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Original scientific paper
Modeling Trusted Processing Architectures for Mandatory Access Control
Thomas H. Hinke
; Computer Science Department, University of Alabama in Huntsville, Huntsville, U.S.A.
| Fulltext: english, pdf (9 MB) | pages 67-82 | cite | |
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APA 6th Edition H. Hinke, T. (1995). Modeling Trusted Processing Architectures for Mandatory Access Control. Journal of computing and information technology, 3 (2), 67-82. Retrieved from https://hrcak.srce.hr/150429 MLA 8th Edition H. Hinke, Thomas. "Modeling Trusted Processing Architectures for Mandatory Access Control." Journal of computing and information technology, vol. 3, no. 2, 1995, pp. 67-82. https://hrcak.srce.hr/150429. Accessed 18 Jan. 2021. Chicago 17th Edition H. Hinke, Thomas. "Modeling Trusted Processing Architectures for Mandatory Access Control." Journal of computing and information technology 3, no. 2 (1995): 67-82. https://hrcak.srce.hr/150429 Harvard H. Hinke, T. (1995). 'Modeling Trusted Processing Architectures for Mandatory Access Control', Journal of computing and information technology, 3(2), pp. 67-82. Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/150429 (Accessed 18 January 2021) Vancouver H. Hinke T. Modeling Trusted Processing Architectures for Mandatory Access Control. Journal of computing and information technology [Internet]. 1995 [cited 2021 January 18];3(2):67-82. Available from: https://hrcak.srce.hr/150429 IEEE T. H. Hinke, "Modeling Trusted Processing Architectures for Mandatory Access Control", Journal of computing and information technology, vol.3, no. 2, pp. 67-82, 1995. [Online]. Available: https://hrcak.srce.hr/150429. [Accessed: 18 January 2021] |
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Abstracts
This paper introduces a trusted architecture graph (TAG) model, which can be used for modeling the semantics of trusted architectures designed to enforce mandatory access control. The TAG permits the modeling of various types of trusted functions, storage functions and processing functions and their interconnection through various types of links. The value of the TAG and the associated TAG notation is that they provide a uniform way of representing different trusted architectures that may be described either informally in a natural ll.lnguage, or formally (but voluminously) described in design documents or programming code. By providing a concise yet expressive description of the architecture, the various features of one architecture can be readily compared with another's. This paper provides some examples that illustrate how various trusted database management system architectures can be formulated in the TAG notation such that their significant differences can be readily observed.
Keywords
Computer Security; Security Architectures Modeling
Hrčak ID: 150429
URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/150429
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