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Original scientific paper

Frege and Russell: Does Science Talk Sense?

Mark Wilson

Fulltext: english, pdf (494 KB) pages 179-190 downloads: 228* cite
APA 6th Edition
Wilson, M. (2007). Frege and Russell: Does Science Talk Sense?. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 3 (2), 179-190. Retrieved from https://hrcak.srce.hr/93217
MLA 8th Edition
Wilson, Mark. "Frege and Russell: Does Science Talk Sense?." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 3, no. 2, 2007, pp. 179-190. https://hrcak.srce.hr/93217. Accessed 19 Sep. 2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Wilson, Mark. "Frege and Russell: Does Science Talk Sense?." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3, no. 2 (2007): 179-190. https://hrcak.srce.hr/93217
Harvard
Wilson, M. (2007). 'Frege and Russell: Does Science Talk Sense?', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 3(2), pp. 179-190. Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/93217 (Accessed 19 September 2021)
Vancouver
Wilson M. Frege and Russell: Does Science Talk Sense?. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2007 [cited 2021 September 19];3(2):179-190. Available from: https://hrcak.srce.hr/93217
IEEE
M. Wilson, "Frege and Russell: Does Science Talk Sense?", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.3, no. 2, pp. 179-190, 2007. [Online]. Available: https://hrcak.srce.hr/93217. [Accessed: 19 September 2021]

Abstracts
Over the course of the nineteenth century mathematicians became vividly aware that great advances in intuitive “understanding” could be obtained
if novel definitions were devised for old notions such as “conic section”, for one thereby often gained a deeper appreciation for why old theorems in the subject had to be true (the new definitions were said to have proved “more fruitful” in these regards). From a naïve philosophical standpoint, such definitional alterations look as if they must properly displace the “propositional contents” of the very theorems they seek to illuminate. Haven’t our reformers merely “changed the subject”, rather than truly provided. The conceptual enlightenment they claim? Many practitioners of the time claimed that “Science” enjoys a special prerogative to ignore “surface content” in its search for truth, a sentiment with which Frege often concurs, at least in his early writings. Yet it is hard to render these opinions consistent with his official views on sense andreference, as this essay details. It also surveys Russell’s views on such topics, although he was generally less aware than Frege of the revolutionary mathematical work pursued within the “search for fruitful definitions” program.

Keywords
Definition; 19th century definitional practice; objective content; sense; meaning

Hrčak ID: 93217

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/93217

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