

Scanning EUFOR – Operation ALTHEA and a possible Croatia's role in it

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The purpose of this paper is to provide analysis of the capabilities and the overall path that European Union Forces (EUFOR) have undertaken in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). To do so we will look at the goals of EUFOR, its composition, its funding and actions during the past period. Using those findings we will then be able to assess whether or not EUFOR is on a path to success or failure and finally determine if it is in Croatia's interest to take part in the EU's crisis mission in BiH.

Key words:

1. Introduction

En route to negotiations between Yugoslavia and its soon-to-break-away constituent Slovenia, in May 1991, Luxembourg's Foreign Minister and momentary President of the Council of EU, Jacques Poos, with a profound sense of European identity and power, prophetically stated "*The hour of Europe has dawned*"¹. For him, and many other European politicians, the impending implosion of Yugoslavia was going to be the opportunity to show the world that the EU was a verified global player, capable of not only taking care of the Balkans in a solidified, coherent and strategic European approach but also one in no way led by the USA, as Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission in 1991, put it – "*We do not interfere in American affairs, so we hope they will have enough respect not to interfere*

in ours."² In the very beginning these statements even made some sense because the war in Slovenia successfully ended through negotiations in very short period of time, but the real problems were just beginning however, and to this day, it is hard to fathom how catastrophically short these same words would fall in a few short months.

Acting through the UN authorized peace-keeping mission that resembled *swimming with bound hand and feet*, European nations along with the rest of the world sat back and watched as one Bosnian Serb aggression after another, followed by Croat and Bosniak counterattack after counterattack, led to over 200 000 killed with approximately two million displaced persons in the region. In the end, it took three years of killings for the UN and the EU to act, but this time under the auspices of NATO, and under the plan and will of the USA. Although no international ground troops were committed to stop the Serb aggression, continuous bombing of their positions along

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with the offensive of the Croatian army, brought the leaders from Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb to the negotiations table in Dayton (Ohio). Once again, under the decisive leadership and flexibility of the US negotiations team, the Dayton Peace Agreement was argued, agreed upon and initiated. Meanwhile, the most substantial EU contribution during the Dayton peace process was *insisting* that the official signing of the peace treaty should be done in Paris – an act to save face, rather than to end the war.

NATO would remain in BiH for the next nine years³, this time using both ground forces as well as its air superiority, to make sure each entity in Bosnia implemented the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord – the de-escalation, demilitarization and disarmament of their armed forces and civilian population as well as the repatriation of the displaced persons, whether they were Croats, Bosniaks or Serbs. NATO's first task force, named the Implementation Force (IFOR), was charged with the task aforementioned and became operational on 20 December 1995 with over sixty thousand American, European and Russian troops. Nevertheless, IFOR's Operation *Joint Endeavour* was heavily restricted in its actions. Stringent parameters and rules of engagements practically eliminated the adjective portion from the phrase *decisive action*.

"At one point, during the first year of Joint Endeavour, Bosnian Serb politicians and nationalists encouraged those Bosnian Serbs living in Sarajevo and other parts of the BiH Federation held territories to destroy their property and relocate to Republika Srpska. Hundreds of homes were subsequently set ablaze, often destroying entire apartment complexes rather than just the individual home, and when some Serbs wanted to stay, nationalists thugs would do the work for them, forcing people to leave. Throughout it all however, IFOR was not able to arrest any individual unless its own forces were directly endangered, and through other similar loop holes, implementation of Dayton was to take much longer than a year."⁴

The subsequent task force, known as the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), took over where IFOR left off and began Operation *Joint Guardian/Operation Joint Forge* on 20 December 1996.⁵

At the Istanbul Summit on 28 June 2004, NATO expressed its intention to pull out of BiH by the beginning of December.⁶ Over those eight years of its operation, SFOR's mission was, like IFOR's, summed up in the provisions of the General Framework Agreement, working towards a stable, secure and independent BiH. SFOR's actions must surely be applauded for keeping the peace for an additional

eight years, however, a report filed by the International Commission on the Balkans just five months after SFOR left BiH, emphasized the reality of the precarious situation Bosnia still found itself in, stating:

