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The New Education and Virtual Humankind

Abstract

The author presents a new education project connected with Rawls' model of a well-ordered society. The most important element of this project is moral education. Modern liberalism (e.g. Th. Pangle) identifies moral education with civic education. The author finds this way of thinking about one's participation in social and political life rather interesting and needed. However, what does the anthropological foundation of these concepts look like? The very idea of human being – as a rational individual alone – is assumed as the subject of the process of education. The author tries to show that this idea is very close to the concept of human being one could call virtual.

Key words

education, virtual humankind, John Rawls, liberalism, moral education

The awareness of connection between the political order and the model of education has been present in philosophy since its birth, also becoming one of the major topics of political philosophy. Even today this connection evokes great interest and anxiety among philosophers despite the fact that pedagogy has long been isolated from philosophy and granted the status of a separate science, and despite the development of modern democracy and political institutions connected with it. Since the most expressive modern image of political order has been presented by the representatives of liberalism, I shall use modern liberalism as the base for reflection on the contemporary way of harmonising the norm and values of “the art of politics” and “the art of education”.

The debate connected with *The Theory of Justice* by John Rawls, which was first published in 1970, was the most important event within contemporary political philosophy. The language as well as the level of discourse proposed by Rawls has established a new canon of liberal thought, thus enlivening theoretically liberalism itself and enforcing a new definition of trends remaining in opposition to liberalism like, e.g., communitarism. Influenced by these debates, Rawls revised some of his ideas and developed them in his subsequent work, i.e., in *Political Liberalism*.¹ And it is this work that constitutes the basis of my considerations. I wish to stress, however, that I am not going to criticise Rawls' conception or argue its point. Rawls's system is exceptionally consistent logically and has an extremely dense conceptual structure. Thus, if its criticism and polemics were to be honest, they would require a comprehensive approach, preferably in the form of a competitive system. My design is much more modest. My goal here is to express certain

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John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, Columbia University Press, New York 1996

anxiety that I experienced while reading Rawls's work. My anxiety resulted from an attempt at reconstructing the model of education that, in my opinion, is implicitly included in the project of political order offered by Rawls. Or rather, it resulted from my trying to discover its anthropological assumptions.

It must also be stated at once that this kind of operation is beyond the theoretical frames determined by Rawls himself. In his programme he isolates his theory of justice from considerations of metaphysical or anthropological nature, recognising autonomy of political philosophy in this respect. He states that political philosophy, as he conceives it, is autonomous, because in order to characterise its basic concepts that are to serve "to express ourselves in it in our moral and political thought and action that suffices" to adopt certain normative system without reaching to its base, assumptions or foundations. This philosophical minimalism links Rawls with realism:

"We strive for the best we can attain within the scope the world allows."²

Also another eminent representative of liberal thought, Stephen Macedo, warns against transferring the criticism of liberalism to an excessively abstract level because, according to him, liberalism

"... is most directly a way of organising political life that stresses the importance of freedom, individual rights, law, limited government and public reasonableness."³

However, despite these warnings and declarations, the solutions offered by modern liberalism, including those discussed by Rawls in *Political Liberalism*, many a time evoke in the reader (or rather in some readers) the need for their deeper justification. Obviously, Rawls is prepared for this situation too. He honestly takes into account all readers' worries and needs of this kind, though he removes them beyond the boundaries of studies he conducts. To explain this, we must refer here to an extremely useful, not to say sophisticated, methodological solution that Rawls offers in *Political Liberalism*. Though it was developed for the needs of the theory of justice as fairness, mostly to determine the conditions necessary to enable its common acceptance, it can also be used in theoretical discussions.

Well, according to Rawls, the essential feature of a contemporary democratic society that is able to apply the idea of justice that he worked out is "reasonable pluralism". This means that it is a society in which various comprehensive doctrines, "all completely rational", are alive.⁴ Among those reasonable comprehensive doctrines Rawls includes, i.a., religions and ideologies as well as philosophies. Just because citizens promote various rational comprehensive doctrines of this kind, which shows their rationality, they are also able to achieve a consensus regarding the "political conception of justice". This, however, can be achieved only at the price of "putting aside the question how these comprehensive doctrines, being alive in the society, are connected with the content of the political conception of justice". In this way the consensus is not achieved in the process of harmonising those rational comprehensive doctrines, but through ignoring them. They are transferred behind the "veil of ignorance" which, in this way, becomes even tighter than it was in the *Theory of Justice*.⁵ Rawls hopes to achieve full political consensus as regards the idea of justice through minimisation of its scope and neutralisation of the procedure of achieving it. Taking this into consideration, we must also accept the fact that other than normative philosophical objections and doubts addressed at Rawls's theory

