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https://doi.org/10.7906/indecs.10.3.1

First- and third-person approaches: the problem of integration

Olga Markič orcid id orcid.org/0000-0002-1671-293X ; Faculty of Arts - University of Ljubljana


Puni tekst: engleski pdf 459 Kb

str. 213-222

preuzimanja: 2.370

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Sažetak

The author discusses the problem of integration of first- and third-person approaches in studying the human mind. She critically evaluates and compares various methodologies for studying and explaining conscious experience. Common strategies that apply reductive explanation seem to be unsatisfied for explaining experience and its subjective character. There were attempts to explain experience from the first-person point of view (introspectionism, philosophical phenomenology) but the results were not intersubjectively verifiable. Dennett proposed heterophenomenology as a scientifically viable alternative which supposed to bridge the gap between first- and third-person perspectives. The author critically evaluates his proposal and compares it to contemporary attempts to provide first-person methods.

Ključne riječi

cognitive science; heterophenomenology; consciousness; experience; explanation

Hrčak ID:

89633

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/89633

Datum izdavanja:

31.10.2012.

Posjeta: 2.986 *