Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 26 No. 2, 2011.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
“Quid pro quo, Clarice”: Wittgenstein’s Multiaspectual Notion of Clarity
Kristijan Krkač
orcid.org/0000-0001-6956-8102
; Zagreb School of Economics and Management / Philosophical Faculty of the Society of Jesus in Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
Sažetak
In this paper, the author elucidates J. R. Searle’s famous plea for clarity and L. Wittgenstein’s multiaspectual notion of it. The concept of clarity is introduced via Searle’s plea for clarity and the problem of it is introduced via Wittgenstein’s morphological method. An ambiguity in the concept of clarity is presented, namely the difference between clarity as a transparency and clarity as an understanding. L. Wittgenstein’s unambiguous notion of perspicuity as seeing and understanding is presented as a solution to the previous difference as the major source of ambiguity of the concept of clarity. Some exceptions from clarity are presented; particularly the paradox of complete understanding without clarity. Finally, Wittgenstein’s river image from On Certainty and explication of the image in terms of a worldview and three kinds of remarks (sentences), namely empirical, grammatical/hinge, and axes remarks which make a presentation completely understood for practical purposes.
Ključne riječi
axes sentences; clarity; empirical sentences; grammatical sentences; John R. Searle; Ludwig Wittgenstein; perception; perspicuity; practice; river image; transparency; understanding; worldview
Hrčak ID:
82559
URI
Datum izdavanja:
17.4.2012.
Posjeta: 2.186 *