of justice are situated beyond it, that is, within the sphere of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines. I am full of admiration for this methodological solution that resembles to some extent Alexander the Great's cutting of the Gordian knot. However, since – as I have already stated – I am not going to argue with Rawls or criticise him, I do not mind my being situated beyond the theoretical sphere he determines. Considering the anthropological assumptions of the educational model that arises from Rawls's conception, I consciously remain within the reasonable comprehensive doctrine called traditionally understood philosophy.

After all these explanations, it is necessary to describe the outline of Rawls' conception of the new political order constructed as an idea accompanying his basic political concept, i.e., the idea of justice as fairness. In Rawls's words, this order is described as a “well-ordered society”. If a given society, i.e., “a just system of co-operation through generations” is to be recognised as a well-ordered society, it must satisfy the following conditions:

1. publicly recognised conception of justice: “everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same principles of justice”;
2. effective regulation of such conception of justice: “its basic structure – that is, its main political and social institutions and how they fit together as one system of co-operation – is publicly known, or with good reason believed, to satisfy these principles”;
3. effective sense of justice of the citizens: “its citizens have a normally effective sense of justice and so they generally comply with society's basic institutions, which they regard as just”.⁶

Again, I shall emphasise that according to Rawls' political liberalism in a well-ordered society the conception of justice that can be accepted by all citizens is limited to the “sphere of what is political”, and its value is just loosely connected with their views, religious beliefs or philosophy (reasonable comprehensive doctrines). It is so because the ultimate task of the idea of justice turns out to be limitation and correction of social processes. What is more, in a well-ordered society there is no room for this kind of utopian – in Rawls's opinion – view that all citizens accept the same comprehensive

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Ibid., p. 88.

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Stephen Macedo, *Liberal Virtues. Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990, p. 207

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Cf. J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, p. 36 ff. As Rawls himself claims, he owes this distinction between ordinary pluralism and “reasonable pluralism” to Joshua Cohen's work “Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus”, in: David Capp, Jean Hampton and John E. Roemer (eds.), *The Idea of Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 1993. Also in particular Lecture II, p. 58 ff

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It is important to remember that “the veil of ignorance” is a very specific theoretical construct, which, in the *Theory of Justice*, is to warrant to the parties of social contract a univocal choice of a definite theory of justice

as fairness in a definite original position. As Rawls states: “Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.” Among these specific contingencies he includes, i.a., position in the society, social background, natural dispositions and gifts, particular conceptions of good, life plans and psychological traits as well as membership in generation. All particular knowledge remains behind the veil of ignorance. Still, Rawls does not deprive the parties of social contract of general knowledge, e.g., that regarding the conception of good or essence of humanity. (Cf. John Rawls, *Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1995, pp. 136 ff.) As we can see, in *Political Liberalism* even the general knowledge is ousted behind the veil of ignorance.

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J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, pp. 35 ff

doctrine. They only publicly recognise the same conception of justice. The main idea of this conception of justice is the idea of society as a system of just co-operation complemented by the idea of well-ordered society and an idea of citizens as free and equal persons. We should also notice that Rawls does not want to link these ideas in any fixed and necessary way, claiming that the two latter ones merely “accompany” the idea of justice.

Let us now look what traits should mark the citizens able to generate a well-ordered society. Their rationality proves to be a necessary condition. The first two of the above mentioned conditions of a well-ordered society can be fulfilled only in this way. Only a rational citizen is able to understand the procedures of fundamental agreements and observe its conditions. It is also important for this construction to recognise that being a citizen is not a man’s function, role or dignity, concordant with his specific essence (like, e.g., in Aristotle). Similarly to Hobbes, Rawls refers here to the concept of person:

“In the present case the conception of the person is a moral conception, one that begins from our everyday conception of persons as the basic units of thought, deliberation, and responsibility, and adapted to a political conception of justice and not to a comprehensive doctrine. It is in effect a political conception of the person, and given the aims of justice as fairness, a conception suitable for the basis of democratic citizenship. As a normative conception, it is to be distinguished from an account of human nature given by natural science and social theory, and it has a different role in justice as fairness.”⁷

