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Naturalistic Moral Realism

Matej Sušnik

Sažetak

The subject of this paper is probably the most influential version of
moral realism, known as “moral realism naturalism”. After I propose what seems to be the most appropriate formulation of moral realism, I discuss whether it is possible to show that moral properties and natural properties can be identified a posteriori. In the second part I try to show that moral realists naturalists cannot refute wellknown
Mackie’s “argument from querness” (or at least one version of that argument). In the end I discuss whether moral realists naturalists can ascribe the explanatory power to moral properties.

Ključne riječi

Moral properties; natural properties; considered moral judgments; reflective equilibrium; supervenience; moral explanations

Hrčak ID:

100

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/100

Datum izdavanja:

7.12.2005.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 2.793 *