APA 6th Edition Iwasa, N. (2011). Hume’s Alleged Success over Hutcheson. Synthesis philosophica, 26 (2), 323-336. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/82557
MLA 8th Edition Iwasa, Noriaki. "Hume’s Alleged Success over Hutcheson." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 26, br. 2, 2011, str. 323-336. https://hrcak.srce.hr/82557. Citirano 23.10.2019.
Chicago 17th Edition Iwasa, Noriaki. "Hume’s Alleged Success over Hutcheson." Synthesis philosophica 26, br. 2 (2011): 323-336. https://hrcak.srce.hr/82557
Harvard Iwasa, N. (2011). 'Hume’s Alleged Success over Hutcheson', Synthesis philosophica, 26(2), str. 323-336. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/82557 (Datum pristupa: 23.10.2019.)
Vancouver Iwasa N. Hume’s Alleged Success over Hutcheson. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2011 [pristupljeno 23.10.2019.];26(2):323-336. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/82557
IEEE N. Iwasa, "Hume’s Alleged Success over Hutcheson", Synthesis philosophica, vol.26, br. 2, str. 323-336, 2011. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/82557. [Citirano: 23.10.2019.]
Sažetak David Hume thinks that human affections are naturally partial, while Francis Hutcheson holds that humans originally have disinterested benevolence. Michael Gill argues that Hume’s moral theory succeeds over Hutcheson’s because the former severs the link between explaining and justifying morality. According to Gill, Hutcheson is wrong to assume that our original nature should be the basis of morality. Gill’s understanding of Hutcheson’s theory does not fully represent it, since for Hutcheson self-love and self-interest under certain conditions are permissible, or even desirable or necessary for the good of society. There is not much difference between Hutcheson’s and Hume’s theories in the sense that they both extract impartial morality from human character as it is. Hume’s theory does not succeed over Hutcheson’s because Hume does not propose a better way of extracting morality nor explain all moral phenomena.