To characterise rationality that distinguishes citizens, Rawls uses two categories, which, in fact, were first distinguished by Kant, that is, the reasonable and the rational.⁸ However, the rational itself is not able to make citizens observe the principles of justice or, first of all, make them recognise the need of justice. Hence, Rawls endows them also with moral powers. This means that citizens are not merely “carriers of desires”, i.e., persons appropriately motivated to act, but they are also responsible for their choices and aims, tastes and preferences. It is the form and aims of these desires that can make social co-operation either more effective or impossible. It is obviously one of the most difficult problems of social and political philosophy, for we touch here the question of a proper model of such choices and preferences. Rawls tries to avoid considering this problem. However, recognising that being incapable of just social co-operation is pathology, he makes this very capacity for just co-operation a norm, and not merely an ethical one.⁹

Let us also notice that according to Rawls a citizen, being reasonable and rational, possesses two moral powers, namely: 1) the capacity for the sense of justice; and 2) the capacity for a conception of good. As we can see, in this case the already known to us division into the idea of justice and comprehensive doctrines is applied as well. The sense of justice makes us capable of a consensus regarding the political conception of justice. On the other hand, as regards the conception of good, it is shaped within our comprehensive doctrines. In this way Rawls gets rid of the classical debate of political philosophy, namely the debate regarding common good. What is more, he also separates the idea of good from the idea of justice.

As we remember, in Rawls’s conception the idea of citizen is complementary to the idea of society as a system of just co-operation through generations. To make this co-operation possible, the citizens must be free and equal persons. According to Rawls, the citizens’ freedom is conditioned by

their rationality and reasonableness. On the other hand, the citizens are equal, at least to the minimum, necessary extent, just because they possess moral powers. This connection between the citizens' rationality and moral powers is very important here. It is moral sensitivity characteristic of reasonableness that should determine the citizens' desires, and their desires are the basis of their activity. Hence Rawls devotes so much room to "moral psychology". It is very important, because if a well-ordered society is to be stable, not only should all citizens know and accept its principles, but, most of all, exercise them, that is, apply them in action. This means that the principles should regulate people's actions in their mutual relations (community, society, etc.). It is this very element that is essential to Rawls's conception of education, and particularly of moral education.

This characteristic of a citizen includes one more element important for the liberal and republican tradition. After Kant, we can describe it as a requirement of civility. The principle of legitimisation of democratic order adopted by Rawls requires that the ideal of citizenship binding for it imposes one more moral duty, namely, duty of civility. In Rawls's approach this means that citizens should be able to explain one another, taking into account basic issues,

"... how the principles of policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason. This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made."¹⁰

I hope that I managed to indicate in Rawls's conception those elements, which compose the picture of his political project, of his political liberalism. This project is drawn as a political image of a society that, thanks to common acceptance of the idea of justice and partly due to reasonable consensus, is able to build constitutional democracy. Thus, it is time to reconstruct the image of education that would be in accord with this political construction.

My concern here is with education understood as a process of upbringing and teaching. Upbringing means controlled shaping of various personality features, while teaching means transmitting definite knowledge and skills. With the passage of time, in modern states, both the contents of upbringing and teaching (though to a different extent and on different levels) have been subjected to the control of political institutions. Recording this trend in the development of education, classical liberalism recognised it mostly as a threat to individual freedom. This regarded particularly upbringing, i.e., moral education, which, according to, e.g., John Locke, should be first of all

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Ibid.

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For Rawls, rationality and reasonableness are two complementary ideas. Within the idea of just co-operation reasonableness and rationality are complementary ideas, but they cannot be connected with each other or infer one from another. They act as a couple and each of them is connected with a corresponding moral power: reasonableness with justice and rationality with the conception of good. (Cf. J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, pp. 48 ff.)

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Ibid., p. 184. – Within political liberalism, it is a norm binding for the model of a citizen. Though in the *Theory of Justice* this incapability of social co-operation, that Rawls identifies as the lack of the sense of justice, allowed for the statement that "one who lacks a sense of justice lacks certain fundamental attitudes and capacities included under the notion of humanity". (J. Rawls, *Theory of Justice*, p. 488)

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Cf. J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, p. 217

left to parents and remain in the private sphere.¹¹ As regards teaching, and especially professional teaching, Locke was ready to leave it to the state. In his opinion, however, when the political authority tries to assume the responsibility for the formation of the citizens' character, it reaches beyond the sphere of activity that is appropriate for it, namely, the public sphere. And trespassing the private sphere it threatens the fundamental individual rights to freedom and the individual's striving for happiness.

