Izvorni znanstveni članak
Two Definitions of Contingency and the Concept of Knowledge
Vladimir Drekalović
orcid.org/0000-0001-9046-1596
; Faculty of Philosophy, Nikšić, University of Montenegro, Nikšić, Montenegro
Sažetak
This paper analyses two definitions of contingency. Both definitions have been widely accepted and used as to identify contingent events. One of them is primarily of a philosophical character, whereas the other is more commonly used in mathematics. Evidently, these two definitions do not describe the same set of phenomena, and neither of them determines the completely intuitive notion of contingency.
Namely, carefully selected examples testify that the first definition is too narrow and the second too wide. These facts have certain epistemological consequences. They must, therefore, serve as a warning for using the definitions only in a restrictive and cautious way when detecting random beliefs – those we cannot identify as knowledge.
Ključne riječi
Contingency; definition; knowledge; mathematics; philosophy
Hrčak ID:
121967
URI
Datum izdavanja:
29.5.2014.
Posjeta: 3.415 *