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Prethodno priopćenje
https://doi.org/10.10.18045/zbefri.2015.2.257

An investigation of the choice of governance modes in Chinese family firms

Jiancai Pi   ORCID icon orcid.org/0000-0003-4327-8355 ; Department of Economics, School of Business, Nanjing University, 22 Hankou Road, Nanjing 210093, China

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (5 MB) str. 257-273 preuzimanja: 351* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Pi, J. (2015). An investigation of the choice of governance modes in Chinese family firms. Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci, 33 (2), 257-273. https://doi.org/10.10.18045/zbefri.2015.2.257
MLA 8th Edition
Pi, Jiancai. "An investigation of the choice of governance modes in Chinese family firms." Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci, vol. 33, br. 2, 2015, str. 257-273. https://doi.org/10.10.18045/zbefri.2015.2.257. Citirano 28.10.2020.
Chicago 17th Edition
Pi, Jiancai. "An investigation of the choice of governance modes in Chinese family firms." Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci 33, br. 2 (2015): 257-273. https://doi.org/10.10.18045/zbefri.2015.2.257
Harvard
Pi, J. (2015). 'An investigation of the choice of governance modes in Chinese family firms', Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci, 33(2), str. 257-273. https://doi.org/10.10.18045/zbefri.2015.2.257
Vancouver
Pi J. An investigation of the choice of governance modes in Chinese family firms. Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci [Internet]. 2015 [pristupljeno 28.10.2020.];33(2):257-273. https://doi.org/10.10.18045/zbefri.2015.2.257
IEEE
J. Pi, "An investigation of the choice of governance modes in Chinese family firms", Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci, vol.33, br. 2, str. 257-273, 2015. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.10.18045/zbefri.2015.2.257

Sažetak
This paper aims to investigate the choice of governance modes in Chinese family
firms. For that purpose, we build a principal-agent model to conduct our analyses.
There are two modes of governance that the owner of the family firm can choose
from, either the relational governance or the professional governance. The choice
of governance modes is embodied in managerial compensation under different
contractual arrangements. Our theoretical analyses show that under some
conditions it is optimal for the owner to choose the relational governance, while
under other conditions it is optimal for the owner to adopt the professional
governance. That is to say, the choice of governance modes is condition-dependent,

Ključne riječi
Relational governance; professional governance; Chinese family firm; moral hazard

Hrčak ID: 149849

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/149849

[hrvatski]

Posjeta: 574 *