army with all of their weapons. Captured Russians, Germans, and other nationalities are to be handed over to the 57th Army. This delivery of prisoners and weapons to the Third Yugoslav Army is to be completed by 18 May 1945 at the latest.

No June 1945

293 9th - Eighth Army LO Report on Visit to Headquarters 5 Corps
7/8 June

Hand-Over of Yugoslavs to Tito's Forces

As with the hand-over, of the Cossacks, this operation was much less difficult than had been anticipated.

This report was by an Eighth Army LO, not an AFHQ LO as previously believed. This can be seen by inspection of the full text

From the Cage at Viktring the Yugoslavs were taken in TOVs to Maria Elend or Bleiburg stations. Escorts and guards at the stations were found by 1 Gds Bde. At the stations Yugoslavs were searched for arms, org into their own units (coys and bns) as far as possible, and entrained. Care was taken to segregate Ustachi from Chetniks, and to provide seats for offrs, women and children.

On completion of entrainment, Tito's guard appeared and took over, a signature being obtained from the Yugoslav guard comd.

As far as is known there were no incidents whilst the personnel were in British hands, but Yugoslav LO reported 3 suicides and 2 wounded, all believed to have taken place on the train.

Conduct of Yugoslav guards seen by 5 Corps LO at Maria Elend was exemplary.

Lt Lochhead (SOE) was 5 Corps LO

294 111 British Ambassador Belgrade (Stevenson) to Anthony Eden

Agreement reached with Tito over Venezia Giulia to withdraw his forces from Trieste and neighbouring territories.

295 11th CCS 876 (1292) Combined Chiefs of Staff

Re NAF 975. Report by the Combined Administrative Committee on disposal of prisoners of war and refugees in Austria by SACMED :

Action already taken by SACMED with respect to the disposition of the Cossacks should be ratified.

In view of the action already taken on the governmental level concerning dissident Yugoslav troops, further transfers of Croats should be withheld.

See KP 303

With respect to Chetniks, SACMED should be informed to handle such personnel in accordance with existing instructions of the British Foreign Office and Department of State.

No August 1945

Winston Churchill's Views on Forced Repatriation

313 1st 3152 Alexander C Kirk to Secretary of State Washington

Alexander stated last evening that at Potsdam Churchill had expressed great apprehension as to future of all those people who refused to return to their native countries because of opposition to political regimes and referred specifically to Poles, Yugoslavs, Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians.

The former British Prime Minister had stated that every person in above-mentioned categories who was forced to return to his native country was a future enemy of England. He urged Alexander to be particularly careful to see to it that no force used to persuade anyone to return to his native country.

Kirk Reports Anti-partisan Hand-Over to Tito Against US Wishes

314 4th 3187 Alexander C Kirk to S of S Washington

Re our 2162 of May 14. Just learnt that despite our informing COS, CAO, Res Minister and G-5 Section of Department's views the instructions contained in Robertson's draft telegram [FX 75383] in which we did not concur were carried out.

See KPs 107 and 103 but also see KP 269 (29 May) in which USPOLAD was informed of actual situation!

315 8th - Deputy USPOLAD to SAC AFHQ

I refer to my memorandum of 17 May 1945 in which I brought to the attention of the Deputy Chief of Staff my non-concurrence in the telegram which the CAO dispatched to MACMIS with regard to the disposition of certain Yugoslav nationals who surrendered to the Allies . . .

See KP 163

I am instructed to inform you that the Department of State fails to understand why the instructions contained in the CAO's telegram were not countermanded in time to prevent the apparent transfer of Yugoslav troops which did not begin until 23 May. The Department points out that the CAO's instructions did not conform to the views of the United States and British Governments and the transfer, in the opinion of the Department, could not be justified on the grounds of administrative expediency.

Offie is referring here to KP 118 the signal to MACMIS about the 200,000 Croats who never reached Austria whereas Kirk in KP 102 had referred to the Robertson Signal (KP 103)!

The Department desired me to add that it assumes that further transfers have been stopped in accordance with instructions in FAN 576, of 20 June 1945.

See KP 303

Prilog br. 26: Jasna Zanić Nardini, stalni dopisnik „Vjesnika“ iz Londona „Jedan krivac manje“, Vjesnik, 21. listopada 1990.

2 stranica • nedjelja 21. listopada 1990. godine

VJESNIK

Jedan krivac manje

NOVI IZVJEŠTAJ O BLEIBURGU: Najvažniji zaključak tzv. Cowgillove komisije glasi da Harold Macmillan, u vrijeme rata ministar zadužen za zonu Sredozemlja, nije imao gotovo nikakva udjela u prisilnim izručenjima 70.000 Kozaka i Jugoslavena

OD STALNOG DOPISNIKA
„VJESNIKA“

LONDON – Nedugo pošto je povjesničar Nikolai Tolstoy 1986. objavio svoju spornu (i. a. Otoku kasnije zabranjen) knjigu „Ministar i pokolj“ koja govori o prisilnim izručenjima britanskim zarobljenicima u drugom svjetskom ratu, radom je započela jedna privatna komisija. Začetak joj je bio da ispita okolnosti u kojima je u proljeće 1945. britanska vojska u okupiranoj Austriji sovjetskim te jugoslavenskim vlastima izručila više od 40.000 Kozaka i drugih izbjeglica iz SSSR što su se uglavnom borili na strani Nijemaca, te oko 26.000 izbjeglih ili zarobljenih Jugoslavena što su pripadali različitim protututovskim snagama. Četverogodišnji rad Komisije tada je okrunten izlaskom dvaju podebelih svezaka, koji su u nazočnosti velikog broja novinara, povjesničara i publicista ovih dana promovirani u Londonu. Riječ je o izvještaju koji je pritom ponovo uzbunio duhove, umjesto da ih smiri, kako je bila namjera njegovih sastavljača.

ČVRSTE ČINJENICE: Oslanjajući se na čvrste činjenice pisanih dokumenata, taj izvještaj kronološkim redom govori o posljednjim trenucima rata u okupiranoj Austriji. U prilogu su tiskani i faksimili dokumenata koje su članovi Komisije pronašli u britanskim i američkim državnim arhivima, zatim u zaostavštini Harolda Macmillana, te arhivima u Beogradu i Ljubljani. Članovi Komisije se bivši diplomati lord Brimelow, novinar i publicist Christopher Booker, te njezin predsjednik brigadni general Anthony Cowgill.

Najvažniji zaključak te tzv. Cowgillove komisije (samozvanog tijela budući da se nije radilo o službenoj istrazi) glasi

da Harold Macmillan, bivši britanski premijer, a u vrijeme rata ministar zadužen za zonu Sredozemlja, nije imao gotovo nikakva udjela u prisilnim izručenjima ukupno 70.000 Kozaka i Jugoslavena. Radilo se o njihovu slanju u gotovo sigurnu smrt, kako se pokazalo kasnije nakon masovnih likvidacija koje su nad deportiranim ratnim zarobljenicima upriličile i Crvena armija i pobjednička partizanska vojska. U izvještaju se kaže, da ta izručenja nisu bila dio Macmillanove zavjere (kakvu spominje Tolstoy), da se zarobljenike izručilo mimo i usprkos službenoj britanskoj politici 1945. Naprotiv, prisilne repatrijacije značile su ispravnu primjenu neugodne ali opravdane politike, dogovorene na najvišim britanskim instancama – zaključuje Cowgillova komisija.

Kozaci su tako bili izručeni sovjetskim snagama na temelju sporazuma potpisanog na Jalti – budući da su se Britanci nadali kako će na taj način osigurati i najbrže puštanje vlastitih ratnih zarobljenika iz logora u Istočnoj Evropi. Kao glavni razlog za deportaciju Jugoslavena, koji su se, biježeći pred partizanima, sklonili u Austriju (a to se saroliko društvo sastojalo od domobrana, ustaša, četnika, nedicevaca, ljotečevaca itd.) Cowgillov izvještaj navodi napetosti što su izbile između Titovih partizana i britanske vojske. Do krize je došlo kada je pri kraju rata maršal Tito pokušao osvojiti i zadržati dijelove južne Austrije i sjeverne Italije, stoji u izvještaju.

U takvim prilikama, Britanci su željeli očistiti palušu od zarobljenika, odnosno riješiti ih se, kako bi bili spremni za slučaj vojnog sukoba s dojučerašnjim saveznikom, partizanima. Na kraju, međutim, do tog sukoba koji je visio u zraku, nije ni došlo.

POKOLJA NIJE BILO? Jedna od zanimljivosti izvještaja jest i tvrdnja, kako se poznati „blaj-

burški pokolj“ partizana nad izbjeglicama iz Hrvatske nikada nije dogodio – barem ne unutar austrijskih granica na samom blajburškom polju (jednik „Danas“ prenosi u idućem broju prijevod izvotka koji o tome govori.)

Znatan dio citave priče o izručenjima poznat je i od ranije – no Cowgillova komisija inzistira da je sve teklo po dogovorenoj proceduri, da deportacije bilo Kozaka, bilo Jugoslavena nisu bile dio nikakve „zavjere“ Macmillana i viših oficira britanske vojske.

Biograf Harolda Macmillana Alistair Horne prisutan, prilikom promocije izvještaja, izjavio je, kako je niemu otkrpio jasno da britanski viši oficiri doista nisu organizirali izručenja na svoju ruku. No, on je potom postavio pitanje (koje je ostalo bez pravog odgovora) o tome – nije li moguće da su zapovjednici britanske vojske sklopili s Titom pogodbu u tom smislu, da se on sa svojim partizanima povuče iz spornih dijelova Austrije i Italije, a da mu Britanci izruče 26.000 Jugoslavena.

