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Party Instability, Institutional Incentive and Corruption in Emerging Democracies

Dagmar Radin ; Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Mississippi State University, USA
Brian Shoup ; Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Mississippi State University, USA

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (1 MB) str. 401-425 preuzimanja: 547* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Radin, D. i Shoup, B. (2014). Party Instability, Institutional Incentive and Corruption in Emerging Democracies. Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava, 14 (2), 401-425. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/129897
MLA 8th Edition
Radin, Dagmar i Brian Shoup. "Party Instability, Institutional Incentive and Corruption in Emerging Democracies." Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava, vol. 14, br. 2, 2014, str. 401-425. https://hrcak.srce.hr/129897. Citirano 26.09.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Radin, Dagmar i Brian Shoup. "Party Instability, Institutional Incentive and Corruption in Emerging Democracies." Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava 14, br. 2 (2014): 401-425. https://hrcak.srce.hr/129897
Harvard
Radin, D., i Shoup, B. (2014). 'Party Instability, Institutional Incentive and Corruption in Emerging Democracies', Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava, 14(2), str. 401-425. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/129897 (Datum pristupa: 26.09.2021.)
Vancouver
Radin D, Shoup B. Party Instability, Institutional Incentive and Corruption in Emerging Democracies. Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava [Internet]. 2014 [pristupljeno 26.09.2021.];14(2):401-425. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/129897
IEEE
D. Radin i B. Shoup, "Party Instability, Institutional Incentive and Corruption in Emerging Democracies", Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava, vol.14, br. 2, str. 401-425, 2014. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/129897. [Citirano: 26.09.2021.]

Sažetak
Corruption is widely viewed as a detriment to consolidation in new democracies. In this paper we argue that new democracies face a particular dilemma that makes corruption more likely. Specifically, we suggest that information asymmetries exist between political elites and voters that make it difficult for new political parties to forge the long time horizons necessary for democratic institutions to mature. Political elites, whether they be cadres of the former authoritarian
regime who recast themselves as committed to the new democratic
project or formerly excluded opposition figures intent on establishing themselves in the new participatory order, lack information about the preferences of broad scale publics. These newly empowered voters, while possessing interests of their own, often lack the ability to determine the precise platform positions of new political parties as well as the likelihood that candidates are committed to the long-term strengthening of democratic values. As a consequence, new political parties may have a disincentive to establish clear and ideologically
precise platform positions that they can commit to over time. Instead, they have incentives to try and cultivate bases of voter support through the use of bribes, political favors, and other nepotistic practices that, while useful in the short-term, undermine long-term democratic legitimacy. We suggest that, to the extent that political elites value political office more than the development of a
clear and consistent space in the political spectrum, parties in new democracies are unlikely to eschew corrupt practices. We examine party fractionalization indices as a way to capture this uncertainty and use a case study of Croatia to develop our core arguments.

Ključne riječi
corruption; party systems; institutions; new democracies

Hrčak ID: 129897

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/129897

[hrvatski]

Posjeta: 926 *