As regards Rawls, in the educational process he is first of all interested in the way of acquiring the competence necessary for the citizens to be able to participate in the political sphere:

"Society's concern with their education lies in their role as future citizens, and so in such essential things as their acquiring the capacity to understand the public culture and to participate in its institutions, in their being economically independent and self-supporting members of society over a complete life, and in their developing the political virtues, all this from within a political point of view."¹²

The latest reservation means that according to Rawls the goal of education should consist in preparing children for their becoming

"... fully co-operating members of society and self-dependent persons; it should also promote political virtues so that the children were willing to observe fair conditions of social co-operation in their relations with the rest of the society."¹³

Thus, the process of education should include elements like development of intellectual powers, transmission of knowledge and professional skills, as well as moral formation. Limited to this inventory, the contents of the discussed model of education do not include, as it seems, any new elements as compared to the model adopted today by democratic states. However, when Rawls speaks here of "society's concern", he makes it clear that this model of education cannot be imposed or forced by political authorities. It should emerge in effect of the citizens' actions taken in the public sphere, which, as we can remember, is distinguished by Rawls from the political sphere, constituting its background or, rather, base.

Again we can notice here the distinction that is noticeable on every level of a well-ordered society, i.e., the division into the political sphere (the sphere of common consensus regarding the idea of justice), and vast, comprehensive doctrines differing from one another. It should also be remembered that Rawls's distinction between the public sphere and the non-public one does not correspond with the traditional division into the public and private spheres, because it regards different areas of rationality and, according to Rawls, there is nothing like private reason.

In Rawls's conception, initial education including moral education remains in hands of the parents, and its shape is determined by their chosen comprehensive doctrines that also determine their lifestyle. Admitting that children's upbringing depends on their parents' lifestyles, Rawls refers to one of the most important elements of classical liberalism. Once more we shall quote here Stephen Macedo:

"Liberalism holds that reasonable persons properly pursue a wide variety of lifestyles, goals, projects, and commitments. Indeed, one of the great attractions of liberal politics and its view of man is that they liberate persons from inherited roles, fixed hierarchies and conventions that narrowly constrain individuality and the scope of choice. Liberal reasonableness must be broad enough to encompass variety: it must accommodate liberal diversity, public reasonableness, and critical reflection on personal roles and allegiances."¹⁴

However, a basic difficulty appears here. In what way can these diverse models of education rooted in different comprehensive doctrines, i.e. in different lifestyles and systems of values, and therefore connected with different conceptions of man, compose a common model of a citizen of a well-ordered society? While explaining this, we can reject the idea of the “invisible hand of the market” in advance as it does not take into account the idea of justice, and the conception of “prearranged harmony” since it issues from a very definite philosophical doctrine (Leibniz).

Let us notice here that as early as in the *Theory of Justice* Rawls offered the solution to this problem, which evokes comparisons with another great philosophical system, namely with the Plotinus’s theory of emanation. He admitted that the sense of justice as the goal of moral education couldn’t occur within us as a result of coercive indoctrination or psychological training. Rawls also rejected moral education conceived as simply a casual sequence, whose final result would be the occurrence of proper moral bonds. In this situation he suggests gradual, adjusted to the stage of education, adoption of the idea of justice on the basis of permanent contact with it:

“As far as possible each stage foreshadows in its teaching and explanations the conception of right and justice at which it aims and by reference to which we later recognise that moral standards presented to us are justified.”¹⁵

This emanative model of moral education was valid in the situation in which the parties of social contract were equipped with a certain amount of general knowledge, because it was only through reference to it that they could determine subsequent levels of the acquired knowledge and subsequent moral standards. However, when Rawls made his requirements regarding the original position of the parties of this contract more radical, rejecting also general knowledge, the problem occurred again. What is more, an additional difficulty arose, connected with Rawls’s political liberalism understood as general knowledge, its place and function in moral education and in political education in general.