U verbalnoj bici koja se potom zamednula, neki od prisutnih, poput grofa Tolstoya, optužili su Komisiju da je u svojem radu bila pristrana, te da se radi o ljudima establišmenta, a ne o objektivnim sucima niti povjesničarima. Neki drže spornom i odluku Komisije da se koristi pretežno pisanim izvorima, a ne izjavama preživjelih svjedoka. S druge strane, nakon četiri godine rada, sastavljači „Cowgillova izvještaja“ otkrili su obilje novog materijala, sud o kojem tek trebaju izreći povjesničari. U međuvremenu, grof Tolstoy već piše novu knjigu, Christopher Booker (član Cowgillove komisije) uskoro objavljuje vlastiti prikaz toka spora, a BBC radi na dokumentarnoj emisiji. Ukratko, riječ je o konverzi koja i nakon 45 godina ne zamire.

JASNA ZANIĆ NARDINI

Prilog br. 27: Dio iz knjige Franci Strlea „Veliki finale na Koroškem“, Ljubljana 1976.

da bi jim privoščili ugodnosti ujetniškega taborišča na Vetrinjskem polju. Vendar pa o vrnjenih ustaših ni natančnih podatkov, zlasti ne o tistih, ki so jih Britanci v Jugoslavijo poslali z vlaki proti vzhodu, se pravi prek Pliberka in Dravogradu, kjer so jih prevzemale enote 3. jugoslovanske armade.

Zelo natančni podatki so ohranjeni o tistih ustaših in hrvatskih domobranih, ki so se vrnili v Jugoslavijo skozi karavanški predor in prek Jesenic. Enote 11. dalmatinske udarne brigade iz sestave motoriziranega odreda 4. armade so že 19. maja 1945 prevzele od Britancev 2.100 ustašev in domobranov. Naslednji dan, 20. maja, so od 9. britanskega korpusa iz Celovca dobile še tisoč ujetnikov hrvatske narodnosti. To pa je bil šele začetek.⁷⁰³

Iz taborišča na Vetrinjskem polju so prišli najprej na vrsto ljotičevci, o katerih so tudi Britanci dobro vedeli, da se po fašistični miselnosti v ničemer ne razlikujejo od nemških nacistov. Na tovornjakih so jih 24. maja 1945 odpeljali na postajo Sv. Helene. Ves čas so bili močno zastraženi: Britanci so jih spremljali z bajoneti na puškah, s pripravljenimi strojnimi v rokah in s tanki. Na prostoru pred železniško postajo so jim temeljito preiskali prtljago, nato so jih zaprli po 40 v vsak železniški živinski vagon, oficirji s podpolkovnikom Radoslavom Tatalovićem, komandantom operativne skupine Srbskega prostovoljnega korpusa,* ki so jo vojaško potolkle že enote 4. in 7. korpusa Jugoslovanske armade pri Čabru in Kočevski reki ter poslej ni pomenila nobene resne vojaške nevarnosti več, pa so dobili poseben potniški vagon. Ko je lokomotiva potegnila, so iz čakalnice skočili partizani, se povzpeli na vlak in najprej dobro zastražili zajete oficirje, ki so bili od presenečenja popolnoma prepadeni.⁷⁰⁴

S to prvo vlakovno pošiljko je odšel tudi domobranski pratež z dvajsetimi vozmi in štiridesetimi ljudmi. Odpeljali so se čez Celovec in Beljak proti Podrožci, očitno zaradi tega, ker so Britanci hoteli prikriti pravo smer. Druga pošiljka je šla 25. maja naravnost iz Vetrinja po Rožu v Področco.⁷⁰⁵

Po teh prvih dveh vlakovnih pošiljkah je prišel neki domačin povedat Francu Krenerju, da Angleži vračajo čet-

* To sta bila 3. in 4. polk, ki sta bila po porazih pri Čabru in Kočevski Reki dejansko v razsulu. Tatalović je moral ukazati umik proti Vrhniki pri Ljubljani, drugače bi mu bile enote popolnoma razpadle (Uroš Kostić »Trščanska operacija« v rokopisu).

Prilog br. 28: Dio knjige Milana Rake i Slavka Družijanića „Jedanaesta dalmatinska (biokovska) brigada“, Split 1987. koji se odnosi na događaje u Koruškoj krajem rata


MILAN RAKO
SLAVKO DRUŽIJANIĆ

JEDANAESTA DALMATINSKA (BIOKOVSKA) BRIGADA

INSTITUT
ZA HISTORIJU RADNIČKOG POKRETA DALMACIJE
SPLIT, 1987.

frontovima. Ubrzo je postignuta suglasnost i naša kolona je krenula u pravcu Bovca. Tom prilikom u Štab odreda došao je kao oficir za vezu pripadnik britanske specijalne jedinice, poručnik R. C. Lothead, student elektro-tehnike, Škotlandanin iz Glazgova. On će ostati pri Štabu odreda sve do povlačenja odreda iz Koruške.

Po dolasku u Bovec trebalo se s Britancima dogovoriti o daljem kretanju odreda. Naši su smatrali da je najpogodniji pravac za dalje kretanje naše kolone – pravac preko planinskog prijevoja Predel i dalje preko Trbiža u Korušku. Britanci se nisu složili s tim pravcem već su tražili da naš odred krene sa njima paralelno preko Vršiča, a njihova će jedinica prodirati preko Predela. Za naše motorizovane dijelove – tenkove, artiljeriju i pozadinske motodijelove postignuta je suglasnost da s obzirom na neprohodnost pravca preko Vršiča krenu preko Predela i da dalje nastave kretanje preko Trbiža ka Koruškoj.



Ovako je izgledao doček u svim naseljenim mjestima Slovenačkog primorja našoj vojsci

Kod procjene situacije o kretanju navedenim pravcima trebalo je imati u vidu, da su mostovi i dionice puteva na mnogim dijelovima puta prema Trbižu bili porušeni. Naše jedinice nisu raspolagale s potrebnim mostovnim materijalom s kojim bi brzo osposobile put za tenkove i artiljeriju, dok su saveznici raspolagali s tom opremom. Trebalo je i tu činjenicu imati u vidu u donošenju odluke o pravcu kretanja a i tražiti savezničku podršku, kako bi se što prije izbilo u Korušku.

Ovakvo rješenje odgovaralo je i odredu, jer je tako motorizovanim dijelovima (artiljerija i tenkovi) omogućeno da brže stignu na granicu Koruške, a isto

Odnos prema našim vlastima u Koroškoj nije trebalo posebno obrađivati jer je on od ranije poznat.

Pukovnik Boško Šiljegović tih dana neprekidno je angažiran na rješavanju niza pitanja koja je nametala situacija. Trebalo je regulirati odgovarajuće odnose s britanskom komandom 5. korpusa koja je ujedno komanda okupacione zone (komandant britanskog 5. korpusa je general Kaighley) Komanda ovog korpusa bila je smještena u jednoj vili na obali Vrbskog jezera. Razgovori oko razoružavanja neprijateljskih jedinica teku bez velikih natezanja. Međutim, najteži su razgovori oko podrške našoj vlasti na području Koroške, pošto u Celovcu i u Koroškoj djeluje istovremeno i austrijska vlast koja je u tim momentima pružetak stare vlasti. Istina, ponovo formirana ali od strane organa bivše Hitlerove uprave, jer su oni direktno prenijeli svoje ranije prerogative na njih. Saveznička okupaciona uprava više je okrenuta ka saradnji s ovom posljednjom. Britanski komandant u ličnom kontaktu sa Šiljegovićem obećava suradnju, no i pored toga izbijaju neprekidno sporovi između naših organa vlasti i Komande mjesta u Celovcu s organima britanske okupacione uprave. General Kaighley je u razgovoru vrlo ljubazan i uglađen, on pruža utisak čovjeka koji se pasionirano bavi filozofijom. U pukovniku Šiljegoviću našao je dobrog sugovornika. Njih dvojica vode razgovore i u šetnji kroz prostrano uređeni park vile na obali Vrbskog jezera.⁷⁴⁷⁾

Major Dubajić je i oficir za vezu kod Britanaca. On često odlazi kod njih i angažiran je na rješavanju niza poslova koje je data situacija svakodnevno namećala, od traženja goriva za naše tenkove (tenkovi su upotrebljavali visokootkanski benzin kojega se nije moglo tada naći u zaplijenjenim gorivima po njemačkim skladištima), suradnje oko hvatanja ratnih zločinaca (Pavelića i drugih) do suradnje na razoružavanju njemačkih kolona. Na Dubajićevo traženje Britanci su odredili jedan tenkovski bataljon kao pomoć u razoružavanju kolone koja je i dalje nastojala da se probije na pravcu Velikovec–Celovec. Komandant toga bataljona britanski major, perfektno je govorio srpskohrvatskim jezikom, pošto je prije rata živio u Boru u Srbiji, gdje mu je otac bio jedan od direktora u Borskom rudniku bakra. On je iskazivao sklonost prema našoj vojsci. Sa Dubajićem je često na pregovorima i britanski poručnik Lothead, koji je u našem štabu od Kobarida kao oficir za vezu iz savezničke vojske. Poručnik Lothead je pravi zagovornik teze naših pregovarača u britanskim komandama. U jednom od tih razgovora britanski komandant je prigovorio Dubajiću, da su naše jedinice zarobile kolonu Rusa iz Kozačkog korpusa u Jesenicama i da su poslije razoružanja puštene da odu slobodno u Austriju, a da oni Britanci imaju obavezu prema maršalu Tolbuhinu da sve zarobljenike iz ruskih i kozačkih jedinica, koje su bile u sastavu njemačke vojske predaju sovjetskim jedinicama. On je tom prilikom zatražio da se ubuduće sve takve zarobljenike preda njima a oni će ih izručiti Rusima.⁷⁴⁸⁾

Nakon dogovora o razoružanju kolone koja je nastupala prema Celovcu iz pravca Velikovca i intervencije britanskog tenkovskog bataljona njemačka kolona je otpočela s predajom naoružanja i opreme. Ogromna količina ratnog plijena odjednom se našla na cesti i uz cestu Velikovec–Celovec. Naše jedinice pristupile su istovremeno uz razoružanje i prikupljanju zaplijenjene ratne tehnika i materijala.

⁷⁴⁷⁾ Kazivanje B. Šiljegovića i Srećka Frajndliha (naš tumač, sada novinar »Vjesnika« u Zagrebu) autoru.