"The region is as close to failure as it is to success. For the moment, the wars are over but the smell of violence still hangs heavy in the air. The region's profile is bleak - a mixture of weak states and international protectorates, where Europe has stationed almost half of its deployable forces. Economic growth in these territories is low or non-existent; unemployment is high; corruption is pervasive; and the public is pessimistic and distrustful towards its nascent democratic institutions."⁷

Fixing the remaining, and increasingly complicated political, economic and military problems (i.e., integrating the entities' militaries and police forces under national ministries, curbing corruption, fighting widespread unemployment, and attracting foreign investment) would once again *fall onto the willing shoulders of the EU*, bringing the historically painful words of Jacques Poos and Jacques Delors to the forefront once again.

The European book entitled "*Taking care of our own affairs*" was once again opened and added to on 21 June 2003. Addressing all EU Member states and nations from the region, Romano Prodi⁸ irrevocably declared at the Thessaloniki Summit that Europe's unification will not be complete until the countries from the region are members of the Union, and added that the EC is ready to *pull out all stops* to implement this agenda.⁹

Two United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) cemented this declaration before the *world's most global body*: on 9 July 2004 UNSCR 1551 welcomed the EU's intention to launch its mission in BiH, and on 22 November 2004 UNSCR 1575 authorised the EU mission to proceed and in particular its military component, EUFOR, to proceed that December. With the arrival of EUFOR on 2 December 2004, the EU has for the most part assumed complete authority and responsibility for BiH. The plan was for the military component, EUFOR, to work in conjunction with Office of High Representative (OHR), the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in an interoperative capacity not possible during past UN and NATO-led missions. The EU *took Jacques Poos words* to a com-

pletely new level, this time truly internalising the problems in the country and in a certain sense in the region. Though that was the plan, the question we have yet to answer is "How does, and how successfully has, EUFOR contributed to the stabilising of the BiH?"

2. The Mission

The most important thing to recognize about the objectives of EUFOR is that they originate and concentrate on political goals. Its guiding framework is based on the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) – Annexes 1-A and 2, the 2003 Feasibility Study conducted by an appointed EU commission, and OHR's annual Mission Implementation Plan. Not only are EUFOR's operations organised in regard to these documents and in promoting OHR's intent, but its exit strategy is based on building efficient state level structures and on whether or not BiH "is a stable, viable, peaceful and multiethnic...irreversibly on track towards EU membership"¹⁰ EUFOR's mission in BiH is thus divided into three groupings – short-term, medium-term and long-term political objectives.

In the short term, EUFOR's first and potentially most disastrous challenge was to ensure that it did not permit BiH's security to slip simply because of the transition scheduled on 2 December 2004. Its second task was to make sure that the Stabilisation and Association Process and the Mission Implementation Plan reinforce each other. In the medium term, EUFOR's goals were to turn over more and more ownership of peace implementation to BiH authorities while at the same time contributing to a secure situation within the country, to allow political and economic reforms to take place. Finally, the long term objective is the condition aforementioned - ...*irreversibly on the track...* that determines the *end of state* mission for EUFOR.

The key military tasks associated with accomplishing these tasks are:

- * Providing a robust presence to deter lingering militant extremists, to monitor the population and entity armed forces, and therefore to prevent a resumption of violence;
- * Ensuring security and freedom of movement for all political and economic EU actors;
- * Conducting information operations for political objectives;
- * Managing lingering aspects of the GFAP, including airspace management, advice on de-mining and ordnance disposal and weapon collection programmes.¹¹

The key supporting tasks also illustrate the importance of the political mandate since these tasks further illustrate that EUFOR is simply another tool at the disposal of international and domestic organisations within the BiH. The four key supporting tasks were:

