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In Search of Faultless Disagreement
Marián Zouhar
orcid.org/0000-0003-2455-8722
; Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences Klemensova 19, 811 09 Bratislava, Slovak Republic
Sažetak
It is sometimes claimed that there are disagreements about matters of personal taste that are faultless; in such a case, the disputing speakers believe incompatible propositions about taste while both of them are correct in what they believe. The aim of the paper is to show that it is rather difficult to find such a notion of disagreement that would permit faultlessness in the required sense. In particular, three possible notions of disagreement are discussed; neither of them is found to be satisfactory to those who would like to make room for faultless disagreements. The first notion is derived from ordinary instances of disagreement about matters of fact; it is claimed that no faultless disagreement is possible if disagreement is understood along these lines. The second notion is based on certain ideas derived from relativism about truth; it is argued that, though permitting faultlessness, it leads to counterintuitive results. More precisely, certain cases classified as disagreements in this sense would be, rather, taken as instances of agreement from an intuitive viewpoint and certain cases that are not classified as disagreements in this sense are, intuitively, instances of disagreement. The third notion is derived by omitting one feature of the second notion; it is argued that the resulting notion is so weak that it cannot capture what is essential to disagreement proper.
Ključne riječi
Disagreement; disagreement about matters of personal taste; faultless disagreement; perspective; predicate of personal taste; relativism about truth
Hrčak ID:
129631
URI
Datum izdavanja:
19.11.2014.
Posjeta: 1.098 *