⁷⁴⁸⁾ Kazivanje S. Dubajića autoru 1983. godine.

SITUACIJA NAKON IZBIJANJA KORUŠKE GRUPE NA RIJEKU KRKU

Na frontu ispred jedinica 14. slovenačke divizije, 14. SS divizija »Galizien« već 10. maja prestala je pružati jači otpor, a brigade slovenačke divizije izbile su: »Šerčerjeva« u Velikovec, »Tomšičeva« u Sinča Vas i Pliberk, »Bračičeva« je krenula ka Borovlju, Koruški partizanski odred posjeo je položaje na liniji Borovlje–Kožentavra–Svetna Vas i po dubini željeznički i cestovni most na Dravi.



Doglavnik Mile Budak i posljednji predsjednik vlade tzv. NDH Nikola Mandić sa suradnicima u Področici 17. maja 1945.

U tim momentima na jugoslavenskom teritoriju nalazila se glavnina Löhro-ve armije, koja je još uvijek željela da se probije na austrijski teritorij te u tom pravcu poduzima odgovarajuće mjere. U toj situaciji naše jedinice u Koruškoj mogu očekivati pokušaje prodora ove velike neprijateljske grupacije i to na pravcima Dravograd–Pliberk–Celovec i Ljubljana–Tržič–Celovec.

Jedinice 5. britanskog korpusa krenule su iz Celovca prema Velikovcu i Pli-berku.

skih mostova do Celovca sutradan 13. maja. Idućeg dana u širi rajon Sent Jakoba stigla je i Kranjska grupa.

Željeznička pruga Jesenice–Področca bila je u ispravnom stanju. Trebalo je nju što prije osposobiti za saobraćaj (praktički to je bila u stvari samo dužina tunela ispod Karavanki). Organizirane željezničke organizacije nije bilo. Tog zadatka u Jesenicama prihvatio se zamjenik komandanta brigade kapetan Dominko Antunović. On je prije rata u toku služenja vojske bio u željezničkoj jedinici, pak je ponešto znao o željeznici. Potražio je željezničare, no videći da će izgubiti puno vremena odlučio se da sam pokrene lokomotivu i s njom je prošao kroz tunel. U međuvremenu prikupljeno je i željezničko osoblje i tako je proradio najkraći put iz Koruške prema Jesenicama i Ljubljani,⁷⁶⁸⁾ kuda će narednih dana dano-noćno proticati zaplijenjena ratna tehnika i zarobljenici iz Koruške prema Jesenicama i Ljubljani.

Sredinom dana 14. maja Kranjska grupa stigla je kompletna u Rožnu dolinu i razmjestila se na širem prostoru Sent Jakoba. Od tog momenta Motomehanizirani odred djeluje do daljega kao cjelina.

U toku ovog dana Motomehanizirani odred dobio je potrebne količine goriva kojeg je neprekidno depešama traži od Štaba 26. divizije. Da bi se razumjela problematika oko snabdijevanja odreda s gorivom potrebno je istaći neke od momenata koji su komplicirali djelovanje odreda uslijed nemogućnosti blagovremenog snabdijevanja gorivom. Uz motorna vozila kojima su raspolagale artiljerijske i tenkovska jedinica, odred je zarobio veliki broj njemačkih vozila i jednim brojem motorizirao svoju pješadiju, a kod Nijemaca su nađene zaplijenjene male količine goriva. Potrebno gorivo moglo je biti dotureno iz divizijskih i armijskih rezervi sa šireg prostora Trsta, cestom koja dolinom Soče vodi preko prijevoja Vršiča i Predela u Korušku ili u Kranjsku Goru. Vršički prijevoj je za vozila bio neprohodan pa se moralo orijentirati samo na Predelski prijevoj ili neki drugi cestovni pravac koji preko Udina izvodi u Korušku. Međutim, za ove prohodne puteve trebalo je tražiti odobrenje savezničke komande. Već 10. maja Štab 11. brigade svojom depešom obavještava Štab 26. divizije da je brigada ostala bez goriva i traži da se uputi pravcem Tolmin–Bovec–Trbiž–Kranjska Gora. Kako gorivo nije stizalo Štab brigade ponovo depešom od 12. maja traži od divizije da joj upute gorivo ranije navedenim pravcem i da se zatraži odobrenje od saveznika. I konačno prva količina goriva je doturena 14. maja.⁷⁶⁹⁾ S gorivom za kamione nekako je išlo, jer su pronađene minimalne količine za nužne potrebe. Međutim s gorivom za tenkove i blinde nije moglo biti rješenja ukoliko se ne dobije od Britanaca (visokooktanski benzin za tenkovske motore). Taj problem je uspješno riješio major Dubajić svojom intervencijom kod Britanaca tako što su Britanci dali benzin za tenkove iz svojih skladišta.⁷⁷⁰⁾

Iako je za sve jedinice njemačke oružane sile prestanak davanja otpora nastupio 9. maja u 01.00 sat, one na pojedinim pravcima još i dalje nastoje da se silom oružja probiju u Austriju i da se predaju savezničkim jedinicama. U tome se naročito ističu razne kvislinške jedinice sa teritorija Jugoslavije. General Löhr je iskoristio nedovoljnu budnost jedinice koja ga je držala u zarobljeništvu i krenuo u Korušku. Tom prilikom njegova 104. divizija obnovila je borbe sa 14. slovenačkom divizijom na prostoru između Črne i Pliberka. Ustaško-domobranske snage i četnici također ne polažu oružje već nastoje da se probiju prema zapadu na pravcu Slovengradec–Dravograd–Pliberk. I tu na desetak kilometara dalje u rajonu Dravskih mostova neprijatelj je do jučer pružao otpor.

768) Pismo D. Antunovića u arhivi autora.

769) Knjiga depeša 26. divizije.

770) Kazivanje S. Dubajića autoru 1983. godine i Omera Miroševića, tada pomoćnika vodnog delegata voda blindi tenkovskog bataljona.

Dakle, na prostoru gdje se još nalaze jedinice Grupe armija »E«, kao i kvislinške jedinice, situacija je još prilično nejasna. Iz istočnog pravca Karavanki moguće je očekivati prodor neprijateljskih grupa ili kolona ukoliko budu zaustavljene na pravcu Pliberk–Celovec, a pošto naše jedinice na tom pravcu spriječavaju prodor Löhrovoj armiji i kvislinzima to je izvjesnost da će pojedine neprijateljske kolone krenuti prema Dravskim mostovima kod Borovlja realna.

Polazeći od navedenih činjenica Stab odreda je donio odluku da idućeg dana prebaci jedinice na prostor Svetna Vas–Struga–Borovlje–Mostovi na Dravi dajući im zadatak da na tom prostoru sačekaju eventualne grupe neprijatelja koje bi se probile s istoka i da im ne dozvole dalji prodor prema Celovcu i Beljaku prisiljavajući ih na kapitulaciju.



Major Simo Dubajić i britanski oficir za vezu poručnik R. C. Lochead opuštenu u razgovoru – Koroška maj 1945.

Neprijateljski ratni plijen se i dalje prikuplja. Jedna četa 4. bataljona i dalje se nalazi u Trdnjoj Vasi, gdje je ostala prilikom povlačenja Koroške grupe u rajon Sent Jakoba.

Tokom 15. maja jedinice odreda prebačene su na navedeni prostor s tim da su dva bataljona posjela liniju Borovlje–Kožentavra (Prvi i Drugi bataljon), druga dva bataljona, artiljerija i tenkovi raspoređeni su po dubini rasporeda.

Povrijeđene borce u jučerašnjoj saobraćajnoj nesreći na traženje referenta saniteta brigade Branka Petkovića Britanci su primili u svoje sanitetske ustanove – tri teže povrijeđena borca smještena su u Beljaku, a ostalih 18 upućeno je u Udine.⁷⁷¹⁾

Nakon žestokih borbi u rajonu Dravograda, Slovenjgradeca, Poljane i Pliberka Nijemce i kvislinge jedinice naše 3. armije i 4. operativne zone prisilile su na kapitulaciju 15. maja. Jedan dio ustaško-domobranskih jedinica s tog prostora

771) Knjiga depeša 26. divizije u Arhivu VII.

nije se pomirio sa sudbinom predaje već je krenuo u probijanje kroz šumovite predjele sjevernih padina Karavanki s ciljem da se tim pravcem probiju u pravcu Celovca i Beljaka. Njihovo izbijanje pred naše položaje kod Borovlja moglo se očekivati za dva do tri dana.

Sutradan, komandant brigade depešom javlja Stabu 26. divizije: »... Što se tiče ratnog plijena, mi nemamo mogućnosti da se time bavimo, pošto imamo mnogo drugog posla u vezi razoružanja neprijateljske vojske koja nailazi na desetke hiljada.«⁷⁷² Navedena brojka »na desetke hiljada« sigurno je preuveličana, ali tih dana probijale su se daleko jače kolone neprijatelja, pa je razumljivo da su se takve brojke već bile nekako udomaćile u ocjenama naših jedinica. Iz navedenog sadržaja depeše lako je zaključiti da je to uvijek osnovna preokupacija našeg odreda, no i pored toga nastavlja se prikupljanje ratnog plijena, pri čemu Britanci vrlo često ometaju našim jedinicama da prikupljaju ratnu opremu, a posebno prave smetnje četi koja se nalazi u Trdnjoj Vasi. Iako se očekuje probijanje neprijateljskih grupa kroz Karavanke, u 16 sati Štab brigade je dobio depešu od Štaba 26. divizije u kojoj se kaže da je Štab 4. armije naredio da 11. brigada ostaje do daljeg u Koruškoj i da svoje dijelove sa sadašnjeg prostora prebaci u Celovec, kao i da sav zaplijenjeni materijal evakuira u pravcu Trsta.⁷⁷³