- * Supporting civil crisis teams regarding counter-terrorism, the fight against organised crime and strengthening the rule of law;
- * Assisting BiH authorities with technical and military advice specifically in defence reform and other areas of security;
- * Supporting the ICTY and BiH authorities to look for and detain the indicted;
- * In an unforeseen case of dire circumstances, evacuating IC officials in BiH.¹²

Thus, while the EUFOR does have clear military tasks, it is geared toward subjective political and social goals rather than to the more tangible goals of *eliminating the enemy*. The enemy in this case is general corruption, criminal activity, ethnic animosity, as well as economic and institutional weakness and political discord, and as a result EUFOR is a part of a highly complicated, politically sensitive mission which requires completely different things from its troops than their traditional basic training of *point and shoot*. Multinational Task Force Northwest commander, Brigadier Ian Liles puts it the best:

"In conducting these tasks, anti smuggling operations among others, and other aspects of the EUFOR mission we are breaking new ground in the use of military forces. This has involved EUFOR soldiers having to adapt and develop new skills, and learn about the subjects as unfamiliar as the logging industry and the fuel trade. Although this does not draw to our traditional war fighting skills it is no less important because if we get this final effort right we can help ensure BiH reaches its potential..."¹³

ALTHEA surely promotes, and requires, that thirty three member nations work together to not only break the language barrier associated with such a multinational operation, but also to get every disparate unit on the same page in terms of training and skill sets.

However, it is important to note that despite the significant challenges facing EUFOR during its mission in BiH, the situation it finds itself in is of a fundamentally different character than that of other forces currently active in the world today, such as the USA, and even NATO, in its mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. Operation ALTHEA therefore can not be regarded as a trial by fire as much as it can be

regarded as a trial run on attempted union of political wills through one common badge.

For the first time, a complete, single-entity mission was established in a country. Never before has the OHR, now dual-hatted as the EUSR, had as much of a role and influence of troops to satisfy his Mission Implementation Plan and bring Bosnia and Herzegovina back on to its own two feet.

Unlike a mission run by NATO or that of the US alone, Operation ALTHEA is part of a new approach to crisis management.¹⁴ First, NATO is a security organization that is not *properly designed* for a complete economic and political operation while it has proved exceptionally decisive in its military capacity. The reasons for these are numerous but one easily identifiable is that in NATO there are many more organizations than that of the EU, as well as many more 'alpha nations' determined to affect the economy or political situation on the ground. Second, no one nation alone will be respected for or even morally allowed to conduct peace-keeping, crisis-management operations in another. An example is that of the US and its coalition in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which is seen as a product of *American greed*. The EU serves in the unique position of being able to coalesce strong, recognizably independent, nations (not just states in the case of the US) to bring all three pillars of economic, political, and now military force to bear on any nation. EUFOR is the last of these pillars and is the largest attempt by the EU thus far to unite behind a single foreign, security policy (ESDP) and to attempt *to fill in the shoes* of a big, battle-proven force, NATO.

3. Composition – Fact and Figures

Although one can argue that technical details about composition of forces and their organisation perhaps would not be appropriate in this kind of article, or somebody may find the following too descriptive, in order to show the complexity of the EUFOR's mechanism it is decided to put those information into the text.

EUFOR has drawn the support and commitment of troops from 33 nations to accomplish its mission in BiH, and its total troop strength is 6688, made up of 5802 soldiers from 22 EU nations and 886 troops from 11 non-EU nations.¹⁵

EUFOR is divided into four task forces which are the Integrated Police Unit (IPU), the Multinational Task Force North-West (MNTF-NW), the Multinational Task Force North (MNTF – N), and the Multinational Task Force South East (MNTF – SE). BiH is divided into three military areas of op-

eration that are controlled by the mentioned MNTFs. EUFOR's day to day operation in BiH are run by its Commander, but higher up the chain of command is the EU Operation Commander for ALTHEA, also dual-hatted as NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (D-SACEUR). The Political and Security Committee follows next and provides the political control and strategic direction for EUFOR.¹⁶ Ultimately however, EUFOR is placed under the authority of the Council of the EU.

