Izvorni znanstveni članak

https://doi.org/10.21464/fi36409

Ontology of the “Objective Enemy” as Non-Being: Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt

Goran Sunajko ; Leksikografski zavod »Miroslav Krleža«, Frankopanska 26, HR–10000 Zagreb

Sažetak

In the paper we analyse the concept of the “objective enemy” at the ontological and political levels. The hypothesis of the paper is that “objective enemy” is not being, rather it is non-being, and therefore one does not exist as an concrete, realistic being. The thesis is set in an ontological framework that being must have unity, immutability and recognizable form that was shown in the ontological premises of Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle and Husserl. At the level of philosophical and political analysis in the theoretical concepts of Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt, it is evident that the “objective enemy” does not exist as a concrete being, but only as being invented by the concept that is not adequate to its own subject. This means the untruth in ontological sense. The work draws attention to the danger of the term of “objective enemy” that does not correspond to the real beings, also evident in the Croatian political discourse in the example of the terms: “Fascist”, “Ustaša”, “Četnik”, “Yugo-communist”, and others.

Ključne riječi

being; non-being; Edmund Husserl; ontology; fiction; “objective enemy”; public; private; totalitarianism; friend–enemy

Hrčak ID:

180138

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/180138

Datum izdavanja:

13.12.2016.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 2.699 *