Štab 11. brigade pripremio je prebacivanje bataljona u Celovec i obavijestio depešom Štab divizije da 17. maja u 12 sati kreće u Celovec.⁷⁷⁴ Međutim, tok događaja u odnosima naše zemlje sa saveznicima koji su inzistirali da naše jedinice napuste Korušku izmijenit će ovu odluku. Naime, toga dana je britanski poslanik u Beogradu predao notu svoje vlade kojom se odbacuje zahtjev jugoslavenske vlade od 13. maja kao neprihvatljiv (13. maja je maršal Tito u pismu britanskom ambasadoru izrazio žaljenje, što od saveznika, osim Sovjetskog Saveza, nije do sada dobio odgovor za uspostavljanje jugoslavenske okupacione zone u Austriji prema noti Jugoslavije od 2. aprila) za britansku vladu, koja ostaje kod svog zahtjeva od 12. maja i traži da maršal Tito izda naređenje da se jedinice pod njegovom komandom smjesta povuku s teritorije Austrije na jugoslavensku stranu, podrazumijevajući granicu s Austrijom od 1937. godine.⁷⁷⁵

U Celovcu organi naše vlasti i političkih organizacija poduzimaju sve mjere na konsolidaciji političke situacije u Koruškoj. U toku dana (17. maja) u Celovcu je održana antifašistička konferencija koja je izabrala Pokrajinski narodnooslobodilački odbor za Korušku. U izboru je učestvovalo 280 delegata, od kojih je po 120 Austrijanaca i Slovenaca, iza čega je lako zaključiti da se je išlo na ravnopravnost pripadnika jedne i druge nacije. Za predsjednika je izabran dr Franče Petek. Konferencija je izglasala Deklaraciju kojom odbacuje nametnuti Landesregierung – vladu pronacističke obojenosti (vlada Koruške) i poziva narod na borbu protiv ostataka nacizma i priključenje Celovca Titovoj Jugoslaviji. Na kraju je upućeno pismo maršalu Titu i Prvom predsjedniku Slovenske vlade Borisu Kidriču.⁷⁷⁶

Prikupljanje ratnog plijena na cesti Borovlje–Celovec nastavlja se. Britanci s ovom djelatnošću nisu zadovoljni. Oni su 17. maja došli sa svojim tenkovima na prostoru neposredno sjeverno od Mostova na Dravi i direktnim gađanjem zapalili 8 zaplijenjenih njemačkih tenkova. Istovremeno su počeli praviti različite smetnje našim jedinicama na Dravskim mostovima.⁷⁷⁷

I pored toga što Britanci od vremena do vremena prave teškoće našim jedinicama, ali istovremeno ponekad izlaze na ruku zahtjevima naših komandi,

772) Isto.

773) Isto.

774) Isto.

775) Dr Dušan Biber, »Tito-Churchill«, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd i »Globus«, Zagreb, str. 553.

776) F. Strle, n. d., str. 375.

777) Operativni izvještaj 11. brigade od 1. VII 1945. g.

tako su pored ranije navedenih pružanja pomoći, danas saopćili da će našim jedinicama predati oko 32.000 ustaša i četnika.⁷⁷⁸⁾ Predaja će se obavljati u Podrošci svakog dana s tim da će dnevno izručiti 2.000 do 3.000 zarobljenika. Za ovu svrhu pukovnik Siljegović je odredio posebnu grupu vojnika iz 3. bataljona. Pred pad mraka Britanci su dovukli nekoliko članova ustaške vlade (grupu diplomata – kako su je oni nazivali), na čelu s njenim predsjednikom dr Nikolom Mandićem i doglavnica Milom Budakom i Ademagom Mešićem. S članovima vlade bio je i poveći broj ustaških vojnika i civilnih funkcionera. Pojedini od njih vodili su sobom i članove svoje porodice. Tako je s Budakom došla i njegova kćerka, koja je komandantu brigade Guvi saopćila želju da i ona stupi u partizansku vojsku kao borac. Ademaga Mešić s nakrivljenim čurakom na glavi u kojem su bili zlatnici izgovarao se kako je on stari đuturum i da ne može snositi nikakve odgovornosti. Mandić je pukovniku Siljegoviću iznio kako je bio zajedno s književnikom Petrom Kočićem u Bosansko-hercegovačkom saboru u doba Austrije.⁷⁷⁹⁾ Kod »diplomata« između ostaloga nađena su i lična Paveličeva odlikovanja, razni pokloni koje je on dobijao – pozlačeni pištolj, lovačka puška s vrijednim ukrasima i slično. Svaki od njih je imao izvjesnu količinu zlata, konvertibilne zapadne valute i drugih vrijednih predmeta. Idućeg dana ova grupa je prebačena vozom u Jesenice.

Štab brigade je 1đ. maja uputio 4. bataljon u Podrošcu sa zadatkom da osigurava širi prostor oko željezničke stanice uz istovremeno upućivanje jednog voda u Jesenice da tamo osigura prijem zarobljenika i materijala. Četa ovog bataljona je i dalje u Trdnjoj Vasi. U rajonu 3. bataljona kod sela Struge jedno odjeljenje britanskih vojnika s oficijom na čelu bacilo je pod cestu jednu blindu i tri protivavionska mitraljeza. U 13 sati Štab 26. divizije depešom traži da se general Löhrr uputi sa svojim štabom u Štab 4. armije. U 22 sata Guvo i Dubajić su odgovorili: »General Löhrr sa svojim štabom, osim dva generala, koji su pobjegli – upućeni u 3. armiju.⁷⁸⁰⁾

Izručenje ratnih zarobljenika – ustaša, domobrana i četnika nastavlja se po dogovoru.

Britanci i pored toga što predaju ratne zarobljenike i dalje čine smetnje. Tako su 19. V na željezničkoj stanici u Podrošci postavili na željezničke šine tenkove, kako bi omeli izvlačenje zaplijenjenog materijala u Jesenice. Ovo oni čine i pored ranijih protesta naših oficira u Štabu britanskog korpusa, kada je dobijeno obećanje da neće praviti slične smetnje.⁷⁸¹⁾

Radio-depešom poslat je izvještaj Štabu 26. divizije o brojnom stanju brigade ovog dana (19. V) i ono iznosi: po spisku 2.848 vojnika, od čega u Koruškoj na licu 2.105 i u rashodu 743 boraca.⁷⁸²⁾

Na neprekidno inzistiranje zapadnih saveznika o povlačenju naših jedinica iz Koruške, maršal Tito je 19. maja odgovarajući na notu britanske vlade od 17. maja, da je vlada DFJ izdala naredbu jedinicama Jugoslavenske armije da se povuku iz Koruške na predratnu graničnu liniju. Dalje se u odgovoru navodi da je tako udovoljeno savezničkim željama ne prejudicirajući konačno uređenje granica s Austrijom do kojeg će doći na mirovnoj konferenciji, te da prebacivanje jugoslavenskih trupa ovisi o prebacivanju ratnog plijena koji je pao u ruke naše vojske.⁷⁸³⁾

U 8.30 sati istog dana, kada je predata nota britanskoj vladi o povlačenju naših trupa iz Koruške stigla je u Štab odreda depeša Štaba 26. divizije, u kojoj je

778) Knjiga depeša 26. divizije u Arhivu VII.

779) Kazivanje: B. Siljegovića, I. Guve, S. Dubajića i drugih autora 1983. g.

780) Knjiga depeša 26. divizije u Arhivu VII.

781) Isto.

782) Isto.

783) D. Biber, n. d., str. 554

stajalo: »Naša vlada odlučila je da iz Koruške povuče naše trupe na staru granicu, s tim da se izvuče ratni materijal i zarobljenike, kao i da je dužnost komandanta 4. armije preuzeo general-lajtnant Peko Dapčević.«⁷⁸⁴⁾

Nakon ove depeše u Odredu su otpočele pripreme za povlačenje iz Koruške.

Očekivanje da će ustaške jedinice koje su odbile da krenu u zarobljeništvo krenuti sjevernim padinama Karavanki, danas, 20. maja ostvarilo se je. Ispred položaja našeg 1. bataljona u rajonu Borovlja pojavile su se ustaše – grupa jačine oko 40 vojnika. Komandir 1. čete Jerković krenuo je s četom prema njima. Brzo su se predali, ali su ujedno saopćili da dublje u šumi ima tri bojne ustaša. Jerković je o ovom obavijestio Stab bataljona. U Stabu bataljona je odlučeno da se krene prema ustašama i da se zatraži njihova predaja. K njima su krenuli komesar i pomoćnik komesara bataljona Kosta Ugrića i Vojtjeh Ostojić. Ustaški pregovarači su odbijali predaju, no kada se je ispred njih pojavila naša tenkofska jedinica vrlo brzo su pristali na razoružanje i predaju. Tom prilikom se predalo oko 4.500 ustaša i domobrana.⁷⁸⁵⁾ Dobijeni izvještaji tog dana od zarobljenika da

784) Knjiga depeša 26. divizije u Arhivu VII.

785) Pismo Koste Ugrića (u arhivi autora). O pregovorima i predaji ove ustaške grupe Kosta Ugrića u svom pismu za monografiju brigade piše: »Ustaše su se probijale kroz pošumljeni teren i našle na naš bataljon, koji je otvorio vatru. Nakon kratke pučnjave oni su stavili do znanja da žele pregovarati. Krenuli smo motociklom s prikolicom ja i Ostojić. Vozač je bio jedan mlađi Nijemac, zarobljenik. Došli smo pravo među ustaše. Ustaški komandant, kao i njegov cio stab bili su na konjima i tako smo vodili pregovore – oni u sedlu, mi u prikolici i na motoru.

Odmah sam upitao ustaškog komandanta da li će predati jedinicu, našto mi je on, kao tobože iznenađen, odgovorio:

– Zašto?

– Zato što su Nijemci odavno potpisali kapitulaciju – rekao sam.

– Poglavlak nije potpisao kapitulaciju. Hrvatska nije kapitulirala! – oštro je dodao ustaša.

– U tom slučaju morat ćete da se borite s nama.

– Mi ćemo se svakako probiti do Engleza.

– Englezi će vas predati nama – replicirao sam.