IPU, whose primary mission is to support the OHR's Mission Implementation Plan and EUFOR's relevant key supporting tasks, numbers 534 soldiers and consists of a Headquarters, a Mobile Element of four company size units responsible for carrying out Normal Framework Operations, civil disturbance operations and quick reactions force operations; a Specialised Element of five investigations teams and one operational support team and a Logistic Element consisting of units for logic supply and maintenance.

MNTF – NW is comprised of three EU nations (UK, Netherlands and Austria) and seven non-member states (Canada, Chile, New Zealand, Romania, Bulgaria, Norway and Switzerland). The combined troop strength is approximately 1600 and it includes a Signals Unit, a Medical Unit, an Aviation Unit and a Multinational Battle Group of two manoeuvre and one security company (comprised by the UK and the Netherlands). There are also 16 Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) that live and work in the local communities.

MNTF – N is comprised of 11 EU nations (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden) and 1 non-member state (Turkey). The Task Force contains over 1800 troops, most with experience in peace supporting operations, and it also includes a Signal, a Security, an Aviation, a Composite, and a Reconnaissance Company as well as a Military Police Platoon, a Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit and a Manoeuvre Battalion. There are also 14 LOTs dispersed in the local communities.

MNTF – SE is comprised of 4 EU nations (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) and 2 non-Member states (Albania and Morocco). It contains over 1500 troops and includes a Support Unit, a Communication and Information Unit, an Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Unit, a Verification Unit and a Liaison and Observation Unit. There are also 16 LOTs situated in the local communities.

LOTs are one of many ways in which EUFOR is making its presence felt throughout BiH using a

limited number of troops. They are on average made up of ten to twelve soldiers who integrate themselves with the local authorities, supervising local operations, observing the civilian population and remaining visual for the sudden emergence of conflict, whether ethnic, political or military and for these reasons LOTs are labelled *the eyes and ears* of EUFOR.

4. Funding

Complexity shown in the last few paragraphs leads us to the conclusions about the high costs of this mission and hence also to a rational need for detailed evaluation of the funding system used for it. Financing has always been traditionally complicated within the EU. Basing its foreign policy on Three Pillars which divide up all areas of possible operations into the community dimension (economic and monetary affairs), the security dimension (the Common Security and Foreign Policy) and the judicial and home affairs dimension (Justice and Home Affairs), each Pillar has its own budgeting process and resources. The Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union provided much autonomy to its member states, stating that all EU military operations would not be funded through regular EU budget, but by a percentage of the GNP from the states that participate in each mission (allowing EU member states more control over whether or not they choose to take part). Then in 2002, another distinction was made between *common* and *individual* costs to the Member states "where only the former would be funded through GNP-based scales, while individual costs would be funded by the principle of *costs lie where they fall*".¹⁷ This provided a much looser structure for obtaining funds for countries, but these proposals and treaties did not address the issue of financing EU operations having military or defence implications.

Thus, on 23 February 2004, the ATHENA mechanism was established for all future EU operations involving military force by EU Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP¹⁸. Operation ALTHEA is funded by this mechanism, which continues to preserve that dichotomy of *common* and *individual* costs.¹⁹ The largest individual cost for each member state is funding their individual troops with salaries and housing, as this is not covered by the common budget. Arguably, the most important section of this document rests in the Article 23 – *Determination of Contributions* in Chapter 7, which addresses the funds that each member state must provide. Lastly, there has been large reform in the funding process which removes the requirement for a separate Coun-

cil Decision for the financing of each operations, giving ATHENA the decision-making authority for determining operational common costs, which "can be seen as an attempt to satisfy some of the need for centralised administration of the financing mechanism for EU-led military operations, which is still a sensitive issue within the EU."²⁰

While ATHENA is a much more efficient funding mechanism, there are still significant problems associated with other budgetary programs that are also quite integral to the success of ALTHEA's overall mission. There is a lack of procedures for the quick release of funds, and prolonged planning and mission start-up could deny EU's rapid reaction capabilities in future crises. The common costs that have been covered by the Community budget have been changed in variety from one operation to the next, including once more for the EU Police Mission that started on 1 January 2003. If this is not fixed, when the EU is attacked or needs to respond quickly, there will not be a mechanism or structure already in place to handle that threat, and then it might be too late for the appropriate reactions to be taken. EUFOR had several years, from the time of its declaration of intent to its arrival, to prepare properly for its operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is still no way that the EU could handle a situation like the one of Iraq or Afghanistan if it was *thrown on them*.