As Rawls himself noticed, it is mostly the area of education that houses the danger of transforming political liberalism into one of the numerous comprehensive doctrines striving to rule over the greater part of life or even the complete life (as he claims to be the case in Kant’s or Locke’s liberalism). It might be, as Rawls regretfully admits, a certain “unavoidable consequence of reasonable requirements regarding children’s education”. However, in Rawls’s opinion, political liberalism does not strive to encompass all life. Its goal is different and its requirements much smaller.

“I will ask that children’s education include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights, so that, for example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society

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Cf. John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, in: *The Harvard Classics*, Vol. XXXVII, Part I, P. F. Collier & Son, New York 1909–14

12
J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, p. 200

13
Ibid., p. 199

14
S. Macedo, *Liberal Virtues*, p. 207

15
J. Rawls, *Theory of Justice*, p. 515. As regards the importance of moral education for political education: cf. Thomas L. Pangle, *The Ennobling of Democracy. The Challenge of Post-modern Era*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1992, particularly part IV.

and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to insure that their continued membership when they come of age is not based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or fear of punishment for offences that do not exist.”¹⁶

Again it turns out that political liberalism itself does not offer any definite model of education. It only addresses certain demands at public education and its different forms, so that it is able to educate proper citizens. Also, as it becomes liberalism, the formulation of these demands cannot be hard nor have the nature of command. Rawls advocates soft solutions. This is why he suggests that the “idea of justice as fairness” itself can perform this unifying role in the political sphere, allowing for organisation of different conceptions of education so that they can serve stability of a well-ordered society. For he is convinced that a proper political idea is also equipped with educational function:

“Thus, the account of justice as fairness connects the desire to realise a political ideal of citizens’ two moral powers and their normal capacities, as these are educated to the ideal by the public culture and its historical traditions of interpretation. This illustrates the wide role of a political conception as educator.”¹⁷

It is thanks to this identification of the image of political order with the order of education that we can find in Rawls this “new model of education” I heralded in the title of this work.¹⁸

If we now put together all these diverse elements of Rawls’s political construction, it will turn out that a well-ordered society, in effect of respecting the idea of justice as fairness, creates a pattern that determines possible forms of social and political activity. The model of a citizen and person also issues from it. And this is why it can also perform educational function for the citizens, preferring definite actions and personality models. This kind of statement, exposing or even overexposing certain fragments of Rawls’ reasoning still remains within its range. As I have already mentioned, I want to discern here also what model of a man can be fitted in this model of education and what are its anthropological assumptions. This kind of question, however, makes it necessary to transcend the theoretical range determined by Rawls while constructing political liberalism.

Thus, consciously placing myself beyond this construction I can look from a new angle at the original position, fundamental for acceptance of the idea of justice. I appreciate novelty and theoretical elegance of the solution adopted by Rawls. Instead of arduously searching for common points of view and areas for possible compromise, he undertakes an individual action consisting in rejection of all differences that could make this original compromise difficult. Therefore, in order to become parties in this original contract regarding the idea of justice, men have to be able to reduce themselves to mere “parties” of this contract. This means that they must reduce to the extreme not only their knowledge, but also themselves, their individuality and uniqueness. Looking from the outside we can perceive the veil of ignorance merely as a shadow theatre. Is it possible, however, that a contract made between shadows can preserve its validity also for the owners of the shadows? It is not by chance that Rawls denies autonomy to the parties of the contract, connecting it with the whole political sphere. This is why I am also worried by the new conception of political education offered by Rawls. For me it seems like programming an individual rather than educating him. It is so even if Rawls selects a very noble programming language,

the language of justice, and even if the programming itself is limited to defining the original position behind the veil of ignorance.

Accordingly with the rules of the language that Rawls uses, a citizen in the political sphere, if he is to be always ready for actualisation of the original contract, i.e., if he is to retire again behind the veil of ignorance, seems to me “a man with no characteristics”. He should, first of all, control himself, be able to self-reduce his individuality, be polite in relations with other, identical persons and, last but not least, be rational. Therefore, we must realise that programming will always result with a virtual person. It will always be a man who is distinctly idealised, not through his perfection or outstanding personality, but rather through his ordinariness achieved on the basis of some statistical mean. That the educational product of political liberalism is not a rich diversity of lifestyles but rather a mediocre commonness of a virtual man is practically manifested today by the model of “political correctness” observed in certain spheres and places. Programmatic rejection of a definite system of values and strict philosophical assumptions becomes the basis for justification of ethical shallowness as well as formlessness of mass democracy.