– Sta ste vi uostalom? – bahato je dodao ustaški komandant! – Vi ste obični engleski satelit. Ako se ne uspijemo probiti prema Celovcu, mi ćemo se probijati prema Trstu.

– Vi ste kompletno neobaviješteni. Trst smo mi zauzeli još 1. i 2. maja – odgovorio sam.

– Uostalom, ukoliko se predamo vama tko nam garantira da će s nama postupiti po međunarodnom pravu? – počeo je da okreće razgovor u drugom smjeru ustaški komandant.

Meni je svega bilo dosta. Pred nama su najozloglašeniji koljači koji su zvjerski ubijali žene, starije i djecu, i oni sada govore o međunarodnom pravu. Zato se nisam mogao uzdržati i oštro sam odgovorio:

– Vi dolazite iz Jugoslavije. Tamo i posljednje dijete zna da će biti kažnjeni ratni zločinci. Ukoliko ste ratni zločinac, nećete izbjeći kazni!

U tom trenutku ustaški komandant iznenađen ovakvim odgovorom povikao je gotovo životinjskim glasom:

– Što kažeš?

Ustaša je podigao prijeteci automat uperivši ga u nas. Ja sam tada dao znak šoferu da nas vrati natrag. Cijelo vrijeme smo se osvrтали da nam ustaša ne ispalii rafal na leđa.


Nakon toga sam pronašao Simu Dubajića i zatražio da na ustaše krenemo tenkovima. Iluzorno bi bilo ginuti u borbi s ovom brojnom grupom izdajnika i to, nekoliko dana nakon zvaničnog završetka rata. Simo je uz prigovor da tenkove ne treba upućivati u šumu ipak na kraju pristao. Popeli smo se na jedan tenk i cijelom četom krenuli na ustaše.

Međutim ustaše su bile jače, bar u tom trenutku, na riječima, nego na djelu. Predali su se a da pri tom nisu ispalili ni jedan metak. Očigledno, pojava tenkova učinila je svoje.

Sada je nastao problem kako ove koljače prebaciti u Jugoslaviju. Pošto su razoružani, ukrali smo ih u jednu željezničku kompoziciju. Međutim pred tunelom u Področici nastale su nove komplikacije. Na šinama se prepriječio britanski tenk, a kraj njega jedan britanski kapetan je uporno odbijao da propusti kompoziciju u Jugoslaviju. Uzaludno je bilo pozivanje na savezničke odnose. I sva diplomatska vještina Sime Dubajića kao da nije pomagala. Britanac je bi uporan. Simo se od jednom izgubio i nakon kratkog vremena imao sam priliku da vidim jednu od najkomičnijih scena na kraju rata. Pojavio se Simo i s njim nekoliko vojnika koji su se ugibali pod teretom jednog klavira, kojeg su nosili steškom mukom. Simo je naredio da se klavir stavi na tenk i tada je nastala upravo groteskna situacija. Britanski kapetan je bio zbunjen a vjerojatno i šarmiran ovim neobičnim prizorom. Sklonio je tenk s pruge. Tako je nekoliko stotina ustaša »zamijenjeno« za jedan klavir. Kompozicija je krenula kroz tunel s ustašama u Jugoslaviju.

još na tom pravcu ima u šumi oko 20.000 ustaško-domobranskih vojnika, koji sobom vode žene i djecu (depeša tog sadržaja poslana je Štabu divizije) pokazali su se kao neistiniti.⁷⁸⁶ Ustaško-domobranske grupe izbile su i ispred položaja 2. bataljona. S njima su započeti pregovori u 11.30 sati, a u 21 sat predalo se 14 ustaša i jedan njihov oficir.⁷⁸⁷

Od Britanaca je 21. maja preuzeto još oko 1.000 zarobljenika.⁷⁸⁸ Ustaško-domobranske grupe i dalje pristižu ispred Borovlja. U toku dana naš 2. bataljon prisilio je na predaju ukupno oko 300 ustaša.⁷⁸⁹



Komandant brigade Ivan Guvo predaje raport general-lajtnantu Petru Drapšinu

U toku dana izdata su naređenja o povlačenju naših jedinica preko predratne jugoslavensko-austrijske granice. Treći artiljerijski motorizirani divizion krenuo je u sastav svoje brigade u pravcu Gorice.⁷⁹⁰ Bataljoni su u rajonu Borovlja prekinuli kontakt sa zaostalim ustaškim grupama i krenuli u pravcu Šent Jakoba radi pripreme za odlazak preko stare granice. I u toku ovog dana nastavljena je evakuacija ratnog plijena a primljeni su ratni zarobljenici od saveznika prema ranijem dogovoru.

Izvršavajući borbene zadatke u zadnjim danima rata od Kranjske Gore do Celovca izgubili su živote borci: Miroslav Felenčič, Ivo Čović, Erich Marosche,

786) Knjiga depeša 26. divizije, Operativni izvještaj 11. brigade od 1. VII 1945. g.

787) Operativni dnevnik 2. bataljona.

788) Knjiga depeša 26. divizije u Arhivu VII.

789) Operativni dnevnik 2. bataljona,

790) Operativni dnevnik 3. motoriziranog divizona, Arhiv VII.

Stjepan Karlović, Ivan Kuzmanić, Drago Ribarević, Petar Sardelić i Hans Siegfried.

Naše jedinice 22. maja napuštaju Korušku. Štab 26. divizije depešom je naredio brigadi da krene u pravcu Tržiča (Monfalcone) i da se smjesti u Kostanjevicu na Krasu. Evakuacija ratnog plijena i prijem zarobljenika obavlja se kao i ranijih dana.

Tokom 23, 24. i 25. maja prebacivanje jedinica i ratnog plijena teklo je neprekidno, s tim što je u toku 24. i 25. maja u Področici 2. četa 2. bataljona obezbjeđivala preuzimanje ratnih zarobljenika od Britanaca. Ova četa je zadnjeg dana u rajonu Področice razoružala 100 ustaša i zaplijenila 130 pušaka, 10 šmajsera i 7 pištolja.⁷⁹¹⁾

Brigada vrši pripreme za odlazak u sastav svoje divizije, a 24. maja u 9.30 sati dobija depešu iz divizije po kojoj brigada privremeno za potrebe primopredaje zaplijenjenog materijala i zarobljenika ostavlja jedan bataljon u Jesenicama, a s ostalim dijelovima da krene u Kostanjevicu na Krasu. U Jesenice je stigla 1. brigada 16. vojvođanske divizije koja je od naše brigade trebala da preuzme njezinu dotadašnju ulogu. Međutim, u 12 sati depešom od Štaba divizije brigada je dobila naređenje da do daljeg ostaje u Jesenicama. Štabu brigade će nakon toga (27. maja) biti saopćeno da se brigada do daljnega stavlja na raspolaganje Ministarstvu narodne obrane DFJ.⁷⁹²⁾

Dana 25. maja iz Štaba brigade upućena je depeša Štabu 26. divizije u kojoj stoji da je za posljednjih sedam dana primljeno od Britanaca oko 15.000 ustaša, od kojih su 10 generala i 8 ministara, te oko 1200 četnika. I dalje se jedan dio nalazi u Področici gdje očekuju transport za Jesenice. U toku dana primljeno je još oko 1.500 ustaša koje su trebali biti predani 3. armiji.⁷⁹³⁾ Idućeg dana upućena je depeša o prijemu zarobljenika u kojoj se obavještava Štab 26. divizije da su primljeni pripadnici 2, 3. i 4. puka Srpskog dobrovoljačkog korpusa u jačini od 3.650 vojnika.⁷⁹⁴⁾

Sumirajući svoje i neprijateljske gubitke u vremenu od 3. do 23. maja, Štab 11. brigade u svom operativnom izvještaju od 1. jula 1945. godine iznosi:

Naši gubici bili su: 8 mrtvih i 12 ranjenih, a gubici neprijatelja iznosili su: 777 mrtvih vojnika i 2 oficira i zarobljenih 10.443 vojnika i 258 oficira.

Prema istom izvještaju za istaci su važnija materijalna dobra koja su pala u ruke naše armije i prebačena iz Koruške u Jesenice ili je zadržano u Jesenicama (željezničke kompozicije, oprema i naoružanje neprijateljskih jedinica razoružanih u Jesenicama), kao što su: 423 kamiona, 10 automobila, 2 tenka, 1 blinda, 11 lokomotiva, 331 željeznički vagon, 20 oklopnih vagona, 23 topa raznih kalibara, 5 minobacača kalibra 81 mm, 149 ručnih reaktivnih bacača, 69 protivavionskih topova, 234 mitraljeza, 325 automata, 5.400 pušaka, 21 vagon municije, velike količine drugog materijala – hrana, odjeća i obuća, inženjerska sredstva, sredstva veze, sanitetski materijal i sl.⁷⁹⁵⁾

U navedena zaplijenjena sredstva nisu ubrojena ona koja su zaplijenjena od strane ostalih jedinica Motomehaniziranog odreda, a isto tako nisu unešeni gubici u živoj sili tih jedinica, kao i ubijeni i zarobljeni neprijateljski vojnici, koje su te jedinice izvele.

Također u pregled zarobljenih neprijateljskih vojnika nisu unešeni podaci o broju ustaša, četnika, slovenačkih domobrana, koje su izručili Britanci.

Dolaskom svih jedinica u Jesenice, 25. maja brigada je izvela svečanu paradu povodom rođendana Vrhovnog komandanta maršala Tita.

791) Operativni dnevnik 2. bataljona.

792) Operativni dnevnik 11. dalmatinske brigade.

793) Knjiga depeša 26. divizije u Arhivu VII.

794) Isto

795) Operativni izvještaj 11. dalmatinske brigade od 1. VII 1945. g.

Prilog br. 29: Konferencije u Kairu i Teheranu 1943.
Diplomatski dokumenti, Međunarodni odnosi Sjedinjenih
američkih država, Washington 1961.

Foreign Relations
of the
United States
Diplomatic Papers

The Conferences
at Cairo and Tehran
1943



United States
Government Printing Office
Washington : 1961

(1) At least 50,000 and perhaps 100,000 of the German Commanding Staff must be physically liquidated.

