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Justificatory Reasons for Action
Georg Spielthenner
; University of Zambia
Sažetak
Practical reasons play a central role in our everyday discourse about action and there is no major ethical theory into which the concept of reasons for action does not play a crucial role. However, the nature of reasons for acting is not well understood. The aim of the present essay is therefore to clarify the notion of justificatory reasons for action. To accomplish this, I start, after some preliminaries, from a widely shared but oversimplified model of practical reasoning. On this view, we have a reason for acting if this action is a necessary and available means to bring about one of our ends. I show that this view is mistaken. In particular, I argue that, contrary to prevailing opinion, desires do not provide an agent with justifying reasons for action. By discussing the necessary conditions for justifi catory reasons, I outline an account of practical reasons that is more sophisticated and more accurate than most theories of desire-dependent reasons, neo-Humeanism included.
Ključne riječi
practical reasons; reasons for action; instrumental reasons; reasons for acting; neo-Humeanism
Hrčak ID:
98269
URI
Datum izdavanja:
1.2.2013.
Posjeta: 873 *