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Scheler's Critique of Husserl's Phenomenological Understanding of "Objective a priori"

Wei Zhang ; Fakultät für Philosophie, Sun Yat-sen Universität, V. R. China


Puni tekst: njemački pdf 138 Kb

str. 265-280

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Sažetak

On the one hand, Scheler's critique of Kant's concept of a priori benefits from Husserl to a large extent, and it complements and deepens Husserl's. On the other hand, Scheler also critiques Husserl's definition of a priori. Husserl's material a priori as ideal object primarily thanks to his so-called "Bolzano- turn". In this connection, Scheler grabs hold of the relation of Husserl to Bolzano from the very beginning. For Scheler, Husserl thinks in a "platonic" way, and still falls in a new type of "Platonism", or rather, logical Platonism, although he correctly refuses the ordinary Platonism. In Scheler's view, Husserl's phenomenological reduction is "not purely" executed, and therefore his phenomenological experience (categorial intuition) is problematic, or more precisely, the relation between categorial intuition and sensuous intuition is problematic. The final aim of Scheler's critique of Husserl's phenomenological understanding of "objective a priori" is to win the primary position of categorial intuition and its content (material a priori), ethical insight and its correlate (material value), and ultimately of phenomenological ethics of material value.

Ključne riječi

Husserl's Bolzano-turn; ideal object; logical Platonism; objective a priori; the functionalization of essential insight; the phenomenological reduction

Hrčak ID:

74465

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/74465

Datum izdavanja:

30.11.2011.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski njemački

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