(2) The victorious Allies must retain possession of the important strategic points in the world so that if Germany moved a muscle she could be rapidly stopped.

MANUAL STALIN added that similar strong points now in the hands of Japan should remain in the hands of the Allies.

THE PRESIDENT jokingly said that he would put the figure of the German Commanding Staff which should be executed at 49,000 or more.

THE PRIME MINISTER took strong exception to what he termed the cold blooded execution of soldiers who had fought for their country. He said that war criminals must pay for their crimes and individuals who had committed barbarous acts, and in accordance with the Moscow Document,* which he himself had written, they must stand trial at the places where the crimes were committed. He objected vigorously, however, to executions for political purposes.

MANUAL STALIN, during this part of the conversation, continuously referred to Mr. Churchill's secret liking for the Germans.

With reference to the occupation of bases and strong points in the vicinity of Germany and Japan, **THE PRESIDENT** said those bases must be held under trusteeship.

MANUAL STALIN agreed with the President.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that as far as Britain was concerned, they do not desire to acquire any new territory or bases, but intended to hold on to what they had. He said that nothing would be taken away from England without a war. He mentioned specifically, Singapore and Hong Kong. He said a portion of the British Empire might eventually be released but that this would be done entirely by Great Britain herself, in accordance with her own moral precepts. He said that Great Britain, if asked to do so, might occupy certain bases under trusteeship, provided others would help pay the cost of such occupation.

MANUAL STALIN replied that England had fought well in the war and he, personally, favored an increase in the British Empire, particularly the area around Gibraltar. He also suggested that Great Britain and the United States install more suitable government[s] in Spain and Portugal, since he was convinced that Franco was no friend of Great Britain or the United States. In reply to the Prime Minister's inquiry as to what territorial interests the Soviet Union had,

* Declaration of German Atrocities, November 1, 1943; *U.S. Code*, p. 13.

Prilog br. 30: Konferencije u Jalti i na Malti 1945.
Diplomatski dokumenti, Međunarodni odnosi Sjedinjenih
američkih država, Washington 1955.

Foreign Relations
of the
United States
Diplomatic Papers

The Conferences
at Malta and Yalta
1945



United States
Government Printing Office
Washington : 1955

NS-2014 SW/2-204: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1945—9 p. m.

18. Department is extremely anxious that in any discussion concerning the repatriation of American and Soviet prisoners of war and civilians that there be no connection between the return of Americans found in German prisoner of war and civilian internment camps on the one hand, and Soviet nationals found among German prisoners of war taken by the American forces on the other hand. ReEmbs 5053, December 29 and War's telegram November 29 to Military Mission.¹ Some difficulty has arisen here in the determination of claimants to Soviet nationality whom this Government is prepared to turn over to the Soviet authorities for return to the Soviet Union.

Among the persons found fighting with the German troops are a few with Slavic names who disclaim Soviet nationality. Over 1100 Soviet nationals found fighting with German troops were turned over to the Soviet authorities at a west coast port last week. A further report of the problems which have arisen in this connection will be sent to you for your information.

STETTINIUS
(E. A. P[litt])

¹ Neither printed.

NS-2014 SW/2-204

*Soviet Draft of an Agreement Regarding the Treatment of Soviet Citizens and British Subjects Liberated From the Germans*¹

SECRET

SOVIET DRAFT OF RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT

In reply to Embassy's note of December 11th,² People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs have the honour to state that Soviet Government are prepared to conclude an agreement concerning the principles governing the treatment of liberated Soviet and British prisoners of war, but they consider that such an agreement should extend also to Soviet citizens and British subjects interned and forcibly deported by the Germans. In addition it would be desirable somewhat to extend

¹ This undated copy was found among papers attached to the note of February 5, 1945, from Eden to Stettinius, *post* pp. 691-692. This draft was apparently presented to the British Embassy at Moscow on January 20, 1945. According to Deane (pp. 188-189) a similar draft for the repatriation of United States and Soviet citizens was submitted to him on January 19, 1945, and was forwarded by him for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower, and McNarney.

² No copy of this British note has been found in the Department's files.

*Memorandum of Conversation*¹

TOP SECRET

Subject; Examination of the Draft Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet and Allied Armies.²

EXAMINATION OF THE DRAFT RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY THE SOVIET AND ALLIED ARMIES

Preamble.

No comment.

Article I.

No comment.

Article II, paragraph 1.

Mr. Novikov requested that the words "undertake to follow all" be replaced by the words "at the same time take the necessary steps to implement."

Article II, paragraph 3.

Mr. Novikov requested that the words "notifying the competent Soviet or Allied authorities" be replaced by "effected as a rule by agreement or in any case only after notification to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities."

Article III.

Mr. Novikov said that he would prefer the text of Article III of the Soviet draft.³ This reads as follows:

"3. The competent British and Soviet authorities will supply liberated Soviet citizens and British subjects with food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the authorities at the other side at places agreed upon between the sides on the following basis:

"(a) Ex-prisoners of war shall be provided with all forms of supply (stores and food) on a basis laid down respectively for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers.

"(b) Civilians will be supplied on a basis laid down for privates.

"The parties will not mutually demand compensation for these or other services which their authorities may respectively supply to liberated Soviet citizens or British subjects."

It will be noticed that the Soviet draft makes no mention of UNRRA or other relief agencies and makes special provision of supplies to civilians.

¹ Authorship not indicated, but Page has stated that this memorandum was drafted by him (telegram from Paris, September 15, 1954, 740.5/9-1554).

² The draft under discussion was the draft approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on February 8, 1945 (*ante*, pp. 754-756).

³ *Ante*, pp. 418-418.

BILATERAL DOCUMENT

of title

*Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union Concerning Liberated Prisoners of War and Civilians*¹

AGREEMENT RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY FORCES OPERATING UNDER SOVIET COMMAND AND FORCES OPERATING UNDER UNITED STATES OF AMERICA COMMAND

The Government of the United States of America on the one hand and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other hand, wishing to make arrangements for the care and repatriation of United States citizens freed by forces operating under Soviet command and for Soviet citizens freed by forces operating under United States command, have agreed as follows:—

Article 1.

All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United States command and all United States citizens liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

United States and Soviet military authorities will respectively take the necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

Article 2.

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens of the other contracting party found by them, and will at the same time take the necessary steps to implement the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and United States repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access to the camps and points of concentration where their citizens are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are interned officers. The outside protection of and access to and from

¹ Released to the press by the Department of State March 8, 1946; printed as Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 505; also in 59 Stat. 1874.

the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be effected by agreement with the competent Soviet or United States authorities. The removal of camps and transfer of liberated citizens may, in exceptional circumstances, also be effected without preliminary agreement provided the competent authorities are immediately notified of such removal or transfer with a statement of the reasons. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

Article 3.

The competent United States and Soviet authorities will supply liberated citizens with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall, subject to the provisions of Article 8, be fixed on a basis for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers. The basis fixed for civilians shall as far as possible be the same as that fixed for privates.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens of the other contracting party.

Article 4.

Each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens held by the other contracting party.

Article 5.

Soviet and United States military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and United States authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

Prilog br. 31: Dio knjige „Kočevska - pusta in prazna“- Zamolčani grobovi


1

Množična prikrita grobišča

Čeprav se problematika prikritih grobišč¹⁰³⁰ ne navezuje neposredno na obravnavano temo v tej knjigi, je dejstvo, da so prikrita grobišča nasprotnikov partizanskega gibanja v Kočevskem Rogu zaznamovala Kočevsko in ji pustila zloglasen pečat. Dolga leta je Kočevski Rog s svojimi grobišči pomenil sinonim za poveljne množične pomore na Slovenskem – kljub dejstvu, da posamezna grobišča v njem širši javnosti niso bila poznana.

Po 5. maju 1945 se je okoli 10.000 do 12.000 pripadnikov slovenskih oboroženih formacij protipartizanskega tabora (Slovensko domobranstvo, Gorenjska samozaščita oziroma Gorenjsko domobranstvo in del Policijskega zbora v Ljubljani ter nekaj četnikov) umaknilo na avstrijsko Koroško. Spremljalo jih je okoli 6000 civilistov. Na Vetrinjskem polju južno od Celovca jih je razorožila in internirala britanska vojska. V tistem času je prek slovenskega ozemlja na Koroško prispelo tudi več tisoč hrvaških ustaških in domobranskih, srbskih in drugih vojakov ter civilistov in se v strahu pred Jugoslovansko armado in novimi oblastmi želelo predati zavezniškimi oblastem. Te so se odločile, da Jugoslovane, ki so služili nemškimi oboroženimi enotami, izročijo Jugoslovanski armadi ter da ne sprejmejo več novih enot z jugoslovanskega ozemlja. Med

¹⁰³⁰ Izrazi zamolčana grobišča, poveljna grobišča, fojbe ali zdaj najbolj uveljavljeni: prikrita grobišča, pomenijo grobišča, ki so posledica poveljnih množičnih in posamičnih izvensodnih usmrnitev v letih 1945 in 1946, pa tudi grobišča iz časa vojne, v katerih so posmrtni ostanki pripadnikov oboroženih formacij protipartizanskega tabora in civilistov. V širšem pomenu pa nam izraz prikrita grobišča pomeni vsa tista grobišča iz omenjenega obdobja, kjer so pokopani vojaki in civilisti, ki niso mogli, niso smeli imeti svojega groba. Osebe in skupine, ki jim je bila odvzeta osnovna človečanska pravica do posmrtnega obeležja. V politični, publicistični in deloma strokovni rabi se je za ta grobišča uveljavil izraz poveljna (množična) grobišča.