5. Potential Croatia's Role in ALTHEA Operation

Croatia currently supports EUFOR's operation ALTHEA in addition to NATO's continued presence as the most important and effective international efforts regarding the BiH's future. Regarding ALTHEA, Croatia has been providing an extensive, vital logistical support to all of its operations that involve air-see-land transit or support bases. Even though Croatia has not been asked to contribute troops to ALTHEA, it has been providing it with free air control services, as well as for the KFOR Operation in Kosovo. Additionally, Croatia has been providing EUFOR with medical support as well.

There is a very rational argument for Croatia taking part in the EUFOR more actively, because of the at least few visible reasons:

* EUFOR is going to be and already is an integral part of the EU's growth and consolidation as a potential global player with recognisable influence in the region (after the September 11, the US focus turned to combat against terrorism and this mission

should, to a certain extent, be a proof of the EU's capabilities in that sense);

* Croatia has clear intention to join the EU, for its own security and welfare;

* Croatia can *currently* be both a potential candidate for NATO and an EUFOR participant;

* EUFOR does not involve in domestically unfavourable, casualty producing missions but in 'moral acts' that can bring about as much positive change if not more than *troops sent to depose dictators*.

There is much to gain and little to lose from Croatia being involved more or even fully joining the EUFOR, although several considerations need to be kept in mind:

First, while operation ALTHEA is on course to accomplishing its mission, there is no information how long it will have to stay in BiH - until the country is 'viable and self-sustaining' - without any clear date for ending an increasingly limitless operation of 'security and state building', each member state has to be prepared for the extension of the mandate of the forces in BiH. EUFOR will have to remain in BiH at least until the Kosovar and Montenegrin issues of sovereignty are finally addressed. Even a mild conflict over territory in this region could shake the fragile state that BiH is currently in. There is a considerable amount of work that yet needs to be done to satisfy the 2003 Feasibility Report (particularly in regard to the Police reform and the collaboration with ICTY). Also another new administration should adjust (the new High Representative took the office on 1 February 2006). All this could significantly increase tensions within Bosnia and Herzegovina's political circles and EUFOR's presence will again be needed as a safety for worse case scenarios.

Second, EUFOR to date has not been militarily or administratively tested. As for the foreseeable future in BiH, there will be no real way to sense how EUFOR commanders would respond in the heat of the battle, to test the overall troop cohesion (despite simulated exercises) or to see how forcefully EU politicians would stick to their convictions and persist in BiH in face of certain troop deaths. There has been no invasion to thwart or attacks to repeal. Soldiers move around freely and at ease, as it is evident in the design and tasks implementation of LOT. IFOR and SFOR, under the auspices of NATO, took the brunt of the problems - during the nine years they were responsible for the overall security and stability in BiH (there were around 260 deaths and injuries just in IFOR operations). Also, despite the fact that the EUFOR presents a multinational collabora-

tion, with 33 nations taking part, one of the simplest issues - language - could derail the situation during an actual peacekeeping or offensive mission. Simply put, when those bullets start flying, *what language is going to be used for troop's coordination against an enemy?* Or maybe furthermore, troops should be fluent, or at least conversant, in many languages and, due to time and energy constraints; there will have to be guidance from the EU Council over what language will take precedence, if any.