I must again stress that the above doubts and objections to the Rawls’s conception and the model of education connected with it come from beyond his own system. They also result from my attachment to another model of education. It is a model in which, contrary to Rawls’s views, one consciously makes his original choices and the goals of education remain in the undetermined perspective of the future. For, like Kant, I am convinced that stabilisation of an already achieved political state of things, even if it is recognised as perfect, is not the proper dimension of education. Education is always directed at the future. And in regard to the future our knowledge can be merely approximate. This is why Kant placed his project of education in a more general perspective of philosophy of history. According to it one can only cherish a justified hope for constant improvement of humankind. This regards also its political dimension, namely the idea of global republic warranting permanent world peace.

According to this model, education itself is a process that consists in evoking changes inside a human being and stimulating his creative efforts in this direction. And this can only be achieved through influence of other human beings, paragons (educators) and not through simulation of an ideal form of a society that will program such changes within him. The situation that I described as programming Kant would probably perceive as conditioning, which he recognised as incompatible with the idea of education. According to him, education should first of all teach a child to think, i.e., it should lead a child to the principles that give an impulse to action and not impose the form of this action.

Knowing how much Rawls respects Kant, I can assume with high probability that he would accept these remarks, a least some of them, referring them,

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J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, p. 199

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Ibid., p. 86

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I would like to stress here that referring to the conception of “new education” does not

mean that I refer to any definite historical form of education, e.g., the reform of education introduced in America by Benjamin Franklin, which is often given this name. Neither shall I discuss here the conception of education connected with post-modernism commonly criticised as the new model.

however, to the area of a comprehensive doctrine, i.e., to the area of philosophy. Yet, I do not expect that he could manage to cope in this simple way with Kant's thought that I am going to quote at the end of this paper. In a way it shakes the fundamental intention of the conception of political liberalism, in which the model of education is understood as a consequence of the political model (even if they are identical). Namely, it shows that we will only be able to determine a proper political model when we find the proper model of education:

“Vielleicht daß die Erziehung immer besser werden und daß jedes folgende Generation einen Schritt näher thun wird zur Vervollkommnung der Menschheit; denn hinter der Education steckt das große Geheimniß der Vollkommenheit der menschlichen Natur.”¹⁹

Barbara Anna Markiewicz

Neue Erziehung und virtuelle Menschheit

Zusammenfassung

Die Autorin stellt ein neues Erziehungsprojekt vor, das mit Rawls' Modell der vernünftig eingerichteten Gesellschaft in Zusammenhang steht. Das wichtigste Element dieses Projektes ist die moralische Erziehung. Der moderne Liberalismus (z.B. Th. Pangle) setzt die moralische Erziehung mit der bürgerlichen Erziehung gleich. Diese Auffassung der Teilnahme am sozialen und politischen Leben findet die Autorin interessant und notwendig. Doch wie ist es um die anthropologische Fundiertheit dieser Begriffe bestellt? Die Idee des menschlichen Wesens – als eines rationalen Individuums – setzt dieses als ein Subjekt des Erziehungsprozesses voraus. Die Autorin versucht zu zeigen, dass diese Idee dem Konzept des menschlichen Wesens, das als virtuell bezeichnet werden könnte, sehr nahe kommt.

Schlüsselwörter

Erziehung, virtuelle Menschheit, John Rawls, Liberalismus, moralische Erziehung

Barbara Anna Markiewicz

La nouvelle éducation et les êtres humains virtuels

Sommaire

L'auteur présente un nouveau projet éducatif rattaché au modèle de société bien ordonnée de Rawls. L'élément le plus important de ce projet est l'éducation morale. Le libéralisme moderne (par exemple Th. Pangle) assimile l'éducation morale à l'instruction civique. L'auteur trouve que cette manière de concevoir la participation individuelle à la vie sociale et politique est intéressante et utile. Cependant, quelle forme le fondement anthropologique de ces conceptions revêt-il? L'idée même de l'être humain – exclusivement en tant qu'individu doué de raison – y est prise pour sujet du processus éducationnel. L'auteur essaie de montrer que cette idée est très proche du concept de l'être humain que l'on pourrait qualifier de virtuel.

Mots clés

éducation, l'être humain, John Rawls, libéralisme, l'éducation morale

19

Immanuel Kant, *Über Pädagogik*, in: *Kants Werke*, Akademie-Textausgabe, Walter de Gruyter & co., Berlin 1968, p. 446