Škofjevi zavodi v Šentvidu pred 2. svetovno vojno (Muzej novejšje zgodovine Slovenije)

27. in 31. majem so vračali pripadnike slovenskega protipartizanskega tabora in civiliste. V celoti naj bi zavezniki vrnili skupaj s civilisti okoli 10.000 ljudi. V virih se sicer pojavljajo različne številke: od 8263 do 11.850. Hrvaške ustaše in domobrance so vrnili že prej, v času med 18. in 23. majem, pripadnike Srbskega dobrovoljskega korpusa in četnike pa med 24. in 27. majem. Po zavezniškem poročilu naj bi od 18. do 31. maja jugoslovanskim oblastem izročili 12.196 Hrvatov,¹⁰³¹ 8263 Slovencev, 5480 Srbov in 400 Črnogorcev.¹⁰³² Transporti vrnjenih so šli v dveh smereh. Britanske enote so domobrance in druge prepeljale do železniških postaj v Podgorju (Maria Elend) in Pliberk (Bleiburg), kjer so jih prevzeli pripadniki Jugoslovanske armade in prepeljali v Jugoslavijo; iz Podgorja čez Področico in Jesenice ter čez sprejemni taborišči v Radovljici in Kranju na škofjeloški grad in v Škofjeve zavode v Šentvidu nad Ljubljano, kjer je bilo osrednje taborišče. Iz Pliberka so jih odpeljali prek Dravograda do Slovenj Gradca, naprej pa peš ali z vlakom v taborišče Teharje. Zadnja transporta so tja pripeljali z vlakom prek Maribora.

¹⁰³¹ Primerjaj z ocenami vrnjenih iz posameznih taborišč, skupaj 24.600 v: John Ivan Prcela, Dražen Živić: *Hrvatski holokaust*, Zagreb 2001, str. 67–80.

¹⁰³² Anthony Cowgill, Thomas Brimelow in Christopher Booker: *The Repatriations from Austria in 1945. The Report of an Inquiry*, London 1990 in dopolnilni zvezek Cowgill Inquiry, *The Documentary Evidence*, London 1990, KP 309, str. 299.

XII. – Prikrita grobišča in zaprto območje Kočevska Reka

Ujetnike so po kratkih zaslišanjih razdelili v tri skupine: A, B in C (oziroma I, II, III). Verjetno so vsaj za Slovence sezname nato tudi primerjali s podatki, ki jih je OZNA zbrala v letih 1944 in 1945, ter opravili poizvedbe v domačih krajih. Tiste iz skupine C – bilo jih je največ – so kmalu umorili. Iz Šentvida so jih večji del prepeljali z vlakom do Kočevja in nato s kamioni do brezen v Kočevskem Rogu, s Teharij pa največ do rudniških razpok Starega Hrastnika. V skupini A so bili zlasti mladoletni domobranci starosti do osemnajst let, ki naj bi jih izpustili, vendar so bili tudi ti, kot pričajo viri, obsojeni na prisilno delo, nekatere pa so tudi odpeljali na morišča. V skupino B so uvrstili bolničarje, domobrance, stare od osemnajst do enaindvajset let, ter domobrance z manj kot letom dni vojaškega staža, predvsem tiste, ki so se domobrancem pridružili po 1. januarju 1945. Dobršen del te skupine so prav tako likvidirali, preostalim so sodila vojaška sodišča in jih večinoma obsodila na časovne kazni z zaplembo premoženja. Izbiranja med Hrvati in Srbi so potekala po nekoliko drugačnih merilih.

Tiste, ki so služili v nemški vojski, v oboroženih enotah pod njenim poveljstvom, ali so z njimi sodelovali in ostali v Sloveniji, so nove oblasti sredi maja pozvale, naj se prijavijo. Zaprli so jih in podvrženi so bili enakemu izboru kot v Šentvidu in Teharju, a z blažjim režimom. Iz zaporov so jih vodili na bližnja morišča. V taborišča je OZNA zaprla tudi velik del pripadnikov nemške manjšine in tiste Slovence, ki jih je sumila sodelovanja z okupatorji. Kogar niso izgnali ali izpustili, so usmrtili.¹⁰³³ V tistih majskih in junijskih dneh je bilo življenje vrnjenega domobranca in marsikaterega civilista bolj malo vredno in je bilo razvrščanje »na levo ali desno«, v smrt ali življenje, odvisno od osebne odločitve oznovskega oficirja, pa tudi od osebnih poznanstev in zamer iz časa pred vojno, med vojno in po njej. Pri tem je bila usoda posameznika odvisna tudi od tega, kakšno krivdo so pripisovali domobranski enoti, ki ji je ujetnik pripadal. Nekateri preživeli iz skupine C menijo, da pri izbiri niso imeli nobenega sistema in da so jih klicali preprosto po skupinskih seznamih, narejenih ob prihodu v taborišče. »Bil je čas, ko so si nekateri prisvojili oblast nad življenjem in smrtjo!«¹⁰³⁴

¹⁰³³ Več o tem glej Boris Mlakar: *Slovensko domobranstvo: 1943-1945. Ustanovitev, organizacija, idejno ozadje*, Ljubljana 2003, in v opombah navedeno literaturo; Tone Ferenc: *Povojne množične usmrtnice 1945-46*. V: *Enciklopedija Slovenije*, 16, Dodatek, Ljubljana 2002, str. 166, 167.

¹⁰³⁴ Iz govora predsednika DZ RS Franceta Cukjatiya ob pokopu posmrtnih ostankov iz zgornjebistriških zaklonišč, 30. 10. 2004.


**Prilog br. 32: Pronađeni predmeti slovenskih domobrana
pronađeni u grobištu pri Macesni gorici u Sloveniji**



Najdeni predmeti slovenskih domobrancev ob grobištu pod Macesnovo gorico; foto Mitja Ferenc, september 2004


Miroslav Medimorec: Izvršio sam zapovijed: odveo sam u smrt 900 Hrvata

Prilog br. 33: Šematska karta Austrije, sjeverne Italije i Jugoslavije s označenim rasporedom savezničkih snaga od 3. ukrajinskog fronta do američke i britanske 5. i 8. armije te sjedišta korpusa i divizija



Prilog br. 34: Šematska karta jugoistoka Europe s Austrijom u središtu, strelice označuju pravce nastupanja savezničkih snaga u posljednjim danima Drugoga svjetskog rata

Miroslav Međimorec: Izvršio sam zapovijed: odveo sam u smrt 900 Hrvata



Prilog br. 35: Dokument KP 206 od 27. svibnja 1945. (o povlačenju snaga JA iz Koruške)

KP 206 [PRO WO 170/4241]

Uprave 31

SECRET - Information on SOVIET NATIONALS

MIN 5 0028
4670
3 JUL 55

6 REPLY AND BY
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Copy to : HAN JÜRGEN AHN
HEIN EICHEN AHN

Ref conference on 21 May at MIN 5 0028 on transfer SOVIET NATIONALS. Various cases have recently been referred to this file in which doubt has been expressed as to whether the individuals concerned should be treated as SOVIET NATIONALS in so far as their return to the SOVIET UNION almost from 5 JULY is concerned. In these cases no further action will be taken until the SOVIET NATIONALS have been identified in this file. It will not be treated as SOVIET NATIONALS until further orders.

- Nothing will be treated as SOVIET NATIONALS :-
- (1) Any individual who is in our hands who, at the time of joining the SOVIET Army, was in the hands of the SOVIET Army, and who has been identified as such in the SOVIET NATIONALS file.
 - (2) Individuals who are in the hands of a Special Forces unit or team, the following directives will apply :-
 - (a) Any individual who is in our hands who, at the time of joining the SOVIET Army, was in the hands of the SOVIET Army, and who has been identified as such in the SOVIET NATIONALS file, will be treated as a SOVIET NATIONAL for the purpose of treatment.
 - (b) Any individual although a SOVIET blood who, prior to joining the SOVIET Army, was in the hands of a Special Forces unit, will not until further orders be treated as a SOVIET NATIONAL.
 - (c) In any case of doubt, the individual will be treated as a SOVIET NATIONAL.

File

KP 206
and
KP 207

KP 207 [PRO FO 371/48608]

<p>C</p>	<p>C 2858</p> <p>7 JUN 1945</p>
<p>1945</p>	<p>AUSTRIA</p>
<p>History IC 2858/147/3 Number FROM Mr. Beck-Geserte o Mr. Houbback.</p>	<p>Withdrawal of Yugoslavs from Klagenfurt. Transmittal copy of letter from Klagenfurt to the Ministry of War Affairs in Vienna regarding the attitude of Austrians in Klagenfurt since the departure of the Yugoslavs and in Carinthia.</p>
<p>Date 26th May, Received in Registry 7th June, 1945 C : Austria.</p>	<p>(Ministry)</p> <p><i>C 2858</i></p> <p><i>K.F. G. 1/1</i></p> <p><i>CR</i></p> <p><i>1945</i></p>
<p>Lost Paper. <i>C 2858</i></p>	<p>References.</p>
<p>(Print)</p>	

Prilog br. 36: Cowgillovo izvješće

of that agreement. On 22 May the G-5 conference at AFHQ also discussed named categories of dissident Yugoslavs, and representatives from both G-5 and G-1 at AFHQ took part in the conferences at Eighth Army on 26-27 May when the hand-overs of the Yugoslavs under existing arrangements were confirmed. 5 Corps sent daily sitreps up to Eighth Army confirming numbers and types of prisoners being handed over, throughout the period of the repatriation. Of particular significance, in addition, were the messages being sent on the full GHQ liaison net (Phantom) by the Phantom representative at 5 Corps (located after hostilities with G Intelligence 5 Corps) who flashed the major details of the Low-Ivonovitch agreement at **2320 hrs on 19 May** to Eighth Army and other commands concerned.

- (xi) **An official army enquiry instigated following the visit of Alexander to 5 Corps on 4-6 June resulted in a 'cover up' by 5 Corps to conceal from him the truth of what had happened;**

The 'army enquiry' which followed the visit of FM Alexander and Gen McCreery to 5 Corps on 4-6 June was conducted not by an AFHQ representative, as previously understood, but by a fairly junior liaison officer, Capt R Thompson, from Eighth Army. Although his report gave a generally reassuring picture in respect of both Cossacks and Yugoslavs, this was not a 'cover up'. In the case of the Cossacks it was made clear that 'incidents' had occurred, and that these were being further investigated. The chief eventual result of this was the 36 Infantry Brigade Report on 3 July which although it may have glossed over the attempts to 'segregate' ex-PoWs and Displaced Persons who were not Soviet citizens, in other respects gave a frank and disturbing account of what had happened. In the meantime Eighth Army's letter of 13 June made it clear that a complacent view was not taken of what happened, that mistakes had been made both in respect of the hand-overs of non-Soviet nationals and the use of force, and that such mistakes should not be repeated.

