Izvorni znanstveni članak
Inner Sense and the Broad Perceptual Model: A Reply to Shoemaker
Kevin Kimble
; National Chung-Cheng University, College of Humanities, Department of Philosophy, Min-Hsiung Township, Chiayi County, Taiwan
Sažetak
In several recent essays, Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspective knowledge lacks certain central features which parallel the conditions satisfied by ordinary cases of sense perception. In one influential paper, he discusses and criticizes the “broad perceptual” model of the nature of introspective knowledge of mental states, the view which claims that our introspective awareness of internal facts is analogous to our awareness of facts about the external world. This model may be characterized by its conformance to two conditions of ordinary perceptual awareness which Shoemaker dubs the causation condition and the independence condition. Shoemaker attacks the broad perceptual model by arguing that certain mental facts are “self-intimating”, with the implication being that introspective awareness of mental states does not satisfy the independence condition, and hence its character is not adequately captured by the broad perceptual model. In what follows, I will discuss the main arguments of Shoemaker’s essay. I will argue that a broad perceptual model of introspection can successfully circumvent the central problems he raises; and along the way I will develop some criticisms regarding certain aspects of Shoemaker’s positive proposal.
Ključne riječi
inner sense; awareness; introspection; self-knowledge; phenomenal character; perceptual experience
Hrčak ID:
120145
URI
Datum izdavanja:
17.2.2014.
Posjeta: 1.399 *