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The ethics of testimony : survivor as the other of ‘dasein’
Zrinka Božić Blanuša
; Odsjek za kroatistiku, Filozofski fakultet - Zagreb
Sažetak
In his famous analysis of Sein zum Tode, Martin Heidegger defines death as an individual’s engagement. Even though he admits that Mitsein is an essential structure to the constitution of selfhood, death belongs exclusively to the solitary Dasein. In other words, the fate of Dasein is communal, but it still takes no part in the Other’s relation to the anticipation of its own death. Since we cannot experience our own death, according to Heidegger, the only thing we can do is to be there alongside the dying Other. However, the Other can witness our dying and perceive our absence from the world. Heidegger’s concept of solitary death has been discussed by Jean-Paul Sartre, intensely criticized by Emmanuel Levinas, redefined and defended by Jacques Derrida and repeatedly thematized by Maurice Blanchot. In this fruitful and longstanding discussion, the question of otherness has been raised several times. But, the question of the existential position of the survivor, as the one who remains after one’s death, has been problematized by Giorgio Agamben. Although the problem of testimony has been dealt with by authors concerned with the problem of historical trauma (LaCapra, Caruth, Leys, Felman), his analysis has been developed as a direct response to Heidegger’s philosophy of Being. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to question Heidegger’s influential concept of Sein zum Tode in the light of Agamben’s problematization of testimony.
Ključne riječi
Agamben; Heidegger; ethics; testimony; witness; death; Dasein; Muselmann
Hrčak ID:
174637
URI
Datum izdavanja:
1.12.2010.
Posjeta: 908 *