The LO's report on the Yugoslav hand-overs was rather more anodyne, but here it must be remembered from a British point of view the entire operation had gone smoothly, without any need for direct use of force by British troops. As we have discovered, 5 Corps did ask for reports from officers concerned in the events following the Bleiburg surrender. But the horrific consequences of the main Yugoslav hand-overs only began to unfold when the prisoners had reached Yugoslavia out of sight of their British escorts, and information on what subsequently took place was not to reach the British or the Americans until some time later.

It can certainly be argued that the AFHQ enquiry which followed Dr Krek's protest on 7 June did not produce a very full or

complete picture of what had happened. But it seems clear from FM Alexander's eventual reply to Kirk on 14 August (*he could not deal with the anti-Tito Yugoslavs as he would have liked*) that there were aspects of these repatriations which in other circumstances he would have preferred to avoid. And in general, despite a reluctance to go too fully into the less satisfactory aspects of what had happened, it is impossible to sustain the charge that there was a systematic attempt to deceive FM Alexander as to any aspect of the Yugoslav hand-overs.

- (xii) **In later years key signals and other documents were deliberately removed from official files to conceal what had happened.**

Tolstoy's final, constantly reiterated point is that over the years, indeed right up until the 1970's, key signals and other documents were deliberately removed from official files in a systematic effort to conceal what had happened in Austria in 1945, which is why these documents are now missing. It is true that some signals and documents **are** missing from British files, and in many cases we have only been able to find these from archives in Washington and elsewhere. But we have found no evidence whatever to indicate that the missing documents have been removed in any systematic attempt at concealment, or that they have been destroyed for any sinister reason. The weeding out of official archives to save space has been a routine process over the years, and it is singularly unfortunate that in this particular case documents which would have proved important and valuable have been unwittingly thrown away. Nevertheless the most significant documents which has been missing from British files, and which was only discovered in Washington (initially at Tolstoy's own instigation) subsequent to the publication of **The Minister and the Massacres**, is the 6 March letter from AFHQ defining a Soviet citizen. If anyone had reason to conceal what happened in Austria in 1945, this is the one document which should not have been destroyed, since it makes clear that, contrary to all conjecture, there was no specific instruction to screen out emigres. The same applies to the subsequent AFHQ letters of 7 March and 15 March on the same subject; and also to the notes on the AFHQ/Eighth Army conferences on 26-27 May which make clear that ultimately 5 Corps received full authorization both for the hand-overs themselves and for the methods by which it intended to carry them out. All these documents which refute the '*conspiracy*' theory **are** missing from British files, but were found in 1989 in the Kirk archives in Washington.

Four other specific cases of documents discovered in the course of our investigation are of particular interest :

- (i) On p 94 of **The Minister and the Massacres**, in the course of speculating on the decision not to hand over the Ukrainian

Prilog br. 37: Nikolai Tolstoy, „Damned by Macmillan’s own diary“, The Times, 27. studenoga 1990.

27 OCT 1990 *The Times* Nikolai Tolstoy accuses Cowgill of distortion over the forcible return of the Cossacks

Damned by Macmillan's own diary

Daniel Johnson's article "Macmillan: a vindication that came too late" (*The Times*, October 19) claims that publication of the Cowgill enquiry into the circumstances of the repatriation of Cossacks and Yugoslav citizens from Austria in 1945 proves irrefutably that my charges against the former prime minister were from the outset groundless. The case I presented, he alleges, was based solely on malice, and I should apologise accordingly. I am certainly prepared to apologise as abjectly as would be appropriate were I to be persuaded that the matter indeed stands as represented by Mr Johnson. However, I do not see that this is in any way the case, and will briefly explain why.

My principal charge against Macmillan is readily set out. Among the Cossacks repatriated by force or lies were several thousand Russian emigre soldiers and refugees who had been living in Western Europe since the revolution of 1917. The Soviets were desperate to lay their hands on the emigres, but Allied policy rigorously prohibited the repatriation of these people against their will. Though Macmillan was informed of their presence (through not of their precise numbers), he provided General Keightley, the British commander on the spot, with a "cease and desist" directive to deliver all Cossacks without discrimination to the Soviets.

dis honourable and inhuman actions out of sadism or bloody-mindedness? Or did Macmillan's "advice" adduce sufficient political considerations to persuade an able but intellectually limited commander to undertake actions no British officer would normally contemplate? The only reason provided by General Keightley at the time for sending the Cossacks to the Soviets rather than to the Americans was the "verbal directive from Macmillan to Corps Commander".

For reasons of space it is impossible to do more than indicate the direct evidence for Macmillan's complicity, while reminding readers of his extraordinarily evasiveness on the subject, both at the time and later. Though the "advice" or "verbal directive" to hand over all the Cossacks was the only recorded decision made during his conference with Keightley, Macmillan appears to have avoided mentioning it in his report to the Foreign Office two days later. After 1974 he repeatedly declined either to see me, or to avail himself of repeated opportunities to correct my writings before publication. Others, including his son Maurice, entertained similar obduracy. Yet if his involvement was as marginal or non-existent as Mr Johnson claims, he did not have much to say, publicly or privately. What is one to make of Macmillan's private admissions to his

biographer, Alistair Horne, when they are isolated from the surrounding passages of commentary? I may well have said "we'd better send them all back...Quite possibly we did send back the White Russians, by mistake... Save for the "by major part of what I allege?" I conclude with a passage taken from page 63 of the Cowgill enquiry, which conveniently illustrates both Macmillan's equivocal behaviour in 1945 and what I regard as the flawed arguments of his defenders today. Much of the enquiry's defence of Macmillan is based on his supposed openness at the time about his treatment of the Cossacks. Yet he was not candid. Only by inserting a sentence from Macmillan's private diary into a public document has the report managed to make this case. Let me explain.

Five days after his visit to Keightley, Macmillan reported to Mr Johnson may well be satisfied with this approach to historiography, but I can assure professional historians will share his opinion. I certainly do not feel inclined to do so, nor do I intend to follow the implications of his or Cowgill's contention, which implicitly seems to attribute responsibility for the monstrous failure of 1945 to the whole guiltless figure of Churchill. Alexander, McCreevy, Mark Clark, and other honourable and chivalrous statesmen and soldiers.

these grave problems were being resolved. One might think this piece of evidence an obstacle to the Cowgill report's argument in support of Macmillan's openness with his colleagues and superiors in everything to do with the handovers. But what do we find? After the words "these German forces" the report adds the sentence "We have decided to hand them over". There follows a vigorously argued paragraph claiming that this is strong evidence of Macmillan's candour towards his colleagues. "We have decided to hand them over" is nowhere to be found in the original document, and has been taken from Macmillan's private diary entry for May 13. Regrettably, this is not the sole occasion where the enquiry has oversteered its case on the basis of arguments that cannot be sustained by the evidence.

Mr Johnson may well be satisfied with this approach to historiography, but I can assure professional historians will share his opinion. I certainly do not feel inclined to do so, nor do I intend to follow the implications of his or Cowgill's contention, which implicitly seems to attribute responsibility for the monstrous failure of 1945 to the whole guiltless figure of Churchill. Alexander, McCreevy, Mark Clark, and other honourable and chivalrous statesmen and soldiers.

government's need to know how all was in accordance with government policy, and given the

Prilog br. 38: Stephan Ward „Inquiry clears Macmillan of „war crimes“, The Independent, 19. studenoga 1990.

THE INDEPENDENT

Friday 19 October 1990

Inquiry clears Macmillan of 'war crimes'

By Stephen Ward

THE CONCLUSIONS of a four-year investigation published yesterday cleared Harold Macmillan, the late Lord Stockton, of a conspiracy to defy British government policy in 1945 by sending 70,000 anti-communist Russians and Yugoslavs either to their deaths or to labour camps.

Lord Stockton, a former Prime Minister, was British Minister Resident in the Mediterranean area at the end of the war.

The report, by four individuals who financed their own research, describes the repatriations from Allied-occupied Austria as a correct implementation of an unpleasant but justifiable policy.

This derived largely from the Yalta Agreement, signed between the Allied powers and ratified by the British War Cabinet. Without that agreement, British prisoners of war liberated by Soviet forces would not have been freed.

The authors make no moral judgements. They publish a volume of facsimile documents they uncovered, and say people can now draw their own conclusions.

They did not consider oral testimony of surviving participants, except to "help them establish the context of a document".

Count Nikolai Tolstoy, the principal source of the allegations against Lord Stockton, questioned the authors' impartiality.

Brigadier Anthony Cowgill, the chairman, was an officer in Germany at the time, and later met some of the officers involved. He instigated the private inquiry in 1986 when Count Tolstoy's second book, *The Minister and the Massacre*, was published. Lord Brimelow was a second secretary in the Foreign Office at the time. Christopher Booker had written on the subject, and his sister, Serena, who died in 1982, worked on an official biography of Lord Stockton.

Count Tolstoy said: "We will never get to the bottom of this without professional historians being called in instead of people like these with an axe to grind."

The inquiry also cleared Lord Aldington, who was awarded £1.5m libel damages last year against Count Tolstoy and Nigel Watts over a pamphlet describing him as a war criminal.

The fourth member of the group, Brigadier Teddy Tryon-Wilson, was senior administrative officer of one of the units involved in the repatriations. He withdrew from the group when they came to write their conclusions.

■ *The Repatriations From Austria* will be published by Sinclair-Stevenson on 22 October. It costs £19.95, the documents £24.95.

Miroslav Međimorec: **Izvršio sam zapovijed: odveo sam u smrt 900 Hrvata**