Third, BiH public and a part of political elites will most likely not favour Croatian troops in the country, even if under the auspices of EUFOR, due to different interpretations of the use of Croatian military forces in that country in the last decade. However, there is a sufficient reason for Croatia to try and involve its troops in logistics operations, allowing to publicly claim full participation in EUFOR, and not only the support for this mission. Also, by sending troops into EUFOR, Croatia would work on building trust between itself and other member states. Finally, concerning this topic, it would be advisable for Croatia to consider in what capacity it could help EUFOR to accomplish its mission. Obviously, language skills are a significant plus for Croatian staff involved and should be offered and used.²¹ An additional problem could be the placement of Croatian troops as it is hard to imagine them residing in FBiH let alone the RS. At the very least, it would still be advisable for Croatia to begin negotiations with the EU and parallel with the state administration in BiH to work out arrangement for additional Croatian help even if it is not in the form suggested here. If EUFOR remains a force, as all facts point to the affirmative, then it will only be a matter of time before Croatia also plays a part in its scope.

Fourth, there will be economic and political costs for support of Croatian troops in BiH or in any other country the troops would be sent. Croatia should be willing to fund a certain portion of the common costs as well. Time would also have to be spent on negotiations with BiH, the OHR, commanders of EUFOR and diplomats of the Council of Europe in order to gain their confidence for joining the mission.

6. Conclusion

Ultimately, the greatest benefit to Croatia for joining the EUFOR would be the international recognition of its credibility regarding military, economic and political development, especially if its troops prove that they can act professionally in such

a demanding environment, taking into consideration recent conflicts in the region, particularly BiH, as well as different interpretations of the role of Croatian army in that sense. Indeed, Croatia is the only country among the group of four lobbying for accession to the EU (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia) that is not a part of the EUFOR. Croatian engagement, in this way, will demonstrate a very high level of maturity and professionalism in its armed forces, and transparent civil control of them. Furthermore, Croatian troops will get to drill and work in conjunction with other EU nations, who represent not only EUFOR but also NATO. This works towards the long-term goal of Croatia to additionally promote its accession to the EU and NATO. There is no reason why Croatia should not offer EUFOR its skills with linguistics, among all, and play a key role in processing the information gathered concerning, for example, criminal activities. It could also take a significant part in the field of promoting the information sharing of border surveillance against both human and drugs trafficking. Even Albania is involved in EUFOR, and although their contribution is not a small thing, reading their own self-description of their involvement should illustrate that Croatia can absolutely take an increased role without cause for concern on its part or the part of BiH:

"During those six months, the Albanian Coy is fully engaged with the security of the Rajlovac Base where are included main gate, pedestrian entrance, the towers... The most intensive work is at the gates where they check the ID cards, car passes, searching the vehicles and pedestrians, as well as taking care to equip the visitors with the required documentation according to the Base security propositions. Theirs is a duty, which doesn't know any pause but is a closed cycle of 24 hours a day, seven days a week and so on, and that is one of the main reasons which put it on top of the list of the most

difficult duties that most of the soldiers all over the world wouldn't select as their preferred one."²²

It is more than obvious that Croatia belongs to the EU in every sense. No alliance with the United States, although it is important to acknowledge that country like Croatia does not have to pick a side, would be able to encompass all the aspects that the EU brings to the table, and shares with Croatia culturally.

Thus, Croatia should take more concrete steps in putting into practice its proclamations about itself being a reliable partner to the international community, especially the EU, in pacification and stabilisation of the region and BiH in particular. On the other hand, as a sign of mutual respect between the two neighbouring states, it should try to gain the confidence of the Bosnian officials before dealing with the EUFOR committee responsible for the third party membership. The reason for this is that the EUFOR might immediately take the position claiming that Croatia's active involvement would spark renewed hostility and decrease stability with deployed Croatian troops, but if politicians from both sides have already met and worked out a mutual understanding of how and where BiH could benefit from Croatia's involvement, then EUFOR doubts could be held off. Of course, this depends on any channels in government to work out some agreement in goodwill, and all of the actions taken, if any, shall be also done in that manner.

Joining the EUFOR, Croatia will provide a concrete opportunity to pave its way to the EU and NATO, while joint practices and actions would introduce Croatian forces and Ministry of Defence to the interoperability expected in these mechanisms.

Therefore, the mission in BiH presents a rare opportunity, one that is close to home and touches the core of Croatia's future relationship with its fellow SEE countries, to develop its military establishments. ■

NOTES

1 The Economist: Back to Bosnia, 17th March 2005

2 Bolton, John R.: European Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policies, 10th November 1999., www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID=17123

3 The USA planned publicly to keep its troops on the ground for one year at least. That was extended time and time again until recently.

4 Holbrooke, Richard: To End the War, Random House, 1998.

5 Official Documents System of the United Nations: United Nations Security Council Resolution -UNSCR 1088 (1996), <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/026/19/PDF/N9702619.p df?OpenElement>

6 Official Documents System of the United Nations: United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 1551 (2004), <http://>

daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/419/37/PDF/N0441937.pdf?OpenElement

7 Report of the International Commission on the Balkans: The Balkans in Europe's Future, www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf

8 President of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004

9 Official EU Website: EU - Western Balkans Summit: Speech by Romano Prodi (21st June 2003), http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/sp03_318.htm

10 Council of the EU: Concept for the European Union (EU) Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) - Operation ALTHEA, <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st12/st12576.en04.pdf>

11 Ibid. p. 6.

12 Ibid. p. 7.

13 Official EUFOR Website: Brigadier Ian Liles: Foreword COM MNTF(NW), <http://www.euforbih.org/forum/007/p02a/tefp02a.htm>

14 Another name for crisis management is 'nation building' but it is intentionally avoided among all circles for the negative connotations and meanings the term plays in domestic politics.

15 The numerical breakdown, from most to least of the Member states' soldier contributions is as follows: 1.) Germany – 1227, 2.) Italy 1032, 3.) United Kingdom – 669, 4.) Spain – 538, 5.) The Netherlands – 447, 6.) France – 381, 7.) Austria – 265, 8.) Poland, 9.) Greece – 182, 10.) Portugal – 167, 11.) Slovenia – 165, 12.) Finland – 158, 13.) Hungary – 119, 14.) Sweden – 81, 15.) Czech Republic – 61, 16.) Belgium – 48, 17.) Ireland – 45, 18.) Slovakia – 4, 19.) Latvia – 3, 20.) Estonia – 2, 21.) Lithuania – 1 and 22.) Luxembourg – 1. The numerical breakdown, from most to least, of the non-Member states' soldier contributions is as follows: 1.) Turkey – 229, 2.) Bulgaria – 192, 3.) Morocco – 133, 4.) Canada – 112, 5.) Romania – 110, 6.) Albania – 70, 7.) Chile – 24, 8.) Switzerland – 9, 9.) Norway – 3, 10.) New Zealand – 3, and 11.) Argentina – 1. – Data from the Official EUFOR Web-site: EUFOR Troops Strength - <http://www.euforbih.org/organization/strength.htm>

16 Official Journal of the EU: Article 14 of Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP on the European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina - 12th July 2004 – L252/10, 28th July

2004, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_252/l_25220040728en0010_0014.pdf

17 Skons, Elisabeth: International Financing of Peace Operations, Stockholm Peace Research Institute, 22nd March 2005.

18 Entire document at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_063/l_06320040228en0068008_2.pdf

19 Common costs for Operation ALTHEA (total 71.7 million € for the 2004-2005) and the complete list of what constitutes a common cost can be found in Annexes I, II, III.

20 Ibid.p.15.

21 The same should be done in the sense of the EU accession sharing experience. For example, Croatia benefited from the experience of the lessons learned from the transitional countries in the last EU enlargement wave (like Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia etc.), but had to translate all documents in order to be able to use them. On the other hand, some countries from the region (incl. BiH) can use Croatian documents without translation, concerning the language similarities, and this benefit represents the significant alleviation in the mentioned process.

22 Albanian Contingent, 1LT Saimir Mustafaj, ALB Army EUFOR Forum No. 6, July 2005, <http://www.euforbih.org/forum/006/p13a/tefp13a.htm>

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